Phil-am Life Ins. Co. vs.

Pineda, Dimaguya 175 SCRA 416

Facts:

 Rodolfo Dimaguya procured an ordinary life insurance with the petitioner Phil-Am Life
Insurance and designated his wife and children as irrevocable beneficiaries.
 Years later, he filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal to amend the designation of his
beneficiaries from irrevocable to revocable.
 This was opposed by the petitioner but the CFI granted Dimaguya’s petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether the designation of the irrevocable beneficiaries could be changed or amended
without the consent of the irrevocable beneficiaries?
(2) Whether the beneficiaries in this particular case, as minors, can validly give their
consent to change or amend their designation as irrevocable beneficiaries?

Held:

(1) No. The designation of the irrevocable beneficiaries could not be changed or amended
without their consent.
(2) No. The beneficiaries in this case, as minors, cannot validly give their consent to change
or amend their designation as irrevocable beneficiaries.

It is only with the consent of all the beneficiaries that any change or amendment in the policy
concerning the irrevocable beneficiaries may be legally and validly effected.

The alleged acquiescence of the six (6) children beneficiaries of the policy (the beneficiary-wife
predeceased the insured) cannot be considered an effective ratification to the change of the
beneficiaries from irrevocable to revocable.

The fact that all the six (6) children named as beneficiaries were minors at the time,** for which
reason, they could not validly give their consent. Neither could they act through their father
insured since their interests are quite divergent from one another.
BPI and FGU Insrance Corp., vs. Yolanda Laingo, GR 205206, 3/16/2016

Facts:
 Rheozel Laingo, son of the private respondent, Yolanda Laingo, opened a Platinum 2-in-
1 Savings and Insurance Account with the petitioners.
 Rheozel died due to vehicular accident. Yolanda thru her Secretary Alice, went to BPI to
withdraw Rheozel’s money worth more than 900K.
 Petitioners did not provide any notice about Rheozel’s insurance coverage.
 More than 2 years later, when Rhealyn, Rheozel’s sister, was cleaning Rheozel’s room,
Rhealyn found the Personal Accident Insurance Coverage of Rheozel’s.
 Laingo filed a formal claim to BPI and FGU, however, it was denied becauseit was late.
Based on the insurance contract, the claim should had been filed within 3 months after
the death of the insured.
 Laingo then filed a complaint for specific performance with damages with the RTC.
 The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner basing its decision with the letters of the
contract.
 CA reversed said decision in favor Laingo. CA ruled that Laingo could not be expected to
do an obligation which she did not know existed. The appellate court added that Laingo
was not a party to the insurance contract entered into between Rheozel and petitioners.
Thus, she could not be bound by the 90-day stipulation.

Issue: Whether or not Laingo, as named beneficiary who had no knowledge of the existence of
the insurance contract, is bound by the three calendar month deadline for filing a written notice
of claim upon the death of the insured?

Held: No. SC agreed with the private respondents.

Laingo contends that as the named beneficiary entitled to the benefits of the insurance claim
she had no knowledge that Rheozel was covered by an insurance policy against disability or
death issued by FGU Insurance that was attached to Rheozel's savings account with BPI. Laingo
argues that she dealt with BPI after her son's death, when she was allowed to withdraw funds
from his savings account in the amount of P995,000. However, BPI did not notify her of the
attached insurance policy. Thus, Laingo attributes responsibility to BPI and FGU Insurance for
her failure to file the notice of insurance claim within three months from her son's death.
Sps. Cha vs. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 690; 86 SCAD 102

Facts:

Petitioner-spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy-Cha, as lessees, entered into a lease contract with
private respondent CKS Development Corporation (hereinafter CKS).

One of the stipulations of the one (1) year lease contract states:

18. . . . The LESSEE shall not insure against fire the chattels, merchandise, textiles, goods and effects
placed at any stall or store or space in the leased premises without first obtaining the written consent and
approval of the LESSOR. If the LESSEE obtain(s) the insurance thereof without the consent of the
LESSOR then the policy is deemed assigned and transferred to the LESSOR for its own benefit; . . .1

Notwithstanding the above stipulation in the lease contract, the Cha spouses insured against loss by fire the
merchandise inside the leased premises for Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) with the United Insurance Co.,
Inc. (hereinafter United) without the written consent of private respondent CKS.

On the day that the lease contract was to expire, fire broke out inside the leased premises.

When CKS learned of the insurance earlier procured by the Cha spouses (without its consent), it wrote the insurer
(United) a demand letter asking that the proceeds of the insurance contract (between the Cha spouses and United) be
paid directly to CKS, based on its lease contract with the Cha spouses.

United refused to pay CKS. Hence, the latter filed a complaint against the Cha spouses and United with RTC. CA
affirmed RTC ruling.

Issue: Whether or not the paragraph 18 of the lease contract entered into between CKS and the Cha spouses is valid
insofar as it provides that any fire insurance policy obtained by the lessee (Cha spouses) over their merchandise
inside the leased premises is deemed assigned or transferred to the lessor (CKS) if said policy is obtained without
the prior written consent of the latter?

Held: No.

basic in the law on contracts that the stipulations contained in a contract cannot be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.3

Sec. 18 of the Insurance Code provides:

Sec. 18. No contract or policy of insurance on property shall be enforceable except for the benefit of some
person having an insurable interest in the property insured.

A non-life insurance policy such as the fire insurance policy taken by petitioner-spouses over their merchandise is
primarily a contract of indemnity. Insurable interest in the property insured must exist at the time the insurance takes
effect and at the time the loss occurs.4 The basis of such requirement of insurable interest in property insured is
based on sound public policy: to prevent a person from taking out an insurance policy on property upon which he
has no insurable interest and collecting the proceeds of said policy in case of loss of the property. In such a case, the
contract of insurance is a mere wager which is void under Section 25 of the Insurance Code, which provides:
 Sec. 25. Every stipulation in a policy of Insurance for the payment of loss, whether the person insured has
or has not any interest in the property insured, or that the policy shall be received as proof of such interest,
and every policy executed by way of gaming or wagering, is void.

In the present case, it cannot be denied that CKS has no insurable interest in the goods and merchandise inside the
leased premises under the provisions of Section 17 of the Insurance Code which provide:

Sec. 17. The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be
damnified by loss of injury thereof.

Therefore, respondent CKS cannot, under the Insurance Code — a special law — be validly a beneficiary of the fire
insurance policy taken by the petitioner-spouses over their merchandise. This insurable interest over said
merchandise remains with the insured, the Cha spouses. The automatic assignment of the policy to CKS under the
provision of the lease contract previously quoted is void for being contrary to law and/or public policy. The proceeds
of the fire insurance policy thus rightfully belong to the spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy-Cha (herein co-petitioners).
The insurer (United) cannot be compelled to pay the proceeds of the fire insurance policy to a person (CKS) who
has no insurable interest in the property insured.

The liability of the Cha spouses to CKS for violating their lease contract in that the Cha spouses obtained a fire
insurance policy over their own merchandise, without the consent of CKS, is a separate and distinct issue which we
do not resolve in this case.