Land Titles and Deeds Week 4

Regalian Doctrine
Right of Possession from Title

Ramon Aranda vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172331 | August 24, 2011

Salcedo, Deanne Aubrey

FACTS:

 ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI) filed a petition for original registration of a9,103-
square meter parcel of land in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the petition, saying that the
land is part of the public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title
thereto.

 ICTSI-WI later amended the application to make the petitioner Ramon Aranda, the
vendor. Aranda alleged open, continuous, public, and adverse possession of the subject
land in the concept of owner for more than 30 years. Petitioner’s sister, Merlita
A.Enriquez, testified that their father, Anatalio Aranda, donated the land to petitioner in
1965. The document signifying the donation was however eaten by rats. Witness, Luis
Olan, testified that they had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the
land in the concept of owner until his father, Lucio Olan, sold the land in 1946 to
Anatalio. Luis had no copy of the document of sale since it was given by his mother to
Anatalio. The trial court granted the petition but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land subject for registration is covered by the Regalian Doctrine

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT:

 The Supreme Court denied the petition.

 The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original registration of
land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section 14(1) thereof, a petition may
be granted upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

 Under the Regalian Doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

 In this case, the certification issued in compliance with the directive of the trial court,
stated that the subject property falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land,
Project No. 22-A of Lipa, Batangas per LC Map 718 certified on 26 March 1928.

 However, in the certification dated 14 January 2000 which was submitted in evidence by
Ramon Aranda, stated that it has been verified to be within the Alienable and
Disposable Zone under Project No. 39, LC Map No. 3601 certified on 22 Dec.
1997.
 The Supreme Court said that, Ramon Aranda has not explained the discrepancies in the
dates of classification mentioned in the government certifications. Consequently, the
status of the land applied for as alienable and disposable was not clearly established.

 Aranda also failed to show that he possessed the property in the manner and for the
duration required by law. The CA found out that the land was only declared for taxation
purposes for the first time only in 1981. He likewise failed to prove the alleged possession
of his predecessors-in-interest. There were was no evidence that Lucio Oland declared
the property for tax purposes at any time before he sold it to Anatalio Aranda. There is
also no showing that Anatalio Aranda declared the property in his name from the time he
bought it from Lucio Olan.

 Even assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and corn on the land, such statement is
not sufficient to establish possession in the concept of owner as contemplated by law.
Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant.

 The Supreme Court likewise held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a
piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest
must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence.

 Since, Ramon Aranda failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law, the CA was
correct in reversing the trial court and dismissing his application for judicial confirmation
of title.
Dioscordo Carbonilla vs. Marcelo Abiera
G.R. No. 177637 | July 26, 2010

Serato, Hannah

FACTS:

Dioscoro Carbonilla filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents Marcelo Abiera and
Maricris Abiera Paredes before the MTC of Maasin City. Carbonilla claimed that he is the
registered owner of a lot and a residential building standing on the land that is being occupied
by the respondents Abiera. He sent a demand letter to them asking them to leave but the
latter refused. Carbonilla presented copies of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of
Ownership and Tax Declaration (TD) of the land to show that it was originally registered on
1968 in the name of his father.

Abieras denied the Carbonilla's claim and asserted that they occupied the building as owners,
having inherited the same from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, Marcelo’s parents
and Maricris’ grandparents. They maintained that they have been in possession of the
building since 1960, but it has not been declared for taxation purposes. As for the subject
land, the Abieras claimed that they inherited the same from Francisco Plasabas, grandfather
of Alfredo Abiera. They pointed out that the land had been declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Francisco but was later cancelled. They presented copies of the two TDs in the
name of Francisco Plasabas and the Building Permit dated April 11, 1977.

The MTCC decided the case in favor of Abiera. The court declared Abiera as having the better
right to its material possession in light of Carbonilla's failure to refute Abiera's claim that their
predecessors had been in prior possession of the building since 1960 and that they have
continued such possession up to the present. In so ruling, the court applied Art. 546 of the
Civil Code which allows the possessor in good faith to retain the property until he is
reimbursed for necessary expenses.
Carbonilla elevated the case to the RTC which reversed MTCC ruling. The RTC placed the
burden upon the Abieras to prove their claim that they built it prior to Carbonilla's acquisition
of the land, which burden, the court found, Abiera failed to discharge. Abiera then filed a
petition for review with the CA. The CA, following this Court’s ruling in Ten Forty Realty and
Development Corporation v. Cruz, categorized the complaint as one for forcible entry. It then
proceeded to declare that the action had prescribed since the one-year period for filing the
forcible entry case had already lapsed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Carbonillo has sufficiently established his ownership of the subject properties.

HELD:

NO. While Carbonilla may have proven his ownership of the land, he failed to present any
evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building.
The Court cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building)
with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof that Carbonilla
acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the owners
of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. In comparison to Abieras’ proof
of possession of the building since 1977, Carbonillas’s evidence pales in comparison.
In the present case, Carbonilla opted to file an ejectment case against Abiera. Ejectment
cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The statements in the complaint that the Abieras’ possession of the building was by
mere tolerance of Carbonilla clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer
involves the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which
the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of
action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such
possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It
must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful
possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by
mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.

Carbonilla failed to prove that the Abieras’ possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He
did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting thatthey
tolerated Abiera’s entry to and occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of
tolerance will not suffice. Carbonilla must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have
been present right from the very start of the possession—from entry to the property.
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer
would be an improper remedy. Notably, no mention was made in the complaint of how entry
by Abiera was effected or how and when dispossession started. Neither was there any
evidence showing such details.

In any event, Carbonilla has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of
his property by filing an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the
better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real
property. Hence, the petition is denied.
Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority
G.R. No. 133250 | July 9, 2002

Sobiaco, Cleofe May

FACTS:
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private
entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the
negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market
price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The
difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire
Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this
Court forfeited in favor of the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession
over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy-Eight
Thousand Four Hundred Forty-One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of
One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety-Four Million One Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand Two
Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00)
Pesos per square meter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the Amended Joint Venture Agreement for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violates the constitution.

RULING:
YES. The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.42 The King, as the sovereign
ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the
Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however,
the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The
Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the
Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must
be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable
and disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi- public use.
Mateo and Juan H. Reyes vs. Mateo Raval Reyes
G.R. No. L-21703-04 | August 31, 1996

Suaybaguio, Mervin Jay

FACTS:

Three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered
owners of several parcels of land, to wit; Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of the
Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
22161, and also Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral survey, embraced in and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066.

The petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed, in the above stated cadastral cases,
a motion for issuance of writs of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of
Title above referred to.

Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is only in possession of
the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the
lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he claimed that he has
been in, and is entitled to, the possession there, having acquired by way of absolute
sale from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third
(1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots.

After due hearing of this appellant, the court a quo issued the writ of possession with respect
to Lot Nos. 15891 and 15896, which writ was, upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration,
amended to include all the other lots covered by both titles.

Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of possession.

Subsequently, petitioners filed an ordinary civil action (Civil Case No. 3659) seeking to
recover the disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval
Reyes. Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered the complaint and
pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots, alleging the same ground that he
is a co- owner, he having bought from plaintiffs' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's
undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and participation to the disputed lots.

Pending trial of the civil case (No. 3659), petitioners presented a motion to compel
respondent Raval Reyes to surrender and deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed this motion.

ISSUE:

Who between petitioners or respondent has a better right to the possession or custody of the
disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title?

HELD:

Petitioners have a better right to the possession of the title. It appearing that respondent had
presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no valid and
plausible reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from the registered owners the
custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case,
this Court has already held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose
name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more
preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name
does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the
possession thereto.

It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to
recover his alleged co-owner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition
in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and considering that he
may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on notice of lis pendens
under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the purpose of recording the fact
that the lots covered by the titles in question are litigated in said Civil Case, the Court again
see no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of
certificates of titles.
 National Grains Authority vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-68741 | January 28,1988

Trajano, Jovelyn

FACTS:

The spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo.
San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses
Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) the
sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents
for the sum of P90,000.00.

From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse
and open possession of subject property. Original Certificate of Title covering the property in
question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the
knowledge of the private respondents and said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney
in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner,
National Grains Authority the counsel for the petitioner requesting for the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage covering the property involved in this case for unpaid
indebtedness.

The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued
in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff. Private respondents learned that a title
in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that
the same property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner.

Private respondent offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the
balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale
but the petitioner refused to accept the payment. Petitioner in its reply informed counsel of
private respondents that petitioner is now the owner of the property in question and has no
intention of disposing of the same.

The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject property were
asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Private respondents filed a complaint
against the petitioner and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying that they be declared the
owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same. The
petitioner maintained that Ulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo; that it is a purchases in good
faith and for value of the property.

After due hearing, the trial court rendered its decision declaring defendant National Grains
Authority the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the
same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the breach of trust us sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by NGA
which is an innocent purchaser for value.

HELD:

In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens
System and has obviously a better right than private respondents and that the Deed of
absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only
on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the
Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although unregistered under
the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership and the possession of the
property in question.

Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to
land under the Torrens System is an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal notice
to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to
deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate
the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the
land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one
in the nature of or akin a proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or
unknown.

Petitioner NGA was never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any
knowledge at the time of the execution of the mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive
condition in the deed of absolute sale, much less of its violation. Nothing appeared to excite
suspicion. The Special Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT was in the name of
the mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in the public auction.

Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent
mortgage under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in the
public auction sale.

As correctly declared by the trial court, the National Grains Authority is the lawful owner of
the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title.

As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to reconvey
or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that there is absolutely no
reason why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value, should reconvey the land to the
private respondents.
Cajayonvs. Spouses Batuyong
G.R. No. 149118 | February 16, 2006

Villanueva, Rosalyn

FACTS:

Cajayon, Constantino and Candelaria are co-owners of lot covered by a TCT. Petitioners and
Candelaria entered into partition agreement and Candelaria then sold to the petitioners his
property. Petitioners started the construction of a seven (7) door bungalow-type building that
allegedly intruded into the lot of the respondents in which they agreed upon those petitioners
would defer the construction work pending as a result of a relocation survey to be conducted
by a government surveyor. The surveyor submitted a report that there was a delineation of
boundaries but despite that the petitioner proceeded with the construction. Petitioner refused
the demand made to the petitioners to vacate the encroached portion. Respondents filed an
ejectment case against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Metc and CA ruled in
favor of the respondents. As a collateral issue, Petitioner claim that they are entitled to the
rights of a builder in good faith.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are in good faith?

HELD:

No, it is doctrinal in land registration that the possession of titled property adverse to the
registered owner is necessary tainted with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction
works on the disputed lot despite knowledge of the respondent’s ownership put petitioners in
bad faith.
Spouses Valenzuela vs. Spouses Mano
G.R. No. 172611 | July 9, 2010

Arangcon, Ladyh April

FACTS:

Petitioner Federico Valenzuela (Federico) is the son of Andres Valenzuela (Andres) who was
the owner and possessor of a parcel of land with an area of 938 square meters, more or less,
located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The property was declared in the name of Andres
under Declaration of Real Property No. 7187. Andres died on October 10, 1959, and the
possession of said property was transferred to Federico. On August 5, 1980, a document
denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Pagpaparaya o Pagkakaloob7 was
executed by the heirs of Andres who waived all their rights to the property in favor of
Federico.

Meanwhile, on February 7, 1991, a Deed of Conditional Sale8 was executed between Feliciano
Geronimo (Feliciano) and herein respondent Jose Mano, Jr. (Jose), wherein the former agreed
to sell to the latter a 2,056-square meter parcel of land located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan,
Bulacan. The corresponding Deed of Sale9 was subsequently executed in March 1991.On
March 4, 1992,10 Jose applied for a Free Patent and on April 10, 1992, Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-35111 was issued in his name. This time, the property was indicated as
covering an area of 2,739 square meters.

Sometime in 1997, Federico declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 97-19005-
0110512 the property covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 7187 in the name of
Andres. Subsequently, Jose sold a portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-351 to Roberto
S. Balingcongan (Balingcongan). On January 8, 1998, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
11286513 was issued in the name of Balingcongan covering 2,292 square meters.

Federico transferred his residence to Malabon and so he left the care of the property to his
nephew, Vicente Joson (Vicente). Sometime in 1999, Federico instructed Vicente to construct
a perimeter fence on his property but he was prevented by Jose, claiming that the 447 square
meters was his property as reflected in his TCT No. T-112864. On the other hand, Federico is
claiming it as part of the property he inherited from his father, Andres.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner Federico Valenzuela has the better title of the property.

HELD:

YES. Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot. The Deed of Conditional
Sales described the purchased property as follow:

A part of parcel of land (T.D. No. 14312) situated at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan.
Bounded on the North- Lot 6225; East- Lot 1306 & 1311; South- Lot 1307 and 1308
and West- Lot 1304 & 1299. Containing an area of Two Thousand Fifty-Six (2,056)
square meters, more or less. (Bulacan)."
Feliciano sold a portion of Lot 1305 to Jose. After the sale was made, a Sketch/Special Plan20
was prepared by Geodetic Engineer Fortunato E. Chavez. It is clear from such document that
Lot 1305-A representing the upper portion with an area of 1,112 square meters was retained
by Feliciano and what was sold was the lower portion thereof which became Lot No. 1305-B
with a total area of 2,292 square meters. This exceeds the area of 2,056 square meters
indicated in the above sale transaction.

The testimony of Feliciano from whom Jose purchased the property coincides with the
observation made during the ocular inspection conducted by the RTC that there is an old
fence, measuring about 40 meters which encloses the true and actual area purchased by
Jose. Feliciano retained the upper portion of Lot No. 1305 which eventually became Lot No.
1305-A because it is along the national highway. The disputed 447 square meters property is
located at the eastern side of Lot No. 1305-A. He gave Jose a right of way at the western
side24 of the lot he retained for himself.

This supports the theory that Feliciano was fully aware that the property at the eastern part
of his property belonged to Andres from whom Federico inherited the said lot. This is the
reason why a right of way going to the national highway was given to Jose between Lot No.
1305-A and Lot No. 1304. If the disputed property is part of the sale as claimed by Jose, then
Feliciano would not have given the said right of way but would rather keep it to himself.

Settled is the rule that a person, whose certificate of title included by mistake or oversight
the land owned by another, does not become the owner of such land by virtue of the
certificate alone. The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but is not intended to perpetrate fraud against
the real owner of the land. The certificate of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from
the true owner.