Simon - Pragmatics - Lectures+page Numbers

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Simona ȘIMON
PRAGMATICS
Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

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CONTENTS
1. Using and understanding language in context
2. The semantic aspects of meaning: sense and reference
3. Deixis: the relation of language to its point of origin
4. The pragmatic aspects of meaning: implicature &
presupposition
5. Speech acts: Austin’s approach to SAs, Searle’s approach to
SAs, van Dijk’ approach to SAs
6. General principles of communication: the principle of
cooperation, the principle of politeness, the principle of
relevance

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1. Using and understanding language in context

1.1 Communication & code
Communication = ”the process whereby individuals exchange meanings through a common
system of codes” (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1993, vol. 21:631)
Code = “a set of rules or an interpretative device known to both transmitter and receiver, which
assigns a certain meaning or content to a certain sign” (Dyer, 1999:131)
1.2. Communication, channel, code, meaning & context
During the communication process, meaning is transmitted among the participants in the form
of some code and through some kind of channel (non-verbal: gestures, posture, dress, paralanguage;
verbal: written & oral: letters, novels, short messages & speech).
Human verbal communication: code = language
Language = verbal (words) + non-verbal (phonic = spoken language + graphic = written
language) components (Superceanu, 2000:21)
Language is used to communicate, to exchange meanings.
Two types of meaning one gets while communicating:
Semantic meaning = the propositional/ descriptive content of a sentence
Pragmatic meaning = the meaning of a sentence uttered in a particular context
1.3. The situation of communication: participants & context
1.3.1 Participants
The situation of communication involves at least two participants:
1. the addresser/ sender/ transmitter (= message producer & message encoder)
2. the addressee/ receiver (= message decoder).

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1.3.2 Context
Any act of communication takes place in a certain context which comprises both the
events preceding that particular situation of communication and the common cultural background
(Vestergaard & Schrøder,1985:15-16)
“…context is a constitutive element of discourse and people make recourse to it both in
production and in interpretation. On the one hand, the role of context is to support the choice of
language and of the intended interpretation and on the other hand, to limit the range of such
choices ” (Superceanu, 2000: 37)
1.3.2.1 Context as text
The situational context (physical, social, cultural circumstances) is encapsulated in the
lexical and grammatical structures, i.e. verbal context also termed co-text (Superceanu, 2000: 38-
39).
1.3.2.2 Analysing context
Dell Hymes (1972:56): SPEAKING grid
Setting: time, place, other physical conditions in which the speech act occurs
Participants: speaker, hearer
Ends: purpose, goals, outcomes
Act sequence: message form and content (speech act)
Keys: tone and manner of conversation (serious, humorous, playful, precise)
Instrumentalities: (verbal/non-verbal) channel, forms of speech (dialect, standard language,
formal, informal)
Norms: of interaction (culture dependent): action-reaction pattern
Genres: textual categories (magazine article, story, ad, letter)
Christiane Nord (1991:36): the New Rhetoric Formula = the 8 Wh-questions defining the
extratextual factors of context
Who transmits (sender)
to Whom (receiver)
What for (communicative intentions ascribed to a person; effect)
by Which medium (channel)
Where (place)
When (time)
Why –a text (reason/ occasion)
with What function (purpose; goal ascribed to a text: narration, conversation, description,
definition, classification, instruction, argumentation)?

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1.4 What is pragmatics?

term “pragmatics” <= Latin ‘pragmaticus’ & Greek ‘pragmaticos’ = ‘being practical’
pragmatics = the study of the practical dimension of meaning (Grice, 1975)
pragmatics = “the study of how utterances have meanings in situations” (Leech, 1995:x),
i.e. in context.
1.4.1 Pragmatic features of everyday language use
1. Appropriacy of language use in relation to its senders and receivers
2. Non-literal or indirect meaning of an utterance
3. Inference made by receiver in order to decode the speaker’s message
4. Indeterminacy of an utterance
5. Context(s) in which an utterance occurs
6. Relevance of an utterance
7. Misfires = unsuccessful utterances
Example: “Now I’ve done it”
1. Appropriacy: appropriate in a context; a comment was needed
2. Non-literal or indirect meaning of the utterance: “Now we have nothing to eat.”
3. Inference made by receiver in order to decode the speaker’s message: The glass container
is broken-> The fridge is empty. ->Now we have nothing to eat.
4. Indeterminacy of the utterance: it=???
5. Context: a mom accidently drops the glass container storing the dinner meal
6. Relevance of the utterance: ??? “Now I’m happy”???
7. Misfires: ??? Utterance uttered on the phone in the middle of another conversation:
“You’ve hurt his feelings.” “Now I’ve done it”???
1.5 Conclusions
Communication:
Channel, code
Sender Receiver
Message in context
PRAGMATICS = “the study of how utterances have meanings in situations” (Leech,
1995:x), i.e. in context.
Analysing context: Dell Hymes’ SPEAKING grid & Christiane Nord’s WH-question
grid
Semantic and pragmatic meaning of a sentence / utterance

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Pragmatic features of everyday language: appropriacy, non-literal or indirect meaning,

inference, indeterminacy, context, relevance, misfires.
Bibliography & Webography
Dyer, G. 1999 (1982). Advertising as Communication. London & New York: Routledge.
Grice, H. P. 1975. 'Logic and Conversation‘. In Cole, P. & Morgan, J. (eds.) Syntax and
Semantics 3: Speech Acts, New York: Academic Press.
Hymes, D. 1972. “Models of interactions of language and social life”. In J. Gumperz & D.
Hymes (eds.). Directions in Sociolinguistics: the Ethnography of Communication. New York:
Holt, Reinehart and Winston: 35-71.
Leech, G.N. 1995 (1983). Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman.
Nord, C. 1991. Text Analysis in Translation. Amsterdam and Atlanta, Ga: Rodopi
Superceanu, R. 2000. Elements of Discourse and Discourse Analysis: A linguistic approach.
Timişoara: Editura Orizonturi Universitare.
Vestergaard, T. & K. Schrøder. 1985. The Language of Advertising. Oxford & New York:
Basil Blackwell.
***, 1993. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 21. Macropedia. Chicago.
http://homepages.wmich.edu/~bowman/channels.html (24.09.2014)

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2. The semantic aspects of meaning: sense and reference

2.1 Introduction
Language is used to communicate, to exchange meanings.
Two types of meaning one gets while communicating:
Semantic meaning = the propositional / descriptive content of a sentence
Pragmatic meaning = the meaning of a sentence uttered in a particular context
2.2 Semantic meaning: sense & reference
A. A word’s sense/denotation = dictionary definition of the word
“A word’s sense is that aspect of its meaning which relates to a particular concept or
concepts. Roughly speaking, it is the dictionary definition.” (Kennedy, 2003:63)
B. A word’s reference / connotation = meaning of the word in context
“In particular contexts, words are sometimes described as having reference. That is,
they refer to particular things.” (Kennedy, 2003:63)
“The connotative meaning of a word is the personal associations it has for particular
uses.” (Kennedy, 2003:64)
“In sum, denotation is part of the abstract meaning, whereas reference is part of
contextual meaning.” (Superceanu, 2000:28)
Word meaning
Sense/ Denotation (dictionary)
Reference / Connotation (context)
A linguistic form
One unique sense / denotation (dictionary)
None, one or several reference(s) / connotations (context)

e.g.
a. One sense, no reference: I can see a dragon in the street.
dragon= 1. Sense: “A mythical monster like a giant reptile. In European tradition the dragon is typically
fire-breathing and tends to symbolize chaos or evil, whereas in East Asia it is usually a beneficent symbol

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of fertility, associated with water and the heavens.”

(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/dragon)
2. Reference: Dragons don’t exist.
b. One sense, one reference: I really like this ice cream.
ice cream= 1. Sense: “A semi-soft frozen dessert made with sweetened and flavoured milk fat.”
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ice-cream?q=ice+cream+)
2. Reference: this ice cream

c. One sense, several references: I really like ice cream
ice cream= 1. Sense: “A semi-soft frozen dessert made with sweetened and flavoured milk fat.”
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ice-cream?q=ice+cream+)
2. Reference: (all kinds of) ice cream
2.3 Kinds of reference

Reference is defined as “an act in which a speaker, or writer, uses linguistic forms to enable a
listener, or reader, to identify something. Those linguistic forms are referring expressions…”
(Yule, 1996:17)
Kinds of reference:
Anaphoric reference, i.e. the receiver has to look back in the text for the interpretation of a
lexical item:
The book is interesting, it’s a present from my mom.
Cataphoric reference, i.e. the receiver has to look forward in the text for the interpretation of a
lexical item:
I like it, the book I mean.
Referring expressions:
7. Proper nouns: Mary, London, Mount Everest

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8. Definite noun-phrases: the man, the trip, this ice-cream

9. Indefinite noun-phrases: a man/trip; some/ any/ all trips
10. Definite pronouns: it, he, them, us
11. Indefinite pronouns: somebody, someone, everybody, everyone, no one/none, nobody,
anyone, anybody, something, anything (Yule, 1996:17, Cobb & Gardiner, 1994: 128-186)
Ambiguity:
“Reference may become a source of ambiguity where the context or the co-text does not provide
sufficient knowledge for the addressee to be able to identify the referent.” (Superceanu, 2000: 29)
e.g. All suits cost $ 20. (each suit/ all suits) => Indefinite referring expression
2.4 Conclusions
Word meaning = Sense/ Denotation (dictionary) + Reference/ Connotation (context)
A linguistic form = one unique sense / denotation (dictionary) +
none, one or several reference(s)/ connotations (context)
Reference -> referring expressions: proper nouns, definite/ indefinite noun-phrases,
definite/ indefinite pronouns
Ambiguity -> indefinite referring expressions
Anaphoric / backward reference
Cataphoric / forward reference
Bibliography & Webography
Cobb, T. & Gardiner, R. 1994. Today’s English Grammar. Bucureşti: Prietenii Carţii.
Kennedy, G. 2003 (1988). Structure and Meaning in English. A Guide for Teachers. Harlow:
Pearson Longman.
Yule, G. 1996. Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/dragon (04.10.2014)
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ice-cream?q=ice+cream+
(04.10.2014)

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3. Deixis: the relation of language to its point of origin

3.1 Introduction
deixis < Greek “’pointing’ via language” (Yule, 1996:9), ‘pointing to or picking out’ (Grundy,
2000:23)
deictic expressions = indexicals (= referring forms):
“Any linguistic form used to accomplish this ‘pointing’ is called a deictic expression” (Yule,
1996:9)
Deictic expressions / Indexicals are used to indicate:
1. people > person deixis: me, you
2. places > spatial deixis: here, there
3. time > temporal deixis: now, then.
The interpretation of the deictic expressions depend on the context shared by both the speaker
and the hearer.
“Deixis is clearly a form of referring that is tied to the speaker’s context, with the most basic
distinction between deictic expressions being ‘near speaker’ versus ‘away from speaker’.
(Yule,1996:9)
‘near speaker’/ proximal terms: you, this, here, now
Deictic center/ speaker: I, we, this, here, now
‘away from speaker’/ distal terms: s/he, they, that, there, then (Yule,1996:9-12)
3.2 Person deixis

• It points to the relationship between the addresser & the addressee.
• Deictic categories: ‘I’/ speaker, ‘you’/ hearer, ‘he, she, it’/ ‘others’
• HONORIFICS = expressions that refer to persons of higher social status = “politeness formulas
in a particular language which may be specific affixes, words, or sentence structures”(Richard et
al.,1985: 131)
• Many languages: T/V DISTINCTION: tu/ vous, tu/ dumneavoastră, du/Sie = familiar / non-
familiar addressee distinction => the speaker’s choice of one addressing form over the other points
indirectly to “the speaker’s view of his or her relationship with the addressee” (Yule, 1996:10)

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“In those social contexts where individuals typically mark distinctions between the social status of
the speaker and addressee, the higher, older, and more powerful speaker will tend to use the ‘tu’
version to a lower, younger, and less powerful addressee, and be addressed by the ‘vous’ form in
return.” (Yule, 1996:10-11) => also known as ‘social deixis’
E.g. In Spain: the age distinction is more powerful than the economic/ social distinction => a rich,
but young business woman will address the old cleaning lady with the polite/ non-familiar form of
address, while the cleaning lady will address the young business woman with the familiar form of
address. (adapted from Yule, 1996:11)
N.B. In English
In English, I & WE are always used deictically: I’ll give you my phone number.
the speaker’s attitude towards the hearer: exclusive and inclusive WE => ambiguity
Exclusive WE = (speaker + others) - addressee
Inclusive WE = (speaker + others + addressee)
e.g. We clean up after ourselves around here. (we = the hearer included or excluded)
Let’s clean up. (inclusive we = all the present ones)
Let us clean up. (exclusive we = all the present ones - addressee) (adapted from Yule, 1996:11
- 12)
In English, YOU is used both as a formal and as a non-formal form of address.
YOU may be used:
gesturally in a deictic way: You have to come. (~ I, as a speaker, am pointing at you, my friend.)
symbolically in a deictic way: You have to come. (~ you = all the pupils in the class, the entire
group of pupils)
non-deictically, with a general reference: You will never know what comes next. (O’Keeffe,
A., Clancy, B. & Adolphs, S. , 2011:39-42)
The 3rd person S/HE, IT, THEY are not usually used deictically, but anaphorically (= reference
made not to the context, but to the co-text) (Grundy, 2000:10-11):
gestural deictic use: She is my mother. (the speaker pointing at her)
anaphoric non-deictic use: I like Mary, your cousin. She is nice.
In English, the use of 3rd person instead of 2nd person form is used to express:
irony/ humour:
Would his (instead of your) highness like some coffee?
indirect potential accusations:
You didn’t clean up.
=> Somebody didn’t clean up after himself.

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=> Each person has to clean up after him or herself. (adapted from Yule, 1996:11)
3.3 Spatial / Place deixis
Spatial deixis : “the relative location of people or things is being indicated” (Yule, 1996:12)
Spatial deictic forms:
adverbs: here - there (location near & distant from the speaker), where, left - right, above -
below, in front - behind
proximal demonstratives: this – these
distal demonstratives: that - those
verbs of movement: to come - to go, to bring - to take (Grundy, 2000:28-30; Yule, 1996:12-13)
e.g. Come to bed. (movement towards the speaker) / Go to bed. (movement away from the speaker)
3.4 Temporal / Time deixis

Temporal deixis : the relative time of events is being indicated
Temporal deictic forms:
adverbs: now – then, again, later, yesterday, today, tomorrow
adverbial phrases: this/ last/ next Monday/ week/ month/ year (Grundy, 2000:31-32; Yule,
1996:14-15)
verb tense: present-past
e.g. I am not available now, please leave a message after the signal. -> answering machine; now=any
time a caller calls and I cannot pick up the phone.
3.5 Conclusions
• Deictic expressions = indexicals (= referring forms)
• Speaker’s context: ‘near speaker’ versus ‘away from speaker’ deictic expressions
• Person deixis: personal pronouns, honorifics, T/V distinction
• Place / Space deixis: adverbs, proximal/ distal demonstratives, verbs of movement
• Time deixis: adverbials, adverbial phrases, verb tenses
Bibliography
Grundy, P. 2000. Doing Pragmatics. London: Edward Arnold.
O’Keeffe, A., Clancy, B. & Adolphs, S. 2011. Introducing Pragmatics in Use. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Richard, J. Platt, J. & Weber. H. 1985. Longman Dictionary of Applied Linguistics. London:
Longman Group Ltd.
Yule, G. 1996. Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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4. The pragmatic aspects of meaning: implicature & presupposition

4.1 Introduction
“Making meaning is a dynamic process involving the negotiation of meaning between
speaker and hearer, the context of utterance (physical, social, and linguistic) and the meaning
potential of an utterance” (Thomas, 1995:22)
⇒ a. Speaker meaning, which is essential for the study of implicatures, presuppositions,
speech acts
⇒ b. Utterance meaning, i.e. “the discourse comprehension and information processing
during communication” (Superceanu, 2000:30) = the hearer’s perspective
Levels of speaker meaning (Thomas, 1995:16):
1. contextual or utterance meaning = well-formed sentences + sense + reference in context
2. communicative intention = illocutionary force of an utterance
illocutionary force = “intention behind behavioural acts like urging, promising, ordering,
complaining, etc. , which people can perform by uttering sentences” (Superceanu, 2000:31)
e.g. Could you open the window? – request
Do you want some bread? – question eliciting information or offer
4.2 Implicature
Implicature = “the additional or different meaning conveyed by utterances” (Superceanu, 2000:32)

speakers mean more than they say
Grice (1975, 1978):
1. Conventional implicature = ”the use of particular words or expressions which conventionally

implicate some additional meaning” (Superceanu, 2000:32)
2. Conversational implicatures = implicatures that arise in context and are “understood by taking
into account the principles of communication” (Superceanu, 2000:33)
4.2.1 Conventional implicature
Conventional implicature = implicature derived from the language use; it makes recourse to
linguistic means:
Words that generate conventional implicature: but, therefore, yet, even
Discourse deixis (relation between discourse parts): however, moreover, besides, anyway,
well, still, furthermore, although, oh, so

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Social deixis (relationship between the conversation participants): Sir, Madam, sonny, mate
(Levinson, 1983: 128-131)
e.g. Even John can do it. -> John who usually cannot do such things, can do it.
John is Scottish, but he is not mean. -> Scottish people are mean, but John, although a
Scottish, is not.
Go to your room, sonny/ son. -> You must follow my order, because you are my son &
sons obey their parents.
4.2.2 Conversational implicature
Conversational implicatures = implicature arisen during communication
A. Generalized implicature = context independent implicature
e.g. I have two children. -> I have no more than 2 children
I think the concert starts at 8. -> I am not sure that the concert starts at 8.
B. Particularised implicature = context dependent implicature
e.g. (I have tickets for a concert. My car doesn’t start and the taxi and bus drivers are on strike)
That’s a marvellous situation. -> I’m not happy, on the contrary, I’m nervous / angry because I will
miss / be late for the concert.
4.3 Presupposition
Pragmatic presuppositions = “what is taken by the speaker to be to be the common ground of the
participants in conversation” (Stalnaker, 1978: 321)
⇒ this common ground of the participants in conversation, i.e. the context knowledge shared
by all the conversation participants = presupposition pool (Venneman, 1975:314)
Addressee
Discourse subjects reconstruction
Pressuposition

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e.g.
A: Mr. Johnson is having a class in the old building.
B: He is in the language lab, then.
A: Yes. (Superceanu, 2000: 32)
Presupposition: Mr. Johnson is a language teacher.
Presupposition checking: a sentence is logically presupposed by another sentence even if negated.
Even if Mr. Johnson is (not) having a class in the old building, he is still a language teacher.
4.4 Conclusions
1. Making meaning -> negociation of meaning between speaker & hearer: speaker meaning +
utterance meaning
2. Levels of speaker meaning: contextual or utterance meaning + communicative intention (=

illocutionary force)
3. Implicatures & presuppositions:
convey the implicit meaning of discourse
are understood by the addressee through inference (= logical deductive thinking)
2 kinds of implicatures:
1. Conventional implicature
2. Conversational implicature (generalised+particularised)
Presupposition – presupposition pool – presupposition checking
Bibliography
Grice, H.P. 1975. ‘Logic and conversation’. In Cole, P. & J.L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and
Semantics, 3, New York: Academic Press.
Grice, H.P. 1978. ‘Further Notes on logic and conversation’. In Cole, P. (ed.), Syntax and
Levinson, S.C. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stalnaker, R.C. 1978. ‘Assertion’. In Cole, P. (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, 9, New York:
Academic Press.

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Thomas, J. 1995. Meaning in Interaction. London: Longman.
Venneman, T. 1975. ‘Topic, sentence, accent and ellipsis. A proposal for their formal
treatment’. In Keenan, E.L. (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language. Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press.

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5. Speech acts: Austin’s approach to SAs, Searle’s approach to SAs,

van Dijk’ approach to SAs
5.1 Introduction
While communicating, people use language not only to say things, but also to perform
actions.
e.g. Thank you.
- Using the appropriate intonation in the appropriate context, such a sentence may express:
-> gratitude
-> reproach
5.2. Austin’s approach to SAs

Austin -> lectures on speech acts (lectures published posthumously in the book How To Do
Things With Words)
Austin points out that “the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual
phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating” (Austin, 1962: 147).
=> Speech acts = expressions of psychological states (e.g. embarrassment, gratitude, irritation,
regrets, etc.) or of involvement in social interaction (e.g. ordering, requesting, promising,
warning, etc.).
Austin: distinction between constative and performative utterances.
Constative utterances describe a state-of-affairs and have the property of being either true or
false (truth conditions):
e.g. I have two children.
It is a splendid autumn day outside.
Performative utterances perform an act, do something actively (marrying, christening,

apologizing, naming a ship, etc.), they do not just say things and they “are not ‘true or false’”
(Austin, 1962: 5):
e.g. I apologize.
I hereby christen this ship The Great Conqueror.

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I give you my word.
I object.
I pronounce you man and wife.
=> performatives cannot be evaluated according to truth conditions, but to felicity conditions:
there is a conventional procedure with a conventional effect;
the persons and circumstances are appropriate, as specified in the procedure;
the procedure is executed correctly and completely;
other conditions are fulfilled, such as requisite thoughts, feelings, intentions and conduct
of the parties, as specified in the procedure (cf. Austin, 1962: 18).
=>performative utterance can be ‘felicitous’, i.e. successful, or ‘infelicitous’, i.e. unsuccessful
Felicity conditions are applicable particularly to very conventional and formal acts and
events performed as rituals or ceremonies, which Thomas named “ritual performatives” (1995:
36).
In order to distinguish the first person performatives from other types of utterances, Austin
suggests the insertion of the adverb hereby between subject and verb:
e.g. I hereby apologize.
I hereby christen this ship The Great Conqueror.
I hereby give you my word.
I hereby object.
I hereby pronounce that they be man and wife.
in uttering a sentence, three kinds of acts are simultaneously performed:
a. a locutionary act, which presupposes the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and
reference (i.e. the study of meaning);
b. an illocutionary act, which presupposes the making of a request, statement, promise, offer,
asking a question, issuing an order, etc. in uttering a sentence, on account of the conventional
force/ intention associated with it or with its explicit paraphrase (i.e. the direct achievements by
the conventional force associated with the issuance of an utterance);

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c. a perlocutionary act, which presupposes the bringing about of effects on the addressee(s) by
uttering the sentence, these effects depending on the circumstances of the utterances (i.e. all the
intended and unintended effects/ consequences caused by a particular utterance in a particular
situation) (cf. Austin, 1962: 108)
e.g. Stop talking!
When a teacher asks a student to stop talking during an exam, he simultaneously performs three
acts:
a. a locutionary act: he utters a sentence made up of two words (“Stop talking!”) meaning ‘stop
speaking to your colleague’ and referring to the student’s lip movement and the sounds thus
produced;
b. an illocutionary act: the teacher may utter an order, an urge or a piece of advice;
c. a perlocutionary act: the teacher may either persuade or frighten the student. In the former case,
the student stops talking, because, due to the teacher’s intervention, he realizes that he has been
disturbing the other students present. In the latter case, the student may remember a similar
situation when the teacher had asked another student to leave the classroom, thus not finishing his
written paper and failing the exam.
5.3 Searle’s approach to SAs

J. Searle: speech acts = “the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication” (1969: 16)
because “speaking a language is performing speech acts” (1969: 16).
The production of speech acts is governed by “certain rules for the use of linguistic elements”
(1969: 16). He calls these rules constitutive rules and distinguishes them from regulative rules.
Constitutive rules describe the sentence / utterance meaning and help the hearer decode the
speaker meaning (cf. Searle, 1969: 42-50) => illocutionary acts described in terms of some
constitutive rules
Regulative rules “regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour; for

example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships which exist
independently of the rules” (Searle, 1969: 33).

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11.3.1 Searle’s constitutive rules (obtained from Austin’s felicity conditions):
1. the propositional content rule: the speaker S utters a proposition P in the context of a sentence
or larger stretch of discourse T; this utterance predicates a future act A of the speaker S;
2. the preparatory rules:
- P is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A, and S believes
H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A;
- P is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of
events;
3. the sincerity rule: P is to be uttered only if S intends to do A.
Searle explains that for performing some acts, an appropriate psychological state is necessary
(sincere promises, a piece of advice, statements, etc. as opposed to lies, abuses, etc. which violate
the sincerity rule), while for performing other acts (christening, marrying, etc), the sincerity rule
needs not be met (one cannot christen or marry insincerely).
4. the essential rule: the utterance of P counts as a commitment of S to do A (in the case of the acts
which express a psychological state: thanking, welcoming, etc, the sincerity rule and the essential
rule overlap) (cf. Searle, 1969: 63).
these constitutive rules govern the use of Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFID) = the
linguistic devices used to determine the illocutionary force of an utterance, for example word order,
stress, intonation contour, punctuation, verbs, especially performative verbs, adverbs, etc.
Where the context and the utterance clearly indicate that the essential condition is met, it is not
necessary to explicitly use an IFID in performing an act (cf. Searle, 1969: 62-71).
11.3.2 Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts
Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts takes into account the illocutionary force (= a
specific kind of action which is performed in speaking, and described on the basis of constitutive
rules) and comprises the following classes:
1. Assertives commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition, e.g. stating, claiming,
reporting, concluding, confessing, confirming, etc.
2. Directives are attempts made by the speaker to get the hearer to do a volitional act, e.g. ordering,
commanding, begging, challenging, requesting, questioning, advising, recommending, etc.

21
3. Commissives commit the speaker to some action, e.g. promising, offering, swearing, vowing,
threatening, etc.
4. Expressives express the speaker’s psychological state with respect to the state-of-affairs
expressed by the propositional content, e.g. thanking, apologizing, blaming, pardoning,
congratulating, condoling, welcoming, etc.
5. Declaratives bring about changes in the reality expressed by the propositional content, e.g.
christening, resigning, dismissing, naming, appointing, sentencing, etc (cf. Searle, 1976: 1-24).
Searle also distinguishes between direct & indirect speech acts:
1. direct speech acts: their illocutionary force and sentence type directly match
2. indirect speech acts: their illocutionary force and sentence type do not directly match (e.g.
interrogatives used to make requests)
Reasons for the use of indirect speech acts: embarrassment to do something in a direct way, fear
of rejection, desire to be friendly or to behave in an authoritarian way towards somebody.
Deductive model of analysis of indirect SAs:
e.g.
Parent to misbehaving children on car trip: Do you want me to turn around right now?
Direct act: directive (question); Indirect act: commissive (threat)
Customer to barista: Could I get a large nonfat latte?
Direct act: directive (question); Indirect act: directive (order)
5.4 Van Dijk’s approach to SAs

T. van Dijk : speech acts are actions by nature and consequently should be studied with the
theory of actions (cf. van Dijk, 1992: 167-183).
theory of action: distinction between actions and acts.
⇒ Acts = intention-successful doings
⇒ Actions = acts which require further consequences in order to be purpose-successful.
From this perspective, the intention has the action itself as its scope and the purpose is defined
as a mental event in which an agent represents the goals of the action (a statement of purpose
answers a Why-question about the action):

22
e.g. I may intend to open the window, but the window lock is broken, so my intention is
unsuccessful; if I do open the window, my intention is successful. If I open the window in order to
get some fresh air, and indeed this happens when I open the window, then my purpose is successful.
But let us say that some children have put some garbage on fire and there is smoke and bad smell
in the air (but I am not aware of this when I open the window, because maybe the children are
around the corner), then my purpose of getting some fresh air is purpose-unsuccessful, because all
I get is an unpleasant smell.
5.4.1 Van Dijk’s classification of speech acts
5.4.1.1 Van Dijk’s classes of SAs (cf. van Dijk, 1992: 213-218):
a. a single speech act is an act/ a speech act with one intended result
b. composite speech acts may be compound and complex (have no given purpose):
b1. a compound speech act consists of component speech acts at the same level, i.e. equally
important speech acts; the result of each speech act is a condition for the success of the next speech
act:
b2. a complex speech act consists of a number of minor and major speech acts such that at least one
speech act is embedded in one of the component major speech acts:
c. sequences of speech acts (have a given purpose, the same agent, acts need not be part of a definite
plan): which may be interpreted as:
c1. one action if they can be assigned one global intention/ plan or if this action can in turn be a
condition/ consequence of other actions:
c2. sequences of actions: in all the other cases.
e.g.
a.. a single speech act : I’ll give you a lift!
b. composite speech acts :
b1. a compound speech act :
It’s raining outside and you’ve got no umbrella. I’ll give you a lift!
↓ ↓ ↓
compound speech acts major speech act
b2. a complex speech act :

23
e.g. John is in hospital || because he has been hit by a car on the pedestrian crossing.
↓ || ↓
major speech act + embedded speech act = complex speech act
c. sequences of speech acts interpreted as:
c1. one action : I attend all the classes. I pass all the exams. I take only good marks. → the
global intention is: I want to make my parents proud of me.
c2. sequences of actions: in all the other cases.
5.4.1.2 Van Dijk’s classification of SAs according to their contribution to the realization of
another speech act (cf. van Dijk, 1992: 213-218):
a. preparatory speech act: when its result is a necessary or probable condition for another speech
act
b. component speech act: which counts as a necessary speech act represented in the global intention
of the main speech act
c. auxiliary speech act: when the success of its result is a sufficient condition for the success of the
main speech act
d. consequent speech act: which is derived from the performance of the main speech act
e.g.
a. preparatory speech act:
I’ve learned a lot for the driving test. Hopefully I’ll pass it!
↓ ↓
preparatory speech act + major speech act = sequence of speech acts interpreted
as one action
b. component speech act:
If I pass the driving test, || I’ll get the driving licence in three days.
↓ ↓
component speech act + major speech act = complex speech act
d. auxiliary speech act:

24
I have answered all the questions at the driving test. Hopefully I’ll pass it!
↓ ↓
auxiliary speech act + major speech act = a sequence of speech

acts interpreted as one action
e. consequent speech act:
The unemployment rate has increased, || so criminality is expected to rise in this region.
↓ ↓
major speech act + consequent speech act = complex speech act
5.4.1.3 Van Dijk’s classification of SAs in terms of their connexity in discourse (cf. Van Dijk
1992:232):
a. micro-speech acts, i.e. the structure of individual speech acts and the linear structure of
speech act sequences
b. macro-speech acts/ global speech acts, i.e. the global, overall structure of communicative
interaction
a macro-speech act = “the global speech act performed by the utterance of a whole discourse,
and executed by a sequence of possibly different speech acts” (van Dijk,1992: 215)
=> speech acts: organized linearly in sequences and hierarchically in global speech acts
5.5 Conclusions
SAs = expressions of psychological states (e.g. embarrassment, gratitude, irritation, regrets, etc.) or
of involvement in social interaction (e.g. ordering, requesting, promising, warning, etc.).
=> SAs are used in order to perform actions with the help of language
1. Austin:
1.1 constative SAs - truth conditions + performative SAs – felicity conditions
1.2 three kinds of acts are simultaneously performed in uttering a sentence: a locutionary, an
illocutionary and a perlocutionary act
2. Searle:
1.1 constitutive & regulative rule
1.2 constitutive rules governing the use of IFIDs

25
1.3 assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, declarative Sas
1.4 direct – indirect SAs
3. Van Dijk:
3.1 single SAs, composite SAs may be compound and complex, sequences of SAs
3.2 preparatory speech act, component speech act, auxiliary speech act, consequent speech act
3.3 all the micro-speech acts => macro-speech act / global speech act
Linear organisation of the micro-speech acts and their global organisation in a macro-speech act
in discourse
Bibliography
Austin, J. 1962. How To Do Things With Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Searle, J.R. 1994 (1969). Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J.R. 1975. “Indirect Speech Acts”. In P. Cole & J.L. Morgan. Syntax and Semantics 3:
Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press: 59-82.
Searle, J.R. 1976. “The classification of illocutionary acts”. In Language in Society, 5: 1-24.
Şimon, S. 2008. “The Pragmatic Structure of Written Advertisements”. In R. Superceanu & D.
Dejica (eds.). Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Professional

Communication and Translation Studies: Politehnica University of Timisoara. vol. 1.
Timisoara: Politehnica Publishing House: 51- 58.
Van Dijk, T. A. 1992 (1977). Text and Context: Explorations in the semantics and pragmatics of
discourse. London: Longman.

26
12. General principles of communication: the principle of

cooperation, the principle of politeness, the principle of relevance
6.1 Introduction
Communication = “a specific kind of interaction or transaction achieved by means of language”
(Superceanu, 2000: 45)
⇒ Both the addresser and the addressee have to adjust to the communicative situation, “to
recognize a common immediate aim”, to “adhere to general principles”, to “utilize certain
strategies” (Superceanu, 2000: 45) in order to succeed in communicating with each other.
Herbert Paul Grice (1975) observed the way in which talk exchanges evolved and formulated the
the principle of co-operation. Other principles of communication are the principle of politeness
(Leech, 1983) and of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).
6.2 The principle of cooperation / The cooperative principle (CP)
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
The cooperative principle was aimed to help the conversation participants understand the
way in which implicatures are produced, and interpret them.
6.2.1 Maxims of the principle of cooperation
a. Maxims of quantity:
a1. Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purpose of the exchange.
a2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
b. Maxims of quality => supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
b1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
b2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
c. Maxim of relation => supermaxim: Be relevant (relating to a subject appropriately).
d. Maxim of manner => supermaxim: Be perspicuous (= clear).
d1. Avoid obscurity of expression
d2. Avoid ambiguity
d3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity, i.e. length)
d4. Be orderly

27
6.2.2 Non – observance of the maxims
Non – observance of the maxims in the following situations (Grice, 1975: 49) gives rise to:
1. Violating a maxim: “unostentatiously”, i.e. unintentionally, breaching a maxim => lying,

misleading, obfuscation (e.g. false/ partial information in arguments, parliamentary
speeches, journalistic interviews): e.g. politicians often do not answer a question, but give
long, complicated and ambiguous answers, thus violating the maxim of manner: BE BRIEF.
2. Opting out of a maxim: unwillingness of a speaker to cooperate in such a way as to observe
the maxims; the intention is made clear by the speaker: “I cannot say (any) more”, “I don’t
think I can give you the reasons”, “I don’t want to say any more”
-> often in public life: police officers, priests, other officials refuse to disclose everything
they know because they have confidential information that can affect others
(cf. Superceanu, 2000: 48)
3. Unintentionally infringing a maxim “through a defective linguistic performance”
(Superceanu, 2000: 48): foreign speakers of a language, children, people with physical or
mental illnesses that impair their performance.
e.g. My teacher was a physician. => ??physician = physicist?? => infringing the maxim of quality
4. Flouting a maxim = non-observance of one/ several maxims “at a time with the intention of
expressing a different or additional meaning to what they are saying” (Superceanu, 2000: 48)
=> conversational implicatures are thus generated the CP is generally observed, but some
maxims are exploited intentionally for effect.
A. Flouting the Maxims of Quantity
= more/less information than required; more information to mark respect, to point to a certain
situation + less information to be blunt, to point to unwillingness to speak (Cook, 1989: 31)
e.g.
At the time of the recording, all the cast were members of the BBC Drama Group.
(J.Thomas, 1995: 69)
BBC announcer gives too much information -> implicature: one/several actors were no
longer members of the BBC Drama Group at the time of the broadcast
- Is she rich?
- She was when she was with me. (Spark, 1984:91)

28
-> less information is given -> implicature: the speaker cannot be expected to know details
about the wealth of his former wife since they are no longer together
B. Flouting the Maxims of Quality
= Be true = flouted to create figures of speech: hyperboles, metaphors, irony or sarcasm
e.g.
The pain is killing me. (Superceanu, 2000: 49)
-> Figurative use -> implicature = powerful pain
C. Flouting the Maxims of Relation
= Be relevant = flouted when the topic is not addressed properly or when a change of topic occurs
e.g.
Forrest: Will you marry me? I’d make a good husband.
Jenny: You would, Forrest. -> answer to his argument, not his proposal
Forrest: But you won’t marry me?
Jenny: You don’t want to marry me. -> answer pointing to his wish, not hers as it would have been
expected (Speak up, 1996/1: 28)
-> No blunt negative answer of Jenny’s for politeness reasons
D. Flouting the Maxims of Manner
= Be perspicuous = flouted when ambiguous or obscure utterances are used to create some social
effects, e.g. humour, or to exclude some participants from the conversation
e.g.
- Who’s the defendant?
- The guy from the EV R&D. (Superceanu, 2000:50)
-> The name is not given : ambiguous utterance
6.3 The principle of politeness

The principle of politeness (Leech, 1983: 81): minimize the expression of impolite beliefs and
maximize the expression of polite beliefs.

29
⇒ The tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement and sympathy maxims (Leech, 1983:
104-139)
a. The tact maxim: minimize the expression of beliefs which imply cost to other; maximize the
expression of beliefs which imply benefit to other
b. The generosity maxim: minimize the expression of benefit to self; maximize the expression
of cost to self
c. The approbation maxim: minimize dispraise to other; maximize praise to other
d. The modesty maxim: minimize the expression of praise of self; maximize the expression of
dispraise of self
e. The agreement maxim: minimize disagreement between self and other; maximize agreement
between self and other
f. The sympathy maxim: minimize antipathy between self and other; maximize sympathy
between self and other
e.g.
a. The tact maxim: focus on the hearer
Could you possibly help me? = indirect expression minimizing imposition (as opposed to : Help
me!)
Do pay us a visit on Sunday!/ You must pay us a visit on Sunday . = politeness “maximizers”:
emphatic DO or MUST
b. The generosity maxim: focus on the speaker
I can help you with the exercise. (polite= reference to the cost to addressor)
You can help me with the exercise. (impolite = reference to the cost to the addressee)
Would you like your old car refurbished? (more polite = the speaker’s role is minimized)
Would you like me to refurbish your car? (less polite = the speaker’s role is maximized)
c. The approbation maxim: compliments, unfavourable opinions
The dinner was really good.
You could be more tolerant. (<-> Be more tolerant.)
d. The modesty maxim: avoid boasting

30
How stupid/ clever of me!
It is just a small gift. (even if it is large)
e. The agreement maxim: seek agreement and avoid/ weaken disagreement; often adverbial
maximizers are used: fully, entirely, certainly, absolutely, quite
It’s an absolutely adorable child!
I’m afraid/ I regret I don’t share your opinion on that!
I’m not really sure I share your opinion on that!
f. The sympathy maxim: congratulation, commiseration, condolences
I’m sorry to hear about your loss.
May you have a happy golden anniversary!
Maximizers or minimizers are used to overstate agreement or to mitigate disagreement
1. Minimizers that minimize imposition/ mitigate disagreement:
1.1 lexical modifiers: please
1.2. downtoners: possibly, maybe, perhaps
1.3 subjectivizers: I was wondering, I think/ feel, I wanted to know, I’m afraid
1.4 consultive devices: do you think, is there a chance
1.5 hedges: some, any, somehow
1.6 understaters: just, a little, a minute
1.7 apologizers: I am sorry to bother you, but…
1.8 impersonalizers: preference for passives
2. Maximizers that overstate agreement:
2.1 emphatic DO or MUST
2.2. adverbial maximizers: fully, entirely, certainly, absolutely, quite
e.g.
1. The use of minimizers:
(I think/ I’m afraid/ Somehow/ I’m sorry, but) I don’t share your point of view.

31
I cannot (possibly) comply with your request.
(Please) sit down!
2. The use of maximizers:
I (do) share your point of view.
You must join us for lunch.
I (fully/ entirely) support you in this endeavour of yours.
6.4 Principle of relevance

Principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995): Every act of ostensive communication
communicates a presumption of its optimal relevance.
⇒ Implicature = implicit content of an utterance
⇒ Explicature = explicit content of an utterance
⇒ Principle of relevance = an inferential model of analysis; communication=an inferential

process “whereby information is produced and interpreted” (Superceanu, 2000: 52)
⇒ Principle of relevance explains both the implicated and the explicated informational
content.
e.g.
A: Would care for a drink?
B: I’m taking antibiotics. -> refusal
- explicature: A is offering B a drink, B is taking antibiotics.
- implicature: A person taking antibiotics cannot drink => B refuses A’s offer
6.5 Conclusion
1. Cooperative principle: applied to communication when the participants share a common goal
- violations or flouting of the CP maxims for achieving particular effects
2. Politeness principle: applied to communication when the addresser wants to achieve his/her
goals
- it refers to the linguistic indirectness
3. Relevance principle: applied to explicit and implicit communication

32
- It is an inferential model of analysis which takes into account the effect obtained in the context
of discourse.
Bibliography
Cook, G. 1989. Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grice, H.P. 1975. ‘Logic and conversation’. In Cole, P. & J.L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and
Leech, G. 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. London & New York: Longman.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. 1995. Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell.


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1

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

1. Using and understanding language in context

2. The semantic aspects of meaning: sense and reference

3. Deixis: the relation of language to its point of origin

4. The pragmatic aspects of meaning: implicature &

5. Speech acts: Austin’s approach to SAs, Searle’s approach to

SAs, van Dijk’ approach to SAs

6. General principles of communication: the principle of

cooperation, the principle of politeness, the principle of

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

1. Using and understanding language in context

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

1.4 What is pragmatics?

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

Pragmatic features of everyday language: appropriacy, non-literal or indirect meaning,

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

2. The semantic aspects of meaning: sense and reference

Sense/ Denotation (dictionary)

Reference / Connotation (context)

One unique sense / denotation (dictionary)

None, one or several reference(s) / connotations (context)

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

of fertility, associated with water and the heavens.”

2. Reference: this ice cream

2.3 Kinds of reference

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

8. Definite noun-phrases: the man, the trip, this ice-cream

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

3. Deixis: the relation of language to its point of origin

Deictic center/ speaker: I, we, this, here, now

3.2 Person deixis

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

3.4 Temporal / Time deixis

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

4. The pragmatic aspects of meaning: implicature & presupposition

Implicature = “the additional or different meaning conveyed by utterances” (Superceanu, 2000:32)

Grice (1975, 1978):

1. Conventional implicature = ”the use of particular words or expressions which conventionally

4.2.1 Conventional implicature

Words that generate conventional implicature: but, therefore, yet, even

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

sons obey their parents.

4.2.2 Conversational implicature

Conversational implicatures = implicature arisen during communication

A. Generalized implicature = context independent implicature

e.g. I have two children. -> I have no more than 2 children

B. Particularised implicature = context dependent implicature

Discourse subjects reconstruction

Dr. Simona Șimon, lecturer simona.simon@upt.ro +40 724 75 47 88

A: Mr. Johnson is having a class in the old building.

B: He is in the language lab, then.

A: Yes. (Superceanu, 2000: 32)

Presupposition: Mr. Johnson is a language teacher.

Presupposition checking: a sentence is logically presupposed by another sentence even if negated.

2. Levels of speaker meaning: contextual or utterance meaning + communicative intention (=

3. Implicatures & presuppositions:

convey the implicit meaning of discourse

are understood by the addressee through inference (= logical deductive thinking)

2. Conversational implicature (generalised+particularised)

Presupposition – presupposition pool – presupposition checking