Case No. 1 G.R. No.

163980 August 3, 2006

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in his

personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as
General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his capacity
as Chairman of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), MAYOR FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and SECRETARY
FLORENTE SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of
2003."

Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the
West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner
in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association.

Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center Administration

Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary
Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival
Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of
Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and
development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).

On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel
of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government
site to be known as the NGC. 1

On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the
440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the
disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. 2

In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from
the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on
September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number
of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program. 3

On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Among the salient
provisions of the law are the following:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of
the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.

Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. –
Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184
hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the
same open for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona
fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the
determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in
1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal
agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.

Sec. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local Government or
Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. – Certain
portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such
purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or
structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the
provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in
favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis
therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without
specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually
used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207,   4  the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant
petition, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD
BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO
IMPLEMENT.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD
BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL. 5

First, the procedural matters.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot question the
implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right over the NGC
East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the maximum lot area that may be awarded to a resident-
beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a
qualified beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period.  6 Also, the OSG
contends that since petitioner association is not the duly recognized people’s organization in the NGC and
since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the
NGC. 7

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 8

Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition, whether or not it is the duly
recognized association of homeowners in the NGC. There is no dispute that the individual members of
petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited
or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and
lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the
IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the OSG’s allegation
that the failure of petitioner association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars them
from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely operates to confer on them the
legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury
arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the
selection process. While it is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side only and thus
cannot be affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest
of the assailed provisions of the IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the
disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.

We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The petition does not merit
dismissal on that ground.

There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the instant petition. The OSG
claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of
prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. 9 Since in issuing the
questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part,
respondent Mayor of Quezon City 10 and respondent NHA 11 contend that petitioners violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court
of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.

The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a consequence.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. 12
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or
quasi-legislative power. 13

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks
to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. 14

Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 15

True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. 16 A direct invocation of
the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 17

In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 18 the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 19 A perusal,
however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the
Court’s taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that
precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided
in Section 5, Article VIII of the

Constitution, 20 the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is

generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition
should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a
quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said
entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 21 Prohibition lies against
judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally,
the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order
to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. 22 Prohibition is the proper remedy to
afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law
by which such relief can be obtained. 23 Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

In a number of petitions, 24 the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without adjudicating on
the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner,
the instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not
shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In
proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the
power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it
cannot be questioned. 25

Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome, however, is just as dismal for
petitioners.

Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:

Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide residents

3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries

xxxx

(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of Policies and subject to the
condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and
maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject further to the availability of lots.

xxxx

(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated based on the Code of
Policies including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.

xxxx

3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell

(a) Westside

(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.

xxxx

(c) for both eastside and westside

(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in item a.1 above in case of
westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after approval of the subdivision plan shall be subjected to
lot price escalation.

The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing Authority factoring therein the
affordability criteria. The new rate shall be approved by the NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).

Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are constitutionally infirm as they are not
germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented.

First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified beneficiaries under
Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which
mandates that the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or
occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.

The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups, namely, the urban poor
or the bona fide  residents within the NGC site and certain government institutions including the local
government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the allocation of additional property within the
NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by which this area may be
distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot
disposition to government institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso
mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area actually used or occupied at the
time of the law’s effectivity, this proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the
local government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not
have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which
even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by
him.

Petitioners’ interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and the prior
proclamations establishing the NGC. The government’s policy to set aside public property aims to
benefit not only the urban poor but also the local government and various government institutions
devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious purposes. 26 Thus, although
Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the
entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being
used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the housing program for
NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation No. 248
issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the
population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional property within the NGC for urban poor
housing but instead authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified previously by
Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would not adequately provide for the
housing needs of all the bona fide residents in the NGC.

In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional beneficiaries shall be allocated the
areas actually occupied by them; hence, the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed
and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for
institutional beneficiaries would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of the
NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be awarded to each
beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a lot at  P700.00 per
sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who
fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by
imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they
conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The argument
deserves scant consideration.

Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being
implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature
of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. 27 All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the
law. 28

In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines
and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and
the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by
which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee
is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the
terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of
the law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the
discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over
these matters.

The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of
administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 29 In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the
selling price of the lots is unreasonable.

The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a
contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee’s authority to formulate
guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms
and conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is
nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract to
sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.

Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a procedural flaw.
According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by several representatives of people’s
organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from duly
recognized peoples’ organizations must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is
worth noting that petitioner association is not a duly recognized people’s organization.

In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the
procedural due process requirement is deemed complied with. That there is observance of more than the
minimum requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate
the same.
In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 2 G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.

FRANCISCO, R., J.:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be
carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on
his side.1 As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:

. . . social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving, whether he be a
millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable
doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to
prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are
rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate
of the law.2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its
resolution.

Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No.
118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions
were ordered consolidated.3

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted
private respondents' Petition for Certiorari  and Mandamus and ruled as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is
hereby GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is

declared null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;

b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit — not

merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" — with an accessible
bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following
petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial
instruments — within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:

P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap

P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago

P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;

c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to

withdraw the above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final
determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; and

d) Respondent DAR is ordered to

1) immediately conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving
the petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence and
to 2) decide the cases within 30 days after they are submitted for
decision.4

Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995,5 denying their
motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected
to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).

Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation
and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private
respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 19926 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990,7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative
proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the
Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved"
and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw
the same.

Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.
As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:

Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of

title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of
Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based
on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of
P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for
the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu
thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries
(ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with
the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash
and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).

The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.

Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are

the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615
hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December
1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries
executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the
LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest;
that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the
Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust
fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in
trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E"; Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they
signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals
to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).

The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the
execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount
as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).

Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for

brevity) alleges — with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon — that
the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered
by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative
proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was
conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a
decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation for
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at
P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said
amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of
P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first
trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner
AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in
 Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an
area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of
701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken
thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust
account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83',
three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp.
8-9)

The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land
valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100).8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by
the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR ,
the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657.9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank
merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the
compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-
making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance
of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA
6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et
al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12

For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in
consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used.13

On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private
respondents.14 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the
same.15

Hence, the instant petitions.

On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745
alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed
decision.16 The Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their
comments.17

Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in
lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter
of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final
resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.

Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e)
of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account
as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit
through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared
policies of RA 6657.

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were
the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a
"trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit".

The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative

agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of
promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations
cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment,19 for settled is the rule that administrative regulations
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic
law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and
regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening
of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and
54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent
court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being
null and void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts
deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of
their properties, petitioners assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section
16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law.
According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf
pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that
adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section
16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended
merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention
petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the
Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".22

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain.

xxx xxx xxx

The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as
it found that:

. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657

which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil.
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of
the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money" — even as the
Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other" — the Supreme Court in said case did not
abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely
recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby
allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment
other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment
of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their
properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of
eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough
for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to
private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is,
however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and
final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we
reiterate the cardinal rule that:

. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just

compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the
property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom
of the farmer.25 But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the
courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from
their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this
objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice
cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection.26

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 3 G.R. No. 116356 June 29, 1998

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DAVAO PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 1 the Court, en
banc, ruled that Executive Order 1088 2 was not unconstitutional. We adhere to said ruling in this case.

The Case
This is a petition or certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals 4 in CA-GR
CV No. 34487 promulgated on July 18, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against defendant-appellant.

The Decision affirmed by Respondent Court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered directing the defendant:

1. To pay plaintiff the sum of P602,710.04 with legal

rate of interest commencing from the filing of the
complaint representing unpaid pilotage fees;

2. To pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00;

3. And costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal. 5

The Facts

As found by the trial court, these are the undisputed facts:

On September 25, 1989, plaintiff [herein private respondent] elevated a complaint against
defendant [herein petitioner] for sum of money and attorney's fees alleging that plaintiff
had rendered pilotage services to defendant between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989
with total unpaid fees of P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, defendant failed to pay
and prays that the latter be directed to pay P703,290.18 with legal rate of interest from the
filing of the complaint; attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation and
such other relief.

On November 18, 1989 defendant answered vigorously disputing the claims of plaintiff.
It assailed the constitutionality of the Executive Order 1088 upon which plaintiff bases its
claims; alleged that there is a pending case before the Court of Appeals elevated by the
United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines of which plaintiff is a member[;]
whereas defendant is a member of the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the
Philippine[s] which is an Intervenor in CA-G.R. SP No. 18072; that there therefore is lis
pendens by Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the Rules; that the subject of the complaint falls
within the scope and authority of the Philippine Ports Authority by virtue of PD No. 857
dated December 23, 1975; that Executive Order No. 1088 is an unwarranted repeal or
modification of the Philippine Ports Authority Charter; that the fees charged by plaintiff
are arbitrary and confiscatory; and the basis of the Executive Order 1088 is offensive,
sourced from Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution and rendered inoperative by the
Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986 and the present Constitution; and that the only
agency vested by law to prescribe such rates, charges or fees for services rendered by any
private organization like the plaintiff within a Port District is governed by Section 20 of
PD 857. As regular patron of plaintiff, defendant has never been remiss in paying
plaintiff's claim for pilotage fees and the present complaint under the foregoing
circumstances is without legal foundation. Defendant prays that plaintiff be advised to
await the final outcome of the identical issues already elevated to and pending before the
Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 18072. Defendant prays for an award of damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expense and costs.

At the Pre-Trial Conference, the only issue raised by plaintiff is whether the defendant is
liable to the plaintiff for the money claims alleged in the complaint.

The defendant on the other hand raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Order 1088 is

constitutional;

2. Whether or not Executive Order 1088 is illegal;

3. Whether or not the plaintiff may motu proprio and

independently of the Public Estates Authority enforce
Executive Order 1088 and collect the pilotage fees
prescribed thereunder;

4. Assuming Executive Order 1088 is constitutional,

valid and self-executory, whether or not the defendant is
liable; and if so, to what extent and for what particular
items; and

5. Whether or not the plaintiff is liable under the

counterclaims (p. 102, Expediente).

On September 5, 1990, plaintiff presented witness Capt. Felix N. Galope, in the course of
which testimony identified among others EXHIBITS "B" to "E-2" and "J" to "1-2"
consisting of documents related to the collection of the unpaid pilotage fees; basis for
such computations; Statement of Accounts; demand letter and official recipients of
payment made.

On September 6, 1990, Simplicio Barao, plaintiff's Billing Clerk testified among others
on the records of plaintiff's Captain's Certificate/Pilotage Chits and Bills/Statements of
Accounts on the claims against defendant (EXHIBITS "G" to "H-48-A") and the details
of the outstanding accounts in favor of plaintiff. The records show defendant raised no
objection thereto and by virtue of which all of plaintiff's documentary exhibits were
admitted. (Order dated January 14, 1991, p. 277 Expediente).

On March 14, 1991, defendant presented Celso Occidental, employee of defendant

shipping company, in the course of which testimony submitted EXHIBITS "1" to "1-D"
which is plaintiff's Billing Rate, both old and new with a payment of P79,585.64; and "2"
to "2-G" representing plane ticket paid for by defendant for transportation expenses of its
counsel and cost of stenographic transcripts.
 Defendant's last witness, Capt. Jose Dubouzet, Jr. and a Harbor Pilot was briefly
presented. 6

After due trial, the trial court rendered its ruling, viz.:

Plaintiff's evidence as to the unpaid pilotage services due from defendant duly supported
by voluminous documentary exhibits has not been refuted nor rebutted by defendant. On
the contrary, when plaintiff's documentary exhibits were formally offered, defendant did
not raise any objection thereby leaving the documents unchallenged and undisputed.

Upon the other hand, while the records show that defendant raised no less than five (5)
issues the evidence fails to show any proof to sustain defendant's posture. On the
contrary, neither of defendant's two witnesses appear to have even grazed the outer
peripheries of what could have been interesting issues with far-reaching consequences if
resolved. 7

The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed
under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.

Public Respondent's Ruling

As stated earlier, Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Respondent Court
pointed out that petitioner, during the pre-trial, limited the issues to whether: (1) EO C88 is
unconstitutional; (2) EO 1088 is illegal; (3) private respondent itself may enforce and collect fees under
EO 1088; and (4) petitioner is liable and, if EO 1088 is legal, to what extent. It then affirmed the factual
findings and conclusion of the trial court that petitioner "fail[ed] to show any proof" to support its
position. Parenthetically, Respondent Court also noted two other cases decided by the Court of Appeals,
upholding the constitutionality of EO 1088. 8

The Issue

In sum, petitioner raises this main issue: whether Executive Order 1088 is unconstitutional. 9

The Court's Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

EO 1088 Is Valid

Petitioner contends that EO 1088 10 is unconstitutional, because (1) its interpretation and application are
left to private respondent, a private person, 11 and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers.
Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and on the basis of the memorandum
circulars issued by the PPA, the administrative body vested under PD 857 12 with the power to regulate
and prescribe pilotage fees. In assailing the constitutionality of EO 1088, the petitioner repeatedly asks:
"Is the private respondent vested with power to interpret Executive Order No. 1088?" 13

The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent provisions of EO 1088 read:

Sec. 1. The following shall be the rate of pilotage fees or charges based on tonnage for
services rendered to both foreign and coastwise vessels:

For Foreign Vessels Rate in US$ &/or its

Peso Equivalent

Less than 500GT $ 30.00

500GT to 2,500GT 43.33

2,500GT to 5,000GT 71.33

5,000GT to 10,000GT 133.67

10,000GT to 15,000GT 181.67

15,000GT to 20,000GT 247.00

20,000GT to 30,000GT 300.00

30,000GT to 40,000GT 416.67

40,000GT to 60,000GT 483.33

60,000GT to 80,000GT 550.00

80,000GT to 100,000GT 616.67

100,000GT to 120,000GT 666.67

120,000GT to 130,000GT 716.67

130,000GT to 140,000GT 766.67

Over 140,000 gross tonnage $0.05 or its peso equivalent every excess tonnage. Rate for
docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and shifting other related special services
is equal to 100%. Pilotage services shall be compulsory in government and private
wharves or piers.

For Coastwise Vessels Regular

100 and under 500 gross tons P 41.70

500 and under 600 gross tons 55.60

600 and under 1,000 gross tons 69.60

 1,000 and under 3,000 gross tons 139.20

3,000 and under 5,000 gross tons 300.00

5,000 and over gross tons

Sec. 2. With respect to foreign vessels, payment of pilotage services shall be made in
dollars or in pesos at the prevailing exchange rate.

Sec. 3. All orders, letters of instructions, rules, regulations and other issuances
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 14 the Supreme
Court, through Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, upheld the validity and constitutionality of Executive
Order 1088 in no uncertain terms. We aptly iterate our pronouncement in said case, viz.:

It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because
that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an
act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here as we have
already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service,
has always been regarded as legislative in character.

x x x           x x x          x x x

It is worthy to note that E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates
without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease
rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix
new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service
charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise
vessels in all Philippine ports.

x x x           x x x          x x x

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to
comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them
below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. . . . . 15

We see no reason to depart from this ruling. The Court's holding clearly debunks petitioner's insistence on
paying its pilotage fees based on memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. 16 Because the PPA circulars
are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."  17 As stated
by this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 18 "[t]he conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction,
or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law."  19 It is axiomatic
that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its
duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law,
such as EO 1088, the latter prevails. 20

Based on the foregoing, petitioner has no legal basis to refuse payment of pilotage fees to private
respondent, as computed according to the rates set by EO 1088. Private respondent cannot be faulted for
relying on the clear and unmistakable provisions of EO 1088. In fact, EO 1088 leaves no room for
interpretation, thereby unmistakably showing the duplicity of petitioner's query: "Is the private respondent
vested with power to interpret Executive Order No. 10882?"

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 4 G.R. No. 190837

March 5, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (now
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION), Petitioner,
vs.
DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. and TERRAMEDIC, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256
(RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari, 1 raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Bureau.of Food and Drugs (BFAD), now Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), assails the Order2 dated December 18, 2009 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 08-124
which: (a) declared BF AD Circular Nos. 1 and 8, series of 1997 (Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997) null and
void; (b) ordered the issuance of writs of permanent injunction and prohibition against the FDA in
implementing the aforesaid circulars; and ( c) directed the FDA to issue Certificates of Product
Registration (CPR) in favor of respondents Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc. and Terrarriedic, Inc.
(respondents).

The Facts

The FDA3 was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720, 4 otherwise known as the "Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act," primarily in order "to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for
foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetic product[s]." 5 On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health
(DOH), thru then-Secretary Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, issued Administrative Order No. (AO) 67, s. 1989,
entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical Products." Among others, it
required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with the FDA before they may
release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory
bioavailability6/bioequivalence7 (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these
products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there
was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of Circular No. 1, s. 1997 8 resumed the
FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing
facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 9 which provided additional
implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products. 10

Respondents manufacture and trade a "multisource pharmaceutical product" 11 with the generic name of
rifampicin12 – branded as "Refam 200mg/5mL Suspension" (Refam) – for the treatment of adults and
children suffering from pulmonary and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis. 13 On November 15, 1996,
respondents applied for and were issued a CPR for such drug, valid for five (5) years, or until November
15, 2001.14 At the time of the CPR’s issuance, Refam did not undergo BA/BE testing since there was still
no facility capable of conducting BA/BE testing. Sometime in 2001, respondents applied for and were
granted numerous yearly renewals of their CPR for Refam, which lasted until November 15, 2006, albeit
with the condition that they submit satisfactory BA/BE test results for said drug. 15

Accordingly, respondents engaged the services of the University of the Philippines’ (Manila) Department
of Pharmacology and Toxicology, College of Medicine to conduct BA/BE testing on Refam, the results of
which were submitted to the FDA. 16 In turn, the FDA sent a letter dated July 31, 2006 to respondents,
stating that Refam is "not bioequivalent with the reference drug." 17 This notwithstanding, the FDA still
revalidated respondents’ CPR for Refam two (2) more times, effective until November 15, 2008, the
second of which came with a warning that no more further revalidations shall be granted until
respondents submit satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam. 18

Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed a petition for
prohibition and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is the DOH,
and not the FDA, which was granted the authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720. As
such, the issuance of the aforesaid circulars and the manner of their promulgation contravened the law
and the Constitution.19 They further averred that that the non-renewal of the CPR due to failure to submit
satisfactory BA/BE test results would not only affect Refam, but their other products as well. 20

During the pendency of the case, RA 9711, 21 otherwise known as the "Food and Drug Administration
[FDA] Act of 2009," was enacted into law.

The RTC Ruling

In an Order22 dated December 18, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and thereby declared
Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 null and void, ordered the issuance of writs of permanent injunction and
prohibition against the FDA in implementing the aforesaid circulars, and directed the FDA to issue CPRs
in favor of respondents’ products.

The RTC held that there is nothing in RA 3720 which granted either the FDA the authority to issue and
implement the subject circulars, or the Secretary of Health the authority to delegate his powers to the
FDA. For these reasons, it concluded that the issuance of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.

1997 constituted an illegal exercise of legislative and administrative powers and, hence, must be struck
down.23

Accordingly, the RTC issued a Writ of Permanent Injunction 24 dated January 19, 2010, enjoining the FDA
and all persons acting for and under it from enforcing Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 and directing them to
approve the renewal and revalidation of respondents’ products without submitting satisfactory BA/BE test
results.
Aggrieved, the FDA sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition with an urgent prayer
for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction against
the implementation of the RTC’s Order dated December 18, 2009 and Writ of Permanent Injunction dated
January 19, 2010.25 The Court granted FDA’s application and issued a Temporary Restraining
Order26 dated February 24, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular
Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997. In resolving this issue, there is a need to determine whether or not the aforesaid
circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and, as such, must comply with the requirements
of the law for its issuance.

The FDA contends that it has the authority to issue Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 as it is the agency
mandated by law to administer and enforce laws, including rules and regulations issued by the DOH, that
pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical products. 27

For their part, respondents maintain that under RA 3720, the power to make rules to implement the law is
lodged with the Secretary of Health, not with the FDA. 28 They also argue that the assailed circulars are
void for lack of prior hearing, consultation, and publication. 29

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law
which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines
of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority
to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform
with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative
power.30

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent

rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. 31 They usually implement existing law, imposing general,
extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress 32 and effect a change in
existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations. 33 Meanwhile, interpretative rules
are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative
body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being administered and purport
to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no
single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be
covered by the said rules.34 Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based
on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends. 35

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive
Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing,
and publication in order to be valid and binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule.
This is because "[w]hen an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected
a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law."36

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that RA 3720, as amended by Executive Order No. 175, s.
198737 prohibits, inter alia, the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products without obtaining the
proper CPR from the FDA. 38 In this regard, the FDA has been deputized by the same law to accept
applications for registration of pharmaceuticals and, after due course, grant or reject such
applications.39 To this end, the said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon the
recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of
pharmaceutical products.40

In accordance with his rule-making power under RA 3720, the Secretary of Health issued AO 67, s. 1989
in order to provide a comprehensive set of guidelines covering the registration of pharmaceutical
products. AO 67, s. 1989, required, among others, that certain pharmaceutical products undergo BA/BE
testing prior to the issuance of CPR, contrary to respondents’ assertion that it was Circular Nos. 1 and 8,
s. 1997 that required such tests.41

Despite the fact that the BA/BE testing requirement was already in place as early as the date of effectivity
of AO 67, s. 1989, its implementation was indefinitely shelved due to lack of facilities capable of
conducting the same. It was only sometime in 1997 when technological advances in the country paved the
way for the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities, thus allowing the rule’s enforcement. Owing to
these developments, the FDA (then, the BFAD) issued Circular No. 1, s. 1997, the full text of which
reads:

In Annex 1 of A.O. 67 s. 1989 which is entitled Requirement for Registration provides that
"Bioavailability/Bioequivalence study for certain drugs as determined by BFAD" is required for [(i)]
Tried and Tested Drug, (ii) Established Drug, and (iii) Pharmaceutical Innovation of Tried and Tested or
Established Drug.

Drugs requiring strict precaution in prescribing and dispensing contained in the List-B (Prime) were the
drugs identified by BFAD in the process of registration that will be required
"Bioavailability/Bioequivalence" studies. However, due to the supervening factor that there had yet been
no bioavailability testing unit in the country when the A.O. 67 s. 1989 became effective, the Bureau did
not strictly enforce the said requirement.

The supervening factor no longer exist [sic] as of date. As a matter of fact, one of the registered products
tested by the Bioavailability Testing Unit at the University of Sto. Tomas under the NDP Cooperation
Project of the Philippines and Australia failed to meet the standard of bioavailability. This finding brings
forth the fact that there may be registered products which do not or may no longer meet bioavailability
standard.

Wherefore, all drugs manufacturers, traders, distributor-importers of products contained or identified in

the list b’ (prime) provided for by BFAD, a copy of which is made part of this circular, are advised that
all pending initial and renewal registration of the products aforementioned, as well as all applications for
initial and renewal registration of the same, shall henceforth be required to submit bioavailability test with
satisfactory results on the products sought to be registered or renewed conducted by any bioavailability
testing units here or abroad, duly recognized by the BFAD under the Dept. of Health.1âwphi1 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
The FDA then issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 to supplement Circular No. 1, s. 1997 in that it reiterates the
importance of the BA/BE testing requirement originally provided for by AO 67, s. 1989.1âwphi1

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the issuance of
CPRs covering certain pharmaceutical products. As such, it is considered an administrative regulation – a
legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express authority
granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be
registered with the FDA prior to their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the
validity of its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the requirements of prior
hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded to the government in
the exercise of its official duties.42

On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations
because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret,
clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only
purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions
of AO 67, s. 1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant
to RA 3720.43 Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would
not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking,
administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed
for their validity.

In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 are valid issuances and binding to all
concerned parties, including the respondents in this case.

As a final note, while the proliferation of generic drugs and medicines is indeed a welcome development
as it effectively ensures access to affordable quality drugs and medicines for all through their lower
prices, the State, through the FDA, which is the government instrumentality tasked on this matter, must
nevertheless be vigilant in ensuring that the generic drugs and medicines released to the market are safe
and effective for use.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated December 18, 2009 and the Writ of
Permanent Injunction dated January 19, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256
in Civil Case No. 08-124 are hereby SET ASIDE. BFAD Circular Nos. 1 and 8, series of 1997 are
declared VALID. Accordingly, the Court's Temporary Restraining Order dated February 24, 2010 is
hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 5 G.R. No. 103533 December 15, 1998

MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. AND PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 25251 dated September 17, 1991 and the resolution 2 dated January 8, 1992, which
denied the motion for reconsideration. At issue here is the control and disposition of "breakages" 3 in
connection with the conduct of horse-racing.

The pertinent facts on record are as follows:

On June 18, 1948, Congress approved Republic Act No. 309, entitled "An Act to Regulate Horse-Racing
in the Philippines." This Act consolidated all existing laws and amended inconsistent provisions relative
to horse racing. It provided for the distribution of gross receipts from the sale of betting tickets, but is
silent on the allocation of so-called "breakages." Thus the practice, according to the petitioners, was to
use the "breakages" for the anti-bookies drive and other sales promotions activities of the horse racing
clubs.

On October 23, 1992, petitioners, Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc.
(PRCI), were granted franchises to operate and maintain race tracks for horse racing in the City of Manila
and the Province of Rizal by virtue of Republic Act Nos. 6631 and 6632, respectively, and allowed to
hold horse races, with bets, on the following dates:

. . . Saturdays, Sundays and official holidays of the year, excluding Thursday and Fridays
of the Holy Week, June twelfth, commonly known as Independence Day, Election Day
and December thirtieth, commonly known as Rizal Day.

(Sec. 5 of R.A. 6631)

. . . Saturday, Sundays, and official holiday of the year, except on those official holidays
where the law expressly provides that no horse races are to be held. The grantee may also
conduct races on the eve of any public holiday to start not earlier than five-thirty (5:30)
o'clock in the afternoon but not to exceed five days a year.

(Sec. 7 of R.A. 6632)

Said laws carried provisions on the allocation of "breakages" to beneficiaries as follows:

Franchise Laws

R.A. 66314 R.A. 66325

(for MJCI) (for PRCI)

Provincial or city hospitals 25%

Rehabilitation of drug addicts 25% 50%

For the benefit of Philippine

Amateur Athletes Federation 50% 25%

 Charitable institutions 25%

On March 20, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 420 was issued creating the Philippine Racing Commission
(PHILRACOM), giving it exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse
racing, including the framing and scheduling of races. 6 By virtue of this power, the PHILRACOM
authorized the holding of races on Wednesdays starting on December 22, 1976. 7

In connection with the new schedule of races, petitioners made a joint query regarding the ownership of
breakages accumulated during Wednesday races. In response to the query, PHILRACOM rendered its
opinion in a letter dated September 20, 1978. It declared that the breakages belonged to the racing clubs
concerned, to wit:

We find no further need to dissect the provisions of P.D. 420 to come to a legal
conclusion. As can be clearly seen from the foregoing discussion and based on the
established precedents, there can be no doubt that the breakage of Wednesday races shall
belong to the racing club concerned. 8

Consequently, the petitioners allocated the proceeds of breakages for their own business purpose:

Thereafter, PHILRACOM authorized the holding of races on Thursdays from November 15, 1984 to
December 31, 1984 and on Tuesdays since January 15, 1985 up to the present. These mid-week races are
in addition to those days specifically mentioned in R.A. 6631 and R.A. 6632. Likewise, petition allocated
the breakages from these races for their own uses.

On December 16, 1986 President Corazon Aquino amended certain provisions Sec. 4 of R.A. 8631 and
Sec. 6 of R.A. 6632 through Executive Orders No. 88 and 89. Under these Executive Orders, breakages
were allocated to beneficiaries, as follows:

Franchise Laws

E.O. 899 E.O. 88 10

(for MJCI) (for PRCI)

Provincial or city hospitals 25%

Rehabilitation of drug addicts 25% 50%

For the benefit of Philippine

Racing Commission 50% 25%

Charitable institutions 25%

On April 23, 1987, PHILRACOM itself addressed a query to the Office of the President asking which
agency is entitled to dispose of the proceeds of the "breakages" derived from the Tuesday and Wednesday
races.
In a letter dated May 21, 1987, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., replied that "the disposition of the breakages rightfully belongs to PHILRACOM,
not only those derived from the Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also from the Tuesday and
Wednesday races in accordance with the distribution scheme prescribed in said Executive Orders". 11

Controversy arose when herein respondent PHILRACOM, sent a series of demand letters to petitioners
MJCI and PRCI, requesting its share in the "breakages" of mid-week-races and proof of remittances to
other legal beneficiaries as provided under the franchise laws. On June 8, 1987, PHILRACOM sent a
letter of demand to petitioners MJCI and PRCI asking them to remit PHILRACOM's share in the
"breakages" derived from the Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday races in this wise:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Pursuant to Board Resolution dated December 21, 1986, and Executive Order Nos. 88
and 89 series of 1986, and the authority given by the Office of the President dated May
21, 1987, please remit to the Commission the following:

1) PHILRACOM's share in the breakages derived from Wednesday

racing for the period starting December 22, 1976 up to the December 31,
1986.

2) PHILRACOM's share in the breakages derived from Thursday racing

for the period starting November 15, 1984 up to December 31, 1984; and

3) PHILRACOM's share in the breakages derived from Tuesday racing

for the period starting January 15, 1985 up to December, 1986.

4) Kindly furnish the Commission with the breakdown of all breakages

derived from Tuesday, Thursdays and Wednesdays racing that you have
remitted to the legal beneficiaries. 12

On June 16, 1987, petitioners MJCI and PRCI sought reconsideration 13 of the May 21, 1987 opinion of
then Deputy Executive Secretary Macaraig, but the same was denied by the Office of the President in its
letter dated April 11, 1988. 14

On April 25, 1988, PHILRACOM wrote another letter 15 to the petitioners MJCI and PRCI seeking the
remittance of its share in the breakages. Again, on June 13, 1990, PHILRACOM reiterated its previous
demand embodied in its letter of April 25, 1 988. 16

Petitioners ignored said demand. Instead, they filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati, on the ground that there is a conflict between the previous opinion of
PHILRACOM dated September 20, 1978 and the present position of PHILRACOM, as declared and
affirmed by the Office of the President in its letters dated May 21, 1987 and April 11, 1988. Petitioners
averred that there was an "actual controversy" between the parties, which should be resolved.

On March 11, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares
and decides as follows:
 a) Executive Orders Nos. 88 and 89 do not and cannot cover the
disposition and allocation of mid-week races, particularly those
authorized to be held during Tuesdays, Wednesdays and those which are
not authorized under Republic Acts 6631 and 6632; and

b) The ownership by the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. and the Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. of the breakages they derive from mid-week races
shall not be disturbed, with the reminder that the breakages should be
strictly and wholly utilized for the purpose for which ownership thereof
has been vested upon said racing entities.

SO ORDERED. 17

Dissatisfied, respondent PHILRACOM filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction before this Court, raising the lone question of whether or not E.O. Nos. 88
and 89 cover breakages derived from the mid-week races. However, we referred the case to the Court of
Appeals, which eventually reversed the decision of the trial court, and ruled as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

The decision on the part of PHILRACOM to authorize additional racing days had the
effect of widening the scope of Section 5 of RA 6631 and Section 7 of RA 6632.
Consequently, private respondents derive their privilege to hold races on the designated
days not only their franchise acts but also from the order issued by the PHILRACOM. No
provision of law became inconsistent with the passage of the Order granting additional
racing days. Neither was there a special provision set to govern those mid-week races.
The reason is simple. There was no need for any new provisions because there are
enough general provisions to cover them. The provisions on the disposition and
allocation of breakages being general in character apply to breakages derived on any
racing day. 18

x x x           x x x          x x x

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing analysis and interpretation of the laws in

question, the judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. Decision is hereby
rendered:

1. declaring Section 4 of RA 6631 as amended by E.O. 89 and Section 6 of RA 6632 as

amended by E.O. 88 to cover the disposition and allocation of breakages derived
on all races conducted by private respondents on any racing day, whether as provided for
under Section 4 of RA 6631 or Section 6 of RA 6632 or as ordered by PHILRACOM in
the exercise of its powers under P.D. 420;

2. ordering private respondent to remit to PHILRACOM its share under E.O. 88 and E.O.
89 derived from races held on Tuesday, Wednesdays, Thursday as authorized by
PHILRACOM.

SO ORDERED. 19
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of merit, with respondent Court
of Appeals further declaring that:

x x x           x x x          x x x

In so far as the prospective application of Executive Orders Nos. 88 and 89 is concerned.

We have no disagreement with the respondents. Since PHILRACOM became the
beneficiary of the breakages only upon effectivity of Executive Order Nos. 88 and 89, it
is therefore entitled to such breakages from December 16, 1986 when said Executive
Orders were issued. However, we do not concede that respondents are entitled to
breakages prior to December 16, 1986 because it is clear that the applicable laws from
1976 to December 16, 1986 were R.A. 6631 and R.A. 6632, which specifically apportion
the breakages to specified beneficiaries among which was the PAAF, a government
agency. Since respondents admit that PHILRACOM (Petitioner) was merely placed in
lieu of PAAF as beneficiary/recipient of breakages, then whatever breakages was due to
PAAF as one of the beneficiaries under R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632 accrued to or should
belong to PHILRACOM as successor to the defunct PAAF.

Finding the Motion for Reconsideration without merit, and for reasons indicated, the
Motion is denied.

SO ORDERED. 20

Consequent to the aforequoted adverse decision, petitioners MJCI and PRCI filed this petition for review
under Rule 45.

The main issue brought by the parties for the Court's resolution is: Who are the rightful beneficiaries of
the breakages derived from mid-week races? This issue also carries an ancillary question: assuming
PHILRACOM is entitled to the mid-week breakages under the law, should the petitioners remit the
money from the time the mid-week races started, or only upon the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89?

Petitioners assert that franchise laws should be construed to apply the distribution scheme specifically and
exclusively to the racing days enumerated in Sec. 5 of R.A. 6631, and Sec. 7 of R.A. 6632. They claim
that disposition of breakages under these laws should be limited to races conducted on "all Saturdays,
Sundays, and official holidays of the year, except, on those official holidays where the law expressly
provides that no horse races are to be held", hence, there is no doubt that the breakages of Wednesday
races shall belong to the racing clubs concerned. 21 They even advance the view that "where a statute by
its terms is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to
other matters" 22

However, respondent PHILRACOM contends that R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632 are laws intended primarily
to grant petitioners their respective franchises to construct, operate, and maintain a race track for horse
racing. 23 When PHILRACOM added mid-week races, the franchises given to the petitioners remained the
same. Logically, what applies to races authorized under Republic Act Nos. 6631 and 6632 should also
apply to races additionally authorized by PHILRACOM, namely mid-week races, because these are
general provisions which apply general rues and procedures governing the operation of the races.
Consequently, if the authorized racing days are extended, these races must therefore be governed by the
same rules and provisions generally provided therein.

We find petitioners' position on the main issue lacking in merit and far from persuasive.
Franchise laws are privileges 24 conferred by the government on corporations to do that "which does not
belong to the citizens of the country generally by common right". 25 As a rule, a franchise springs from
contracts between the sovereign power and the private corporation for purposes of individual advantage
as well as public benefit. 26 Thus, a franchise partakes of a double nature and character. 27 In so far as it
affects or concerns the public, it is public juris and subject to governmental control. 28 The legislature
may prescribe the conditions and terms upon which it may be held, and the duty of grantee to the public
exercising it. 29

As grantees of a franchise, petitioners derive their existence from the same. Petitioners' operations are
governed by all existing rules relative to horse racing provided they are not inconsistent with each other
and could be reasonably harmonized. Therefore, the applicable laws are R.A. 309, as amended, R.A. 6631
and 6632, as amended by E.O. 88 and 89, P.D. 420 and the orders issued PHILRACOM. Consequently,
every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. This principle is
expressed in the legal maxim "interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi", that is,
to interpret and to do it in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation. 30

A reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the determination that the entities enumerated in the
distribution scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632, as amended by Executive Orders 88 and
89, are the rightful beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week races. Petitioners should therefore remit the
proceeds of breakages to those benefactors designated by the aforesaid laws.

The holding of horse races on Wednesdays is in addition to the existing schedule of races authorized by
law. Since this new schedule became part of R.A. 6631 and 6632 the set of procedures in the franchise
laws applicable to the conduct of horse racing business must likewise be applicable to Wednesday or
other mid-week races. A fortiori, the granting of the mid-week races does not require another legislative
act to reiterate the manner of allocating the proceeds of betting tickets. Neither does the allocation of
breakages under the same provision need to be isolated to construe another distribution scheme. No law
can be viewed in a condition of isolation or as the beginning of a new legal system. 31 A supplemental law
becomes an addition to the existing statutes, or a section thereof; and its effect is not to change in any way
the provisions of the latter but merely to extend the operation thereof, or give additional power to enforce
its provisions, as the case may be. In enacting a particular statute, legislators are presumed to have full
knowledge and to taken full cognizance of the existing laws on the same subject or those relating thereto.

Proceeding to the subsidiary issue, the period for the remittance of breakages to the beneficiaries should
have commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the holding of mid-week races because R.A.
Nos. 6631 and 6632 were ready in effect then. The petitioners contend that they cannot be held
retroactively liable to respondent PHILRACOM for breakages prior to the effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and
89. They assert that the real intent behind E.O. Nos. 88 and 89 was to favor the respondent PHILRACOM
anew with the benefits which formerly had accrued in favor of Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation
(PAAF). They opine that since laws operate prospectively unless the legislator intends to give them
retroactive effect, the accrual of these breakages should start on December 16, 1986, the date of
effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89. 32 Now, even if one of the benefactors of breakages, the PAAF,
as provided by R.A. 6631 and 6632 had ceased operation, it is still not proper for the petitioners to
presume that they were entitled to PAAF's share. When the petitioners mistakenly appropriated the
breakages for themselves, they became the implied trustees for those legally entitled to the proceeds. This
is in consonance with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides that:
 Art. 1456 — If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.

The petitioners should have properly set aside amount for the defunct PAAF, until an alternative
beneficiary was designated, which as subsequently provided for by Executive Order Nos. 88 and 89, is
PHILRACOM:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Secs. 2 — All the cash balances and accumulated amounts corresponding to the share of
the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation/Ministry of Youth and Sports Development,
pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6632, not remitted by the Philippine Racing
Club, Inc./Manila Jockey Club Inc., are hereby transferred to the Philippine Racing
Commission to be constituted into a TRUST FUND to be used exclusively for the
payment of additional prizes for races sponsored by the Commission and for necessary
outlays and other expenses relative to horse-breeding activities of the National Stud
Farm. . . . . . . [E.O. No. 88]

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 2. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all cash balances and
accumulated amounts corresponding to the share of the Philippine Amateur Athletic
Federation/Ministry of Youth and Sports Development, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6631, not remitted by the Manila Jockey Club, Inc., are hereby constituted into a TRUST
FUND to be used exclusively for the payment of additional prizes for races sponsored by
the Philippine Racing Commission and for the necessary capital outlays and other
expenses relative to horse-breeding activities of the National Stud Farm. . . . . . . . [E.O.
No. 89]

While herein petitioners might have relied on a prior opinion issued by an administrative body, the well-
entrenched principle is that the State could not be estopped by a mistake committed by its officials or
agents. 33 Well-settled also is the rule that the erroneous application of the law by public officers does not
prevent a subsequent correct application of the law. 34 Although there was an initial interpretation of the
law by PHILRACOM, a court of law could not be precluded from setting that interpretation aside if later
on it is shown to be inappropriate.

Moreover, the detrimental consequences of depriving the city hospitals and other institutions of the funds
needed for rehabilitation of drug dependents and other patients are all too obvious. It goes without saying
that the allocation of breakages in favor of said institutions is a policy decision in pursuance of social
development goals worthy of judicial approbation.

Nor could we be oblivious to the reality that horse racing although authorized by law is still a form of
gambling. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-
reliance. 35 For this reason, legislative franchises impose limitations on horse racing and betting.
Petitioner's contention that a gambling franchise is a public contract protected by the Constitutional
provision on non-impairment of contract could not be left unqualified. For as well said in Lim vs.
Pacquing: 36
 . . . it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but
rather it is, more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the
government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police
power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for
the public welfare. 37

That is why we need to stress anew that a statute which authorizes a gambling activity or business should
be strictly construed, and every reasonable doubt be resolved so as to limit rather than expand the powers
and rights claimed by franchise holders under its authority. 38

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the appealed decision and the resolution of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 25251, are hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-34674             October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-appellee.

Jose Yulo for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ
of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and
for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present
prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine
Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the
Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No.
328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:

SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the
importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly
prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign
countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the
concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in
part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has
ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.

SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 8, 1924.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No.
3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit
prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the
petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the
petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the
reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred
and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands. — It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or
introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of
Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorize the
importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from
foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as
may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per
annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the
importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture
of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation,
bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be
submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the
head of the department, prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
 "At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations and
others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The
Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition for a fixed
period in case local conditions require it."

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.

Approved, March 14, 1922.

The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would
make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for
the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.

An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by
implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland,
Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357;
Orange Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11 L.R.A.,
370, etc.)

This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is
necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs.
Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the
statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would
not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.

But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid.
As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the
cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of
foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare
and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power (12
C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152;
Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan  vs. Ferriols and
Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts
recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated
there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in
passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional
grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been
adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net

In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that the
power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do not think that
such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville
Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in such case:

The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as
 to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made.

Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the
Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of
cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the
Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It
does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a
tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine
Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock,
82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs.
U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition' and `amendment.')"

The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Case No 7. G.R. No. L-16704             March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: .

Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take
into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as
well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a
maximum of P500 for any one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of
the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to
assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of"
such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general
interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the
validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate
it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.

Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or
regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective,
but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to
how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.

The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to
adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect
of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and
regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be
enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in
general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative
agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the
product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.
(Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) .

A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its
scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement
with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means.

Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of
the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of
Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: .

(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in
excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3)
dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to
do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:

(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess
of P500.00 received during the month.

It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in
addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term
"compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became
necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination.
Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of
the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail
that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the
Commission as to how the law should be construed. 1äwphï1.ñët

The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does
not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was
merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that
the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a
general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative,
constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.

The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present
case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the
corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not
by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions
contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.

We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that
such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity.

It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No.
22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses,
allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it
imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in
pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not
demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question
in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after
the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered
compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is
true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law,
nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must
be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may
have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is
now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the
purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions
authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law,
whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should
give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
 Case No. 8 G.R. No. 17122             February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

Williams & Ferrier for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

JOHNS, J.:

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an
appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with
the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.

(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities
referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.

(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual
may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.

(d) . . .

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the
production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner
or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning
of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.

SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and
decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five
thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the
court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall
be criminally liable.
 SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall
consider that the public interest requires the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so
declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then
on be temporarily suspended.

Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-General,
with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act to have likewise
terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but
such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to
such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period
covered by the Governor-General's proclamation.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of
rice at an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-
General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of
sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the
price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53
of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of
section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive
Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged,
and in imposing the sentence.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30,
1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was
first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the
20th of August, 1919.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves
the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For
any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The
Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of
State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out
the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure,
or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they
shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis
for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or
what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what
is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state
of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at
which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a
criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there
may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and
issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are
vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the
Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary
has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is
supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature
is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the
price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally
delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-
General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred
upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The
Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and
within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation
of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law,
and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in
the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L.
ed., 94), first laid down the rule:

Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and, under
the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and
freight unless protected by their charters.

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the
transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as being
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public
utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was
followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad
commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law
was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by
Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which
the court held:
 Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. — Under Laws 1887, c.
10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and
reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is
conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates
recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.

Same — constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The authority thus given to the
commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what are equal and
reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.

It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides —

That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be
equal and reasonable.

With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the facts,
to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of
the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held —

That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to
require either argument or citation of authority.

The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and
regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already
passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or
discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and reasonable. It
had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.

They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall
be, — which would not be allowable, — but have merely conferred upon it an authority and
discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is
entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the law, and what is
shall be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It can
neither make nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration
of the law, and with no other power.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made."

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in
use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions,
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all
its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment
of any prescribed fact or event.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220
U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture
as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided
that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as
will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve
the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and
regulations shall be punished, . . ."

The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:

In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or in
stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the
United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an
exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal
of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they
will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different from governmental authority.

The opinion says:

From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon executive
officers power to make rules and regulations, — not for the government of their departments, but
for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative
power. But when Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated
its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill up the
details" by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could
be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or
measured by the injury done.

That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital to
the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and grazed
their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of
the government's property. In doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty
imposed by Congress.

The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve.
He is required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is
authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of
reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary,
but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power. It will be
noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a
railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and determine
just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.

The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate
the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and
that in vesting the commission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.

The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and
the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others,
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated."

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.

These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative
authority.

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and
clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department
of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law,
essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the
constitution.

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be
provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner,
that its operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its
own action to depend.

The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:

All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until 5
o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the president.

Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:

We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer arbitrary
power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust and
groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated; second, because the power to
regulate saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A
legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can
 make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the
ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the present case
the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of
his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in
him, and cannot be sustained.

The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per
"ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice,
and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was
not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a
crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.

The Executive order2 provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as
follows:

In Manila —

Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.

Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.

In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila price less
the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling expenses to the place
of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.

In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the maximum
price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be,
plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the
place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.

(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute
all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective
and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant
may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and
different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different
prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative
power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their
deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the
Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above
regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was
the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.

Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-General to
fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the price
of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and uniform, and not local or special.
Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over the
Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of common
knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with
different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with
the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and
the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in
Manila "at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice,
and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and
corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many
other things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other
products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then
by the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat,
eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands. In the very nature of
things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust
discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is
nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General,
makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or
quality.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words,
the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not
"any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold,
without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and
whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon
which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed.
The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The
act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant
is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the
Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale
of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a
severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question here presented is
the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or
against, its constitutionality.

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and
property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any
emergency condition. The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the people of the
Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of government. We make the broad statement
that no state or nation, living under republican form of government, under the terms and conditions
specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at
which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government.

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with
government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the
Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason, the
Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or commodity in the
Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any other or different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution
should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full force
and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could
not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the United
States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour should be bought and
sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared war, and at the time was at war with other
nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the
United States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or
constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be
paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant,
who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or
have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the
defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this court
have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet
the changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican
form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix the
price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement that no decision of
any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the
particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative,
which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved,
the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold
in the manner power in violation of the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-
General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell
it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or
undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.

Case No. 9 G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but
hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626
and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and
carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.
 (SGD.) FERDINAND
E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the
above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the
case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial
court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that
the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not
have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles  5 is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly
affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the
need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,"  8 to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task
for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the
bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power
then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since
the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a
phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more
fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the
Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in
the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This
was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule"
laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be
the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt
easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances
may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest
they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to
vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the
protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion
in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums it all
up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown
would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny
that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King
John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all
rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to
have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the
other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,
one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is
to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the
two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with
the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not
be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law
of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth
College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach
of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a
worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number
of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the
need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted
without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need
to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints
and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to
regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the
most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before
he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome
intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its
regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call
for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending
the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
"present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small
farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts
of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without
due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao
without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law
was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then
badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their
number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient
famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price,
cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and
branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police
power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect
the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the
community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at
least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive
order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a
lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an
absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As
for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be
easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to
reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was
fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed
with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under
the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court
of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial
and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that
is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to
declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this
case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would
have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present
challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the
Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke
them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive
tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They
become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright
and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Case no. 10 G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO
REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.

Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito
del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.

It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro
fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by “using their own motor banca, equipped
with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and
electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other
end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the
use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals
within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace” (Criminal Case No. 5429).

Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The
Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now
before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at
all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since
the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it
unlawful.

As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits “the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance” in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not
less than six months nor more than five years.

It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing.” Notwithstanding the
silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: ñé+.£ªwph!1

SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS ñé+.£ªwph!1

OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules
and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are
promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1

SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as

follows:

(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines’ includes all waters of the
Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated
respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of
November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies
of fresh waters are included.

(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric
current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or
generator-operated and from and available source of electric current.

© ‘Persons’ includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.

(d) ‘Fish’ includes other aquatic products.

SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing
or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters
except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a
permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be
carried at all times.

SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall
subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court.

SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or parts thereof

inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.

SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after
its publication in the Office Gazette.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63
O.G. 9963).

Thus, the phrase “in any portion of the Philippine waters” found in section 2, was changed by the
amendatory order to read as follows: “in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water.”

The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable
under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other
violation of that law “or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court.”

That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of
not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the
Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the
severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.

Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of
electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f],
Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,

We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro
fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA
531 and the cases cited therein).

And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the
order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First
Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. Of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992,
June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).

It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order
affirming the municipal court’s order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated
as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).

In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under
section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or
poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of
Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an
obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.

The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2)
the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the
regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose
for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h]
Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing
resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that
“any other violation of” the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder “shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court.”

As already pointed out above, the prosecution’s reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty
for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.

We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful
fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5)
failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing
electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of “other violations”
because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for
fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the
penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).

Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against
electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro
fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens
the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and
that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is
a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was
promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt
water areas.

That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1

SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. —

It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or
gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
 obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs
(1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ...

The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential
Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).

The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of
the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive
regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.

Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 © of Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree.
Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by “imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years”, a
punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not
more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84.

An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in
particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources)
under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means
of an administrative order.

Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that
may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to
the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes
(People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).

The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute
(U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial
Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. Of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative
regulations or “subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of
“the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations,
and the increased difficulty of administering the law” Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs.
Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in

harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil.
419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585;
Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-
21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J.
845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs.
Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA
340, 349).

There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers.
Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary “shall from time to time issue instructions,
orders, and regulations consistent” with that law, “as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions
thereof.” That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries
law, Presidential December No. 704.

Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries “to prepare and execute upon the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations
consistent with the purpose” of that enactment “and for the development of fisheries.”

Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “the Department Head shall have the
power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other
instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict
enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as
expressly authorized by law.”

Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law
(Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs.
Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of
the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for
the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own
right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.

Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”

As noted by Justice Fernando, “except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to
the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he
can exercise it.” “department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.”
(Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493,
496-8).

“Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be
enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in
general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative
agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the
product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.” The
rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs.
Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).

This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of
technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and
necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any
possible misunderstanding or confusion.

The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in
conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders
the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina,
29 Phil. 119, 124).

In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime
punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil.
1125, 1132).

It has been held that “to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power
vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency” (1 Am. Jur.
2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).

In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries
Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro
fishing.

The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish
and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law.

Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said
administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over
which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only
upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon
recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be
proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.

Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having
caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three
kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island.

This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within
three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval
and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned.

As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the
promulgation of that provision by the Secretary “is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which
has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved” to the lawmaking body. “Such
an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an
exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore” the said provision “is null and void
and without effect”. Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss.

A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and
regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to
enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d
534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).

Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51).

In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one
which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be
scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra).

The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission “to adopt, promulgate,
amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting
the taking of the various classes of game.

Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that “it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or
receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any
game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof.”

Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person
displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he
was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission.

It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the
taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said
so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment
against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.

WHEREFORE, the lower court’s decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction
and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No.
5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-6791             March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular
No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette
prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and
effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be
published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor
General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have
force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely
enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the
guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall,
in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of
the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No.
386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S.  vs. Tupasi
Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations
especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that
before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their
promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in
the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include
regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio

de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien
 los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo
lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones
contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta,
advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del
Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is
clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not
be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the
foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may
raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the
issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question
of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been
published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to
be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense,
and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs  de
oficio.

Case No. 12 G.R. No. 157286             June 16, 2006

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION (PSDSA), its officers, to wit:
DR. ANILLA A. CALAMBA, President; DR. CARMELITA L. PALABAY, Gen. Vice-President; MS.
ESTELITA R. REYES, Board Secretary; DR. THELMA A. GALANG, Asst. Board Secretary; MR.
FERNANDO LAVITA, Treasurer; MS. LITA DIONISIO, Asst. Treasurer; MS. ROSELILY PADRE,
Auditor; MR. ROMAN CALICDAN, Asst. Auditor; MR. TOMO-AY, MR. OSCAR PEÑAFLORIDA,
Bus. Managers; DR. ANTONETTE ANG, DR. MAGNITA LABRADOR, P.R.O.’S; MR. BONIFACIO
MIGUEL (Region I), MR. JOSE CALAGUI (Region II), DR. REYNALDO SAGUM (Region III), MR.
RUBEN PANAHON (Region IV), MR. OSCAR BARBA (Region V), MS. IRMA GANELA (Region
VI), DR. ERLINDA NAPULI (Region VII), DR. PONCIANO GABIETA (Region VIII), MR.
FEDERICO FIDEL (Region IX), MR.EMILIANO V. RODRIGUEZ (Region X), MS. EDWINA ALAG
(Region XI), MR. DOMINADOR ATAM (Region XII), MS. CONSUELO VELASCO (NCR), MR.
VICTORINO AGMATA (CAR), MS. NATIVIDAD SALASAB (ARMM-CARAGA), All PSDSA Vice-
Presidents for their respective Regions: DR. LOLITA CABANAYAN, MR. CICERO AKLANG, DR.
RUSTICO OCAMPO, MR. ROMEO SANTOS, MR. EMMANUEL CAMA, MR. ROMEO TUMAOB,
MR. JOVENCIO MENDOZA, MR. ALEJANDRO BARING, JR., MS. BERNARDITA APOSTOL, MS.
LORETA MACALUDAS, DR. MYRNA LYN MARACON, MS. ELIZABETH SAN DIEGO, SITH
HINDRON DAMMANG, MS. IMMACULADA BRINGAS, and MS. GLORIA DERECHO, all
members of the PSDSA Board of Directors, in their own behalf as current District Supervisors and IN
REPRESENTATION OF ALL DISTRICT SUPERVISORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, Department Secretary, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, and
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
filed by the Public Schools District Supervisor Association (PSDSA) seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and
Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003. The petition
likewise seeks to compel, by way of a writ of mandamus, the Department of Education, Culture, and
Sports (DECS) and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to upgrade the salary grade level
of the district supervisors from Salary Grade (SG) 19 to SG 24.

The Antecedents

Ever since the Department of Education (DepEd) 1 was founded decades ago, its management had been so
centralized in the Manila office. Schools in the national, regional, and division levels merely followed and
implemented the orders and memoranda issued by the Education Secretary. Due to the evolution of the
learning process and the onset of information technology, there was a need for a radical change in the
governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve the management of the Department was
conducted, and one of the proposals was the abolition of the office of the district supervisor.

Then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairman of the Committee on Education, authored Senate Bill
No. 2191, the thrust of which was to change the existing management style and focus on the schools
where the teaching-learning process occurs. The bill was intended to highlight shared governance in the
different levels in the DECS hierarchy and establish authority, accountability, and responsibility for
achieving higher learning outcomes. While the governance of basic education would begin at the national
level, the field offices (regions, divisions, schools, and learning centers) would translate the policy into
programs, projects, and services to fit local needs. 2 The national level was likewise to be tasked to define
the roles and responsibilities of, and provide resources to the field offices which would implement
educational programs, projects, and services in communities they serve. 3 At the forefront would be the
DepEd Secretary, vested with the overall authority and supervision over the operations of the department
on the national, regional, division, and schools district level. 4

Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act 2001," became a
law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under the law,
each regional office shall have a director, an assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion
and support, planning, administrative and fiscal services. 5 The regional director was given the authority to
hire, place and evaluate all employees in the regional office except for the position of assistant
director,6 as well as the authority, accountability, and responsibility to determine the organization
component of the divisions and districts, and approve the staffing pattern of all employees
therein;7 evaluate all division superintendents and assistant division superintendents in the region; 8 and
other functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities. 9

A division, on the other hand, is headed by a schools division superintendent with the following
responsibilities, among others: to supervise the operations of all public and private elementary, secondary,
and integrated schools, and learning centers; 10 to hire, place and evaluate all division supervisors and
schools district supervisors as well as all employees in the divisions, both teaching and non-teaching
personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant division superintendent; 11 and perform other
functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. 12

The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each district is headed by a
school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion. However, the responsibilities of the
schools district supervisor are limited to the following: (1) providing professional and instructional advice
and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or
cluster thereof; (2) curricula supervision; and (3) performing such other functions as may be assigned by
proper authorities. The schools district supervisors have no administrative, management, control or
supervisory functions over the schools and learning centers within their respective districts. 13

On the school level, an Elementary School Principal (ESP) was designated as school head for all public
elementary schools; and a Secondary School Principal (SSP) for high schools or a cluster thereof. 14 The
ESP and the SSP serve as both instructional leaders and administrative managers with the following
authority, accountability and responsibility:

(7) Administering and managing all personnel, physical, and fiscal resources of the school;

(8) Recommending the staffing complement of the school based on its needs;

(9) Encouraging staff development;

xxxx

(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of upgrading
teachers’/learning facilitators’ competencies, improving and expanding school facilities, and
providing instructional materials and equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported to the
appropriate district supervisors and division superintendents; and

(12) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. 15

Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to "promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the Act, provided that the principle of shared
governance shall be fully implemented within two (2) years" after such approval.

Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, petitioner sought the
legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) National Committee on Legal Aid to make
representations for the resolution of the following administrative issues:

1. Restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives, and position level
of Public Schools District Supervisors.

2. Upgrading of Salary Grade level of Public Schools District Supervisors from Salary Grade
Level 19 to Salary Grade Level 24 under DBM Circular No. 36, otherwise known as the
Compensation and Position Classification Rules and Regulation.16
In a Letter dated March 1, 2002 addressed to then DepEd Secretary Raul Roco, the IBP stated that, per its
review of the documents submitted by the PSDSA, it found the latter’s position valid and legal, to wit:

First: The basis for the abolition of the position of District Supervisors under the Attrition Law and DECS
Department Order No. 110, Series of 1991 is no longer valid and rendered moot and academic due to
issuance of DECS Department Order No. 22, Series of 1996 and the passage by Congress of the
Philippines of Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Basic Education Governance Act of 2000.
Under R.A. 9155, school districts are mandated to be maintained and responsibilities of Public School’s
Districts Supervisors have been clearly defined.

Second: There is a clear case of discrimination of grant of salaries and benefits to District Supervisors
compared to salaries and benefits received by the School Principals – which position is lower in the
hierarchy of positions as prepared by the Department of Education and the Department of Budget and
Management. School Principals and District Supervisors enjoy the same level of Salary Grade even if the
latter position is considered as a promotion and enjoys a higher level of position than that of the position
of School Principals.17

The PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation with the district
supervisors nationwide through a convention, and their valid inputs be considered in formulating the rules
and regulations to be urged by the DepEd. However, the Secretary failed to reply. Thus, the IBP reiterated
the concerns raised by the PSDSA in a Letter18 to the DepEd dated April 15, 2002.

On January 6, 2003, DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus issued DECS Office Order No. 1, which
constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9155. Sections 4.1 to 4.3, Rule IV
of the IRR provide:

SECTION 4.1. The Schools Division Superintendent. – A division shall consist of a province or city
which shall have a schools division superintendent. There shall be at least one assistant schools division
superintendent and office staff for programs promotion, planning, administrative, fiscal, legal, ancillary,
and other support services.

SECTION 4.2. Authority, Accountability, and Responsibility of the Schools Division Superintendent. –
Consistent with the national educational policies, plans, and standards, the schools division
superintendents shall have authority, accountability, and responsibility for the following:

1) Developing and implementing division education development plans;

2) Planning and managing the effective and efficient performance of all personnel, physical, and
fiscal resources of the division, including professional staff development;

3) Hiring, placing, and evaluating all division supervisors and schools district supervisors as well
as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school
heads, except for the assistant division superintendents;

4) Monitoring the utilization of funds provided by the national government and the local
government units to the schools and learning centers;

5) Ensuring compliance of quality standards for basic education programs and for this purpose
strengthening the role of division supervisors as subject area specialists;
 6) Promoting awareness of, and adherence by, all schools and learning centers to accreditation
standards prescribed by the Secretary of Education;

7) Supervising the operations of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated
schools, and learning centers; and

8) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary and/or Regional Director.

SECTION 4.3. Appointing and Disciplinary Authority of the Schools Division Superintendent. – The
schools district superintendent shall appoint the division supervisors and school district supervisors as
well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads,
except for the assistant schools division superintendent, subject to the civil service laws, rules and
regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be issued by the Secretary of Education for the purpose.

The schools division superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only over the non-teaching
personnel under his jurisdiction.

Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the schools division superintendent over the non-teaching
personnel shall be subject to the civil service laws, rules and regulations, and procedures and guidelines to
be issued by the Secretary of Education relative to this matter.

The Regional Director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel insofar
as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions under the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers (R.A. No. 4670).19

Sections 5.1 and 5.2, Rule V of the IRR, in turn, provide:

SECTION 5.1. The Schools District Supervisor. – A school district shall have a school district supervisor
and office staff for program promotion.

The schools district supervisor shall primarily perform staff functions and shall not exercise
administrative supervision over school principals, unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities.
The main focus of his/her functions shall be instructional and curricula supervision aimed at raising
academic standards at the school level.

The schools district supervisor shall be specifically responsible for:

1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;

2) Curricula supervision; and

3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary, Regional Directors, and
Schools Division Superintendents where they belong.

The schools district supervisor being mentioned in this section shall refer to a public schools district
supervisor.
SECTION 5.2. The School District. – A school district already existing at the time of the passage of this
Act shall be maintained. However, an additional school district may be established by the regional
director based on criteria set by the Secretary and on the recommendation of the schools division
superintendent. For this purpose, the Secretary of Education shall set standards and formulate criteria as
basis of the Regional Directors of the establishment of an additional school district. 20

On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district
supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition
and mandamus, alleging that:

I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS’

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS
(SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE
DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 – THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF
2001.

II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS

PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND
INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND
SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT LAW.

III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT
SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE
LEVEL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE
HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS – DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO
RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS
AND OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION – IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
ILLEGAL.21

Petitioners maintain that the questioned provisions of the IRR are invalid because they "extended or
expanded and modified" the provisions of R.A. No. 9155. They argue that the said law should be read in
harmony with other "existing educational laws" which it did not specifically repeal, such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as "The Education Act of 1982," as amended by R.A. No. 7798;
R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as the "Magna Charta for Public School Teachers"; and R.A. No. 7784
captioned "An Act to Strengthen Teacher Education in the Philippines by Establishing Centers of
Excellence, Creating a Teacher Education Council for the Purpose, Appropriating Funds Therefore, and
for Other Purposes."

Petitioners assert that under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, the district offices of the DepEd are intended
as field offices where the district supervisors can assist the ESPs and teachers/learning facilitators within
their district as experienced educational managers. Thus, the district supervisors were not divested of the
inherent administrative functions to manage and oversee the schools within their respective districts,
including their subordinates. They emphasize that the law provides an "office staff for program
promotion" in the school districts, which would be of no use if the office has no administrative
supervision over schools within its respective districts.
Petitioners assert that under the IRR, the schools district supervisors primarily perform staff functions and
shall not exercise administrative supervision over school principals, unless specifically authorized by the
proper authorities. Thus, under the IRR, the exercise of administrative supervision over school principals
was made discretionary and subject to the whims and caprices of "the proper authorities." The logical
inference of this provision, petitioners aver, is that the administrative supervisory powers can be
withdrawn from a district supervisor without any reason at all, a provision which has no basis in the
enabling law.

Petitioners further contend that the DepEd has no authority to incorporate its plan of downgrading the
position of district supervisor, that is, from being an administrator of a particular district office to a
position performing a staff function, to exercise administrative supervision over the school principals only
when specifically authorized by proper authorities. Petitioners insist that respondent Education Secretary
was focused on removing the level of management in the district office, such that the IRR empower
school heads (principals) to have administrative and instructional supervision of school or cluster of
schools, while supervision of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and
learning centers was given to the division office.

Petitioners further insist that respondent Education Secretary failed to consider the fact that R.A. No.
9155 strengthened the district office as a mid-level administrative field office of the DepEd. The law even
mandates to allow the district supervisor to have an office staff for program promotion in the district
office. Apart from the current administrative functions inherent in the district office, DECS Service
Manual 2000 vested additional specific functions to the district offices, to provide professional and
instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning
centers in the district, as well as curricula supervision.

Petitioners posit that R.A. No. 9155 did not, in anyway, allow or authorize the reorganization of the entire
DepEd; it never reduced the position, rank, classification, and salary grade level of district supervisors,
nor abolished the district offices which are responsible for the administration and management of
elementary schools within its jurisdiction. It did not remove from the district supervisors the function of
administrative supervision over schools within their respective areas. In fact, petitioners insist, what the
law did was to give the district supervisor additional responsibility of providing professional and
instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning
centers in the district or cluster thereof.

Petitioners point out that under Section 4.3, paragraph (b), Rule IV of the IRR, the schools division
superintendent was given the power to appoint the division supervisors and schools district supervisor and
other employees subject to civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be
issued by the Secretary of Education for the purpose. On the other hand, the school division
superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only over the non-teaching personnel under his
jurisdiction. Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the schools division superintendent over the non-
teaching personnel shall be subject to civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and procedures and
guidelines to be issued by the Secretary of Education relative to this matter. The regional director shall
continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel in so far as the latter are covered by
specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A.
4670).

Petitioners posit that this grant of disciplining authority to the regional director for teaching personnel
who commit violations of laws, rules, and regulations is definitely not provided for in R.A. No. 9155. The
division superintendent was given the power not only to hire and appoint the division supervisors, district
supervisors, school heads, or principals as well as employees in the division, both teaching and non-
teaching positions. However, when it comes to disciplining officers and teaching personnel who commit
infractions or violations of law, rules, and regulations of the DepEd, the exercise of such disciplining
authority is lodged in the hands of the regional director. Petitioners point out that the power to hire
teachers is in the hands of the division superintendent; principles of administrative rules and procedure
provide that the authority to hire and appoint carries with it the authority to discipline and fire the hired
and appointed personnel particularly if the law is silent thereon. Since the division superintendent has the
authority to hire teaching personnel within its division, he/she should also take the responsibility of
disciplining erring teachers and employees. If the set-up of placing the power of hiring and power to
discipline or fire an errant personnel is separated or divided between two offices of the DepEd, the
proliferation of "palakasan" or "bata-bata" system will flourish, to the detriment of the public education
system and public service.

Petitioners also point out that under Section 7(E)(11) of R.A. No. 9155, school heads are authorized to
accept gifts, donations, bequests, and grants for the purpose of upgrading teacher’s/learning facilitator’s
competencies, improving and expanding school facilities and providing instructional materials and
equipment, which, in turn, shall be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and division
superintendents. However, under Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR, on the authority, accountability,
and responsibility of school heads, district supervisors were deleted as one of the administrative officers
to whom such reporting is to be made. Petitioners conclude that to the extent that the division
superintendents are not mandated to report donations and grants to district supervisors, the IRR is void.

On their plea for mandamus, petitioners pray that the Court compel the DepEd and the DBM to upgrade
their present salary grade. They claim that the position of an ESP is already classified as SG 21, which is
higher by two grades than that of district supervisors, SG 19. Considering their higher position in the
department’s pecking order, vis-à-vis that of the ESPs, petitioners opine that to rectify the present grade-
level distortion, their salary grade should be upgraded to SG 24. 22

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that a perusal of Section 7(D) of R.A. No.
9155 shows that the district supervisor has limited responsibilities, and that the power to exercise
administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by any of those responsibilities. The Education
Secretary is the disciplining authority in the DepEd, with the regional directors acting as the disciplining
authority in their respective regions.

As to petitioners’ gripe that the IRR deleted district supervisors from among those school heads who
should report when "[a]ccepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of upgrading
teachers’/learning facilitators’ competencies, improving and expanding school facilities, and providing
instructional materials and equipment," the OSG avers that this reportorial function is "directory" and
merely for "convenience."

Anent petitioners’ grievance on their alleged stagnant salary grade level, the OSG points out that the same
is "already provided for under FY 2003 GAA, [thus], petitioners’ complaint against the non-increase of
their SG level is already moot and academic." The OSG also emphasizes that the upgrading of the ESP’s
salary grade over the petitioners is not violative of petitioners’ right to equal protection of the law, since
"district supervisors and ESPs are not similarly situated."

In reply, petitioners contend that the upgrading of the salary grade level of district supervisors to SG 21 is
an admission by the DepEd and by the DBM of the validity of their demand to increase their salary grade
to a respectable SG 24.

The petition is partially granted.

It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of
a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. 23 The implementing
rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or
repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. 24 It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are
allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives
and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards
prescribed by law.25 Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions
and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
entrusted to their jurisdiction.26 The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative
agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and
growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular
statute.27

We have reviewed the IRR and find that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are
valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the
law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division
supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-
teaching personnel, including school heads.28 A school head is a person responsible for the administrative
and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. 29 The division superintendent, on the
other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated
schools and learning centers.30

Administrative supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." 31

A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no administrative
supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of
R.A. No. 9155, to wit:

(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;

(2) Curricula supervision; and

(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.

As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the district supervisors were divested
of any administrative supervision over elementary and public high schools. The Senate resolved to vest
the same in the division superintendents, and the Lower House concurred. Senator Rene Cayetano
proposed that the traditional function of the school supervisors of exercising administrative supervision
over the elementary and public high schools be maintained. However, Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the
Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Education and the Sponsor of the Bill, objected to such
proposal:

The President:
Why do we not say AND SHALL NOT BE INCLUDED?

Senator Cayetano:

Yes, better yet, Mr. President. I thank the Chair for that amendment.

The President:

All right. Can we approve that? The sponsor accepts the amendment, I assume.

Senator Aquino-Oreta:

Yes, Mr. President.

The President:

Is there any objection from the floor? (Silence) There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Cayetano:

Thank you, Mr. President.

In line 17, it ends with the conjunction "and." I would like to propose an amendment by inserting a new
paragraph (b). This is, of course, the duties and responsibilities of schools district supervisors. It is to
SUPERVISE SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT, because right now, this is exactly their job.

Again, the reality is, there are efforts to minimize, if not remove, the principal function of school
supervisors, which is to supervise school principals in the district. I just want it to be there to ensure that
their primary functions remain as such.

Therefore, what appears as paragraph (b) in line 18 will now be subparagraph (c).

The President:

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:

Mr. President, may I just explain. There are two school supervisors. One is for the academic function and
the other is for the administrative function. As such, if these two supervisors will dictate to the principals,
then our thrust in reducing the level of bureaucracy might not be met. Also, the thrust of this governance
bill really is to flesh out the importance of the school as the heart of education here. In that heart, we have
the teacher, the student, and the school head.

What we are trying to do here is to bring to the forefront the school itself. In fact, right now, there is a
move in the DECS to do away with the school supervisor in charge of administrative and leave that
function to the principal. If the principal, the school head will be dictated upon by these two school
supervisors, we might not be able to achieve what we want to do here – putting to the forefront the school
itself. Meaning, putting to the forefront the school head, the teacher, and the student.
Senator Cayetano:

Mr. President, I would like to thank the sponsor for that enlightenment. That is precisely my point.

Not too long ago, I was a speaker before the school supervisors all over the land. One of the points that
they complained about was, in most cases, their job to supervise school principals is now being removed
or have been removed simply because – and I may be inaccurate here – the Japanese government – I
know it is a foreign government that funded a study of the organizational setup of the DECS – has
recommended the abolition of school supervisors.

This is the reason this representation would like to ensure that the traditional function of the school
supervisors, among which is to supervise school principals, remain as such. What is good for the Japanese
education is not necessarily good for the Philippines. This representation knows that this is precisely one
of the complaints of the school supervisors.

The lady sponsor admitted that, indeed, there is an effort to phase out the school supervisors. That is
precisely my point, Mr. President. I do not want the school supervisors to be phased out simply because a
foreign government which funded the study of our education has suggested it.

The President:

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:

Mr. President, actually, it is not Japanese. It is an ADB proposal to the DECS. The DECS had a study
made on how to improve the management order of the DECS. That was one of the proposals. They gave
three proposals. One of them was to take out the school supervisors.

But precisely, Mr. President, we are not doing that, we are not taking them out. What we are saying is for
the school supervisor to focus on the curriculum because in the administration of the affairs of the school,
we are saying that the principal knows best how to administer or how to run the school better. And so, we
are saying here that school supervisors will be there contrary to the view of that ADB study. We will
maintain them, but the focus of the school supervisors will be on the curriculum of the schools.

Senator Cayetano:

Mr. President, again I thank the lady senator. But again let us look at who supervisors of schools are.
Supervisors of schools once upon a time were all school principals. They rose from the ranks, that is why
they are fully aware of the administrative as well as the instructional capability of the principals now who
are under them. To remove their right to supervise, – now it is the ADB, I am correct, the lady senator is
correct because as I said I was not sure – to remove this traditional function would really render the
supervisors practically without anything to do. That is why they are now being justified that henceforth
there will be no principals that will be promoted as school supervisors because when the school
supervisors reach the age of retirement and retire, no principals shall be promoted to that level. But these
school supervisors now, Mr. President, were once upon a time in their professional lives principals, and
they know best how the schools should be run – administratively and instructionally. That is the reason
for that, Mr. President.
The President:

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Cayetano:

So, may I ask the sponsor to accept this, Mr. President.

Senator Aquino-Oreta:

Mr. President, what was the amendment?

Senator Cayetano:

To insert a new paragraph, paragraph (b) in line 18, which states: SUPERVISE SCHOOL PRINCIPALS
IN THE DISTRICT.

The President:

May I suggest, THE SUPERVISION OF SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT, because –

Senator Cayetano:

Yes, Mr. President.

The President:

– the antecedent for that is, "The schools district supervisor shall be responsible for."

Senator Cayetano:

That is right, Mr. President. Supervision, yes.

The President:

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:

Mr. President, may I have one minute?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Tatad:

Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for one minute.

The President:
Is there any objection? (Silence) There being none, the session is suspended for one minute.

It was 5:33 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:43 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President:

The session is resumed.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 2191

Senator Tatad:

Mr. President, we are still trying to find a way out of these conflicting points of view on the role of the
supervisor. To allow the parties to have a little more time to work on this, I move that we suspend
consideration of Senate Bill No. 2191. (Underscoring supplied)32

When the session resumed, Senator Cayetano no longer pursued his proposed amendment, and moved
instead that the same be amended to read "Curricula Supervision." The Senate approved the proposal of
the Senator:

The President:

The session is resumed. Senator Cayetano is recognized.

CAYETANO AMENDMENT

Senator Cayetano:

Thank you, Mr. President.

With the permission of the lady senator, after consulting her and the Majority Leader, I would like to
propose an amendment by rewording the original amendment I was proposing last night. The reworded
proposed amendment would be like this: CURRICULA SUPERVISION.

The President:

That would be on what page?

Senator Cayetano:

That would be on page 10, line 17, as a new paragraph (b).

The President:
And how will it read?

Senator Cayetano:

CURRICULA SUPERVISION.

The President:

Just that?

Senator Cayetano:

Just that, Mr. President.

Senator Tatad:

Put a semicolon (;).

Senator Cayetano:

And because of that, line 18 which is paragraph (b), should now be paragraph (c).

The President:

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:

The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. (Underscoring supplied)33

Thus, under R.A. No. 9155, administrative supervision over school heads is not one of those
responsibilities conferred on district supervisors.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation
or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not
have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 34

It is not surprising that Senator Aquino-Oreta maintained her position that district supervisors should not
have administrative control or even supervision over ESPs and SSPs. As early as 1990, the DECS had
adopted the policy that, effective January 1, 1991, the positions of district supervisors and division
supervisors would be gradually phased out by not filling-up these positions as they become vacant. 35 On
September 17, 1991, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued DECS Order No. 110, Series of 1991,
declaring that, to foster better considerations and articulation of progress in the elementary level, all
elementary school principals shall report directly to the school division superintendents. In his Order
dated June 22, 1994, then DECS Secretary Armand V. Fabella declared that DECS Order No. 110 shall
remain in effect, with the recommendation that, in order to facilitate the phase-out of district supervisor
positions, incumbent district supervisors were encouraged to transfer to vacant division supervisor
positions, provided they meet the qualification standards for such positions. 36 For his part, in his DECS
Order No. 22, Series of 1996, DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria restored the district supervisor positions
but only on a selective basis and subject to the following guidelines:

a) Schools superintendents, with the concurrence/approval of their regional directors, may have
the option to restore the position in selected districts after a careful evaluation of need. For this
purpose, the number of schools and their geographical location and distance for effective
monitoring, the availability of regular transportation, urban-rural setting, etc., should be
considered in the decision.

b) The role of the district supervisor as an instructional leader and resource for teachers, rather
than merely as an administrative supervisor, should be emphasized in their functions and duties.

c) In the event of restoration and appointment of the position in a particular district, the school
superintendent shall ensure that the system of field supervision previous to the issuance of DECS
Orders No. 110, s. 1991 and No. 41, s. 1994 shall, likewise, be restored. Correspondingly, the
designation of coordinating principals in affected districts shall be withdrawn.

d) Should a division office opt not to restore some or all district supervisor positions, the funds
for such positions may be used to create new positions or upgrade existing positions, subject to
the approval of the Department of Budget and Management.

e) Considering that a number of vacated district supervisor positions in some divisions may have
been converted to other positions and/or otherwise phased out since 1991, appointments of
district supervisors shall be issued by regional directors only upon verification from the
Department of Budget and Management that the said position may be filled.

It is enjoined that regional directors and schools superintendents shall exert special effort to ensure that
the implementation of this Order shall be harmonious and conducive to field supervision. 37

Under DECS Order No. 36, Series of 1998 issued by DECS Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco, the positions
of district supervisors were restored to their original status as a supervisory level in the DECS
administrative hierarchy subject to the following guidelines:

1.1 The positions of Education and District Supervisors are hereby restored to their original status as a
supervisory level in the DECS administrative hierarchy, subject to the following guidelines:

1.1.1 The functions of a district supervisor as an instructional leader and resource person for
teachers should be emphasized.

In the event of restoration and appointment of public schools district supervisor, the designation of the
coordinating principal shall be withdrawn.

Appointment of district supervisors shall be issued by regional directors only upon verification from the
Department of Budget and Management that the positions still exist since a number of vacated district
supervisor positions in some divisions may have been converted to other positions and/or otherwise
phased out since 1991.38
However, as already stated, the Senate resolved to maintain the positions of district supervisors but
limited their responsibilities only to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 to conform to the
basic thrust and objectives of the law. Far from strengthening the office of the district supervisors as a
mid-head field office of the DepEd, the law limited the authority and responsibility attached to such
position.

While it is true that the district supervisor is given a support staff for program promotion, it cannot
thereby be implied that he/she likewise has administrative supervision over ESPs and SSPs. Such a
construction has no basis in law and in fact. Indeed, such a construction of the statute defeats the very
purpose of the law.

It is a basic precept that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the
statute. The particular words, clauses, and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expression, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. 39

Besides, Congress enumerated the duties and responsibilities of a district supervisor. Congress would not
have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict or limit its meaning and
confine its terms only to those expressly enumerated. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include situations not provided nor intended by Congress. 40

The submission of the OSG, that the schools district supervisors have the administrative supervision over
school heads, is more in accord with the law, to wit:

Section 7 of RA 9155, on School District Level, pertinently provides that "a school district shall have a
school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion," and that the schools district
supervisor shall be responsible for: (1) "(p)roviding professional and instructional advice and support to
the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district [or] cluster
thereof;" (2) "(c)urricula supervision;" and, (3) "(p)erforming such other functions as may be assigned by
the proper authorities."

A perusal of Section 7 shows that the District Supervisor has limited responsibilities, and that the power
to exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by responsibility nos. 1 and 2. Neither
is that power covered by the directive that the District Supervisor shall have an office staff for program
promotion. The only logical conclusion, therefore, that can be derived from the aforesaid enumeration of
responsibilities is that the District Supervisor may only exercise administrative supervision over ESPs
when such function is assigned by proper authorities. And, since the DepEd Secretary specifically
declared through the IRR of RA 9155, that the District Supervisor shall not exercise administrative
supervision over the ESPs, unless otherwise authorized, petitioners cannot complain against the said
declaration. On this score, it is settled that the intent of the statute is the law (Philippine National Bank v.
Office of the President, 252 SCRA 5 [1996]). In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words
and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning (Mustang
Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 [1996]).

Needless to say, Section 7, on Division Level, further provides that the School Division Superintendent
shall have authority, accountability and responsibility for, among others, "(s)upervising the operation of
all public and private elementary, secondary and integrated schools, and learning centers." To claim,
therefore, that the District Supervisor has administrative supervision over the ESPs would also violate the
above-quoted provision.41
The Court likewise declares that the last paragraph of Section 4.3 of the IRR, stating that the regional
director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel insofar as the latter
are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions under R.A. No. 4670 ("Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers") does not contravene R.A. No. 9155. Indeed, the IRR merely reiterates the
DECS Rules of Procedure, DECS Order No. 33, issued on March 30, 1999 by the DepEd Secretary, and
R.A. No. 4670 which was approved on June 18, 1966, and pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides that the DepEd Secretary is empowered to

a. Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies,
functions, plans, programs, and projects; and

b. Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the offices
under the Secretary and for execution of the laws relative thereto.

Additionally, the IRR was issued by the DepEd Secretary pursuant to Section 7(A)(1) of R.A. No. 9155,
which mandates that the Secretary formulate national educational policies and enhance the employment
status, professional competence, welfare, and working conditions of all the DepEd personnel. 42

We agree that R.A. No. 9155 does not provide who has disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel
of the DepEd. However, under Section 3, Chapter III of DECS Order No. 33, Series of 1999, otherwise
known as the 1999 DECS Rules of Procedure, the disciplining authority in the DECS is the DepEd
Secretary, with the regional directors acting as such in their respective regions except those appointed by
the President.43

The officers and employees referred to in the Rules of Procedure include teachers who, under R.A. No.
4670, shall mean:

x x x all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including
guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts, or vocational instructors, and all other persons
performing supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated
by the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians,
school dentists, and other school employees.

A division superintendent of schools is not a disciplining authority over teachers, whether under R.A. No.
4670 or under the DECS Rules of Procedure. In fact, under Section 2, Chapter VII of such Rules of
Procedure, a division superintendent is a chairperson of the investigating committee over formal
complaints filed against such teachers:

a) When the respondent is an elementary or secondary school teacher, head teacher, principal, district
supervisor/chair/coordinator or Education Supervisor I –

(1) The schools division superintendent or his or her duly authorized representative, as
chairperson;

(2) The duly authorized representative of the school, district, or division teacher’s organization,
as member; and

(3) The division supervisor for elementary or secondary education where the respondent belongs,
as member.
The foregoing rule is based on Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 which reads:

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a
committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who should, at least, have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools
within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education.

Anent the issue on reporting of acceptance of donations, Section 7(E)(11) of R.A. No. 9155 provides:

(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of upgrading teachers’/learning
facilitators’ competencies, improving and expanding school facilities, and providing instructional
materials and equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported to the appropriate district supervisors
and division superintendents. (emphasis supplied)

However, Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR provides that:

(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants in accordance with existing laws and policy of the
Department for the purpose of upgrading teachers’/learning facilitators’ competencies, improving and
expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials and equipment. Such donations or
grants must be reported to the division superintendents. (emphasis supplied)

We agree with petitioners’ contention that, under the law, donations and grants must be reported to the
appropriate district supervisors and not only to the division superintendents. The use in the law of the
word "must" is an expression of the mandatory nature of the reporting of donations and grants to district
supervisors. The reason for the provision is that such grants and donations which are intended to upgrade
teachings/learning facilitators’ competencies, improve and expand school facilities, and provide
instructional materials and equipment will assist the school district supervisors in the performance of their
duties and responsibilities under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, and submit appropriate
recommendations to the proper administrative officers.

On petitioner’s plaint of the failure of respondents to upgrade their salary grade level to at most SG 21,
and for the issuance of the writ of mandamus mandating respondents to increase their salary grade from
SG 19 to 24, the same is premature.

There is no showing in the petition that, before filing their petition, petitioners sought an adjustment of
level of their salary grade from SG 19 to SG 21 before respondents or the Civil Service Commission.
Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Section 14 of R.A. No. 6758, otherwise known
as the Salary Standardization Law, provides:

Sec. 17. Powers and Functions. – The Budget Commission (now Department of Budget and
Management), principally through the OCPC (now CPCB, Compensation and Position Classification
Board) shall, in addition to those provided under other Sections of this Decree, have the following powers
and functions:
a. Administer the compensation and position classification system established herein and revise it as
necessary;

xxxx

f. Certify classification actions and changes in class or grade of positions whenever the facts warrant,
such certification to be binding on administrative, certifying, payroll, disbursing, accounting and auditing
officers of the national government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions.

Sections 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9155 provide:

SEC. 10. The Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Budget and Management shall, within ninety
(90) days from the approval of this Act, jointly promulgate the guidelines on the allocation, distribution,
and utilization of resources provided by the national government for the field offices, taking into
consideration the uniqueness of the working conditions of the teaching service.

The Secretary of the Department of Education shall ensure that resources appropriated for the field offices
are adequate and that resources for school personnel, school desks, and textbooks and other instructional
materials intended are allocated directly and released immediately by the Department of Budget and
Management to said offices.

SEC. 11. The Secretary of the Department of Education, subject to civil service laws and regulations,
shall issue appropriate personnel policy rules and regulations that will best meet the requirements of the
teaching profession taking into consideration the uniqueness of the working conditions of the teaching
service.

And insofar as the salary system for teaching positions is concerned, Section 14 provides:

SEC. 14. The Salary System for Teaching Position. – The salary grade of a teacher shall be determined in
accordance with the following:

a. The Teachers’ Preparation Pay Schedule shall be prepared by the Commission in consultation
with the Department of Education and Culture. Under this system, the teacher's academic or
educational preparation, teaching experience in both private and public schools, and extra-
curricular activities for professional growth, shall be considered in pursuance of the principle of
'equal pay for equal training and experience.'

xxxx

d. The Budget Commission, in coordination and consultation with the Department of Education
and Culture and the Civil Service Commission may, when future needs require, modify, change
or otherwise improve on the salary system herein established for the teaching and closely related
occupations, any change that may be made as provided herein shall become part of the
implementing rules of this Decree to be issued by the Budget Commission upon prior approval by
the President.

Moreover, the issue of whether or not respondents should be compelled to adjust upwards the salary grade
of petitioners to SG 21 has become moot and academic, because, on November 3, 2003, the DepEd and
the DBM issued Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 containing the guidelines in the implementation of
the Salary Upgrading for District and Education Supervisors, to wit:

4.0 GUIDELINES

4.1 To maintain the previous salary grade relationships under RA No. 6758 among the PSDS and
ES I, on the one hand, and Elementary School Principal (ESP) IV and Secondary School
Principal (SSP) II, on the other hand, and to preserve the consistency in the salary grade
relationships of said positions, the following are hereby authorized:

4.1.1 Upgrading of the PSDS and ES I positions from SG-19 to SG-20 in July 2003 and
to SG-21 in July 2004;

4.1.2 Upgrading of the ES II positions by two (2) salary grades from SG-20 to SG-21 in
July 2003 and to SG-22 in July 2004;

4.1.3 A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of ES III positions starting July 2003
and another one-step salary adjustment starting July 2004;

4.1.4 A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of CES positions starting July 2003 and
another one-step salary adjustment starting July 2004.

4.2 Attached herewith is Annex A containing the summary of the guidelines for the salary
upgrading of positions authorized herein.

5.0 SALARY RULES

5.1 For purposes of the salary upgrading herein authorized, the basic salary of the employee
concerned shall be adjusted as follows:

5.1.1 Effective July 1, 2003 – at the same salary step of his assigned salary grade as of
June 30, 2003 (Illustrative Example A) adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed under
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 474 (Annex B);

5.1.2 Effective July 1, 2004 – at the same salary step of his assigned salary grade as of
June 30, 2004 (Illustrative Example A) adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed under
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 474 (Annex B).

5.2 The transition allowance as defined in 3.2 being received by the PSDS and ES, if any, shall be
considered as advance entitlement of the salary increase herein authorized. (Illustrative Examples
B and C)

5.3 No step adjustment shall be granted to incumbents of positions whose salary already falls at
or exceeds the maximum step (eighth step) of the salary grade allocation of their positions.
(Illustrative Example D)

5.4 The herein salary increases shall be effected through the issuance of a Notice of Salary
Adjustment (NOSA) by the duly authorized official. (Annex C)
6.0 FUNDING SOURCE

The amounts necessary to implement the salary adjustments authorized herein shall be charged against
the Nationwide lump sum appropriation for the purpose amounting to fifty million pesos (P50,000,000) in
the DepEd’s budget in RA 9206, the CY 2003 General Appropriations Act. For CY 2004, the same shall
be charged against the lump sum appropriation for the purpose that may be included in the 2004 budget.

7.0 POST-AUDIT

Any salary adjustment paid under this Circular shall be subject to post-audit by the DBM – ROs
concerned. Any payments thereof which are not in accordance herewith shall be adjusted accordingly.

8.0 CONTRIBUTIONS

The salary adjustments authorized herein are subject to the mandatory requirements for life and
retirement premiums, and health insurance premiums.

9.0 SAVING CLAUSE

Conflicts arising from the implementation of the provisions of this Circular shall be resolved by the
Department of Education, upon prior consultation with the Department of Budget and Management.

10.0 EFFECTIVITY

This Circular Letter shall take effect on July 1, 2003.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 is declared valid, except Section 6.2(11), Rule VI thereof which provides
that "donations or grants shall be reported only to the division superintendents." Such donations or grants
must also be reported to the appropriate school district supervisors, as mandated by Republic Act No.
9155. Petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 13 G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court
dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there
will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may
repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain,
whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present
Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability
been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while
the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended
its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the
repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of
the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature
and that of Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy
of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense
of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for
the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of
the position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one
hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial
power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the
exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose
jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are
estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various
resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in
G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his
conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was
assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the
Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of
her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let
alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its
jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.
Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in
accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be
a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision.
It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that
became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case
was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to

declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional;
but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which
are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review
and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice,
and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to
interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin
Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules
and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998,
Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the
said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the
Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this
Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the
rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same
judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

x x x           x x x          x x x

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the
case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of
the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . .
For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can
render the execution unjust or impossible.5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out
by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons
v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as
its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause
that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive.
The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution
of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date
can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or
at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
 the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in
absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not
reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the
ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has
performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if
however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be
addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to
make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change
the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said
law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own
Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as
alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a
law enacted by Congress.1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no
jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary.
Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce
their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of
judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and
incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs
execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal
cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani
Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-
existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
 Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan 10 Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice
Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by
this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The
venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license."
By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and

procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may
be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by
giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the
process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time
immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control
and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became
final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on
December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing
a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC,
Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated
November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow
(him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court
to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the
Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

x x x           x x x          x x x

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation

however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and
Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of
execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for
the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information
of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the
appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent
of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of
supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in
relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for
the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to
the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about
the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of
executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article
81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For
instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution
of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in
the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such
clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the
convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable
statute as when the date at execution set by the President would be earlier
than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date

of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7,
Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development
shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the

rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed
(Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources
of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be
asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without
need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
 upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent
with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it
cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by
the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become
operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter."
(Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was
filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process
and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not
oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of
execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the
counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest
from the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its
jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article
VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents.
The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority
for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement
of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death
convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.  15 As
observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government
from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution."  16 The
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of
the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend
R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is
like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of
its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute
final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the
life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the
right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly
granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld
over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after
his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper
perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts.
Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m.
He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of
1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal
of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that
clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by
thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have
publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also
sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35)
other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only
resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a
Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The
Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus,
the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in
Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority,
there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere
speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath
and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th
Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on
capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress
that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In
contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly
a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress
was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush
to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner.
The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the
present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the
law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the
fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further
relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste
and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will
not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no
less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the
issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the
Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal
or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the
death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that
of Senator Pimentel. 18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the
reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the
position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under
the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113
congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the
morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments
formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the
President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the
prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now
be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment
had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in
punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the
legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of
the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates.
To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But
when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to
turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the
Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the
reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the
courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown
away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of
the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and
they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by
society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order
issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with
applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.
 Case No. 14 G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R.

REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA,
ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it
cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully
prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three
(3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition
for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs.
Professional Regulation Commission."

The records shows the following undisputed facts:

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following
pertinent provisions:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by,
or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by
Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint
for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC
to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the
lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from
enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.

Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the
other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The
respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950
for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance.

SO ORDERED. 2

Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain
the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held —

That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with
the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to
control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3

To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration
vs. Mendoza,  4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin  5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this
Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the two being co-equal bodies.

After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court
ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that
whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and
Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers
and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on
a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first,
within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A,
the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that
a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the
ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional
Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one
is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of
action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission.
Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in
Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions
of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently,
Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the
general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7

What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is
attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our
jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded
on, to wit:

In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or

resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is
concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be
upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion:

The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a

failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of
government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal
departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each
supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential
act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied
therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the
courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the
Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief
Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a
case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals
should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts
should be governed by the same principles as govern the jucucial review
of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10

Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the
Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under
the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was
filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the
circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention
of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify
what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive
Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held:
 ... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case
No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of
injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .

Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter

into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the
threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated
February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing
officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The
respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this
nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the
administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the
authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before
the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.

In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent
Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.

Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the
Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The contention is devoid of merit.

In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section
9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings
wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law
Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights,
privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 14 This does not
cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its
purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the
respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the
issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an
order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an
invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments,
decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the
Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or
rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of
election laws." 16

As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:

We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract
to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response
to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively
and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final
orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the
award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the
parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned
order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its
authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC
resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no
contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising
from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
(Emphasis supplied.) 17

One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9,
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Thus:

The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the
Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion
of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19

Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
 The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over
resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from
the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case
No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.

Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all
the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be
affected by it.

Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak
to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an
examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions . ... 21

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and
every examinee during the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes
for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to
how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants.
They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should
be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth.
As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds
of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner
not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the
promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most
suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged
public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out
their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit:
 ... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It
decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion.

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by
depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they
should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their
mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get
ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such
leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then
so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should
be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all
within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by
all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed.

In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and
void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 15 G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

 a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234,
265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415,
427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644,
658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-
1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293,
297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-
839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-
1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-
1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-
2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568,
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-
852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92,
94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
 other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of  Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it
is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not
be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a
general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because,
if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself
is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel
for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those
in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings
no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is
a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed
to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
 Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
[4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which
he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme
Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por
el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented
prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to
wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters
nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled
that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized
by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter
of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published
in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they
shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 16 G.R. No. 187752               November 23, 2010

IRENE K. NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K. NACU, and NEJIE N. DE

SAGUN, Petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated December 24, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated May 6, 2009. The assailed Decision held that
Irene K. Nacu (Nacu), Enterprise Service Officer III at the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA),
assigned at the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ), was guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from the
service and its accessory penalties.

The case arose from the following facts:

On December 17, 1999, PEZA issued Memorandum Order No. 99-003, prohibiting its employees from
charging and collecting overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises. The pertinent portions of the
said regulation read:

Effective immediately, PEZA shall provide processing/documentation services required by economic

zone export-producers for incoming and outgoing shipments x x x FREE OF OVERTIME
FEES/CHARGES x x x.
xxxx

Economic zone export producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders, truckers and other service
providers and enterprises are strictly prohibited from offering financial and/or non-financial tokens,
compensation, etc. to any PEZA official and/or personnel, in connection with PEZA overtime services
rendered and/or other transactions.

In addition, economic zone export-producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders, truckers and other
service providers and enterprises are enjoined to notify ranking PEZA officials (Administrator, Manager,
Officer-in-Charge, Deputy Director Generals and the Director General) on any difficulties or problems
they encounter, particularly those pertaining to lack of service-orientation or improper behavior of any
PEZA officer and/or personnel.3

Sometime in September 2001, Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation (EBCC) filed a complaint
against Nacu for allegedly charging it overtime fees, despite Memorandum Order No. 99-003.

Acting on the complaint, PEZA immediately conducted a preliminary investigation, during which Atty.
Norma B. Cajulis, PEZA’s lawyer, interviewed Rey Ligan (Ligan), a document processor at EBCC. Ligan
attested, among others, that the overtime fees went to Nacu’s group, and that, during the time Nacu was
confined in the hospital, she pre-signed documents and gave them to him.

On November 21, 2001, Atty. Procolo Olaivar (Atty. Olaivar) of PEZA Legal Services Group requested
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to verify the genuineness of Nacu’s signatures appearing on
the Statements of Overtime Services (SOS). 4 Original copies of 32 SOS and a specimen of Nacu’s
signature were then sent to the NBI for comparison.

On January 25, 2002, the NBI informed Atty. Olaivar that "no definite opinion can be rendered on the
matter" since "the standards/sample signatures of the subject submitted [we]re not sufficient and
appropriate to serve as basis for a specific comparative examination." The NBI then requested that, should
PEZA still want it to conduct further examination, it be furnished with additional standard/sample
signatures, in the same style and pattern as that of the questioned document, appearing in official/legal
documents on file, executed before, during, and after the date of the questioned document. 5

PEZA referred the 32 SOS, together with the same standard specimen of Nacu’s signatures/initials, to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory (PNP Crime Lab) for determination of the genuineness of
Nacu’s signature appearing therein.

In Questioned Document Report No. 052-02 dated May 3, 2002, Rosario C. Perez, Document Examiner
II of the PNP Crime Lab, stated her findings, thus –

1. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned initials/signatures IRENE

NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19, Q-20, Q-21, Q-23, Q-24,
Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32" and the submitted standard initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1
to S-19" inclusive reveal significant divergences in the matter of execution, line quality and
stroke structure.

2. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned initials/signatures IRENE

NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" and the submitted
standard signatures/initials of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" inclusive reveal significant
similarities in the manner of execution, line quality and stroke structure.
xxxx

CONCLUSION

1. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12,
Q-13, Q-15, Q-19 to Q-21, Q-23 to Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32" appearing in the twenty-two (22) pieces
[of] Statement of Overtime Services and the submitted standard initials/signatures of Irene K.
Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" inclusive WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME
PERSON.

2. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16
to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" appearing in the ten (10) pieces of Statement of Overtime Service and the
submitted standard initials/signatures [of] Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" inclusive WERE
WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.6

Finding a prima facie case against Nacu, PEZA Director General Lilia B. de Lima (Director General De
Lima) filed a Formal Charge against her for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. It was alleged that Nacu unlawfully charged ₱3,500.00 overtime fee from
EBCC on ten occasions (covered by the ten SOS which the PNP Crime Lab found to have been written by
Nacu), for a total amount of ₱35,000.00.

Nacu denied that the signatures appearing on the ten overtime billing statements were hers. She averred
that it was impossible for her to charge EBCC overtime fees as the latter was well aware that PEZA
employees may no longer charge for overtime services; that she had no actual notice of Memorandum
Order No. 99-003; and that she caused no damage and prejudice to PEZA and EBCC.

During the hearing, PEZA presented the following witnesses: Rosario Perez, the document examiner who
examined the SOS; Atty. Dante Quindoza, Zone Administrator of BEZ, who testified that Nacu was one
of the officials authorized to sign the documents; Romy Zaragosa, Corporate Relations Manager of
Covanta Energy, who attested that meetings were held on November 17, 2001 and January 25, 2002,
wherein Ligan testified that he gave the payment for overtime fees to Nacu; Roberto Margallo (Margallo),
Enterprise Service Officer III of PEZA, who testified that he knows Nacu’s signature and that he was
certain that the signatures appearing on the SOS were hers; Omar Dana, EBCC plant chemist, who
testified that EBCC paid, through Ligan, overtime fees to Nacu and some other persons; Elma Bugho,
PEZA Records Officer, who testified on the issuance of PEZA Memorandum Order No. 99-003; 7 and
Miguel Herrera, then Division Chief of PEZA at the BEZ, who testified that he was responsible for the
implementation of PEZA rules and regulations and for assigning examiners upon the request of zone
enterprises and brokers.8

On February 8, 2005, the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation, and Discipline (CBIID), with the
approval of Director General De Lima, found Nacu guilty of the acts charged, thus:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline (CBIID) –

1. resolves – that Irene K. Nacu committed an act which constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action and finds her guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct[, and conduct] prejudicial to the best
interest of service pursuant to Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and hereby
 2. recommends that – respondent be dismissed from service pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV,
Revised Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in Philippine Civil Service with accessory
penalties of:

a) cancellation of eligibility;

b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and

c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service. 9

Nacu moved for a reconsideration of the CBIID’s findings, but the motion was denied. By way of appeal,
Nacu elevated the case to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

On February 19, 2007, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 070327, affirming the CBIID’s resolution,
viz.:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Irene K. Nacu, former Enterprise Service Officer III, Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA), is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 08, 2005
issued by Director General Lilia B. de Lima finding Nacu guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal
from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and disqualification from being re-employed in the government service is AFFIRMED. 10

Nacu filed a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 070327, but the motion was denied in
Resolution No. 071489 dated August 1, 2007.11

Nacu forthwith filed a petition for review with the CA, assailing the CSC resolutions. On September 17,
2007, while the case was pending resolution, Nacu died and was substituted by her heirs, Benjamin Nacu
(husband), Nejie N. de Sagun (daughter), and Ervin K. Nacu (son), herein petitioners.

The CA, in the assailed Decision dated December 24, 2008, affirmed the CSC resolutions. The CA could
not believe Nacu’s claim that she was not aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003, considering that the
order was issued almost two years earlier. According to the CA, as a PEZA employee, Nacu had the
obligation to keep herself abreast of everything that transpires in her office and of developments that
concern her position. It stressed that even if Nacu had not actually received a copy of the memorandum
order, such circumstance will not foreclose the order’s effectivity; and that it is merely an internal
regulation which does not require publication for its effectivity. 12

The CA brushed aside Nacu’s objections to (a) Ligan’s written statement because it was not made under
oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during the hearing; (b) the PNP Crime Lab’s findings for
being unreliable in light of the NBI’s own finding that the samples were not sufficient; and (c) Margallo’s
testimony identifying Nacu’s signatures on the SOS, on the ground that he was not presented as an expert
witness. The CA pointed out that proceedings in administrative cases are not strictly governed by
technical rules of procedure and evidence, as they are required to be disposed of summarily.

In particular, the CA found pointless Nacu’s criticism of the PNP Crime Lab’s findings based on the
NBI’s opinion on the samples given. To counter the same, the CA highlighted the fact that the NBI’s
opinion did not conclusively state that the signatures were not that of Nacu. It stressed that Nacu failed to
adduce clear and convincing evidence to contradict the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, relying merely on the
NBI’s opinion which, to the mind of the CA, did not actually absolve petitioner.
According to the CA, Memorandum Order No. 99-003, the PNP’s findings, and the witnesses’
testimonies, taken together, were sufficient to hold Nacu administratively liable for the acts complained
of. Nacu was not denied due process, considering that she was given the opportunity to explain her side
and present evidence, and that she had, in fact, participated in the hearing.

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution14 dated May 6, 2009. They then elevated the case to this Court through this petition for review
on certiorari.

Petitioners submit to this Court the issue of whether the finding that Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is supported by substantial
evidence.

Petitioners’ arguments focus largely on the weight given by the CA to the PNP Crime Lab’s report,
which, they insist, should not be given credence as it is unreliable. Firstly, it was not shown that the
questioned document examiner who examined the SOS was a handwriting expert. Secondly, the signature
samples were, according to the NBI, insufficient references for a comparative examination. Thirdly, the
sample signatures used were obtained in violation of Nacu’s right against self-incrimination. And lastly,
the report merely states that there were similarities in the manner of execution, line quality, and stroke
structures of the signatures, and that such conclusion does not translate to a finding that the signatures
appearing on the SOS are genuine.

Petitioners also object to the CA’s reliance on the statements made by Ligan during the preliminary
investigation, which were not given under oath. They contend that Nacu was denied due process when
Ligan was not presented as witness during the trial, and that there were inconsistencies in Ligan’s
statements.

And finally, as an affirmative defense, they reiterate that Nacu was not aware of the issuance and
implementation of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They point out that there was, in fact, no showing
that the said order had been published in a newspaper, posted at the BEZ, or a copy thereof furnished to
Nacu.

We find no merit in this petition.

Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings, means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 15 The standard
of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible
for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.16

Overall, the testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made by Ligan during the preliminary
investigation, and the findings of the PNP Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS,
amounted to substantial evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that Nacu was guilty of the
acts complained of. Petitioners’ allegations of unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies of the
evidence neither discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu.

For one, petitioners cite the PNP’s findings as unreliable in light of the NBI’s opinion that the samples
utilized by the PNP Crime Lab—the same samples submitted to the NBI—were not sufficient to make a
comparative examination.

We do not agree. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the findings of one are not binding or
conclusive upon the other. Moreover, as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Comment, the NBI’s finding referred only to the insufficiency of the samples given; the NBI did not
actually make a determination of the genuineness of the signatures. While the NBI may have found the
samples to be insufficient, such finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime Lab’s own
findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of the signatures found on the overtime billings
matched the sample signatures. The difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of the samples
could only mean that the PNP Crime Lab observes a standard different from that used by the NBI in the
examination of handwriting.

Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, Nacu should have channeled her efforts into
providing her own proof that the signatures appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all,
whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same by clear and convincing evidence. 17 Nacu
could not simply depend on the alleged weakness of the complainant’s evidence without offering stronger
evidence to contradict the former.

In any case, the CA did not rely solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in concluding that the signatures
appearing on the ten SOS were Nacu’s. Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu,
also identified the latter’s signatures on the SOS. Such testimony deserves credence. It has been held that
an ordinary witness may testify on a signature he is familiar with. 18 Anyone who is familiar with a
person’s writing from having seen him write, from carrying on a correspondence with him, or from
having become familiar with his writing through handling documents and papers known to have been
signed by him may give his opinion as to the genuineness of that person’s purported signature when it
becomes material in the case.19

Petitioners also posit that Nacu was denied her right against self-incrimination when she was made to
give samples of her signature. We do not agree. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing
or automatically operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection does not come into play.
Moreover, the right must be claimed at the appropriate time, or else, it may be deemed waived. 20 In the
present case, it does not appear that Nacu invoked her right against self-incrimination at the appropriate
time, that is, at the time she was asked to provide samples of her signature. She is therefore deemed to
have waived her right against self-incrimination.

Next, petitioners assail the credibility of Ligan’s statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan
was not presented as witness during the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due process when she was
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan.

It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.21 In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the non-presentation of a witness during trial
and the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the said witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held that
the contention was unavailing, stating that -
In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating that the petitioner therein could not
argue that she had been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing
Casimiro v. Tandog, 459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 22

The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude
as long as fairness is not compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of due
process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits, or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their
direct testimonies.23

In addition, petitioners claim that there were inconsistencies in Ligan’s statement. While Ligan allegedly
stated that Nacu gave him pre-signed documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that
these pre-signed documents referred to the ten overtime billings referred to in the formal charge, the
record does not show that Nacu was confined in the hospital on the dates indicated in the said billings.

To set the record straight, Ligan did not specifically mention that the dates indicated in the pre-signed
documents were also the days when Nacu was confined in the hospital. He merely said that Nacu pre-
signed some documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that she gave these documents to
him. Neither did he state that these pre-signed SOS were the same ten SOS cited in the formal charge
against Nacu. It was petitioners’ own assumption that led to this baseless conclusion.1avvphi1

In Nacu’s defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of the existence of Memorandum
Order No. 99-003. They aver that there was no evidence showing that Memorandum Order No. 99-003
was posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be said that the order had already taken effect
and was being implemented in the BEZ. Petitioners claim that Nacu had, in fact, no actual knowledge of
the said order as she was not furnished with a copy thereof.

Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the said order. As correctly opined by the CA, it is
difficult to believe that Nacu, one of the employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum order, was not
in any way informed—by posting or personal notice—of the implementation of the said order,
considering that over a year had lapsed since it had been issued. From the testimonies of the other
witnesses, who were employees of PEZA and PEZA-registered enterprises, it was evident that the
prohibition against charging and collecting overtime fees was common knowledge to them.

At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take effect. Memorandum Order No. 99-
003 is an internal regulation that clearly falls within the administrative rules and regulations exempted
from the publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing case of Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera:24

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. 25

At the very least, Nacu should have been aware that collecting payments directly from PEZA-registered
enterprises was strictly prohibited. Months before Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was promulgated,
PEZA had already put a stop to the practice of collecting direct payments for overtime fees from PEZA-
registered enterprises under Office Order No. 99-0002 dated March 8, 1999. The latter specifically
provides that "overtime shall be paid only through the regular payroll system," and that overtime claims
shall be supported by the required documents. 26 This was followed by PEZA General Circular No. 99-
0001 (Prescribing New Rates of Overtime Pay Payable by Zone Enterprises, Customs Brokers And Other
Entities Concerned) dated August 10, 1999, providing that –

4.5. All payments to be made by requesting parties shall be covered by official receipts.  IN NO
CASE SHALL PAYMENT BE MADE DIRECTLY TO ZONE/PCDU PERSONNEL.

4.6 No additional charges or fees shall be paid by requesting parties, nor shall they offer gifts,
"tips" and other financial/material favors to PEZA employees rendering overtime services.

4.7 At the end of the month, all claims of personnel for payment of overtime services shall be
supported by the following documents:

4.7.1. Copies of written requests by enterprises and other parties;

4.7.2. Certificate of service or DTR;

4.7.3. Authority to render overtime services; and

4.7.4. Certificate of accomplishment.27

Petitioners desperately argue that Nacu could not have charged and collected overtime fees from EBCC
as it was well aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. The contention is puerile. Petitioners are, in
effect, saying that knowledge of the existence of a rule prohibiting a certain act would absolutely prevent
one from doing the prohibited act. This premise is undeniably false, and, as a matter of fact, judicial
institutions have been founded based on the reality that not everyone abides by the law.

All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and penalized with dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties. The
general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial
evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. It is
not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of
evidence.28

Nacu’s length of service or the fact that this was her first offense has not been clearly established. We
cannot reasonably take them into consideration in reviewing the case. At any rate, these circumstances
cannot serve to mitigate the violation, considering the gravity of the offense and the fact that Nacu’s act
irreparably tarnished the integrity of PEZA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 24, 2008 and its Resolution dated May 6, 2009 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Case No. 17 G.R. No. 132593 June 25, 1999

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul Decision No.
2447 dated July 27, 1992 of the Commission on Audit (COA) denying Philippine International Trading
Corporation's (PITC) appeal from the disallowances made by the resident COA auditor on PITC's car
plan benefits; and Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998 of the COA denying PITC's motion for
reconsideration.

The following facts are undisputed:

The PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
252 on July 21, 19731, primarily for the purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade in
pursuance of national economic development. On October 19, 1988, the PITC Board of Directors
approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers. 2 Under such car plan program, an eligible
officer is entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by
PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary deduction
over a period of five (5) years. Maximum value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges from Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) to Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00), depending on
the position of the officer in the corporation. In addition, PITC will reimburse the officer concerned fifty
percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums and costs of registration of the chattel
mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the date the vehicle was purchased. The terms
and conditions of the car plan are embodied in a "Car Loan Agreement". 3 Per PITC's car plan guidelines,
the purpose of the plan is to provide financial assistance to qualified employees in purchasing their own
transportation facilities in the performanced of their work, for representation, and personal use. 4 The plan
is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility during official trips especially within Metro Manila or the
employee's principal place of assignment, without having to rely on PITC vehicles, taxis or cars for hire. 5

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took
effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation
into standardized salary rates save for certain additional compensation such as representation and
transportation allowances which were exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate. Said
section likewise provides that other additional compensation being received by incumbents as by of July
1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.

Sec. 12, RA 6758, reads —

 Sec. 12. Consolidation of All Allowances and Compensation. — All allowances, except
for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and
hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad;
and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be
determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.

To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10). Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 discontinued
effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary, not
otherwise enumerated under paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.

Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides:

5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation
granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-
paragraphs 5.4 and 5.56 above shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989.
Payment made for such allowance/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as
illegal disbursement of public funds.

On post audit, the payment/reimbursement of the above-mentioned expenses (50% of the yearly car
registration and insurance premiums and 50% of the costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the
car) made after November 1, 1989 was disallowed by the resident COA auditor. The disallowance was
made on the ground that the subject car plan benefits were not one of the fringe benefits or form of
compensation allowed to be continued after said date under the aforequoted paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC
No. 10 7, in relation to Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.

PITC, on its behalf, and that of the affected PITC officials, appealed the decision of the resident COA
auditor to the COA. On July 27, 1992, COA denied PITC's appeal and affirmed the disallowance of the
said car plan expenses in the assailed Decision No. 2447 dated July 27, 1992. Relevant portions of the
decision read thus:

Upon circumspect evaluation thereof, this Commission finds the instant appeal to be
devoid of merit. It should be noted that the reimbursement/payment of expenses in
question is based on the Car Plan benefit granted under Board Resolution No. 10-88-03
adopted by the PITC Board of Directors on October 19, 1988. The Car Plan is undeniably
a fringe benefit as appearing in PITC's "Compensation Policy under the heading "3. Other
Fringe Benefits", particularly Item No. 3.13 thereof. Inasmuch as PITC is a government-
owned and/or controlled corporation, the grant of the Car Plan (being a fringe benefit)
should be governed by the provisions of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10,
implementing RA 6758. Under sub-paragraph 5.6 of said Circular, it explicitly provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Since the Car Plan benefit is not one of those fringe benefits or other forms of
compensation mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10, consequently the
 reimbursement of the 50% share of PITC in the yearly registration and insurance
premium of the cars purchased under said Car Plan benefit should not be allowed. . . . 8

PITC's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COA in its Resolution dated January 27, 1998. 9

Hence, the instant petition on the following grounds:

1. That the legislature did not intend to revoke existing benefits being
received by incumbent government employees as of July 1, 1989
(including subject car plan benefits) when RA 6758 was passed;

2. That the Car Loan Agreements signed between PITC and its officers
pursuant to PITC's Car Plan Program, including the Car Loan
Agreements, duly executed prior to the effectivity of RA 6758, constitute
the law between the parties and as such, protected by Section 10, Article
III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which prohibits the impairment of
contracts; and

3. Finally, that the provisions of PD 985 do not apply to PITC inasmuch

as under its Revised Charter, PD 1071, as amended by E.O. 756 and E.O.
1067, PITC is not only expressly exempted from OCPC rules and
regulations but its Board of Directors was expressly authorized to adopt
compensation policies and other related benefits to its officers/employees
without need for further approval thereof by any government office,
agency or authority. 10

The petition is meritorious.

First of all, we must mention that this Court has confirmed in Philippine Post Authority vs. Commission
on Audit 11 the legislative intent to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and/or allowances over
and above those authorized by RA 6758 to continue to receive the same even after RA 6758 took effect.
In reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has manifested its intent to gradually phase out this
privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay and consistent with the rule that laws
should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of fairness and justice. 12 Addressing the issue as to
whether the petitioners-officials may still receive their representation and transportation allowance
(RATA) at the higher rates provided by Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 97 in light of Section 12, RA
6758, this Court said:

Now, under the second sentence of Section 12, first paragraph, the RATA enjoyed by
these PPA officials shall continue to be authorized only if they are "being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989." RA 6758 has therefore, to this extent, amended LOI
No. 97. By limiting the benefit of the RATA granted by LOI No. 97 to incumbents,
Congress has manifested its intent to gradually phase out this privilege without upsetting
its policy of non-diminution of pay.

The legislature has similarly adhered to this policy of non-diminution of pay when it
provided for the transition allowance under Section 17 of RA 6758 which reads:

Sec. 17. Salaries of Incumbents. — Incumbents of position presently

receiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including
 those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments the
aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein
prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which
shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition allowance
shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent
shall receive in the future.

While Section 12 refers to allowances that are not integrated into the standardized
salaries whereas Section 17 refers to salaries and additional compensation or fringe
benefits, both sections are intended to protect incumbents who are receiving said salaries
and/or allowances at the time RA 6758 took effect. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Based on the foregoing pronouncement, petitioner correctly pointed out that there was no intention on the
part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at
the time of the virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC officials who
availed of the subject car plan benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1, 1989. Thus, it was
legal and proper for them to continue enjoying said benefits within the five year period from date of
purchase of the vehicle allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.

Further, we see the rationale for the corporation's fifty percent (50%) participation and contribution to the
subject expenses. As to the insurance premium, PITC, at least, up to the extent of 50% of the value of the
vehicle, has an insurable interest in said vehicle in case of loss or damage thereto. As to the costs of
registration of the vehicle in the employee's name and of the chattel mortgage in favor of PITC, this is to
secure PITC of the repayment of the "Car Loan Agreement" and the fulfillment of the other obligations
contained therein by the employee.

Still further, the vehicle being utilized by the officer is actually being used for corporate purposes because
the officer concerned is no longer entitled to utilize company-owned vehicles for official business once
he/she has availed of a car plan. Neither is said officer allowed to reimburse the costs of other land
transportation used within his principal place of assignment (i.e. Metro Manila) as the vehicle is presumed
to be his official vehicle. 14 In the event that the employee resigns, retires or is separated from the
company without cause prior to the completion of the 60-month car plan, the employee shall be given the
privilege to buy the car provided he pays the remaining installments of the loan and the amount
equivalent to that portion of the company's contribution corresponding to the unexpired period of the car
plan. On the other hand, if the employee has been separated from the company for cause, the company
has the other option aside from the foregoing to repossess the car from the employee, in which case, the
company shall pay back to the employee all amortizations already made by the employee to the company,
interest free. 15

Secondly, COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10 16 as basis for the disallowance of the subject car plan
benefits. DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM pursuant to Section 23 17 of RA 6758
mandating the said agency to issue the necessary guidelines to implement RA 6758 has been declared by
this Court in De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, et al. 18 as of no force and effect due to the absence
of publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Salient portions of
said decision read:

On the need publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative.
Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada 19, publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is
in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or
 implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC
No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines.

In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which
completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to
government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere
interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it
tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation
sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the circular under
attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials
and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of said
circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper or general circulation in the Philippines
— to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition
they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in
keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.

In the case at bar, the disallowance of the subject car plan benefits would hamper the officials in the
performance of their functions to promote and develop trade which requires mobility in the performance
of official business. Indeed, the car plan benefits are supportive of the implementation of the objectives
and mission of the agency relative to the nature of its operation and responsive to the exigencies of the
service.

It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for
publication in the Official Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would
the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items
were disallowed in audit?

The answer is in the negative, precisely, for the reason that publication is required as a condition
precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed
the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to
its non-publication. As was stated in Tanada vs. Tuvera, 21, "prior publication of laws before they become
effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that such omission would offend due process insofar as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

In view of the nullity of DBM-CCC No. 10 relied upon by the COA as basis for the disallowance of the
subject car plan benefits, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the second issue raised in the instant petition.

We deem it necessary though to resolve the third issue as to whether PITC is exempt from RA 985  22 as
subsequently amended by RA 6758. According to petitioner, PITC's Revised Charter, PD 1071 dated
January 25, 1977, as amended by EO 756 dated December 29, 1981, and further amended by EO 1067
dated November 25, 1985, expressly exempted PITC from the Office of the Compensation and Position
Classification (OCPC) rules and regulations. Petitioner cites Section 28 of P.D. 1071 23; Section 6 of EO
756 24; and Section 3 of EO 1067. 25

According to the COA in its Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998, the exemption granted to the
PITC has been repealed and revoked by the repealing provisions of RA 6758, particularly Section 16
thereof which provides:
 Sec. 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations. — All laws, decrees, executive,
orders, corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from
the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix position classifications, salaries, pay
rates or allowances of specified positions, or groups of officials, and employees or of
agencies, which are inconsistent with the System, including the proviso under Section 2
and Section 16 of PD No. 985 are hereby repealed.

To this, petitioner argues that RA 6758 which is a law of general application cannot repeal provisions of
the Revised Charter of PITC and its amendatory laws expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage
being special laws. Our rules on statutory construction provide that a special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication 26; that a statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as
repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifested  27; that if
repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it. 28

In the case at bar, the repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of "all corporate charters that exempt agencies
from the coverage of the System" was clear and expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes for which
the law was enacted, that is, the standardization of salaries of all employees in government owned and/or
controlled corporations to achieve "equal pay for substantially equal work". Henceforth, PITC should
now be considered as covered by laws prescribing a compensation and position classification system in
the government including RA 6758. This is without prejudice, however, as discussed above, to the non-
diminution of pay of incumbents as of July 1, 1989 as provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decisions of the Commission on Audit
are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.