REVERSION

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI
South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, ISAGANI DU
TIMBOL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS
CITY, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor

General Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for
petitioner.

Quitain Law Office for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South

Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, dated June 22, 1973,
dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 1253, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Defendants", instituted by
the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102 and
Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based thereon issued
in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol; to order the aforesaid
defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No. P-2508
and the defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree
the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain,
and granting such further relief as may be just and equitable in the
premises.

The land covered by the free patent and title in question was
originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966,
transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to
defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on
February 3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.

On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the
President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July
20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508
was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.

On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance

of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No.
1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate
of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null
and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question
to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground
that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not
disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of
the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is
situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said
land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside
the area which was reverted to the category of public forest,
whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was
filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter; that the
said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private
respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the
land applied for.

Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals  (G.R. No. L-

28591, 30 SCRA 207-301), holding that a certificate of title
fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud
consisted in misrepresenting that the land covered by the
application is part of the public domain when it is not, the
respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
Certificate of Title based on the patent had became indefeasible in
view of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38
of the Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the
ground of fraud. From this order of June 22, 1973, dismissing the
complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this
Court for review.

After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the

ground that the area covered by the patent and title is not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence
the patent and title thereto are null and void.

The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant

to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for
reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a
public forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or
forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the
Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the
Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as
agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable
under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the administration
of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his
jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and
authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest
reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of
products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the
Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest
or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the
Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the
area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by
the President on March 7, 1958. When the defendant Isagani Du
Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question
on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable or
alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private
parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is
not disposable public land but forest land are void ab initio.
In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p.
508, 512, this Court said:

And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no

jurisdiction to issue a patent because the land involved
was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it
 may be plausibly contended that the patent title would
be ab initio void, subject to attack at any time by any
party adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-
17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409
and 1421; Vaño vs. Insular Gov't., 41 Phil. 161; Aderable
vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960).

A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no
authority to do  so (Knight vs. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct.,
258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title
under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight,
lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or
when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same
because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said
certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally
included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)

The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct.

31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied upon by respondent Court in
dismissing this case, is not controlling. In that case no forest land
was involved but agricultural public land which was first covered by
a patent issued to one party and later registered under the Torrens
System by the other party. The litigation was between private
parties where the party who registered it under Act No. 496 sought
the nullity of the title of the patentee under the Public Land Act. In
the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and
reversion of the land is the state itself which is specifically
authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such
proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to
a private individual.

The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du

Timbol was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the
application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant
must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30
years; that the applicant, after diligent search by the Acting Chief of
the Survey-Party, Francisco R. Alcones, in South Cotabato, could
not be contacted because he is a resident of Davao City; that there
are no existing signs of improvements found in the area in question
as it is not under cultivation but covered with grasses, bushes and
small trees; that it is being used as ranch for grazing cows by the
heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot; that no monuments were placed on
the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no actual
survey thereof; that the property in question is inside the ranch of
the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement
No. 1244 and, therefore, inside the forest zone; and that said ranch
has a fence around it to show that other persons could not enter
and cultivate the same, and that the signature of then Acting
District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has been
forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du
Timbol.

The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing

of the application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven
would override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case
without hearing. The misrepresentations of the applicant that he
had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon
are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title
under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows:

That statements made in the application shall be

considered as essential conditions or parts of any
concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement thereon or omission
of facts, changing, or modifying the consideration of the
facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts
set forth in the application shall ipso facto  produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. ...

A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will

be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person
applies for registration of the land under his name although the
property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public
lands,  failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the
conditions imposed by law  is a ground for holding such title void
(Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696,
May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-80; emphasis supplied). The lapse
of the one year period within which a decree of title may be
reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to
hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if
such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law,
would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a
shield of fraud in securing title. (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938, page 38).

Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title

of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become
indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A
title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse
of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in
court by the Solicitor General, (Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-8278. 96 Phil. 946: Eugenio, et
al., vs. Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-7083, May 19, 1955; De los
Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G.R. No. L-6088,
Feb. 24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405).

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title

may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section
101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R.
No. L-14707, May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the
state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run
against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code).
The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred
prescription (Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al.,
G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348. People vs. Ramos,
G.R. No. L-15484, Jan. 31, 1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the
Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad 35 Phil. 728; 751-753).

Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol

can no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act, the
land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for
reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public
Land Act), for the remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by
the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such other relief as may
be just and equitable in the premises.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court,
dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, and that of
September 29, 1973, denying the motion for its reconsideration,
both issued in Civil Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are
hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent court shall proceed
to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly.

Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

 
 [G.R. No. 80687. April 10, 1989.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DIRECTOR OF LANDS,  petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
MARIANO, M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 23, Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS MICLAT,
JUAN C. PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE,  respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PROTECTS

INNOCENT TRANSFEREES FOR VALUE; TITLES OBTAINED
RENDERED INDEFEASIBLE AND CONCLUSIVE. — There
is noallegation in the complaint filed by the petitioner that any one
of the defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they
had acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent
transferees for value was never questioned in that pleading. Not
having been disproved, that status now accords to them the
protection of the Torrens System and renders the titles obtained by
them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not
change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044. Section 39 of the Land
Registration Act clearly provided: "Sec. 39. Every person receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of
title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrance except those noted on said certificate."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PIÑERO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 57 SCRA 386,
NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The decision in Piñero v.
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present proceeding because
the lands involved in that case had not yet passed to the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. They were still held by the Piñeros. The
action for reversion was filed by the government against them as the
original transferees of the properties in question. They were the direct
grantees of the free patents issued by the government pursuant to
which the corresponding certificates of title were issued under the
Torrens system. The fraud alleged by the government as a ground for
the reversion sought was imputable directly to the Piñeros, who could
not plead the status of innocent purchasers for value. The difference
between them and the private respondents is that the latter
acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after
several transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla in
1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for
value in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
3. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT LAND NO LONGER PART OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN; LAND REGISTRATION ACT, NOW CALLED "PRIVATE
REGISTRATION DECREE" GOVERNS. — The land being now
registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private
respondents, the government has no more control or jurisdiction
over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as the
Solicitor General contends — as if it made any difference — of the
Friar Lands. The subject property ceased to be public land when
OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the
latest from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full
payment of the purchase price. As private registered land, it is
governed by the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now
denominated the Property Registration Decree, which applies even
to the government. The pertinent provision of the Land Registration
Act was Section 122, which read as follows: Sec. 122. "Whenever
public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government
of the United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands
are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or
private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands." This
should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing
thus: "Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest, the Government will convey to
such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper
instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become
effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and
twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the Land Registration Act."
4. ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL TRANSFER OF LAND, MERELY AVOIDABLE,
NOT VOID AB-INITIO; LAND CEASES TO BE PUBLIC UPON
REGISTRATION AND ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. —
The petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer was null and
void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only voidable.
The land remained private as long as the title thereto had not been
voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the Court has held in
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. (30 SCRA 301): "A certificate of title
fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud
consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public
domain, although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from
the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as the land involved
in the present case does not belong to such category. OCT No. 282-
A would be merely voidable or reviewable. . . . Once a patent is
registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land
ceases to be part of public domain and becomes private property over
which the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A
public land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of
Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and becomes as indefeasible as
Torrens Title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of
issuance thereof."

DECISION

CRUZ, J  p:

The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground that

the original sale thereof from the government was tainted with fraud
because based on a forgery and therefore void ab initio. The present
holders of the property claiming to be innocent purchasers for value
and not privy to the alleged forgery, contend that the action cannot
lie against them.
The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of
78,865 square meters. 1 It was originally purchased on installment
from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who
allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa,
Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. 2 Tomasa and
Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. 3 In
1971 these three assignees purportedly signed a joint affidavit
which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support their claim
that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over
the said land on which they said they had already made full
payment 4 On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910
(Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of
the said affiants. 5 Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No.
55044 (replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the
register of deeds of Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio
Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal) Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval,
and Enrique Naval. 6
When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985,
the registered owners of the land, following several transfers, were
Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan C. Pulido under
TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval under
TCT No. 80394. 7 they were named as defendants and asked to
return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of
forgery and fraud. The plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having
died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959,
they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971,
on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) was
based. 8
In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in
the join affidavit and said they had all acquired the property in good
faith and for value. By way of affirmative defenses, they invoked
estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata. 9 For her part,
Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the
government had no cause of action against her because there
was no allegation that she had violated the plaintiff's right, that the
government was not the real party-in-interest because the subject
land was already covered by the Torrens system, and that in any
event the action was barred by prescription or laches. 10
The respondent court, in its order dated October 2, 1987, granted
the motion. 11 The petitioner, contesting this order, now insists
that it has a valid cause of action and that it is not barred by either
prescription or res judicata.
The Court will observe at the outset that the joint affidavit is indeed
a forgery. Apart from the fact that two of the supposed affiants were
already dead at the time they were supposed to have signed the
sworn statement, even the most cursory examination of the
document will show that the three signatures affixed thereto were
written by one and the same hand. 12 There is no doubt about it. It
is indeed difficult to understand how such an obvious forgery could
have deceived the people in the Bureau of Lands who processed the
papers of this case and made possible the fraudulent transfer of the
land.
But given such deception, would the sale itself be considered null
and void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all
titles derived therefrom also ineffectual ab initio? LLjur
We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the
complaint 13 filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants
was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired the
subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for
value was never questioned in that pleading. Not having been
disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the
Torrens System and renders the titles obtained by them thereunder
indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change despite the
flaw in TCT No. 55044.
 
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the
same free of all encumbrance except those noted on
said certificate.
The rulings on this provision are indeed as numerous as they are
consistent:
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of
the Land Reg. Act), every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and
in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
 encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and
any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and
enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims
and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned
by law as existing against the land prior to the issuance
of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not
noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the
whole world, including the government. 14
xxx xxx xxx
A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of
Sec. 39 of the Land Registration Act. 15
xxx xxx xxx
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land
registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once
the title was registered, the owner might rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. 16
The decision in Piñero v. Director of Lands 17 is not applicable to
the present proceeding because the lands involved in that case had
not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
They were still held by the Piñeros. The action for reversion was
filed by the government against them as the original transferees of
the properties in question. They were the direct grantees of the free
patents issued by the government pursuant to which the
corresponding certificates of title were issued under the Torrens
system. The fraud alleged by the government as a ground for the
reversion sought was imputable directly to the Piñeros, who could
not plead the status of innocent purchasers for value. cdphil
The difference between them and the private respondents is that the
latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact
after several transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla
in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for
value in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The petitioner
contends that it was Pedro Miclat who caused the falsification of the
joint affidavit, but that is a bare and hardly persuasive allegation,
and indeed, even if true, would still not prove any collusion between
him and the private respondents. The mere fact that Remedios
Miclat was the daughter and heiress of Miclat, without more, would
not necessarily visit upon her the alleged sins of her father.
The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension of
the juridical personality of her father and so cannot claim to be an
innocent purchaser for value because she is charged with
knowledge of her father's deceit. Such conclusion has no basis in
fact or law. Moreover, there is evidence that Remedios did not
merely inherit the land but actually purchased it for valuable
consideration and without knowledge of its original defect. The
agreement to subdivide, 18 which she presented to show that she
had acquired the land for valuable consideration, is more
acceptable than the conjectures of the petitioner. It is also
consonant with the presumption of good faith.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the
names of the private respondents, the government has no more
control or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public
domain or, as the Solicitor General contends — as if it made any
difference — of the Friar Lands. The subject property ceased to be
public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla
in 1910 or at the latest from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in
1971 upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registered
land, it is governed by the provisions of the Land Registration Act,
now denominated the Property Registration Decree, which applies
even to the government.
The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act was Section
122, which read as follows:
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the United
States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands
are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be
 brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and
shall become registered lands. 19
This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act,
providing thus:
Sec. 12.  . . . upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest, the Government will
convey to such settler and occupant the said land so
held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which
shall be issued and become effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec.
122) of the Land Registration Act.
The petitioner claims that it is not barred by the statute of
limitations because the original transfer of the land was null and
void ab initio and did not give rise to any legal right. The land
therefore continued to be part of the public domain and the action
for this reversion could be filed at any time. The answer to that is
the statement made by the Court in Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran
Patiwayan v. Martinez 20 that "even if respondent Tagwalan
eventually is proven to have procured the patent and the original
certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would not revert back
to the State," precisely because it has become private land.
Moreover, the petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer
was null and void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was
only voidable. The land remained private as long as the title thereto
had not been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the Court
has held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. 21
A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and
void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part of the public
domain, although it is not. In such case the nullity
arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact
that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands. Inasmuch as the land involved in the present
case does not belong to such category, OCT No. 282-A
would be merely voidable or reviewable (Vda. de
Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco, 110 Phil. 113): (1)
upon proof of actual fraud; (2) although valid and
 effective, until annulled or reviewed in a direct
proceeding therefor (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590),
not collaterally (Soroñgon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259,
262; Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184;
Henderson vs. Garrido, 90 Phil. 624, 630; Samonte vs.
Sambilon, 107 Phil. 198, 200); (3) within the statutory
period therefor (Sec. 38, Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico,
33 Phil. 363; Delos Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420;
Snyder vs. Provincial Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764;
Reyes vs. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791; Clemente vs. Lukban,
53 Phil. 931; Sugayan vs. Solis, 56 Phil. 276, 279; Heirs
of Lichauco vs. Director of Lands, 70 Phil. 69); (4) after
which, the title would be conclusive against the whole
world, including the Government (Legarda vs. Saleeby,
31 Phil. 590, 596; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil.
883; J. M. Tuason vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615).
And as we declared in Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources: 22
. . . Once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of
public domain and becomes private property over which
the director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in
the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable
Torrens Title, and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens
Title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of
issuance thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant
to a judicial decree, subject to review within one (1) year
from the date of the issuance of the patent. Beyond said
period, the action for the annulment of the certificate of
title issued upon the land grant can nolonger be
entertained. (Emphasis supplied)
It is worth observing here that in two earlier cases, the private
respondents were challenged by the heirs of Matilde Cenizal
Arguson but both were dismissed and the titles of the registered
owners were confirmed by the trial court. 23 This decision was later
sustained by this Court. 24 While this is not to say that the present
petition is barred by res judicata, as the government was not a
party in these cases, it does suggest that the issue it wants to rake
up now has long been settled. It should not be the subject of further
judicial inquiry, especially at this late hour. Litigation must stop at
some point instead of dragging on interminably.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity
of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a
piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid,
he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition
was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What
is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the
system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence
would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and
complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive if not
even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of
the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles
issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are
satisfied. As in this case. cdphil
 
We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith
and for value of the subject property and that the original
acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own
titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the
government.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,  concur.
|||  (Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, [April 10, 1989], 253 PHIL
732-742)
 [G.R. No. L-36507. June 14, 1974.]

ANTONIO PIÑERO, JR., EMMA BERNAD (assisted by

her husband Norberto Bernad) and
FORTUNATO PIÑERO, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE D
IRECTOR OFLANDS, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his
capacity as the Provincial Land
Officer of Zamboanga del Norte, MARIANO D.
PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy
Public Lands Inspector, NICANOR ALASAAS,
EUSEBIO CAMANSI and TOMAS
SUMALPONG, respondents, THE DIRECTOR OF LAND
S, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his capacity as the
Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte and
MARIANO D. PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy
Public Lands Inspector,respondents-appellants.

Porferio E. Mah  for petitioners-appellees.

Solicitor  General  Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor  General  Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Francisco J.
Bautista for respondents-appellants.

DECISION

BARREDO, J  p:

Appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the

Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in its Civil Case No.
1128, granting the writ of prohibition prayed for by appellees
against the appellant Director of Lands, the Provincial Land
Officer of the same province and other subordinate officials who, by
order of said director, had initiated an investigation of alleged fraud
claimed to have led to the issuance of the Free Patents and
corresponding Certificates of Title to the said appellees.
This appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on February
20, 1973, the decision of the trial court being based exclusively on a
stipulation of facts as follows:
"1. That Antonio Piñero, Jr., and Emma Piñero Bernad
are residents of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte; while
Fortunato Piñero is presently a resident of Negros
Oriental;
2. That the identities of Lots Nos. 5790, 5792 and 2532,
all of Pls-100, situated at Napuyan, Dapitan,
Zamboanga del Norte, are submitted (sic);
3. That Lot No. 5790, Pls - 100 is covered by Free
Patent No V-63411 issued January 30, 1957 in
favor of Antonio Piñero, Jr., and Lot No. 5792 Pls-100 is
covered by Free PatentNo. V-63420 issued on January
30, 1957 in favor of Emma Piñero Bernad, and that Lot
2532 is applied for by Fortunato Piñero under
Homestead Application No. V-66441 approved
as of January 2, 1953, but up to the present no Patent
has as yet been issued;
4. That Lot 2532 was formerly part of PSU-111118, a
private survey, executed by Surveyor Calixto Sudiacal in
1939 for Fortunato Piñero; and that by subsequent
survey executed by the ECA, Psu-111118 was
subdivided into smaller lots, one of which is now Lot
2532;
5. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63411, Original
Certificate of Title No. D-5349 was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in
favor of Antonio Piñero, Jr., on October 17, 1957;
6. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63420, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5312 was issued by
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, in
favor of Emma Piñero on October 17, 1957;
7. That on August 8, 1958, the Director of Lands issued
an order directing the investigation of the
protest of Eusebio Camansi, against the patented
application of AntonioPiñero, Jr., a copy of said order
being found on page 14 of the expediente; and that on
March 24, 1959 the Director of Lands thru the Chief
Legal Division directed the Provincial Land Officer at
Dipolog, to investigate the protest of Nicanor Alasaas
against the patented
application of Emma Piñero Bernad, a copy of said
order is also being on page 15 ofthe expediente;
8. That as regards Lot 5790 Pls-100 the
protest of Eusebio Camansi has been given due course
against the claim of Antonio Piñero, Jr., which protest
has been investigated and terminated, Antonio Piñero,
Jr., being represented by his counsel Atty. Jesus
Sarmiento;
9. That Nicanor Alasaas filed his protest dated February
27, 1958 and subscribed on March 11, 1958, before
Notary Public, G.R. Dalmacio, Jr., a copy is hereto
attached as Exhibit A; and that the protest of Nicanor
Alasaas has been investigated by Atty. Mariano D.
Palermo, investigator of the Bureau of Lands, Dipolog,
Zamboanga del Norte on August 30, 1959;
10. That with respect to Lot 5792 the same has already
been investigated and regarding Lot 5790 the
investigation has already been terminated
but no decision has as yet been issued;
11. That with respect to the claim of Tomas Sumalpong
against the application of Fortunato Piñero an
investigation was conducted on August 21, 1959 but
neither FortunatoPiñero nor counsel appeared; that
when the said case was rescheduled for October 30,
1959, Atty. Jaime T. Hamoy counsel for
Fortunato Piñero filed a motion for postponement on
the ground that said counsel had a Criminal Case to
attend to in the Justice of the Peace Court of Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte, after which the hearing was
rescheduled for December 28, 1959; that in said
hearing counsel for Fortunato Piñero for the first time
attacked the authority of the investigation on the
alleged ground that under the Revised Administrative
Code only the Director of Lands and
Chief of Section of said Office can order
investigation of land conflicts; that up to the
present no resolution of that issue has as yet been
made; and that no written motion bearing on the same
ground interposed before the investigator was ever
raised before the Director of Lands;
12. That pursuant to a letter of Atty. Candido Pa.
Sumalpong as counsel for Tomas Sumalpong under
date of July 28, 1959, protesting against the above-
mentioned homestead
application of Fortunato Piñero which letter was
addressed to the Director of Lands thru the Provincial
Land Officer at Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, the said
Provincial Land Officer in the first indorsement dated
July 22, 1959 addressed to Deputy
Public Lands Inspector, Mariano D. Palermo, directed
the investigation of the case until the said case is
terminated for disposition under the
provision of Land Administrative Order No. 13-3 that
the said first indorsement was the sole authority for the
investigationof the claim of said Tomas Sumalpong
against the homestead application of Fortunato Piñero;
that as above stated the investigation of the
claim of Tomas Sumalpong was not terminated because
counsel for Fortunato Piñero attacked the authority for
the said investigation;
13. That in connection with the separate petition of the
respondents, Nicanor Alasaas, Eusebio Camansi and
Tomas Sumalpong against the application of the
petitioners the same respondents were required by the
Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands in a
letter dated September 4, 1959 to file a sworn protest
and pay the protest fee within a period of thirty days
from the receipt of the said letter, otherwise the
respondents claim will be dismissed and disregarded
 without further notice; that a copy of said letter is
hereto attached as an integral part of this
stipulation of facts as Exhibit "B"; that there
is no showing that respondents complied with the said
letter nor is there any showing that the claim of the
respondents are already dismissed (that is as of this
date); that on December 18, 1959 the petitioners, thru
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the alleged protest
but up to the present no resolution on said motion has
ever been made; that as shown by this
letter of September 4, 1959 which was addressed to
Antonio Mabulay, Annex "B" respondents Tomas
Sumalpong, Nicanor Alasaas and Eusebio Camansi
were not given copy of this letter, and that the
motion of counsel for the "Dismiss the Protest" (sic) does
not show that respondents Tomas Sumalpong, Eusebio
Camansi and Nicanor Alasaas were ever furnished a
copy of said motion;
14. That the Director of Lands was actually served with
summons on January 20, 1960 as shown by the
return of the City Sheriff of Manila, which return
appears on page 25of the record of this case;
15. That for all matters not covered by this
stipulation of facts parties agree to ask for a date for the
reception of evidence."
We hold the appeal to be meritorious. In the light of the facts
disclosed in the foregoing stipulation, We reiterate
Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12777, May 22, 1961, 2
SCRA 25, wherein We held that it is not only the right but the
duty of the Director of Lands to conduct the investigation of any
alleged fraud in securing a free patent and the corresponding title to
a public land and to file the corresponding court action for the
reversion of the same to the State, if the facts disclosed in the
course of such investigation should so warrant. Consequently,
prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such an investigation despite
the existence of a Torrens title.
Indeed, it is to be clarified that Section 91 of the Public Land
Act leaves no other alternative to the Director of Lands. The
provision reads thus:
"SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall
be considered as essential conditions and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in such statements,
and any subsequent modification, alteration, or
change of the material facts set forth in the application
shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the
duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and
whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the material facts set out in the application are
true, or whether they continue to exist and are
maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the
purpose of such investigation, theDirector of Lands is
hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory
process from the courts. In every investigation made in
accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith,
fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal
modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the
grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to
obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully
issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized
delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct
and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the
basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may
issue without further proceedings."
 
Underlying this section and providing its justification is the
Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution of 1935, in force during the material dates ofthe events
herein involved, declaring that "all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain . . . and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State . . . ." And under
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, "the scope of this
constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language,
embraces all lands of any kind ofthe public domain, its purpose
being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation."
Accordingly, the right to acquire disposable lands from the State
through any of the means provided for in the Public Land
Act, Commonwealth Act 141, must necessarily be subject to the
reservation expressly made in above quoted Section 91 to the effect
that "the statement made in the application shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of any . . . title . . . issued on the
basis of such application" and that "any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any
subsequent modification, alteration or change of the material facts
set forth in the application shall ipso facto 1 produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted."
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a
Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a homestead
patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated
previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been
emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file
an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made
clear that an action for reversion may be instituted by the
Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. 2 It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in
fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to
benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever
existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into
the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to
the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other
officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding
action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain,
subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in
accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title
over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by
the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the
purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud
had been committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
Nothing said above, however, should be understood as holding that
the Court has found that the titles of appellees have been in fact
fraudulently secured. That matter may be resolved only after
the Director of Lands shall have finished his investigation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is
reversed and the writ of prohibition sought by appellees is denied.
Costs against appellees.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,
Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino,
JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
|||  (Piñero, Jr. v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-36507, [June 14,
1974], 156 PHIL 382-388)
 [G.R. No. 147379. February 27, 2002.]

HEIRS OF AMBROCIO KIONISALA, namely, ANA,

ISABEL, GRACE, JOVEN and CARMELO, all
surnamed KIONISALA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
HONORIO DACUT, namely: VISAMINDA D.
OREVILLO, VIOLETA DACUT,
JOSEPHINE DACUT and
ELIZABETH DACUT,  respondents.

Abundio L. Okit for petitioners.

Constantino A. Cabacungan for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of

titles, reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They claimed
absolute ownership of Lots 1015 and 1017 located in Pongol,
Libona, Bukidnon even prior to the issuance of the corresponding
free patents and certificates of title in favor of petitioners. After
petitioners filed their answer, a hearing on the affirmative defenses
was set. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the cause of action of private respondents was truly for
reversion, so that only the Director of Lands could have filed the
complaint, and that the certificate of non-forum shopping
accompanying the complaint did not comply with the standard form
of such undertaking. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the
order of dismissal by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.
The Court ruled that it was obvious that private respondents
alleged in their complaint all the facts necessary to seek the
nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title
covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in
interest in light of their allegations that they have always been the
owners and possessors of the two parcels of land even prior to the
issuance of the documents of title in petitioners' favor, hence, the
latter could only have committed fraud in securing them. Further,
private respondents have sufficiently pleaded an action for
reconveyance, more specifically, one which is based on implied
trust. In the complaint, private respondents clearly asserted that
they were fraudulently deprived of ownership thereof when
petitioners obtained free patents and certificates of title in their
names. This allegation certainly measured up to the requisite
statement of facts to constitute an action for reconveyance.
The Court also agreed with the Court of Appeals that private
respondents did not altogether dispense with the certificate of non-
forum shopping. What is involved here is a certification several
sentences short of the standard form. Verily, this Court can only
presume innocent reasons — as there was no reason for pursuing a
contrary belief — for the omissions of the other standard
statements therein.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; TEST

FOR SUFFICIENCY OF FACTS. — The test of the sufficiency of the
facts to constitute a cause of action is whether admitting the facts
alleged the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint. In answering this
query, only the facts asserted in the complaint must be taken into
account without modification although with reasonable inferences
therefrom.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY STATES EITHER CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF FREE PATENTS AND
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OR FOR RECONVEYANCE; CASE AT
BAR. — Applying the test to the case at bar, we rule that the
complaint does not allege an action for reversion which private
respondents would obviously have no right to initiate, but that it
sufficiently states either a cause of action for declaration of nullity
of free patents and certificates of title over Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 or
alternatively a cause of action for reconveyance of these two pieces
of realty, wherein in either case private respondents are the real
parties in interest.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF FREE
PATENTS AND CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND ACTION FOR
REVERSION, DIFFERENTIATED. — An ordinary civil action for
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not
the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them
lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty
whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership
of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga where the plaintiff
in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the
cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title because even if
the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land
embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment
would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for
reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would
be the Director of Lands. On the other hand, a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would
require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot
prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as
well as the defendant's fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of
land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly
not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and
whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is
consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the
State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership
over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to
the defendant.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NULLIFICATION OF FREE PATENTS, NOT
ESSENTIAL TO SPECIFICALLY STATE IN COMPLAINT ACTUAL
DATE WHEN COMPLAINANTS BECAME OWNERS AND
POSSESSORS OF SUBJECT LOT. — It is obvious that private
respondents allege in their complaint all the facts necessary to seek
the nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title
covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in
interest in light of their allegations that they have always been the
owners and possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to
the issuance of the documents of title in petitioners' favor, hence
the latter could only have committed fraud in securing them. It is
not essential for private respondents to specifically state in the
complaint the actual date when they became owners and
possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. The allegations to the effect
that they were so preceding the issuance of the free patents and the
certificates of title, i.e., "the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the
same not being anymore public but already private property," are
unquestionably adequate as a matter of pleading to oust the State
of jurisdiction to grant the lots in question to petitioners. If at all,
the oversight in not alleging the actual date when private
respondents' ownership thereof accrued reflects a mere deficiency
in details which does not amount to a failure to state a cause of
action. The remedy for such deficiency would not be a motion to
dismiss but a motion for bill of particulars so as to enable the filing
of appropriate responsive pleadings. CDaSAE
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECONVEYANCE; ELUCIDATED. — It is settled that
in reconveyance the free patent and the certificate of title are
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer
of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's name. All
that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which
admitting them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to recover title
to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of
the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him
of the same.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BASED ON IMPLIED TRUST; CASE AT BAR. —
We rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in
addition to the cause of action for declaration of free patents and
certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more specifically,
one which is based on implied trust. An implied trust arises where
the defendant (or in this case petitioners) allegedly acquires the
disputed property through mistake or fraud so that he (or they)
would be bound to hold and reconvey the property for the benefit of
the person who is truly entitled to it. In the complaint, private
respondents clearly assert that they have long been the absolute
and exclusive owners and in actual possession and cultivation of
Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of
ownership thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and
certificates of title in their names. These allegations certainly
measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an
action for reconveyance.
7. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; COMPLAINT; EVIDENTIARY MATTER
NEED NOT BE ASSEVERATED. — It is easy to see why the
allegations demanded by petitioners are unnecessary, even
improper, in a complaint. Whether petitioners are innocent
purchasers for value of the contested lots is a matter of defense that
private respondents need not anticipate in their complaint;
indubitably it lies upon petitioners' discretion to allege this fact in
their answer perhaps to bar recovery of the two pieces of realty.
Moreover, private respondents do not have to asseverate in the
complaint the documents proving their alleged sources of title.
These matters are evidentiary details which undoubtedly
find noplace in a complaint. Being matters of evidence proving the
ultimate fact of ownership averred by private respondents, the
disclosure of such evidence must await either the proceedings for
discovery or pre-trial or even the trial proper. It should also be
stressed that in pleading the ownership of a parcel of land in an
action for recovery of ownership/possession thereof, all that
plaintiff is required to state in the complaint are — ". . . a disseisin
and its continuance by the defendant . . . Plaintiff was not required
and did not allege the source and kind of title under which it
claimed, and under the complaint, it was at liberty to introduce
proof of any legal title which it possessed. Conversely, the
defendants were at liberty to introduce all legally admissible
evidence tending to show that title was not in the plaintiff. Hence,
they had the right to show that the legal title was in themselves.
For, if legal title to the property were shown to be in the defendants,
the evidence of the plaintiff that title belonged to it would certainly
be met . . . It must be furthermore remembered that . . . plaintiff is
allowed to make up his complaint in an action to recover possession
of land without disclosing the title which he intends to rely
upon." cTCaEA
 
8. CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP;
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
FREE PATENTS AND CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND
RECONVEYANCE TANTAMOUNT TO QUIETING OF TITLE WHICH
IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. — We rule that neither the action for
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title of Lot
1015 and Lot 1017 nor the action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust of the same lots has prescribed. We have ruled that "a
free patent issued over private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever. Quos nullum est, nullum
producit effectum." Moreover, private respondents' claim of open,
public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the two (2)
parcels of land and its illegal inclusion in the free patents of
petitioners and in their original certificates of title, also amounts to
an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. The action for
reconveyance based on implied trust, on the other hand, prescribes
only after ten (10) years from 1990 and 1991 when the free patents
and the certificates of title over Lot 1017 and Lot 1015, respectively,
were registered. Obviously the action had not prescribed when
private respondents filed their complaint against petitioners on 19
December 1995. At any rate, the action for reconveyance in the case
at bar is also significantly deemed to be an action to quiet title for
purposes of determining the prescriptive period on account of
private respondents' allegations of actual possession of the disputed
lots. In such a case, the cause of action is truly imprescriptible.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94; CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
SHORT OF STANDARD FORM ACCEPTABLE. — We agree with the
Court of Appeals that private respondents did not altogether
dispense with the certificate of non-forum shopping. What is
involved here is a certification several sentences short of the
standard form as it only states: "That we have not filed any case in
any court or bodies affecting the same subject matter." While this
manner of formulating the certification is indeed deplorable, its
presence in the complaint nonetheless shows the intention of
private respondents to comply with the standard form. Verily, we
can only presume innocent reasons — as there is no reason for
pursuing a contrary belief — for the omissions of the other standard
statements therein. In Cabardo v. Court of Appeals where the
certificate of non-forum shopping was found deficient in details we
ruled ". . . petitioner's failure to state in the certificate of non-forum
shopping that he undertakes to inform the Court of any petition
which might be filed, as required under Revised Circular No. 28-91,
may be overlooked since it does not appear that any petition related
to this case has ever been filed in any other court. On the other
hand, to dismiss the petition on this ground would be to uphold
technicality over substantial justice." For the same reason
that no case related to the complaint filed by private respondents
has been filed by them in any other court, we rule pro hac vice that
the contested certificate of non-forum shopping is substantial
compliance with the rules. Indeed to hold otherwise would only
further delay the disposition of the original dispute between
petitioners and private respondents concerning the ownership of Lot
1015 and Lot 1017.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

ONCE MORE we are faced with the erroneous application of what

are perceived to be elementary rules of pleading. The
misapprehension of the basic concepts underlying these rules can
be befuddling, but what is worse, the lost man-hours spent in
untangling the ensuing allegations of pleading errors causing
unnecessary delay in the adjudication of cases. Instead of
immediately resolving the original dispute and adjudicating the
merits of conflicting claims, which in the instant petition involves
the ownership of two (2) parcels of land with the sizable area of
187,718 square meters, the judicial process is unfortunately wasted
in the maze of unfounded claims of deficiencies in the parties'
pleadings.
On 19 December 1995 private respondents filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of titles, reconveyance and damages against
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-312 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. This complaint involved two (2)
parcels of land known as Lot No. 1017 and Lot No. 1015 with areas
of 117,744 square meters and 69,974 square meters respectively,
located in Pongol, Libona, Bukidnon. On 7 September 1990 Lot No.
1017 was granted a free patent to petitioners Heirs of
Ambrocio Kionisala under Free Patent No. 603393, and on 13
November 1991 Lot 1015 was bestowed upon Isabel Kionisala, one
of the impleaded heirs of Ambrocio Kionisalaunder Free Patent No.
101311-91-904. Thereafter, on 19 November 1990 Lot 1017 was
registered under the Torrens system and was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-19819 in petitioners' name, while on 5
December 1991 Lot No. 1015 was registered in the name of
Isabel Kionisala under Original Certificate of Title No. P-20229.
In support of their causes of action for declaration of nullity of titles
and reconveyance, private respondents claimed absolute ownership
of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to the issuance of the
corresponding free patents and certificates of title. They further
alleged in their complaint —
. . . 2. That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners
and in actual possession and cultivation of two parcels
of agricultural lands herein particularly described as
follows [technical description of Lot 1015 and Lot
1017] . . . 3. That plaintiffs became absolute and
exclusive owners of the abovesaid parcels of land by
virtue of inheritance from their late father,
Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the same from a
certain Blasito Yacapin and from then on was in
possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in the
concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. In fact
Honorio Dacut has had this parcels of land rented by
the Philippine Packing Corporation for more than
twenty years (20) up to the present time; 4. That
recently, plaintiff discovered that defendants, without
the knowledge and consent of the former, fraudulently
applied for patent the said parcels of land and as a
result thereof certificates of titles had been issued to
them as evidenced by certificate of title No. P-19819 in
the name of the Hrs. of Ambrocio Kionisala and No. P-
20229 in the name of Isabel Kionisala, xerox copies of
the titles hereto attached and marked as annexes "A"
and "B" and made part hereof; 5. That the patents
issued to defendants are null and void, the same having
 been issued fraudulently, defendants not having been
and/or in actual possession of the litigated properties
and the statement they may have made in their
application are false and without basis in fact, and, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources not
having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not
being anymore public but already private property; 6.
That in the remote possibility that said certificates of
title cannot be declared as null and void, plaintiffs,
being the absolute and exclusive owners of the parcels
of land titled by the defendants, are entitled to
reconveyance . . . WHEREFORE, premises considered, it
is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that
judgment issue: 1. declaring certificates of title No. P-
19819 and P-20229, null and void, and in the event
that this remedy is not possible, ordering defendants to
reconvey to plaintiffs the land subject matter of this
litigation . . .
The complaint was accompanied by a verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping which affirmed under oath thus —
I, VISAMINDA DACUT OREVILLO, after being duly
sworn, states: That I am one of the plaintiffs in the
above-entitled case; that we have caused the
preparation and filing of the same and that all
allegations contained therein are true and correct to the
best of my own knowledge; That we have not filed any
case in any court or bodies affecting the same subject
matter.
On 7 February 1996 petitioners filed their answer to the complaint
and asserted the following affirmative defenses —
8. That the complaint states no cause of action; 9. That
the cause of action, if any, is barred by statute of
limitations, prescription of action or by equitable
principle of laches; 10. That . . . it is only the Director of
Lands (now DENR) through the Office of the
Solicitor General that has the authority to file
annulment of Free Patent or Homestead Patent issued
 by the Director of Lands or DENR; That the complaint is
not supported by certification of non-forum shopping as
required by Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the
Supreme Court . . .
Petitioners set for hearing their affirmative defenses. After the
hearing, or on 3 December 1996 the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action of private
respondents was truly for reversion so that only the Director of
Lands could have filed the complaint, and that the certificate of
non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint did not comply
with the standard form for such undertaking. 1 On 23 December
1996 private respondents moved for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal but on 3 June 1997 the motion was denied
by the trial court.
On 7 June 1997 private respondents appealed the order of
dismissal to the Court of Appeals. On 15 February 2000 the
appellate court promulgated its assailed Decisionreversing the order
of dismissal. 2 The Court of Appeals ruled that while the
allegations in the complaint were insufficient for purposes of
an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of a certificate
of title since the actual date when private respondents became
owners of Lots 1015 and 1017 prior to the issuance of the
corresponding free patents and certificates of title was not
specifically indicated in the complaint, nonetheless the
allegations therein were comprehensive enough to constitute a
cause of action for reconveyance. 3 The appellate court
concluded: "On this score, it was reversible error for the lower court
to have dismissed the complaint . . . because in an action for
reconveyance, what is sought is the transfer of the property which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's
name, to its rightful and legal owner or to one with a better
right . . . ." 4 The appellate court likewise found substantial
compliance in the certificate of non-forum shopping 5 by
citing Cabardov. Court of Appeals  6 and Kavinta  v. Court of
Appeals. 7
 
On 7 March 2000 petitioners moved for reconsideration of the
CA Decision. On 22 January 2001 the appellate court denied the
motion for lack of merit, hence this petition for review.
At the core of the instant petition is the issue of sufficiency of the
complaint filed by private respondents. Verily, does the complaint
allege an action for reversion which private respondents would
have no right to file or institute? Or does the complaint state a
cause of action for declaration of nullity of the free patents and
certificates of title for Lot 1015 and Lot 1017, or alternatively a
cause of action for reconveyance of these two lots? Has the cause of
action, if any, prescribed? And does the certificate of non-forum
shopping substantially comply with the standard requirement?
First. The test of the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of
action is whether admitting the facts alleged the court could render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint. 8 In answering this query, only the facts asserted in
the complaint must be taken into account without modification
although with reasonable inferences therefrom. 9
Applying the test to the case at bar, we rule that the complaint does
not allege an action for reversion which private respondents would
obviously have no right to initiate, but that it sufficiently states
either a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patents and
certificates of title over Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 or alternatively a
cause of action for reconveyance of these two pieces of realty,
wherein in either case private respondents are the real parties in
interest.
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and
certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. 10 The
difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of
ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an
action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint
would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence
in Gabila v. Barriga 11 where the plaintiff in his complaint admits
that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of
the defendant's title because even if the title were canceled or
amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the
portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public
domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only
person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free
patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the
plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of
such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's
fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff.
In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or
deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of
title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. 12 The real
party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-
existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even
before the grant of title to the defendant. In Heirs of Marciano
Nagano v. Court of Appeals  13 we ruled —
. . . from the allegations in the complaint . . . private
respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter
portion for having possessed it in the concept of an
owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and
adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the
lot is private land . . . Consequently, merely on the basis
of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is
apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free
Patent. Hence, the dismissal of private respondents'
complaint was premature and trial on the merits should
have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
It would have been entirely different if the action were
clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be
instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section
101 of C.A. No. 141 . . .
It is obvious that private respondents allege in their complaint all
the facts necessary to seek the nullification of the free patents as
well as the certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017.
Clearly, they are the real parties in interest in light of their
allegations that they have always been the owners and possessors
of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to the issuance of the
documents of title in petitioners' favor, hence the latter could only
have committed fraud in securing them —
. . . That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners
and in actual possession and cultivation of two parcels
of agricultural lands herein particularly described as
follows [technical description of Lot 1017 and Lot
1015] . . . 3. That plaintiffs became absolute and
exclusive owners of the abovesaid parcels of land by
virtue of inheritance from their late father,
Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the same from a
certain Blasito Yacapin and from then on was in
possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in the
concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years . . . 4.
That recently, plaintiff discovered that defendants,
without the knowledge and consent of the former,
fraudulently applied for patent the said parcels of land
and as a result thereof certificates of titles had been
issued to them as evidenced by certificate of title No. P-
19819 in the name of the Hrs. of Ambrocio Kionisala,
and No. P-20229 in the name of Isabel Kionisala . . . 5.
That the patents issued to defendants are null and void,
the same having been issued fraudulently, defendants
not having been and/or in actual possession of the
litigated properties and the statement they may have
made in their application are false and without basis in
fact, and, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties
the same not being anymore public but already private
property . . .
It is not essential for private respondents to specifically state in the
complaint the actual date when they became owners and
possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. The allegations to the effect
that they were so preceding the issuance of the free patents and the
certificates of title, i.e., "the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the
same not being anymore public but already private property," are
unquestionably adequate as a matter of pleading to oust the State
of jurisdiction to grant the lots in question to petitioners. If at all,
the oversight in not alleging the actual date when private
respondents' ownership thereof accrued reflects a mere deficiency
in details which does not amount to a failure to state a cause of
action. The remedy for such deficiency would not be a motion to
dismiss but a motion for bill of particulars so as to enable the filing
of appropriate responsive pleadings. 14
With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is
settled that in this kind of action the free patent and the certificate
of title are respected as incontrovertible.15 What is sought instead
is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's
name. 16 All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts
which admitting them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to
recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was
the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally
dispossessed him of the same. 17
We rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in
addition to the cause of action for declaration of free patents and
certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more specifically,
one which is based on implied trust. An implied trust arises where
the defendant (or in this case petitioners) allegedly acquires the
disputed property through mistake or fraud so that he (or they)
would be bound to hold and reconvey the property for the benefit of
the person who is truly entitled to it. 18 In the complaint, private
respondents clearly assert that they have long been the absolute
and exclusive owners and in actual possession and cultivation of
Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of
ownership thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and
certificates of title in their names. These allegations certainly
measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an
action for reconveyance.
Petitioners would nonetheless insist that private respondents
should have also alleged, in addition to "possession in the concept
of owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely
for thirty (30) years at the least," the statement that Lot 1015 and
Lot 1017 have not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
Petitioners also proffer the trifling argument that (apparently in
order to render sufficient for pleading purposes the allegations of
ownership) private respondents should have attached to their
complaint the documents which would prove the sources of their
title to the disputed parcels of land.
It is easy to see why the allegations demanded by petitioners are
unnecessary, even improper, in a complaint. Whether petitioners
are innocent purchasers for value of the contested lots is a matter
of defense that private respondents need not anticipate in their
complaint; indubitably it lies upon petitioners' discretion to allege
this fact in their answer perhaps to bar recovery of the two pieces of
realty. 19 Moreover, private respondents do not have to asseverate
in the complaint the documents proving their alleged sources of
title. These matters are evidentiary details which undoubtedly
find no place in a complaint. Being matters of evidence proving the
ultimate fact of ownership averred by private respondents, the
disclosure of such evidence must await either the proceedings for
discovery or pre-trial or even the trial proper. It should also be
stressed that in pleading the ownership of a parcel of land in an
action for recovery of ownership/possession thereof, all that
plaintiff is required to state in the complaint are —
 
. . . a disseisin and its continuance by the defendant . . .
Plaintiff was not required and did not allege the source
and kind of title under which it claimed, and under the
complaint, it was at liberty to introduce proof of any
legal title which it possessed. Conversely, the
defendants were at liberty to introduce all legally
admissible evidence tending to show that title was not
in the plaintiff. Hence, they had the right to show that
the legal title was in themselves. For, if legal title to the
property were shown to be in the defendants, the
evidence of the plaintiff that title belonged to it would
certainly be met . . . It must be furthermore
remembered that . . . plaintiff is allowed to make up his
complaint in an action to recover possession of land
without disclosing the title which he intends to rely
upon. 20
Second. We rule that neither the action for declaration of nullity of
free patents and certificates of title of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 nor
the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust of the same
lots has prescribed. We have ruled that "a free patent issued over
private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects
whatsoever. Quos nullum est, nullum producit
effectum." 21 Moreover, private respondents' claim of open, public,
peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the two (2) parcels
of land and its illegal inclusion in the free patents of petitioners and
in their original certificates of title, also amounts to an action for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible. 22
The action for reconveyance based on implied trust, on the other
hand, prescribes only after ten (10) years from 1990 and 1991 when
the free patents and the certificates of title over Lot 1017 and Lot
1015, respectively, were registered. Obviously the action had not
prescribed when private respondents filed their complaint against
petitioners on 19 December 1995. At any rate, the action for
reconveyance in the case at bar is also significantly deemed to be an
action to quiet title for purposes of determining the prescriptive
period on account of private respondents' allegations of actual
possession of the disputed lots. 23 In such a case, the cause of
action is truly imprescriptible. 24
Third. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents
did not altogether dispense with the certificate of non-forum
shopping. What is involved here is a certification several sentences
short of the standard form as it only states: "That we have not filed
any case in any court or bodies affecting the same subject matter."
While this manner of formulating the certification is indeed
deplorable, its presence in the complaint nonetheless shows the
intention of private respondents to comply with the standard form.
Verily, we can only presume innocent reasons — as there
is no reason for pursuing a contrary belief — for the omissions of
the other standard statements therein. In Cabardo  v. Court of
Appeals  25 where the certificate of non-forum shopping was found
deficient in details we ruled —
. . . petitioner's failure to state in the certificate of non-
forum shopping that he undertakes to inform the Court
of any petition which might be filed, as required
 under Revised Circular No. 28-91, may be overlooked
since it does not appear that any petition related to this
case has ever been filed in any other court. On the other
hand, to dismiss the petition on this ground would be to
uphold technicality over substantial justice.
For the same reason that no case related to the complaint filed by
private respondents has been filed by them in any other court, we
rule pro hac vice  that the contested certificate of non-forum
shopping is substantial compliance with the rules. Indeed to hold
otherwise would only further delay the disposition of the original
dispute between petitioners and private respondents concerning the
ownership of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. We note that their conflicting
claims could have been resolved by now if not for the erroneous
application of the elementary rules of pleading which resulted in the
premature dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondents.
This Court need not repeat the fastidious and unfounded adherence
to technicality which already stalled for an unfortunate seven (7)
years more or less the proceedings in the trial court.
In sum, the grounds relied upon in petitioners' desire to dismiss the
complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 95-312 cannot
be impressed with merit. By this decision, however, we are not
foreclosing the presentation of evidence during trial on the merits
that Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 are not private property and that
private respondents are not truly the owners thereof. This and other
issues on the merits must follow where the preponderant evidence
lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision  of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February
2000 reversing the Order  dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 95-312 entitled Heirs of Honorio Dacut, namely,
Visaminda Orevillo, Violeta  Dacut, Josephine  Dacut and
Elizabeth Dacut  v. Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala, namely, Ana,
Isabel, Grace, Ophelia, Joven and Camilo, all surnamed Kionisala,
and Isabel  Kionisala is AFFIRMED with the understanding that
private respondents Heirs of Honorio Dacut as plaintiffs therein
may proceed on the basis of their causes of action of declaration of
nullity of free patents and certificates of titles and/or reconveyance
based on an implied trust, with claim for damages. The proceedings
in the trial court shall commence forthwith within thirty (30) days
from notice of the finality of this Decision without unnecessary
delay. SHIETa
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, G.R. No. 147379,
[February 27, 2002], 428 PHIL 249-266)
 [G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005.]

NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO,

LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G.
TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E.
COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO
C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J.
RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE
LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE,
ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD LUMIQUED,
LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C.
TEMERAS, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO
M. SANTIAGO,respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64957, 1 affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil
Case No. 1220, 2 dismissing petitioners' Complaint for
declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and
possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay
San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject
Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April
1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a certain Ismael Favila y
Rodriguez. 3
According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was
part of a vast tract of land called "Hacienda Quibiga," which
extended to Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas,
Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan,
Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the
Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila
claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a
Special Power of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid" on 25
February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of
Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to the
petitioners, each portion measuring around 500 to 1,000 square
meters, in exchange for the labor and work done on the Subject
Property by the petitioners and their predecessors. 4
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to
evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had
actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed
that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270,
all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of
respondent. 5
OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondent's mother, Isabel
Manahan y Francisco, and three other individuals, pursuant to
Decree No. 10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of the
Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands. The whole
property covered by OCT No. 670 was subsequently adjudicated in
favor of Isabel ManahanSantiago (formerly Isabel Manahan y
Francisco). Consequently, OCT No. 670 was cancelled and TCT No.
T-53028 was issued exclusively in the name of Isabel
Manahan Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel
Manahan Santiago executed a Deed of Donation transferring the
property to her son, respondent herein, who subsequently secured
TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270 in his own name. 6
Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for
declaration of nullity of respondent's certificates of title on the basis
that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. Among the defects of
OCT No. 670 pointed out by petitioners were that: (1) OCT No. 670
was not signed by a duly authorized officer; (2) Material data
therein were merely handwritten and in different penmanships; (3)
OCT No. 670 was not printed on the Official Form used in 1913, the
year it was issued; (4) It failed to indicate the Survey Plan which
was the basis of the Technical Description of the property covered
by the title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred to in OCT No. 670 was
issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No. 670 was issued earlier,
on 13 February 1913; and (6) Decree No. 10248 was issued over a
property other than the one described in OCT No. 670, although
also located in the Province of Rizal. 7
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on
the Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996. According to respondent,
"[t]he allegations in the Complaint would readily and patently show
that the same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious, without basis in law
and in fact. . . " 8
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners
had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint
stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and
authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondent's land
titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and
conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world. 9
Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon.
Emmanuel M. Muñoz, et al. and Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation v. Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et
al., 10 respondent argued that the Spanish title, on which
petitioners based their claim, was neither indefeasible nor
imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 892, which
took effect on 16 February 1976, required all holders of Spanish
titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands
under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, 11 within six months from effectivity of the decree.
After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under
the Torrens System. 12
Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription. He
pointed out that any action against his certificates of title already
prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which was
issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the
Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least, respondent
contended, "it must be presumed that the questioned land titles
were issued by the public officials concerned in the performance of
their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law." 13
Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and occupied
the Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders, squatters and
illegal occupants, bereft of any right or interest, since the Subject
Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the
name of respondent and his predecessors-in-interest. 14
Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less,
threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included as
defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, "Carmelino
M. Santiago  v. Remigio San Pascual, et al.," which respondent
instituted before the same trial court against squatters occupying
the Subject Property. In its decision, dated 01 July 1992, the trial
court held that "there is no doubt that the plaintiff (respondent
herein) is the owner of the land involved in this case on which the
defendants have built their houses and shanties. . . ." Although the
decision in Civil Case No. 783 was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
it had become final and executory for failure of the defendants-
appellants therein to file their appellants' brief. 15
In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses as prayed for by the respondent. During said
hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido
Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to
questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial
court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally
would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that
it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that
should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title.
Respondent, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but
relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far submitted
to the trial court. 16
After the preliminary hearing, the trial court issued the questioned
Order, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint.
Pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court read: SEcITC
After considering the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented, this Court is inclined not to grant
plaintiffs (sic) prayer. Finding credence and giving
weight to plaintiffs (sic) lone but "expert witness", it is
crystal clear that, to quote:
 1. "a parcel of land titled illegally will revert to the
State
2. it is the State who must file the corresponding
case of annulment of title through the Office
of the Solicitor General, and
3. a land illegally titled in the name of private
individual, the State through the Office of the
Solicitor General should file the
corresponding case for cancellation of title."
(TSN August 26, 1997).
The above quoted testimony is straight from horse (sic)
mouth so to speak as this was the testimony of the
plaintiffs (sic) expert witness. And judging from the said
testimony alone aforecited, plaintiffs (sic) cause [of
action] is bound to fail. "Plaintiffs (sic) own testimony"
wrote "finis" to their case. From the record, this case
was initiated and filed by private individuals,
Nemencio Evangelista, et. al., contradicting their
witness (sic) testimony. To reiterate, this Court finds
credence to the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) witness,
i.e., is (sic) the State through the Office of the
Solicitor General who must initiate and file a case of
this nature when title to a land is being claimed to be
obtained through fraud and allegedly spurious.
The opinion of this Court anent the testimony of the
witness is not without basis. Explicit is the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the recent case
of Heirs of Marciano Nagano  v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
An action for reversion has to be instituted by the
Solicitor General pursuant to Section
101, Commonwealth Act No. 141. (282 SCRA
43). SEACTH
 
As to the documentary evidence, having gone through
with the "Deed of Assignment/s" purportedly executed
by and between a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez and
the plaintiffs, which is the principal if not the only basis
of plaintiffs claim ownership and possession of the
subject parcel of land, the same does not hold water in
a manner of speaking, for being self-serving. "Assignor
Ismael Favila y Rodriguez" claimed in said Deed that he
is the Attorney-in-Fact by virtue of an alleged Special
Power of Attorney executed in his favor by his "mga
kapatid" on February 23, 1965, but said Special Power
of Attorney was not presented before this Court, thus
there arises a doubt as to its existence and execution
not to mention doubt on the existence of his "mga
kapatid" who as alleged executed said Special Power
Attorney (sic) in his favor.
Even if this Court granting arguendo would admit the
authenticity of said "Deeds of Assignment/s", that will
not alter the outcome of the pending incident/s before
this Court. Why? Because the said "Deed of
Assignment/s" which were based on Spanish title have
lost their evidentiary value pursuant to the Presidential
Decree No. 892 i.e. "DISCONTINUANCE OF THE
SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION
AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE
IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS."
xxx xxx xxx
There is no need to elaborate on the above-cited
provisions of PD 892 as they are self-explanatory.
Suffice it to say that there is no showing, that plaintiffs
complied with the said law i.e. to "apply for registration
of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from
the effectivity of this decree (February 16, 1976).
Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of
land ownership in any registration proceedings under
the Torrens System."
This being the case and likewise being clear that
plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject
of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the
 said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring
before this Court the instant complaint. . . .
Moreover, the principal issue in this case is for the
declaration of nullity of defendant's title, which has
nothing to do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of ownership and
possession even if we set aside, albeit momentarily, the
truth that plaintiffs (sic) claim were based on barred
Spanish Title/s, and thus plaintiffs were never the
owners of the parcel of land subject of this case.
Further, defendants (sic) title especially so with the
mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or
more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not
having been questioned by any party. Only now that it
is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are
on the offensive and relying on their lone expert
witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly
sealed their fate. . . . 17
After the trial court denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
in its Order, dated 20 July 1999, 18 petitioners appealed both
Orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 July
2002, 19 affirmed the Order of the trial court, dated 05 February
1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution,
dated 14 February 2003. 20
Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Review 21 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, raising the following issues and praying for the
reversal of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the Order of dismissal of the trial court: cDTIAC
I. Whether the lower court's dismissal of the petitioners'
complaint should be proscribed by the rules of
evidence it being based inter alia on Engr. Naval's
testimony, which was indisputably not based on
facts but conclusion of law.
II. Whether the lower court's dismissal of petitioners'
complaint should be proscribed by the rules of
 evidence it being done sans ample evidence except
bare allegations of respondent.
III. Whether the provision of P.D. 892, i.e., Spanish
titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under
the Torrens system, holds of an exception.
IV. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically
where petitioners are in possession of subject land,
can be subject of prescription.
In his Comment, 22 the respondent, for the most part, reiterated
the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed
petitioners' Complaint, but for reasons different from those relied
upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to file
the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint filed before the trial court
stated no cause of action.
Before anything else, it should be clarified that "the plaintiff
has no legal capacity to sue" 23 and "the pleading asserting the
claim states no cause of action" 24 are two different grounds for a
motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. Failure
to distinguish between "the lack of legal capacity to sue" from "the
lack of personality to sue" is a fairly common mistake. The
difference between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 25
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the
Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that
the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal
capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the
necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does
not have the character or representation he claims. On
the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state
a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue"
 should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a
plaintiff'sgeneral disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general disqualifications of a
party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can
be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the
second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss
based on the fact that the complaint, on the face
thereof, evidently states no cause of action. TaDIHc
In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is
raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the
petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action because
the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real
party-in-interest. It is the respondent's contention that only the
State can file an action for annulment of his certificates of title,
since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of
the Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of
action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground,
requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Complaint. In the case of Garcon  v. Redemptorist Fathers, 26 this
Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an
action or affirmative defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to
dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action,
the question submitted to the court for determination is
the sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on
whether these allegations of fact are true, for said
motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of said complaint. Stated otherwise, the
 insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the
face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on
this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a
complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged
therein and noother matter may be considered, and the
court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations,
and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the
merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the
allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved,
and use these as basis for said motion.
In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated
a cause of action, the trial court should have limited itself to
examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was
proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the
Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or
attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically
admitted by the respondent. The trial court evidently erred in
making findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds of Assignment
executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994
and 02 June 1994; and questioning the existence and execution of
the Special Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila by his
siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may only be resolved
after a proper trial on the merits.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent
hypothetically admitted that: (1) Petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest, in the concept of owners, had been in actual, physical,
open, continuous and adverse possession of the Subject Property
against the whole world since time immemorial; (2) The Subject
Property was part of the vast tract of land called "Hacienda Quibiga"
awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain by
virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael Favila, an heir and successor-in-
interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact
pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his "mga
kapatid" on 25 February 1965, executed Deeds of Assignment
covering the Subject Property in favor of petitioners; (4) Petitioners
still occupied and possessed the Subject Property, on which their
houses were erected, when they discovered that the Subject
Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the
name of respondent; and (5) That petitioners filed the Complaint to
prevent their eviction by the respondent. To determine whether
these allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is
important for this Court to establish first the nature of petitioners'
action. acHDTA
 
Indeed, petitioners' Complaint filed before the trial court was
captioned as an action for declaration of nullity of respondent's
certificates of title. However, the caption of the pleading should not
be the governing factor, but rather the allegations therein should
determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer
for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper
relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and
the evidence introduced. 27
The trial court believed that petitioners' action was ultimately one
for reversion of the Subject Property to the public domain. Based on
the testimony of Engineer Naval and the case of Nagaño  v. Court of
Appeals, 28 it declared that the State, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, is the party-in-interest in an action for
cancellation of a certificate of title illegally issued in the name of a
private individual, because the eventual effect of such cancellation
is the reversion of the property to the State.
The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial court, and
calls for a far closer review of its decision in Nagaño  v. Court of
Appeals, 29 wherein the Court held that —
It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint
that private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250
square meter portion for having possessed it in the
concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly,
continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an
assertion that the lot is private land, or that even
assuming it was part of the public domain, private
respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto
under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No.
1942. . . .
 Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents
and purposes, segregated from the public domain,
because the beneficiary is "conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in
the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond
the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands
and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence,
dismissal of private respondents' complaint was
premature and trial on the merits should have been
conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
It would have been entirely different if the action were
clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be
instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section
101 of C.A.No. 141, which provides:
Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead,
in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic]
of the Philippines.
In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of
Honorio Dacut, 30 the difference between an action for declaration
of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion was more
thoroughly discussed as follows: IEAaST
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title is not the same as an
action for reversion. The difference between them lies in
the allegations as to the character of ownership of the
realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action
for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint
would admit State ownership of the disputed land.
Hence, in Gabila  vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the
plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to
demand the cancellation or amendment of the
 defendant's title because even if the title were canceled
or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein
or of the portion affected by the amendment would
revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action
was for reversion and that the only person or entity
entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patent and certificate of title would
require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent
and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or
mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed
by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not
from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land
is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to
bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title
obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The
real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff
who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the
parcel of land in question even before the grant of title
to the defendant. . . .
In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject
Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary, petitioners
asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of their actual,
physical, open, continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the
concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-
in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of Assignment
executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred to a
Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-
interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are
asserting private title over the Subject Property, and consequently,
their action could not be one for reversion.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than
an action for nullity of respondent's certificates of title, theirs was
more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their
title over the Subject Property.
Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or quieting of
title, provides that:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and
in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
Respondent's certificates of title over the Subject Property appeared
valid or effective; but according to the petitioners, they were fake,
spurious and/or fraudulent, and a cloud on their title to the same
property that needed to be removed. A cloud on title has been
defined as follows: DCHaTc
Cloud on Title. — A cloud on title is an outstanding
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may
nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to
property. The matter complained of must have a  prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud
on title is a semblance of title which appears in some
legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity
or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on
the face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by
extrinsic evidence. . . 31
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was
one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the
same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the
parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not
stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action
to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable
title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter
of the action. 32 Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint
that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in,
the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to
remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based.
It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his
interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule,
assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property. 33
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property
by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same
since time immemorial, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by
Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their
Complaint, revealed that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest based
their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of
title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time
immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial
carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even before the
Spanish conquest. 34 If the Subject Property was already private
property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been
beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to
anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the
Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having
acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could
acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-
in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same
Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from
invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject
Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by
discontinuing the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands
recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title,
unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months from
its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for
registration of their land under what is now P.D. No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership
in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
system. 35 Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of
any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real
property. DHEcCT
 
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors
of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to
apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property.
In the absence of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892,
then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed
to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the
Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in
registration proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or
vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and
vested. 36 By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration
proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from
accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason
therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from
accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some
other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on
or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or
registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land
titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never be
recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would
definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and
instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to
eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as
proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the
fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet
been brought under the operation of the Torrens
system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by
proof of actual possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of
the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish
title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. 37
This Court cannot sustain petitioners' argument. Actual proof of
possession only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas
clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A
holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real
property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the
required prescriptive period.38 Because of this inherent weakness
of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title
under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in
actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the
possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same
property by virtue of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular
provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with
which it is associated. An apparently general provision may have a
limited application if read together with other provisions of the
statute. 39
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted
and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole
statute. 40 Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to
discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any
probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a
deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish
titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity
or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles
may no longer be presented to prove ownership. HDIaET
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for
registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land
registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court
his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real
property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed
and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer
present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of
the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his
actual possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the
Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court
on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application
of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as
evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a
land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or
to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles
from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis,
such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree 41 or
the Public Land Act. 42 Petitioners though failed to allege any other
basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the
Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court has
already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already
ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property,
the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of
a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly
dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the
dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for
this Court to address the issue of prescription of the
action. EcDSHT
Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77,
dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, [April 29, 2005], 497
PHIL 269-297)
 [G.R. No. L-11651. December 27, 1958.]

TOMAS ROCO, ET AL.,  plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

JUAN GIMEDA, defendant-appellee.

Ricardo V. Reyes  for appellants.

Remotigue, Nacua, Remotigue & Palma and  Rafael O.
Gimarino for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. LIMITATION OF ACTION; ACTION BASED ON FRAUDS.

— Under the law, an action based on fraud should be instituted
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 114, Civil
Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.)
2. REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LANDS; PATENT ONCE
ISSUED; FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION; REMEDY OF PARTY
AGGRIEVED. — Once a patent has already been issued, the land
covered thereby has the character of registered property in
accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has
been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for
reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Register Of Deeds, 49 Off.
Gaz, [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)

DECISION

LABRADOR, J p:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Cebu, Hon. Jose S. Rodriguez, presiding, dismissing the
complaint upon petition of defendants, on the ground that it fails
to state a cause of action.
The complaint makes the following allegations: that before
August 22, 1918, Espiridiona Caramihan, owned and possessed
two parcels of land known as lots Nos. 2741 and 3082 of the
Barili Cadastral Survey No. 219, covered by tax declarations Nos.
01865 and 01854; that upon the death of said Espiridiona
Caramihan on August 22, 1918, said lands were partitioned
equally among her children, who similarly possessed and
cultivated their respective shares and paid the taxes thereon;
that in the years 1925 to 1927, through ignorance and
inadvertence of the heirs, the said lots were declared public land
in a cadastral proceeding; that Espiridiona occupied said lands
openly, adversely, continuously and publicly, planting coconut
and fruit trees and building her dwelling house thereon, and that
said improvements and house are still on said lots; that the
present plaintiffs acquired their rights to the lots by purchase
from the heirs of the original owner Esperidiona Caramihan, that
on or about December 7, 1940, JuanGimeda, defendant, filed an
application for a free patent to said lands, surreptitiously and
fraudulently, without knowledge of the owners and possessors,
and on December 7, 1940, the Director of Lands issued an order
and in accordance therewith, on September 17, 1951, the
Bureau of Lands issued patent No. 51552 in the name of
defendant JuanGimeda; that the plaintiffs and their original
predecessor-in-interest have always been in the actual, physical,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said parcels of
land and defendant Juan Gimeda applied for and obtained his
patent thereto without notice to them and without their
knowledge, and secured the approval of his patent by fraudulent
statements, alleging that he was the only heir of Espiridiona
Caramihan and the only occupant of the land; and that by such
false and fraudulent statements the Bureau of Lands approved
his application and ordered the issuance of his patent.
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint, then
amended the said answer and alleges that he is the youngest
among the children of Espiridiona Caramihan; denies the
allegations made in the complaint as to the acquisition by false
and fraudulent means of the said lands; alleges that the
complaint states no cause of action. He presents a counterclaim
for P5,000 and P10,000 as moral and exemplary damages,
respectively, and P500 as attorney's fees. Plaintiffs deny this
counterclaim.
 Later on defendant presented a motion to dismiss, alleging
that the complaint alleges no cause of action, arguing that as the
title in his favor was issued on October 17, 1951 and action was
filed on July 15, 1954, the action was filed more than two years
after the issuance of the patent, beyond the one-year period
provided by law. The authorities cited for this defense are the
case of Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez David, 50 Phil., 797;
Villarosa vs. Sarmiento, 46 Phil., 814; Cabanos vs. Register of
Deeds, 40 Phil., 620; Sumcad vs. Judge of the Court of First
Instance, et al., 96 Phil., 946; 51 Off. Gaz., [5] 2413.
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the decree
issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to annul
the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent
statements were made in the application for the patent
and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of
the petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of the
property. The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it
can be instituted within four years from the discovery of the
fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph
43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the patent here has
already been issued, the land has the character of registered
property in accordance with the provisions of Section 122
of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of
the party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is
an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Register of
Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No.
496.).
The order of dismissal appealed from is, therefore, reversed
and the case is returned to the court a quo for further
proceedings in accordance with law.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ. concur.
|||  (Roco v. Gimeda, G.R. No. L-11651, [December 27, 1958], 104
PHIL 1011-1014)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200973. May 30, 2016.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) —
Region IV,
Manila, petitioner, vs. AMOR HACHERO and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PALAWAN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:
Subject of this petition for review on  certiorari is the July 4,
2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
87267 and its March 6, 2012 Resolution, 2affirming the March
29, 2006 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48,
Puerto Princesa, Palawan (RTC), which denied the Petition for
Cancellation of Free Patent, Original Certificate of Title and
Reversion filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
The Antecedents
Sometime in 1996, Amor Hachero (Hachero) filed his Free
Patent Application No. 045307-969 covering Lot No. 1514, CAD-
1150-D (subject land) before the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office  (CENRO) of Palawan. The subject land,
with an area of 3.1308 hectares or 31,308 square
meters  (subject land), is located in Sagrada, Busuanga,
Palawan. 4
The said application for free patent was later approved by
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) of Palawan based on the following findings:
 1) That Hachero was a natural-born Filipino citizen of the
Philippines and, therefore, qualified to acquire public
land through free patent;
2) That the land applied for had been classified as alienable
and disposable and, therefore, subject to disposition
under the Public Land Law;
3) That an investigation conducted by the Land
Investigator/Inspector/Deputy Public Land Inspector
Sim A. Luto, found that the subject land had been
occupied and cultivated by Hachero himself and/or
through his predecessor-in-interest since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto;
4) That the notice for the acquisition of the land
by Hachero was published in accordance with law and
that no other person provided a better right to the land
applied for;
5) That there was no adverse claim involving the land still
pending determination before the CENRO; and
6) That the claim of Hachero was complete and there
was no record in the CENRO of any obstacle to the
issuance of the patent. 5
On October 15, 1998, Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was
issued to Hachero and the subject land was registered under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. E-18011 onMay 7, 1999.
After an inspection and verification were conducted by the
CENRO in 2000, it was discovered that the subject land, covered
by OCT No. E-18011, was still classified as timberland and so
not susceptible of private ownership under the Free Patent
provision of the Public Land Act. 6
Consequently, on November 26, 2002, the Republic,
represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region IV, Manila,
filed the Complaint for the Cancellation of Free Patent No.
045307-98-9384 and OCT No. E-18011 and for Reversion, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 3726.
 Despite personal receipt of the summons and the
complaint, however, Hachero did not file any responsive pleading
within the period required by law. Upon theRepublic's motion,
the RTC declared Hachero in default. Thereafter,
the Republic was allowed to present its evidence  ex-parte. 7
The Republic presented its lone witness, Diosdado Ocampo,
former CENRO officer of Palawan, and formally offered the
following documents as its exhibits: a) Application for Free Patent
of Amor Hachero; b) Orders of Approval of the Application and
Issuance of Free Patent; c) Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384; d)
OCT No. E-18011 issued in the name of Amor Hachero; e)
Inspection Report, dated July 24, 2000; and f) Verification, dated
July 17, 2000, both issued by one Sim Luto. 8 CAIHTE
The Ruling of the RTC
On March 29, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision in favor
of Hachero. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby resolves to deny the instant action for
cancellation of Free Patent and Original Certificate of
Title and Reversion for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC explained that the free patent and title had already
been issued after Hachero was found to have complied with all
the requirements; that it was the Republicitself thru the DENR-
CENRO, Coron, which brought the subject land under the
operation of the Torrens System; that it could not understand the
complete turnabout made by the same office and its officials who
certified before that the subject land was alienable and
disposable and who approved Hachero's application; that
the Republic failed to show the document which stated that the
subject land was still timberland as indicated under Project No.
2A L.C. Map No. 839, released on December 9, 1929, despite the
fact that said document was already available at the CENRO
office at the time of the application for free patent; that the lands
adjacent to the subject land were already alienable and
disposable; that the free patent and the title itself were public
documents entitled to the presumption of regularity; and that the
verification and inspection report of one Sim Luto together with
the other CENRO officials presented by the Republic were
insufficient to defeat Hachero's patent and title. 10
The Ruling of the CA
On July 4, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, stating
that the verification presented by the Republic could not be given
probative value because L.C. Map No. 839, dated December 9,
1929, which served as basis for the verification, was not
presented before the RTC. According to the CA, the Inspection
Report, standing alone, was not sufficient to overcome the
burden imposed upon the Republic and could not serve as basis
of the reversion of the subject land. The CA doubted the
subsequent findings of the land investigator that the subject land
was still timberland because he was the same land investigator
who previously evaluated the subject land and certified that it
was alienable and disposable. 11
Not in conformity, the Republic filed the subject petition
anchored on the following:
GROUNDS
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF
FREE PATENT NO. 045307-98-9384 AND ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. E-18011 AND
REVERSION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE DISCHARGE OF THE OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS BY THE INVESTIGATING
PERSONNEL OF THE DENR IN THIS CASE
HAS THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY, WHICH PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT.
II
THE PREVIOUS FACTUAL
MISAPPRECIATION COMMITTED BY THE
 DENR EMPLOYEES CANNOT AND
SHOULD NOT BIND THE GOVERNMENT,
ESPECIALLY WHEN, AS IN THIS CASE,
THE MISTAKE OR ERROR REFERS TO
IMMUTABLE MATTERS SUCH AS
ALIENABILITY OF A PORTION OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN. 12
In advocacy of its cause, the Republic basically argues that
per its investigation and verification conducted in July 2000, the
free patent issued to Hachero was defective and erroneous
considering that the land it covered fell within the timberland
zone. It contends that the said factual findings carry great weight
and should be accorded respect by the courts due to the special
knowledge and expertise of DENR personnel over matters within
their jurisdiction. Considering that the DENR personnel acted in
the discharge of their official functions, the Republic asserted
that they have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duties. Moreover,Hachero failed to
rebut the DENR's investigation report and, for said reason, the
presumption in favor of the investigating personnel and their
report has become conclusive.
The Republic further contends that the title issued
to Hachero, which had been issued based on an erroneous DENR
finding that the land was alienable, can still be overturned by a
later report stating otherwise. Thus, the Inspection
Report, 13 dated July 24, 2000, and Verification
Report, 14 dated July 17, 2000, superseded the previous finding
that the subject land was alienable and disposable.
The Republic avers that the State is not estopped by the
mistakes of its officers and employees and that the previous
factual misappreciation committed by DENR employees cannot
bind the government. 15 DETACa
Hachero's counter-position
Hachero counters that the petition should be dismissed on
the ground that it has raised substantially factual matters. He
points out that the findings of fact of the RTC and the CA are
final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal if there
is no showing of grave abuse of discretion. He calls the attention
of the Court to the fact that the officials, who previously certified
to the alienability and disposability of the subject land but made
a complete turn around by declaring otherwise, could not have
made a mistake or error. He asserts that the main document a
vital piece of data denominated as Cadastral Map No. 839, which
became the basis for the reinspection/reinvestigation and
verification by CENRO, Coron, was released on December 9,
1929 and admittedly already in their records when the
application was approved for titling, and yet was not presented in
court as evidence. Finally, Hachero stresses that the government
cannot be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens and that titleholders maynot be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's
agents, in the absence of his complicity in a fraud or manifest
damage to third persons.16
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
General Rule and Exceptions when
factual findings of the trial court
are affirmed by the CA
It is generally settled in jurisprudence that the findings of
fact of the trial court specially when affirmed by the CA are final,
binding and conclusive and may not be re-examined by this
Court. There are, however, several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
1] When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
2] When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible;
3] When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4] When the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts;
5] When the findings of facts are conflicting;
 6] When in making its findings, the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7] When the findings of the CA are contrary to that of the
trial court;
8] When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
9] When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
main and reply briefs are not disputed;
10] When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; and
11] When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 17
After combing through the records, the Court is of the
considered view that there is a need to review the findings of the
courts below due to the presence of some of the enumerated
exceptions mentioned above, which are 1) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; and 2) when the findings of
fact are contradicted by the evidence on record.
The Republic  showed clear and convincing
proof that the subject land was inalienable
and non-disposable
Records reveal that on October 15, 1998, upon the approval
of Hachero's application by CENRO of Palawan, Free Patent No.
045307-98-9384 was issued and, on May 7, 1999, the property
was subsequently registered under OCT No. E-18011.
Thereafter, in an effort to find out fake or illegal titles, the
DENR created a task force to investigate and evaluate all issued
patents and titles. An investigation conducted by a representative
of the Regional Executive Director of the Regional Office No. IV
revealed that the subject land covered by OCT No. E-18011 was
still timberland and, therefore, could not be segregated from the
public domain as timberlands were classified as inalienable and
non-disposable public lands.
 Accordingly, both Sim Luto, Land Management Officer III,
and Diosdado L. Ocampo, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer, prepared and signed the Inspection Report,
dated July 24, 2000, and Verification, dated July 17, 2000,
attesting to the fact the subject land fell within the timberland
zone under Project No. 2A, L.C. MapNo. 839, released on
December 9, 1929. For said reason, both recommended the
cancellation of OCT No. E-18011.
Aside from the Inspection Report and the Verification,
the Republic also adduced maps 18 prepared by the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), which
showed that the subject land was located within the periphery of
the land area classified as unclassified public forest and beyond
the alienable and disposable area. In other words, as the maps
clearly reveal, every inch of the subject land is inside the
unclassified public forest area. Evidently, these maps presented
by theRepublic, together with the Inspection Report and the
Verification, all clearly demonstrate that the subject land is not
yet subject to disposition. aDSIHc
Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties
applies favorably to  Republic
The Court would have wanted to study Hachero's position
on the matter, but he did not file an answer or responsive
pleading to the complaint filed by the Republicbefore the RTC. It
appears from the records, however, that he was duly served with
the summons together with a copy of the complaint. He,
apparently, opted to ignore it, in effect, waived his right to rebut
the allegations thereof at the first opportunity.
There being a controversion, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties applies favorably to
the Republic. This means that the DENR's inspection report and
the verification stating that the subject land is still inalienable
has become conclusive. The doctrine in Bustillo vs. People, 19
. . . In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties which the records failed to rebut. The
 presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however,
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support
of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an
officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness.
[Emphasis Supplied]
and in Farolan  v. Solmac Marketing Corp., 20
In the same vein, the presumption, disputable
though it may be, that an official duty has been
regularly performed applies in favor of the
petitioners.  Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter
esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and
solemnly done.) It was private respondent's burden to
overcome this juris tantumpresumption. We are not
persuaded that it has been able to do so.
are both instructive.
Cancellation of title and reversion proper
where there exists a mistake or oversight in
granting free patent over inalienable land
The courts below ruled that the Inspection Report and the
Verification had no probative value because the land
classification map (L.C. Map No. 839) on which they were based
was not presented in the trial court. Likewise, the courts below
considered the subsequent findings of the land investigator —
that the land still belonged to the public domain — as doubtful
because the officials who previously evaluated and verified that
the subject land was alienable were the same officials who now
investigated and verified the same and found it inalienable.
The Court holds otherwise.
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to
revert the land back to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation
therefore is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee. 21 In Republic  v. Guerrero, 22 the Court gave a more
general statement that "this remedy of reversion can only be
availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land
in patents or certificates of title." 23Nonetheless, the Court
recognized in  Republic v. Mangotara, 24 that there were
instances when it granted reversion for reasons other than fraud:
. . . . In Estate of the  Late Jesus S.
Yujuico  v.  Republic (Yujuico case), reversion was
defined as an action which seeks to restore public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court
also allowed the resort by the Government to actions
for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons
other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a
patent of the conditions imposed by law; and lack of
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent
covering inalienable forest land or portion of a
river, even when such grant was made through
mere oversight. 25
[Emphasis Supplied]
In the case at bench, although the Republic's action for
cancellation of patent and title and for reversion was not based
on fraud or misrepresentation on the part ofHachero, his title
could still be cancelled and the subject land reverted back to the
State because the grant was made through mistake or oversight.
This could probably be the reason why, shortly after one (1) year
from the issuance of OCT No. E-18011 to Hachero, the DENR
personnel conducted another investigation and verification on
the subject land. It would appear that they suspected that a
mistake was made in their issuance of the patent as the subject
land had not been reclassified or released as alienable or
disposable land. It remained plotted within the timberland
classification zone. This time, they supported their findings with
maps prepared by the NAMRIA. The Republic also followed the
proper legal procedure for cancellation of patent and title and for
reversion. They filed a complaint in court and
notified Hachero through summons. They gaveHachero an
opportunity to be heard in court. For unknown reasons, however,
he disregarded the summons, allowed himself to be declared in
default, and forfeited his right to adduce evidence in his defense.
Prescription and estoppel
cannot lie against the State
Contrary to the observation of the courts below, there is
nothing incomprehensible or puzzling or suspicious about the
complete turnaround made by the DENR after its re-
investigation. The Court has carefully reviewed the records and
found nothing anomalous. ETHIDa
At any rate, it is a time-honored principle that the statute of
limitations or the lapse of time does not run against the State.
Jurisprudence also recognizes the State's immunity from
estoppel as a result of the mistakes or errors of its officials and
agents. These well-established principles apply in the case at
bench. The Court in  Republic v. Roxas elucidated:
It is true that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act is registered
pursuant to Act 496, otherwise known as The Land
Registration Act, or Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree,
the certificate of title issued by virtue of said patent
has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under
said registration laws. We expounded in  Ybañez  v.
Intermediate Appellate Court  that:
The certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. After the expiration of
the one (1) year period from the issuance of the decree
of registration upon which it is based, it becomes
incontrovertible. The settled rule is that a decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual fraud
within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such
an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. The validity of the certificate of title in this
regard can be threshed out only in an action expressly
filed for the purpose.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title
issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant
to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a
judicial registration proceeding, provided the land
covered by said certificate is a disposable public land
within the contemplation of the Public Land
Law. TIADCc
There is no specific provision in the Public Land
Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land
Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the
one (1) year period within which the public land patent
is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section
32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent
certificate of title with indefensibility. Nevertheless, the
pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases
clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration
Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by
implication by this Court to the patent issued by the
Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of
Natural Resources, under the signature of the
President of the Philippines in accordance with law.
The date of issuance of the patent, therefore,
corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree
in ordinary registration cases because the decree
finally awards the land applied for registration to the
party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the
Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards,
and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This,
to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and
spirit of the homestead laws,  i.e., conservation of a
family home, and to encourage the settlement,
residence and cultivation and improvement of the
lands of the public domain. If the title to the land
grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected
to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given
by the Government thru the process of proceedings in
accordance with thePublic Land Law, there would
arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the
government's system of distributing public agricultural
lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of
the State. (Emphases ours, citations omitted.)
Yet, we emphasize that our statement in the
aforequoted case that a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible
after one year, is subject to the proviso that "the land
covered by said certificate is a disposable public land
within the contemplation of the Public Land Law." As
we have ruled herein, the subject property is part of
the Matchwood Forest Reserve and is inalienable and
not subject to disposition. Being contrary to the Public
Land Law, Homestead Patent No. 111598 and OCT No.
P-5885 issued in respondent Roxas's name are void;
and the right of petitioner Republic to seek
cancellation of such void patent/title and reversion of
the subject property to the State is imprescriptible.
We have addressed the same questions on
indefensibility of title and prescription in Mangotara,
thus:
It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that
despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree
of registration/certificate of title, the State, through
the Solicitor General, may still institute an action for
reversion when said decree/certificate was acquired by
fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title
does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the
registration of a patent under the Torrens system does
not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrant's already existing one. Verily, registration
under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.
But then again, the Court had several times in
the past recognized the right of the State to avail itself
of the remedy of reversion in other instances when the
title to the land is void for reasons other than having
been secured by fraud or misrepresentation. One such
case is Spouses Morandarte  v. Court of Appeals,
where the Bureau of Lands (BOL), by mistake and
oversight, granted a patent to the spouses Morandarte
which included a portion of the Miputak River.
The Republic instituted an action for reversion 10
years after the issuance of an OCT in the name of the
spouses Morandarte. The Court ruled:
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the
officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot
be invoked against the government with regard to
property of the public domain. It has been said
that the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents.
It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a
title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the
Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not
have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public
domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said
certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land
or property illegally included. Otherwise stated,
property of the public domain is incapable of
registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that
title.
Another example is the case of Republic  of the
Phils.  v. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. IV, in which the
homestead patent issued by the State became null and
void because of the grantee's violation of the
conditions for the grant. The Court ordered the
reversion even though the land subject of the patent
was already covered by an OCT and
theRepublic availed itself of the said remedy more than
11 years after the cause of action accrued, because:
There is merit in this appeal considering that the
statute of limitation does not lie against the State. Civil
Case No. 1382 of the lower court for reversion is a suit
brought by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
as a sovereign state and, by the express provision of
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, any
transfer or alienation of a homestead grant within five
(5) years from the issuance of the patent is null and
void and constitute a cause for reversion of the
homestead to the State. In Republic  vs. Ruiz, 23
SCRA 348, We held that "the Court below
committed no error in ordering the reversion to
plaintiff of the land grant involved herein,
notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate of
title based on the patent had been cancelled and
another certificate issued in the names of the grantee
heirs. Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to
hold and possess in fee simple the land, by reason of
his having violated Section 118 of the Public Land
Law, the Court may properly order its reconveyance to
the grantor, although the property has already been
brought under the operation of the Torrens System.
And, this right of the government to bring an
appropriate action for reconveyance is not barred by
the lapse of time: the Statute of Limitations does not
run against the State." (Italics supplied). The above
ruling was reiterated in Republic  vs. Mina, 114 SCRA
945.
If the Republic is able to establish after trial and
hearing of Civil Case No. 6686 that the decrees and
OCTs in Doña Demetria's name are void for some
reason, then the trial court can still order the
reversion of the parcels of land covered by the same
because indefeasibility cannot attach to a void decree
or certificate of title. . . . (Citations omitted.) AIDSTE
 Neither can respondent Roxas successfully
invoke the doctrine of estoppel against
petitioner Republic. While it is true that respondent
Roxas was granted Homestead Patent No. 111598 and
OCT No. P-5885 only after undergoing appropriate
administrative proceedings, the Government is not
now estopped from questioning the validity of said
homestead patent and certificate of title. It is, after all,
hornbook law that the principle of estoppel does not
operate against the Government for the act of its
agents. And while there may be circumstances when
equitable estoppel was applied against public
authorities, i.e., when the Government did not
undertake any act to contest the title for an
unreasonable length of time and the lot was already
alienated to innocent buyers for value, such are not
present in this case. More importantly, we cannot use
the equitable principle of estoppel to defeat the law.
Under the Public Land Act and Presidential
Proclamation No. 678 dated February 5, 1941, the
subject property is part of the Matchwood Forest
Reserve which is inalienable and not subject to
disposition. 26
[Emphases Supplied; citations omitted]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 4, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87267 and
its March 6, 2012 Resolution are REVERSED andSET ASIDE.
Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 and OCT No. E-18011 in the
name of Amor Hachero are hereby
declared NULL and VOID and CANCELLED.
The subject land is ordered reverted to the public domain as
part of the inalienable timberland.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Republic v. Hachero, G.R. No. 200973, [May 30, 2016])
 [G.R. No. 186603. April 5, 2017.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION
VI, ILOILO
CITY, petitioner,  vs. VALENTINA ESPINOSA,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, LEONILA CALISTON, AND
SPOUSES DIOSCORO & ESTRELLA
ESCARDA, respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to nullify

the Court of Appeals' (CA) July 25, 2008 Decision 2 and
February 4, 2009 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00421. The CA
modified the May 12, 2004 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, and
dismissed the reversion case filed by theRepublic of the
Philippines (State) against respondents Valentina Espinosa and
her successor-in-interest, Leonila B. Caliston, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 12, 2004 and Order dated July 16,
2004 are hereby modified upholding the validity of
Original Certificate of Title No. 191-N and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91117, respectively, issued in
the names of Valentina Espinosa and Leonila Caliston.
The award of damages, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation in favor of Leonila Caliston is affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 5
On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was
issued to Valentina Espinosa (Espinosa) in Cadastral Case No.
39, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 980. It covered a 28,880-square
meter lot located at Lot No. 3599 of Cadastral Record No. 980,
Poblacion, Sipalay City, Negros Occidental (property). By virtue of
the decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 191-N was
issued on October 15, 1962 in the name of Espinosa. 6 On June
17, 1976, Espinosa sold the property to Leonila B. Caliston
(Caliston), who was later issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-91117 7 on June 29, 1976. 8
On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the
Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VI, Iloilo City, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint 9 for
annulment of title and/or reversion of land with the RTC, Branch
61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The State claimed that
the property is inalienable public land because it fell within a
timberland area indicated under Project No. 27-C, Block C per
Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as certified by the
Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986. 10
The spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses
Escarda) intervened, 11 alleging that they have been occupying
the property since 1976 on the belief that it belongs to the
State. 12 They prayed that Caliston be ordered to cease and
desist from ejecting them. 13 CAIHTE
In answer, Caliston countered that the property is not
timberland. Invoking laches and prescription, she argued that
her title was issued earlier in 1962, while the map shows that the
property was classified only in 1986. 14 Caliston also claimed
that the spouses Escarda lacked the capacity or personality to
intervene because only the State may initiate an action for
reversion. She also alleged that the spouses Escarda cannot
claim a better right as against her because she merely tolerated
their occupancy of the property until their refusal to vacate
it. 15 As counterclaim, Caliston claimed for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses against the
spouses Escarda for the baseless and malicious complaint. 16
The RTC rendered a Decision 17 dated May 12, 2004.
Relying on LC Map No. 2978, the trial court ruled in favor of the
State and ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of the
public domain, viz.:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 191-N
in the name of Valentina Espinosa and all its
derivative titles, such as: TCT No. T-91117 in
the name of Leonila Caliston, null and
void ab initio;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT No. 191-N and TCT
N[o]. T-91117 to defendant Register of Deeds
for the Province of Negros Occidental and the
latter to cancel said titles and all their
derivative titles, if any;
3. Ordering the reversion of the land covered by
the aforesaid patent and title to the mass of
the public domain under the administration
and disposition of the Director of Forestry
(now Regional Executive Director, Region VI,
Iloilo City);
4. Declaring that defendant Leonila Caliston has
better right over the subject lot as against
intervenors Spouses Dioscoro and Estrella
Escarda; and
5. Ordering the intervenors to pay defendant
Leonila Caliston the following sums:
a) Not less than P20,000.00 for moral
damages;
b) Not less than P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages;
c) Not less than P10,000.00 for attorney's
fees, plus so much appearance fees of
P2,000.00 incurred and/or paid by
answering defendant in connection with
this case; and
d) Not less than P5,000.00 for expenses of
litigation.
 SO ORDERED. 18
Caliston's motion for reconsideration 19 was denied in an
Order 20 dated July 16, 2004. On August 5, 2004, Caliston filed
a Notice of Appeal 21 with the RTC. On the other hand, the
spouses Escarda did not file a notice of appeal. Records were
then forwarded to the CA, where proceedings ensued.
There, Caliston argued that the trial court improperly relied
upon LC Map No. 2978, which was prepared long after the
property was alienated and awarded to Espinosa, her
predecessor-in-interest. The map, the admissibility and
genuineness of which have yet to be proved, cannot be used to
defeat the cadastral proceedings presumed to have been
regularly conducted. Even assuming the map can be considered,
Caliston claims that her property is situated in an area indicated
as alienable and disposable. She also reiterated her defenses of
laches and prescription. 22
For its part, the State argued that the lower court did not
err in relying upon LC Map No. 2978 though it was prepared only
in 1986. According to the State, forest lands are incapable of
private appropriation and possession, however long; prescription
does not run against the government. 23
The CA rendered a Decision 24 dated July 25, 2008
modifying the RTC Decision. It upheld the validity of OCT No.
191-N and TCT No. 91117 issued in the names ofEspinosa and
Caliston, respectively, and affirmed the award of damages,
attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation in favor of Caliston.
The CA found that the State failed to prove fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of Espinosa when she was issued
OCT No. 191-N. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that
the property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence consisting
of LC Map No. 2978, certified by the Director of Forestry on
January 17, 1986, was not authenticated pursuant to Section
24, 25 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties
stipulated only as to the existence of the map, but not as to its
genuineness or the truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the
map is admitted in evidence, Espinosa's rights over the property,
which accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a
subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24
years. 26 The CA cited 27 the case of SAAD Agro-Industries,
Inc.  v.  Republic of the Philippines. 28
In a Resolution 29 dated February 4, 2009, the CA denied
the State's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The lone issue presented is whether the State has
sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest
land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and
issued a title.
We deny the petition.
I
The State failed to prove that the property was classified as
forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree and
issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It
must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land
sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government. 30 Since cadastral proceedings
are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued
only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional
facts — that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties
are heard, and that evidence is considered. 31 As such, the
cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after
proving these jurisdictional facts. 32
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a
cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N,
the predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No. 91117. Having been
granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be
presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 33 This
means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by
incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and
disposable property in the cadastral proceedings. DETACa
 This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to
recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of
the public domain. The State may still do so through an action
for reversion, as in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the
Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the
public domain. 34 It is proper when public land is fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations. 35 There are also instances when we granted
reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a "person
obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens
system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction
over the same because it is of the public domain." 36
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges
neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings
and in the issuance of the title inEspinosa's favor. The argument
for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included
in the certificate of title because it is of the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land
registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the property
was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was
decreed to Espinosa.  37 To reiterate, there is no burden on
Caliston to prove that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land. 38 At this stage, it is reasonable to presume
that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title, had already
established that the property is alienable and disposable land
considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over
it. 39 In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that
there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property
inEspinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is
consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the
case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. 40
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of
evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986. The
records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally
offered in evidence. The rules require that documentary evidence
must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of
testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by
the court, in writing. 41 Due process requires a formal offer of
evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and
the appellate courts. 42 This gives the adverse party the
opportunity to examine and oppose the admissibility of the
evidence. 43 When evidence has not been formally offered, it
should not be considered by the court in arriving at its
decision. 44 Not having been offered formally, it was error for the
trial court to have considered the survey map. Consequently, it
also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the mass of
the public domain on the basis of the same.
Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted
in evidence, this will not help to further the State's cause. This is
because the only fact proved by the map is one already admitted
by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in
1986. 45 This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion
that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings
conducted in 1955, proved that the land is alienable and
disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in
1962.
II
The reclassification of the area where the property is located
in 1986 should not prejudice Espinosa and her successor-in-
interest. 46 Apropos is the case of Sta. Monica Industrial and
Dev't Corp.  v. Court of Appeals. 47 In that case, the State offered
in evidence a land classification map to prove that at the time the
land was decreed to the original owner, it had not yet been
released and still fell within the forest zone. However, the map
did not conclusively state the actual classification of the land at
the time it was adjudicated to the original owner. We thus ruled
that the State failed to prove that the titles should be annulled —
Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an
action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the
judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The
petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
 evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When
the proceedings were originally filed by
the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of
De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the
parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public
forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land
classification maps drawn several years after the
issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to
conclusively establish the actual classification of
the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before
this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and
refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation
reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation
and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts
thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier, are
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor
of the decree's regularity, more so when we consider
that notice of the application for registration and the
date of hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney
General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public
Works and the Director of Forestry, among others, was
published in the Official Gazette and that Governor
General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes
private rights. 48 aDSIHc
We stress that our ruling is not inconsistent with the
doctrine that forest lands are outside the commerce of man and
unsusceptible of private appropriation. Neither are we changing
the rule on imprescriptibility of actions for reversion. We are
merely deciding on the facts as proved by the record. To allow a
reversion based on a classification made at the time when the
property was already declared private property by virtue of a
decree would be akin to expropriation of land without due
process of law. 49
At this juncture, we agree with the CA's application of SAAD
Agro-Industries, Inc.,  50 which involved a complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of a lot covered by a free patent
and original title. To support its claim that the lot was part of the
timberland and forest reserve, the State submitted as evidence a
photocopy of a land classification map. This map also became the
basis of the testimonies of City Environment and Natural
Resources Office officers declaring that the lot falls within the
timberland or forest reserve. The State, however, failed to submit
either a certified true copy or an official publication of the map,
prompting the trial court to deny its admission in evidence. After
proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to the
State's failure to show that the subject lot therein is part of the
timberland or forest reserve or has been classified as such before
the issuance of the free patent and the original title. The CA,
relying on the map, reversed the trial court.
When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated
the trial court's decision. We held that the photocopy of the land
classification map cannot be considered in evidence because it is
excluded under the best evidence rule. We emphasized that all
parties, including the Government, are bound by the rules of
admissibility and must comply with it —
The rules of admissibility must be applied
uniformly. The same rule holds true when the
Government is one of the parties. The Government,
when it comes to court to litigate with one of its
citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its
rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings
are substantially in every respect the same as those of
its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. This
is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its
claims and rights are justiciable by every other
principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights
of the private parties under similar circumstances.
Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders
the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as
proof to show that the subject lot is part of the forest
reserve. 51
We went on to explain that even if the map was admitted in
evidence to prove that the lot was classified as part of the
timberland or forest reserve, the classification was made long
after private interests had intervened. Not only was the lot
already occupied and cultivated, a free patent and a certificate of
title were also awarded and issued years ahead of the
classification —
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by
respondent is admissible in evidence, still the land in
question can hardly be considered part of the
timberland or forest reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which
purports to be the "correct map of the areas
demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the
provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended" was made only
in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made
nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free
patent over the subject lot.
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, private interests have intervened
before classification was made pursuant to P.D. No.
705. Not only has Orcullo by herself and through her
predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed the
subject lot since 1930, a free patent was also awarded
to her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971.
In fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent
and certificate of title was regular and in order. Orcullo
complied with the requisites for the acquisition of free
patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141
(Public Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands
and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
xxx xxx xxx
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only
in the present Constitution, but also in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized
and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic
foundation of the State's property regime.
Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not
lose sight of the fact that in every claim or right by the
Government against one of its citizens, the paramount
 considerations of fairness and due process must be
observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that
the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it
adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status of
Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid
and regular issuances, respondent's insistence on the
classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve
must be rejected. 52
These principles laid down in SAAD Agro-Industries,
Inc. undoubtedly apply here. As part of fair play and due process,
the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer of evidence as
much as every private party is. More, the State's subsequent
reclassification of the area where the property is situated cannot
be used to defeat the rights of a private citizen who acquired the
land in a valid and regular proceeding conducted 24 years
earlier. ETHIDa
The result would have been different had the State proved
that the property was already classified as part of forest land at
the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed
to  Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to discharge this burden;
the grant of title which carries with it the presumption
that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the
property in the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the
reversion based on a subsequent reclassification, more so on lack
of evidence, would amount to taking of private property without
just compensation and due process of law. 53 This, however, is
not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due process
are paramount considerations that must still be observed. 54
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' July 25, 2008
Decision and February 4, 2009 Resolution
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, [April 5, 2017])