Dgdfgdfgddgd - - weaknesses of personalities involved

Historical Context of the Documents

Since its founding on July 7, 1892, the Katipunan (Kataas-taasang

Kagalang-galangang Katipunan ng mga Anak nang Bayan) or KKK remained to
be an underground organization and had remained a secret organization until its
discovery on August 19, 1896, at a time when Spanish officials and friars were
already hearing rumors and were suspicious about the existence of a rebellious
group. The discovery, which was simply an accident for it happened only
because of the petty quarrel between Apolanio dela Cruz and Teodoro Patiño
who worked at the printing press of Diario de Manila and also members of the
Katipunan. The bickering resulted in Patiño confiding to his sister who lived in an
orphanage in Mandaluyong and whose grief made her mother superior to
convince Patiño to confide about the secret organization to Fr. Mariano Gil. The
friar-curate was already suspicious about the existence of the rebel group
Patiño's sister was not actually worried about her brother's quarrel but about his
participation and membership in an underground rebellious organization. His
brother was then convinced to divulge the secret organization to the suspicious
Fr. Gil who brought with him Spanish guards to raid the printing press and
found evidence of the Katipunan in their lockers (Agoncillo and Guerrero, 1977,
p. 195).

This came as a surprise for the Katipuners who had to hurry to meet up and
organise for crackdown and arrests of those suspected to be members of the
Katipunan had already begun. By the last week of August 1800, about 500 to
1.000 Katipuneros had already assembled, though ill-equipped, untrained, and
lacking in battle discipline was committed to fight and carry out a plan they
hatched as early as August 24, 1896 to attack Manila on August 25, 1890 Bus
the planned attack in Manila did not happen on August 29, instead, Bonifacin
shifted the offensive on an arsenal known as El Polvorin in San Juan del Mante.
The former El Polvorin is today located at San Juan Elementary School in San
Juan City, Metro Manila. It was a strategic shift since the attack, if mueressful
could yield into their possession guns and ammunitions which they needed to
beef up their weapons of mostly bolos and spears. The first major offensive
turned out to be a blunder. This was the result of their lack of military
experience. While they were highly motivated to fight, they were not, however.
battle hardened not even battle ready. And while the Katipunan's leadership
structure was able to organize and motivate groups of men, leading these men
in a strategic and tactical manner in a battle is another matter. In the battle of
San Juan del Monte, the Katipuneros were met with heavy casualties and pulled
back at Pasig River where they traced their retrent as far back as San Mateo,
where they attacked the municipal building from across the convent and parish
church up to Nanka River where the Spaniards met their retreat. The momentary
victory placed San Mateo and Montalban in the hands of the rebels but the
reinforcements sent by Gov. Gen Ramon Blanco changed the tide of the battle
and placed Montalban and San Mateo again in Spanish hands. The rebels were
repulsed again where they had to retreat to Balara to regroup and mount a
guerilla war (Agoncillo and Guerrero, 1977, p. 198)

But Bonifacio's setbacks were nos total failures for on August 30, 1896. just the
next day, eight provinces rose in revolt against Spain. Katipuneros in Manila,
Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija captured
their provincial and municipal offices and churches and declared. their territories
under the command of the revolutionaries. This forced Gov. Gen. Ramon Blanco
to declare the eight provinces under the state of war and under martial law.
From the eight provinces, the Spaniards had a special concern for Cavite since,
geographically and strategically, the province is located close to Manila, and
houses a naval outpost at Sangley Point that could guard the mouth of Manila
Bay from enemies that could attack Manila. The whole of Cavite except for the
raval station fell in the hands of the revolutionaries. The first order of battle for
the Spaniards was to retake the province.
The success of the revolutionary campaign in Cavite was not due to terrain but
mainly because of the social class that led it. Pueblos upon pueblos fell in the
hands of the Katipuneros because those who joined and led the attack in the
province were coming from the middle class, mostly gobernadorcillos, cabezas
de barangay and members of the principalia. The Aguinaldo's came from the
landed family in Kawit. Other prominent leaders were also owners of land,
members of the middle class, teachers and lawyers. While Bonifacio was
fighting a war of attrition in the hills of Batar. San Mateo, and Montalban where
he was the one attacking in a territory which is not his locality, the Cavitenos
were fighting a war of defense. They were dug in trenchen food supplies would
mit be much of a prostem e they were fighting war in their own backyard.

By September 1896, the youngest gobernadorcillo of Kawit. Capitan Miong

(Emilio Aguinaldo) had become a local hero for having decimated the forces of
General Ernesto Aguirre in the battle at Imus. By November, the renewed
offensive and reign of terror of the Spaniards broke the defenses of the
Katipuneros and the Spaniards began to retake the pueblos they lost.
Unfortunately, in 1895 even before the revolution started, Cavite had two
Katipunan chapters. Mariano Alvarez, gobernadorcillo of Noveleta first,
organized in 1895 the Sangguniang Bayan Magdiwang (Provincial Council of
Noveleta). Mariano Alvarez was the uncle of Bonifacio's wife Gregoria de Jesus,
whose chapter had Noveleta and later, San Francisco de Malabon (now General
Trias) as headquarters of the Magdiwang. In the same year, Baldomero
Aguinaldo, Justice of the Peace of Cavite Viejo or Kawit also created another
chapter of the Katipunan, the Sangguniang Bayan Magdalo (Provincial Council
of Cavite Viejo) with its capital at Cavite Viejo where the Aguinaldo estate was
located Baldomero was the older cousin of Emilio

There are two differing claims as to when these two councils were founded.
Agoncillo (1956, p. 60) was clear in stating that the Gen. Mariano Alvarez was
first in the formation of the Magdiwang council. Aguinaldo (1967, p. 25)
indicated in his memoir that the Magdalo council was formed in June 1895, as
he joined the Katipunan in March 1895. This chapter was formed through an
election which he claimed was won by his older cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo at
his utmost pleasure because he could not dispense of the job since he was
serving as gobernadorcillo of Kawit at that time. This election was conducted in
the presence of the Supremo, Pio Valenzuela, and Emilio Jacinto. If the
Magdiwang was organized prior to Magdalo, it would then be deduced that the
Magdiwang was formed not later than June 1895. In the account of Santiago
Alvarez (1977, p. 16), he stated that the Magdiwang was organized in April
1896 in an election that was won by the gobernadorcillo of Noveleta, his father,
Mariano Alvarez and witnessed by the Supremo, Pio Valenzuela, and Emilio
Jacinto. Two days later, Emilio Aguinaldo approached them in regard to the
formation of another council and in an election held that same day, the Magdalo
council was formed with the assumption of Emilio as chairman but which he
gave up in favor of his cousin Baldomera. With the differences in the dates
claimed, only two things are definite: Magdiwang was organized ahead of
Magdalo, and the Supremo was present in both elections.

Table 3.1 shows the pueblos controlled by the two camps (Ricarte, 1963, p.
7-14). While the Caviteños even took the existence of the two factions
beneficial, for they were helping each other, dissension came with major
reverses that led to the Spaniards recapturing the rebel pueblos. While they
commissioned themselves with military ranks, the two factions could not later
on agree with the design of the uniform that they would wear. And with these
disagreements came the most divisive issue of which of the two chapters which
proclaimed themselves governments would be recognized as legitimate

re
for the province. Remember that the men which composed these two councils
were gobernadorcillos and members of the principalia at the time when these
councils were organized. When the revolution started, as they were accustomed
to governing their localities, they would like to elevate their councils into local
governments as they were used to. But it was imperative that neither side of the
two councils would like to give up their territories to the other as neither side
would be under the jurisdiction of the other. It would be understandable that the
Magdiwang would hardly give up their territories for they occupied the most
number of pueblos extending as far as Batangas. It would also be
understandable if the Magdalo would not just give up their territories to the
Magdiwang, since they were attacked by the Spaniards in their first offensive
salvo. They had gained initial victories in defense of the province and they were
the first ones to have suffered casualties.

If these councils were only Sangguniang Balangay or Municipal Councils, then

merging may not be that tedious but these are Sangguniang Bayan or Provincial
Councils which will be converted into provincial governments. There cannot be
two chapter-governments in one province. Since they could not agree, for not
one would even want to step down, the best proposal would be to dissolve the
mother organization itself, the Katipunan. Dissolving the Katipunan in Cavite,
however, would not be that easy. The Magdiwang hierarchy, having close
affinity with Bonifacio due to blood ties, respected the Katipunan even
considering it as a government in itself. The Magdalo, on the other hand, having
suffered so much beating because of the initial Spanish attack, wanted the unity
of the troops in order to stand their ground amid their need for reinforcements
as they wanted a new government formed. The only way, then, to unite the two
councils under one government was to have an election. But an election outside
of one initiated and sanctioned by the Katipunan under its by-laws would be
illegal. On the other hand, an election outside of the by-laws of the organization
would have a semblance of legitimacy if the Supremo would be there to
authorize it.
As Cavite was losing ground, making the forces united would be the only option
to save the province from Spanish hands. The solution was to invite the
Supremo Andres Bonifacio who was waging his war campaign in the areas of
Montalban and Balara in the middle of December 1896 in order to resolve the
conflict among them. The first meeting, at Imus on December 31, 1896 failed to
resolve the issue. It is then understandable that by reading the accounts of this
meeting, the Magdalo had been adamant to question what kind of government
they had. The same question was hotly posed during the second meeting in
March 1897, when the Magdalo delegates even questioned what kind of
government was the Katipunan. The invitation for the Supremo to resolve their
differences may not just be about a diplomatic solution. Since the Supremo was
present in both formation and election of leaders of both Magdiwang and
Magdalo, his very presence creates legitimacy in the electoral process. his
presence in the election, as he was invited to resolve their differences, was also
meant to create a sense of legitimacy to an election and eventually to the
government that will be created. The election that followed would have
resolved their differences, but as it was an election in Cavite and by Caviteños
only, they would have created only a local government in the province of Cavite.
As it turned out, it was an election, they proclaimed, to be the election for the
Republic of the Philippines.

In the crossfire of the brave men, but ambitious as well, Bonifacio fell into the
trap that he eventually lost his position and came to the death of the
organization he founded. Agoncillo reckoned that on March 22, 1897, in the
election of president during the convention at Tejeros, the Republic of the
Philippines was born (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1977, p. 202).

About the Authors

Santiago Alvarez (a.k.a. Gen. Apoy or Kidlat ng Apoy) was born on July 25, 1872
at Noveleta, Cavite. He was the only child of Gen. Mariano Alvarez (a.k.a. Gen.
Maninam) leader of the Magdiwang faction and Nicolasa Virata. His parents'
ambition for him was to become a teacher, thus he studied under the tutelage of
Antonio Dacon at Imus, later under Ignacio Villocillo, and then transferred to
Tondo under Macario Hernandez. He was 24 years old when his education was
interrupted at the outbreak of the revolution. He led the revolutionaries in the
Battle of Dalahican. He continued his education after the revolution where he
entered UST, transferred to San Juan de Letran to finish his Bachelor in Arts
degree and eventually earned his law degree at Liceo de Manila (Alvarez, 1977,
p. 2). He was already having his law practice in the 1920s when a new air of
vibrance was blowing in the hope that the Americans would grant the
Philippines its independence come 1921. The hope
was drawn from the promise of the Jones Law of 1916
which stated in the preamble that the United State will
grant independence upon proof of the Philippine's
capability to govern itself. The eager anticipation would
usher in a new era that would place the heroic acts of
the Revolution of 1896 and the living veterans of the
revolution in oblivion. In the preface of his book,
Memoirs of a General, he implied his aim, to make
known to the youth the fading struggle of the
revolutionaries and the story of the revolution. Working
from his notes, he reconstructed the story of the
revolution as a participant-eyewitness. His work was first serialized in Tagalog
weekly magazine Sampaguita in 36 parts beginning July 1927. In June 1973,
Carolina Malay translated the original Tagalog version into English which was
completed sometime in 1977.

Figure 3.1 Gen. Santiago Alvarez

Jim Richardson is known among Filipino scholars as the author of one of the
most important works in the Philippine revolution, The Light of Liberty:
Documents and Studies on the Katipunan, 1892-1897. He is an independent
scholar who focuses on Philippine nationalism and radicalism in the 19th and
20th centuries. His other publications include Roots of Dependency: Political
and Economic Revolution in 19th Century Philippines (co-authored with
Jonathan Fast); The Philippines (World Bibliographical Series); Komunista: The
Genesis of the Philippine Communist Party, 1902-1935. He lives in London with
his wife Clarita, who was born in Magalang, Pampanga.

READING 3.1

The Katipunan and the Revolution:

Memoirs of a General

Extract from The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General by

Santiago Alvarez, Trans. By Paula Carolina S. Malay with introductions by Dr.
Ruby Paredes, pp. 3-4,82-89, Copyright © 1992 by Ateneo University Press and
the Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

Preface

As the country moves toward change, the youth become more discerning and
discriminating regarding the competence of authors, especially those of
historical writings. They begin to question the credentials of anyone who dares
to write a history of the people or even of mere episodes. They look for
motivations for such writings and inquire about their sources.

Before we look into the period of Philippine history concerning the Katipunan
and the Revolution that I discuss in the following pages, I wish to say a few
things about my humble self. I shall be fifty-five years old on 25 July 1927; I was
born in the year 1872 in Noveleta, Cavite. In my early years, I studied under
Macario Hernandez at his school located on Camba Street in Manila.
Subsequently, I attended San Juan de Letran College and the University of Santo
Tomas. After the tumultuous cry for national freedom (the Revolution), I
resumed my studies in 1902, at the law school of the Liceo de Manila, and later
worked at the law offices of Felipe Buencamino, Sr., and of R. del Rosario. While
working in the latter's law office, I earned my law degree.

For five full years, from August 1896 to August 1901, I was one of those who
guided the Revolution. But even before the outbreak of the Revolution, I was
already active in the Katipunan as a member and as a delegate; as such, I was
often in the company of the Supremo Andres Bonifacio, Dr. Pio Valenzuela, and
Mr. Emilio Jacinto. We organized chapters and propagated the movement in
general. In the process, I was able to keep some notes about our experiences. As
these were written in pencil on ordinary paper, they are now faded with age and
have become difficult to read, especially by people other than myself. The
following narrative, therefore, is not only of an eyewitness but also of active
participants.

I am greatly indebted to my colleague and friend, Mr. Lope K. Santos, whose

nationalist sentiments encouraged me to undertake this project. He prodded me
into writing these memoirs by arguing that since I could shed more light on the
different facets of the Revolution, I would be doing a service to the youth, whom
he saw as the direct beneficiaries of this work. I myself would prefer that I
reconstruct those events from my notes now instead of somebody else doing it
after my death. My notes would appear disjointed and unclear to anyone else
aside from myself, and any attempt to utilize them to write a historical account
of the period would prove of little value.

The events I have related in this account of the Katipunan and the Revolution
reverberate with shouts of "Long live our patriots!" and "Death to the enemy!"
These were in answer to the enemy's assaults with mausers and cannon, the
latter fired from both land and sea.

The Magdiwang government honored me with an appointment as captain

general, or head of its army. Gen. Artemio Ricarte was lieutenant general.

I will now attempt to write down what I saw and what I know about the
Katipunan and the Revolution. First I shall narrate the events relating to the
revolution beginning from 14 March 1896; then I shall deal with the
organization and activities of the Society of the Sons of the People (full name:
Kamahal-mahalan at Kataastaasang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan [The
Most Venerable Supreme Society of the Sons of the People]). The Katipunan
account is based on records which were entrusted to me by the original
founders of the Katipunan.

In the interest of honorable truth, I shall now attempt to write a history of the
Katipunan and the Revolution which I hope will be acceptable to all. However, I
realize that it is inevitable that, in the narration of actual happenings, I shall run
the risk of hurting the feelings of contemporaries and comrades-in-arms. I
would like to make it clear that I shall try to be as objective as possible and that
it is far from my intention to depreciate anyone's patriotism and greatness.

I shall be honored if these memoirs become a worthy addition to what

Gen.Artemio Ricarte has already published in this weekly... (Alvarez)

The Revolution was facing a grave crisis. The Katipunan forces in Cavite were
suffering defeat after defeat with great loss of life. Magdalo territories had
passed to Spanish hands after the Battles of Salitran, Zapote, and Dalahikan.
Imus, the rebel capital, was in a state of imminent collapse. To strengthen
defenses so that they could stop the Spanish advance into the rest of the
province that was still held by the Magdiwang and to forestall the loss of more
lives, the Supremo Bonifacio, with the approval of other revolutionary leaders,
called a meeting of the Magdalo and Magdiwang leaders. This meeting,
scheduled for 24 March 1897, was postponed for the next day because of the
death of Lt. Gen. Crispulo Aguinaldo, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo's brother, on that
day in the Battle of Salitran.

The Magdiwang leaders were waiting for their Magdalo counterparts at the
Tejeros friar estate house, the designated place, long after lunch on that day.
They had a designated place, long after lunch on that day. They had to start in
the afternoon to allow the usual enemy raids, which came in the morning, to
subside before they ventured out to Tejeros, a village in the municipality of San
Francisco de Malabon. When the Magdalo group finally came at about five in
the afternoon, they brought with them the sad news of the death of General
Magdalo's own brother. Heading a small group, General Magdalo recounted the
circumstances of the heroic death of his patriot brother. Then he begged to be
excused to attend to arrangements for his beloved brother's funeral. Thus, the
meeting was put off for the next day at the same place.

But before dispersing, Secretary of the Treasury Diego Mojica proposed a

resolution of condolence and prayers for patriots who had died heroically like Lt.
Gen. Crispulo Aguinaldo. The Supremo Bonifacio thought this was superfluous
and objected to such a resolution. "True love of country," the Supremo argued,
"and service to the cause of freedom for the Motherland are the noblest
attributes that would ensure one's place in heaven. Lt. Gen. Crispulo Aguinaldo
and the comrades who died before him are all truly blessed and are now in their
respective places in the heavenly kingdom. Moreover, they will always occupy
an honored place in the history of our country."

The assembly at Tejeros was finally convened on 25 March 1897. The

invitations to the meeting were signed by Secretary Jacinto Lumbreras of the
Magdiwang Council, and he presided over the assembly. Seated with Lumbreras
at the long presidential table were the Supremo Andres Bonifacio, Messrs.
Mariano Alvarez, Pascual Alvarez, Ariston Villanueva, Mariano C. Trias, Diego
Mojica, Emiliano R. de Dios, Santiago V. Alvarez, Artemio Ricarte, Santos Nocon,
Luciano San Miguel, Pab lo Mojica, Severino de las Alas, and Santiago Rillo, all
of them of the Magdiwang. Among the Magdalo seated at the head table were
Messrs. Baldomero Aguinaldo, Daniel Tirona, and Cayetano Topacio,

It must be mentioned that, before the assembly was convened, Secretary of War
Ariston Villanueva of the Magdiwang Council received the confidential
information that Mr. Daniel Tirona of the Magdalo faction was set to undermine
the proceedings of the assembly and that he had already succeeded in enjoining
many among the Magdiwang leaders to ally with him. Secretary Villanueva kept
silent, but nevertheless alerted Captain General Apoy, who had troops in
readiness for any sudden eventuality.

The leaders were seated at the presidential table, as previously described, and
all the others were standing in groups on both sides of those seated. After
Chairman Jacinto Lumbreras had declared the assembly open, he announced the
main topic of discussion, which was how to bolster the defenses in the areas
still under Magdiwang control. Presently, Mr. Severino de las Alas rose to speak,
and when he was recognized he said, "Before we discuss minor details, let us
first tackle the major issue such as what kind of government we should have
and how we should go about establishing it. Once we make a decision about
these questions, the problem of organization and strengthening of defenses will
be resolved."

"As initiator of the Revolution," Chairman Lumbreras replied, "the Katipunan

now holds authority over the islands. It has a government of law and a definite
program. It is obeyed and respected by all because it stands for freedom,
brotherly love, and a well-organized and well-run government. The purpose of
this meeting is to discuss the best measures to take to strengthen the
Magdiwang government vis à-vis the enemy. We should avoid surrendering the
headquarters of the Katipunan army should the Magdalo eventually lose out."

The chair next recognized the Supremo. He concurred with what Chairman
Lumbreras had just said and explained that the "K" in the middle of the sun in
the Katipunan flag used in the Revolution stood for Kalayaan (freedom).

Mr. Severino de las Alas spoke again. He countered that the letter "K" and the
sun on the flag did not indicate whether the revolutionary government was
democratic or not.

The Supremo replied that from the rank and file to the highest levels, the Kati
punan was united in its respect for universal brotherhood and equality of men. It
was risking bloodshed and life itself in its struggle against the king, in order to
establish a sovereign and free government. In short, it stood for people's
sovereignty, not a government led by only one or two.

Mr. Antonio Montenegro spoke in defense of Mr. Severino de las Alas's stand.
He argued that if they would not agree on the kind of revolutionary government
they were to have and that if they were to let the status quo prevail, then they
who were in the Revolution would be no better than a pack of bandits or of wild,
mindless animals.

General Apoy was hurt by these words of Mr. Montenegro. He quickly stood up
and looked angrily at the previous speaker.

"We of the Katipunan," he began, "are under the jurisdiction of our respected
Highest Council of the sons of the People. This Council is the defender of, and
has authority over, the Magdiwang and Magdalo governments of Cavite. We are
true revolutionaries fighting for freedom of the native land. We are not bandits
who rob others of their property and wealth. Nor should we be likened to
beasts, for we know how to protect and defend others, especially the political
refugees who seek asylum with us. We are rational and we do not expose those
who talk big but do not accomplish anything. If you want to establish a different
kind of government that is to your liking, you must do as we have done. Go back
to your localities and snatch them from Spanish control! Then you can do what
pleases you; but don't you dare seek refuge among cowards who might call you
bandits and beasts. And for everybody's satisfaction, I am now ordering you
arrested!"

Captain General Apoy stopped speaking and looked intently at the person he
was alluding to and ordered a detachment under Maj. Damaso Fojas to keep him
under guard. After a short while, Dr. Jose Rizal's sister, Trining, and his widow,
Josephine, pleaded with General Apoy not to arrest Mr. Montenegro, but to let
him stay at the estate house where they themselves were staying. They
volunteered to be held personally responsible for Mr. Montenegro while in their
custody. Captain General Apoy easily acceded to the request.

The strong and excited denunciation by Captain General Apoy of Mr.

Montenegro alerted the Magdiwang troops. The leaders eyed everyone
suspiciously and were only awaiting a signal from General Apoy for them to
begin shooting. Disorder ensued and disrupted the assembly.

When order was restored, some wanted the convention adjourned, but the
Supremo Bonifacio prevailed upon the others to continue. However, the
presiding officer, Mr. Lumbreras, refused to resume his role of chairman. He
wanted to yield the chair to the Supremo whom he thought to be the rightful
chairman.

The Katipunan, as you know," Mr. Lumbreras explained, "was responsible from
the beginning for the spread of the revolutionary movement throughout the
Philippines. But because of the disaffection of some, this assembly was called to
establish a new overall revolutionary council. If we are to pursue this ambitious
and important undertaking, only the Supremo has the right to preside at this
assembly, for he is the Father of the Katipunan and the Revolution."

Mr. Lumbreras's speech was well received and his proposal was unanimously
accepted. The Supremo Bonifacio assumed the chairmanship accordingly and
said, "Your aim is to establish a new overall government of the Katipunan of the
Sons of the People. This would repudiate the decisions made at the meeting
held at the friar estate house in Imus. In my capacity as President-Supremo of
the Most Venerable Katipunan of the Sons of the People, I agree and we should
respect all decisions properly discussed and approved in all our meetings. We
should respect and abide by the wishes of the majority."

Because of a repeated clamor for the approval of the establishment of a

government of the Philippine Republic, the chair proceeded to prepare for an
election to the following positions: president, minister of finance, minister of
welfare, minister of justice, and captain general.

The Supremo spoke again before the election began. He said that the candidate
who would get the most number of votes for each position should be the
winner, no matter what his station in life or his education. What should matter
was that the candidate had never been a traitor to the cause of the Motherland.
Everyone agreed and there were shouts of approval such as, "That is how it
should be-equality for everyone! Nobody should be higher or lower than the
other. May love of country prevail!"

The Supremo Bonifacio appointed Gen. Artemio Ricarte as secretary. Then, with
the help of Mr. Daniel Tirona, he distributed pieces of paper to serve as ballots.
When the ballots had been collected and the votes were ready to be canvassed,
Mr. Diego Mojica, the Magdiwang secretary of the treasury, warned the
Supremo that many ballots distributed were already filled out and that the
voters had not done this themselves. The Supremo ignored this remark. He
proceeded with the business at hand as if nothing unusual had happened.

When the votes for president were counted, Mr. Emilio Aguinaldo won over Mr.
Andres Bonifacio, the Supremo. The winner was acclaimed by applause and
shouts of "Mabuhay!" (Long live!).

Mr. Severino de las Alas spoke again to say that since the Supremo Bonifacio
had received the second highest number of votes for the presidency, he should
be proclaimed vice-president of the government of the Philippine Republic.
When nobody signified approval or disapproval of the proposal, the presiding
officer, the Supremo Bonifacio ruled that the election be continued. For
vice-president, Mr. Mariano Trias won over Mr. Mariano Alvarez and the
Supremo Bonifacio. General Vibora was elected captain over General Apoy.
General Vibora demurred, saying that he had neither the ability nor the right to
assume the new position. But General Apoy cut short his objections by saying
that he personally vouched for General Vibora's competence and right to occupy
the position to which he was elected. General Apoy's endorsement was greeted
with shouts of "Long live the newly elected captain general!"

Mr. Baldomero Aguinaldo wanted the elections to be finished before it got too
dark. To facilitate the counting of votes, he suggested that for all other positions
to be voted upon, voters should stand on one side of the hall if in favor and on
the other side if against. The suggestion was adopted for the rest of the
election. For the position of secretary of war, Mr. Emiliano R. de Dios was
elected overwhelmingly over Messrs. Santiago V. Alvarez, Ariston Villanueva,
and Daniel Tirona. After the voters had given the proper honors to the new
secretary of war, they proceeded to elect the secretary of the interior. Mr.
Andres Bonifacio, the Supremo, won over Mr. Mariano Alvarez. The crowd broke
into shouts of "Mabuhay!" Mr. Daniel Tirona requested for a restoration of order
and then spoke aloud.
"My brethren, the office of secretary of the interior is of such great scope and of
such sensitivity that we should not entrust it to one who is not a lawyer. One
among us is a lawyer. He is Mr. Jose del Rosario. Let us reconsider the choice for
the last position, for, he has no credentials to show attesting to any educational
attainment.

Then in as loud a voice as he could muster, Tirona shouted, "Let us elect Mr. Jose
del Rosario, the lawyer!"

Greatly embarrassed, the Supremo Bonifacio quickly stood up and said, "We
agreed to abide by the majority vote and accept its choice no matter what the
station in life of the person elected. And because of this, I demand from you, Mr.
Daniel Tirona, an apology. You must restore to the voters and the one they
elected the honor you have only now besmirched." Then he pulled out his
revolver and took aim. Instead of replying, Mr. Tirona ignored the Supremo's
remarks and, perhaps because of fear, he slid away and got lost in the crowd.
Disorder ensued as the convention secretary tried to disarm the Supremo, who
was intent on shooting Mr. Tirona. The people began to disperse and the
Supremo adjourned the meeting with these words:

"In my capacity as chairman of this convention and as President-Supremo of the

Most Venerable Katipunan of the Sons of the People, which association is
known and acknowledged by all, I hereby declare null and void all matters
approved in this meeting."

Then he left quickly and was followed by his aides and some others present.

Mr. Baldomero Aguinaldo, the Magdalo president, did not leave San Francisco
de Malabon that night, in order to convince the Magdiwang leaders to reconvene
the disrupted meeting the following day. They agreed to his proposal. That
same night rumor had it that Messrs. Mariano Trias, Daniel Tirona, Emiliano R.
de Dios, Santiago Rillo, and others were in the parish house of the Catholic
church at Tanza (Santa Cruz de Malabon), and that they were conferring with
the priest, Fr. Cenon Villafranca. Many attested to seeing them, but no one knew
what they talked about.

On the request of Magdalo Pres. Baldomero Aguinaldo, a meeting was called at

the same friar estate house in Tejeros. Called on the day after the tumultuous
convention, its purpose was to continue and revalidate the proceedings of the
election meeting, to revive their former alliances, and to restore cordiality and
fraternal love in their relations. Aside from the Supremo Andres Bonifacio,
among the Magdiwang who attended were Messrs. Mariano Alvarez, Diego
Mojica, Ariston Villanueva, Pascual Alvarez, Jacinto Lumbreras, Santiago
Alvarez, Artemio Ricarte, Nicolas Portilla, Santos Nocon, and Fr. Manuel Trias,
the parish priest of San Francisco de Malabon. They waited until five that
afternoon, but none of the Magdalo members came, not even their president
who had initiated what would have been a reconciliation meeting.

That same night it was rumored that the Magdalo leaders were currently
holding their own meeting at the parish house in Tanza. Though it had reason to
be apprehensive because the Magdalo were meeting in territory under its
jurisdiction, the Magdiwang leadership looked the other way because the
Magdalo were hard-pressed for meeting places since its territories had all been
taken by the Spanish enemy.

The next morning, 27 March 1897, eyewitnesses who had spied on the
proceedings revealed that, indeed, a meeting had taken place at the Tanza
parish house and that the Supremo's decisions regarding the election at the friar
estate house were not respected. These revelations surfaced despite denials
from many sectors.
At the gathering in the "Tanza parish house, those elected at the Tejeros
convention knelt before a crucifix and in the name of the Holy Father, the
highest pontiff of the Roman Catholic church, invoked the martyred saints and
solemnly took their office. F Cenon Villafranca officiated. With Messrs. Severino
de las Alas and Daniel Tiona as witnesses, the following took their oaths of
office: Messrs. Emilio Aguinaldo, Mariano C. Trias, and Artemio Ricarte.
Conspicuously absent was the Supremo Andres Bonifacio, who was not invited
although he was one of those elected to office. It will be recalled that as
chairman of the Tejeros convention, he declared null and void all matters
approved by the assembly because of a grave violation of a principle agreed
upon before the election.

It should be noted here that, unknown to the Magdiwang Council, the Magdalo
posted troops to guard the Tanza parish house for their oath-taking ceremonies.
The troops were under strict orders not to admit any unwanted Magdiwang
partisans. If the news about the secret ceremony had leaked out earlier, and the
underdogs in the power struggle had attempted to break into it, they would
have been annihilated then and there.

The Spaniards captured and occupied the town of Imus in the afternoon of 25
March 1897. They left three days afterwards and marched into the San
Francisco de Malabon territory up to the village of Bakaw. When they reached
Bakaw, they were intercepted by Magdiwang troops led by Supremo Bonifacio
and General Apoy. A pitched battle ensued. But the Magdiwang initiative was
foiled by the arrival of a great number of enemy reinforcements at the height of
the encounter. In the face of such an unfavorable situation, the Supremo decided
on a tactical retreat to their fortifications. General Apoy for his part, ordered
Major Baluyot to rally all other armed units of the Magdiwang army and assign
them to the Tarike fortifications in San Francisco de Malabon.
After the battle, the Spaniards encamped and rested in Bakaw, but throughout
the night they were harassed with potshots from small Katipunan bands.

Anticipating that the enemy encamped at Bakaw would try to penetrate the
strong Dalahikan fortifications in Noveleta from the rear, General Apoy ordered
General San Miguel to pull out all troops from Dalahikan and transfer them to
some other fort.

On 3 April, the Supremo made a bid to recapture Noveleta. General Vibora and
Gen. Santos Nocon accompanied him in the offensive, which lasted the whole
day. But despite a fierce determination on their part and heavy enemy losses,
they were unable to dislodge the Spaniards.

A few days after the Supremo's unsuccessful attempt to retake Noveleta, fresh
Spanish reinforcements began arriving in great numbers in the open fields to the
west of Bakaw and along the seashores of Noveleta and Salinas. At nine that
morning, artillery fire from mountain cannons began battering the San Francisco
de Malabon fortifications, extending from Tejeros to Tarike. A two-hour shelling
was followed by ground attack by cavalry and infantry troops.

After preliminary skirmishes, man-to-man combat broke out at the Tarike fort. It
became a fierce battleground as the rebels made a valiant defense. Every head
that emerged from either side was quickly bashed in or severed at the neck. All
that could be heard was the rattle of gleaming blades, the burst of gunfire, and
the thud of bodies as they fell against the earth. Wielding a variety of arms such
as spears, mochetes, doggers, revolvers, and rifles, the combatants locked in
struggle and fell together. In one instance, the tip of a bayonet piercing
somebody's middle come out straight through the back of another who himself
had a pointed machete sticking in his chest. In another instance, one who was
mortally wounded by a sharp dagger was killed by the other's gun. Another pair
who fell together each had bayonet thrusts, one through the navel and the other
above the chest. Some had severed heads, others, severed hands or feet.

General Apoy and the Supremo Bonifacio lost many gallant troops in this
bloody and miserable battle. Among those who died were the valiant Maj. Pio
Baluyot and head soldiers Francisco Arnaldo, Juan Brosas, Lucio Poblete, and
Nicomedes Esguerra. The enemy rode roughshod over their bodies as they
rushed into town to raise their flag of victory and to burn houses.

Very early that morning before the battle, Captain General Apoy had visited the
Tarike fort to boost the morale of the Magdiwang and Balara troops. Then at
past seven o'clock, they saw the Spaniards massing a great number of their
troops. The commanders of the Magdiwang and the Balara contingents thought
it was the better part of discretion if the captain general was not with them
inside the fort when the expected attack took place. Thus, Major Baluyot and
Captain Olaes escorted him across the river to the west of the town of San
Francisco de Malabon.

Gen. Pio Del Pilar and his troops, along with a small detachment from Imus,
came to help the defense of San Francisco de Malabon, but for some unknown
reason he withdrew even before the enemy could attack. He made his
withdrawal without notifying those inside the fort.

Coming from Imus and Kawit, the enemy took Noveleta without resistance. They
the fortifications and collected Katipunan arms and ammunition. Coming in and
spreading out into the open fields around Imus, Kawit, Noveleta, and San
Francisco de Malabon, they overwhelmed the People's troops with their sheer
number.

READING 3.2
Ang Haring bayan, Declaration, March 23, 1897

(The "Acta de Tejeros")

Extract from "Ang Haring bayan, Declaration, March 23, 1897 (The Acta de
Tejeros)" by Jim Richardson in Katipunan Documents and Studies, Copyright
2018 by Jim Richardson, Reprinted with permission by Jim Richardson as
indicated in his website

The document transcribed below does not bear any heading or title, but is
widely known as the "Acta de Tejeros." It proclaims that the convention held at
Tejeros the previous day had been so disorderly, so tarnished by skullduggery,
that its decisions were illegitimate and invalid. Patriots who remain true to the
ideals of the Katipunan, the signatories in effect affirm, should not recognize the
government or republic instituted at the convention, and should disregard the
election of its leaders - Emilio Aguinaldo as President; Mariano Trias as
Vice-President; Artemio Ricarte as Captain General; Emiliano Riego de Dios as
Director of War; and Andres Bonifacio as Director of the Interior.

The Tejeros convention was a pivotal event in the Philippine revolution, and its
consequences remain contentious to this day. Because the protestations voiced
in the "Acta" ultimately failed to nullify its outcome, it was the point at which the
overall leadership of the struggle against Spain passed from the Katipunan to
the nascent government, and from Bonifacio to Aguinaldo. And it had a deeper
significance beyond organizational structures and personalities, some nationalist
historians argue, because it symbolized the seizure of the revolutionary
movement by the Caviteño elite, and the defeat of the revolution of the masses.

Here it is not intended to revisit the debates about class and ideology, or to
attempt to give an overview of the revolution in Cavite, but rather to focus on
the Tejeros convention and its politics in the narrow sense - on how the
delegates were aligned, on its outcome, and on this angry repudiation, the
"Acto," written in its immediate aftermath.

Above the signatures on the "Acta" are penned the words "Ang Haring bayan"
("The Sovereign People"), which suggests that the signatories profess to be
voicing the will of the nation at large. They issue the proclamation, too, "in the
name of the Katipunan." But most insistently they speak and act on behalf of the
particular territorial unit within the Katipunan they call the Magdiwang
Presidency. "We ratify this document," they affirm, "under a binding oath to
commit our lives and wealth to the defence and support of our said Presidency."
The Magdiwang stamp is impressed on the front page.

What at first sight is most puzzling about the "Acta" is that it rejects the
outcome of a convention at which Magdiwang partisans had supposedly been in
a clear majority. When one reads the grounds advanced by the signatories for
nullifying the proceedings - dark conspiracies, ineligible electors, pre-marked
ballot papers - the questions that repeatedly spring to mind are therefore "Why
did you, as leaders of the Magdiwang, allow these things to happen? Why did
you lose control?"

A closer look at the Tejeros drama, however, suggests that these might be the
wrong questions to ask.

Magdiwang and Magdalo

The Magdiwang first came into existence as an ordinary balangay (branch) of

the Katipunan in the town of Noveleta, constituted on April 2, 1896 at a
ceremony presided over by Bonifacio. The following day, Bonifacio presided over
a similar ceremony in the neighboring town of Kawit, at which the Magdalo was
inaugurated. Growing rapidly, the two branches were soon elevated to the
status of popular councils (Sangunian Bayan), which meant they could form
branches of their own and establish their own areas of jurisdiction. The
demarcation between the two councils became more pronounced and
formalized in the course of the early engagements with Spanish forces in
September and October 1896, and even more so once the province of Cavite
had been liberated from Spanish authority. The Magdiwang and Magdalo
councils then transformed themselves into regional governments, each with
their own presidents, cabinets, officials, military units and, to a degree at least,
mutually agreed territories.

From its capitals in northern Cavite at first Noveleta and later San Francisco de
Malabon the Magdiwang council extended its influence southwards and
westwards to the towns of Rosario, Tanza, Naik, Ternate, Maragondon, Bailen,
Magallanes, Indang and Alfonso, and also to Nasugbu, Tuy, and Look in the
province of Batangas. The Magdalo council, similarly, from its capitals in
northern Cavite- at first Kawit and later Imus-extended. its influence
southwards and eastwards to the towns of Carmona, Dasmariñas, Silang,
Amadeo and Mendez. Northwards, the Magdiwang counted San Roque within
its jurisdiction, and Magdalo counted Bacoor. The western part of the province,
in broad terms, was Magdiwang territory, and the eastern part was Magdalo.

The oft-recounted rivalry between the Magdiwang and Magdalo, in short, was
confined to a relatively small geographical area - the province of Cavite and
parts of Batangas. Nor should the level of antagonism be exaggerated. Frictions
were frequent, but they never culminated, so far as is known, in physical
violence. There were times, too, when relations were relatively cordial, and
when Magdiwang and troops fought side by side against the Spanish foe. The
vagaries of this uneasy co-existence, it might be argued, assumed a historic
significance beyond their due simply because the Magdiwang and Magdalo
councils alone, in Cavite, had liberated an expanse of territory in which they and
revolutionists from elsewhere could move and communicate freely, or could hold
gatherings like the Tejeros convention.
The Magdiwang, Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan Supreme Council

Andres Bonifacio was invited to Cavite by the Magdiwang president, Mariano

Alvarez, and from the time he arrived in the province in mid-November 1896 he
was closely associated with the Magdiwang council. He took up residence, and
established his headquarters, in San Francisco de Malabon, the Magdiwang
capital, and he sometimes led Magdiwang troops in battle. It is more than likely
he also attended meetings of the Magdiwang council. No documentary sources
have yet been found, however, that substantiate the claims of Aguinaldo and
other Magdalo partisans that Bonifacio somehow displaced Mariano Alvarez as
overall head of the Magdiwang council. The title by which Bonifacio was most
widely known in Cavite was simply "the Supremo," and his status and authority,
as the Magdiwang memoirists Ricarte and Alvarez indicate, derived primarily
from his position as head of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan. Alvarez, in
particular, consistently draws an explicit distinction between the Magdiwang
government on the one hand and Bonifacio and the KKK Supreme Council on the
other.

It is not known whether Bonifacio acted alone in the name of the Supreme
Council whilst in Cavite, or whether he actually reconstituted the body at this
time. The only other person then in Cavite thought to have been a Supreme
Council member immediately prior to the revolution was Francisco Carreon, but
other possible appointees (aside from Caviteños) could have been Alejandro
Santiago (president of the Tondo-based Katagalugan council of the KKK in
1896); Teodoro Gonzales (who had been on the Supreme Council around
1893-5); Apolonio Samson (a KKK leader in Caloocan and Novaliches) and
Bonifacio's brother Procopio (who had headed a KKK branch in the Manila
district of Santa Cruz).

The Imus Assembly

Towards the end of December 1896, Bonifacio presided over an assembly of
Magdiwang and Magdalo leaders, convened by the Magdalo in their capital of
Imus to discuss whether to retain the existing Katipunan structure or to
establish a revolutionary government. The Magdiwang favored the former
option, and the Magdalo the latter, and after heated exchanges the meeting
broke up without resolution on this key point. Nevertheless, the assembly did
agree, according to Ricarte and Alvarez, to appoint Bonifacio to head a
"legislative committee" or "congress" (Lupung Tagapagbatas or Kapulungan)
and to authorize him to appoint as its members ``some people he considered to
be worthy" (ilang taong inaakala niyang karapat-dapat). It is not known whether
Bonifacio ever did appoint members to this body, or whether it ever met, but in
the early months of 1897 he was using the title "President of the Supreme
Congress'' ("P. ng K. Kapulungan'') and some of his communications were
stamped with a seal bearing the words ``Sovereign Nation of Katagalugan -
Supreme Congress" (Haring Bayang Katagalugan - Kataastaasang Kapulungan).
Even if the Congress never convened - due perhaps to the exigencies of war - it
appears that Bonifacio believed that it should convene when circumstances
permitted, and that it would be a step towards establishing a revolutionary
government.

The Tejeros Convention: (i) The Agenda

Three months after the Imus assembly, on March 22, 1897, leading
representatives of the two councils convened again, this time in Magdiwang
territory at the casa hacienda in Tejeros. Though its fateful consequences are
well known, almost everything else about the convention is shrouded in doubt,
not least because the sources available are few, partisan and conflicting.

One of the critical uncertainties about the Tejeros gathering is its purpose. its
planned agenda. Ricarte and Alvarez-the only actual participants to leave
memoirs - both say the original intention was to discuss how to defend the
liberated territory of Cavite against the Spanish offensive then being led by
General Lachambre. Only once the convention was under way, they maintain,
did the idea of establishing a revolutionary government get mooted and agreed.

This version of events, however, is contradicted by a contemporary letter that

pertains to the invitation to the Tejeros meeting. This letter, sent by the
president of the Magdalo council, Baldomero Aguinaldo (a cousin of Emilio), to
Felix Cuenca and Mariano Noriel, two prominent Magdalo members in the town
of Bacoor, clearly indicates that the formation of a government and the election
of its leaders was mentioned in the invitation. The full Tagalog text of this letter
is reproduced as an addendum to these notes. Writing on March 21, 1897,
Aguinaldo informs Cuenca and Noriel that he had received a copy of this
invitation the night before from the president of the Magdiwang council
(Mariano Alvarez). "We have been invited," Aguinaldo writes, "to go tomorrow,
the 22nd, to the hacienda of Tejeros" in order to elect a "Kgg na pulungan ng
hihimacsic (Gobierno revolucionario) at pulungan din naman ng hihimacsic sa
bauat hucuman (Gobierno Provincial)". Aguinaldo asks Cuenca and Noriel to
consider who would be worthy candidates, impresses upon them the
importance of going to the convention (unless the Spanish offensive made it too
dangerous to travel), and directs them to send word urgently to KKK presidents
in other towns telling them also to attend without fail.

There seems to be little doubt, then, that the election of a revolutionary

government was on the Tejeros agenda from the outset. On close reading, in
fact, neither the "Acta" nor the account of the convention given by Bonifacio in
his letter to Jacinto dated April 24, 1897 (Document 8.10) contends otherwise.
The "Acta" does not protest against the election in principle. "As regards the
election," the relevant passage begins, "...we came to an agreement with... the
Magdalo Presidency...and [the election] was accordingly held yesterday..."
[Emphasis added]. The reason why the election should be annulled, according to
the "Acta," is not that it was unsanctioned or unplanned, but that it was blighted
by misconduct.

Bonifacio tells Jacinto that at Tejeros he had argued that the election should not
proceed "because the representatives from other provinces (hukuman) were not
present, aside from which I said that a decision had already been reached [about
this matter] at the meeting held in the town of Imus." But, he reports, the
majority had been determined to press ahead with establishing a government,
and had brushed his arguments aside. He does not suggest, though, that the
proposal to hold elections had been raised without any prior notice.

Bonifacio had a valid point when he argued that the elections should be
deferred until such time as delegates from other provinces (hukuman) could
attend and the new revolutionary government and the republic could be
established on a more representative foundation. He rightly foresaw that any
government formed at Tejeros might claim to be national in scope but in reality
would be composed almost entirely of men from a single province, Cavite. Given
the deteriorating military situation, on the other hand, there was little realistic
prospect that a more broadly representative congress would be feasible in the
near future. Those who wished to press ahead with the elections at Tejeros
might therefore acknowledge that the government they proposed would not be
ideal, but would still be able to counter Bonifacio's arguments by saying that his
Katipunan Supreme Council had over time become even less representative of
the revolution as a whole.

The Tejeros Convention: (ii) The Delegates

Nobody knows the total number of delegates who attended the Tejeros
convention, but the sources give the names of twenty-six.
Alvarez names fifteen participants on the Magdiwang side when he first
narrates the events at Tejeros (in chapter 32 of his account), and to these can be
added by virtue of their close association with the Magdiwang council Andres
Bonifacio and a prominent member of his staff, Teodoro Gonzales. No other
sources, so far as is known, add any further names. The full list of these
seventeen delegates, together with their respective home towns, is as follows:

Mariano Alvarez (Noveleta) Pascual Alvarez (Noveleta)

Santiago Alvarez (Noveleta)

Andres Bonifacio (Manila; staying in San Francisco de Malabon)

Severino de las Alas (Indang)

José del Rosario (Tanza)

Teodoro Gonzales (Manila, staying in San Francisco de Malabon)

Jacinto Lumbreras (San Francisco de Malabon) Diego Mojica (San Francisco de

Malabon)

Pablo Mojica (San Francisco de Malabon)

Santos Nocon (San Francisco de Malabon)

Artemio Ricarte (Batac, Ilocos Norte; living

Emiliano Riego de Dios (Maragondon)

in San Francisco de Malabon)

Santiago Rillo (Tuy, Batangas; formerly Maragondon)

Luciano San Miguel (Noveleta)

Mariano Trias (San Francisco de Malabon)

Ariston Villanueva (Noveleta)

From the Magdalo side, meanwhile, Emilio Aguinaldo recalls in his memoir that
many delegates were unable to go to the Tejeros convention because Magdalo
towns were then bearing the brunt of the Spanish onslaught. He names only
four who attended, and from other sources Medina has identified five more,
making a total of nine, as follows:

Baldomero Aguinaldo (Kawit)

Crispulo (Kawit)

bo

ed

Felix Cuenca (Bacoor) Tomas Mascardo (Kawit)

Antonio Montenegro (Manila; staying in Imus)

Sixto Sapinoso (Imus)

Daniel Tirona (Kawit)

Cayetano Topacio (Imus)

Licerio Topacio (Imus)

The Magdiwang and its associates, the memoirists record, not only had clearly
the greater number of these "named" individuals, who presumably included all
the most influential delegates, but also held the chair at the convention and
provided its secretaries. The presiding officer was at first Jacinto Lumbreras, and
subsequently Andres Bonifacio, and the secretaries are said to have been
Artemio Ricarte and Teodoro Gonzales,

The leading protagonists, according to Alvarez, mostly sat at a long table, whilst
everyone else stood in groups around the sides. Although it is safe to assume
that the overwhelming majority came from Cavite, there was also a significant
contingent from Batangas to the south and a few from provinces to the north.
Ronquillo relates that the large upstairs sala in the Tejeros estate house was
"absolutely filled to capacity," but none of the memoirists hazards an estimate of
how many people were present in total, or says how many were entitled to vote.
According to one account, the votes cast in the election for president totaled
256, but even if this figure is accurate it is impossible, given the allegations of
irregularities, to know whether it reflects the true number of electors, accredited
or otherwise.

The Tejeros Convention: (iii) The Balance of Opinion

Since the "rank-and-file" delegates who stood around the long table are
obscured by so many intractable unknowns, any discussion about what
happened at Tejeros must inevitably return to the more prominent, seated
figures whose names the memoirists recall. There is no reason, in any event, to
suppose that the prominent figures did not represent the overall balance of
opinion at the meeting, and there is no evidence that their leadership was
challenged, or their wishes thwarted, by some kind of "rank-and-file" revolt.

If we assume that the "rank-and-file" delegates backed their respective

leaderships, and if the Magdiwang majority had been as clear cut as Alvarez,
Ricarte, Aguinaldo and countless secondary sources say, then the wishes of the
Magdiwang council, to state the obvious, would have prevailed.

But they did not, as the "Acta" incontrovertibly testifies. Bonifacio's attempt to
persuade the assembled delegates to defer the election of a government might
suggest that he recognized from the very start that he and his Magdiwang allies
did not hold a secure majority. The convention's rejection of his arguments must
have immediately confirmed his fears.

To explain why the convention decided to press ahead with the elections, and
why Aguinaldo was elected as president rather than Bonifacio, we need to look
more attentively at the allegiances of some of the delegates who Santiago
Alvarez and other sources identify as leaders or allies of the Magdiwang camp.

Alvarez was a member of the Magdiwang inner circle: Captain General - of the
Magdiwang's troops, son of the council's president, and cousin of the council's
interior minister. His memoir contains a huge wealth of information about the
revolution of 1896-1897 in general, and about events in Cavite in particular,
that cannot be found in any other source. Anyone who has read it, though, will
know that its structure is somewhat disjointed, its style discursive, and its detail
occasionally self-contradictory. Reading through his account as a whole, rather
than his first and fullest Tejeros narrative in isolation, it soon becomes apparent
that at least six of the seventeen individuals he describes in his chapter 32 as
prominent Magdiwang leaders or allies had either broken away from the council
by the time of the convention on March 22 or would not necessarily act in
concert with their Magdiwang colleagues.
Mariano Trias, firstly, who took office around January 1897 as the Magdiwang
minister of welfare and justice, is said by Alvarez and Ricarte to have switched
his allegiance to the Magdalo council in February 1897 following disputes with
his colleagues over military and personal matters. Trias, recounts Alvarez, had
started to organize his own private army, and to commission his own
subordinate officers, independently of the unified Magdiwang command.
Rebuked by other Magdiwang ministers, and by Alvarez himself as Captain
General of the Magdiwang forces, Trias had defected to the Magdalo forces,
accepting the rank of lieutenant general and taking with him two senior officers,
Mariano San Gabriel and Julian Montalan, and their respective troop
detachments. Surprisingly, though, he retained his position as a Magdiwang
minister. At one point he tendered his resignation, but it was not accepted.

Trias not only depleted Magdiwang military strength by his action, he also
persuaded Emiliano Riego de Dios, the Magdiwang minister of development, to
move over to the Magdalo camp as well. Riego de Dios departed, Alvarez
recalls, without even the courtesy of tendering his resignation as a Magdiwang
minister.

José del Rosario, a lawyer who served for a time as a colonel on Alvarez's own
staff, became a secret ally (lihim na kapanalig) of the Magdalo secretary of war
Daniel Tirona. The Tejeros convention came to an abrupt and chaotic end,
famously, after Tirona shouted that "José del Rosario, the lawyer" was better
qualified to fill the position of Director of the Interior than Andres Bonifacio,
whom the delegates had just elected.

Teodoro Gonzales, a lawyer attached to Bonifacio's staff, is described by Alvarez

as another defector to the Magdalo camp. Gonzales himself, in a brief comment
published as an appendix to Alvarez's work, says that he remained with the
Supremo up the time of the Tejeros convention, but confirms that they had then
"parted ways."

Santiago Rillo, suggests Alvarez, also aligned himself with the Magdalo
leadership prior to the Tejeros convention. Another account says that Rillo
played an important role in swaying the convention against the Magdiwang
attempt to defer the establishment of a revolutionary government.

Severino de las Alas, records Alvarez, was among those who argued most
forcefully at Tejeros that the formation of a revolutionary government should not
be deferred, and should be given precedence above all else.

Mariano Trias and Emiliano Riego de Dios, in sum, though nominally still
members of the Magdiwang council, had in effect aligned themselves with the
Magdalo camp before the Tejeros convention, and José del Rosario, Teodoro
Gonzales, Santiago Rillo and Severino de las Alas sided at the convention with
those who wanted, without further delay or ado, to see the Magdalo, the
Magdiwang and all the other KKK councils subsumed under a single
revolutionary government.

If these six individuals are removed from the "Magdiwang list" and reassigned
together with the nine on the "Magdalo list" to a new "revolutionary
government" or "pro-republic" list, the balance suddenly tilts. The initial count of
17-9 in favor of the Magdiwang is converted to 11-15, and the Magdiwang
become the minority. It is possible, in fact, that the ratio became 10-16, or even
9-17, because Alvarez also hints that question marks hung over the Magdiwang
loyalties of his deputy Captain General, Artemio Ricarte, and his own cousin,
Pascual Alvarez, the minister of the interior. About a month before the Tejeros
convention, he relates, Bonifacio received word that the Magdalo secretary of
war, Daniel Tirona, wanted to lure Ricarte and Pascual Alvarez away from the
Magdiwang army by commissioning them as generals in the Magdalo army.
When the Supremo confronted the three men about this allegation, Pascual
Alvarez and Ricarte "laughed it off as a private joke, but glanced at secretary
Tirona" ("lihim na nagtawanan at sinulyapan lamang ang kagawad Tirona").
Ricarte confirms in his own memoir that the reports Bonifacio heard were
correct, and that Tirona personally had secretly handed the commissions to
Pascual Alvarez and himself.

Alvarez's memoir, as already remarked, is not internally consistent; points of

detail frequently differ from one chapter to another. When he briefly returns to
the subject of the Tejeros convention towards the end of his narrative, however,
there is a more fundamental discrepancy. It is almost as if, looking back at what
he has written, it strikes him that his initial portrayal of the convention as
Magdiwang-dominated has been refuted by the weight of his own evidence
about the defections of his erstwhile colleagues. Having said in chapter 32 that
the meeting was convened at the instigation of Bonifacio and the Magdiwang,
he recalls in chapter 77 that it was summoned by the Magdalo council. Having
previously assigned Emiliano Riego de Dios, Santiago Rillo, Severino de las Alas
and Teodoro Gonzales to the Magdiwang camp, his later recollection is that by
the time of Tejeros they had become "partisans of the Magdalo government"
("nagtatanggol ng pamahalaang Magdalo"). These concluding reflections,
suggesting that the Magdalo leadership was already taking the initiative, and
gaining the ascendancy, before Tejeros, tally much more closely with the
evidence scattered elsewhere, both in Alvarez's own memoir and in the other
sources.

The Tejeros Convention: (iv) The Elections

A substantial proportion of the Tejeros delegates commonly described as

"Magdiwang," therefore, in reality no longer aligned themselves with the
Magdiwang camp and should more accurately be categorized as
"independents". Reclassifying these individuals not only tips the balance of
delegates, but casts a different light on the results of the elections at Tejeros
and challenges the impression customarily given by historians that most of the
winning candidates were Magdiwang "loyalists".

Before the convention ended in uproar, the delegates voted to fill five leading
positions in the revolutionary government. Ricarte's listing of the candidates
who stood for these positions shows that neither camp schemed or voted as a
cohesive bloc. Assuming he remembered correctly, not one of the five elections
at Tejeros was a straightforward contest between a single Magdalo candidate
and a single Magdiwang candidate. If we annotate his listing with the known or
probable affiliations of the respective candidates, the picture is as follows: For
President, Emilio Aguinaldo [Magdalo] was elected over Mariano Trias
independent] and Andres Bonifacio [Magdiwang "loyalist" ally].

For Vice-President, Mariano Trias [independent] was elected over Andres

Bonifacio [Magdiwang "loyalist" ally], Severino de las Alas [independent] and
Mariano Alvarez [Magdiwang "loyalist"].

For Captain General, Artemio Ricarte [independent] was elected over Santiago
Alvarez [Magdiwang "loyalist"]. For Director of War, Emiliano Riego de Dios
[independent] was elected over

Ariston Villanueva [Magdiwang "loyalist"], Daniel Tirona [Magdalo]

and Santiago Alvarez [Magdiwang "loyalist"].

For Director of the Interior, Andres Bonifacio [Magdiwang "loyalist" ally]

was elected over Mariano Alvarez [Magdiwang "loyalist"] and Pascual

Alvarez [independent].
Some candidates, evidently, were nominated as individuals rather than as
standard-bearers of their respective councils. Any conspiracies afoot were too
devious, too complex for a latter-day observer to detect or comprehend. But the
overall outcome was clear. Magdiwang "loyalist" candidates were defeated in
four of the five contests, and the only victorious candidate aligned with the
Magdiwang "loyalists" was Bonifacio himself.

The "Acta de Tejeros": (i) Signatories and Non-Signatories

The day after the convention Bonifacio and the "loyalist" core of the Magdiwang
leadership, still at the Tejeros estate house, drafted and signed the "Acta,"
insisting that the elections lacked any legitimacy. Emilio Aguinaldo and Mariano
Trias proceeded to swear their oaths of office before a large crucifix in the
convento at Tanza, about a mile distant from Tejeros. Emiliano Riego de Dios,
Severino de las Alas, Santiago Rillo and other "pro-republic" Magdiwangs were
in the cheering crowd. Artemio Ricarte, meanwhile, oscillating between the two
camps, first affixed his signature to the "Acta," then made his way to the
ceremonies at the Tanza convento, took his oath as Captain General, and then
went back to Tejeros and made a written declaration saying that he had taken
his oath under duress.

Of the seven individuals named by Santiago Alvarez as having been members of

the Magdiwang cabinet in January 1897, four signed the "Acta" - Mariano
Alvarez, Jacinto Lumbreras, Diego Mojica and Ariston Villanueva; and three did
not-Mariano Trias, Emiliano Riego de Dios and Pascual Alvarez. The signatories
also included the most senior figures in the Magdiwang military high command
Santiago Alvarez, Artemio Ricarte and two Brigadier Generals. With the
addition of a few more names, and a little additional detail, the most notable
"Acta'' signatories and their respective positions can be listed as follows:
Mariano Alvarez (Noveleta), president of the Sb. Magdiwang; gobernadorcillo of
Noveleta prior to the revolution. Santiago Alvarez (Noveleta), Captain General of
the Magdiwang army.

Andres Bonifacio (Manila, but staying in San Francisco de Malabon), President of

the Sovereign Nation, President of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan,
President of the Supreme Congress. Jacinto Lumbreras (San Francisco de
Malabon), minister of state of the Sb.

Magdiwang and acting president when Mariano Alvarez was absent. Epifanio
Malia (Noveleta), Captain in the Magdiwang army.

Diego Mojica (San Francisco de Malabon), minister of finance in the Sb.

Magdiwang; formerly president of the Sb. Mapagtiis (the Katipunan council in
San Francisco de Malabon, which was merged into the

Magdiwang government in early 1897). Santos Nocon (San Francisco de

Malabon), Brigadier General in the Magdiwang army.

Nicolas Portilla (San Francisco de Malabon), Brigadier General in the

Magdiwang army; formerly secretary of Sb. Mapagtiis.

Nicolas Ricafrente (Noveleta), president of the Magdiwang municipal

council of Noveleta. Artemio Ricarte (Batac, Ilocos Norte; living in San Francisco
de Malabon),

Deputy Captain General of the Magdiwang army; formerly treasurer of Sb.

Mapagtiis.
Luciano San Miguel (Noveleta), Brigadier General in the Magdiwang army.
Ariston Villanueva (Noveleta), minister of war of Sb. Magdiwang, past
gobernadorcillo of Noveleta.

About the other 33 signatories, only snippets of information can be gleaned -

that Andres Villanueva, for example, was the son of Ariston Villanueva, and that
the Olaez and Angkiko families were prominent in the town of Noveleta. Still
resisting the temptation to dwell on the question of class, it should just be noted
that the Magdiwang leaders occupied much the same position in their
communities as did their Magdalo counterparts. They were not big landowners,
because the haciendas in northern Cavite were all held by the religious
corporations. Some had only modest means. Collectively, by virtue of their
political influence, relative educational attainment, and relative wealth, they
were indisputably members of the local elite.

More precisely, they belonged to the elite of Noveleta and San Francisco de
Malabon, two towns little more than four miles apart. The defection of leaders
from other towns- men like Severino de las Alas from Indang: José del Rosario
from Tanza: Emiliano Riego de Dios from Maragondon and Santiago Rillo from
Tuy in Batangas - had dramatically narrowed the territorial range of the
Magdiwang's representation and authority

The 'Acta de Tejeros': (ii) Outrage and Estrangement

The primary purpose of the "Acta", as already noted, was to nullify the Tejeros
elections. Copies of the document were to be dispatched to KKK branches of the
same accord ("canyon"), and members who had not attended the convention
would thereby be informed why its outcome was illegitimate. The majority at
Tejeros, the "Acta" affirms, had been gained by fraud. Almost all the ballot
papers for "their" (the Magdalo) candidates had been marked by just one person,
and had been issued to people who were not entitled to vote. The document
also reiterates one of the arguments Bonifacio had advanced for postponing the
elections - which a number of delegates had been unable to attend.

So deep was their resentment, though, that the "Acta" signatories did not wish
to confine their statement to the immediate injustice of the elections. They
wanted to place on record as well a number of grievances against the Magdalo
that pre-dated Tejeros, going back even to the outbreak of the revolution in
Cavite "we began the revolt and they came later." After the Magdalo had joined
the fray, the Magdiwang had helped them with donations of cash, food and
livestock, and when Magdalo towns had come under Spanish attack many
Magdiwang soldiers had sacrificed their lives in their defence. None of this
fraternal assistance, the "Acta" observes, had ever been reciprocated, and now it
had been rewarded by "an attempt to take our Presidency away from us by
fraud."

The Magdiwang council, the "Acta" declares, is not willing to be subordinate to

a government that is illegitimate. If anyone is to be subordinated, say the
signatories with the hint of a threat, it should be "them" (meaning Magdalo),
because they were the ones who "caused all the trouble" and who ought to be
put to right.

But in the immediate future the "Acta'' envisages only that loyal revolutionists
will keep their distance ("paglayo") from the Magdalo presidency, and will be
prepared to defend the Katipunan and the Magdiwang presidency to the death.
Beyond this talk of separation, the "Acta'' says nothing about what should
happen next. No call is raised for the election to be re-run. There is no pledge of
loyalty to the Supreme Council of the Katipunan as the still-rightful directing
body of the revolution, nor any proposal that the Supreme Congress should be
convened to frame a constitution, as had been agreed at the Imus assembly held
three months previously. Thoughts about the way forward had momentarily got
lost in a spate of recrimination.

Conclusion

Very probably the Magdiwang "loyalists" had good cause to be resentful; very
probably the elections at Tejeros were indeed marred by malpractice. But this
does not mean, of course, that the overall outcome would have been different
had they been orderly and clean. If the proclaimed result had been a travesty of
the convention's will, then surely the outery after the meeting would have been
much stronger, and would have prevailed.

It would be wrong to ask why the Magdiwang partisans "lost control" at Tejeros,
these notes have sought to show, because they had not been "in control even
when the convention was called to order. If there had been a time when the
Magdiwang. Bonifacio and their allies held the upper hand over the Magdalo,
that time had already passed. Magdiwang prestige and influence did not
suddenly collapse without warning at Tejeros; they had already been in decline
in the weeks before. A more pertinent line of questioning might be to ask what
exactly were the causes of the internal discord within the Magdiwang camp:
what precipitated the defections that debilitated its strength and presaged its
dissolution. The available sources, alas, allude to these causes only vaguely, and
often not at all.

Acta de Tejeros (English translation)

Here at Tejeros, within the jurisdiction of the town of Mapagtiis, of the

Magdiwang Presidency, this twenty-third day of March one thousand, eight
hundred and ninety-seven. I, the Minister of State and Acting President, Mr.
Jacinto Lumbreras, Bagong Bayan, fellow Ministers, Generals, Marshals,
Brigadiers, Colonels, Presidents and other leaders from the towns within the
jurisdiction of the said Presidency having offices with which they are vested,
each of us of legal age and competent, have convened together, and also with
Messrs. Andres Bonifacio, Maypagasa, esteemed Supremo; and Mariano
Alvarez, Mainam, the present President, and our agreement is as follows:

First: As regards the election of a President, Ministers, Generals and other

necessary officers, we came to an agreement with the other Presidency,
the Magdalo Presidency, and [the election] was accordingly held
yesterday at the aforementioned Tejeros, but we are not content because
it was not well conducted. We discovered that our Presidency in truth was
wronged, because almost all their ballot papers were written by just one
person, and [issued to] unqualified people so as to give them a majority.
We have learned that they conspired together, and for this reason we
consider that what happened there was invalid. No document, in fact, was
prepared to formalize the new arrangements, which needed our signed
endorsement. Yet another major deficiency was that some of our brother
chiefs were elsewhere and unable to attend.

Second: We have discovered their secret moves, audacious and improper, to

place our Presidency under their control. For some reason not known here
in our Presidency, General Emilio Aguinaldo invited the presidents in our
jurisdiction to consider a matter not mentioned in the printed letter.

Third: Two towns under their jurisdiction, Silang and Marinas, were
captured by the Spanish enemy, and very many of our soldiers died as a
result, and in addition to our having made contributions of cash, animals
and rice, we had many wounded and suffered other great losses. Thanks
to the mercy of God, not one of the towns under our jurisdiction has been
captured by the said enemy.
Fourth: Not once have we solicited any kind of aid from them, whereas they
have from us.

Fifth: Our people have been fighting practically day and night in order to
defend them, as well as contributing greatly in other ways, and the
reward has been an attempt to take our Presidency away from us by
fraud.

Sixth: We began the rebellion and they came later. In this regard, we have
realised that their actions towards us are not those of true brothers, and
we have agreed to distance ourselves from them so that our Presidency
cannot be made subordinate, whatever happens. They are the ones who
should submit and be put to right, because they caused all the trouble.
We ratify this document under a binding oath to commit our lives and
wealth to the defence and support of our said Presidency. All of us, other
affiliates and those who wish to become affiliates, will abide by this
document. Should any amongst us come to suffer misfortune, openly or
secretly, or be wickedly killed, we shall all investigate and shall not rest
until the perpetrator, if such there be, is found and duly punished. We
resolve also that should any amongst us betray this compact, we shall all
turn upon him without mercy. We shall likewise act vigorously to track
down individuals who presume to commit some vile treason against the
K.K.K. and the Presidency, or against any of our brethren. We shall pursue
them relentlessly and despatch them to the Presidency as soon as
possible for punishment. We conclude this compact in the name of the
revered Catipunan, all signing with our names, surnames and names in
the said Catipunan. Although we are many, we are united as one in our
sentiment, courage, solidarity, unworthiness and life. This resolution will
be kept securely in the Presidency, and printed copies will be despatched
to towns of the same accord to be likewise safely kept by brother
Presidents or other leaders. This was done on the month, day and year
above written.