Special Report
The Vizag polystyrene plant accident – Analysis and
comments
R
eview and learnings for practicing
chemical engineers, based on
discussions among the B. Chem.
Engg. Batch (1978) of Institute of Chemi-
cal Technology (ICT), Mumbai, formerly
known as UDCT.
Background and purpose
The industrial accident on 7th May
2020, at the polystyrene plant of LG
Polymers India Pvt. Ltd. at Vizag, lead-
ing to at least 12 deaths and over 2,000
people affected, has been a matter of
concern to the Indian chemical industry
and engineering fraternity. As alumni of
ICT, Mumbai, with a life-time of experi-
ence in design, production, technology
and safety of chemical plants, some with
first-hand experience in styrene and poly-
styrene plants, we felt compelled to dis-
cuss and deliberate on this accident and to
understand its root cause, so that we can
shed some light on the key issues facing
the chemical manufacturing industry in
India.
It may be noted that this discussion is
not based on any direct investigation car-
ried out at the accident site, or access to
the logbooks, or interaction with the ope-
rating or management teams. This may
come out in due course, after official in-
vestigation by the authorities. The princi-
pal purpose of this document is to capture
a learned view on the accident, so that
recurrence of such accidents can be avoid-
ed in future. As professionals trained in
chemical engineering by one of the top-
rated chemical engineering institute in
the world, we feel it is our moral respon-
sibility to check on the overall health of
chemical manufacturing industry and to
help improve its image in society.
The note is based on the discussions
among the WhatsApp Group of the
Chemical Weekly May 26, 2020
Content
of polymerisation (technically called as
‘degree’) decides the properties. Styrene
– a common product made by petrochemi-
cal industry world over – is itself an aro-
matic organic chemical, made by catalytic
reaction of benzene and ethylene to form
ethyl benzene, followed by dehydrogena-
tion. Styrene is liquid at ambient tempera-
ture, and is reasonably safe to handle and
transport, though inherently flammable
B. Chem. Engg. batch of 1978, comprising and toxic. The entire Indian requirement
of more than 15 chemical engineers. Their of styrene is imported from China, and
names are listed at the end of the docu- several other countries.
ment. The collective ownership of this
document is with this team. Besides being used to make PS, sty-
rene is also used as a raw material for some
The material/s perfumery and speciality organic chemi-
Polystyrene (PS) is a common engi- cals. LG Chemicals, the Korean com-
neering polymer, used on its own as a plas- pany owns the PS plant at Vizag, Andhra
tic or in combined forms with other plas- Pradesh. This plant has gone through mul-
tics, resins and chemicals. ‘Thermocol’, tiple ownerships, with stepwise capacity
polyester resins, Styrene-Butadiene Rub- enhancement over the last fifty years.
ber (SBR) are some of the well-known
forms of PS. The accident
A major leakage of styrene occurred in
PS is produced by controlled polymeri- the early hours of 7th May 2020 from the
sation of styrene. The extent or the degree LG Polymers plant in Vizag. The spread of
this gas into the residential areas surround-
ing the plant resulted in at least 12 deaths
and over 2,000 affected people, caused by
Styrene: its inhalation. The immediate corrective
actions taken by the plant management
and the district authorities are claimed
Other Names : Ethylbenzene,Vinylbenzene, to have restricted the human cost of this
phenylethene incident.
Chemical Formula : C6H5CH=CH2
Molecular Mass : 104.15 g/mol
It is understood that the plant was
Physical Form : Liquid at NTP
Density : 909 kg/m3 shut down for nearly 40 days, on account
Boiling Point : 145°C the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown in
Vapour Pressure : 6.4 mmHg at 25°C the country and was scheduled to restart
Flash Point : 31°C
around 7th May. The accident apparently
Explosive Limits : 0.90% LEL-6.8% UEL
Toxicity: LD50 : 2194 ppm (mouse, 4 hr) took place during the restart.
5543 ppm (rat, 4 hr)
It is important to note that accidents in
Ref.:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ styrene plants, storage and transit, caus-
Styrene#Health_effects
ing styrene leak and associated damages,
137
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 Special Report
Table 1: Selected thermal runaway incidents related to the styrene process
Date Location
07/05/1994 Kaohsiung, Taiwan
01/26/1996 Chiayi, Taiwan
01/21/1998 Kaohsiung, Taiwan
12/24/1998 Kanagawa, Japan
06/27/1998 Channahon, IL, US
06/23/1999 Pasadena, TX, US
10/06/1999 Chiayi, Taiwan
03/27/2000 Pasadena, TX, US
04/02/2003 Addyston, OH, US
04/08/2004 Jiangsu, China
06/30/2005 Mesa, AZ, US
Ref.: Lin Zhao et al, ACS Omega, 2019 4 (5), 8136-8145
fatalities and non-fatal human damages
are not uncommon. In fact over last 25
years, there have been 11 accidents – four
in Taiwan, one in Japan, one in China and,
four in USA – collectively accounting for
12 fatalities and 107 injuries (Table 1), the
most recent being from the styrene-car-
rying railway tanker at Cincinnati, USA,
in Aug. 2005. In fact, EPA came out with
an Emergency Response Guideline Book
with scientifically validated approach list-
ing chemicals which undergo self-poly-
merisation. (Ref.: https://www. aristatek.com/
Newsletter/OCT08/TechSpeak.pdf).
Technical background of PS reaction
PS is made from styrene by thermal
initiation process; i.e. styrene is initially
heated to start up the reaction, following
which the inherent exothermic (i.e. heat-
liberating) nature of the resulting poly-
merisation reaction causes the temperature
to rise rapidly. The temperature rise cannot
be left uncontrolled, and the heat gene-
rated, is removed by circulating a thermic
fluid (Dowtherm DTA), so that the reactor
operates at the desired temperature around
450°C. The polymer formed is in the mol-
ten form; it is extruded into strands, cut
into granules and despatched to customers.
A plant for making PS, named as
138
Content
is currently imported, mainly from the
Consequences Middle East, North East and South East
Asia. A styrene production plant requires
Injury Fatality
significant investment to set up and run;
0 1 and it does not seem economical for
1 0 Indian users of styrene to have their own
4 0 production plants in India. This may have
led to current Indian users being less
0 0 informed on the practical aspects of
1 0 handling styrene.
21 2
Styrene tends to self-polymerise,
1 0
even at ambient temperature, albeit at
71 1 very slow reaction rates. However, even
0 1 the slow rates of self-polymerisation
8 6 cause major operating issues, because
of heat liberation, blockages in the tank,
0 1 pipelines and pumps due to the formation
of a solid polymer. The rate of this reac-
M/s. Polychem, operated in Mumbai from tion doubles every 10°C. Such polymeri-
the 1956 to around 2005. This was based sation can lead to quality deterioration
on technology sourced from M/s. Dow and operating issues. The combination of
Chemical – initially 7,500-tpa (tonnes polymerisation – heat liberation – tem-
per annum) capacity, single-line, which perature rise – and further polymerisation
was later doubled. The PS was used to can lead to rapid reaction and heating;
make general-purpose PS (GPPS) and this is known as a ‘run-away reaction’.
high-impact PS (HIPS), the latter through As the temperature rises, styrene starts
addition of polybutadiene rubber. The vaporising. The pressure in the storage
Polychem plant was closed around for tank may progressively increase, and the
environmental and economic reasons safety valves provided on the tanks may
around 2005, and its assets were sold to open. The styrene storage tanks are there-
Supreme Industries Ltd. fore fitted with secondary containment
facility, to prevent any leakage to the
The entire Indian requirement of sty- environment. The tanks are also provided
rene – about 850,000-tonnes in 2018-19 – with cooling/chilling circuits, which can
Self-Polymerisation of styrene
n H
C C
H H n
 Enthalpy of polymerisation: 49-160 kcal/kg
 TBC (Inhibitor) slows down the reaction rate; does not inhibit polymerisa-
tion totally.
 Rapid temperature rise starts at 100-105°C, under adiabatic conditions.
Ref.: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acsomega.9b00004
Chemical Weekly May 26, 2020
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bring down the temperature and control
the reaction.
In order to avoid such polymerisation,
styrene is mixed with a polymerisation
inhibitor – 4-tert-butylcatechol (TBC) – at
controlled concentrations. This prevents
polymerisation during high sea or road
transit, as well as during storage. Before
utilising the styrene for PS synthesis, the
TBC needs to be removed. Provision to
remove the TBC is an integral part of
styrene storage facility. Use of TBC is
practised especially by those users who
handle and store large quantities of sty-
rene. Users of small quantities or those
who make immediate use of styrene within
minimal storage time, may not use/add TBC.
In the event of styrene vapours escap-
ing from the tank/premises, it is required
to know how far the vapours can spread;
and how many people/animals/farms
may get affected. The regulatory au-
thorities have made it mandatory for the
producers to evaluate the spread of the
vapour and its human impact on mathe-
matical diffusion models, accounting for
external factors like wind direction and
speed, ambient temperature, season and
time of the day, and the location of human
population in a 360 degree radius of the
plant. Permitted quantities for storage,
the primary and secondary containment
measures, disaster management facili-
ties mandated and the consent to operate
are planned based on these modelling
studies. The consent to operate are also
audited periodically by statutory authori-
ties and by plant management audits, to
assure total compliance.
Strict adherence to the above guid-
ance assures safety in styrene handling,
transit, storage and PS production facili-
ties.
Possible causes of the accident
With the above technical background,
we discussed the possible causes of the
accident, which are summarised here.
Chemical Weekly May 26, 2020
Content
Uncontrolled polymerisation during
prolonged storage
It is understood that the PS plant was
closed during the COVID-19 lockdown
and was being restarted after relaxation
of lockdown conditions. The accident
took place during the restart operations.
Was the right level of TBC added to the
styrene stored, given that the ambient
temperature in March to May can be very
high (≥40°C). The styrene in the storage
tank could thus have experienced such
high temperatures for almost forty days
during the shutdown, resulting in uncon-
trolled polymerisation inside the storage
tank; and temperature/pressure rise could
cause the styrene to evaporate, build up
pressure and escape through vent.
Failure of the temperature control
system on styrene storage tank
In case polymerisation commenced
in the storage tank, it is possible that the
temperature control system based on the
circulation of coolant fluid/chilled water
may have failed. Good design practice
– as shown in Figure 1 – generally provides
for interlocks which does not permit such
failure to occur, because alarm systems get
activated well in advance of failure. In a
well-designed & well-maintained plant,
STYRENE TANK
CIRCULATION IN PROGRESS
SET POINT (LO)#COM 0 C
SET POINT (H1)#COM 0 C
LT-STY
#COM
#COM
#COMMT
#COMxg
#COMMT
#COMCM
STYRENE STYRENE
Fig. 1: Styrene storage tank safety system
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the probability of such failures occurring
is low.
Non-adherence to standard operating
procedures (SOPs)
All plants are slated to follow set
SOPs. There are well-defined SOPs even
for shut-down and start-ups, including
for warm-shutdown and warm-start up
(which means stopping a running plant
and restarting the same with materials held
up in the plant). For the mature technology
used in PS plants all over, such procedures
are followed globally and any abnormal
temperature/pressure in the styrene stor-
age tank would have been detected before
re-starting up the plant. All failure condi-
tions are expected to surface through a
structured pre-start audit procedure. Since
the plant shutdown was likely to have been
done at a short notice, due to COVID-19
lockdown order, the SOP for warm shut-
down, which should have been followed
as a rule (covering, for example, emptying
transfer line, mixing additional dosages of
polymerisation inhibitor, recording of tank
temperature during shutdown, etc.) may
not have been fully followed as per com-
pliance requirements.
Chemical engineers in this WhatsApp
CHWR
HE-7
CHWS
CH WATER SUPPLY VALVE INTERLOCK
SET [POINT CH WATER
TO BL1
#COM C < #COM C
TO BL3
TO BL5
139
 Special Report
group, with considerable experience in
start-up and shut-down of similar plants
(such as LPG, hydrogen sulphide, and
other reactive monomers), have high-
lighted the need for total rigour in follow-
ing procedures for shutdown and restarts
in order to avoid accidents.
Considering that the plant and tech-
nology is well established, and several
shutdowns and start-ups may have been
done, SOP must have been available for
these operations.
Practices in MNCs using styrene as raw
material
The members of this WhatsApp group
with considerable expertise in handling
styrene wish to share the following good
manufacturing practices:
 When styrene is used in small quan-
tities with short storage times, the
polymerisation inhibitor needs to be
monitored to avoid depletion. Many
medium/small users of styrene do not
check the levels of this vital inhibitor
(LG is a large company though). We
understand that after the accident, LG
Polymers urgently purchased the in-
hibitor to save the remaining quantity
of styrene.
 A spare or standby storage tank hav-
ing the same capacity as the styrene
tank under consideration must always
be available in case of emergency, so
that styrene can be transferred from
the regular storage tank if the storage
system fails.
 As far as possible, it is desirable to
continue running the production plant
until all the styrene is completely
used up, and then organise the shut-
down. This will eliminate the need to
store and monitor styrene.
 It is also good practice not to store
styrene over extended periods of
time.
 Stored styrene must preferably be
under nitrogen blanketing all the
time.
140
Content
 A supply of TBC must always be
available in the plant raw material
stores for emergencies.
 It may be noted that even technically
empty styrene tanks are prone to con-
tain solid deposits of polymer, which
can often be found on, and inside, the
casing of submersible pumps. This
may be attributed to the polymerisation
of residual styrene, traces of which can
accumulate inside sumps and pumps,
causing jamming of the pump impel-
ler. When this was observed in a sty-
rene storage system a few years ago,
the Plant Safety Audit Committee re-
commended removing and overhauling
of the submersible pump at the end of
each production campaign. Jamming
of submersible pump can also hap-
pen with a fresh lot of styrene due to
the inherent fine clearance between
the pump shaft sleeve and the bush-
ing mounted inside the hollow vertical
pipe of submersible pumps.
 Normal production campaigns gene-
rally run continuously round the clock
and situations involving cold/warm
start-up and shut-down are very rare.
As such, plant operating personnel
have little or no practical experience of
these kind of start-ups and shut-downs.
All the above learnings from different
plants around the world must become an
integral part of the knowledge base of any
styrene handling facility globally.
Hazard & Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
Oilfield operations involve many
start-ups/shut-downs and so-called ad
hoc operations. It is common practice
to undertake a complete HAZOP before
any operation. Oil rig operations involve
highly flammable materials and are
hazardous. Even in the case of routine
operations, a ‘permit to work’ system is
in place and is strictly adhered to.
Toolbox talk is mandatory to create
the ethos, to revise well-known practices,
and to warm-up for a safe operation.
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Green tag system and Lock out Tag out
(LOTO) system is also rigorously fol-
lowed. For a non-routine operation (like
drilling exploration or High-Pressure
High Temperature well), DWOP (Drill-
ing Well On Paper) exercise is carried
out and hazard analysis is undertaken in
detail, including severity matrix and miti-
gation methods. This makes the people
and management prepared for any even-
tuality by revising the basics of process
safety.
Industry-specific safety measures (if
not available) must be developed and
rigorously followed by all sectors of the
chemical industry. There are no short
cuts to safety and safety has no holiday.
The recent circular from the Ministry
of Industries (issued post the LG Polymers
accident) regarding safe restart procedures
to be followed is a glaring example of
the lack of serious thought.
Partial failure of knowledge transfer
It is observed that for many mature
technologies transferred to the develop-
ing world, the effectiveness of know-
ledge transfer between generations of
engineers is not robust. With the comfort
of good safety track records of such mature
technologies, the current generation of
plant engineers often do not possess the
necessary practical understanding and
insights, which the earlier generations of
engineers – who were involved in plant
design and construction – possessed.
During the transfer of knowledge bet-
ween generations, a lot of key messages
gets inadvertently obscured.
We observe that, despite its invalu-
able role in the success of chemical manu-
facturing industry, technology transfer
remains a non-standardised process. It
remains a one-time activity, when the
technology is purchased, or transferred
from lab to plant, and no formal process
for technology transfer is standardised in
the later life of a plant. It is required to
Chemical Weekly May 26, 2020

develop, follow and execute a technical
standard for the same.
Audit failure
The rigour and discipline of audits
(plant audits, safety audits, management
audits) is supposed to take care of pro-
cedural lapses and bring back the disci-
pline. Audits, if conducted seriously, can
help correct many such lacunae. This
WhatsApp Group strongly feels that
most audits are now conducted with the
intent of securing certification, which
are mandated by statutory authorities or
the customer, and miss out on compre-
hensive corrective actions. This needs to
be redressed as a matter of priority.
The team feels that the following
good practices need to be seriously put
to implementation:
 Management commitment to conduct
business in safest and sustainable way.
 Repeated and consistent training to
employees on process sensitivities, in-
cluding safety awareness.
 Regular, frequent and comprehensive
safety drills.
 Sustained campaign on safety aspects
for all operations in business.
 Adequate funds and skilled manpower
to accomplish the tasks.
 Recognising and rewarding emplo-
yees who follow practices, and puni-
tive actions against those found to be
non-compliant.
 Comprehensive & brutally honest
audits (safety audit, systems audit &
overall management audit). In our
opinion, the ‘big rot’ lies here and must
be corrected as a matter of urgency.
Good audit practices, such as: not us-
ing the same auditor/auditing agency
for more than two years; no sample
audit, but comprehensive audit of all
aspects, every two years; financial
liability of auditors individually and as
agencies, for auditing failures; audit of
audits, etc., need to be implemented.
NIST/ISO standards available for
such purpose need to be implemented
Chemical Weekly May 26, 2020
Content
ruthlessly and improved, based on the
experience, in line with the word and
the spirit of the audit, by honest audit-
ing agencies. (Ref.: https://www.nistinsti-
tute.com/hse-audit-for-process-chemi-
cal-industries.php).
Seriousness in execution of warm
shut-down and warm restart
In the case of LG Polymers, we un-
derstand that this was not a normal shut-
down. It was unplanned shut down. Com-
pany could have approached government
and continued some operations, till it
was safe to shut down. The inventory
could have been reduced to safest levels.
The intermediate tank, after removal of
polymerisation inhibitor, should have
sprinkling system fitted to keep material
cooled during shut-down. There must be
round-the-clock monitoring of such tanks
for temperature and pressure. The opera-
ting personnel need to be adequately
trained, specifically for shut-down and
recommissioning.
It is observed that most managements
normally do not give the necessary atten-
tion to recommissioning; and push for rapid
production. The restart of a plant after
shutting down is most difficult, even more
difficult than the initial commissioning.
This is due to the presence of a big team
to supervise first commissioning of a plant
(Design, R&D, Projects, Instrumentation,
Maintenance etc). But in the case of plant
restart, it is only the core production team
that is involved. The restarting team rarely
know the amount of energy they are hand-
ling and hence can be negligent. Many a
times, auditors can find vital alarms being
bypassed. Training and commitment to
SOP are critical.
Human errors
Human errors cannot be the excuse
for industrial accidents. Experience shows
that human errors can be minimised
through multiple, interlocked actions such
as efficient supervision, pre-job safety
meetings, and comprehensive permit to
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work. The severity of such accidents man-
dates that chance of errors should be mini-
mized through automation, interlocks, and
controls.
Timely legal/punitive action
Prima facie it looks like there was
gross negligence on somebody’s part
while preparing to restart the closed plant.
The main reason for such casual attitude
is lack of concern for safety of fellow be-
ings – both inside and outside the plant.
The Bhopal accident is a glaring example
of how no one was deemed liable and the
guilty escaped unpunished. We sincerely
hope that those liable in this case are
brought to account. Timely punitive action
(including stringent actions as cancellation
of qualification/licence, ban on similar fu-
ture employment, financial liability etc.)
can prove to be strong deterrents to casual
approaches which some plant personnel
seem to take.
Change management
There are many changes made dur-
ing normal running and shutdown. These
changes must be authorised by expert
members of senior leadership team, and
operating personnel must be well trained
and informed about the changes made.
There must be a documented system
for the same, and changes should be re-
viewed by top management. It is very im-
portant to get HAZOP done before these
changes are implemented.
Learnings
Since the purpose of this analysis is
not to find the specific causes of the Vizag
accident, but to capture and consolidate
the learnings so that such accidents can be
avoided in the future, the team has listed
the main learnings. These may serve as
useful for practising chemical engineers,
designers and students of chemical engi-
neering and process safety, alike.
Continuous, comprehensive & rigorous
training
The plant personnel at all levels
141
 Special Report
should be repeatedly trained in all as-
pects of the process and tested repeatedly.
Training should be meant for all – from
plant management to the plant cleaning &
security personnel.
Extra focus on non-routine situations
and change management
Even situations which are extremely
uncommon, but possible, should be co-
vered in these trainings. The comfort and
familiarity developed by operating per-
sonnel through long stretches of no-loss-
time runs, which the plant must be rightly
proud of, should be questioned. Change
management is a critical aspect of non-
routine operations: it must be system
based, with proper authorisation, assign-
ment of responsibility, and interlocks for
checklist. Such change management pro-
cedures need to be emphasized periodi-
cally and revised on any plant upgrades,
overhauls etc. Standard safety pyramid
data based on near-misses to fatalities,
should be captured, analysed and shared.
Data and learnings from external plants
engaged in similar processes/products
must be captured and shared for learning.
Never underestimate a chemical/
material
Plant operating personnel must never
become complacent and feel that ‘we
have handled this chemical/material for
years, so nothing will happen.’ Treat
every chemical/material with the due
respect it deserves.
Know-what, Know-how, know-why
Establish a system for knowledge
transfer; and ensure that people con-
cerned have the know-what (what they
are supposed to do), know-how (how
they are supposed to do it) and know-why
(why they have to do it that way). The
responsibility with which people will
work, goes up by orders of magnitude
when they know-what-how-&-why.
Brutally honest audits
Ensure that companies use auditors
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Content
properly – whether for process, safety,
environment, quality, finance, or man-
agement. Never look at audits as a mere
means to get certification, or awards.
Never interfere with the auditors’ work;
demand a thorough audit; do not be de-
fensive; do not take short-cuts with audi-
tor’s comments and recommendations,
even if it takes time for implementation.
Change the auditors/audit team periodi-
cally, lest both parties develop a comfort
with each other, and compromise on the
audit quality. An auditor who agrees that
everything is okay in your plant is most
likely not to be doing his/her job to the
right extent of professionalism. Let the
auditors know that you want them to
be brutally honest. Auditors are critical
watchdogs for longer-term success.
Combination of punitive actions and
rewards
There will always be situations where
compromises are made in the interest of
short-term gains (such as meeting daily
volumes, costs). Management may ap-
preciate a production team for such
achievements, but simultaneously repri-
mand them for the shortcuts taken and
negligence. They should get a weighted
average of both these actions! Set up a
system to take timely punitive action on
such behaviour; and reward those who
honour and implement the correct way of
working. Let this message be made loud
and clear to all.
Additional suggestions
A few more suggestions:
Styrene is handled in India by seve-
ral PS manufacturers since 1956, but no
accident has occurred so far. The Vizag
plant is over 50-year-old and was taken
over by the Korean MNC LG Chemi-
cals, who are a knowledgeable in the
manufacture of PS. It is necessary for
the current owners to bring state-of-the-
art technology, SOP for safety standards,
and technical audits while operating and
further expansion in plant capacity. Up-
grading technology must be made man-
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datory for recording and monitoring of
critical areas of plant operation includ-
ing storage systems. Obsolete persona-
lised system of monitoring, which is a
routine practice followed in old plants,
must be replaced.
Government of India must restrict the
expansion of plants over 50 years old,
which are already depreciated. These
plants pose serious dangers to human
health, whenever actions fall short of ope-
rational standards. Environmental emis-
sion standards must also be comparable
with new plants elsewhere.
Government of India must also re-
strict/ban and impose financial disincen-
tives on organisations importing tech-
nologies older than, say, 25 years for
manufacturing chemicals in India.
List of contributors
The following ICT alumni contri-
buted to the discussion (in alphabeti-
cal order of names): Amberkar Vivek,
Bhirud B.V., Dharmadhikari Rajendra,
Gulati R.S., Kakade Vikas, Katti Sanjeev,
Kulkarni Nandkumar D, Kulkarni Sad-
guru, Kulkarni S.R., Mehta V.P., Mhatre
Mangesh, Narvekar Ravindra, Niranjan K,
Pai Raiturkar Avadhut, Phalak Kiran and
other members of the WhatsApp group:
UDCT B. Chem. Engg. 1978.
Coordinated and edited by Sadguru
Kulkarni and K Niranjan.
Contact for communication: sadguru.
kulkarni@gmail.com
DISCLAIMER
The authors do not claim to have
first-hand knowledge of the LG Polymers
accident. The information and comments
made above are based on their profes-
sional experience as practising chemi-
cal engineers. ICT is not associated with
this article and does not stand liable. The
authors do not stand liable for the use of
the information given in this document.
Chemical Weekly May 26, 2020