G.R. No.
112287 December 12, 1997 It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VLASONS SHIPPING, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 112350 December 12, 1997
VLASONS SHIPPING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, respondents
Doctrine:
The stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public
cannot justifiably be applied to a private carrier.
Facts: Plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Charterer and defendant Vlasons
Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner, entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby
NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the MV Vlasons I to make one voyage to load steel products at
Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor, Manila. The handling, loading and
unloading of the cargoes were the responsibility of the Charterer.
The skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets shipped were allegedly found to be wet and
rusty. Plaintiff, alleging negligence, filed a claim for damages against the defendant who
denied liability claiming that the MV Vlasons I was seaworthy in all respects for the carriage
of plaintiff’s cargo; that said vessel was not a “common carrier” inasmuch as she was under
voyage charter contract with the plaintiff as charterer under the charter party; that in the
course its voyage, the vessel encountered very rough seas.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers pursuant to
which there exists a presumption of negligence against the common carrier in case of loss
or damage to the cargo are applicable to a private carrier.
Held: No. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a
common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.
goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service
for a fee [Mendoza vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836, 842-843 (1952)]. A carrier
which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. “Generally, private
carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to
carry goods for the general public.
Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the ship owner’s obligations are governed
by the foregoing provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a
general rule, places the prima facie presumption of negligence on a common carrier.
G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PATERNO V. TAC-AN, BATANGAS CITY and
ADORACION C. ARELLANO, in her official capacity as City Treasurer of Batangas,
respondents.
FACTS: FPIC is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as
amended, to contract, install and operate oil pipelines. The original pipeline concession was
granted in 1967[1] and renewed bythe Energy Regulatory Board in 1992.In January 1995,
FPIC applied for a mayor's permit with the Office of the Mayor of Batangas City.
However, before the mayor's permit could be issued, the respondent City Treasurer
required FPIC to pay a local tax based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993
pursuant to the LGC. The respondent City Treasurer assessed a business tax on the FPIC
amounting to P956,076.04 payable in four installments based on the gross receipts for
products pumped at GPS-1 for the fiscal year 1993 which amounted to P181,681,151.00. In
order not to hamper its operations, FPIC paid the tax under protest in the amount
ofP239,019.01 for the first quarter of 1993.On January 20, 1994, FPIC filed a letter-protest
addressed to the respondent City Treasurer, alleging exemption under Section 133 (j) of the
LGC. City Treasurer denied the protest contending that FPIC cannot be considered
engaged in transportation business, thus it cannot claim.
ISSUE:Does Section 133 (j) of the LGC only refer to common carriers via land, water and
air AND via motor vehicle?
HELD: Respondent's argument that the term "common carrier" as used in Section 133 (j) of
the LGC refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water, is erroneous FPIC is already paying three
(3%) percent common carrier's tax on its gross sales/earnings under the National Internal
Revenue Code. To tax FPIC again on its gross receipts in its transportation of petroleum
business would defeat the purpose of the LGC.
G.R. No. 147246            August 19, 2003
ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE,
INC., respondents.
Facts: Wheat in bulk, was shipped by Marubeni American Corporation of Portland, Oregon
on board the vessel M/V NEO for delivery to the consignee, General Milling Corporation in
Manila.
The shipment was insured by the private respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance,
Inc. against loss or damage. The carrying vessel arrived in Manila and the cargo was
transferred to the custody of the petitioner Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc.
The petitioner was contracted by the consignee as carrier to deliver the cargo to
consignee's warehouse. On, 900 metric tons of the shipment was loaded on barge PSTSI
III for delivery to consignee. The cargo did not reach its destination.
It appears that the transport of said cargo was suspended due to a warning of an incoming
typhoon.
The petitioner proceeded to pull the barge to Engineering Island off Baseco to seek shelter
from the approaching typhoon. A few days after, the barge developed a list because of a
hole it sustained after hitting an unseen protuberance underneath the water. The barge was
then towed to ISLOFF terminal before it finally headed towards the consignee's wharf. Upon
reaching the Sta. Mesa spillways, the barge again ran aground due to strong current. To
avoid the complete sinking of the barge, a portion of the goods was transferred to three
other barges.
The next day, the towing bits of the barge broke. It sank completely, resulting in the total
loss of the remaining cargo. Private respondent indemnified the consignee.15Thereafter, as
subrogee, it sought recovery of said amount from the petitioner, but to no avail.
The private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for recovery of the amount of
indemnity, attorney's fees and cost of suit.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the private respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that it is not a common carrier.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is a common carrier
Held: Common Carrier.  Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done
on an irregular rather than scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common
carrier need not have fixed and publicly known routes. Neither does it have to maintain
terminals or issue tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a common carrier as laid
down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals.
The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In the case at bar,
the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering
its barges to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by
water for compensation.
G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondents.
Facts: Cendena was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying used bottles and scrap
materials in Pangasinan and brought these to Manila for resale.
He used two 6-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, he would load his vehicles
with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to Pangasinan.
For that service, he charged freight lower than regular rates. General Milk Co. contacted
with him for the hauling of 750 cartons of milk.
On the way to Pangasinan, one of the trucks was hijacked by armed men who took with
them the truck and its cargo and kidnapped the driver and his helper.
Only 150 cartons of milk were delivered. The Milk Co. sued to claim the value of the lost
merchandise based on an alleged contract of carriage.
Cendena denied that he was a common carrier and contended that he could not be liable
for the loss it was due to force majeure. The trial court ruled that he was a common carrier.
The CA reversed.
Issue: Whether or not Cendena is a common carrier?
Held: Yes, Cendena is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely
backhauled goods for other merchants, and even if it was done on a periodic basis rather
than on a regular basis, and even if his principal occupation was not the carriage of goods.
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity.
It also avoids making a distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
services on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does it make a distinction between a carrier offering its services to the general
public and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of
population.
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a
minibus owned by respondents.
While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping sound” was heard, and after a
short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondent’s
spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already
prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents.
Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed
a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental
suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead.
Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial
court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint.
The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not
entitled to damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether there was a valid waiver
(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages
Held:
(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her
cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the
first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may
not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need
to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the
vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but
that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too
signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the
import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against
the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an
injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute
and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common
carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported
waiver is offensive to public policy.
(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome this
presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised extraordinary
diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon
common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A
common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the
circumstances".
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of
respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's
refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound"
and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the
physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent
and his driver.
(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost
any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages on
the basis of speculation or conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is
another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly
as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the
face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily
integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier
is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as
a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe
that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.
Principles:
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him.[4] A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person
when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right
vested in such person.
We would have to conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be
regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly... against
the common carrier.
To exempt a common carrier from... liability for death or physical injuries to passengers
upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient
cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was
impossible to avoid. Any... participation by the common carrier in the occurrence of the
injury will defeat the defense of force majeure.
G.R. No. L-31379 August 29, 1988
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE CONCEPCION, respondents.
FACTS: Vicente E. Concepcion, a civil engineer doing business under the name and style
of Consolidated Construction had a contract with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
for the construction of the airport in Cagayan de Oro City Misamis Oriental.
Being a Manila-based contractor, Concepcion had to ship his construction equipment to
CDO through Compañia Maritima.
While the payloader was about 2 meters above the pier in the course of unloading, the 3. Weight submitted by Concepcion was entered into the bill of lading by Compania’s
swivel pin of the heel block of the port block of Hatch No. 2 gave way, causing the company collector, without seeing the equipment to be shipped.
payloader to fall.
4. Mr. Mariano Gupana, assistant traffic manager of petitioner, confirmed that the company
The payloader was damaged. Concepcion demanded a replacement of the payloader which never checked the information entered in the bill of lading.
it was considering as a complete loss because of the extent of damage, and filed a claim for
5. Weight of the payloader as entered in the bill of lading was assumed to be correct by Mr.
damages.
Felix Pisang, Chief Officer of MV Cebu.
Meanwhile, Compañia found that the payloader weighed 7.5 tons and not 2.5 tons as
Even if petitioner chose not to take the necessary precaution to avoid damage by checking
declared in the Bill of Lading. Compañia denied the claim for damages, contending that had
the correct weight of the payloader, extraordinary care and diligence compel the use of the
Concepcion declared the actual weight of the payloader, damage to their ship as well as to
"jumbo" lifting apparatus (which has a capacity of lifting 20 to 25 tons) as the most prudent
his payloader could have been prevented.
course for petitioner.
RTC dismissed the complaint with costs, stating that the proximate cause of the fall of the
The general rule under Articles 1735 and 1752 of the Civil Code is that common carriers are
payloader was Concepcion's act or omission in having misrepresented the weight of the
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods transported
payloader as 2.5 tons instead of its true weight of 7.5 tons, which underdeclaration was
by them are lost, destroyed or had deteriorated.
intended to defraud Compañia Maritima of the payment of the freight charges and which
likewise led the Chief Officer of the vessel to use the heel block of hatch No. 2 in unloading To overcome the presumption of liability for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the
the payloader. goods under Article 1735, the common carriers must prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as required in Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SHIPPER’S UNDERDECLARATION OF ACTUAL
WEIGHT OF THE PAYLOADER WAS THE PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE OF ITS The responsibility of observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
DAMAGE ABSOLUTELY EXEMPTING THE CARRIER FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. further expressed in Article 1734 of the same Code.
RULING: NO. While petitioner has proven that Concepcion did furnish it with an inaccurate
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires
weight of the payloader, petitioner is nonetheless liable, for the damage caused to the
the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or
machinery could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable skill and attention on its
destruction of the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery.
part in overseeing the unloading of such a heavy equipment.
It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to
And circumstances clearly show that the fall of the payloader could have been avoided by
use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for
petitioner's crew. Evidence on record sufficiently show that the crew of petitioner had been
shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage including such methods as
negligent in the performance of its obligation by reason of their having failed to take the
their nature requires."
necessary precaution under the circumstances which usage has established among careful
persons: While the act of private respondent in furnishing petitioner with an inaccurate weight of the
payloader cannot successfully be used as an excuse by petitioner to avoid liability to the
1. Petitioner used a 5-ton capacity lifting apparatus to lift and unload a visibly heavy cargo
damage thus caused, said act constitutes a contributory circumstance to the damage
like a payloader.
caused on the payloader, which mitigates the liability for damages of petitioner.
2. Laxity and carelessness of petitioner's crew in their methods of ascertaining the weight of
heavy cargoes offered for shipment before loading and unloading them, as is customary
among careful persons.
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO
VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping
Corp at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at
Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter to
unload the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. An
hour after the passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel the crane operator began
its unloading operation. While the crane was being operated, Viana who had already
disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded there. He
went back and while he was pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane hit him
pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane resulting to his death. A complaint
for damages was filed against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner
contends that Viana ceased to be a passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that
consequently his presence there was no longer reasonable. CA affirmed the trial court’s
order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had
already disembarked the vessel.
Ruling: YES. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock
or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and
prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by
the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the
presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his
cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier
is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford
them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed
a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
G.R. No. 118126 March 4, 1996
TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. RENATO T. ARROYO, respondents.
FACTS: Atty Renato Arroyo purchased a ticket from Trans-Asia Shipping lines, Inc. for the
voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de Oro from Cebu Sity. Upon boarding he
noticed that engines of the vessel were being repaired. Regardless, he boarded the same.
The vessel departed on time with only 1 engine running. It stopped near Kawit Island and
after half an hour of stillness, the passengers, who already were suffering from mental
distress, demanded that they be brought back to their port of origin.
At Cebu City, passengers who wished to disembark were allowed and given 10 minutes.
Atty. Arroyo as one of the passengers. After which, the vessel continued its voyage.
On this account, Passenger Arroyo filed before the trial court a complaint for damages
against Trans-Asia Shipping Inc. for failure of transporting the former to his place of
destination.
ISSUE: WON a vessel being unworthy of the sea is tantamount to a breach of contract?
HELD: Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the private respondent. That meant that the
petitioner was, pursuant to Article 1755 of the said Code, bound to carry the private
respondent safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case,
we are in full accord with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed to discharge this
obligation.
Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner undertook some repairs on the
cylinder head of one of the vessel's engines. But even before it could finish these repairs, it
allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two.
Moreover, even the lone functioning engine was not in perfect condition as sometime after it
had run its course, it conked out. This caused the vessel to stop and remain a drift at sea,
thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor. Plainly, the vessel
was unseaworthy even before the voyage began. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be
adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent
officers and crew. 21 The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its
vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article
1755 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO and VIRGINIA DE LA
VICTORIA, respondents
Doctrine: The carrier is liable for the damages to the full extent and not up to the value of
the vessel if it was established that the carrier was guilty of negligence, in failing to maintain
the ship as seaworthy and in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed
to carry. FACTS: Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son and niece. The
tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan. The Don Juan collided with the
M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC)
and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don
Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of the four
members of private respondents families were never found. Private respondents filed a
complaint in the RTC against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
damages for the death of their family members. The RTC ruled in favor of the complainants
and ordered petitioner to pay for the damages. The CA affirmed the said decision. ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable for damages to the full extent.
RULING:
YES.
The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for
injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of
maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. Petitioner is guilty of negligence in
(1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the
voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry
more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for
damages to the full extent. Prior to this case, a previous case was brought for the death of
other passengers. Said case is entitled Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court. In that
case it was found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of
the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it
found that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time
of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he
failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court
found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to
prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning
of the ship. Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in tolerating the
playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the ship
and failing to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within 10 to
15 minutes of its impact with the M/T Tacloban City. In addition, the Court found that the
Don Juan was overloaded. On the Doctrine of stare decisis: Adherence to the Mecenas
case is dictated by this Courts policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance
with the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
to relitigate the same issue.
G.R. No. L-30309 November 25, 1983
CLEMENTE BRIÑAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Quezon for his 55-
year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were
bound for Barrio Lusacan. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old
woman and her granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua, Victor Millan took
over as engineman, Clemente Briñas as conductor, and Hermogenes Buencamino as
assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at about 8:00 p.m, the train slowed
down and the conductor shouted 'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Because of that, the old woman
walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with one
hand and holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the
door, the train suddenly picked up speed. As a result the old woman and the child stumbled
and they were seen no more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at the next
barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the passengers who disembarked thereat.
The accused wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless
and imprudent manner, without due regard to existing laws, regulations and ordinances,
that although there were passengers on board the passenger coach, they failed to provide
lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the necessary precautions for the safety of
passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, as a result of which, they were over run, causing
their instantaneous death.
CFI Decision: CFI of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double
homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor
Millan. For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant Hermogenes Buencamino and
on the ground of reasonable doubt in the case of defendant Victor Millan the court hereby
acquits them of the crime charged in the information and their bail bonds declared
cancelled. As to the responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case, this will be
the subject of court determination in another proceeding.
CA Decision: Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court. During the
pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the heirs of
the deceased victims filed with the same court, a separate civil action for damages against
the Manila Railroad Company.
Issues: WON (1) the CA gravely erred in convicting petitioner-appellant under the facts as
found by said court; (2) the CA erred in including the payment of death indemnity by the
petitionerappellant, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, after the heirs of the
deceased have already commenced a separate civil action for damages against the railroad
company.
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop
was still a full three minutes ahead. The negligence of petitionerappellant in prematurely
and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of
Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo.
Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused
from criminal liability.
(2) No. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced is culpa contractual, not an act or
omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title
of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not
petitionerappellant Briñas Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are
two distinct sources of obligation.
A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action for
double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file an
independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad
Company.
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the separate civil
action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity in the
judgment of conviction against the petitioner-appellant.
It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the
following items of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim;
(2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper
cases. 

Ruling: (1) No. There is no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
conclusion drawn from those findings. It is undisputed that the victims were on board the
second coach where the petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the
train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up
and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the
train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child
stumbled and they were seen no more.