[ GR No.

55289, Jun 29, 1982 ]

REPUBLIC v. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA

200 Phil. 367

AQUINO, J.:

Like L-49623, Manila Electric Company vs. Judge Castro-Bartolome, this case involves the
prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area".
Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313
square meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni Cristo on
January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters
owned by the said church (Exh. D).

The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military
reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by
the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana
plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes.
Realty taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. N).

On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, duly existing under
Philippine laws, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the
registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed
the land for more than thirty years. It invoked section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, which
provides:

"Chapter VIII. - Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

"x x x x x x x x x

"SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

"x x x x x x x x x

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (As amended by Republic
Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of Lands, opposed the application on
the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable
lands of the public domain, that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of
private appropriation and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not
been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since
June 12, 1945.

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-
04-001344 (Exh. E), in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, represented by
Executive Minister Eraño G. Manalo, with office at the corner of Central and Don Mariano
Marcos Avenues, Quezon City.

From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court under Republic Act
No. 5440. The appeal should be sustained.

As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or
a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like
the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and
because the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which
applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of
English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97
Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).

The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that
the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a
parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular
Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be
registered in this case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land
registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao
vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.

An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."

In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public
agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land
Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo" and that before the issuance of the certificate of title
the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State.

The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of the
Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant.

SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent-appellees.

The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay, Rizal on August
13, 1976 from Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition
and the corresponding appeal was likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal with the
following arguments; firstly, the land in question had essentially been converted to
private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription as a result of open continuous and
notorious possession and occupation for more than thirty years by the original owner,
Olimpia Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing spouses, whom Meralco
acquired the disputed land, and finally, the substantial rights acquired by Ramos
spouses and Peguing spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, extend to
Meralco by virtue of the provision of the Public Land Law.

ISSUE:

1.
Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold lands
of public domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
2.
Does the possession tacked to predecessor Private Corporation automatically
guarantee its rights to possession and title of the land.
3.
Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant
would be extended to a juridical person.

RULING:

1.
No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the
law to hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution
prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain
except for lease of lands not exceeding one thousand hectares.
2.
No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who
occupied the land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public
land for more than thirty years, does not automatically amount to rights and
possession. It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of the certificate
of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under the law. This conclusion is
anchored on the principle that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest
possess and occupied the same since time immemorial. Such possessions justify
the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.
3.
Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of title
before juridical entity may have acquired possession over the property.
That
means that until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an
imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. Thus, any levy and
execution was void.
As between the State and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The
court also took notice that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has
an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC 
G.R. No. 73002 | December 29, 1986

FACTS
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the IAC affirming
a decision of the CFI of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc. of 5 parcels of land, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe.
 
The appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire
real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale
took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels
who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962,
hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant
was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., and the negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company
 from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon, Isabelaon and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela.
 
DIRECTOR OF LANDS:
●        the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after
the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law;
●        and since section 11 of Article XIV OF 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme.
PERTINENT PROVISION
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a b o n a d e claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure . These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in subsection (b) hereof.
ISSUE
W/N the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public
domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares. - YES
RULING
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of
the registration proceedings in 1981.
●        If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative
●        If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
If it is accepted — as it must be — that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had
a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and
owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of
Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or
acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of
so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis
of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public
domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name
must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly
more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the
land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the
1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only
a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
 
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY RULING, NO LONGER A BINDING PRECEDENT.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome,
et al., where a similar set of facts prevailed.
●        In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the
capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the
Piguing spouses.
●        The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-
interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941.
●        1976 - Meralco applied to the CFI of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said
lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground
that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court UPHELD the dismissal.
●        The Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with
Cariño in 1909, thru Susi in 1925 down to Herico in 1980, which developed, affirmed and
reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land
for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better —
and, indeed, the correct, view — becomes evident from a consideration of some of the
principal rulings cited therein.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in
Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.
The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under
The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal
was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land.
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited to
a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially
obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby armed, without costs in this instance.
VICENTE GODINEZ v. FONG PAK LUEN
205 Phil. 176

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father, now deceased, to
Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.
The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
alleging among others that they are the heirs of Jose Godinez who was married to Martina
Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910; that during the marriage of their parents the said parents
acquired a parcel of land lot No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of 3,665 square meters as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 179 (D - 155) in the name of Jose Godinez; that
their mother died sometime in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs; that on
November 27, 1941, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the said Jose Godinez, for valuable
consideration, sold the aforesaid parcel of land to the defendant Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese
citizen, which transaction is contrary to law and in violation of the Civil Code because the latter
being an alien who is inhibited by law to purchase real property; that Transfer Certificate Title
No. 884 was then issued by the Register of Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and
void ab initio since the transaction constituted a non-existent contract; that on January 11, 1963,
said defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant
Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of
land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata, who is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong
Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and
disqualified to acquire real property in this jurisdiction; that defendant Fong Pak Luen has not
acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as the purported contract of sale executed by
Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non-existent, so much so that the
alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over
said property and defendant Navata had not acquired anything from said grantor and as a
consequence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322, which was issued by the Register of Deeds
in favor of the latter is null and void ab initio; that since one-half of the said property is conjugal
property inherited by the plaintiffs from their mother, Jose Godinez could not have legally
conveyed the entire property; that notwithstanding repeated demands on said defendant to
surrender to plaintiffs the said property she refused and still refuses to do so to the great
damage and prejudice of the plaintiffs; and that they were constrained to engage the services of
counsel in the sum of P2,000.00. The plaintiffs thus pray that they be adjudged as the owners of
the parcel of land in question and that Transfer Certificate of Title RT-90 (T-884) issued in the
name of defendant Fong Pak Luen be declared null and void ab initio; and that the power of
attorney issued in the name of Kwan Pun Ming, as well as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322
issued in the name of defendant Navata be likewise declared null and void, with costs against
defendants.
"On August 18, 1966, the defendant Register of Deeds filed an answer claiming that he was not
yet the register of deeds then; that it was only the ministerial duty of his office to issue the title in
favor of the defendant Navata once he was determined the registerability of the documents
presented to his office.
"On December 2, 1967, the court issued an order as follows:
"On November 29, 1968, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint without
pronouncement as to costs. (Record on Appeal, pp. 31-37). A motion for reconsideration of this
order was filed by the plaintiffs on December 12, 1968, which was denied by the trial court in an
order of July 11, 1969, (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 38, 43, 45, 47). The plaintiffs now interpose this
appeal with the following assignments of errors:
I. The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint on the ground of prescription
of action, applying Art. 1144 (1) New Civil Code on the basis of defendant Trinidad S. Navata's
affirmative defense of prescription in her answer treated as a motion to dismiss.
II. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal.
III. The trial court erred in not ordering this case to be tried on the merits."
The appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that
their cause of action has precribed. While the issue raised appears to be only the applicability of
the law governing prescription, the real question before us is whether or not the heirs of a
person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may
recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to
own and possess it.
The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents indicate fairly clearly how the question
should be resolved.
There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez of his residential lot acquired
from the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen
residing in Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which
provided:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.
The meaning of the above provision was fully discussed in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila (79 Phil. 461) which also detailed the evolution of the provision in the public land laws,
Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Krivenko ruling that "under the Constitution
aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands" is a declaration
of an imperative constitutional policy. Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to
defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity from the facts of this
case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak
Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely prohibited. [*] It is enough to stress
that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or
his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in
the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended
to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one involving simply the application of the
statute of limitations.
From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the Constitution
prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the
property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee
later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real
property.
In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447), where the alien vendee
later sold the property to a Filipino corporation, this Court, in affirming a judgment dismissing the
complaint to rescind the sale of real property to the defendant Li Seng Giap on January 22,
1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own
and hold title to lands, held:
"In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, 49 Off. Gaz., 4321; Talento vs. Makiki, 49 Off. Gaz., 4331; Bautista vs.
Uy 49 Off. Gaz., 4336; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee, 49 Off. Gaz., 4345 and Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49
Off. Gaz., 5360, the majority of this Court has ruled that in sales of real estate to aliens
incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution (Section 5, Article
XIII; Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471) both the vendor and the vendee are
deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts
will not afford protection to either party. (Article 1305, old Civil Code; Article 1411, new Civil
Code) From this ruling three Justices dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes and
the writer.) See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, Talento vs. Makiki, Bautista vs. Uy, Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee
and Mercado vs. Go Bio, supra.
". . . . (I)f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee, a naturalized Filipino citizen,
being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been
transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by
Filipinos."
Herrera v. Luy kim Guan (1 SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring that where land
is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be
impugned.
The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52)
which relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or successors-in-interest, in appropriate
cases, to recover that which their predecessors sold to aliens.
Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we had occasion to pass
upon a factual situation substantially similar to the one in the instant case. We ruled:
"But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There
would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the
land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of
this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap & Sons: (96 Phil. 447 [1955])
"'. . . if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed
by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.'
"While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership
to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years
from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from
asserting her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]).
"'Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or mission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29, 35).' (cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]).
"Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property."
In the light of the above considerations, we find the second and third assignments of errors
without merit. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The orders dismissing the complaint and
denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.