EXERCISE SECRET

DRAFT

GLAF/2021/C-320/ARRC/01 Copy No 01 of 02
Total Pages 20

AN APRC ON OCAO BY GLAF AGAINST PLAF

For : COAS GLAF HQ

By : AVM Mohammed Nazrul Islam GLAF HQ
At : 1420F On 15 Jun 21

Refs:

A. GL Air Plg Map.

B. JSSDM Chapter 9
C. AP EX 2B
D. SOHB (Air).
E. AP 1C : Air Wpn and Vul of Tgt.
F. SD 6A (Air) : Aprc
G. AP 2A: AD

Time Zone Used Throughout the Aprc: FOXTROT

REVIEW OF THE SIT

1. The PL's relations with us (GL) and SL have always remained strained because of

their ideological differences and terr disputes. From the beginning, both GL and PL had

equal rights of passage through the Strait of Tonkin. Since 2010, tension has been

mounting between these two countries in this region with the discovery of rich minerals

on the island named as Silk. This island is located north of Tonkin (in Blue Sea, north of

1
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

Port Morsby) which is in possession of GL. The sit further escalated as GL’s inbound

shipping and fishing vessels in proximity of that area were frequently harassed and

threatened by PL’s warships. These unlawful activities of PL further intensified in early

months of this year with an ill intention to capture Silk Island. The aggressive attitude of

PL and strong stance of GL brought these two countries to such strenuous sit where

ultimatum of war adds by PL. Taking advantage of the sit, GL’s eastern neighbor

YELLOW LAND (YL) has also increased pressure on us dmd the settlement of the long

pending border dispute. GL’s political and mil ally SL and BL have agreed through a high

level meeting to assist GL with political and moral sp only. Intl community is highly

concerned but unlikely to assist any of the side in case of any hostility, though effective

intl pressure is expected to be applied for a quick end to such hostilities. Considering the

sit, GL govt has issued war directive to its Armed Forces dictating not to undertake any

provocative act. However, considering the GLAF’s vulnerability to PLAF low lvl attk, the

COAS has decided to to analyze the options for pre-emption against the PLAF.

FACTORS AFFECTING AIM

2. Ltd Cap against Low Lvl Attk. GREEN LAND is vulnerable to low lvl attk by
the PLAF due to our ltd def cap against low lvl attk.

3. Govt War Directive. War directive issued by GREEN LAND Govt restricts
GREEN LAND Armed Forces to take any provocative act against PINK LAND. As such,
offn move by any of the forces of GREEN LAND has to be well justified to convince the
Govt.

4. PINK LAND’s Unwillingness to any Resolve. Despite restraints from Int’l

community, PINK LAND has shown no interest in resolving the issue and has been
2
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

continuing its blockade In the Strait of Tonkin. As such, mil intervention could be the only
option for resolve.

5. Higher Command’s Intent. The COAS has instructed to analyze the options
for pre-emptions and bring out some firm proposals for counter air op against the PLAF..

AIM

6. To plan a pre-emptive attk against PLAF to reduce the offn power that may inflict
significant damage to GLAF.

FACTORS

Overriding Factors

7. Govt War Directive.

a. GL Govt War Directives id the main threat emanating from PL whose aim is
likely to capr Silk Island.

b. Due to the existing belligerent att of YL and PL, all GL res are to be kept
cen loc.

c. GREEN LAND Armed Forces are not to undertake any provocative act to
prevent initiation of hostilities.

d. Due to the current Intl env, the war is not expected to last more than 2-3
wk.

3
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

8. Deductions.

a. Any pre-emption against PLAF by the GLAF has to be strongly justified.

b. Keeping res for countering any eventualities from YL is going to have

effects on the wt of attk that can be launched against PLAF.

c. Considering the sit, initial op plan will be for 24 hrs.

d. Pre-emptive attk would reqr justification and final approval from GL govt.

9. Intl Sp.

a. There will not be any intl assistance for both the side in case of hostility.

10. Deduction.

a. Plg has to be made for considering war reserve and present ORBAT.

11. Exec Time and Degree of Assurance (DA).

a. The pre-emption plan should allow us accomplishment of the task ASP.

b. 75% DA is reqr against PL HVTs while planning for the pre-emptive offn
act.

12. Deductions.

a. For accomplishment of msn with reqr DA, GLAF air assets have to be empl
in the pre-emption with extensive rate of op.

4
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

Pervasive Factors

13. Wx. Gen wx is dry between March and May. Northern coastal area experiences
light to moderate rainfall after May due to Western disturbance. In south, the wx is
generally clear. Early morning fog and low visibility are common along the coast in the
south, which generally clears shortly after sunrise. The first lt, last lt and moon (second
qtr) setting times are 0600, 1830 and 0500 respectively.

12. Deductions.

a. Visual flg may be hampered in the early morning from first light to sunrise
due to fog and low vis. As such, air op may be conducted from sunrise at the
earliest.

b. Air op towards northern Bases of PLAF e.g MANONO, SHIBPUR and

GOMA are likely to be affected by precipitation. However, such effects are unlikely
to have towards central and southern parts.

c. For ni attk, moonlight may provide added advantage for tgt acquisition.

13. Topo. The area is gen flat and open without any meaningful cover in the north as
well as towards south. There are no significant natural features to degrade radar
performance.

14. Deduction.

a. Considering the overall terrain cond of PINK LAND, low lvl attk would be
poss.

5
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

b. Low lvl tgt may be detected by radars from greater ranges providing good
defensive depth at low lvl.

c. East of GOMA and South of AVEBA are two most suitable AB as well as amph
ldg sites.

15. Day/Ni Op. Both GLAF and PLAF have ni attk cap platforms (AD and FGA role)
with blind del cap in few. The Moon phase is in second quarter which sets at 0500.

Other Factors

16. Assurance Level. 75% DA against PLAF HVTs while 65% or less against

others are to be achieved.

17. Deduction. Wpn to tgt matching needs to be done meticulously to achieve the
desired DA.

18. Duration of Op. The op is to be planned for first 24 hrs only.

19. Deduction. Air power would be emp to inflict max damage on offn str of

PLAF to neutralize their offn Cap.

Op Environment

20. Air Ave of App (AA). More than 80% terr of PL is covered by LL radars.
Moreover, PL is mostly a plain land. As such, finding a suitable air AA is quite difficult
task for GLAF. However, GLAF can take the advtg of 2XC-130 ac equipped for EW role.
By providing stand-off Jamming those radars by C-130s ac GLAF air force would be able
to create two AAs, as shown in the Anx C.

6
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

18. Recce. Pre-attk and post-attk recce may be considered. However, pre-attk
recce may terminate the possible element of surprise. Post-attk recce may provide actual
battle damage assessment (BDA).

19. Deduction. 8 x Eurofighter Typhoon ac which is already equipped for photo

recce may be ut for BDA only. Moreover, 12 x HERON UAV may be used to carry out
strat recce and surv, specially before launching any air ops.

20. ADGE. 3 x P-40M Static Radar of PLAF are the high lvl radar, additionally
acts as GCI stn also. ADOC is loc at RAJPUR. 3 out of 6 x P-15 LL Radar of PLAF
would be used as gap fillers and loc in GOMA, SHIBPUR and GARUL. Rest 3 radar are
kept as res in AVEBA and RAJPUR. Newly inducted 10 x LL PRS radar located in
BOGRA, KAMINA, MANONO, SHIBPUR and GARUL are cap to detect obj within 10,000
ft. Additionally, 2 x AD FF of PL Navy is also integrated with the AD network. The
probable RADAR locations of PLAF along with their detection range is att as Annex ‘A’ to
this apprc.

21. Deduction.
a. More than 80% of PL terr is under LL coverage.
b. HL coverage of PLAF can detect any incoming raid from GLAF maintaining
HH profile with a re-action time of min 22 min.
c. LL coverage gives appx wg time of 8 min.
d. Tac routing should be done to avoid detected by LL radars.

22. EA Cap. 2 x EW Cap C-130 ac of GLAF can determine PL’s EOB and
provide stand-off radar and comm jamming. Each of these ac can barrage jam a static
radar and spot jam another radar from a dstn of 150 nm op at an alt of 25,000 ft. It can
also noise jam the complete VHF/UHF freq. PLAF has only ELINT cap in two of its An-32
ac cap of determining GL’s EOB.

7
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

23. Deduction.
a. GLAF C-130 EA ac may be UT for Barrage jamming and spot jamming
against static and mobile radar to force PLAF FI to resort to broadcast con.
b. UHF jamming may be used to reduce cap of SAM, AAA and AAM.

24. EMCON Policy. EMCON policy has to be estb along with the campaign plg.

25. Deduction. Eff EMCON policy would preserve the surprise and protect the
GLAF air asset from giving away the EOB to PLAF.

Eff of En’s Air Force

1. ORBAT. The present depl of PLAF is shown below:

Fig 2: PLAF Present Depl (ORBAT)

8
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

2. DAI, GLAF provided the fol intel iro PLAF:

a. Due to its prolonged svc life, total fleet of MiG-25 is suffering from fuel
leakage from its drop tanks. Under this circumstance, PLAF has decided to emp
all MiG-25 from KAMINA only without external drop tanks.

b. 06 X Jaguar ac are mod for Anti-Ship role only.

c. 02 X AN-32 ac are newly equipped with avionics for ELINT. Both are posn
at BOGRA.

d. In case of nec, 2 X CASA C-212 of PLN at BOGRA can augment the PLAF
op.

3. Deduction. PLAF has total of 198 combat ac. Out of those 72 ac (Mig-27 and
Jaguar Intl) can be emp in FGA role. Together they can carr a total of 144 ST GPBs.
Out of the 144 ST MiG-27 and Jaguar can carr 108 ST GPBs. This wt of attk can infict
significant damage if PLAF takes the initiative to carr out an offn against GLAF. PLAF
can emp 72 X MiG-21BIS for AD role. In case of pre-emptive strike pri to be given to
destroy as many FGA ac on grd as possible. They have not yet redepl their FI/FGA ac
in the FOBs. However, if they are depl in those FOBs then it would take min 36 hrs to
start full scale op from those bases. GLAF may emp HERON UAV for
recce/surveillance role in the bordering area outside the detection range of PLAF
radars to monitor their activities.

4. State of Readiness.

a. Op Str. PLAF's total frontline op str consists of 14 FI/FGA, ½ PR, and 2

tpt sqns. PLAF is Cap of reducing GLAF offn power from those depl loc. However,
it takes about 36 hrs to start full scale ops from a new loc if redepl.

b. Scale of Effort. PLAF can sustain a svc rate of 75% for all types of ac
and can generate 03 sorties/day for FI/FGA/Recce ac and 02 sorties/day for tpt ac
for the duration of the conflict.
9
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

c. RRR. RRR effort aval at each base is Cap of repairing 02 craters within
06 hrs and 04 craters within 12 hrs.

5. Deduction. PLAF maint a high degree of readiness. Their pilots and other pers
are well trained. They conduct routine trg and ex to keep their pers up-to-date with
new procedures. As such, if they seize the initiative to strike GLAF first, then they
would be able to inflict considerable damage to GLAF. As such, in no way they would
be allowed to have the initiative over GLAF.

6. Bases Aval. Salient aspect of the bases of PLAF is given below:

Table 1: PLAF Bases

7. While plg attk on those bases fol aspects has to be born in mind:

a. All RW except the FOBs and BOGRA have parallel taxi tracks suitable for
take-off and ldg.

b. One 1800 x 600 ft revetted ASP can accn max 20 ac.

c. There are 08 HAS ea of the FOBs. KAMINA air fd has 24 HAS.

d. Only AD F had been op from GARUL and SHIBPUR air fd other than
MOBs in the recent past.

10
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

e. There is a naval base loc between BOGRA and MONGLA and PLN air
assets are op from BOGRA air fd.

8. Deduction. While plg to put the RW off for op, consideration to destroy the
parallel taxiway is to be given. Because, if taxiway are op then PLAF would be able to
cont op from those bases. From the aval data it is evident that putting off KAMINA RW
would take the max effort from GLAF perspective. On the other hand BOGRA MOB
has the max no of ac. However, it has no parallel taxiway. As such, consideration to
put off BOGRA RW may be given in the first ph of attk.

9. Res. PLAF has 3 X P-15 radar in res at AVEBA and RAJPUR.

10. Moral & Efficiency. The moral of the pers of PLAF is high. As discussed, they
are very efficient in terms of trg and op. All of the ac is likely achieve 75%
serviceability rates. Their aircrew are have a sense of superiority due to their superior
no of FI/FGA ac inventory.

11. Deduction. Due to the moral & efficiency, beating PLAF would be a daunting
task for GLAF. However, with careful and synchronize attk GLAF would be able to
bring PLAF in their knees.

12. Trg. PLAF conducts routine trg and ex to keep their pers up-to-date. It is
reported in the INTREP that their trg activities has increased significantly in recent
times.

13. Deduction. Given the geo-political development in the region, this is clear
indication of PL’s provocation to GL.

Offn Power Against Opposing Def

14. En VPs.

a. FGA/Strike Ac and ASP. FGA ac of PLAF are vital assets for them to
succeed in any kind of hostilities with GLAF. The wt of attk of the FGA fleet of
PLAF is shown in AnxD. However, they are most vulnerable once they are on the
grd. Some of PLAF ac are kept in revetted ASP and HAS. While others are kept in
the open.

11
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

b. Deductions. FGA fleet of PLAF is to be destroyed on grd as far as

possible.

c. RW. PL has at least one RW in ea of their MOB and FOB. However,

KAMINA has 2X9000 ft RW. These RWs, especially those loc at the MOBs are
very vital for the launching and recovery of their FGA ac. As such, to diminish the
FGA effectiveness these RWs need to be destroyed at the first instance.
Moreover, all the MOB RWs except for BOGRA have parallel taxiway which can
be used for take offs and ldgs. As such, these taxiways also need to be destroyed
vis-à-vis the RWs.

d. Deduction. RWs and taxiways are most vulnerable to be attk at the

beginning of the pre-emptive strike which may be planned in the early morning.
That is the time PLAF pers would have their shift change. Moreover, we do not
expect any CAP during the beginning of hostilities. To min GLAF attrition, the
radars must be destroyed just prior to attk the RWs taxiways and ac on grd.

e. Radars. PLAF has 3 X P-40M and 3XP-15 radars depl in a way to get
max coverage of the PL airspace. These are augmented by the 2 X PLN AD FF’s
radar loc SE of MONGLA and NE of PORT JOYPUR. They also have 10 X PRS
(5 unit) depl in five different bases. These PRS can detect any object within
10,000 ft. These radars start op from 0700 LT. PL maint 2 hrs interval after 04 hrs
op for these radars. By spot and barrage jamming with the help of 2 X C-130 EW
ac of GLAF the detection range of these radars can be reduced by 32%.

f. Deduction. These radars are to be jammed with the help of EW cap C-

130 ac just prior launching attk on them with GLAF FGA ac. This EA will create
much needed ave of approach for GLAF FGA ac to go deep inside PL to carr out
attk on their VPs.

g. HAS/Fuel Storage etc. PLAF has a total of 48 X HAS loc in diff bases.
Therefore, they would be able to shelter at least 48 combat ac in those HAS which
they may use for retaliation against GLAF. Destruction of HAS would need
concentrated effort with precision munitions such as LGB or KAB-500KR bombs.
These HASs will vulnerable once the RWs and radars of respective air fd would
be inoperative.

h. Deduction. 24 X HAS may be attk once the RW and taxiway of KAMINA

MOB has been put out of op.
12
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

j. ADOC. PLAF ADOC is loc in RAJPUR. However, the AD sys is not fully
automated.

k. Deduction. To bring a decisive result ADOC also to be attk once

conditions are perfect.

37. Own Striking Power. The ORBAT of GLAF is given below:

SER NO AC TYPE NO OF SQN No of ac LOCATION REMARKS

1 12 KALANI
1 Eurofighter Typhoon MRCA
1 12 FATAKI

1 12 SOLAN
2 Mirage-V -
1 12 BENI

2 24 BENI
3 JF-17 Multirole
1 12 MAHAGI

1 12 FATAKI

4 F-7BG 2 24 MAHAGI AD Role

1 12 SOLAN

1 12 KALANI
5 Yak -130 -
1 12 FATAKI

1 6 BOGORO
6 C-130 -
1 6 BENI

13
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

½ 6 MAHAGI
7 HERON UAV -
½ 6 FATAKI

a. Range and Wt of Attk.The ROA and config of GLAF’s FGA ac is given

below:

Ser Type Config HH HLLH LL

4XDurandal+2XIR Msl+SPJ 500 nm 400 nm 230 nm
1. JF-17 4XCBU+2XIR Msl+SPJ 500 nm 400 nm 230 nm
8X250 kg + SPJ 500 nm 400 nm 230 nm
2XAM-39 + 2XIR 600 nm 450 nm 270 nm
4X500 kg or 8XCBU 600 nm 450 nm 300 nm
5. Euro Fighter 2x LGB+2x ARM+3x
750 nm 600 nm 450 nm
AMRAAM+2XSRAAM
8X250 kg+ 2x500kg+2xAAM 600 km 450 km 300 km
7. Mirage-V
4X500 kg or 8XCBU 700 km 525 km 350 km
4XKAB-500+4XR-73 500 km 350 km 250 km
9. Yak-130 4XKAB-500+2XR-
600 km 450 km 350 km
73+2XECM pods

b. Details wt of attk of GLAF is given at Anx E, F and G.

c. Deduction. While carr out attk in dense EM environment due

consideration to be given to use Mirage-V, JF-17 or Yak-130 ac. Because these
ac are equipped with chaff and flare dispensers. Only Mirage-V carr SPJ and all
FI/FGA ac carr RWR. Euro Fighter and Mirage-V are best suited to deliver CBU
on the tgt. They both can be used to deliver LGB on the tgt. However, Euro
Fighter needs to be paired with Mirage-V as they do not have laser designation
Cap .Few of the JF-17 are to be kept on ground for AD role as they are very good
multi role platforms.

38. En Def.

a. AD Radars. En LL and HL radar coverage before EA is shown in AnxA.

However, after EA this coverage reduce by 32% which is shown in Anx B.
14
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

b. F Def. PLAF has a formidable fleet of 72XMiG-21BIS equally distr in

three MOBs. These MiG-21s can carr 4 AAM (2 X Atoll + 2 x Aphid) at a go. This
makes them very potent adversary for GLAF’s FGA fleet.

c. Missiles. PLAF has a total of 6 sqns of SA-2 SAM and five sqns of
Crotale SAM depl in different MOBs and FOBs.

d. AD Atry. Moreover, PLAF possesses adequate no of radar con AAA depl

to protect the VPs. These AAAs are difficult to loc.

39. Deduction. Utmost surprise is to be maint before GLAF launches a pre-emptive

strike on PLAF. This is to be done at a time when none of the MiG-21s are airborne for
CAP. To neutralize them, the RWs at MOBs are to be destroyed in the first instance.
Taxiways of MANONO and KAMINA are also to be destroyed. Due to employment
limitations, SA-2 cannot destroy a tgt below 1000 ft. As such, all the attks are to be
planned at LL inside MEZ. However, Crotale has a kill probability of 50% at or below
1000 ft. Nevertheless, this kill probability can be reduced by further 50% by jamming
them. As such, ac equipped with SPJ and ECM pods would be detailed to carr out attk
where Crotale is depl. The kill probability of radar con AAA is only 20% against a LL F
ac. As such, attrition due to AAA may not be avoidable. However, this attrition is justified
considering the operational significance of pre-emptive strike.

Reasonable Assumptions

40. GLAF is going to seize the initiative and carr out pre-emptive strike against the
PLAF

15
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

Relative Str and Cap

41. The fol table would enumerate the comparative str of GLAF and PLAF:

42. Ser
Deduction. Item En-PLAF Own-GLAF Rmk
P L A F h a
24XEF v i n g s u p
24XRafale Eurofighter,
24XMirage-V
36XMiG-27 Rafale & JF-
1. OCAO 36XJF-17
36XJaguar (Intl) 17 are multi
24XYak-130
= 96 role
= 108
2. AD 72XMiG-21BIS 48XF-7BG
CbtSp:
a. 22XAN-32
a. Tpt a. 10XC-130
b. 2XAN-32
b. ECM b. 2XC-130
3. c. Nil *Out of 24XEF
c. UAV c. 12XHERON
d. 6XMiG-25
d. Recce d. 4XDornier
e. 2XC-212
e. Navy Sp
Incl GLN &
Total 200 184 PLN ac.
Excluding UAV

Multirole cbt ac. With the present str of ac PLAF is Cap of inflicting significant attrition to
GLAF as well as attk grd tgts.

Other Factors

43. Crew Fatigue. While plg the op, crew duty and crew rest has to be kept in the
mind. Duty roaster should be planned in such a way so those crews do not become over
stressed.

44. CSAR. As the strike is to carr out deep inside the en terr, ac are to be kept
res for CSAR in case any of the crew eject inside the en terr.

16
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

45. Media Campaign. Media campaign would play a vital role in justifying the pre-
emptive strike that would be carr out in the PL. DAI may be tasked to look into this
aspect.

46. Secrecy. Secrecy to be given utmost priority for success of the pre-emptive
strike. To keep it secret only the handful of cmdrs is to be info of this plan beforehand.

47. Surprise and Deception. GLAF may not be able to hide the movt of the assets
within GL. However, the intention may be hidden from the en. Rapid depl in the FOBs is
to be avoided. Failing to do so would make it difficult to achieve the much needed
surprise.

48. Air Sit.

a. Present Sit. From ‘Relative Str and Cap’ it is evident that PLAF is not only
numerically superior but also superior in terms of Cap. However, this can be
turned in GLAF’s favor by launching the pre-emptive strike.

b. Favourable Air Sit. During the onset, favorable air sit can be achieved by
attk the en during the sunrise when their PRS would not come into op. This would
also help GLAF as PLAF would be in the mid of a shift change. Sit can further be
brought into our favour by jamming the HL and LL radars by EW ac along the AA
just before the FGA ac would be breaking the horizon.

c. Air Superiority. The aim of 1st wave of attk should be to neutralize en

air bases as quick as poss. Imm after that the attk package would tgt and destroy
as many en ac on the grd as poss. The primary tgt should be the en FGA ac.

d. Air Supremacy/Fulfillment of the Obj . By destroying sizeable en ac on

the grd, GLAF would be able to reduce the en strike potential to an extent where
they would not have any option other than agreeing to our terms and conditions.

49. Deduction. Although in the beginning of the strike the en has the advtg,
however, a careful and coordinated pre-emptive strike would be able to inflict decisive
blow to the en strike potential. GLAF is likely to achieve the aim with much ease if the
conduct of the op goes as per the plan.

Summary of Deductions

17
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

50. PLAF is likely to carr out offn act against GL to capture the Island Silk.

51. PLAF is a potent en equipped with superior cap ac.

52. Radar coverage of PLAF can significantly be degraded to create at least two AA
for GLAF.

53. A properly executed pre-emptive strike would be able to neutralize PLAF’s offn
power within 24 hrs.

OWN COURSES

54. Course I GLAF ac to launch a multi-dimensional pre-emptive strike against en air

fd MANONO, BOGRA and KAMINA sp by an enhanced EA attk to Jam en rdr and comm
sys by the modified C-130 ac and UAVs Heron and neutralizing en HL and LL radars at
BOGRA, RAJPUR and MANONO, followed by attk Ac on grd at BOGRA and MANONO
in the first wave at 0600 hrs D day. In the second wave destroy Jaguar, Rafale and MiG-
27 ac trapped in BOGRA and MANONO air fd by using Mirage-V, Euro Fighter, JF-17
and Yak-130 ac with sp by adequate no of Sweepers and Escort.

a. Advtg.

(1) GLAF would be able to saturate the en def.

(2) Forcing the PLAF to go for broadcast control.

(3) Combat ac are most vulnerable on the grd. It is easier and safer to
destroy combat ac on the grd.

b. Disadvtg.

(1) GL will have to prove that the pre-emptive strike was carr out in act
of self def.

18
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

(2) The OCAO has to be carr out with ut most secrecy. If the secrecy is
lost then there would be no surprise. In that case GLAF’s attrition is likely to
be much higher. This would be detrimental to the success of the OCAO.

c. Comment. Pre-emptive strike throughout the history proved successful.

Even a numerically inferior country can in GL ict significant damage to numerically
and technically superior en. After analysis all the factors it is evident that GLAF
would be able to neutralize PLAF’s offn power in three waves of attk.

55. Course II. To retaliate PLAF’s OCAO into GL’s terr.

a. Advtg.

(1) Politically not challenging.

(2) With ISR, GL would be able to detect en FGA package to in GL ict

significant damage.

b. Disadvtg.

(1) If ISR fails to detect an upcoming raid then the damage to GLAF
would be unbearable.

(2) GLAF would not be able to use capable ELINT C-130 platforms
rendering them virtually useless.

c. Comment. For achieving the political obj by GL govt, PLAF should go for
the pre-emptive strike.

SELECTION OF OWN BEST COURSE

56. Out of the two COAs, COA-I is the most suited for the GLAF. By carr out pre-
emptive strike against PLAF, GLAF would be able to neutralize them quickly with min
attrition.
19
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

ASSESSMENT OF TASKS

57. Maj Tasks.

a. Depl at the FOBs.The ROA of GLAF FGA ac does not permit them to GLy
HLLH profile from their respective MOBs. As such, FGA ac are to be depl to fwd
bases at a suitable time.However, complete secrecy is to be maint for this depl.
DteEngg, DteSupp and FOBs to be notified about the depl accordingly

b. Media Campaign.Intl media campaign would be nec to justify the pre-

emptive strike. DAI may be tasked to deal with this.

c. Forces to Tasks. Pl refer to MAAP for forces to tasks which is attached

as Anx H, J and K.

OUTLINE PLAN

58. MSN. To neutralize the offn power of PLAF by waging a OCAO against PLAF.

59. EXEC.

a. C of O / Gen Outline.The OCAO would be carr out in ph. It would involve all
the units and sqns of GLAF.

b. Time of Commencement. The EX would commence wef 0001B 17 Jun

21.

c. Tgt to Wpn Match. LGBs would be used to destroy high value tgt. Such
as radars, ADOC, HAS etc. Anti-ship missiles would be used to destroy PLN FF.
Durandals would be used against the RWs and taxiways. CBUs would be used
against ac in the open. However, the indl sqns are at liberty to plan for tgt to wpn
match.

d. Elm of Force Package. The elm of force package incl C-130, F-7BG,
Euro fighter, Mirage-V, JF-17 and Yak-130 ac. Details of the of the force package
elm is shown in the MAAP.

20
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

e. Route. Route of different attk package is given as Anx L in the wt of attk

of GLAF.

f. Master Air Attk Plan (MAAP). MAAP is geven at Anx H, J and K.

g. Air Variants. The air variants is essential for air op in case of any
unforeseen cond for which own best course of act is not materialized as planned.

60. SVC SP. 4 X Dorniers of GLN at SOLAN would augment the op of GLAF for
gathering int, relay comm and targeting over maritime domain in particular. GLN FFs
which are loc 80 km N of Port Morsby and another loc 60 km SW of Port Siru would
provide air surv around the area for GLAF. They are integrated with GLAF LL AD netwk.

61. COMD AND SIG.

a. LAN/WAN would be used as the primary means of comm. This would be

augmented with secure VHF/UHF comm.

b. Authentication chart would be provided for ea day of op to all the relevant

agencies.

Sign

XXX YYYYYY
Air Mshl
ACAS (O&T)
Tel No: ########

Anxs:
A. HL and LL radar coverage of PLAF before EA.
B. HL and LL radar coverage of PLAF after EA.
C. Ave of App (AA) to PL: GLAF
D. Cal of wt of attk of PLAF
E. Cal for wt of attk: GLAF – 1st wave.
F. Cal for wt of attk: GLAF – 2ndwave.
G. Cal for wt of attk: GLAF – 3rdwave.
H. MAAP: GLAF – 1st wave.

21
EXERCISE SECRET
 EXERCISE SECRET

J. MAAP: GLAF – 2nd wave.

K. MAAP: GLAF – 3rd wave.
L. Route: GLAF.

Distribution: Copy No

PS to COAS
COAS’s Sectt 1
GLAF HQ

File 2

22
EXERCISE SECRET