Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Institutional Features and Strategic

Concerns
Author(s): M. Rashiduzzaman
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 7 (Jul., 1998), pp. 653-670
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BANGLADESH'SCHITTAGONGHILL
TRACTS PEACE ACCORD
Institutional
Featuresand
StrategicConcerns

M. Rashiduzzaman

To end the 25-yearinsurgency in Bangladesh'sChit-

tagongHill Tracts(CHT), PrimeMinisterSheikhHasina (commonlycalled
Hasina)agreedto signan accordwithShantuLarma,theleaderoftheParbat-
tyaChattagram JanasanghatiSamity(PCJSS),thepoliticalwingof thesepa-
ratistrebelsbetterknownas the Shantibahini ("Peace Force"). Since the
formalsigningof thepeace agreement-often describedas a "treaty"though
itis nota compactbetweensovereignstates-on December2, 1997,theBan-
gladeshpublichas demonstrated bothacceptanceand rejectionoftheaccord.
Thereis a growingrealizationthata violentmilitary
solutiontotheprolonged
low intensitywarfarewouldnothave been feasible,butmostBangladeshis
envisiontheCHT as theirnationalterritory and hope to enjoyits economic
and strategicbenefits.Consequently, theaccordhas failedto createthena-
tionalconsensusdesiredby theBangladeshpoliticalleadership.
Those who faultthe CHT accordfocuson its substanceas well as the
processby whichthe compactwas reachedwiththe Shantibahini fighters,
whohad wagedan armedinsurrection againstthegovernment of Bangladesh
(GOB) since 1973. Afterthesigning,theAwamiLeague (AL)-led govern-
mentfacedhavingto deal withthewidespreadpublicforeboding at theun-
chartedinstitutionsendowedwithexceptionalpowerswithwhichit must
now contend.But thedenunciation Hasina encountered forthesecrecythat
had veiled the year-longnegotiations precedingthe agreementwas even
harsher; theoppositionwas also frustrated
furthermore, by thegovernment's
refusalto accede thetreatyto a thorough publicscrutiny.Bangladeshhad

M. Rashiduzzaman is AssociateProfessor
in theDepartment
of Polit-
ical Science,RowanUniversity,
Glassboro,New Jersey.
? 1998 by The Regentsof theUniversity
of California

653

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 654 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

been successfulin holdingbackprolongedviolencein thehilldistricts com-

paredto India's efforts withrespectto the proliferating separatismin that
country's northeasternstatesand Sri Lanka's withrespectto theTamilsepa-
ratists.The CHT had notappearedto be in thethroesof an uncontrollable
upheavalthatwas pushingtheGOB to forgean agreement withoutanyseri-
ous publicdebateon theissues. Acrossthepoliticalaisle, manyobservers
suspectedthata "thirdparty"(a euphemismforIndia) hastenedthe rap-
prochement to end theconflict.
The bulk of the publicacrimonyhighlighted the assumedconstitutional
impropriety of the pact,infringement of Bangladeshsovereignty, and dis-
criminatory treatmentof Bengalisettlers in theCHT. It largelyignoredthe
institutional
interventionsand strategicquestionsswirling aroundtheconcor-
dance. Powersharingthrough workableand mutually acceptableinstitutions
is oftenmoreimportant thanthe narrowconstitutional validityof the deal
itself.The geographiclocationof the CHT, the vitalnationalinterests in-
volved,and thedauntingstrategic configurationof theentireregionwill de-
termine thefuturesuccessor failureof thepeace agreement.
This articleexaminessix institutionaland strategicquestionscenteredon
thetermsagreedto end theprotracted conflictin theCHT. Does thepeace
accorddiminishstatesovereignty in theCHT? Whatare thefeaturesof the
newlyconstructed proposedby the"peace treaty?"Will thenew
institutions
institutionaldynamicscreatea quasi-statein the CHT thatwill hold veto
powerover the sovereignauthority of Bangladesh?Does thetreatyassure
fullprotection withoutdiscrimination to all groupsin and inhabitantsof the
CHT? Will theweaklyinstitutionalized stateofBangladeshcollapseundera
possibleethno-secessionistmovement unleashedby any dramaticfailureof
theCHT accord? Whereis Bangladeshsituatedin thebalanceof powerof
theIndiansubcontinent's volatilenortheast? Andwhatis thestrategic impor-
tanceof theCHT to theoverallsecurity of thecountry?

CHT: Erosionof
The Post-Treaty
Sovereignty?
The AL flauntedtheCHT pactas a "landmark achievement,"sayingitwould
notonlybringpeacefulnationalintegrationbutindeedopen thedoorto the
bountifulnaturalresourcesof the CHT and spurgreatereconomicgrowth
throughoutthewholeregion.Forhumanrightsactivists,indigenous people's
advocates,nongovernmental (NGOs), and liberalintellectuals,
organizations
theCHT settlement was theminimum theyexpectedtheGOB to offerafter
yearsof culturaldeprivation,
military humanrightsviolations,dis-
reprisals,

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 655
possession,rape,and murderperpetrated on thehill tribes.' But the main
oppositionparty-the BangladeshNationalistParty(BNP)-along with
right-wing groupsvehemently contestedthedeal. BNP leaderKhaledaZia
claimedthatthetreaty wouldsetup a parallelgovernment in thecountry and
urgedPrimeMinisterHasina to scrapit.2 In an eloquentcriticism, Nazmul
Huda,a BNP memberof Parliament, said theagreement was absolutelycon-
traryto constitutional provisionsand amountedto a totalabdicationof au-
thorityby theGOB.3 The BNP denouncedtheaccordas a "blackpact,"and
theoppositionleadersallegedthattheagreement violatedboththecountry's
sovereignty and its unitary Constitution.4
So far,it is thehitherto untestedRegionalCouncil(RC) in theCHT that
has suffered thebruntof swellingremonstrance. Manyfearedthatthenew
institutional
construction wouldgravitate theregiontowardsecessionandin-
dependence.5The CHT RegionalCouncil Bill was passed by the Jatiya
Sangshad,thenationalparliament, on May 6, 1998,amida BNP walkoutand
theJatiyaParty(JP) lawmakers'vote againstit. Since theJatiyaSangshad
will need theRC's permission to makelaws thatdeal withtheCHT, parlia-
mentary supremacy undertheConstitution has also been compromised, ac-
cordingto BNP arguments made bothbeforeand afterpassage of thebill.6
The pro-Islamic Jamaat-e-Islam and otherright-wing groupsclaimedthatby
signingthetreaty, theAL government had virtually sold theCHT, an area
vitalto Bangladeshinationalsecurity and economicdevelopment.
However,a groupof constitutional experts,educators,economists,and
lawyersdisagreed,sayingtheyfoundtheCHT pactto be consistent withthe
basic conceptsof Bangladesh'sConstitution.7 JPleaderGeneralH. M. Er-
shadmaintained his oppositionto theCHT agreement, buthis partydid not
taketo thestreetsin protest.Convincedof its merit,PrimeMinisterHasina
wentahead to implement thedeal,no matter how muchherdetractors com-
plained. At thetimeof writing in spring1998,theoppositionhas vowedto
fightimplementation of theaccordevenas thegovernment continuesto pro-
ceed. The BNP objectedto thefourbillsintroduced intotheJatiyaSangshad
in April 1998 to implementthe CHT accord and sponsoredsome 4,000
amendments to theproposals.Whenthespeakerof theSangshadrefusedto
discusstheamendments (manyof whichwerepresumedto be frivolousin

1. For a statement of 550 leadingcitizensin supportof the CHT accord,see Daily Star
(Dhaka), December28, 1997.
2. BangladeshObserver(Dhaka), January 4, 1998.
3. Independent(Dhaka), December4, 1997.
4. Dinkal (Dhaka,Bengalidaily),January 6, 1998.
5. Inquilab(Dhaka,pro-Islamic, Bengalidaily),December5, 1997.
6. Ibid.,January7, 1998. See also Dhaka Courier(politicalweekly),May 13, 1998.
7. Independent,February28, 1998.

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 656 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

nature),BNP memberswalkedoutof theparliamentary session. As a result

of theopposition'swalkout,thenationwas deprivedof a reasoneddebateon
thefloorof theBangladeshSangshad.
Whiletheoppositioncampaignedthattheaccordhad pavedtheroadfora
"ChakmaRaj" (ChakmabeingtheCHT's dominanttribalpeople) of about
5,000 squaremiles(approximately one-tenth thecountry'stotalarea) of re-
source-rich theGOB didnotagreeto givetheCHT completeauton-
territory,
omydespitetheseparatists'demand. Nor did Hasina's government accept
thetriballeaders'long-standing demandthatall Bengalisettlers be expelled
fromtheCHT. Beyondpoliticalhyperbole, thedilemmain post-treaty Ban-
gladesh,no matterwho runsthegovernment, is unyieldingand clear:if the
nationalgovernment attempts to imposethestringent controlofDhakaon the
new CHT authority, theGOB-Shantibahini compromise willfallapart;butif
the GOB yieldsits statesovereignty and the parliamentary authority,the
CHT could possiblydriftaway fromBangladesh.
The peace accordhas concededthatRangamati, Bandarban,and Khagra-
chari,thethreedistricts thatmake up the CHT, will enjoythe statusof a
region,whichcomesclose to beinga self-governing
tribal-inhabited entityin
thenewinstitutional landscapeholdingtheunprecedented management pow-
ers thataccompanyit. In theagreement's preamble,therebelleadershave
committed themselves to thenationalintegrityofBangladesh,althoughsome
erosionof statepowerin theCHT is anticipated underthetermsof theac-
cord. Such entitlements forethnic,religious,and/orlinguisticminorities in
multinationalstatesare fairlycommonin modernstatecraft. Againstthe
backdropof nationstatessplintering intoethnicand communalbloodbaths
aroundthe world,institutional contrivances gearedto autonomousconces-
sionsand decentralization of powerare thewell-known, peaceful,and non-
militarypolitical tools of nationalintegration.Even the criticsof the
agreement did notcome up witha viable alternative to the accordaccom-
plishedby theAL government.

and the Devolution

The New Institutions
Powersinthe CHT
ofAdministrative
TheMinistry for theChittagong Hill TractsAffairs
To appraisehow far statesovereignty has diminishedin the post-accord
CHT, itis important
to inquireintotheemerging powersandgroupdynamics
unfoldedby thenew institutional arrangement.At thenationallevel,there
on Chittagong
willbe a Ministry Hill TractsAffairswitha minister of tribal
background.To assistthatMinistry, an advisorycommittee will be estab-
lished thatconsistsof a ministerin charge of the CHT; chairpersons/
for each of the threehill DistrictCouncils (Rangamati,
representatives

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 657
Khagrachari,andBandarban);thethreemembers ofParliamentthatrepresent
thosedistricts;
Chakma,Bomong,and Mong (all kings);and one permanent
nontribal
residentfromeach of thethreehilldistricts
to be nominated
by the
government.8
The signedagreement does not elaboratetheCHT Ministry'sfunctions,
and it mighttakea whilebeforeitstrueinstitutional fabricis revealed.Po-
it will evolve intoan intergovernmental
tentially, coordinating agencywith
linkagesin thenationalcabinetas well as theJatiyaSangshad. A veteran
Chakmapolitician, KalpanaRanjanChakma,was appointedminister without
portfolioin January1998 and was expectedto head thefutureHill Tracts
Ministry.ThroughthatMinistry, theCHT willhavea presenceandvisibility
in Dhaka,theseatofnationalgovernment. Witha definite tribalprominence
in theadvisorycommittee and a triballeaderat itshead,theMinistry willbe
expectedto speak on behalfof thenew CHT institutions and articulate the
grievancesof thehillpeople. Butin April1998whenthethreeCHT District
Councilbills werepresented in theParliament, leadersof thePCJSS came
directlyto Dhaka to negotiatewiththegovernment. Theirgoal was to bridge
thepresumedgap betweenthebroadagreement and theactualprovisionsof
thenew laws in themaking.Perhapstheforthcoming Ministry will be used
as a forumforresolvingconflicts betweenthenationalgovernment and the
new tribalauthority, butthisis notvisualizedas thecoreinstitution directly
affectingthelives of thehill dwellers.

The CHT RegionalCouncil

With22 members includingitschair,whois indirectly chosenby theelected
membersof thethreehill DistrictCouncils,theCHT is thefulcrum of the
institutions
createdbythesettlement betweentheGOB andtheShantibahini.
Besides thechair(who will be tribal),thecouncilincludes12 tribalmen,2
tribalwomen,6 nontribal (Bengali)men,and 1 nontribal woman. Chairper-
sonsof thethreehillDistrictCouncilswill be theex-officio membersof the
RC, and theywill enjoyvotingrights.
To accomplishthecoordination and supervision ofthethreeDistrictCoun-
of theCHT, theRC will directand supervisetheHill
cils and municipalities
TractsDevelopment;offerthe finaldecisionsof the councilover thecon-
flicts,
jurisdiction,
authority,and activitiesof theDistrictCouncils;coordi-
nateand supervisethegeneraladministration, maintenance of law and order,
and matters relatedto thedevelopment of thethreeDistrictCouncils;direct

8. Englishtranslation
of the CHT Peace Agreement, postedin theArnitech Internet
News:
Newsfromn Bangladesh(NFB), <http://www.bangladesh-web.com/news>, December8, 1997.
The authorhad notyetbeen able to obtainthefulltextof thebills passed in May 1998 at the
timeofwriting.See also EmajuddinAhmed,"The Monsteron theHills,"Dhaka Courier,Feb-
ruary6, 1998.

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 658 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

disastermanagement and reliefprograms, includingNGO activities;and ad-

ministertribalrulesand socialjusticeunderthejurisdiction oftheRC. Addi-
tionally,anyfreshlaws written at thenationallevel regarding theCHT will
requireconsultation withand theapprovalof theRC. As a further require-
ment,any futureconflictbetweenCHT-relatedrulesand otherregulations,
includingtheLocal Government Act of 1989 (a law thatin effectindicates
bothsomeabdicationof theGOB's traditional powersand increasedpowers
thatarebeingperceivedas a vetoin thehandsofthetriballeadershipagainst
theGOB), will be determined accordingto theadviceand proposalsoffered
by theRC.
The RC willhavemanysourcesofincome,including(a) financeprovided
by thethreeDistrictCouncils,(b) earningsand gainsfromRC properties, (c)
loansandgrantsfromthenationalgovernment andotherauthorities, (d) indi-
vidualor institutional
grants, fromRC investments,
(e) profits and (f)income
fromothersourcesauthorized by theGOB, rehabilitation, generalamnesty,
andothersources.9Locatedin theCHT itself,theRC is a distinctly political
institution
withan arrayof powersforthetriballeadership.Even thoughthe
RC is linkedwiththethreehillDistrictCouncils,itis neither an extensionof
local administration
the traditional systemin Bangladeshnorpartof a bu-
reaucraticnetwork controlledby thenationalgovernment. In someways,the
RC resemblesa loose confederal linkageamongthethreehill districts.10

TheDistrictCouncil
Mostof theearlierlocal government rulesabouttheCHT stoodamendedby
theagreement to set up a ParbatyaZila Council(Hill DistrictCouncil) in
eachof thethreedesignated hilldistricts.UndertheHill DistrictLocal Gov-
ernment Act of 1989,each DistrictCouncilhad a tribalchairand 30 mem-
bers,20 of whomweretribalsand 10 nontribals.All weredirectly elected.'1
The new agreement makesno significant changeto thecomposition of the
threenew DistrictCouncilsexceptingthethreewomenseatsthathave been
addedto each of them.
The new CHT DistrictCouncilsare responsible forlandmanagement, the
local police,triballaw and socialjustice,youthwelfare,environmental pro-
tectionanddevelopment, promotion oflocal tourism,andsupervision oflocal
government withinthedistrict.Withfewexceptions,
institutions responsibil-
itiesfortheissuanceoflicensesto local industriesandbusiness,maintenance
of statistics
includingbirthsand deaths,and "provisionof businesstransac-

9. Forthecompositionand powersof theRegionaland DistrictCouncils,see thetextof the

CHT treaty.
10. DainikInquilab(Dhaka,Bengalidaily),December5, 1997.
11. MizanurRahmanShelly,The Chittagong Hill Tractsof Bangladesh:The UntoldStory
(Dhaka:CentreforDevelopmentResearch,1992),p. 143.

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 659
tions"(i.e., tradeand commercial transactions)
and shifting cultivationhave
also been assignedto theDistrictCouncils. No lands,includingkhaslands
(government-owned land availablefordistributionto people) in thedistrict,
can be leased,sold,purchased, orotherwise transferredwithout priorpermis-
sionfromtheDistrictCouncil. Onlythereservedforests;state-owned facili-
ties and industriessuch as Kaptai Hydroelectricity, the BetbuniaSatellite
Stationarea,andothers;andgovernment-owned landsnotearmarked fordis-
tributionare exemptedfromthisnew jurisdiction of theDistrictCouncils.
The DistrictCouncilmay even supervisetheworkof headmen,surveyors,
and assistantland commissioners. Criticsof theCHT agreement challenge
thesenew powers. Such powers,theoppositionleadersinsist,will curbthe
authority of thenationalgovernment overtheregion.The DistrictCouncil's
otherresponsibilities willincludecollectingtaxesfromnumerous sourcesin-
cludingtheregistration of suchmanualvehiclesas rickshaws andpushcarts;
the buyingand sellingof commodities, land,buildings,and domesticani-
mals; as well as claimingpublicand privateindustries; feesof socialjudg-
ment;and a portionof forestroyalties.Supplementary extractionpowers
includetaxeson entertainment, partialroyalties
fromtheexploration of min-
eral resources,and levies on businessand thefishingindustry.

Land Commission
At thegrassroots level,themainsourceof disharmony betweenthetribals
and nontribals will be the controlof land. The treatyhas createda Land
Commission headedbya retiredjudgeto deal withsuchconflicts.Unlikethe
RC and DistrictCouncils,therewill be no nontribal representationin the
Land Commission, although mostofficialmembers including thechairperson
are expectedto be Bengalis. The tribalpeoplehad no stricttradition
of land
records,and manyBengalisettlers also will notbe able to substantiate
their
landclaimswithsolidlegaldocuments.Thesesettlers fearthatthenewpow-
ers createdunderthetreatywill exacerbateland disputesin the CHT and
resultin theloss oftheirlandandexplosionfromtheregion.The Land Com-
missionhas thepotentialto becomethemostrancorousestablishment of the
new tribalarrangements.

GroupDynamicsand Inter-ethnic
Relationsinthe Post-Accord
CHT
Inter-ethnicinteractionswill be acceleratedby the freshgroupdynamics
stemming fromthepowerfulRegionalCounciland threeDistrictCouncils,
wheretherepresentation tribesandtheBen-
ratioforeach ofthe13 different
gali settlershas been predetermined. Amongthe 12 male tribalmembers
(excludingthetribalchair),theChakmas,with31% of theCHT population,
weregivenfiverepresentatives in theRC. The Marinasat 17% of thepopu-

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 660 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

lationreceivedthreeseats,whiletheTripuratribewithonlya littlemorethan
7% werenonetheless giventwo representatives. The Murongtribewill get
onlyone seatin theRC, and six of thesmallesttribessharea singleseatin
thecouncil. The Bengalisettlers, with39% of thepopulation(about50% of
theCHT's total,accordingto unofficial willhavesix maleandone
estimates)
femalemembers.The Chakmas,70% of whomcan read and write,are far
moreliteratethanotherhill people and Bengalisas well-the Marmasand
Tripurashave thenexthighestliteracyratesat 20%, and thefigureforBen-
gali settlersstoodat only28%.12 Socioeconomically, theChakmaswereat
thetopandexpectedto getmostadvantages fromthearrayofinstitutionsand
development activitiesexpectedto followin thecomingyears. The smaller
and relatively backwardtribesdeservedmorerepresentation at theRegional
Council. In factsome of the smallertribeswanteda formof proportional
representation. But theChakmasenjoyedtheupperhandsince theydomi-
natedtheShantibahini and mostof theprominent triballeadersare fromthe
Chakmatribe.Since theaccordhas been signed,some of thesmallertribes
have complainedthatthetreatywas fortheman unfavorable deal.
Amongtheimportant politicalgroupsinheritedby thepost-treatyCHT is
thePCJSS, thepoliticalwingof Shantibahini tribalinsurgents.It was the
leaderof thisgroup,ShantuLarma,who signedthetreaty and was tippedas
chairman of theRC. The PCJSS is expectedto becomea politicalpartyand
could possiblydominateBangladeshpoliticswithrespectto the CHT re-
gion.13For all practicalpurposes,thePCJSS willremaina CHT-basedlocal
party.It is thoughtthatthegroupwillarticulate tribalgrievancesas a wayof
promoting regionalissues;however,theChakmas,as thelargestof theCHT
tribes,dominatethePCJSS and so thesmallertribesweremarginalized.It's
notyetclear how farthePCJSS can mobilizethe smallertribesand other
groupsin theregion.For thetimebeing,thepredominantly MuslimBengali
settlersarenotexpectedto support thePCJSSwithitslargelyBuddhistmem-
bership;possiblymostwill gravitate towardtheoppositionBNP and right-
wingIslamicgroups,whichare campaigning fortheBengalisettlers.Still,
thePCJSS is likelyto remaina forceto be reckonedand mighttakeon a
morenationalpresencebycooperating withtheAwamiLeague duringparlia-
mentary elections.
Numerousunanswered questionsabouttheShantibahini lingeraroundthe
peace accorddespitethefanfareand publicityoverthetribalinsurgents and
theirleaderswho all came out of hidingand surrendered theirarms. No
accuratecounthas ever been made of thenumberof Shantibahini fighters

12. Based on theEnglishtranslation

oftheagreement andTarekShamsurRahman,"Parbattya
ChattagramShantiChukti. . ." [CHT's Peace Accord... .], Daily Ittefaq(Dhaka),December10,
1997.
13. Sangbad(Dhaka,Bengalidaily),January 9, 1998. See also,Independent, March9, 1998.

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN661
operating withintheCHT orfromtheirIndianshelters, anditis unrealisticto
assumethatall of thefighters have givenup theirweaponsdespitethemate-
rialincentivesfordoingso. Underthefuture tribalauthority,
ex-Shantibahini
activistswillremainpolitically influential
withnewjobs and opportunities.14
The Shantibahini leadershavebeenthemostvisiblein theprocessof estab-
lishingthenew tribal-dominated institutions,
and numerouscomplaints have
beenmadein spring1998 againsttheperceiveddominanceof theseactivists
in post-treatyCHT.
AlthoughtheChakmaswerethedominant tribalgroupamongtheShan-
tibahinifightersengagedin thearmedconflict, thepolitico-militaryorganiza-
tion of the insurgents was not monolithic.15The personaland factional
rivalriesthatdividedtheleadershipof theChakmarebelseventually led to
theformation oftheJanaSanghatiSamitiunderPritiKumarChakma(theso-
called Pritigroup)and,in 1983,theassasinationof themainChakmarebel,
M. N. Larma,brother of ShantuLarma. For severalyears,theTripuraand
Marmatribesrefrained fromtheirinsurgency and severalof theirleadersre-
sumednormallives. In theearly1990s,Bandarban, theabodeof theMarma
and Murongtribes,was almostfreefrominsurgent activities.16Since the
signingof theaccord,therehave been reportsthatthePahariStudentPar-
ishad,Ganaparishad, Hill WomenFederation, thePritiGroup,andtheMajor
Samironfactionof the Shantibahini opposed the peace deal thatShantu
Larmahad signedon theirbehalf.WhiletheShantibahini stooddissolvedas
of thiswriting,dissidentspropup theJhumNationalArmy(JNA)and con-
tinueto fightforfullautonomy in theCHT. Theyare knownto have been
activein thedistricts
of Rangamatiand Khagrachari wheretheyhave carried
outsporadicterroristactivitiesthathaveresultedin thedeathsof severalpeo-
ple. Fromwhatis knownaboutthisshadowygroup,theJNAdoes notlike
theaccordand wantstheBengalisettlers to leave theCHT.
Duringthetransitional phaseof thepeace accordimplementation, Bengali
settlerssufferedfroma senseofinsecurity, distrust,andanxietythatcan only
be lessenedbytransparency andopennesson all sides. It is veryimportant to
proceedcarefully and createintergroup trustin theearlieststagesof enforc-
ingthetreaty.Anyfuture outbreak ofinter-ethnicconflictswilllead to wide-
spreaddestabilizationin theregion.Bothsociallyandpolitically, mostnon-
tribalresidentsseekto be classifiedas Bengalis. The BangaliSamannyaPar-
ishad(BengaliCoordinating Council)supports thesepeople.17 At thetimeof

14. According to Shelly,therewereabout3,000Shantibahini

freedomfighters.See TheChit-
tagongHill TractsofBangladesh,p. 145.
15. Ibid.,p. 116.
16. Ibid.
17. Pransanta TripuraandIshratAhmed,"Tribal/Non-TribalDiscourseson Ethnicity
in Ban-
gladesh,"Asian Studies(June1992).

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 662 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

writing,
therestiveBengalisettlerswereknownto have supported theoppo-
sitiondemandthatthepeace accordshouldprotectthe interests of all hill
residents-includingtheBengalisettlersof theregion. Bengaliactivistsin
thethreehill districts,
especiallyin Khagrachari, have reportedlybeen ar-
restedforprotestingagainstimplementation of thepeace agreement.18
Thereis a NationalCommitteeon the CHT, whose leaderAbul Hasnat
Abdullahsignedtheaccordon behalfof theGOB. However,themainoppo-
sitionBNP abandonedthiscommittee and setup itsownnationalcommittee
on theCHT. The GOB-supported nationalcommittee had been empowered
withcertainresponsibilities
to facilitate
theimplementation of thetreaty.

Bureaucraticand Military
Presence
afterTreatyImplementation
DespiteAL assurances,thenew institutions endowedwithfreshpowerwill
affectthetraditionalbureaucratic framework of theCHT. The peace accord
itselfdoes nottouchon theroleofthedeputycommissioners in administering
Rangamati, Khagrachari, andBandarban.19 Hasinahas assertedthattheCHT
deputycommissioners will be designatedas circlechiefs("circle"beingthe
geographicalidentification of a tribalarea) and theirpowerswouldnotbe
affected by thenew institutions, butshe failedto convincemostobservers.
The unanswered questionsremain:Who will supervisethedeputycommis-
sionersand circlechiefs? Whatwill be thenatureof the deputycommis-
sioner'sresponsibilities? It is unrealisticto expectthattherefurbished Hill
DistrictCouncilsand thenewlycreatedpowerfulRegionalCouncilwill ac-
ceptthedeputycommissioners as thepivotoftheirnewadministration. Each
DistrictCouncilwill have an executiveofficer of itsown withtherankof a
deputysecretary in thenationalcivil serviceorganization.WhentheCHT's
newpoliticalorderis fullyimplemented, thedeputycommissioners, realisti-
callyspeaking,can assumeno morethanlimitedcoordination rolesubjectto
theconsentof theemerging hill districts'leadership.
Dispensationof social justice and administration of triballaws will be
withinthejurisdiction of theRC. In a significant breakwiththepast,the
triballeadershipwill administer law and order,and theRC will appointand
superviselaw enforcement officers up to therankof a sub-inspector of po-
lice. Suchpowerwillin factresultin creatinga tribalmajority in theCHT's
police force. Throughits coordination and supervision, the RC will have
swayoverthethreehilldistricts.Othersubstantive responsibilities,suchas
therightto allocatelicensesand permitsfortheheavyindustries and NGO

18. Internet
News,<http//www.dhaka-bangladesh.com/>,
February8, 1998.
19. Rahman,"Parbattya
ChattagramShantiChukti";andauthor'sinterviews
withtwoex-civil
servantswhohad beenpostedin theCHT, Dhaka,January1998,andNew Jersey, March1998.

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 663
willfurther
activities, curtailtraditional
bureaucratic powerin theCHT. The
RC willhaveitsownexecutiveofficer whowillhavetheequivalentrankofa
joint secretaryin thenationalbureaucratic hierarchy.Withthe statusof a
stateminister,theRC chairwillhavethehighestpolitical/administrative rank
in the entireCHT. This will make him or her immuneto the customary
controlof thedistrict or divisionalcommissioner-administrative positions
usuallyheldby BengaliMuslims.
In theeyes of thePCJSS,theBangladesharmedforcesare unwelcometo
the tribalpopulationand the CHT shouldbe effectively demilitarized, al-
thoughthe BangladeshRifles(BDR), a paramilitary bordercontrolforce,
probablyshouldbe deployedaroundthefrontier.20 The Shantibahini did not
get thetotaldemilitarization theysoughtduringthepeace negotiations, but
thepresenceof theBangladeshimilitary has been reducedundertheagree-
ment.The temporary campsusedbytheBangladeshiarmedforceswillall be
dismantled, and thepersonnelwill be garrisoned in a cantonment locatedat
theheadquarters in each of thethreedistrictsand in threemorecantonments
in Alikadam,Ruma,andDighinala.All armedpersonnelexcepting theBDR
willbe withdrawn fromtheoutlying partsof thedistricts.In case of anylaw
and orderbreakdown, theBangladeshmilitary in principlecan return to the
hill territories
fromwheretheywerewithdrawn; in practice,suchtroopde-
ployment will need thesupportand cooperationof theRC chairperson and
thehillpeople.

CHT, India,and theVolatileNortheast:

UncertainFuture?
While vowingto continuea strongmovement againsttheCHT accord,the
prominent BNP leaderSalam TalukderchargedthatPrimeMinisterHasina's
agreement withShantibahini leaderShantuLarmawas actuallya treaty with
India.21 When,in May 1998, thenationallegislaturewas considering the
fourbillsto providethelegal coverfortheagreement, theoppositionand its
allies said thatit wouldincreaseIndiandomination and lead to an ultimate
Indiantakeoverof thehills. Whenthebills werepassedby Parliament later
thatmonth,the BNP and its allies said thatthe treatypaved the way for
"hegemonist" India to enterand increaseits influenceon the CHT. From
1975 to 1996 beforetheAL came to power,Dhaka had beenunableto work
outa deal withtherebelsbecause,in theeyesofmanycritics, New Delhi had
been less thaneagerto cooperatewithBangladesh'spoliticalleadershipat
thattime.India's northeastern andfromtimeto timethe
statesarestrife-torn,
Indiangovernment has accusedBangladeshof harboring thetribalfighters.

20. AmenaMohsin,The PoliticsofNationalism(Dhaka: University

Press,Ltd., 1997).
21. Independent,
February11, 1998.

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 664 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

The CHT's Khagrachari Districtsharesa borderwithIndia's MizoramState,

whose rebelsallegedlytakeshelterin thedistrict'sforestswhenchasedby
Indiansoldiers. It was an open secretbefore1971 thatPakistanisoldiers
sheltered Mizo dissidents.In theyearssincethe1975assassination ofSheikh
MujiburRahmanand overthrow of theAL government, it has been alleged
thattheBangladeshgovernments of Ziaur Rahman,GeneralH. M. Ershad,
and KhaledaZia have providedPakistanimilitary intelligence withfacilities
fromwhichto supplyarmstothenortheastern dissidents.So, Indianstrategic
interestsrequirethattheCHT leadersremainamenableto New Delhi's influ-
ence. It is generally believedthatShantuLarmahadIndia'sblessingtonego-
tiatean "acceptable"peace settlement withBangladeshonce theAL returned
to powerunderHasina's leadershipin 1996.
On the one hand,the CHT combinedwiththe ChittagongDistricthas
broughtBangladeshto thethreshold of a regionaltradeframework thatin-
cludesthenortheastern Indianstates,Burma(Myanmar), Nepal,and Bhutan.
But on theotherhand,theeconomic,political,and military cloutof Bangla-
deshin theCHT is likelyto wane withtheimplementation of thepeace ac-
cordandthedelegationofadministrative powersto thetriballeadership.The
legaciesof old fears,suspicions,rivalries,and conflicts mayruncounterto
thepossibleeconomicbenefitsthatcould flowbetweenthe geographically
contiguous areasbetweenIndiaandBangladesh.ShantuLarmacannotmake
any guaranteesthattherewill be no further insurgency in the CHT, so it
wouldbe unrealistic forthenew tribalauthority to crippletheBangladeshi
troopdeployment capacitywhenever and wherever deemednecessaryforse-
curityreasons. Officers with military experience in the area have already
pointed out thattwo or threemore border outposts will be necessarybeyond
whathas been approved under the treaty.22
By virtueof itsoverwhelming politicaland military presenceand proxim-
ityto theCHT, India is a hegemon that Bangladesh cannot ignore.Even if
New Delhi werenota military to
threat Dhaka,any future unraveling in the
neighboring Indianstatescould be dangerousto thesecurity of the CHT in
particular and theterritorial integrity a
of Bangladeshas whole. Preventing
anyfuture separatistactivitiesin India'snortheastern statesfromspillingover
intotheCHT willbe at theheartofBangladeshilong-term strategicanxieties.
New Delhi and Dhaka can cooperate on a common policy to prevent any
possibleunifiedmovement in the northeast India and the CHT. However,
overtcooperationwith India to suppressthe northeastern rebels is also
fraught as a riskycourse. AfterIndia's multipleunderground nucleartestsin

22. Brigadier(Rtd.)MasukAhmedChowdhury, "ShantuLarma:Ball AkhanApnarCourte"

[ShantuLarma:The Ball Is in Your Court,Now],BhorerKagoz (Dhaka),January 6, 1998; and
authorinterviewswithtworetired military who had servedin theCHT, Dhaka,January
officers
1998.

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 665
May 1998,theoverallclimateforregionalcooperationwithNew Delhi re-
mainsdoubtful.In January1998,UnitedLiberationFrontof Assam leader
AnupChetiawas arrested in Bangladesh,andhisfollowers threatened theAL
government withsevereconsequencesif theirleaderwas handedoverto the
Indianauthorities.If BangladeshactivelycollaborateswithNew Delhi in
containingthe separatistsin the northeastern region,theirviolencecould
spreadovertotheChittagong Port,theindustrial areasintheregion,andeven
to otherpartsof Bangladesh.
Should it becomeembroiledin any futureresumption of hostilitiesor a
wideningofinsurgent activitiesbyCHT separatists andguerrilla groupsfrom
the neighboring Indiannortheast, Bangladeshmay be forcedto seek New
Delhi's helpto putdownsecessionist movements in theregion.It wouldput
Bangladeshintoa Sri Lanka-likesituationwhere,in July1987, Colombo
capitulatedto pressurefromNew Delhi to invitein Indianpeacekeeping
troopsto maintainlaw and orderagainstTamil rebels. WhenBJP foreign
policyadvisorAmbassadorJhastatedthatIndiamaybecomemoreinvolved
in theethnicconflicts of neighboring countries, manyin Bangladeshdid not
takeit withoutsomeconcern.It is notknownif Bangladeshhas anycovert
securityarrangement withNew Delhi to seek Indianmilitaryhelp in the
eventthatsuch domesticdisruptions occur,but China is likelyto bristleif
IndiastepsintoBangladeshiinternal politicalcrises. On theotherhand,New
Delhi also does notwantanyof its smallerneighbors warmingto China(or
even theU.S.), althoughBeijingperiodicallyclaimsto cultivatefriendship
withall SouthAsiancountries.In May 1998,theIndiangovernment alleged
thattherewas Chinesenavy activityin the Burmesebases in the Bay of
Bengal. Therewas also sometensionalongtheBangladesh-Burmese border.
In the aftermath of India's nuclearexplosions,the entireregionmay be
plungedintoan armsrace and such tensionwouldundermine the spiritof
mutualcooperationamongthestatesof SouthAsia.
Findinga balance betweentribalself-determination and maintaining the
territorial of thestatewillbe thecoresecurity
integrity challengeforBangla-
desh,and it maybe difficult forall sides to agreeto thesame goals. Most
observersare awarethata "powerfulsegment"of theShantibahini opposed
theaccord,and severalminortribesalso rejectedit,albeitfordifferent rea-
sons.23Bangladeshinewspapers reportthatsomeChakmarebelleaders,still
basedin India,continueto organizea JhumaNationalArmyaimedat separat-
ing theCHT fromBangladesh.Since thepeace agreement wentintoeffect,
personalsecurityfearshave hauntedboththe government and the Shanti-
bahinileaderswho signedtheagreement.Throughout India's northeastern

23. AmirKhasru,"Peace Outlookin theCHT StillDreary,"Holiday(politicalweekly)(De-

cember12, 1997).

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 666 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

statesand otherpartsof thecountry, militant

tribalnetworks lobbiedagainst
the"peace treaty"signedby ShantuLarmawiththeGOB. As everbefore,
militantChakmasrefusedto accede to anything less thanfull autonomy.
Chakmaactivists mightevenuse thecoveroftheirnewinstitutional powerto
drive a wedge betweenthe Bengali inhabitants and the hill population,
therebyfomenting dissatisfaction
thatmightlead to a completesecession
fromBangladesh.
To restrict theIndianrebelsfromentering theCHT and also discourage
gunrunning andcontainillicitdrugtrade,Bangladeshwillpossiblyneedmore
militaryandpolicein thearea. Takingadvantageoftheporousborder, unau-
thorizedpeople continueto enterthe CHT frombothIndia and Burma. It
appearsthatthetreaty negotiatorsdid notpay muchattention to thesecurity
of thesoutheastern partof theCHT, whereBangladeshsharesfrontiers with
IndiaandBurma.The GOB has alreadyweakeneditselfwithrespectto such
considerations through themilitary and securityconcessionsithas granted to
theRC and thethreehill DistrictCouncils. Moreover,it is fearedthatthe
bulkof theShantibahini armswill pass intothehandsof criminalsand the
newlycreatedtribalpoliceforcewill be inadequatefordealingwiththelaw
and ordersituation.Insteadof leavingthelocal police administration to the
threeDistrictCouncilsand theRC, jointcontrolby theGOB and thenew
tribalauthority wouldbe a morerealisticguaranteeof CHT security.
Key domesticfactorsthatwill influencethe futuresustainability of the
treatyincludethedifferences amongthemainpoliticalleaders,theattitude of
themilitant tribalfactions,liberalintellectual
perceptions, Bengali settlers'
rejectionof the new tribalauthority, and the presenceof the international
NGOs in theregion.A gulfseparatesPrimeMinisterHasinaandtheopposi-
tionleaderKhaleda-not onlyabouttheagreement itselfbutalso theroleof
India in theCHT in particular and Bangladeshistrategic matters in general.
Right-wing groupsare even morehostileand uncompromising towardthe
peace accord,whichtheyfeelwillnotonlyjeopardizetheBengalisettlers but
also threatenthesecurity oftheentireregion.Mostliberalelite,humanrights
activists,and left-leaning groupssupportthe accord and will oppose any
measurethatwouldturnback theclock on theCHT.
Uncompromising treatybashingby the Bangladeshioppositionpolitical
groupsmay strengthen the handsof separatists in the CHT and the Shan-
tibahinifactionsmayrekindletheirinsurgency.It is knownthat29 NGOs
fundedbytheWestern countrieswereactivein theCHT; theyareexpectedto
standbythetribaldemandsifthereis anyshowdownbetweentheGOB and
thetribalauthorities.24 Some NGOs, accordingto observers, had alreadyin-

political
24. For a reporton WesternNGO activitiesin theCHT, see Bikrarn(pro-Islamic,
weekly)(January6-12, 1998).

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 667
ternationalizedthe CHT conflictby lobbyingtheirrespectivegovernments
notto give anyeconomicassistanceto Bangladeshunlessthepeace accord
was signed.In dealingwithanyprolongedethnicstrife, strategic confidence
lies withtheinstitutionaland militarycapacityof thestateconfronting such
challenges.Stronglyinstitutionalizedstatesusuallymanagesuch separatist
conflictsbetterthantheweaklyinstitutionalized ones.25By usingitsmilitary
powerand leverageforcoercionagainsttheseparatists as well as harnessing
its strongerpoliticalinstitutions
bothat thecenterand theperiphery, India
has been able to holdmostof its tribal,regional,ethnic,linguistic,
and reli-
gious conflictsto withinits borders-so far.26 Even withoutpropelling
themselves intoa violentconflict,
thenewCHT institutions willfurther
polit-
icize thehill population;intertribal
as well as Bengali-tribalrelationsmay
sourevenwitha formalaccordat hand. A highlypoliticizedtribalcommu-
nityandgrowinginter-ethnic tensionsagainstthebackdropofa weaklyinsti-
tutionalizedstateis a dangerouscombination forBangladesh.

CHT and BangladeshiStrategicConcerns

The strategicimportance of the CHT is underlined by fiveconsiderations.
First,navigationof theChittagong seaportdependson thewaterlevel in the
KarnaphuliRiverthatmeandersthrough theCHT. Second,facilitiesof the
port,industries,
Chittagongcity,andtheadjoiningtowndependon thepower
generatedbythehydroelectric capabilitysituatedin theCHT. Third,naviga-
tionthroughand irrigation fromthe Karnaphuli,Sangu,Matamuhuri, and
Halda Riversand theirtributarieswill also dependon peace and stabilityin
the CHT. Fourth,the economyand livingstandardsof the CHT and the
entireChittagong regionare closelyinterlinked.Finally,mostof Chittagong
andevenpartsof Noakhaliwouldbe vulnerableshouldtheCHT breakaway
fromBangladeshor ifan insurgency wereto be sustainedthrough theregion.
All threeCHT districtshave international borders.
As manyas 21 oil and gas companiesfromdifferent nationsare carrying
outexplorationworkin different partsofBangladeshandnewgas fieldshave
beenfound,includingone in theCHT. Bangladesh'simportance as a poten-
in thegrowingregionaleconomyhas increasedowingto thehuge
tialpartner
quantityofknowngas reservesandoil prospectsin theCHT as well as in the
country'snortheasternand southeastern regions.But seismicsurveysforoil
and gas in theCHT cannotcontinuewithoutpeace and cooperationin the
region.Faced by Shantibahini theShell Oil Companyabandoned
terrorists,

25. See AtulKohli,"Can DemocracyAccommodate EthnicNationalism?"JournalofAsian

Studies56:2 (May 1997),p. 344.
26. M. Rashiduzzaman, "The CHT Peace Accordin Bangladesh,"NFB, January
21, 1998,
and also Holiday,February8, 1998.

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 668 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

its oil explorationoperationsin Bagaichari(CHT) in 1981. In 1984, tribal

insurgents kidnapped(and releasedafterreceivinga huge ransom)two ex-
pertsfromRoyal Dutch/Shell.In March 1998, activistsallegedlyfromthe
Hill Students Council,a groupopposedto thepeace accord,seizedtwoBan-
gladeshisecurity guardsemployedbytheU.S. energyconcernUnitedMerid-
ian Corporation and releasedthemonlyafterthecompanymettheirransom
demands.
Gas and oil exploration in theBay of Bengaland borderareasis likelyto
cause a conflict of interestwithIndia and Burma. Even afteryearsof stop-
and-gonegotiations, no settlementhas been reachedoverthe sea boundary
sharedby thesethreecountries.Withor without theanticipatedgas and oil
prospectsin theregion,Chittagong's portfacilitieshave gainednew impor-
tanceforthe future.Nepal and Bhutan,two landlockedHimalayanking-
doms,arewillingtoexpandtheirtradewithBangladeshandmakegreater use
ofitsportfacilities.Calcutta,theoldestportin easternIndia,has beenon the
declineand cannotkeep up withgrowingdemandson its facilities.New
Delhi is comingto realizethatnortheastern India could moreeconomically
andefficiently use theBangladeshiportsin Chittagong andKhulna.The port
of Chittagong is only70 kmfromtheborderof theIndianstateof Tripura,
butgoodsfromthisstatemustnowtakea roundabout journeyofnearly1,700
kmto theCalcuttaport.In thenearfuture, Bangladeshwillhaveto modern-
ize and expandits portfacilities.Peace and stability in theCHT will go a
longway to increasethelogisticalcapacityof theregion.
Withtheirnewlyconcededpowers,theRC andthreeDistrictCouncilscan
definetribalnationalinterests, goals, and actions,butunderthe agreement
theymustrespecttheterritorial integrityof Bangladesh.The accordlays a
"foundation of peace" sincetheShantibahini haveformally their
surrendered
armsandpromisedto workthrough civilianinstitutionscreatedby thepeace
agreement.The international community has also welcomedthe peaceful
compromiseand theBangladeshigovernment has launcheda campaignto
obtaineconomicassistancefromforeigndonorsto developthehilldistricts.
Withtheanticipated peace dividends,Bangladeshexpectsto exploitthemin-
erals,agroindustry, tourism,timber,and forestresourcesof theCHT forthe
mutualbenefitof all inhabitants of thecountry.Ongoingrebellion,seces-
sionistactivities,and ethnicmilitancy cannotbe foughtby military means
alone-this approachhas a nearlytwo-decaderecordof failure.The peace
settlement betweenthe GOB and therebelshas offereda politicaltool to
neutralizearmedrebellion.Notwithstanding rival rhetoricand trumpeted
anxietiesbetweenthegovernment andtheopposition overthetreaty,boththe
BNP andtherulingAL areexpectedto sharecommonconcernsovernational
integrity althoughtheymaynotagreeon themethodsthathavebeenchosen
fordealingwiththeCHT crisis.

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 M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 669
NeitherSheikhMujiburRahmannorthesubsequentleadersagreedto the
expulsionof Bengaliinhabitants withinthehill districts,
althoughthetreaty
will discouragethe futureinfluxof new Bengali settlers.Unless the new
institutional
powersare used as a toolforrevengein thehandsof thetribal
leaders,anylarge-scaleexpulsionofthenontribal populationwillbe difficult.
The presenceof the Bangladeshmilitaryand borderpolice in the CHT,
thoughdownsizedand brokenup intoseveralcantonments, has significant
security value sincethegovernment did notyieldtheoperational controlof
thearmedpersonnelto theRC. It wouldbe a strategic advantageunderthe
circumstances-although itmaynotbe easy-to renegotiate thesize,deploy-
ment,andcapabilitiesofthearmedservices.Government-owned reservefor-
ests,hydroelectricpowerstations,telecommunication towers,and numerous
government propertiesmustbe protected.The presenceof themilitary can
facilitate
protectionfortheinnocentandpeace-lovinghilldwellers,whomay
be victimized rebelsfleeingfromIndiaor Burma,
and harassedby criminals,
illegal gun smugglers,and drugdealers. Soon afterthe peace treatywas
signed,theRed Armyof Burma,Burmesecommunist radicals,tookadvan-
tageof thepowervacuumalongtheborderand crossedintoBangladeshto
extortmoneyfromresidents of bordertowns.27

Conclusion
It is too earlyto drawany definitive conclusionsabouttheChittagong Hill
Tractsaccord,whose institutional featuresand strategicconfigurationare
slowlyunfolding, buta fewtentative inferencesare reasonable.Institution-
ally,the accordhas set in motiona processof changefocusingon social,
economic,and politicalforcesthatwill have far-reaching consequencesfor
theregion.The establishment of thenew Regionaland threeDistrictCoun-
cils,thetribalizationofthelocal administration,
thebypassingoftheconven-
tionalbureaucracy, and thedownsizingof theBangladeshimilitary presence
willalterthetraditional balanceof forcesin theCHT and neighboring areas.
The institutionalsuccessor failureofthepeace agreement willdependon the
new relationship thatit promises.The hill tribesand Bengali inhabitants
mustfindcommongroundforcooperationand goodwill. To achievethat
goal, the government of Bangladeshneeds an institutionalmechanismfor
earlywarning andfeedbacktoreconciledifferences bothamongcommunities
and betweenthetribaland nontribal residentsof theregion.
In itstruenature,theCHT crisishas been an ethnonational domesticcon-
flictthatstraddles international
borders,and,through theprocessesof insur-
gency,counterinsurgency, and diplomacy,introducesstate,
negotiations,
nonstate, and internationalactors.The CHT compactis a triangular partner-

27. BBC WorldService(English),March 1, 1998.

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 670 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 7, JULY 1998

shipbetweenBangladesh,theChakma-ledShantibahini, and theabsenteeac-

of
tor India. Bothdiplomatically and the
strategically, concord symbolizesa
pro-Indian tiltthatNew Delhi welcomesnotonlyforgreater regionalpromi-
nencebut also forhavinga pliabletriballeadershipin the CHT who will
cooperatewithIndiansecurity needsbynotsheltering theseparatistsfromthe
Indiannortheastern states.The treatyitselfhas thepotentialto inspiremore
separatistaspirationsin theregion,whichmayin turntransform theexpected
harmony intoa violentbacklash.To someof theChakmaleaders,theCHT
accordwas notan enduntoitselfbutonlythefirst steptowardfullautonomy
(a euphemism fortheir secession and independence).In thenearfuture, Ban-
gladeshstrategic and
planning foreignpolicy over the region likely be
is to
moreIndo-centric thanbefore.Bangladeshhas been at India's mercywith
respectto distribution of waterfromtheGanges,and now Dhaka will also
need New Delhi as leverageagainstanyresurgence of tribalsecessionism.
But thestrategic convergence betweenDhaka and New Delhi maynotbe
sustainable.If India attempts to deploytroopsin theCHT, evenin hotpur-
suitof fleeingnortheastern tribalinsurgents,the entireregionmaybe cat-
apultedintoa nastyinternational conflict.Drasticpoliticalchangein either
India or Bangladeshwill affectstrategic calculationsand mayrequireeach
country to reassessits respectivepositionin theregion.The comingof the
BJPto powerin New Delhi,India's nuclearcapacity,and theriseof militant
Hindunationalism in IndiahavecreatedanxietiesamongmanyBangladeshis.
Theremayyetbe massiveagitation againsttheCHT accordthatwouldpolar-
ize Bangladeshpoliticsbetweenthe Awami League-the pro-Indiansup-
porterof thetreaty-andtheBNP-ledoppositionto it. In thefuture, BNP
successat thenationallevelin associationwiththeright-wing alliancewould
sourtherelationship betweenDhaka and New Delhi. More seriously,any
returnof insurgency in the CHT would bringa poundingheadacheto the
Bangladeshgovernment and angerand frustration to mostBangladeshis.

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