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Seeking common ground. Petroleum and

Indigenous Peoples in Ecquador's Amazon
Sixto Mendez , Jennifer Parnell & Robert Wasserstrom
Published online: 25 Mar 2010.

To cite this article: Sixto Mendez , Jennifer Parnell & Robert Wasserstrom (1998) Seeking common ground. Petroleum
and Indigenous Peoples in Ecquador's Amazon, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 40:5,
12-20, DOI: 10.1080/00139159809604587

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Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014
 A usual meeting took place at Arc0
ional Oil and Gas headquarters
, Texas, on 4 March 1994. Sit-
ting side by side around a conference
table, Indian leaders, oilmen, and envi-
ronmental advocates talked well into the
night. They discussed native land claims,
health care, and the lack of adequate
schools throughout the Oriente,
Ecuador’s Amazon region. At midnight
they reached a decision: They would pur-
sue a dialogue to resolve the issues sur-
rounding Arco’s proposed development of
the Villano oil field. Located deep within
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the Oriente, in a region of ~ a s t a z a

province known as Block 10, the Villano
field had become a battleground in the
often difficult and contentious relation-

PETROLEUM and ship between Arc0 and Ecuador’s indige-

nous Indian communities.
This agreement represented a major

INDIGENOUS turning point. A few years earlier, the

Organization of Indigenous Peoples of
Pastaza (OPIP),one of Ecuador’s most

PEOPLES powerful Indian federations, had

demanded a 15-year moratorium on
all petroleum exploration in Pastaza

in ECUADOR’S province. Yet that night in Plano, OPIP

representatives promised to work with
Arco. This article outlines the process by

AMAZON which that agreement was reached and

where it has led since 1994, assessing
what larger lessons Arco’s unique experi-
ence holds for hydrocarbon companies
working to build relationships with
indigenous peoples elsewhere. To build
such relationships in Ecuador, the com-

by Sixto Mendez, Jennifer Parnell,

and Robert Wasserstrom
 pany discovered, requires some appre-
ciation of history.
Setting the Stage: Ecuador’s
Amazon, 1964-88
In 1964, the Ecuadorian government
passed the Agrarian Reform and Colo-
nization Law. Recognizing the im-
mense disparities between the nation’s
upper-class landowners and its nearly
landless peasants, the law allowed im-
poverished farmers to receive under-
utilized or surplus fields annexed from
private estates. Throughout the An-
dean highlands, where most of these
estates (or haciendas) were located,
peasant communities slowly began to
petition for land, eventually forming
local and regional organizations to
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press for their rights under the law.’
Many hacienda owners, however,
filed lengthy and expensive lawsuits
that effectively blocked confiscation
of their properties. As a result, little
land actually changed hands, and what
acreage did tended to be the least pro-
ductive. Meanwhile, highland popula-
tions continued to grow.
Many senior Ecuadorian officials
argued that the solution lay in encour-
Native villagers in Pastaza at a meeting to discuss the environmental impact that foreign
companies will have on the surrounding lands.
14 ENVIRONMENT
aging landless highland peasants to
settle empty areas of the Oriente. Most
of the eastern rainforest had been
legally declared public land (open for
homesteading and colonization) since
at least the 1930s. The Agrarian
Reform and Colonization Law reaf-
firmed this declaration. It also creat-
ed a new government agency-the
Ecuadorian Institute for Agrarian
Reform and Colonization-which was
authorized to grant 50 hectares (125
acres) of forestland to any farmer who
put 65 percent of his tract to produc-
tive use.
The prospect of settlers drew heated
reactions from the lowland Indians liv-
ing in the Oriente. Most of these peo-
ple inhabited small, dispersed commu-
nities, often made up of no more than
one or two extended families, located
within territories that had been occu-
pied for centuries. Over hundreds of
years, they had developed a way of life
based on hunting and gathering and
shifting cultivation. In 1964, the ap-
pearance of the first wave of settlers
near the town of Macas threatened to
disrupt this existence, in which mini-
mizing ecological disruption guaran-
teed long-term survival.2
That same year, Shuar Indians living
in the rainforest adjacent to Macas
formed the Shuar Federation to defend
their territory and obtain legal title to
their lands.3 Subsequently, the pace of
colonization did slow for several
years, but the land race soon began
again in earnest. In 1973, the govern-
ment issued a stronger agrarian reform
law followed by a new homesteading
act in 1978, which included additional
inducements for settlers. Texaco lnc.,
on the heels of its 1967 discovery of it
major petroleum reservoir in Napo
province, built a new road into the
region, which effectively paved the
way for immigration.
As fresh waves of settlers streamed
down the road into Nap0 province i n
the 1970s, lowland Indian communi-
ties organized to resist the invaders.
They formed the Federation of Indige-
nous Organizations (FOIN) in Nap0 i n
1975 and OPIP in Pastaza province in
1979. In 1980, FOIN, OPIP, and the
Shuar Federation banded together to
create the Confederation of Indige-
nous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian
Amazon (CONFENIAE). This organi-
zation eventually united disparate
native federations in all five of
Ecuador’s Oriente provinces. In 1986,
CONFENIAE and several organiza-
tions of highland Indians founded the
Confederation of Indigenous Nation-
alities of Ecuador (CONAIE) to repre-
sent indigenous peoples throughout
the c o ~ n t r y . ~
In 1988, OPIP organized a bahe
group or local chapter in Villano, a
cluster of seven or eight comrnunitics
located in Pastaza province.s That
same year Arco and its partner Agip
acquired oil exploration rights (from
the Ecuadorian government) to an area
known as Block 10 (see Figure 1 on
page 15). This area included Villano.
The Block 10 project put Arco firmly
on a collision course with OPIP and
other indigenous groups. In relatively
short order, the company stood
accused of willfully violating indigc-
nous rights and causing widespread
environmental damageU6
June 1998
 Enter Arc0
Arco planned a four-stage explo-
ration of Block 10. It would first con-
duct a seismic study, followed by a
four- to six-month review of the data
attained. It would then drill at least
three exploratory wells in the most
promising locations and, if it discov-
ered an important reservoir, develop
and operate the field for roughly 20
years. Arco knew that it would have
to resolve many problems-some
small and some not so small-along
the way. For example, most of Block
10 lay in virgin rainforest or mature
secondary growth located at least 100
miles from the Trans-Ecuadorian
Pipeline System. If Arco discovered
oil, a feeder line would have to be
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built through sensitive and pristine
forestland to connect the field to the
pipeline. In 1988, however, company
representatives believed this and
other obstacles lay at least several
years ahead.
Arco’s successful operations in
other ecologically sensitive areas such
as the North Sea convinced company
managers that they could overcome
the environmental challenges of work-
ing in the rainforest. Even so, the strict
deadlines in Arco’s contract with
Ecuador’s national oil company,
Petroecuador, were a major concern.
These deadlines required Arco to com-
plete 1,200 kilometers of seismic
investigation within 24 months and to
conclude its entire exploration pro-
gram in just four years.
Arco hired an experienced seismic
contractor, Compagnie Gdnerale de
Gdophysique (CGG), to conduct the
fieldwork in Block 10. CGG began to
cut seismic lines in November 1988.
Following standard industry practice
at the time, CGG took no special
measures to contact indigenous com-
munities before it started work. In-
stead, as one former seismic crew
chief recalls, “As we got to each vil-
lage, we would walk in and ask them
what they wanted. Whatever they
asked for, we would do: hire a few
Volume 40 Number 5
Figure 1. Map of Ecuador includlng Block 10
Mxunti
II Ambato
PUYO
Block10
SOURCE: Arc0 Oriente, Inc.
local people, fix the airstrip, maybe
even build a school or clinic, or give
them school supplies or medicines.
As long as it was reasonable, we just
gave it to them.”7
Arco supported this approach,
which seemed to work well until April
1989, when CGG workers arrived
near Sarayacu, a Quichua Indian com-
munity located just outside of Block
10 but included within the seismic
program. The same crew chief re-
members initial contacts as friendly,
but when he returned to Sarayacu the
following week, he encountered sev-
eral angry OPIP officials. Demanding
compensation for trees that had been
cut and accusing CGG of driving fish
from the rivers and wild game from
the forest, they requested a meeting
with general managers from CGG,
Arco, and Petroecuador.
The Ecuadorian government quick-
ly sent two senior officials (accompa-
nied by mid-level representatives
from CGG and Petroecuador) to
negotiate “transit rights” through the
village. Involuntarily held for 12
1
SOUTH AMERICA
days, the delegation left Sarayacu
only after signing the Sarayacu
Accords. Among other things, the
accords called on the government to
end colonization and homesteading in
the rainforest, resolve disputed land
claims, place a 15-year moratorium
on petroleum exploration, grant
indigenous territories semi-auto-
nornous political status, and impose a
levy on oil production whose pro-
ceeds would go to indigenous com-
munities. The accords also estab-
lished a so-called Bilateral Com-
mission, composed of representatives
from indigenous organizations and
the Ecuadorian government, to report
on the status of native communities.
In retrospect, it seems clear that
OPE’ and the other federations de-
signed the accords to provoke a dis-
cussion of broader issues with the
Ecuadorian government rather than to
redress specific grievances related to
Arco’s operations in Block The
accords essentially amounted to what
one indigenous leader describes as a
way of “telling the government that
ENVIRONMENT 15
 they needed to begin a dialogue with
Indian organizations and other groups
on the country's oil policy and natu-
ral resources.'*
For Arco, however, the Sarayacu
Accords precipitated a significant
A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 1964-98
1964: 'l'he Agrarian Reform and Colo-
nization LAW is signed.
1967: Texaco makes a major petroleum
discovery in Niipo province.
1972: Texaco begins oil production at
the Shushufindi field in Sucumbios and
Nupo provinces.
1973: Agrarian Reform Law revised,
;illowiiig government to deprive benefi-
ciurics ot' land rights if they do not meet
production requirements; Indian com-
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munities and settlers begin cutting
m i t i r e forest in the Oriente to plant pas-
ture griisses.
19711: Aniazon Region Settlement Act
passes, declaring most of the Oriente
puhlic Iund.
December 1979: Organization of Indige-
nous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP) forms.
1980: Federation of Indigenous Organi-
zetions (FXXN), Federaci6n Shuar, and
OPIP fonn the Confederationof Indige-
nous Nationalities of' the Ecuadorian
Amazon (CONFENIAE).
1986: CONFENIAE and other groups
Ibmi the Confederation of Indigenous
Nalionalities of' Ecuador (CONAIE).
November 1987: Arco bids for explo-
ration and production rights in Block 10.
1988: OPIP organizes base group in Vil-
lanu, future site of Arco's major petrole-
um discovery; government awards Arco
Rlwk 10 exploration rights.
November 1988-May 1989: Arco's
seismic studies begin.
July IWk First phase of seismic stud-
ics completed.
August 1990: Ecuador's President
Rodrigo Borja refuses to repeal the Col-
onization Law or to grant Pastaza's
indigenous territories semi-autonomy.
October 1990: Arco begins building
exploration well at Moretecocha.
November 1990: Arco signs communi-
ry assistance agreement with Morete-
cwha.
January 1991: Exploratory drilling
hegins at Moretecocha.
Mid-1991:Moretecocha blocks con-
struction of airstrip, stalling Arco's work
16 ENVIRONMENT
change in plans. The company got per-
mission from the Ecuadorian govern-
ment to declare force majeure on its
seismic studies around Sarayacu. It
then amended its contract with Petro-
ecuador to exclude the disputed area
to demand additional benefits.
August 1991: Arco signs second com-
munity assistance agreement with
Moretecocha; agrees to allow University
of California, Berkeley (UCB) re-
searchers to evaluate its environmental
performance in Block 10.
August 1991September 1991: Villano
seismic work completed.
November 1991-January 1992: Vil-
lano exploratory drilling completed.
January 1992: UCB researchers visit
Ecuador.
March 1992: UCB researchers release
findings.
April 1992: OPIP organizes March to
Quito; demands recognition of semi-
autonomous territories in Pastaza and a
single land title to all indigenous com-
munities. Arc0 announces Villano dis-
covery.
June 1993: DIClP (later the Association
for Indigenous Development, Amazon
Region (ASODIRA)) forms.
July 1993 Arc0 signs Villano assistance
agreement with DICIP/ASODIRA.
September 1993: OPIP requests meet-
ing with Arco; ASODIRA protests
meeting: OPIP/Arco discussions break
down.
December 1993: OPIP convenes the
Villano Assembly.
January 1994: OPIP, CONFENIAE,
and CONAIE occupy Ministry of Ener-
gy and Mines in Quito to protest seventh
bidding round on exploration rights and
exclusion of native organizations from
major policy decisions.
February 1994: Minister of Energy and
Mines meets with CONFENIAE,
CONAIB. OPIP, and other indigenous
federations in Puyo to discuss oil policy.
4 March 2994: OPIP and Arc0 repre-
sentatives meet in Plano, Texas.
April 1994: OPIP, ASODIRA, and Fed-
eration of Indigenous Peoples of Pas-
taza, Amazon Region (FIPPRA) form
the Indigenous Front to negotiate with
Arco and Pemcuador.
May 1994: ArcoIAgip, Petroecuador,
and got back to work, completing the
rest of the seismic study.
In January 1991, Arco began
drilling its first exploratory well at
Moretecocha, a village located a few
kilometers from Sarayacu. The com-
the Ministry of Energy and Mines,
OPIP, FIPPRA, ASODIRA, CONFENI-
AE, CONAIE. and Oxfam America
meet at CONFENIAE's Union H;rw
headquarters.
June 1994: CONAIE organizes Nution-
al Mobilization for Life to prolest new
Agricultural Development Law that
transfers communal land titles to indi-
vidual property owners; demands mar+
torium on seventh bidding round.
21-22 September 1994: Technicd
committee's first meeting.
November 1994: ASODIRA informs
Arco that it will no longer accept OPIP
involvement in the Block 10 envimn-
mental assessment.
December 1994: Arco submits Villiino
development plan to Ministry of' Energy
and Mines.
January 1995: OPIP and FlPPRA
demand that Arco suspend all discus-
sions with ASODIRA.
April 1995: Ministry of Energy arid
Mines approves Villano development
plan.
Mny 1995: Arc0 declates force majeure
on Villano development until Petro-
ecuador agrees to build required feeder
link to Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline Systeni.
December 1995: Arco contracts wilh
FugroPetrokem to conduct retrospec-
tive environmental impact assessment.
May 1996: Eight niernhers of the
indigenous political party, Pachakutik-
Nuevo Pals, elected to Ecuador's Con-
gress.
March 1997: Arco resolves pipeline
dispute with Peuoecuador; issue&declil-
ration of commerciality signaling star1
of development phM.
June 1997: Arco rejects Fugro/
Petrokem's draft report; hires ENTRIX
to conduct second environmental assew-
ment.
April 1998 Ministry of Energy and
Mines approves Arco's environmental
impact assessment and management
plan; Arco begins construction of Vil-
lano field wd pipelines.
June 1998
 pany plugged and abandoned
that well after finding insuffi-
cient oil. In 1992 and 1994,Arc0
drilled two additional wells at
Villano, 25 kilometers to the
north of Sarayacu. There, it dis-
covered recoverable reserves of
200 million barrels of medium-
grade oil.

Sarayacu’s Aftermath
During the seismic studies,
Arc0 supported CGG’s “pay
whatever they ask as long as it’s
reasonable” approach. But when
the company decided to drill an
exploration well at Moretecocha,
it negotiated a formal community
assistance agreement with the Arco’s contract with the national utility, Petroecuador,set a strict deadline for the company to
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village. Signed in 1990and even- finish its explorationprogram in just four years.
tually extended through 1996,
this agreement required Arc0 to provide despite the researchers’ strong ties to Berkeley research team acknowl-
villagers with training in carpentry and OPIP and RAN. (Several months ear- edged that many of these issues had
sewing, medical services, and one air- lier, RAN, with OPIP’s blessing, had been re~olved.’~ It concluded that Ar-
plane flight per week to the provincial launched an international campaign to CO’Sconduct in Moretecocha and Vil-
capital in Puyo as well as direct finan- support the Quichua people of Pastaza lano “appears to represent a new envi-
cial support. province that attacked Arco’s opera- ronmental standard for oil exploration
Behind Arco’s willingness to negoti- tions in particular.) in Ecuador.”14
ate with Moretecocha lay its aware- The Berkeley team visited Ecuador
ness of a basic economic fact: Seismic in January 1992 and released its The Plot Thickens
studies might cost several hundred report two months later. The report
thousand dollars; drilling an explo- criticized Arc0 for failing to conduct Although it ended on this positive
ration well typically costs several mil- baseline environmental studies before note, the Berkeley report was widely
lion. For Arco, this greater level of beginning its seismic investigations cited as evidence of Arco’s poor con-
investment justified its support of larg- and for not issuing environmental Yet in the spring of 1992, the
er, longer-term community benefit guidelines to its contractors until well report was actually the least of Arco’s
programs. The company pursued a after exploration work had begun.” It problems. In April, OPIP organized u
similar strategy in Villano, where it also outlined the negative impacts of a highly publicized march to Ecuador’s
signed a community assistance agree- series of technical problems re- capital city Quito, calling international
ment in July 1993,’O searchers claimed had arisen during attention to its demands for a “plurina-
During this period, Arco continued the exploratory drilling and the recla- tional indigenous state.” OPIP wanted
working to resolve the issues OPIP mation of the abandoned well sites.12 the government to issue it a single title
raised at Sarayacu. In August 1991, at In particular, they noted that indige- to the land occupied by Pastaza’s
OPIP’s request, company representa- nous inhabitants reported a decrease indigenous communities (more than
tives met with Rainforest Action Net- in wild game near these sites; they 1.1 million hectares or 2.75 million
work (RAN) members and researchers also observed that Arco’s revegetation acres). This demand sparked angry
from the University of California Col- efforts at Moretecocha were largely demonstrations organized by settlers
lege of Environmental Design at unsuccessful. While faulting the com- and rival indigenous political groups,
Berkeley. OPIP wanted the Berkeley pany for its initial “lack of ecological including the Federation of Indige-
team to conduct an independent envi- understanding, weak environmental nous Peoples of Pastaza, Amazon
ronmental impact assessment of analysis and documentation, and inad- Region (FIPPRA).
Arco’s activities in Block 10. Arc0 equate procedures for consult[ing] In part, the antagonism between
agreed to participate in the assessment with indigenous communities,” the OPIP and FIPPRA can be traced to

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 17

 religious differences. Starting in the
late 1960s, U.S. Protestant missionar-
ies successfully converted large num-
bers of Quichua Indians and other
indigenous peoples in the region. Con-
versions typically involved extended
families and, in some cases, entire
Communities. Where villages split
between Protestants and Catholics,
one group often moved a short dis-
tance away to establish a separate
community and, in many cases, sepa-
rate political organizations. Most of
OPIP’s members were Catholic; how-
ever, FIPPRA’s membership was pre-
dominantly Protestant.
FIPPRA members in Moretecocha
were already embroiled in a territorial
dispute with Sarayacu residents when
Arc0 arrived on the scene. After the
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Ecuadorian government issued prelim-
inary land titles to the two villages in
1990, a group of Sarayacu men occu-
pied hillsides near the proposed site of
Pinrhuza village in Ecuador’s Oriente is home to Shuar Indians.
Arco’s exploratory well that had been
assigned to Moretecocha. They ac-
cused Arco of pulling strings with
government officials to get the land
assigned to the more sympathetic FIP-
PRA members.Ih
Similar events occurred in the com-
munities surrounding Villano. But in
18 ENVIRONMENT
mid-1993, all but one group out of 120
Catholic and Protestant families aban-
doned OPIP to form their own inde-
pendent organization, the Association
for Indigenous Development, Amazon
Region (ASODIRA, originally
DICIP). United in the hope of negoti-
ating a substantial community assis-
tance agreement with Arco, ASODI-
RA members openly admit they left
OPIP rather than agree to its demand
that they share benefits with other
communities in the region.”
The community assistance agree-
ment Arc0 signed with ASODIRA in
July 1993 infuriated OPIP. The feder-
ation accused Arc0 of deliberately
promoting ASODIRA’s creation as
part of a “divide and conquer” strate-
gy. Several years earlier, Ecuadorian
government officials had actively
encouraged alternative groups like
ASODIRA in an attempt to weaken
OPIP and other strong federations.I8
, nous communities title to their
b A
By negotiating with ASODIRA, Arc0
did appear to be doing the same thing.
However, W. Ken Keag, Arco’s then
resident manager in Ecuador, reports
that ASODIRA’s formation caught the
company equally off-guard.” In the
end, Arco’s managers in Ecuador
basically underestimated the political
impact of their actions. Nonetheless,
what they did merely confirmed
OPIP’s worst fears. To make matters
worse, when OPE’ approached Arco
in September 1993 to suggest opening
new discussions, ASODIRA refused
to participate.
Shifting Priorities
ASODIRA and OPIP’s battle over
community development funds in Vil-
lano mirrored many other indigenous
organizations’ struggles throughout
Ecuador during this time period.
By this point, the indigenous organi-
zations had won many of the battles
they originally set out to fight, suc-
cessfully focusing national and in-
ternational attention on land reform,
racial discrimination in basic govem-
ment services, and other political
issues.20 Under President Rodrigo
Borja (1988-92), the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment gave many indige-
lands and took important steps
toward eliminating inequali-
ties in education, health care,
and infrastructure.2’By 1992,
most observers concur, street
demonstrations and marches
had forced most of the prob-
lems that needed to be ad-
dressed by government action
onto the national agenda.22
Deeper, more intractable is-
sues lay beneath such prob-
lems, however. Building i t
road or schoolhouse is one
thing; eliminating poverty or
increasing family income is
another, As the government
began to eliminate outright
discrimination, indigenoul;
organizations faced new and
unfamiliar challenges. As a team of
Ecuadorian and international special-
ists wrote in 1992, “now that many of
the problems of land rights and cultur-
al marginalization have been amelio-
rated, both sympathetic outside
observers and local members wonder
if these organizations are becoming
June 1998
 remote from the pressing demands of
daily life,”23
Many federations foresaw the need
to begin focusing on community devel-
opment during the late 1980sand there-
fore sought financial and technical sup-
port from foreign nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) or other donors.
Slipshod management practices, inex-
perience, and a constant shortage of
resources, however, often conspired to
undermine nascent agricultural cooper-
atives, community stores, and other
ventures.24 As economic setbacks
mounted, federation leaders found
themselves accused of favoritism, dis-
honesty, or outright theft.
Such problems threatened OPIP
and FIPPRA’s relationship. With sup-
port from RAN, OPIP created the
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Amazanga Institute, a forum where

researchers and activists could work
out a regional development scheme.
OPIP earmarked a large part of
Amazanga’s budget to finance the
installation of a state-of-the-art com-
puterized geographic information
system (GIS)at its Puyo headquar-
ters. When President Borja rejected
OPIP’s demand for a single land title
to all of Pastaza’s indigenous com-
munities in May 1992, the rationale
for investing in the GIS system disap-
peared. Afterward, Villano and other
communities complained that the In Shushufindi,pipelines from the Lago Agrio oil rejinery interrupt the lamkcape.
money had been misappropriated or,
at the very least, that they had bene- with Petroecuador, Arc0 and its part- president refused to meet with them.25
fited little from 0PIF”s use of interna- ner Agip did not own the oil in Block Former OPIP officials, however, recall
tional donations. 10, even after the company invested all two meetings where Arc0 raised
This history partly explains the of the capital required to find and pro- “insulting” questions about their au-
political impact of Arco’s community duce it. As hired operators, they would thority to represent indigenous com-
assistance agreement with ASODIRA. be reimbursed for their expenses if oil munities in the region.26Rather than
In their defense, company representa- were to be found and paid in oil for bow to “unacceptable conditions that
tives felt obligated to negotiate with managing the Villano field. But trample the dignity of the future of
local landowners for access to com- Petroecuador had to approve every indigenous people in Pastaza,” as one
munal territory within Block 10, Over- dollar in Arco’s budget, including official wrote, OPIP convened a public
whelmingly, those landowners be- funds spent on local development and assembly of base-level leaders from
longed to ASODIRA, not OPIP. community relations. Hence, Arc0 had each of its 133 member communities
Petroecuador’s reluctance to deal to walk a fine line, conciliating Petro- to debate Arco’s presence in Block
with OPIP after the events in Sarayacu ecuador and meeting indigenous lead-
also played a part in the decision. Arc0 ers’ expectations. For addjtional perspectives on this
officials felt they could not afford to Under the circumstances, conflict article, turn to Commentary on
take such reluctance lightly. Under the was inevitable. Arc0 staff members
terms of their risk service agreement state that by late 1993, OPIP’s then

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 19

 I O.?’ The assembly took place in Vil-
lano in December 1993.
This gathering accomplished two
objectives. First, it demonstrated that
OPLP remained a strong organiza-
tion with a broad-based membership
throughout the province. Second, it
sent a message to ASODIRA that
OPIP intended to speak for all Indi-
ans in Pastaza, including those in Vil-
lano where at least one important
family retained its OPIP membership.
After three days of heated debate and
discussion, the assembly issued a
statement calling on Arco to “lessen
and avoid the social, cultural, and
environmental impact of its project
on native communities.”28
This declaration signaled a subtle
but significant shift in OPIP’s stance.
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014
Four years earlier in Sarayacu, OPIP
had demanded a 15-year moratorium
on petroleum activities. The organiza-
A Ii ’ o engineers designed Villano’s well and production facilities to be operated remotely, unlike the
ulternotivr shown here.
tion issued similar ultimatums in 1992
during the march to Quito. Now,
instead of opposing Arco outright,
OPIP’s leaders were asking the com-
pany to only “moderate” the impact of
its activities.
Despite this apparent change in atti-
tude, little was achieved at the January
I994 meetings between Arco repre-
20 ENVIRONMENT
sentatives and OPIP’s new president,
Hector Villamil. OPIP leaders contin-
ued to claim that Arco had created
ASODIRA to undermine them and
demanded that Arco agree to negotiate
solely with OPIP in the future.
In March 1994, RAN and Oxfam
America helped Villamil and another
OPIP leader, Leonard0 Viteri, travel
to the United States to plead their
case to advocacy groups and journal-
i s t ~ . At
* ~ the end of this trip, Oxfam
America and another nongovernmen-
tal organization, the Seventh Genera-
tion Fund, suggested that Arco
representatives and the two leaders
try meeting again at the company’s
Texas headquarters.
By this time, a new team at Arco had
turned its attention to Block 10. With
the exploration phase complete, an
operations group had come onto the
scene to begin preparing a develop-
ment plan for the Villano field. The
manager leading that group, Louis
Soileau IV, understood the need to
build a serious, long-term relationship
between Arco and the indigenous
communities that could last for the
next 20 years. Such a relationship was
the key to avoiding the kind of grind-
ing, daily conflict otherwise likely to
engulf the Block 10 project. Soileau
and his team knew they needed to
establish working relationships with a
broader range of stakeholders, includ-
ing OPIP and nongovernmental or-
ganizations like Oxfam America and
RAN. Villamil and Viteri, as one syni-
pathetic observer relates, realized that
to stay relevant to its base communi-
ties, OPIP had to provide them with
lasting economic benefits.30The Plano
meeting offered both parties the
opportunity to start fresh.
The Search for Common
Ground
At the Plano meeting, Arco repre-
sentatives and OPIP leaders outlined
two major objectives: minimizing the
environmental and social impacts of
oil production in Villano and creating
a plan to ensure the long-term wel-
fare of Pastaza’s indigc-
nous communities. “We all
agreed that we had no desire
to see another Nap0 pro-
vince,” Soileau recently
recalled. “But to avoid that,
we had to lay out a plan for
future resource develop-
ment here.”31
The Arc0 team also want-
ed to resolve an outstanding
problem raised two years
earlier in the Berkeley re-
searchers’ report: the lack of
baseline environmental stud-
ies on Block 10. The team
knew the time for such stud-
ies had passed, but wanted to
conduct a retrospective en-
vironmental impact assess-
ment. This assessment, in
addition to being a gesture of
good faith, could provide a baseline for
future development and production
activities around Villano.
The Plano meeting attendees
agreed. Acknowledging the need to
involve other stakeholders in future
discussions, they decided to form a
subcommittee with representatives
(continued on puge 3b)
June 1998
 ~~

Common Ground
(conrinuedjiwt page 20)
~ ~
The committee, composed of three widely from that of Arco, Agip, and
Petroecuador representatives, three Petroecuador. Arco arrived at the
Arco/Agip officials, and two members meeting hoping to approve a general
each from OPIP, RPPRA, and plan for the environmental impact

from Petroecuador, ASODIRA, and
FIPPRA to flesh out the assessment’s
terms. A second subcommittee would
examine near- and mid-term commu-
nity assistance opportunities within
Block 10. A larger group, including
perhaps the local government and
other companies operating in Pastaza,
would be invited to help explore
options for long-term development
planning and resource use.
Before they adjourned at midnight,
the Plan0 group wrote a sim-
ple, five-point memorandum.
In it, OPIP agreed to prepare a
proposal for an initial devel-
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014
ASODIRA, had three immediate
responsibilities: define the scope of
Arco’s retrospective environmental
impact assessment; set the level of
indigenous organizations’ participa-
tion in this study; and =view the qual-
ifications of prospective envhnmen-
tal contractors. As operator, Arco
would select the winning bidder. The
committee would then draft terms for
the scope of the study and Arco’s envi-
ronmental management plan for the
assessment in Block 10 and agree on
selection procedures for potential con-
tractors. The indigenous groups’ pro-
posed agenda articulated very differ-
ent priorities, namely the need to
commit financing for the development
plan. Indigenous leaders wanted near-
ly $150,000 to conduct their own envi-
ronmental/community study and train-
ing Program.
Company representatives ultimately
suggested that senior managers at

opment fund to finance the

territorial plan.32 It also prom-
ised to seek a consensus
among the three organizations
representing indigenous com-
munities in Pastaza. Arc0
agreed to seek Petroecuador’s
support for further discus-
sions and to encourage
ASODIRA to talk with O P E
The company also promised
to considerestablishinga fund
to finance the long-term re-
gional development plan.
Lastly, participants agreed to
schedule a meeting in Ec-
uador between all concerned
groups for the following
month, and stipulated that
Oxfam America would be Indigenous rechnical committee members became involved in operations at Villano as trained
“environmentalmonitors.”
allowed to attend as an inde-
pendent observer. Villano field, incorporating basic Arc0 and Petroecuador should take up
After several delays, this second socioeconomic and cultural infoma- these funding proposals separately.
meeting took place in May at CONFE- tion that could be later used in design- After much negotiation, the parties
NIAE’s Union Base headquarters. The ing a long-term community develop agreed that the technical committee
meeting attracted representatives from ment program. would only address environmental
CONAIE, CONFENIAE, Oxfam, issues and that a higher-level group
OPIP, ASODIRA, and FIPPRA. as would deal with financial support and
A Wrench in the Works
well as Arco, Agip. Petroecuador, and community development issues. This
Ecuador’s minister of energy and After a series of delays, the techni- higher-level group came to be known
mines, Francisco Acosta. With Acos- cal committee held its first meeting on as the Political Front.
ta’s blessing, attendees drafted an 21-22 September 1994. At this gather- Before concluding the meeting, the
agreement formally establishing a ing, OPIP, FIPPRA, and ASODIRA committee members signed a general
technical environmental committee. presented an agenda that diverged work program for the environmental

36 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 to minimize ecological disrup-
tion, company engineers de-
signed the well and production
facilities to be operated re-
motely from a town near Puyo,
applying a variation of an off-
shore production model devel-
oped for one of Arco’s North
Sea operations.
The escalating conflict
threatened to derail the techni-
cal commission’s work. Arco
resident manager W. Ken Keag
sent a letter to all three groups
reasserting that the company
had the right to proceed with
its development plans (once
the relevant permits were
issued) whether or not the
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014

environmental assessment was

ever completed. He wrote “the
Most of Block 10 is covered by virgin rainforest or mature secondary growth. Arco eventually indigenous organizations have
decided to build a roadless pipeline at Villano to minimize ecological disruption. once again imposed various
conditions that must be ful-
assessment and finalized selection Several factors precipitated this filled before the next meeting can take
procedures for potential contractors. conflict. After returning from Plano, place. We want to emphasize that the
In addition, they agreed to review a OPIP did try to unite the three organi- work of the Technical Commission is
long list of consulting f m s whose zations as Arc0 had asked. It invited not a process of negotiation, but rather
credentials met initial screening cri- FIPPRA and ASODIRA to form a an effort of mutual c~operation.”’~
teria. With the ground rules for mak- new alliance called the Indigenous Keag’s letter apparently broke the
ing technical decisions in place, Front. FIPPRA and ASODIRA agreed logjam. ASODIRA withdrew its
members agreed to meet again on 12 and the Front did prepare a prelimi- threat, and OPIP and FIPPRA backed
December 1994 to designate the nary document describing its plans for down. The technical committee,
short list of consultants. an integrated environmental manage- including all representatives from the
A few weeks later, Arc0 officials ment and community development three federations, met again in late
received a letter from ASODIRA’s plan. But internal differences inter- January 1995 to start drafting the envi-
president Hector Mayancha that total- vened to upset this alliance. ASODI- ronmental assessment’s final outline.
ly surprised them. The letter an- RA wanted Arco to build a road con- Committee meetings continued over
nounced ASODIRA’s categorical necting Villano to the main highway the next few months and members
rejection of OPIP’s continued partici- 35 kilometers (20 miles) away. OPIP selected three potential contractors to
pation in planning the environmental opposed this proposal in light of conduct the study.
assessment. Noting that OPIP and indigenous experience in Nap0 pro- In April 1995, the Ministry of Ener-
FIPPRA had each asked to delay the vince where potential squatters used gy and Mines approved Arco’s devel-
12 December meeting until January, the road built by Texaco to invade opment plan for Villano. Instead
Mayancha suggested going ahead native territory. According to Mayan- of mobilizing to begin construction,
without both other groups. In re- cha, ASODIRA members interpreted however, the company again declared
sponse, OPIP and FIPPRA removed these objections as yet another exam- force majeure, this time because
ASODIRA as co-sponsor of the pro- ple of OPIP’s indifference to their Petroecuador could not promise to
posed integrated community develop- needs. “If it were up to OPIP,” he said, build a required feeder line from the
ment plan and resubmitted it to Arco. “we would be walking around naked. Villano oil field to the Trans-Ecuador-
They also demanded that the company They don’t want anything to ian Pipeline. Pending resolution of
recognize them as the sole legitimate change.”33Arco’s ultimate decision to this issue, the project remained in
representatives of Pastaza’s indige- build a roadless pipeline at Villano limbo for almost two years until
nous communities. only intensified this feeling. Anxious March 1997, when Arc0 finally issued

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 37

 a declaration of commerciality signal-
ing the start of work.
During this 20-month hiatus, com-
mittee members focused on refining
the environmental assessment study,
reviewing contractor qualifications,
and setting standards for fieldwork.
In December 1995, Arco selected
Fugro International and Petrokem (an
Ecuadorian firm) to jointly conduct
the study. Thereafter, Arco and
FugroPetrokem trained indigenous
representatives to the technical com-
mittee as field technicians so that they
could assist in data collection, analy-
sis, and research design.
FugroPetrokem completed the
fieldwork and submitted its draft
report to the committee in December
1996. After a lengthy review, nearly
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014

everyone on the technical committee

agreed that the work did not include
key biological and social data. In
particular, indigenous representatives
were concerned that botanical invento-
ries were incomplete and that impor-
tant local species were missing. Virtu-
ally all other members agreed. The
committee sent a list of corrections
and other issues the final report need-
ed to address to FugroPetrokem in
June 1997.
By this time, however, Arco had
issued its declaration of commerciality
and had begun to design the environ-
mental impact study and long-term
environmental management plan for
construction and operations at Villano.
Rather than wait for a revised Fugro
study, the technical committee mem-
bers decided that missing data should
be collected as part of this new inves-
tigation. With committee endorse-
ment, Arco contracted with Houston-
based Entrix to complete the impact
study and train indigenous committee
members as “environmental monitors”
in the field. It also hired 30 additional
Indians- I0 from each organization-
as part of its workforce. The environ-
mental impact study began in Septem-
ber 1997 and was completed in March
1998. Arco’s environmental permit
was approved one month later.
Arc0 needed to find the most environmentally sound way to connect the oil field in R l o d
10 to the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline System, some 100 miles away.
Assessing the Technical
Committee
Not surprisingly, technical commit-
tee members offer widely different
assessments of the group’s success.
Arco believes the committee has ful-
filled its main purpose, serving as an
effective communications channel
between the company and indigenous
organizations. Arco’s operations man-
agers knew that once the Villano
development began, it would have a
major impact on indigenous commu-
nities. The technical committee
offered a way for them to involve
“indigenous people in the process
[which was desirable] because they
have a lot of [unique] knowledge
about their envir~nment,”~~ Although
external politics and internal rivalries
have complicated the committee’s
deliberations, Louis Soileau of Arc0
believes the results have justified the
effort: “It was a slow, painful process,
but I always felt that anything we
could do to get people to sit down and
talk to each other was better than not
talking to each other.’’36
OPIP’s Leonard0 Viteri expresses
similar sentiments. Viteri thinks the
committee helped OPIP accomplish
one of its explicit objectives. “When we
went to Plano, we had several objec-
tives in mind, one of which was to
make sure that our organizations, espe-
cially our technical people, would be
broadly involved in planning, imple-
menting, and monitoring the environ-
mental management program in Block
He also believes working on the
committee has fostered transparency
and trust: “I think we have taken big
steps [and while] we haven’t complete-

38 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 ly reached our goal yet, we’re getting
there.”’R Hector Mayancha, ASODI-
RA’s president, concurs.
Petroecuador and the energy min-
istry representatives, however, ques-
tion the utility of involving nonspe-
cialists with little formal training in
technical environmental management
decisions. One former senior official,
who has served on the committee
since its inception, stated that “com-
panies like Arco can’t operate in
Ecuador unless they meet strict envi-
ronmental requirements that are set
by law. We really don’t need another
level of review by groups or organiza-
tions that have no technical qualifica-
Petroecuador specialists
share these opinions. “We’re still
waiting to see if these dialogues real-
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014
ly bear fruit,” one of them comment-
ed recently.40
Arco acknowledges the validity of
these reservations. Indeed, one for-
mer staff member recently recalled
that at the outset “there were people
who felt the dialogue was wasted
effort. . . . Our contract said that the
government was supposed to deal
with the Indians; we were there only
to develop the Yet Arc0 now
sees the technical committee as a
model for resolving potential contro-
versies and ensuring community par-
ticipation in project planning.
Future Challenges
Even so, indigenous representatives
to the committee still believe they
continue to operate at a disadvantage
concerning access to technical infor-
mation. First, Petroecuador deter-
mines which technical documents the
committee can discuss and review,
and indigenous committee members
complain that it has taken a relatively
restrictive and bureaucratic approach
to disclosure. Second, they feel that
they do not always have the training
or background they need to adequate-
ly address complex technical ques-
tions. Third, they chafe at the limits
imposed on their ability to shape the
Volume 40 Number 5
Block 10 environmental management
program. Arco reserves the right to
choose the environmental contractors
after consulting with the committee,
and the company does not involve the
committee in its budget decisions.
Lastly, indigenous committee mem-
bers wonder why discussions of the
size and shape of the Pastaza regional
development plan have yet to make
the agenda.
For its own part, Arc0 remains
troub- led by the indigenous organiza-
tions’ lack of unity. After three years,
they still do not speak with a single
voice. Old divisions appear to lie just
below the surface and could easily
erupt once a major issue like the
regional development plan finds its
way to the table. The indigenous rep-
resentatives acknowledge such fears
are well-founded. ASODIRA presi-
dent Hector Mayancha, for example,
feels that working within the technical
committee has helped overcome
“about half of the earlier distrust”;
OPIP’s Leonard0 Viteri puts the level
closer to “60 or 70 percent.”42Still,
both OPIP and ASODIRA are contin-
uing to prepare separate regional
development plans.
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Competing models for the develop-
ment plan also spark some concern.
ASODIRA and FIPPRA favor a model
that would focus exclusively on Block
10 communities and evolve from a
diagnostic study into a 20-year pro-
gram, sponsored by Arco, to improve
health, education, and household
incomes. The second model, favored
by OPIP, takes a much broader
approach. This model incorporates a
type of trust fund that could be used by
all of Pastaza’s indigenous communi-
ties. OPE’ claims the fund could be
underwritten initially by assessing a
levy on oil production (on the order of
$2 per barrel). This levy could be
expanded later to include income from
logging companies and other sources.
With a constant stream of income,
indigenous communities would have
the resources to implement, manage,
and direct their own integrated sus-
tainable development plans.
Both models raise a number of troub-
ling issues, perhaps the most pressing
of which is figuring out a system
whereby remote communities rather
than a bureaucracy of professional
leaders in the provincial capital can
play a meaningful planning and deci-
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ENVIRONMENT 39
 sionmaking role. Leaving aside the
fact that national legislation would be
required to impose a levy on oil pro-
duction, OPIP faces an uphill battle
on this count. The organization’s
membership embraces more than 100
widely scattered communities located
in half a dozen major watersheds. In
the past, OPIP has been most success-
ful in mobilizing broad support for
political initiatives, such as the 1992
March to Quito, or more recently, the
Women’s March to Save the Rainfor-
est in October 1997. Even sympathet-
ic observers admit OPIP has had
much less success designing and man-
aging community development initia-
t i v e ~Unless
. ~ ~ OPIP can build internal
consensus for its economic proposals,
it will likely face growing conflict and
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014
opposition within its own ranks, as its
I2 regional associations (or fragments
of those associations) fight over
potential benefits. Recognizing this
danger, Arc0 has offered to hire spe-
cialists in participatory community
development planning.
In the final analysis, despite three
years of cooperative effort, suspicions
toward Arc0 persist. During the almost
two year period of force majeure (May
1995-March 1997), Arc0 reduced its
involvement and trimmed its expenses
in Ecuador to the bare minimum.
Although Arc0 representatives contin-
ued to meet with the technical com-
mittee, they consistently postponed
any discussion of long-term develop-
__ ____
OIL UPDATE
In February 1998, Petroecuador
allocated a further block of land,
known a8 Block 24. to Arco. On 27
April 1998, Arco signed an agree-
ment with the Ecuadorian govem-
ment for the rights to explore the
area and drill for oil. Early reports
estimate reserves of 120 million
bamls within the block. Petro-
ecuador projects that Arc0 will
invest $6 million to develop and
drill in the area, beginning in early
1999.
__
40 ENVIRONMENT
ment options or plans. In retrospect,
according to Herbert Vickers (Arco’s
current resident manager in Ecuador),
this decision was a mistake: “Arco
compromised the effectiveness of [its]
initial agreement because we waited
for three years to talk about the most
important issues. This has created an
atmosphere of mistrust. [As a result],
every new piece of work we undertake
requires new negotiation.”44
Arc0 has tried to address these prob-
lems. In March 1997, it invited spe-
cialists from the regional office of the
United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization’s Forest, Trees, and Peo-
ple Program to conduct a workshop
for technical committee members on
participatory methods for managing
socioenvironmental conflicts. Indige-
nous committee members found this
workshop particularly useful because
“our organizations suffer from a lack
of people who are trained in conflict
management, negotiation, and resolu-
~ ~ currently plans to spon-
t i ~ n . ”Arc0
sor additional workshops and other
initiatives involving communities
throughout Pastaza in an effort to fos-
ter a culture of dialogue.
Lessons Learned
Technical committee members all
point out that face-to-face discussions
laid the foundations for resolving
major issues. Despite false starts and
missed opportunities, the committee
has provided an arena where OPIP,
ASODIRA, FIPPRA, Arco, and
Petroecuador have learned to find
common ground. Many committee
members have come to appreciate that
one group’s gain is not necessarily
someone else’s loss. This represents
an essential step in reforming the cul-
ture of confrontation built on the polit-
ical calculus “if you win, I lose” that
has traditionally prevailed in Ecuador
and elsewhere in Latin America.
Arc0 has realized that it and all
other hydrocarbon companies need to
be smarter about local politics. “When
foreign companies come to Ecuador,”
one deputy energy minister recently
observed, “they have absolutely no
understanding of [our] politics. In fact,
they don’t want to understand. They
don’t think it’s their job.”46 In Arco’s
experience, Ecuadorian government
officials frequently encouraged this
view, finding a variety of reasons to
exclude indigenous organizations
from discussions about Block 10. Nev-
ertheless, the ongoing dialogue facili-
tated by the technical committee has
helped Arc0 develop its own perspec-
tive on the indigenous communities,
environmental groups, and other
stakeholders in Pastaza province. This
perspective has enabled the company
to take the initiative in trying to
resolve conflicts.
Throughout Latin America, indige-
nous organizations, environmental
groups, and nongovernmental organi-
zations have objected to oil projects on
environmental grounds to focus public
attention on social and economic ques-
tions. This strategy has generally paid
off, but at the price of confusing real
technical problems with thornier
issues of sustainable development,
stakeholder equity, and grassroots par-
ticipation. The technical committee
has helped Arc0 and its partners avoid
this pattern. The technical training
indigenous organizations and their
members have gained has enabled
them to better distinguish between real
ecological threats and more routine
environmental challenges, thereby
strengthening their ability to act and
negotiate as equal partners.
In the long run, forums like the
Block 10 technical committee, which
facilitate discussions between compa-
nies and indigenous communities
about social, political, and environ-
mental issues, play an enormously
positive role in demonstrating a com-
pany’s good faith-the most basic arti-
cle of sound and morally responsible
business practice.
Sixto Mendez, lewifer Pamell, and Robert Wahscr-
strom are, respectively, manager of environment,
health. and safety for Arc0 Oriente in Quito. Ecuador;
senior environmental engineer for Arco in Plsno.
June 1998
 Texus: and senior p m r in The Terra Group. an inter-
national consulting fimr in Houston. Texas.
NOTES
I. For a brief discussion ofthe 1964 h w and its impact
on highland Indians, see M. H.Selverston,“The Poli-
lics of Culture: Indigenous Peoples and the State in
Ecuador,” in D. L. Van Cott, ed.. Indigenous Peoples
wid Denwwcy in h t i n America (New Ymk: The
Inter-American Dialogue, 19941, 131-52.
2. For a case study of Indians’ responses, scc T. Mac-
donald, “Indigenous Response to an Expanding Fmn-
tier: Jungle Quichua Economic Conversion to Cattle
Ranching,” in N. Whitten Jr.. ed., Cultural lkansforma-
tion.$and Ethnicity in Madern Ecuador (Urban& 111.:
University of Illinois prtss. 1981). 35-3. A mom
extensive discussion is included in T.Macdonald, De
cmtrJorrs a ganadem (From hunters to cattlemen)
(Quito. Ecuador: EdicioncsAbyaYah. 1997).
3. For a description of these events, see E. Salazar. An
Indiun Fedemtion in Lowland Ecuador. WGIA Docu-
ment 28 (Copenhagen, 1977); and, mom recantly, E.
Salazar. “La federacih shuar y la fmntera de la colo
nizaci6n” (The Shuar Federation and the settlement
frontier) in N. Whitten Jr. ed.. Amaz& ecuatoriana:
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014
1 I. Ecuador’s govemment first reguired envimnmental
impwt evaluations in 1994.
12. After an internal analysis of the rew’stechnical
objections, Arc0 decided that most were either ex*
gcratcd or untrue. par exalnple. mosl oflhe Berkeley
group’s recommendations focused on environmental
assessment pmceduns and recordkeeping and Arco
had voluntarily implemented an assessment p r o w s by
chs timethe Momtacochawell was drilled (that is. lhret
years before such assessments were requimd by
Ecuadorian law). Moreover, Arc0 managers flatly dis-
aped with the gmup’s judgment h t A m ’ s environ-
mental studies “failad to target the m a t significant
issues for investigation:’ as the report charged. Compa-
ny officiols also pncsivsd the Berkeley team’s criti-
cism of their envimnmentd assessment pmcedums as
unjustified. Arc0 had hired qualified independent con-
tractors to conduct envimnmenlalstudies for each of its
exploratory wells and had implemented extensive
reforestation programs at Villano and Moretecocha
when commercial deposits of oil had not betn found.
13. S. McCreary et al., ‘‘Indepdent Review of Emi-
mnmental Documentation for Petroleum Exploration
in Block 10,Oriente. Ecuador” (paper prepaml for the
University of California at Berkeley. College of Envi-
ronmental Design, 17 June 1992). 1.
14. Ibid., page 37.
15. For an example. scc ViUunil, note 8 above.
with the authors. July 1997.
31. Louis Soikau 1% manager of operations.A m , DaI-
Ias. Texas, interview with the authors, June 1997.
32. AKO Oriente, “Meeting of Arc0 and tha wmia-
tion of Indipnous Peoples of prstaaa, Plano. Texas,
Merch 4. 1994,” (unpublished memorandum, Quito,
Ecuador).
33. Hector Mayancha, note 17 above.
34. W.K.Keag, “A 10s miembms dc las organizwiones
indlgenas ante la Comisi6n TCcnica Ambiental para el
Blque 10 opedo por el Consorcio WAgip:’ (Tb
the members of indigenous organizations represantcd
on the Technical Environmental Committee for Block
10 by the M A & Cansortium)AOl-Ol2-95
(Quito, Ecuador, 13 January 1995).
35. Louis Soileau IV, note 31 above.
36. bid.
37. Leonardo Viteri, note 9 above.
38. Ibid.
39. Oiovanni Rossuria. former subsecretary for envi-
ronmental protection, Ministry of Energy and Mines,
Quito, Ecuador, interview with the authors, August
1997.
40. Oswaldo Tapia, Petroecuador’s contracts unit.
Quito, Ecuador, interview with the authors. July 1997.
41. Louis Soileau IV, note 31 above.

La utra caw drl pmgroso (Ecuadorian Amazon: The
other face of pmgnss) (Quito. Ecuador: Ediciones
Abya Yala. 1989).
4. For a brief history of indigenous organizations in
Ecuador, see M. Becker, “Nationalism and Pluri-
Nationalism in a Multi-Ethnic State: IndigenousOrga-
nizations in Ecundnr‘‘ (paper presented at the Mi-
America Conference on H i s t q nt the University of
Kansas, Lawrence, 17-19 September 1992). See also
CONAIE. CONAIE: A Brief Histmy (document pub-
lished on Nativeweb at <http:/hvww.nativewe~o~
abyayala/cullures/ecuador/conaie/conaiel .html>,
1992).
5 . “Villano” refers to a cluster of m e n or eight com-
munities, including amund 300 families, located near
an old airstrip of the same name. OPIP was founded in
a village called Santa Cecilia.
6. Rainforest Action Network first published these alle-
gations in 1990. For a summary, see S. Sawyer,
“Indigenous Initiatives in Petmleum poliflcs in the
Ecuadorian Amazon.” Culrural Survival Quarterly 20,
no. l(1996): 26-30.
7. Gustava Gamboa. former COO seismic operations
field supervisor, Quito, Ecuador, interview with the
authors. July 1997.
K. For an indigenous perspwtive on Sarayacu, scc H.
Villamil. “El manejo del conflictocon las petroleras: El
CLLPO de la ARCO-OPIP (Conflict management with
oil companies: The case of Arco-OPIP) in A. Vam,
ed., Mamu negra en la amazonia (Black tide in the
Amazon) (Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya Yala,
1995). 339-66. A summary of the Sarayacu agreements
is included in P. Oniz, “Cultuns y Muniento de con-
flictos socioambientales” (Management of sociocnvi-
ronmental conflict) (unpublished manuscript. Quito,
Ecuador. 1997). In June 1990. CONAIE and CONFE-
NlAE published a follow-up document, ”R~puesta
paru poner en marcha el acuerdo de Sarayacu” (Pm-
poaal to implement the Sarayacu Accords) which may
be found in 1. Juneosa. comp., Docwnentos indlar
(Indian Documents) (Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya
Yda, 1991), 171-87.
9. Leonardo Viteri. f m e r OPIP president. Puyo.
Ecuador, interview with the authors, July 1997.
10. The other clement in this calculation is risk. Arc0
onicials note that they arc generally willing to make
jpater investments in community programs during
exploration activities when they believe there’s a high
probability of finding commercial hydrocarbon
deposits.
42. Leonard0 Viteri. note 9 above.
16. Gamboa, note 7 above.
43. Pablo Ortfz and Victor Upcz, Quito, Ecuador,
17. Patricio Manya, former ASODIRA president. Shell. interview with the authors. July 1997.
Ecuador, interview with the authors. May 1995; and
Hector Mayancha, ASODWA president, Puyo. 44. Herbert Vickers, resident manager, Arco, Quito.
Ecuador. interview with the authors. July 1997. Ecuador. interview with the authors, July 1997.
45. Leonudo Viteri. note 9 above.
18. See T. M.odmrrld. Eeuador’r &wland Quichua
Indians:An Amazonian Response to Political and Envi- 46. Jorge AlbBs. deputy energy minister, Quito.
mnmental Change (New York: Allyn and Bacon, in Ecuador, interview with the authors, August 1997.
PlW.
19. W. Ken b a g . Arc0 resident manager, London,
O T S1997.
England. interview with the ~ U ~ ~ July ,
20. For an extremely hcid account of this pnmsa, sec
A. Bebbington et al., ‘The Evolution of Indigenous
Federations in Ecuador:’ Grassmots Development 16, announces its 1998 edition of
no. 2 (1992): 11-20.
2 1. For a sympatheticdiscussion of Borja’s policies by
Water in the West.
a former education minister, see R. Vallejo, Crdnica
mestiza del nuevo Pcrchakutik (Mestizo account of the
new Pachakutik) Latin American Study Center Work-
ing Paper no. 2 (College Park, Md.: University of
Msryland, 1996).
22. Bebbiigton et al., note 20 above: and Vallejo, note
21 above.
23. Bebbigton et al., note 20 above.
24. kbbington and his calleagues doscribe several
examples of this trend. Other cases w analyzed by R.
C. Smith. C. C. Tnpuy. and N. Wray, Amazonirr:
econami& indigena y memado. h dcsaf(ar &I desar-
m/to (Ammonia: indigenouseconomy and market.The Water in the West
challenges of development) (Quito. Ecuador: Coordi-
nruiora de Ins OrganizacionesIndtgenas de la Cuenca is an up-to-date overview of
Amnzhnica and Oxfun America, 1996). For a discus-
sion of F0I”s experience with community-based
major Western water issues.
forestry projects in Napo province. sw Macdonald.
Each 360 page comb-bound book
note 18 atma.
25, Marcelo Sda and Gustavo Gambon, community
relations manager and coordinator respectively, for
-
costs $30 postage paid
(CO resldenta please rdd 3%snles tax)
Arc0 Oriente. Quito, Ecuador, interview with the
authors. July 1997.
26. Leonardo Viteri, note 9 above. HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
27. Villamil, note 8 above. is the newspaper for people
28. Villamil, note 8 above. For an alternative prspec-
tive, see Sawyer, noto 6 above.
who care about the West.
29. Eventually. the OPIP leader# visited seven major Just$28 per year for 24 issues
U S , cities, Including Washington, New York, San
Francisco. and Los Angeles. Call 1-800-905.1155 for a eubrcrlption
30.Pablo MZ. United Nation6 Food and Agriculture P.0, Box 1090, Paonia, CO 81428
Orpization consultant, Quito, Ecuador. interview

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 41