DieJess

Section 1 - EXECUTIVE POWER

Case: Marcos v. Manglapus
Topic: Scope of Power
Docket Number:
Ponente: J.

Facts:
● Upon the assumption of office of President Aquino, she endured multiple destabilization
attempts from Marcos Loyalists and even Marco himself
○ Marcos attempted to return to the Philippines
● The Marcos family seeks to return to the Philippines but President Aquino has decided to bar
them from returning to the country
● The Marcoses argue that the President does not have the power to bar them from returning
○ They cite Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights and;
○ Article 13 of the UDHR and;
○ Article 12 of the ICCPR
● The state argues that the issue is a political question
○ The rights being invoked by the petitioners collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the state to security and safety

Issue
● W/N the President has the authority to bar the Marcos family from returning to the Philippines?
- YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● Residual Powers
○ The powers of the President is not limited to what is enumerated in the Constitution
○ Implied from the grant of executive power and are necessary for her to comply with her
constitutional duties
● The President is not limited to the specific functions in the Constitution
○ The executive could exercise power from sources not enumerated for as long as they are
not forbidden by the constitution
● In compliance with the President’s oath of office, she must protect and promote the interest and
welfare of her people
● The Court ruled that the President acted for the protection of national security and promotion of
the general welfare of the public
○ There could be a catalytic effect if the Marcoses are allowed to return
● On the invoked rights, these does not include the right to go back home to their national state
DieJess

Case: Webb v. De Leon

Topic: prosecution of crimes; not quasi-judicial function
Docket Number:
Ponente: J.

Facts:
● The present petition is questioning the failure of the DOJ when it did not charge witness Jessica
Alfaro in the Information as an accused
● The petitioners are the prime suspects in the 1991 Vizconde Massacre
● The NBI filed a letter complaint with the DOJ charging the petitioners with the crime of Rape
with homicide
○ Hubert Webb, et.al
● The testimony of principal witness Alfaro was presented as evidence by the NBI
○ She allegedly witnessed the commission of the crime
● Webb moved to examine the evidence and documents of the NBI
○ Upon receipt of the pieces of evidence, the original affidavit of Alfaro was allegedly lost
○ This prompted Webb to file a civil case for the production of the original affidavit
○ The original was eventually submitted
● After the preliminary investigation, the DOJ Panel issued a resolution “finding probable cause to
hold respondents for trial” and recommending that an information for rape with homicide be
filed against petitioners
● The petitioners surrendered to the authorities and filed the petition before the court.

Issue:
● W/N the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica
Alfaro in the Information as an accused? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioner fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged
conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide
● The non inclusion of Alfaro finds anchor in RA 6981
○ This provides witness protection to state witnesses
● Section 10 of the RA details who are qualified to be state witnesses
● Section 12 of the law provides for the non-inclusion in the criminal complaint
● Petitioner Webb questions the validity of the above stated provisions
○ He calls these an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness
● The Court ruled that the petitioner’s argument is incorrect
● The decision to prosecute is not a judicial function
● The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
○ It’s principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed
○ The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion
DieJess

■ Whether, what and whom to charge depends on a smorgasbord of factors which

are best appreciated by prosecutors
● The Court held that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact the RA which
vested the DOJ the power to determine who can qualify as a state witness and who shall be
granted immunity from prosecution.
● The RA is different from Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
○ The Rules of Court pertains the power of the court to discharge a state witness only
because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused
○ The discharge is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an
inherent judicial function
● The law is aimed at a more effective administration of criminal justice, it was necessary to pass a
law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their
appearance in investigative bodies/courts
DieJess

Case: Djamantan v. Domingo

Topic: Deportation
Docket Number:
Ponente: J.

Facts:
● The present petition questions the order of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
which ordered the deportation of petitioner Djumantan
● The petitioner in this case was married to a certain Bernard Banez
○ Banez was the husband of marina Cabael, he went to Indonesia to work
○ He converted to Islam and married Djamantan
○ He had two children with the petitioner
● Djamantan, along with her 2 children arrived in Manila as “guests” of Banez
○ They were met in the airport by Banez and Cabael
● Banez then executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support for his “guests”
○ Petitioner and her children were admitted as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of
the Immigration Act of 1940
● Eventually, Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner
○ This prompted her to file a complaint for concubinage against the two
○ This was dismissed for lack of merit
● Dissatisfied, Banez’ eldest son filed a letter of complaint with the Ombudsman, who referred the
letter to the CID
○ Based of this, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell and was later released
pending the deportation proceedings
○ Djamantan initially asked to be allowed to voluntarily depart but she later changed her
mind and moved to have the case dismissed on the ground that she was validly married
to a Filipino citizen
● However, the CID promulgated its assailed decision finding the marriage between petitioner and
Banez as contrary to the laws of the country and revoked her visa
● Hence this petition

Issue:
● W/N the CID committed GADALEJ in promulgating the decision? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● On the issue of legality of petitioner’s admission into the country and the change of her status
from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
○ On this, the Court found that the petitioner unlawfully entered the country and she did
not lawfully acquire permanent residency
● The Court stated that the privileges that petitioner obtained were through misrepresentation
○ This was a blatant abuse of the immigration laws of the country
DieJess

○ This was because the marriage statute of the petitioner to Banez was never disclosed to
the authorities
● The right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent entry into the
country
○ This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their
admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay
● There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much
less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines
○ Marriage does not make a foreign spouse ipso facto a Filipino citizen
● Foreign spouses do not have a right to gain permanent residency but are only qualified for it.
● However, the Solicitor General has raised that the right of the CID to deport petitioner has
prescribed (Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940)
● The prescription period applied to the case of petitioner is under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the
act
○ “Shall not be effected… unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
5 years after the cause for deportation arises”
● The Court held that the right of the CID to deport the petitioner has prescribed
○ Petitioner was entered the country on January 13, 1979 and the complaint was filed on
November 19, 1980
○ Clearly, more than 5 years has elapsed since the cause for the deportation
(misrepresentation)
● That “arrest” contemplated by the provision refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out
an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the
alien to stay in the country.
○ When CID revoked the permanent residence visa, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and
deportation as an overstaying alien.
DieJess

Case: Pontejos v. Ombudsman

Topic: Power to grant immunity to state witness
Docket Number:
Ponente: C.J. Panganiban

Facts:
● The present petition for certiorari is challenging the Joint Resolution, Review and
Recommendation, and Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB
○ Petitioner was charged with 3 separate informations for Estrada, Direct Bribery, and
Unauthorized Practice of Profession
○ Carmencita Ruiz was extended immunity as a state witness
● The case started when Restituto Aquino filed a complaint against petitioner before the
Ombudsman
○ The accused were officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
○ Pontejos was the arbiter
○ Atos was a legal staff
● Accused invoked denial to the charges against them
● Pontejos was the arbiter for 2 cases wherein Aquino was the complainant while Imperial was the
arbiter for 1 case
○ Aquino lost all the cases
● Eventually, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause against Pontejos for the above
mentioned crimes (see bullet point 1, par. 1)
○ Furthermore, Atos became a state witness and was extended immunity from criminal
prosecution
○ Atos was merely a subordinate who could have acted only upon the prodding of
Pontejos
● This was stated in a Resolution by then Ombudsman Disierto on the condition that she would
appear and testify against Pontejos
○ This was because she did not appear to be the most guilty
● The case was filed with the RTC of Quezon City
○ Pontejos fled a Motion for Reinvestigation and the Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the Information to include Atos as co-accused
○ She claimed that the power to grant immunity pertains solely to the court, not to the
prosecution which can only recommend.

Issue:
● W/N the Ombudsman erred in granting the immunity to Atos to become a state witness? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the decision to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character.
● The prosecutorial powers include the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange
for testimony against another
DieJess

● Mapa v. Sandiganbayan:
○ The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the
prosecution process
● It is constitutionally permissible for Congress to vest the prosecutor with the power to determine
who can qualify as a witness and be granted immunity from prosecution
○ The Court has held previously that the DOJ, COMELEC, and the PCGG have discretion to
grant immunity on the basis of the respective laws that vested them with such power
● Similarly, the OMB was also vested with the power to grant immunity from prosecution under
Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act
● Petitioner contends that the OMB’s authority to grant immunity is subject to the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court (Section 17)
○ On this, the Court held that this is applicable only to cases already filed in Court
○ The trial court is given the power to discharge an accused as a state witness only
because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused
● The power to choose who to discharge as a state witness is an executive function. Essentially, it
is not a judicial prerogative.
● Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act requires conformity with the Rules of Court:
○ Absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged
○ No evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except the
testimony of the said accused
○ The testimony of the said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points
○ Said accused does not appear to be most guilty
○ Said accused has not any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude
● In this case, the allegations of the petitioner do not show grave abuse of discretion in the
granting of immunity to Atos
DieJess

Case: Banda v. Ermita

Topic: Power to reorganize
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Leonardo-De-Castro

Facts:
● The present petition is challenging the Constitutionality of E.O. No. 378 issued by PGMA
○ Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on
behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO)
● NPO is a creation of E.O. No. 285 issued by President Aquino
○ Born from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units
of the Philippine Information Agency
○ NPO handles the printing of several government documents
■ Official Gazette
■ Ballots
■ GAAs
● WoOn October, 2004, PGMA issued the assailed order which amended Section 6 of E.O. No. 285
○ This removed the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services
requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities (Section 1 of E.O. No. 378)
● This transferred the printing service of government agencies and instrumentalities to the private
sector through competitive bidding
● Petitioners perceive the E.O. As a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO.
They counted that:
○ It is beyond the powers of PGMA to amend or repeal E.O. No. 285 for P. Aquino created
this pursuant to her legislative power
○ E.O. 378 violates the security of tenure

Issue:
● W/N E.O. No. 378 is valid? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes
● The Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. (Buklod v. Zamora)
● The power also comes from an express grant of power
○ Sec. 31, Book III of the Administrative Code provides:
■ The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
DieJess

● The power grants the PResident the authority to transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President
● The NPO is an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary — therefore, it is part of
the Office of the President
● Section 31 of the Adminsitrative Code authorizes the President to
○ Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Propwer
○ To transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency in the Executive branch, and vice versa.
● In the case, the E.O. merely transferred the printing services of government agencies and
instrumentalities, in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability
○ Therefore, it must compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs
● The reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in the Office of
the President are not strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices
○ Sec. 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code provides Residual Powers
to the President
○ “Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are
not specifically enumerated in the Code, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law”
● Pursuant to the above mentioned provision, the power of the President to reorganize the
Executive Branch under Sec. 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided under
other laws
○ Ex. Specific provisions in the GAL
● The GAA of 2003 gave the President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational
changes in any department or agency in the Executive Branch (Secs. 77 and 78)
● The provisions in the GAA recognizes the power of the President to reorganize even executive
offices already funded by the GAA, including the power to implement structural, functional, and
operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in doing so, modify or realign
appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
● In all, the issuance of the assailed EO is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by
the Administrative Code
● This has been recognized in existing jurisprudence
DieJess

Case: Laurel v. Garcia

Topic: Alienation of Government Property
Docket Number:
Ponente: J.

Facts:
● The petition before the Court is questioning the bidding for the sale of a property in Tokyo Japan,
owned by the Philippine Government under the Reparations Agreement
● The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for
national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their
losses in life and property and their suffering during the Second World War.
● The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until its transfer in 1976
● During the Aquino administration, Ambassador Valdez proposed that the property be made
subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm
○ Kajima Corp. will construct 2 buildings in the property and 1 building in Nampeidai
○ It will also renovate the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai
○ These proposals were not favorably acted on by the government, so they remained
pending
● Thereafter, the President created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of the
properties in Tokyo and Kobe
● On July 25, 1987, the President issued EO 296, which entitled non-Filipino citizens or entities to
avail of reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition
○ This went further despite opposition from various sectors
● Bidding for the properties ensued
● Petitioners raise distinct issues
○ The Laurel petition objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property
○ The Ojeda petition objects the alleged unjustified bias of the government in favor of
selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities

Issue:
● W/N the properties can be alienated by the Philippine government? — NO
● W/N the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have authority and jurisdiction to sell the
Roppongi property? —NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioner Laurel posits that the property and the related lots is classified as one of public
dominion, and not of private ownership under Art. 420 of the Civil Code
○ This entails that the property is under “property intended for public service”
● Being a property of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the
State.
○ Hence, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts.
○ This is notwithstanding the non-use of the property
DieJess

● Respondents contend that the property is not governed by the Civil Code, but by the laws of
Japan
○ Lex Situs rule
● Also, assuming that the Civil Code governs, the property has ceased to become property of
public dominion for not being used for public service for over 13 years.
○ Furthermore, the intention of the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it
to private use has been manifested by overt acts
■ Transfer of the Embassy
■ Issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the government
properties in Japan
■ Issuance of E.O. No. 296
■ Etc.
● The Court held that the nature of the Roppongi lot is expressly spelled out.
○ It was dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding
contract of procurement which bind both Governments
● Therefore, there can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion unless it is convincingly
shown that the property has become patrimonial
○ Public dominion — ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment
■ Purpose is to serve the citizens, not the State as a juridical person
■ Intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropriation
○ Patrimonial — private property but may only be sold to Filipino citizens
● The respondents have failed to prove that it has become patrimonial
● As a property of public dominion, the lot is outside the commerce of man — it cannot be
alienated
● It’s non-use does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property
○ The conversion only happens if the property is withdrawn from public use
○ Until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such
● The abandonment of the intention to use the property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property must be definite
● Abandonment of cannot be inferred from the non-use alone, it must be a certain and positive
act based on correct legal premises
● The overt acts of the government does not clearly declare the abandonment of the properties
for public use.
● There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines
● Even assuming that the property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its
sale
● There is no law authorizing its conveyance (Administrative Code)
● It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
slow will
DieJess

○ Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence
● The Senate resolution is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the
property
● There is a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the property from public domain to
make it alienable and need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property
DieJess

Case: Review Center v. Ermita

Topic: Power over administrative agencies
Docket Number:
Ponente: J.

Facts:
● The present petition is challenging the constitutionality of E.O 566 and the RIRR of the same
issued by PGMA
● The E.O. was issued due to a letter sent by licensure applicants to the Professional Regulation
Commission
○ The letter reported that handwritten copies of two sets of exams were circulated during
the examination period among the examines reviewing at the RA Gapuz and Inress
Review Centers
■ George Cordero, the President of Inress, was then the incumbent president of
the Philippine Nurses Association
○ The Pelicans were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in 2 subjects
(Psychiatric and Medical-Surgical Nursing)
● The results were released on June 19 and on August 18, the CA restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of those who passed the exam
● On September 6, 2006, the President issued the assailed EO which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the
Philippines
○ Pursuant to this, CHED Chairman Puno approved the IRR
● In response to this, petitioner asked the CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRR
○ They argued that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions or consortia of HEIs and professional organization will effectively abolish
independent review centers
● Chairman Puno wrote back stating that to suspend the implementation would be inconsistent
with the mandate of the EO
○ Puno stated that the IRR was presented to the stakeholders during a consultation
process
○ Furthermore, petitioner’s comments and suggestions would be considered in the event
of revisions to the IRR
● Later on, the CHED had a consultative meeting with petitioner and approved the RIRR
○ Petitioner then filed before the CHED a petition to Clarify/Amend the RIRR
■ Exclude independent review centers from the coverage of CHED
■ Clarify the meaning of the requirements for existing review centers to tie-up or
to be integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized professional
associations with recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into
schools
DieJess

■ Revising the rules to make it conform with RA 7722, limiting the CHED’s coverage
to public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting
programs in post-secondary educational institutions
○ In reply, CHED Chairman Neri referred the request to exclude independent review
centers from CHED’s supervision and regulation to the Office of the President as the
matters requires amendment of the EO
● Hence, this petition.
○ Petitioner prays for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and
unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR

Issue:
● W/N EO 566 is unconstitutional? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the EO and the implementing rules are unconstitutional
● EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722
○ The RA lays down the powers and the functions of CHED
○ The said coverage is limited to institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting
programs in all post-secondary educational institutions (public or private)
● Neither the RA nor the IRR of RA 7722 defines an institution of higher learning or program of
higher learning
○ Higher education is defined as education beyond the secondary level or education
provided by a college or university
● Since the coverage of CHED under RA 7722 is limited to institutions of higher education, the EO
and the RIRR clearly expanded the coverage of CHED
○ Review center: a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewers obtained in the formal school setting
in preparation for the licensure examinations
● Clearly, a review center is not an instruction of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722
● Furthermore, the exercise of power by PGMA in issuing the assailed EO is a usurpation of
legislative power
● Under the Administrative Code, the Residual powers of the President has to be provided for
under the law
○ There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED
○ Therefore, the President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a
prior legislation granting her such power
○ The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of
the CHED under RA 7722
● The EO in this case is not supported by any enabling law.
○ Therefore, the exercise of power of the President is an invalid exercise of legislative
power
○ Thus, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of CHED’s quasi-legislative power
DieJess

● Furthermore, RA 8981 is not an appropriate enabling law.

○ The law only pertains to the powers of the PRC in the conduction of examinations — it
has nothing to do with the regulation of review centers
DieJess

Case: Biraogo v. Truth Commission

Topic: Power to investigate
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:
● The present petition seeks for the declaration of EO No. 1 as unconstitutional
○ “Creating the Philippine Truth Commission”
● The EO was in pursuance to the “walang corrupt, walang mahirap” promise of President Aquino
III
○ To transform this slogan into reality, the President found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
● This resulted to EO No. 1 — creating the Philippine Truth Commission
● The PTC is a mere ad hoc body under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by 3rd-level public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendation to the President, Congress, and the
Ombudsman
● The PTC would then have all the powers of an investigative body under the Administrative Code
○ However, it cannot adjudicate, all it can do is investigate
● Truth commissions are essentially bodies that share the following characteristics:
○ Examine only past events
○ Investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a
particular event
○ Temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report
○ Officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State
● Petitioners argue that the EO violates the separation of powers

Issue:
● W/N the EO is unconstitutional? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court stated that the creation of the PTC is not within the ambit of the “power to
reorganize” that was discussed in Banda
○ PTC was not a part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to its creation
○ There was no alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
● Also, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control
○ This power is the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgement of the
former with that of the latter
● Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices
DieJess

○ Power of control is inherently executive while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation of Congress, or the inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws
● To say that there was valid delegation, the OSG cited PD 1416 as amended by PD 1772
○ However, the said PD does not justify the creation of a public office by the President
○ The decree is inoperable when the First Congress convened
● However, the power to investigate is corollary to the power of the President to faithfully execute
laws
○ It flows from Sec. 17 of Art. 7
○ The power to investigate is different from the power to adjudicate (Carino)
■ Investigate: to search or inquire
■ Adjudicate: to adjudge, arbitrate, decide, etc.
● The fact finding of the PTC is not adjudication
○ Their findings are merely recommendatory and cannot be conclusive
○ Furthermore, it does not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ
■ It actually complements the 2 offices
■ The power of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act is not exclusive bit is
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies
○ Therefore, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman primordial duties
● Although the power to investigate is valid, the EO must fall for being violative of the equal
protection clause
○ The EO is limited to those from the “previous administration”
DieJess

Case: US v. Nixon
Topic: General claim of executive power
Docket Number:
Ponente:

Facts:
● The present case arose from the infamous “watergate scandal” which illustrated a blatant abuse
of power of President Nixon
○ A burglary incident happened at the Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate
building complex in Washington DC
○ This was during the campaign period for the 1972 presidential election
● President Nixon sought to quash the subpoena obtained by special prosecutor Jaworski which
asked for access to tapes and papers that concerned meetings between Nixon and the people
who had been indicted in connection with the burglary
● Nixon partially complied with the subpoena by releasing edited versions of dozens of
conversations
○ However, he asked the federal court to quash the subpoena based on lack of necessity
and the President’s executive privilege

Issue:
● W/N the claim of Executive Privilege by Nixon was valid? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the general claim of executive privilege by Nixon was invalid
● To support the claim of executive privilege, the respondent invoked 2 grounds:
○ Valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and
those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties
○ Doctrine of separation of powers
■ Independence of the Executive branch within its own sphere insulates a
President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and
thereby protects confidential Presidential communications.
● In coming up with the decision, the Court stated that the two grounds invoked, without more,
cannot sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial
process under all circumstances.
● Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the
Court finds it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such
material for in camera inspection
● The absolute and unqualified privilege would be an impediment in the primary constitutional
duty of the Judiciary to do justice in criminal prosecutions
○ This would conflict with the function of the Courts
DieJess

● To read the privilege powers as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to
enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in
confidentiality of non military and non diplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional
balance of a “workable government” and gravely impair the role of the courts
● The Court held that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential
privilege
● To preserve the essential functions of each branch, the Court discussed further
○ Presumptive privilege is given for Presidential communications to protect public interest
in candid, objective and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making
● However, this may not interfere with the administration of justice
○ It is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence needed by either the prosecution or by the defense
● Nowhere in the Constitution is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to
the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is
constitutionally based.
● Similarly, the right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial has constitutional
dimensions
● The Court then weighed the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications in performance of the President’s responsibilities against the inroads of such
privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice.
● The allowance of a general claim of privilege would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process
of law and gravely impair the basic function of the court.
○ The acknowledgement of confidential communications is general in nature, whereas the
constitutional need for production of relevant evidence is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case.
● The court concludes then that when the ground for asserting privilege sought for use in a
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over
the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.
○ This generalized assertion must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in
a pending criminal trial
DieJess

Case: Almonte v. Enriquez

Topic: Information not subject of privilege
Docket Number:
Ponente:

Facts:
● The petition before the court is asking to annul the subpoena and orders of the Ombudsman
which required petitioners to produce “all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988 and all evidence such as vouchers for the whole plan till a of EIIB for 1988”
● Petitioner was formerly the Commissioner of the EIIB while Perez is the Chief of the Budget and
Fiscal Management Division of the said Bureau
● The subpoenas were issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed
● The letter implicated the petitioner of funding the RAM coup attempt, purchase of a car for the
personal use of the petitioner, and others
○ In his comment, petitioner denied that there were savings as the positions were filled
○ He also denied the existence of “ghost agents” in the EIIB
● Finding the comments unsatisfactory, the Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman office,
asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
○ In anticipation of the grant of the request, Santo issued a subpoena to petitioners,
requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses as
well as a subpoena duces mentioned above
● Petitioners moved to quash the subpoenas issued and the respondent granted the motion to
quash the subpoena but he denied the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum
○ This was because the petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against
themselves, since the subpoena was directed to the Chief Accountant

Issue:
● W/N the documents being asked to be adduced are classified, and therefore, beyond the reach
of the subpoena? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioners aver that the documents subject to the subpoena are classified
○ Their ground for invoking this is that the knowledge of EIIB’s documents relative to its
Personal Services Funds and its plan till a will necessarily lead to knowledge of its
operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being and
this could “destroy the EIIB”
● It is understood that government privilege is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters
DieJess

○ This is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself
transcending the indicidual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence
thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights
● When there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly
accepted, bu even most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.
○ A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege will have to prevail
● When the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or
other national security secrets but on a general public interest in confidentiality of
conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the
President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.
● In this case, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB
● Also, there is no law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
information.
○ Contrary to this, COA Circular No. 88-293 provides that only item of expenditure which
should be treated strictly confidential is that which refers to the “purchase of
information and payment of rewards”
○ The regulation requires that reasonable records by kept in justifying the confidential or
privileged character of the information relating to informers.
■ There are no such reasonable records in this case to substitute for the records
claimed to be confidential
● The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioner merely indicate the confidential nature
of the EIIB’s functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to
the proper authorities.
○ They claimed that the records have been examined by the COA and found it regular in all
respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the
government which has the constitutional mandate to look into any complaint concerning
public office
● The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to the investigation of the Ombudsman
○ They have the constitutionally designated function as the protectors of the people and
are required to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government
● Therefore, the needs of the Ombudsman outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners
○ Furthermore, while there have been compelling reasons for the claim in 1988 when it
was asserted, it has been 7 years later and these reasons may have been attenuated, if
they have not in fact ceased
○ The agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the
service of the EIIB, while the covert missions to which they might have been deployed
might either have been accomplished or abandoned.
○ On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s duty remains
DieJess

● Even if the subpeonead documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this would only
justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their non production
○ The examination of records should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman
himself.
● In the past, in camera proceedings have been done to safeguard confidential information
without impairing the constitutional mandates of government agencies (Marcos v Manglapus
and Lansang v. Garcia)
DieJess

Case: Senate v. Ermita

Topic: EO 464
Docket Number:
Ponente:

Facts:
● The consolidated petitions before the court proffer that the President has abused her power by
issuing EO. 464. They pray that it be declared as null and void for being unconstitutional
● The Senate, pursuant to its power to conduct inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation,
called for the attendance of various officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus and offices to be resource persons in connection with the North Rail Project controversy
○ Senator Enrile urged the Senate to investigate the project on alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering it
● Thereafter, the Senate invited various officials to serve as resource speakers in a public hearing
on the railway project
○ The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to
various AFP officials
● On September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received a letter from Executive Secretary
Ermita requesting that the hearing be postponed in order to afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issued so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation
○ Sen. Drilon replied with a letter denying the request
○ Sen. Drilon also received a letter from the President of North Luzon requesting that the
hearing be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on
the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured
● 3 days after, the President issued the assailed EO
○ “Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation under the constitution, and for other purposes”
● Simply put, the EO stated that executive officials have to receive consent from the President
before they may appear in legislative inquiries/hearings
● Thereafter, Executive Secretary Ermita sent a letter to Sen. Drilon informing him that the officials
of the Executive Department will not be able to attend without the consent of the President
pursuant to the assailed EO
○ Gen. Sanga likewise sent a letter to Sen. Blazon, Chairman of the Committee on National
Defense and Security, that the officers of the AFP is unauthorized to appear before the
Legislative Hearings
● Despite this, the scheduled Senate investigation ensued and Col. Balutan and B/Gen Gudani
attended
○ They were then relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings for defiance to the Presidential Order
DieJess

● As for the North Rail Project hearings, the Executive Secretary issued letters of regrets, in
response to the invitations sent to various government officials
● Thereafter, the petitions were filed before the Court challenging the Constitutionality of EO 464
● Similar bars prevented future legislative inquiries such as the Blue Ribbon Committee’s
investigation on the Fertilizer scam

Issue:
● W/N the EO is unconstitutional? - Partly

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held to declare Sections 1 and 2(a) of the EO as constitutional
● Sec. 1 provides that the appearance by heads of departments before congress must be done
with the consent of the President
● Sec. 2(a) speaks of the nature, scope and coverage of Executive Privilege
○ Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public officials
covered by the EO
○ Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national
security should no be divulged
○ Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements
○ Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings
○ Matters affecting national security and public order
● The executive privilege is not a clear or unitary concept
● There are different varieties of privilege
○ State secrets — for crucial military or diplomatic objectives
○ Informer’s — identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law
○ Generic — internal deliberations
● Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of power
where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to
military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of
the executive’s domestic decision allowing and policy making functions
● To determine the validity of the claim, the question that must be asked is not only whether the
requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
○ The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution
● Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
● The validity rests on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it was made
● Sections 3 and 2(b) were declared invalid as they are not rooted on substantial bases for the
invocation of executive privilege
DieJess

○ As stated earlier, the claim must be supported by a justifiable reason

○ It cannot be implied as it does not cover specific persons, but rather, specific information
○ The implied executive privilege may not accepted
DieJess

Case: Neri v. Senate

Topic: ZTE-NBN deal
Docket Number:
Ponente:

Facts:
● The petition before the Court is assailing the Decision of the Court to grant the petition for
certiorari of petitioner Neri against the Respondent Senate Committees
● Petitioner appeared before the Senate Committees and testified on matters concerning the
NBN-ZTE controversy
○ The petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Commissioner Abalos offered him 200
million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project
○ He stated that he told President GMA about the bribery attempt and the latter told him
not to accept it
● When he was probed further on the discussions with President GMA in relation to the NBN
project, the petitioner invoked “executive privilege”
● The Committee, undeterred, required petitioner to appear and testify one again to answer the
questions that was asked of him
○ Thereafter, Executive Secretary Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting them to
dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege
● The petitioner did not appear before the Committees upon the orders of the President invoking
executive privilege
○ Thereafter, the Committees issued a show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt
○ In his reply, petitioner manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the hearing and
that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege
● Questions asked;
○ Whether the President followed up the project
○ Whether the President directed him to prioritize the XTE
○ Whether the president said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about
the alleged bribe
● The Senate found his reply unsatisfactory and cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest and
detention
○ Petitioner moved for reconsideration, this was denied, prompting him to file the instant
petition for certiorari

Issue:
● W/N the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by executive privilege? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
DieJess

● The Court held that the information being elicited by the 3 questions are covered by Executive
Privilege:
● Even though EO 464 has been revoked, there is still a recognized claim of executive privilege.
○ The revocation does not, in any way, diminish the concept of executive privilege
● The concept has Constitutional underpinnings
○ Presidential communications are presumptively privileged
○ This is necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the
President and those who assist him. . . with freedom to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately."
● Two types of executive privilege
○ Presidential communications — communications, documents or other materials that
reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential
■ Decision-making of the President
■ This applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decision
also materials as well as pre-deliberative ones
○ Deliberative process — advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated
■ Decision making of executive officials
● The generally accepted types of privilege pertain to those that are of the nature of military and
diplomatic affairs
○ The other concept is the presidential communications privilege
● PCP has the following elements
○ The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegate
presidential power”
○ The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President
○ The Presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
● In this case, the Executive Secretary premised his claim on the ground that the questions fall
under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in
her executive and policy decision-making process and , that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China
○ Simply put, the ground was diplomacy or foreign relations
● The Court held that the communications elicited are covered by the presidential
communications privilege
DieJess

○ It relates to a quintessential and non-delegate power — power to enter into an executive

agreement
○ The communications was received by a close advisor of the president — petitioner Neri
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the Arroyo Cabinet (operational
proximity test)
○ There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority
● The presumption of privilege may only be overcome Byatt showing of public need
○ In this case, there is no showing that the answers to the questions are critical in the
enactment of a law
○ Clearly, it is not in aid of legislation
● In all, the Court held that the claim of executive privilege was properly invoked
○ The test for invocation is when there is a formal claim, lodged by the head of a
department which has control over the matter.
■ The claim requires a precise and certain reason for preserving the
confidentiality
● The letter from ES Ermita satisfies the requirement
○ The letter stated that the Office of the President invokes the executive privilege
○ The Court also found that the justification by Ermita is precise and certain enough to
validate the invocation
■ It would not leave the respondents in the dark on how the information could be
classified as privileged
■ Diplomatic grounds
DieJess

Case: Akbayan v. Aquino

Topic: JPEPA
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Cardio-Morales

Facts:
● The petition before the court seeks to obtain the full text of the JPEPA
● Petitioner legislators called for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being
negotiated by the government
○ The inquiry was then conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization
● In the inquiry, Usec. Aquino was asked to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA and to furnish
the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA
○ Aquino did not heed the request
● Congressman Abuja then asked front he same document, but Aquino stated that the cope would
be provided once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review of the
proposed agreement has been conducted
● In another move, the House Committee requested ES Ermita to furnish all documents on the
subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers etc.
○ Ermita replied that the requested documents would be difficult to accomplish since the
proposed agreement has been in progress for about 3 years
○ The copy of the draft would be forwarded as soon as the text thereof is settled and
complete
● NEDA Director-General Neri and Tariff Commission Chairman Abon was likewise requested for
the copies of the latest text
● Amid speculation that the JPEPA might be signed by the Philippine government within December
2005, the present petition was filed
○ The agreement was later signed two heads of state in Helsinki, Finland and was
endorsed to the Senate for its concurrence
DieJess

Case: Soliven v. Makasiar

Topic: Who has the right to invoke executive immunity
Docket Number:
Ponente:
DieJess

Case: De Lima v. Duterte

Topic:
Docket Number:
Ponente:
DieJess

Case: Gloria v. CA
Topic: Cabinet Members
Docket Number:
Ponente:
DieJess

Section 2 - QUALIFICATIONS

Case: Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC

Topic: citizenship of a foundling
Docket Number:
Ponente:
Facts:
● The petition before the Court is challenging the resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which
declared petitioner as not eligible to run for the 2016 Presidential elections
● Senator Poe is a foundling that was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo
○ She was then found by Edgardo Militar and was turned over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano
Militar
○ Mr. Militar then reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was
found, she was later given the name Mary Grace Natividad Militar
○ Later on, she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesus’s Sonora Poe
■ Fernando Poe Jr. and Susan Roces
■ Her name was then changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
○ When she turned 18, she became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan
■ Later on, she was issued a passport by the DDFA
■ She then studied in UP and eventually went to the US to earn a degree in
Political Science from Boston College
○ She was then married to Teodoro Llamanzares both an American and Filipino national
since birth
■ The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
○ For some time, she lived with her husband in the US
■ Her son was born in the US while her 2 daughters were born in the Philippines
○ She was then naturalized and was granted American citizenship
■ She was also issued an American Passport
○ When FPJ ran for President in the 2004 Elections, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna
returned to the Philippines
■ After the elections, she went back to the Us
○ When FPJ died, she returned to the Philippines again
■ She then resigned from her work in the US
○ In 2005, Sen. Poe and her children all agreed to return to the Philippines
○ Upon returning on May 24, 2005, she was issued by the BIR with a TIN
○ Her and her husband purchased a condo unit at San Juan City in the second half of 2005
DieJess

■ The register of Deeds issued the Certificates of Title on February 20, 2006
○ Poe made a quick trip back to the US to supervise the disposal of some of the family’s
remaining household belongings, she went back to the Philippines on March 11, 2006
○ In late March 2006, her husband officially informed the US Postal Service of the family’s
change and abandonment of their address in the US
■ The home was eventually sold on April 27, 2006
■ Her husband resigned from his job in April 2006 and arrived in the country on
May 4, 2006
■ He then started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006
○ Eventually the family of petitioner acquired a house in Quezon City in early 2006
○ She then took the Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines
○ And reacquainted her citizenship by filing a petition for re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship
○ She, along with her children, were issued Identification Certificates that stated that they
are Philippine citizens
○ She then became a registered voters in San Juan
○ Between 2006-2009, she made several trips to the US using her US Passport
■ She used this after taking the oath but before renouncing her American
citizenship
○ In 2010, she was appointed as the MRTCB Chairperson
■ She then executed an affidavit of renunciation of Allegiance to the US and
Renounced her American Citizenship
○ She then assumed office as the Chairperson of the MTRCB
○ On 2011, she executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the US in
the Presence of the Vice Consul
■ She filled out the Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of US
Citizenship
○ The Vice-Consul then executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Sen. Poe
○ In 2013, Sen. Poe ran for Senator and won
■ In her CoC, she answered that she has been residing in the Philippines for 6
years and 6 months (filed on October 2, 2012)
○ On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her CoC for the Presidency
■ She declared that her residence in the Philippines up until the day of the
election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005
● The filing of the CoC prompted several petitions questioning the qualifications of petitioner to
run for the presidential post
● The petitions were granted and the CoC of petitioner Poe-Llamanzares was cancelled
○ Elamparo petition
○ Tatad, et.al petition
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
DieJess

● W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the assailed
resolutions? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● On NBC — see David v. SET
On Residence
● The cancellation and the denial of due course of the CoC of petitioner was on the ground of
material representation
○ Petitioners in those contests claim that she misrepresented herself when she stated that
she has been living in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months
● On this, the Court ruled that the 10 years and 11 months is true
● The constitutional requirement for Presidents is 10 years residence before the day of the
elections
● Since the elections were on May 9, 2016, petitioner’s domicile in the Philippines was regained on
May 25, 2005
● For one to successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate the following:
○ Residence or bodily presence in a new locality
○ An intention to remain there
○ An intention to abandon the old domicile
● There must be a demonstration of actual removal or an actual change of domicile; bona five
intention of abandoning the former domicile and establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose
● The twin requisites of animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi must be present
○ The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of house must be for an indefinite period of
time
○ The change of residence must be voluntary
○ The residence chosen for the new domicile must be actual
● To prove this, petitioner adduced evidence that she and her family effectively abandoned their
domicile in the US and relocated to the Philippines for good.
○ Passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005
○ Email correspondences with a freight company for the shipment of their household
items weighing 28,000 pounds to the Philippines
○ Email with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to
the philippines
○ Enrollment of her children in Philippine schools starting June 2005
○ TIN card
○ Titles for their condominium and tax declarations
○ Receipts from Salvation Army acknowledging their donation of items
○ Email with the US Postal Service confirming the request to change address
○ Final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
US home
DieJess

● Despite these, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner’s domicile had been timely
changed as of May 24, 2005
○ COMELEC Commissioner Lim stated that the 3rd requisite of animus non revertendi was
lacking
● The Comm. Lim stated that the petitioner could have only started her residence in the
Philippines in July 2006
○ This was when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI
● The COMELEC relied on the following cases to strengthen their claim
○ Coquina
○ Japzon
○ Caballero
○ Reyes
● Respondent claim that the above mentioned cases decree that the stay of an alien former
Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains permanent visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship
○ A visa free entry under a Balikpapan stamp is therefore insufficient
○ Also, since petitioner was still an American until her reacquisition of citizenship, her stay
from May 23, 2005 to July 7, 2006 cannot be counted
● However, the Court held that the reliance of the petitioner on the cases is misplaced
○ The above mentioned cases, although similar, is far different from the situation of
petitioner
○ In Coquilla, only a community tax certificate was secured as evidence
○ In japzon, the case did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to
his reacquisition of citizenship
■ In this case, the Court held that residence is distinct from citizenship
○ In Caballero, the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad
○ In Reyes, the candidate had yet to reacquire her citizenship. Her disqualification was due
to her lack of citizenship requirements
● In this case, however, the overwhelming evidence adduced by petitioner leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her US residence and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablish her residence on May 24, 2005.
● These, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire her citizenship and her family’s
continuous stay in the country, clearly shows that when the petitioner returned on May 24, 205,
she did for good.
DieJess

Section 4 - ELECTION

Case: Pimentel v. Joint Committee

Topic: Non-Leg
Docket Number:
Ponente:

Facts:
● The present petition seeks the annulment of the continued existence of the Joint Committee of
Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvas and
preliminarily canvass the votes case for the Presidential and VP candidates in the 2004
elections
● The petitioner grounds his claim on to the adjournment sine die of the 12th Congress on June
11, 2004
○ He claims that all pending matters and the proceedings terminate upon the expiration of
Congress

Issue:
● W/N the Joint Committee must cease due to the adjournment of Congress? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petition has absolutely no basis under the Constitution
● The claim of petitioner that legislative procedure, precedent or practice is borne out by the rules
of Both Houses of Congress is contradicted by Section 42 Rule 14 of the Rules adopted by the
Senate
○ The section provides that the Senate shall convene in joint sessions during voluntary or
compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President no later than
30 days after the day of the elections
● The petitioner claims that the existence and the proceedings of the Joint Committee are invalid,
illegal and unconstitutional are also misplaced
○ However, the term of the 12th Congress did not terminate and expire upon the
adjournment of the regular session
● The cited constitutional provision does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular
annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next
regular session (Sec. 15, Art. 6)
● The constitutional provisions on terms of office of Congress clearly state that the term of office
ends, unless provided by law, on June 30
○ Clearly, the present Congress cannot have lost its existence until June 30, 2004
DieJess

● The legislative function of the 12th Congress may have come to a close upon the final
adjournment, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as being the National
Board of Canvassers
○ In fact, the joint public session of both Houses to canvass the votes for the President and
the VPhas not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated tasks.
■ For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio
○ The membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes
● In all, the adjournment of Congress does not serve as an impediment to the Joint Committee’s
mandate to be the National Board of Canvassers for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Elections.
DieJess

Case: Lopez v. Senate

Topic: rules for canvassing
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Vitug

Facts:
● The present petition seeking the nullification of Section 13, Rule 8 of the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress which created a Joint Committee which shall preliminary canvass the votes
of the candidates for President and Vice-President during the 2004 elections
● The petitioner Congressman seeks for the nullification of the rule on canvassing of the
certificates as it deprives him and other members of Congress of their congressional
prerogatives

Issue:
● W/N the Congress committed GADALEJ in creating such Joint Committee

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion in creating the Joint
Committee
● Section 4, Article 7 of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress to promulgate its rules for
the canvassing of the certificates
● In existing jurisprudence, the Court has laid down that it had no power to review the internal
proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution
○ Also, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court has no authority to interfere
in the exclusive realm of a co-equal branch, absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion.
● Following these, the creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion
● The Rules state that the decisions and final report of the Joint Committee shall be subject to the
approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately
DieJess

Case: Tecson v. Lim

Topic: Need for post-election issue
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Vitug

Facts:
● The consolidated petition before the Court seeks to challenge the qualifications of FPJ as a
presidential candidate
● FPJ is born in Manila of a American Mother and a Filipino Father
○ FPJ was an illegitimate son of an alien mother
● On this issue, the petitioners are grounding their petition to deny due course or to cancel FPJ’s
CoC (misrepresentation)
● The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit and the following motion for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC En Banc
● Velez and Tecson Petitions — jurisdiction of the COMELEC
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case? - YES

Ruling/Ratio
● The Court is tasked to resolve the basic issue whether the Supreme Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the contest
● The Court held that the present petition does not constitute an election contest as contemplated
in Section 4, Article 7 of the Constitution
● The contest contemplated means a post-election scenario
○ This consists of either an election protest or a quo warranto petition
○ The two remedies share the same objective; to dislodge winning candidate from office
● This was expressly stated in the Rules of the PET
● Furthermore, the rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction over “President” or
“Vice-President” and not of candidates
● To conclude, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as defined by the Constitution would not
include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held
● With this, the Tecson and Velez petitions must fall
DieJess

Case: Macalintal v. PET

Topic: Constitutionality
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Nachura

Facts:
● The petition before the Court questions the constitutionality of the PET as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article 7 of the Constitution
○ This states that the Supreme Court, sitting en Banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose
● Petitioner Macalintal argues that the creation of a purportedly “separate tribunal”
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to
effect the constitutional mandate.
○ The petitioner supports his claim on the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the PET
■ Rule 3 — providing for the membership
■ Rule 8(e) — authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employee and
confidential employees of every member
■ Rule 9 — provides for a separate Administrative Staff of the Tribunal
■ Rule 11 — provides a “seal” separate and distinct from the Supreme Court
● Further, petitioner questions the designation of the members of the Court as Chairman and
Members of the PET
○ This is on the ground that it contravenes Section 12, Article 8 of the Constitution which
prohibits the designation of Members of the SC and of other courts established by law to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Issue:
● W/N the creation of the PET is unconstitutional?

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court used the statutory construction maxim ut mag is valeat qualm pereat — the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
● The subject provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, but neither does it preclude
not prohibit it
● The invoked provision should be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as
the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of Congress
● The mandate of the SC is to act as sole judge of the election contests involving the President and
the VP — its rule making authority is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in
the exercise thereof
● In past cases, the Court has stated that the power of the judiciary is a grant of plenary powers
● The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clarify this judicial power as plenary and that
the jurisdiction of the SC is not an intrusion into the separation of powers doctrine
DieJess

● With this, the Court states that the exercise of the SC of the power to judge presidential and
vice-presidential contests, as well as the rule-making powers adjunct thereto, is plenary —
hence, it is not as restrictive as petitioner submits.
● The establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987
Constitution
● The original PET was established pursuant to RA 1793 — in the aegis of the 1935 Constitution
○ This was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution
○ This was later revived by B.P. Blg 884
● After the EDSA Revolution, the Constitutional framers transformed the PET from a statutory
creation to a constitutional one
● The innovative power, although herculean or burdensome, falls under the doctrine of necessary
implication.
● In comparison with the other electoral tribunals, the PET is also not a separate and distinct
entity, but it is a constitutional body.
DieJess

Section 7 and 8 - FILING A VACANCY

Case: Estrada v. Desierto

Topic: Succession
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Puno

Facts:
● The case before the Court is one of a long line of cases that challenges the presidency of GMA
○ Former President Estrada avers that he is the President on leave, while PGMA claims
that she is the President
● Both Estrada and PGMA were elected by the Filipino People in the 1998 elections
○ Both their terms commenced on June 30, 1998
● Estrada’s term was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly eroded his popularity
● On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, went on air and implicated the
President for his involvement in the jueteng business
● This ignited reactions of rage and prompted the Congress to initiate impeachment proceedings
against the President
○ This also prompted several cabinet members to resign
● The articles of impeachment were then forwarded to the Senate
● The tables turned on January 16, when Senators voted on the opening of the second envelope
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret
bank account under the name “Jose Velarde”
○ The majority of Senate voted against the opening
○ This prompted Senate President Pimentel to resign, as well as the prosecutors
● In view of this, thousands of people assembled at the EDSA Shrine, sparking EDSA Dos
● On January 19, petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would
not be a candidate — this however did not diffuse the growing crisis
○ High-ranking officials of both the PNP and the AFP withdrew their support for the
President
● The next day, January 20, the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power started between the camps of Estrada and Arroyo
○ While the negotiations were ongoing, the news broke out that CJ Davide would
administer the oath of Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine
● The oath was administered and Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacanang
○ He also signed the letter that he is effectively resigning pursuant to Section 11 of the
Constitution, thereby making Arroyo the President
DieJess

● After, the PGMA discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency
○ Appointed her Cabinet
○ Was recognized by the international community
○ Appointed Sen. Guingona as the VP
○ Signed the Solid Waste Management Act into law and other bills
● After the fall from the presidency, several charges were filed by the Ombudsman against Estrada
○ In response to these, petitioner filed cases before the Court averring that he cannot be
prosecuted until after his term as President
○ Also, he filed a Quo Warranto petition against Arroyo
● Estrada argued that Arroyo was only acting-president and he is still the lawful and incumbent
President

Issue:
● W/N petitioner is a President on leave while PGMA is an Acting President? — NO, he resigned

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the President effectively resigned when he left Malacanang on January 20,
2001
● The elements of the resignation are:
○ There must be an intent to resign
○ The intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment
● Resignation is not governed by any formal requirement in form
○ It may be oral or written and implied or express — as long as it is clear, it must be given
legal effects
● Despite lacking a formal resignation letter, the acts and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 bear material relevance to the issue
● Using the totality test, Estrada has effectively resigned
● The intention to give up the presidency is manifest by the proposed snap elections where
Estrada would not be a candidate
● Furthermore, the President’s words to former Executive Secretary Angara that he was to be
given 5 days to a week in the palace by General Reyes showed that he already reconciled with
the reality of resignation
● The negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer that was initiated was also indicative of the
his intention to resign
● More statements to Angara further indicate the intention to resign
● All in all, the overt acts of the President are indicative of his resignation — there can be no other
logical conclusion to these facts
● Petitioner submits the letter he sent to the Heads of Congress that Arroyo shall be Acting
President - thereby showing that he has not relinquished the highest seat in government
○ However, the Court ruled that this mysterious letter bears no significance and cannot
outweigh the clear resignation of the President
DieJess

● Aside from the letter, petitioner also supports his claim using Section 12 of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act which prohibits resignation of a public officer pending an investigation or
prosecution
○ On this, the Court held that the legislative intent clearly rejects the claim of the
President
○ Furthermore, the invoked section cannot apply to the petitioner because the cases
before him were not considered pending
■ The ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation
○ Also, the impeachment trial was also not pending as it already broke down during the
infamous “walk out”
● Various resolutions and the signing of bills into law by PGMA further express that the PGMA’s
presidency is not mere temporary
○ The claim that Estrada did not resign is belied by the Congressional acts
DieJess

Section 13 - PROHIBITION AGAINST

EMPLOYMENT
Case: Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control Board
Topic: Designation and Ex-Officio Capacity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Makalintal

Facts:
● The present petition is questioning Section 2 of RA 3137 as unconstitutional
● Petitioner was authorized by the Collector of Customs, pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff
and Customs Code , to operate a manufacturing bonded warehouse located at Santolan,
Tenejeros, Malabo, Rizal
○ Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse No. 88
○ The authority exempted petitioner from duty from importing raw materials and
proceeded to manufacture them into finished products for export under the terms and
conditions required and specified in the letter-authority
● On June 17, 1961 RA 3137 was enacted which created an embroidery and apparel control and
inspection board
○ covering control, issuance of entry permits, and inspection of conditionally tax-free raw
material importations by local embroidery apparel manufacturers and the corresponding
liquidation of re-exhortations thereof as Philippine-made embroideries and apparels
● Section 2 of the RA provides for the composition of the Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board — included a representative from the private sector coming from the
Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines
● In compliance with Sec. 2, the Board was constituted and the Department of Finance named
Santiago as the representative from the private sector
○ He was the association president of the Philippine Association of Embroidery and
Apparel Exporters, Inc.
● Petitioner challenged the appointment of Santiago on the ground that it was the association
named under Sec. 2
○ However, a letter from Senator Almendras, the principal author of the RA, stated that
the the association contemplated in the RA is the PAEAE
DieJess

● In the exercise of its powers, the Board, requested petitioner to submit pertinent data called for
in the attached form of application for license and requested to remit with the application the
amount of 200 pesos which will be charged against petitioner’s future assessments
● Petitioner then filed a petition to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the provisions of RA
3137 on the ground of its unconstitutionality
○ This was affirmed by the court a quo — section 2 was declared unconstitutional and the
Board was declared illegally constituted

Issue:
● W/N Section 2 of RA 3137 is unconstitutional? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court upheld the validity of the assailed section
● The argument of petitioner is that the provision is an infringement of the Presidential power to
appoint by the President as the act prescribes the composition of the Board as members of
specified offices
● On this, the Court held that the members are ex-officio members
○ These members are designated due to the positions that they hold
● The choice of offices to be represented in the Board is due to their direct relation to the
importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery and apparel products
and their subsequent exportation
● Clearly, there is no attempt to deprive the President of his power to make appointments
DieJess

Case: CLU v. Executive Secretary

Topic: Stricter prohibition on the President’s official family against multiple offices
Docket Number:
Ponente: CJ Fernan

Facts:
● The present petitions are assailing the constitutionality of EO 284, issued by President Aquino
○ The assailed order allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
● The petitioners contest that the EO adds exceptions to Section 13, Article 7 other than those
provided in the Constitution
○ Only exceptions are
■ VP may be appointed as a member of the Cabinet
■ Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the JBC
● The contention is between the constitutionality of the exception provided in the EO
○ Petitioner contends that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution
while the respondent argues that the constitutional prohibition refers to Section 7(2),
Article 9b insofar as the appointive officials mentioned are concerned

Issue:
● W/N the constitutional prohibition admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials
in general under Section 7(2), Article 9b — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The prohibition was born out of the abuses during the Marcos regime, wherein various offices
were created and Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit
as members of the board
○ This led to schemes of self-enrichment
● Cronies of Marcos held numerous positions in various government instrumentalities, agencies
and corporations
● It is clear from the double down on prohibition contained in Articles 7 and 9 that the
Constitutional framers intended to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official
family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned
○ This is underscored by a comparison of Section 13 with other provisions of the
Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding
other offices or employment
● The prohibition under Section 13 is all embracing at it covers both public and private office or
employment
○ Also, the prohibition on direct or indirect practice of any profession, participation in any
business, etc. is not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees
DieJess

● Clearly, the intent of the Constitution is to treat the President and his official family as a class by
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions
● The Executive Department is therefore given stricter prohibitions as ther exercise more powers
● Therefore, the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 13 cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article 9B
○ Construing it in that manner would render negatory and meaningless the manifest intent
and purpose of the framers of the Constitution
● To add, the prohibition does not apply to Executive officials in an ex-officio capacity without
additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
official’s office
○ This is because these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation
of the constitutional prohibition
DieJess

Case: De La Cruz v. COA

Topic: Cabinet Members are not entitled to additional compensation
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez

Per diem — daily allowance

Facts:
● The petition before the court is assailing the decision rendered by COA which denied petitioners
appeal from the Notice of Disallowance issued by the NHA Resident Auditor
○ This Notice disallowed payment to petitioner of their representation and per dimes in
the total amount of 276,600.00
● Petitioner were members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority from
1991-1996
● COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the
national government agencies and goccs which have affected payment of any form of
additional compensation or resume ration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants,
or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions to:
○ Immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration
given to and received by the concerned officials
○ Effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the SC Decision in the CLU
case
● This was following the declaration of the SC that EO 284 was unconstitutional
● Pursuant to this memorandum, NHA Resident Auditor Vasquez issued a Notice of Disallowance
to the Cabinet members who were the ex-officio members of the NHA Board of Directors
and/or their respective alternates who actually received payments
● This was then appealed to COA but it was denied
● Hence this petition

Issue
● W/N COA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the appeal of the petitioners? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The composition of the Board of Directors of the NHA are Cabinet members, pursuant to the
Presidential Decree that created them — PD 757
● The petitioners are not the Cabinet officers, but are “alternates” of the said officers, whose acts
shall be considered the acts of their principals
● Following the ruling in CLU, ex-officio members are prohibited from receiving additional
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or
some other such euphemism
● Therefore, as alternates, petitioner cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation
● Ruling on the contrary would give petitioners a better right than their principals
DieJess
DieJess

Case: Bitonio v. COA

Topic: Designation and Ex-Officio Capacity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

Facts:
● The petition before the Court seeks the annulment of the COA decision which denied the
petitioner’s MR of the COA Notices of Disallowance involving the per diems the petitioner
received from the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
● Petitioner Bitinio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE
● He was then designated by Secretary Brillantes and Secretary Navarro of the DOLE and DTI
respectively, to be the representative of DOLE to the Board of Directors of PEZA
○ This was pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7916
● As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, petitioner was receiving a per diem for
every board meeting he attended during the years 1995-1997
● After a post audit of PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to the petitioner and issued the Notices of Disallowance
○ The reason for this is the SC ruling in CLU and pursuant to the COA memorandum
enforcing the SC decision
● Petitioner then filed an MR but this was denied
● Hence, this petition.

Issue:
● W/N the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by petitioner for his attendance in the
PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the COA was correct in their finding
● COA grounded their decision on the SC decision in CLU, which declared EO 284 unconstitutional
● The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the per diems pursuant to RA 7916
○ He maintains that the RA is stronger than the COA Memorandum
○ Furthermore, the RA was enacted 4 years after the CLU decision
○ And that the RA was never declared as invalid
● However, these arguments are untenable
● Petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor
○ He admitted that there was no separate or special appointment for such position
● Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office
or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to petitioner, who sat in the Board only in
behalf of the Secretary of Labor
● The case shares similar facts as the De La Cruz case as a contrary ruling would allow the
representative to have a better right than his principal
DieJess

● Even though the RA is higher than the COA memorandum, it is still lower in the hierarchy of laws
than the Constitution
○ The CLU ruling was based on the interpretation of a constitutional prohibition
● The invoked provision in the RA was also amended by a subsequent law, making petitioner’s
argument more untenable
DieJess

Case: National Amnesty Comm. v. COA

Topic: Designation and Ex-Officio Capacity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The petition before the Court is assailing 2 decisions of COA that affirmed the NGAO ruling
disallowing the payment of honoraria to the representatives of petitioner’s ex-officio members
● Similarly with the earlier cases, the ground for the disallowance was COA Memorandum 97-038
● Petitioner is a government agency created by President Ramos through Proclamation 347
○ They are tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications
● The composition of the NAC includes a chairperson, 3 appointed members, and ex-officio
members for the DOJ, DND and the DILG.
● The 3 ex-officio members turned over their responsibility in the NAC to their representatives
who were paid an honoraria beginning December 12, 1994
● However, pursuant to the COA Memorandum, the NAC resident auditor disallowed the payment
of honoraria to the representatives amounting to 255,750 from December 1994 to June 1997
○ This was upheld by the NGAO
● Meanwhile, the NAC passed Administrative Order 2 — IRR of Proclamation 347 of President
Estrada
○ The provision of the said order stated that ex-officio members/representatives shall be
entitled to compensation as may be authorized by law
● Petitioner invoked this order in assailing the disallowance to COA
○ However, this was denied
● Hence this petition

Issue:
● W/N the COA committed grave abuse of discretion? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant the compensation or
allowance to the NAC ex-officio members’ official representatives
● The COA has jurisdiction over all government entities or when public funds are being used
● In accordance to this mandate, COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 which disallowed
additional compensations pursuant to the Court’s ruling in CLU
● Petitioner contends that the memorandum cannot be valid or effective unless it has gone
through the required publication pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code
○ However, as the Court held in the case of Tanada, regulations that are internal and
interpretative in nature need not be published
● The COA Memorandum is in this class, therefore, the publication is not a requirement for its
validity and effectively
DieJess

● The NAC ex-officio members’ representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below
Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions
○ They are not exempt from the general prohibition because there is no law or
administrative order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional
compensation — Secs. 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code
○ Receipt of additional emolument is also barred by RA 6758 — the Salary
Standardization Law
● It should be noted that the members assumed their responsibilities by virtue of their positions,
or the positions of their principals as ex officio members.
○ There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. The
former is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
powers and functions of a given office, while the latter merely connotes an imposition
of ADDITIONAL DUTIES, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment
■ DESIGNATION does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant of the
right to claim the salary attached to the position — w/o appointment, a
designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position
● Second, the ex officio members’ representatives are also covered by the strict constitutional
prohibition imposed on the President and his official family
○ This was laid down in the decision of the Court in CLU
● Also, following the decisions in Dela Cruz and Bitonio Jr., representatives of ex officio members
are likewise prohibited as their principals are.
DieJess

Case: Funa v. Ermita

Topic: Designation and Ex-Officio Capacity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Makalintal
Facts:
● The petition before the Court seeks the declaration of unconstitutionality of the designation of
USec. Bautista as OIC of the MARINA
● Bautista was appointed by PGMA as the USec of the DOTC
○ She was then designated as USec. for Maritime Transport of the department via a
Special Order (2006-171)
● Thereafter, MARINA Administrator Suazo resigned from his post and Bautista was designated as
OIC, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary
● This prompted petitioner herein to file the present petition invoking the constitutional
prohibition as interpreted in CLU
● Petitioner insists that the prohibition does apply to those held in ex officio capacities, the
position of MARINA Administrator is not ex officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary — based
of the provisions of its charter, PD No. 474 as amended by EO No. 125-A
○ Furthermore, Sec. 23 of the Administrative Code on the DOTC does not provide any ex
officio role for the undersecretaries in any of the department’s attached agencies
■ The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC shows
that she does not occupy it in an ex officio capacity since an ex officio position
does not require any “further warrant or appoint”
○ Furthermore, petitioner contends that the appointment or designation as OIC was
intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate the
constitutional prohibition
■ This may be seen as a circumvention of the prohibition as the temporary
appointment/designation does not have a maximum duration
■ The temporaries is likewise not enumerated as one of the exceptions to the
constitutional prohibition
● Petitioner also asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Usec. And MARINA
Administrator
○ This is because the recommendations of the MARINA may be subject to counter or
opposing recommendations from the Usec. For Maritime Transport
■ In this case, the DOTC Usec for Maritime Transport and the OIC of MARINA have
become the same person
■ Due to this, there would be no ore check and balance in the maritime industry
● The petition has become moot due to the relinquishment of Bautista as DOTC Usec, but the case
still needs resolution as it meets the requirements for judicial review

Issue:
● W/N the designation of Bautista was constitutional? — NO
DieJess

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the designation of Bautista as OIC was unconstitutional
● This is because the designation falls under the stricter prohibition under Sec. 13, Article 7 of
the Constitution
● Bautista was then the USec. Of the DOTC, therefore, she was covered by the stricter prohibition
under the Constitution and she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7(2), Article 9B
where holding office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position
○ Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex officio capacity, which is the
exception recognized in CLU
● Bautista has failed to prove that her designation was in an ex officio capacity as required by the
primary functions of her office as DOTC USec. For Maritime Transport
● Furthermore, the designation of Bautista being merely an imposition of additional duties related
to her primary position as DOTC USec. Cannot be accepted
○ The DOTC USec. For Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry
Board
■ It includes the DOTC Secretary, the MARINA Administrator, Executive Secretary,
PPA GM, DND Secretary, DBP GM, and the DTI Secretary
● Lastly the defense of respondent that the designation was just temporary and that Bautista was
never really appointed as OIC Administrator of MARINA is untenable
○ This was discussed in Binamira — designation v. Appointment
■ Designation — this connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an
incumbent official. This does not confer security of tenure as the person is only
an acting or temporary appointment
■ Appointment — the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. This results in
security of tenure unless the person is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office
○ Respondents cannot rely on the definitions. The constitutional prohibition does not
distinguish between the two. The words used were “hold the office”
■ This means to possess or occupy the office, or to be in possession and
administration, which implies less than the actual discharge of the functions
and duties of the office.
DieJess

Case: Funa v. Executive Secretary

Topic: Designation and Ex-Officio Capacity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Makalintal

Facts:
● The petition before the Court is assailing the COnstitutionality of Alberto Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations as the Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity as the DOJ
Secretary
○ On March 1, 2010, Agra was appointed as the DOJ Secretary following the resignation of
Agnes Devanadera
○ It was on March 5, 2010 that PGMA designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General
● Petitioner claims that this appointment is violative of Section 13, Article 7 of the Constitution
● Respondent Agra contends that he was the Government Corporate Counsel when he was
designated as Acting Solicitor General
○ He was then appointed as Secretary of Justice when Secretary Devanadera tendered her
resignation in order to run for Congress
○ He maintains that he relinquished his position as the GCC and that pending the
appointment of his successor, he continued to perform his duties as the Acting SolGen

Issue:
● W/N the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice is unconstitutional? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the designation of Agra is violative of Section 13, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution
● Funa v. Ermita laid down the difference between the complementary provisions, Section 13
Article 7 and Section 7 Article 9B
○ Sec. 7 Article 9B — meant to law down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees
○ Sec. 13 Article 7 — meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, The Vp,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
● Agra was designated as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
SolGen
○ This means that Agra is undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article 7 — he could not
validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General
● The temporariness of the designation is of no moment
○ The constitutional prohibition does not distinguish as seen in the usage of the phrase
“hold an office in government”
● There are only 2 exceptions to the constitutional prohibition:
○ VP can become a member of the Cabinet
DieJess

○ Posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13 without additional

compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the officials’ offices
● The designation of Agra was definitely not among the exceptions stated above
○ How was not designated in an ex officio capacity
● Because he was included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally
apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Section 7(2), Article 9B to justify his
designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor
General
● To be validly holding another office, Agra should’ve shown proof that he was allowed to as
expressly stated in the Constitution — this he was not able to do
● The definitions of the 2 concurrent positions held by Agra shows that one position was not
derived from the other
○ The powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor
included by the powers of the DOJ
○ While it is attached to the DOJ, is is not constituent unit of the latter — the
Administrative Code itself decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous
● RA 9417 vested the Solicitor General with a Cabinet rank.
○ Adding the functions of the Solicitor General to the equally demanding tasks of the
Secretary of Justice is obviously too much for any one official to bear
● The concurrent holding of the two positions may also affect sound government operations and
the proper performance of duties
● Even assuming that Agra was not covered by the prohibition in Section 13, Article 7, he remains
to be covered by the general prohibition in Section 7, Aritlce 9(b) of the same Constitution
○ His therefore, his designation was still subject to the conditions under the constitutional
provision
○ The holding of another office is only valid if it is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position
● The case of Quimson v. Ozaeta laid down the test for determining the incompatibility between 2
offices
○ This happens when there is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; where one
office is not subordinate to the other, nor relations of the one to the other such as are
inconsistent and repugnant.
● The functions of the OSG are clearly not related or necessary to the primary functions of the DOJ
○ The nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility exists
between the offices — this further warrants the declaration that Agra’s designation is
void for being violative of the express provisions of the Constitution
DieJess

Case: Espiritu v. Lutgarda

Topic: Designation and Ex-Officio Capacity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Leonen

Facts:
● The petition before the Court is assailing the resolution of the CA which reinstated the order of
the DAR Secretary which approved petitioner’s application for exemption
● In 1978, the City Council of Angela’s City enacted a Zoning Ordinance that classified areas in
Barangay Margot and Sapang Bato as agricultural land
● Pursuant to this, respondent Lurgarta allegedly requested the City Zoning Administrator to
exempt from the zoning classification 2 lots located in the 2 Barangay
○ This was allegedly approved on March 7, 1980 and the lots were reclassified as
non-agricultural or industrial lots
● Later, on June 10 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was enacted
○ Pursuant to this, respondent filed an application for exemption with the DAR seeking to
exempt the above mentioned lots from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage
● This was granted by Secretary of Pagdanganan on February of 2004
○ In arriving at the decision, Sec. Pagdanagan used DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990
stating that lands classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of CARP are
beyond its coverage
● Later, on March 26, 2004, farmers in the landholdings of the respondent, let by herein petitioner,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
○ They argued that under the Zoning Ordinance, HLURB Resolution, and the Angeles City
Council Resolution, the landholdings were classified as agricultural, not industrial
○ Further, they argued that as per certifications by the HLRUB dated June 1, 2001, May 28,
2001, and November 23, 2003, the land holdings within the agricultural zone, and there
was no zoning ordinance passed that reclassified the area into other land uses
● This motion was given due course by the Secretary and was later granted.
○ New Secretary of DA revoked the earlier order of the Sec. Pagdanganan — Sec.
Pangandaman
● Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration and this was denied by Secretary
Pangandaman on the ground that the landholdings were classified and remained agricultural
● Respondent then filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the President
○ The OP, through then Deputy Executive Secretary for legal Affairs Manuel Gaite,
rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit
● Respondent then filed a motion for extension to file her MR but this was also denied by Deputy
Executive Secretary Dizon
DieJess

● Respondent then filed a petition for review before the CA arguing that she was denied due
process and that Gaite’s decision was void since he had been appointed to the SEC two months
prior to the rendering of the decision
○ The CA granted the petition stating that the decision issued by Gaite was void since it
violated Article 7, Section 13 of the Constitution
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the decision of Gaite was void for being unconstitutional? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision is presumed valid, effective, and
binding
● It was alleged that Gaite lost his authority as Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs when
he rendered the decision since he is constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during
his tenure.
○ On this, the Court held that it is not conclusive since no evidence was presented as to
when he accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, or assumed the position
● Assuming that his appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered a de
facto officer at the time he rendered the decision
● This was clarified in Funa v. Agra where in the Court held that the acts of the de facto officer are
just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons
who are interested therein are concerned
○ Official actions are presumed valid in order to protect the sanctity of the dealing by the
public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State
● Respondent has failed to present evidence showing that the decision rendered was ultra vires
DieJess

Case: Doromal v. Sandiganbayan

Topic: Designation and Ex-Officio Capacity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Grino-Aquino

Facts:
● The petition before the Court assails the decision of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to
quash of petitioner and the order of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension from office
pedente lite
● A Special Prosecution Officer conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge against
petitioner, a former Commissioner of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019
○ This was in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of
the Doromal International Trading Corporation which submitted bids to supply 61 million
worth of equipment to the DECS and the NMYC
● An information was later filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan
● This prompted petitioner to file a petition questioning the jurisdiction of of the “Tanodbayan” to
file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman
○ The Court annulled the information in accordance to existing jurisprudence
● Upon the annulment, the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refine
the information
○ This was granted pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the Ombudsman
● Thereafter, a new information was filed before the Sandiganbayan
○ Petitioner then filed a motion to quash the information on 2 grounds:
■ Invalid due to lack of no preliminary investigation
■ Defective because the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged
● The Sandigabayan denied the motion and later suspended petitioner on the motion of the
Special Prosecutor
● Hence this petition

Issue:
● W/N the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied the motion to quash and
suspended the petitioner despite the President having previously approved his indefinite leave
of absence? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that there was grave abuse of discretion and remanded the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
○ This is because the first preliminary investigation was a nullity
● Petitioner has the right to a new preliminary investigation because of the new charge
○ This is in obedience with the provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
● However, there is no merit to the petitioner’s insistence that the information should be quashed
because the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not possess any
DieJess

document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after he became a PCGG
Commissioner
● The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the presence of a signed document bearing the
signature of petitioner as part of the application to bid is not an indispensable requirement
○ This is because the Ombudsman indicated in his Memorandum/Clearance to the Special
Prosecutor, that the petitioner can rightfully be charged with having participated in a
business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13, Article 7 of the Constitution
and because the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an
indirect interest
● The constitutional provision states that the participation may be direct or indirect
○ This is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law
DieJess

Section 14 and 15 - APPOINTMENTS

Case: De Castro v. JBC
Topic: Reversal of Valenzuela ruling
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bersamin

Facts:
● The consolidated petition before the Court seeks to compel the JBC to submit to the incumbent
President the list of at least 3 nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice
○ The Soriano petition proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection
and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice
○ The Philconsa petition wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice
● The principal issue raised by the petitions pose the question on whether the incumbent
President appoint the successor of CJ Puno upon his retirement
● The De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue has impelled the JBC to defer
the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees
○ De Castro opines that the JBC is thereby abrogating unto itself the judicial function that
is not conferred upon it by the Constitution, which has limited it to the task of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary
● CJ Puno retired 7 days after the presidential elections
○ Pursuant to Section 9, Article 8, the vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof
● Congressman Defensor, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for
nominations to the office of the CJ be commenced immediately
○ The JBC En Banc then passed a resolution that it would start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice to be vacated upon the retirement of CJ Puno
● As a result of this resolution, the JBC opened the position of CJ for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement
● The JBC then proceeded with its steps for nominating the next CJ
○ This came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star
● Although the process has begun, the JBC has yet to decide on when to submit to the President
its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy that is now before the Court
● The case is similar to the Valenzuela case wherein the Court held that Section 15, Article 7
prevailed over Sec 4(1), Article 8 because it was couched in stronger negative language and
being prohibitory in nature

Issue:
DieJess

● W/N the incumbent President has the power and authority to appoint during the election ban
the successor of the Chief Justice? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The case involves a conflict between 2 constitutional provisions due to the present circumstance.
○ The JBC is require by the Constitution to submit its nominations within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy
○ The President is barred from appointing 2 months prior to the elections up until the end
of her term
● On this, the Court held that the prohibition in Section 15 does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary
I — in relation to Valenzuela (intent of the constitutional framers)
● The records of the Constitutional Commission deliberations show that there was no intend to
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article 7 to the appointment of members of the
Supreme Court
○ If there was such intention, it would have been explicitly done so
● In relation to the Valenzuela ruling wherein the Court held that the prohibition covers even
judicial appointments, it is noted that the dictum in that matter did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
○ The Court stated that the use of shall in Section 4(1), Article 8 imposes on the President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme COurt within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy —failure to do so will be a clear
disobedience to the Constitution
○ Furthermore, the 90-day limitation was a special provision to establish a definite
mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by a mere
judicial interpretation in Valenzuela
● Following this new interpretation, the Court reversed the Valenzuela ruling for having arbitrarily
ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4(1) stand
independently of any other provision
○ It also ignored that the 2 provisions had no irreconcilable conflict,regardless of the
wording in Section 15, Article 7
● Therefore, the prohibition to appoint in the Judiciary is not within the coverage of Sec. 15
II — JBC
● Section 15, Article 7 also does not apply to all other appointments in the Judiciary
○ The ratio for the constitutional prohibition in Section 15 is to eliminate midnight
appointments from being made by an outgoing President
○ Section 15 was directed against 2 types of appointments
■ Those made for buying votes — made within the election ban
■ Those made for partisan considerations — midnight appointments
● Section 15 is broader than the ruling in the leading case of Aytona wherein President Garcia
made 350 appointments in one night.
DieJess

○ The Court in this case declared that such appointments constitute an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives and are merely partisan in nature which deprived the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments
● The exceptions to the prohibition only covers temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety
● However, contrary to Valenzuela, the Court held that the background and the rationale for the
prohibition leads to the conclusion that the prohibition was confined to appointments made in
the Executive Department
○ This was not extended to appointments in the Judiciary, because the establishment of
the JBC and their subjecting nomination and screening ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary
● The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be
made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or satisfying partisan
considerations.
○ The intense betting of the JBC assures that even the candidates backed by people
influential with the President could not always be assured of being appointed
● There conclusion therefore, is that the JBC was created to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing
away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments
III — Regalado confirmation
● The confirmation of Justice Regalado to the JBC in 1998 with regard to Court of Appeals
vacancies cannot be disregarded
● Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers
rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
IV — Statutory Construction
● 3 sections in Article 7 of the Constitution concern the appointing powers of the President
● Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an
Acting President, and evidently refers only to appointments in the Judiciary
● Section 14 does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting
appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being
revocable at will
● The letter and the spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence
○ Also, there is no statute that authorizes the revocation of appointments in the Judiciary
● Prior to the mandatory retirement, judges of the first and second level courts and the Justices of
the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the Members of the SC may be
removed only by impeachment
● Section 16, only covers appointments that require the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
○ But because of the Section 9 of Article 7 (JBC), the requirement did not include
appointments to the Judiciary
● The 3 provisions are therefore same in character, in so far as they affect the power of the
President to appoint
DieJess

● The fact that the appointments in Sections 14 and 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department
○ This is in consideration of the statutory construction rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context.
V — Judicial Independence
● A holding contrary to what the Court rules in this case would tie the Judiciary and the SC to
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency
○ Therefore, undermining the intent of the Constitution for the Judiciary to remain
independent
● Having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief
Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence
○ This is because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority
● The appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising
judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010
VI — Absurd argument
● The argument that the incumbent President need not appoint because there are still 45 days left
out of the 90 days is flawed
○ This is because it focuses only on the coming vacancy and not to every situation of a
vacancy
● It also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be time remaining in the 90-day
period
○ The difference between the constitutionally mandated date for presidential elections
and the assumption of office of the new President will always be beyond the 90-day
mandatory period
● Such an interpretation would lead to an absurdity, which the framers of the constitution cannot
be assumed to intend
● In fact, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments under Section 15, or its effects on the 90-day period
VII — lahbong dictum amp
● The President may even, in an extreme case, appoint the Chief Justice if the appointee is to
come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court
DieJess

Section 16 - GENERAL APPOINTMENTS

AND AD INTERIM
Case: Government v. Springer
Topic: Nature of the power to appoint —Executive
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Malcolm

Facts:
● The case before the Court is a quo warranto petition brought against 3 directors of the National
Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee
created by Acts No’s 2705 and 2822
● The case questions the validity of the part of Sec. 4 of Act 2705
○ This set the composition of the committee for the NCC which will consist of the
Governor General, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House
● The NCC is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of Act No. 2705
○ The Governor-General was directed to subscribe on behalf of the Government for at
least 51 percent of the capital of the corporation
○ The Government eventually became the owner of more than 99 percent of the 30k
outstanding shares of stock of the NCC
○ Only 19% stand in the names of private individuals
● The Governor General promulgated EO 37 which provided that the voting committee or board of
control, the GG would exercise exclusively the duties and powers theretofore assumed by the
voting committee or board of control.
○ Notice of the contents of the executive order was given to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
● On December 26, 1926, there was a special meeting for the stockholders. The GG, through his
representative, asserted the sole power to vote the stock of the Government.
○ The GG objected to the asserted powers of the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the latter likewise objected to the assertion of the
GG
■ The chair recognized the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives in their capacity as majority members of the voting
committee as the persons lawfully entitled to represent and vote the
Government. They cast their votes in favor of the respondents
■ GG objected

Issue:
● W/N the power to appoint lies in the executive? — YES
DieJess

● W/N the heads of Congress can appoint to the Board? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Governor General was vested with the supreme exclusive power by the Organic Act
○ The GG is also responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands
and of the US operative in within the Philippine Islands
○ The GG also has power of control and supervision over the executive departments
● The Philippines is an agency of the Congress of the US
○ The distribution of power under the Organization act is clearly defined
● The Court stated that the grant of powers to the GG shows that appointment is an Executive
function
● The power to appoint is vested in the executive
○ This is because neither is it legislative nor judicial
○ Giving it to any other branch of government would be a violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers
● The Administrative Code also vests the Governor-General with executive control of the Philippine
Government
○ This was to be exercised in person or through the Secretaries of Departments
● The basic distribution is as follows
○ Legislative — make the law
○ Judicial — construe the law
○ Executive — execute laws
● Given the clear bounds provided by the Organic Act, each branch may not intrude in the
exclusive domain of the others
● The power of appointment can hardly be considered a legislative power
○ Appointments may be made by the legislature or the courts, but when so made should
be taken as an incident to the discharge of functions property within their respective
spheres
● The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by the
Government of the US to the executive branch of the government which it has set up in the
Philippines
● The Organic Act itself provides that the Governor-General shall appoint and with consent of the
Senate, such officers may now be appointed by the Governor General
○ The exception is that the legislature shall provide for the appointment and removal of
heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General
● Furthermore, the Administrative Code provides that the Governor General has the powers and
duties to:
○ Nominate and appoint officials, conformably to law, to positions in the service of the
Government
○ Remove officials from office and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed
officials
DieJess

● The general grant of “executive power” included appointment and removal of executive
subordinates
● With this, the legislators may not appoint members to the NAC
○ Membership in the committee is an office
○ A public station
○ Permanent in character, created by law, whose incidents and duties were prescribed by
law
● NCC, having been bought by the Government, is an agency or instrumentality of the government
○ The stocks in the corporation are public funds
○ The government, being majority owner, naturally dominates the management of its
property
DieJess

Case: Velicara v. OP
Topic: Revocation of GMA appointments
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Carpio

Facts:
● Prior to the May 2010 elections, President GMA issued more than 800 appointments to various
positions in several government offices.
● Section 15 of Article VII bans midnight appointments, stating that:
○ Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
● For purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10, 2010 was set as the cut-off date for valid
appointments. Anything on March 11 and beyond would be considered a midnight appointment.
● The present case is a consolidation of petitions by PGMA appointees who were affected by
subsequent President Aquino’s EO No. 2: Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments
issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight
Appointments.
● The petitioners involved and what transpired are as follows:
○ Atty. Cheloy Velicaria-Garafil -- appointed as State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor
General
■ Date of Appointment Paper - March 5, 2010
■ Date of Transmittal Letter of the Appointment Paper from the OP - March 8,
2010
■ Date of Taking Oath as State Solicitor II - March 22, 2010
■ Date of Receipt of Transmittal Letter by the Malacanang Records Office (MRO) -
May 13, 2010
■ Date of Assuming Position - April 6, 2010
■ No indication of OSG’s receipt of the appointment paper.
○ Atty. Dindo Venturanza -- appointed as Prosecutor IV of Quezon City
■ Date of Appointment Paper - February 23, 2010
■ Date of Transmittal Letter of the Appointment Paper from the OP - March 9,
2010 (actual transmittal to DOJ Secretary was on March 12, 2010)
■ From February 23 to March 12, Atty. Venturanza, upon verbal advice from
Malacanang of his promotion but without an official copy of his appointment
paper, secured clearances from the CSC, Sandiganbayan, and the DOJ.
■ Date of Taking Oath as Prosecutor IV - March 15, 2010
■ Date of Assuming Position - March 15, 2010
○ Irma Villanueva -- appointed as Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators
of the CDA
■ Date of Appointment Paper - March 3, 2010
DieJess

■ There was no record of any transmittal letter of the appointment paper from the
OP.
■ Date of Taking Oath - April 13, 2010
○ Francisca Rosquita -- appointed as Commissioner of the NCIP
■ Date of Appointment Paper - March 5, 2010
■ There was no record of any transmittal letter of appointment paper from the OP.
■ Date of Taking Oath - March 18, 2010
○ Eddie Tamondong -- appointed as Representative of the Private Sector in the SBMA
Board of Directors
■ Date of Appointment Paper - March 1, 2010
■ Date the Appointment Paper was Received by the Office of SBMA Chair - March
25, 2010
■ Date of Taking Oath - March 25, 2010
■ He took another oath of office on July 6, 2010 for “extra caution because of the
rising crescendo of noise from the new political mandarins against ‘midnight
appointments.’”
■ On July 30, 2010, newly-elected President Aquino issued the abovementioned
EO No. 2.
● The EO yielded the following results:
○ Velicaria-Garafil
■ On August 5, Solicitor General Cadiz informed the officers and employees
affected that they were terminated effective the next day.
■ Atty. Velicaria-Garafil had to return the office-issued laptop, cellphone, and was
told that her salary had stopped as of the 7th of August.
○ Venturanza
■ On September 15, Venturanza asked for clarification of his status, duties, and
functions in a letter to Secretary De Lima. He also wrote to President Aquino
asking for reaffirmation of his promotion as City Prosecutor.
■ On October 6, Sec. De Lima directed him to relinquish the office to which he was
appointed and to cease from performing its functions.
○ Villanueva and Rosquita
■ The OP withheld the salaries of Villanueva and Rosquita.
■ On October 1, Executive Secretary Ochoa revoked Rosquita’s appointment.
○ Tamondong
■ He was removed from the SBMA Board on July 30.
● All petitioners challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 2. The CA ruled in favor of its
constitutionality.

Issue:
● W/N the appointments of petitioners are valid? — NO
● W/N EO 2 is valid? — YES
DieJess

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petitioners’ appointments are clearly within the constitutional ban on
midnight appointments
○ The petitioners failed to show proof that their appointment papers have been issued
before the ban
○ Also, the transmittal of the appointment papers are also clearly falling within the ban
● On the Constitutionality of EO 2, the Court held that it was valid
● The appointment ban is there for a reason; thus, for a valid appointment just before or during
the appointment, the application must follow the process
● For an appointment to valid, these must happen: (ALL ARE REQUIRED)
○ Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority
■ The power to appoint is discretionary power of choice is fundamental
■ The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified.
■ Once power of appointment has been conferred by the Constitution or by
Congress, it comes with the discretion of whom to appoint.
○ Transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal
■ Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that
signifies the President's intent of its issuance.
■ For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and
authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e.,
handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be
accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.
■ The possession of the original appointment paper is not indispensable to
authorize an appointee to assume office. If it were indispensable, then a loss of
the original appointment paper, which could be brought about by negligence,
accident, fraud, fire or theft, corresponds to a loss of the office. However, in case
of loss of the original appointment paper, the appointment must be evidenced
by a certified true copy issued by the proper office, in this case the MRO.
○ Vacant position at the time of appointment
■ An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be
made to an occupied office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his
appointment validly terminated, before one could be validly installed to succeed
him.
○ Receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
■ Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and
taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of
the office
DieJess

Case: Pimentel v. Ermita

Topic: Reversal of Valenzuela ruling
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bersamin

Facts:
● The petition before the court seeks the declaration of the appointments issued by PGMA as
unconstitutional
● The Congress commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004
○ Thereafter, the CA was constituted
● PGMA then issued appointments to the respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments
○ Agad - DepED
○ Cruz, Jr. - DND
○ Defensor - DENR
○ Durano - DOT
○ Gonzalez - DOJ
○ Romulo - DFA
○ VIlla - DAR
○ Yap - DA
● The appointment papers for the respondents explicitly states that they are appointed as
“ACTING SECRETARY”
● They then took their oaths of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries
● Several members of the Senate then filed this present petition
● Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004
○ The next day, the President issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity

Issue:
● W/N the appointment of the respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the CA
while Congress is in session is constitutional? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The appointment power of the President is essentially executive in nature
○ Neither can the legislative nor the judiciary interfere in the exercise of such unless in
those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it
● Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature
○ The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive power is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office
● The legislature CANNOT appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications
nor can it impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office
DieJess

○ The power to appoint cannot be curtailed by such legislative moves

● The CA’s exercise of powers is executive, although its membership is essentially legislative
○ The body does not legislate as it is an independent creation of the Constitution
○ It’s power and existence emanates from the CONSTITUTION and not from Congress;
Hence, it is not an agent of Congress

Now on the appointments of the President

● Petitioners contend that PGMA should not have appointed the respondents because of the
provisions of EO 292 which states that “in case of vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only
an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary”
● Further, petitioners aver that there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a
vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the CA, while Congress is in session —
because it would need the CA’s consent first
● The issue is on the lack of permission or prohibition
○ Petitioners raise the issue that there is a lack of permission, by law, that the President
can appoint department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session
○ While the Respondents claim that there is no law that prohibits such, so the President
may
● Appointments in an acting capacity is temporary in nature
○ It serves as a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
permanent appointment is done
○ When a vacancy occurs, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office
● As stated earlier, there can be no curtailment of the power to appoint; hence, Congress cannot
impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego
● The department secretary is the alter ego of the President; thus, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the President’s confidence
○ By its very nature, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session
○ The person may or may not be the permanent appointee — but usually the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee
● This is expressly allowed by law — President to make such acting appointment
○ Provision of EO 292
○ The appointee is not limited to those who are already in government service
● Acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in EO 292
○ This was incorporated as a safeguard from abuse
● Difference between ad interim and acting capacity:
○ Ad Interim — are extended only during a recess of Congress
■ They are submitted to the CA for confirmation or rejection
○ Acting capacity — may be extended any time there is a vacancy
DieJess

■ They are not submitted to the CA

■ A way of temporarily filling important offices
DieJess

Case: Sarmiento v. Mison

Topic: 1st sentence; “alone” ; no confirmation
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bersamin

Facts:
● Petitioners in this case are seeking to enjoin the respondent Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague,
as Secretary of the DBM, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and
emoluments
● Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment for not having been confirmed by
the CA
● The President, under Section 16, can appoint 4 groups of officers
○ Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers in the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
■ NEEDS THE CONSENT OF THE CA — STARTS WITH NOMINATION THEN
CONFIRMED BY THE CA THEN APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT
○ All other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law
○ Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
○ Officers in lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone
● The next 3 appointments are what are in question in this petition

Issue:
● W/N the second, third and fourth groups of officers be appointed with or without the consent of
the CA? — NO NEED

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court employed statutory construction and historical background to resolve the issue
● The 1935 Constitution provides that almost all presidential appointments required the consent
of the CA
● The 1973 Constitution, due to the authoritarian nature of it, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature
● It can be seen that the past 2 Constitutions are on the opposite ends of the spectrum and the
present one seems to be in the “middle ground” as it requires consent from the CA for the first
group of appointments and leaves to the President the appointment of the other officers,
without confirmation.
● This was supported by the the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
○ The deletion of the phrase “and bureaus” for they are lower in the chain of the
executive command
DieJess

● The amicus curiae contended that the use of the word “also” is intended to be read as to mean
that the appointments thereafter should also be confirmed
○ On this, the Court held that it is misinterpreted — the also means in addition to
● The 4th sentence, which states that officers lower in rank are to be appointed by the President
alone
○ On this, the Court held that it is of no moment to consider the word “alone”
○ The deliberations would show that the word is nothing more than a slip or lapsus in
draftsmanship
○ It is redundant in the light of the second sentence
○ The redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the
COnstitution that presidential appointments, except those in the first sentence, are not
subject to confirmation by the CA
● On the issue of the case, since Mison was appointed as the bureau head of the BoC, he is not
within the group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required
● Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
BoC — RA 1937 or the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
○ Although the law was enacted under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution, it must still be
read in harmony with Section 16
DieJess

Case: Bautista v. Salonga

Topic: 1st sentence – “other officers” whose appointments are vested in the President; CHR Chair; CA
confirmation
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Padilla

Facts:
● The case before the Court is with regard to the appointments of the Chairman of the CHR, an
independent office.
● The question arises just a year after the Mison doctrine that excluded the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
sentences of Sec. 16 from confirmation of the CA
● The Chairman of the CHR, is not among the positions mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16 of
the Constitution, which require the confirmation of the CA for its validity
● In particular, the appointment of the Chairman is not specifically provided for in the Constitution
○ The authority to appoint emanates from Executive Order No. 163
○ And thus, the nature of the appointment power of the President is within the second
sentence of Sec. 16
● President Aquino designated the petitioner as Acting Chairman of the CHR on August 27, 1987
● Later, the President extended Bautista a permanent position as the chairman and provided for
the members of the Commission
● The petitioner then took her oath of office and immediately discharged the functions and duties
of the office thereafter
● On January 9, 1989, petitioner then received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments requesting her to submit to the CA certain information and documents as
required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment
● The secretary wrote again to her the next day, requesting her presence at a meeting of the CA
Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights
● Later, she wrote to the Chairman of the CA why she considered the CA as having no jurisdiction
to review her appointment
○ She expressed that the Commission is an Independent office and that her office is not
included in the posts that needs confirmation
● Respondents submit letters that prove that the ad interim appointment of petitioner was
disapproved but the CA in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA
○ In view of the denied MR, Pres. Aquino designated Comm. Mali Lin as acting chairman,
pending the resolution of Bautista’s case
● Now the petitioner is before the court asking the court to declare any action of the CA as well as
its Committee as unconstitutional for having no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm
and to review her appointment

Issue:
● W/N the CHR Commissioner is within the jurisdiction of the CA’s authority to review and
confirm? — NO
DieJess

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the appointment of Bautista need not get the approval of the CA
● Following the Mison doctrine, where the Court held that only those enumerated under the first
sentence of Sec. 16 are within the jurisdiction of the CA, Bautista’s appointment is the sole
prerogative of the President
● The appointment of Bautista is within the second sentence, which is vested by the Constitution
on the President
● Even though the President submitted the appointment to confirmation, the Court held that the
CA nor the President can create power where the Constitution confers none
● When the Constitution states that the appointment is for the President alone to make, the
executive’s voluntary act of submitting such to the CA for confirmation and the subsequent act
undertaken by the CA, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction
● Also, even if the President may voluntarily submit the appointment to the CA, there was no
vacancy to which an appointment could be made.
○ Bautista was appointed on December 17, 1988 and the submission was on January 14,
1989
● Clearly then, there there was no vacancy
● Furthermore, there was no valid ad interim appointment because such cannot apply when it is
the sole power of the President to do so
○ The ad interim appointment of Bautista was therefore a permanent appointment
● Lastly, EO 163-A was declared unconstitutional for going against the intent of the framers
○ The term of the CHR cannot be coterminous with the President
DieJess

Case: Quintos-Deles v. CA
Topic: 1st sentence
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bidin

Facts:
● The case before the court seeks to compel the CA to allow petitioner to perform and discharge
her duties as a member of the HoR representing the Women’s sector and to restrain
respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process
● On April 6, 1988, petitioner and 3 others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article 7, Section 16(2) and Article 18, Section 7
● Then Executive Secretary Macaraig transmitted a letter to the Speaker of the House Mitra
● On April 18, 1988, the 4 sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before the
Speaker
○ However, they were not able to do so due to the opposition of some congressmen
members of the CA
● The members of the CA insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the CA
before they could take their oaths and/or assume office
● Due to the opposition, Speaker Mitra was compelled to suspend the oath taking of the 4 sectoral
representatives
● In view of this, Macaraig sent a letter to the CA submitting for confirmation the appointments of
the 4 sectoral representatives
● Meanwhile, petitioner appealed to the HoR alleging that since no attempt was made to subject
the sectoral representatives already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity for
such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be discriminatory
○ Speaker Mitra replied stating that since President Aquino has submitted their
appointments to the CA for confirmation, the CA has obtained sole jurisdiction over the
matter
● Thereafter, petitioner Deles received an invitation to attend the CA meeting for the deliberation
of her appointment as sectoral representative for women
○ She replied explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction of the CA
● In the Committee meeting, the Committee ruled against the position of Deles
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the appointment as Sectoral Representative requires confirmation by the CA? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Mison doctrine laid down states that the officers mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16
need CA confirmation
○ It includes “and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution”
DieJess

● The exceptions against CA confirmation does not extend to sectoral representatives

● In the case before the Court, since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives may be filled
by the President upon express Provision under Sec. 7, Article 18, sectoral representatives are
therefore within the ambit of the first sentence under “other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution”
● It is noted that the appointment was made while Congress was in recess
○ Therefore, par. 2 extends to her
○ Her appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next
adjournment of the Congress
DieJess

Case: Pobre v. Mendieta

Topic: Reversal of Valenzuela ruling
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Grino-Aquino

Facts:
● The petition before the Court questions the appointment of petitioner Pobre by President
Aquino as the Chairman of the Philippine Regulation Commission
● On January 2, 1992, upon the expiration of the term of PRC Chairman Francia
● At that time, respondent was the senior Associate Commissioner while petitioner was the
second Associate Commissioner
● Later, Executive Secretary Drilon sought the opinion of the acting Justice Secretary Bello on
whether the President power to appoint the Commissioner of the PRC is restricted by Sec. 2 of
PD No. 223
○ It states that the composition of the PRC is to be appointed by the President and the
most senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal
● Sec. Bello replied that the provision does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the
President because such would curtail the constitutional power of the President
● President Aquino then appointed petitioner as the PRC Chairman and he took his oath of office
thereafter
● Even before petitioner’s appointment, Mendieta filed a petition for declaratory relief against
petitioner, Drilon and DOJ Sec. Montenegro praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or
recommending, the appointment of Pobre
○ This was on the ground that under PD 223, he was the rightful successor
○ This was denied because it became moot
● Next, Mendieta filed a quo warranto petition against Pobre claiming that he succeeded Francia
by operation of law
● The trial court ruled in favor of Mendieta and ordered that he is the rightful successor in
accordance to PD 223
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the appointment of the petitioner is lawful? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● PD 223 was enacted by President Marcos when he had the authority to legislate, therefore it is
to be understood that, under the 1973 Constitution, this does not amount to a curtailment of
the Executive Power
○ This was under Section 10, Article 7 of the 1973 Constitution
● Under the 1987 Constitution, this was modified and heads of bureaus and offices was removed
DieJess

○ The President is empowered to appoint “those whom he may be authorized by law to

appoint”
● The law that authorizes the President to appoint the PR Commissioner and Associate
COmmissioners is PD 223, Section 2
● The trial judge relied on the “succession clause” in PD 223
○ “At the expiration of his term, resignation or removal”
● The Court does not agree with the Judge that the filling up of the vacancy “for the unexpired
portion of the term only” refers to the unexpired portion of the term of the successor (the most
senior AC) rather than the unexpired portion of the Chairman’s term.
● The Court held that the succession clause only operates when there is an “unexpired term” of
the Chairman to be served
○ Otherwise, if the Chairman’s term had expired or been fully served, the vacancy must be
filled by appointment of a new chairman by the President
● Some clarifications on the language of the statute:
○ The language of Sec. 2, P.D. 223 needs clarity i.e. “any vacancy in the Commission”:
refers only to a vacancy in the position of Commissioner or Chairman for it is only her (or
she) who may be succeeded by the “most senior Associate Commissioner.”
○ “the most senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner”: Only
the Chairman of the Commission bears the title of “Commissioner;” the others are
“Associate Commissioners.”
● The Court rejects the contention that every vacancy in the Commission shall be filled by
“succession or by “operation of law” for that would deprive the President of his power to
appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate COmmissioners — all to be appointed by the
President under PD 223
DieJess

Case: Flores v. Drilon

Topic: Second Sentence
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bellosillo

Facts:
● The petition before the Court challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 13(d) of RA 7227 or the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
○ Under this RA, Mayor Gordon was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
the SBMA
● The provisions provided that:
○ For the first year of its operation from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the SBMA
● Petitioner claim that the provision infringes on the President’s power to appoint since it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the
post
○ Other violated constitutional or statutory provisions
■ Sec 7, Article 9B — an elected public official cannot be appointed to in any
capacity to any public office during his tenure
■ Section 261(g) of the Omnibus Election Code — election ban within 45 days
prior to the election
● Hence this petition

Issue:
● W/N the appointment of Gordon by operation of law is valid? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The subject provision vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and
the Chief Executive officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to
appoint the Mayor of Olongapo
● Appointment is defined as the designation of a person, by the person or persons having
authority therefore, to discharge the duties of some office or trust or the selection or
designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or
public function and discharge the duties of the same
● Justice Cruz defines it as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office
● The appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion
○ Woodbury — the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his
appointment
○ Malcolm — an appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion
● The Court held in PLM that the power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary
DieJess

● The power of choice is therefore the heart of the power to appoint

● It involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing
appointment papers to the appointee.
○ The choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of appointing power
● When Congress clothes the President the power to appoint, it cannot at the same time limit the
choice of the President to only one candidate
○ Once it has been conferred, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom
to appoint
● Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly,
of his discretion to pick his own choice
● Also, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment
● The questioned proviso makes only one person eligible for the post (the Mayor of Olongapo)
○ Due to this, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to
appoint
● Power to appoint without the essential element of choice is no power at all and goes against the
very nature of appointment
● The provisio is a manifest abuse on the part of Congress to prescribe qualifications where only
one, and no other, can qualify
● Although conferment of appointing power is essentially a legislative act, the proviso limiting his
choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative
DieJess

Case: Rufino v. Endriga

Topic: 2nd sentence
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Carpio

Facts:
● PD 15 created the CCP for the purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines
○ It also created a Board of Trustees to govern the CCP
● The mandates of the board are to draw up programs and projects that
○ Cultivate and enhance public interest in and appreciation of Philippine art
○ Discover and develop talents connected with Philippine cultural pursuits
○ Create opportunities for individual and national self-expression in cultural affairs
○ Encourage the organization of cultural groups and the staging of cultural exhibitions
● The Board also administers and holds in trust real and personal properties of the CCP for the
benefit of the Filipino people
○ It invests income derived from its projects and operations in a Cultural Development
Fund set up to attain the CCP’s objectives
● The petitions before the Court are quo warranto petitions involving 2 sets of CCP Boards
● The Rufino group seek to set aside the decision of the CA that denied their MR
○ The CA declared the Endriga group has the clear right to their respective offices and
ousted the Rufino Group (except for Tantoco)
● The CCP was created by virtue of EO 30
○ It was a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of 7 members
● Soon after the declaration of Martial Law, PD 15 was issued — CCP’s Charter
○ It converted CCP to a non-municipal public corporation free from the pressure or
influence of politics
○ This also expanded the membership of the Board to 9
○ Which was later increased to 11 via EO 1058
● After the People Power Revolution, President Aquino asked for the Courtesy resignation of the
then incumbent trustees and appointed new trustees to the board
● During the Ramos administration, the CCP included the Endriga group
● President Estrada then appointed 7 new trustees for a term of 4 years to replace the Endriga
group as well as 2 other incumbent trustees — the Rufino group
● Thereafter, the Endriga group filed a quo warranto petition before the Court questioning the
Estrada appointees
○ They alleged that under PD 15, vacancies in the board bahala be filled by election by a
vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting and in case only one
trustee survives, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP
○ The endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may
the President full such vacancies
DieJess

● The Endriga Group asserted that when Estrada made the appointments, only one seat was
vacant due to the expiration of Manosa’s term
○ Therefore, the CCP had 10 incumbent trustees
● Endriga’s term was to expire on July 26, 199 while the terms of the other members of his group
were to expire on February 6, 1999
○ They claimed that under the charter, the trustees fixed 4 year term could only be
terminated by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause
○ Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the Board then still had 10
incumbent trustees who had statutory power to fill the vacancy in the Board
● The Group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the
President because its charter provides for autonomy in policy and operation
● Their quo warranto petition was thereby granted by the CA and they were declared as the lawful
members of the Board

Issue:
● W/N Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioners contend that the subject provision is repugnant of Section 16 of the Constitution for
it allows the Board to appoint officers that are equal in rank
● In this, the Court held that the subject provision is unconstitutional
● The Court first delved into the Power of Appointment
○ The Court stated that the power to appoint is the prerogative of the president, except in
those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise
○ Any usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial
branches violates the system of separation of powers
● The president appoints 4 groups of officers under Section 16
○ Heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution
○ Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
○ All other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law
○ Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may, by law, vest in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
● The 4th group is the subject of this case
● The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing
power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional
○ Thus, if Section 6(b) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the
trustees of the CCP board
DieJess

● The scope of the appointment powers of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards is limited to those who are lower in rank
○ Therefore, the heads may only appoint lower-ranked officers and this is clearly seen in
the deliberations of the ConCom
● Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the HEADS of the named offices
○ This is a matter of legislative grace
○ Unlike the Presidential appointment power, this power may be limited by Congress
● The term heads refers to all the offices succeeding that term: departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards
● Agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies
○ Thus, the word “heads” applies to agencies
● All commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads
○ “Heads could only refer to the chief executive or heads of the commissions or boards”
● The 1973 Constitution used heads of agencies, commissions, and boards
● The Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to appoint to
lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that collegial body
○ 1935 —in the courts
○ 1973 — members of the Cabinet
○ 1987 — in the heads
■ In the case of constitutional commissions, the appointing power for
lower-ranked officers is vested in the commission as a body
● The last clause in Section 16 is an enumeration of offices whose heads may be vested by law
with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers
○ This was clearly seen in the deliberations
● Following the above mentioned, the Chairperson of the CCP Board is the Head of CCP
○ The Chairperson of the CCP is therefore vested with the power to appoint

Section 6 (b) and (c) is inconsistent to Section 16, Art. 7

● The provision empowers the remaining trustees of the Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board,
allowing them to elect their fellow trustees
○ This is clearly inconsistent with the constitutional provision which states that the heads
are those who will appoint officers lower in rank
● This excludes a situation where the appointing authority appoints an officer equal in rank as him
● Therefore, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the board to elect their co-trustees, the
provision is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16
● The use of the word “elect” is of no moment
○ This would only allow for a circumvention of the constitutional limitations on the power
to appoint
● Furthermore, the subject provision makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power
of their fellow trustees
○ This creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the
President’s appointment power
DieJess

● The modus therefore is that the President will appoint and the Board will elect the trustees —
such a anomaly must be stopped
DieJess

Case: Calderon v. Carale

Topic: NLRC; list is exclusive
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Padilla

Facts:
● The case before the Court questions the Constitutionality of the appointments of the
respondents
● The Confirmation by the CA is required only for appointees mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President
● Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint
○ Also, in Mison, the Court held that when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to
provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law
● Sometime in March 1989, the Herrera-Veloso Law, amending the Labor Code was approved
○ Section 13 of which provides that:
■ The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners
shall all be appointed by the President, subject to the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments
● Pursuant to such law, President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC
representing the public, workers and employers sectors.
○ The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the
performance of the office
● After the appointments, Labor Secretary Drilon issued AO No 161 designating the places of
assignment of the newly appointed commissioners
● The petition now is questioning the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President to the respondents, without submitting the same to
the CA for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715
● Petitioner submits that RA 6715 presumes validity and is not an encroachment on the appointing
power of the President
○ Because Congress, by law, may require confirmation by the CA of other officers
appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in Section 16

Issue:
● W/N Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments extended by the
President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article 7? — NO
DieJess

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the provision that requires confirmation for additional officers to be
confirmed is unconstitutional
● In ruling, the Court revisited the Mison ruling, where the Court held that there are 4 groups of
Presidential appointees
○ Heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution
○ Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
○ All other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law
○ Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may, by law, vest in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
● The petitioners fall within the second sentence of Sec. 16 — or those officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint
● The Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 whose appointments require confirmation by the CA
● The extension that RA 6715 provides is therefore unconstitutional for it:
○ Amends, by legislation, the first sentence of Section 16 by adding appointments
requiring confirmation by the CA
○ Amends the second sentence by imposing the confirmation of the CA on appointments
which are otherwise entrusted only with the President
● Legislation cannot expand a constitutional provision after the SC has interpreted it (Endencia v.
David)
DieJess

Case: Tarrosa v. Singson

Topic: CB Governor; list is exclusive
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Quiason

Facts:
● The petition before the Court questions the appointment of respondent as the Governor of the
BSP for not having been confirmed by the CA
● Singson was appointed by President Ramos on July 2, 1993
● Petitioner argues that the appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for
confirmation to the CA
○ The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of RA 7653, which established
the Bangko Sentral
○ It provided that: the governor shall be head of a department and his appointment shall
be subject to confirmation by the CA
● Respondent contends that the BSP has its own budget and, its budgetary requirements are not
subject to the provisions of the GAA
● The SolGen also claims that the mentioned provision goes against Section 16 because the
position of Governor is not included in the list of officers that require CA confirmation

Issue:
● W/N the appointment of Singson was invalid? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the CA and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16
● Furthermore, the nature of the petition is a quo warranto petition
○ Only the Solicitor General or a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position unlawfully held or excise by another can bring such action to the Court
DieJess

Section 17- POWER OF CONTROL

Case: Larson-Magallanes v. Pano
Topic: Presidential power to reverse decision of executive heads; what is non-delegable is what the
President is to exercise in person
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Sanchez

Facts:
● The petitioner before the Court questions the act of the Executive Secretary, acting by authority
of the President, reversing the decision of the Director of Lands
● In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a pasture of land in Davao
● He then ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the land to the plaintiff
● The ceded portion was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared
agricultural land
● In 1955, Jose Pano and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the
released area
● Later, the plaintiff corporation filed its own sales application covering the entire released area
○ This was protested by Pano, et,al. claiming that they are actual occupants of the part
covered by their own sales application
● The Director of Lands, rendered a decision ruling in favor of the application of the plaintiff
corporation and dismissed the Pano group’s petition
● In 1957, Executive Secretary Pajo decided the controversy and modified the decision of the
Director of Lands
○ He declared that it would be for the public interest that appellants, who were mostly
landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion
on which they have made improvements
● Pajo then ordered the conversion of the land to be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and
allocated to actual occupants
● The plaintiff corporation then took the decision to the CFI prating that the judgement of the
Secretary of the DENR be the one that governs over the Executive Secretary’s decision
○ This was denied by the court a quo
● Hence, this petition
● Petitioner invokes Sec. 4 of CA 141 — this states that the decisions of the Director of Lands as to
the questions of facts should be conclusive when approved by the DENR Secretary

Issue:
● W/N the statute is controlling upon the courts and the President — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
DieJess

● The Court held that the petitioner’s position is untenable

● The power of the President comes from the constitution itself
○ This comes with his control of all executive departments
● This means that department heads are men of his confidence
● Implicit in the President’s authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries
○ He has the power to appoint them and naturally he controls and directs their acts
● Therefore, the President can rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary
● The practice for appeals from the Director of Lands as affirmed by the DENR Secretary is to take
it up with the OP
○ This has been a judicially recognized practice
● The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the
executive department
○ Control: the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgement of the former for that of the latter
● The second assertion that there was undue delegation of power to the Executive Secretary
○ Petitioner asserts that there is no provision in the Constitution that allows for the
delegation of the power of control of the President
● While it is true that the constitutional powers are to be exercised by the President alone, it is not
correct to say that the Chief Executive cannot delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which
the Constitution does not command that he perform in person.
● This is due to the fact that the President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious
executive and administrative functions
● The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President
○ The rule is that under the constitutional setup, the Executive Secretary who acts for
and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of the DENR, including the
DoL, may issue
● The Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other departments head
○ He acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of the President’s
● Only the President may rightfully say that the Executive secretary is not authorized to assume
authority
○ Therefore, without any action to disapprove from the President, the act of the Executive
Secretary remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed
DieJess

Case: Ang-Angco v. Castillo

Topic: Presidential power over acts v. Persons in classified service
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The Pepsi Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Commerce Secretary
requesting for a special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the custom house which
were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange.
○ This consisted of 1188 units of Pepsi-cola concentrate which were not covered by any
Central Bank release certificates
● On the same date, an identical request to the Secretary of Finance who was also the Chairman of
the Monetary Board of the Central Bank
○ Senator Sabido, in behalf of the company, likewise wrote to said office urging the
authority to be given to withdraw the concentrates
● Not content with those steps, he also wrote to the Acting Governor of the Central Bank, Andres
Castillo, urging the same matter
● Then Secretary Hernandez wrote another letter to Castillo stating that Sabido is taking this to
him personally and unless there are legal objections, he would like to authorize the withdrawal
of the concentrates upon payment of all charges
● Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank submitted to the
Monetary Board a memorandum on the joint petition of the company and Sabido stating that
there is no objection to the proposal
○ However, the MB failed to bring up the matter in its meeting for the reason that the
transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or foreign exchange, and of this
decision, Licaros was informed
● Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, Pepsi Cola approached
Collector of Customs Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the
concentrates, but this official seeing perhaps that the importation did not carry any release
certificate from the Central Bank advised the company to try to secure the necessary release
certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the matter
● In the morning of the same day, the Office wrote a letter to the Ang-Angco that there are no
objections to the release of the concentrates for its office does not have jurisdiction over the
matter
● This letter was shown to Ang-Angco who still hesitated to grant the release
○ He suggested that the letter be amended in order to remove ambiguity
○ Lopez refuses to amend the letter
● Petitioner then called Secretary Hernandez and the latter expressed his approval for the release
○ Thereafter, the concentrates were authorized to be released
● Later, the Commissioner of Customs learned of the release and immediately ordered their
seizure but only a negligee option thereof remained in the warehouse
DieJess

○ He then filed an administrative complaint against Ang-Angco charging him with having
committed a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the customs service
● On this complaint, President Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to investigate
the matter
○ This was composed of the SolGen and other members
● The No-Dollar Importation Office official was also implicated
● After said investigation, the committee submitted to the President recommending that
petitioner be suspended for 15 days without pay
● Later, petitioner was reinstated while the decision on his case remained pending until the death
of Magsaysay
● After around 3 years from the termination of the investigation, Executive Secretary Castillo, by
authority of the President, rendered a decision on the case finding petitioner guilty of the
offenses charged
● Upon learning of the decision, petitioner wrote a letter to the President, informing him that the
action of Castillo deprived him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals
○ It also violated the petitioners right to security of tenure
● This was denied by Castillo, by authority of the President
● After exhausting all the administrative remedies available, petitioner filed before the court this
petition

Issue:
● W/N the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he
belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions in the Civil Service Act of 1959? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the administrative case against officers and employees in classified service
○ This is guaranteed under the Constitution and the Civil Service Act
● Under the Civil Service Act, the Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the classified service.
○ Exception: “except as otherwise provided by law”
● The only limitation to the power of the Commissioner is that it may be appealed to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals
● The law, as it now stands, does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor does it give him
the power to review the decision motu proprio
● It is therefore clear, that under the new law, the case of the petitioner comes under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of CIvil Service
● The President is not empowered by any law to do so.
DieJess

● The pertinent law that would apply is the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the
President may remove an official, conformably to law
○ This shows that the President does not have blanket authority to remove any officer or
employees of the government bu that his power must still be subject to the law that
may be passed by Congress
● Clearly therefore, the President is bound by the Civil Service Law
○ His power to remove is subject to the said law
● The power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its extent
and scope
○ It merely applies to the exercise of control over ACTS OF THE SUBORDINATE and not
over the actor or agent himself of the act.
○ This only means that the President may set aside the judgement or action taken by the
subordinate in the performance of his duties
● Under the Administrative law, control means that the Department head is given direct control of
all bureaus and offices under his department by virtue of which he may “repeal or modify
decisions”
○ The President’s control over the executive department only refers to matters of general
policy
● In harmonizing the conflicting constitutional provisions, the COurt stated that the President does
have the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service
(inherent in the power to appoint)
○ However, this does not extend to officers in classified service
DieJess

Case: Villaluz v. Zaldivar

Topic: Power to remove presidential appointee in unclassified service
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● Petitioner in this case seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with
payment of back salaries
● Petitioner alleges that he was nominated as chief on May 20, 1958 and 2 days after, his
nomination was confirmed by the CA
○ He then took his oath
○ Then in a letter addressed to the President, the Chairman of the Congressional
Committee on Good Government Roces, informed the former that the Committee
alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the MVO:
■ Malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government
■ Failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration, facilitating
thereby the commission of graft and corruption
■ Negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting
● Congressman Roces then recommended that the petitioner be replaced as well as the complete
revamp of the offices under the MVO
● The petitioner was then given a letter from the DPWC Secretary requiring him to explain within
72 hours why no administrative action should be taken against him
● Petitioner then answered explaining and refuting the charges contained against him
● On February 15, 1960, Executive Secretary CAstillo suspened him pending the investigation
● The investigation committee then submitted its report to the President who thereafter issued
AO No. 332 removing petitioner from office
○ Polio was then appointed in his place
● Petitioner then filed an MR but this was denied
● Hence, this petition
● Petitioner claims that the President does not have jurisdiction to investigate and remove him
since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service
of the government
● He claims that he can only be removed from office after due hearing by the President pursuant
to RA 2260

Issue:
● W/N the President has jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against
the petitioner? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The petitioner, being a presidential appointee who is unclassified comes under the jurisdiction
for the President
DieJess

● The President has the power of control over the executive department and the people under the
same
● The jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service is limited to those who are in classified
service (Ang-Angco v. Castillo)
● Clearly, there is no error of procedure committed by the respondents in investigating and taking
disciplinary action against petitioner
● The President is the immediate superior of the petitioner, therefore, the same former may
commence with the proceedings motu proprio
DieJess

Case: Joson v. Torres

Topic: Power to discipline local officials
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Puno

Facts:
● The petition before the Court questions the validity of the suspension from office of the
petitioner by the Respondent
● Petitioner was the Governor of Nueva Ecija and he was suspended from office following a
complaint by the Private Respondents involving an incident that occurred in the session hall of
the provincial capitol
○ Petitioner entered the session hall with armed men and intended to harass the private
respondents into approving a loan from PNB
● The complaint was filed with the President and the same directed the Executive Secretary and
the Secretary of Justice to take appropriate actions relating to the incident
● Thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija to settle the controversy between the
two
○ They eventually entered into an agreement and promised to maintain peace and order
in the providence
● However, this agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents
reiterated their letter-complaint
● Pursuant to the order, the petitioner was asked to file his comment. He repeatedly requested an
extension of various grounds i.e., finding counsel, Christmas season, activities and official
functions
● After the multiple extensions, petitioner still failed to file his comment so the Acting DILG
Secretary issued an order the declared petitioner in default and to have waived his right to
present evidence
○ Thereafter, the opposing party was allowed to present evidence ex-parte
● Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint was not verified on
the day it was filed with the OP and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no
authority to require him to answer the complaint
● Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, placed petitioner under preventive
suspension for 60 days pending the investigation

Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in applying the alter-ego principle?

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two authorities:
○ Disciplining Authority
○ Investigating Authority
DieJess

● This is governed by Administrative Order 23

● Pursuant to the provisions stated, the Disciplining Authority is the President, whether acting by
himself or through the Executive Secretary while the Investigating Authority is the DILG
Secretary, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee
● However, the DILG Secretary is not the exclusive Investigating Authority
○ The Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee
● The President’s power over administrative disciplinary cases against elective officials is derived
from his power of general supervision over local governments (Sec. 4, Art. 10)
● The power of supervision means overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the
subordinate officers perform their duties, if they fail to neglect such duties, the official May
are such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties
○ This power is no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or
that subordinate officers act within the law
● Supervision is not incompatible with discipline — this power to discipline and ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an
investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires.
○ It is an active power
● The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate
○ As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution
itself to investigate the complaints against local government officials
○ This is delegated to the DILG Secretary or a Special Investigating Committee pursuant
to AO No. 23
○ Such delegation is not undue as the President remains to have the power to discipline
● The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency
○ “Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the CHief Executive, and , except in cases where the President is required
by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President
presumptively the acts of the President “
● This doctrine is corollary to the power of control of the President
○ Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency
■ However, the President may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally
● The procedure how the two Authorities should exercise their powers is distinctly set forth in the
LGC and AO No. 23
DieJess

○ The Office of the President or the Sanggunian concerned shall require the respondent to
submit the answer within 15 days from receipt thereof
● When a complaint is filed, the DA shall order the respondent to submit his answer and upon
filing such answer, the DA shall refer the case to the IA for investigation
● In this case, the complaint was filed with the OP but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered
petitioner to answer
○ Clearly, the OP did not comply with the rules of procedure
○ Petitioner should have been made to answer before any investigation was commenced
● However, such procedural lapse is not fatal — the President found the complaint sufficient in
form and substance to warrant its further investigation.
DieJess

Case: KMU v. Dir-Gen of NEDA

Topic: also under faithful execution clause
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The present petition questions the constitutionality of E.O 420 issued by PGMA
● The said order required all government agencies and GOCCs to streamline and harmonize their
ID systems and authorized the NEDA DG to implement the program
● Petitioner allege that the said order is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch

Issue:
● W/N EO No. 420 is a usurpation on the legislative power by the President? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of
their functions under existing laws.
○ These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to the EO
○ Ex. PRC, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, LTO, etc.
● The EO merely requires the government entities to adopt a uniform data collection and format
for their IDs for the purposes mentioned in the EO
○ Reduce costs
○ Achieve efficiency and reliability
○ Insure compatibility
○ Provide convenience to the people served by government entities
● The EO also limited the data to be collected and recorded — these are the usual data required
for identification by government and even private entities
● At present, some government IDs require more than what is being required by the EO
○ Clearly, making the collection and recording of government entities will achieve
substantial benefits
● A unified ID system for all government entities can be achieved in either of 2 ways
○ Heads of theses government entities can enter into a MOA making their systems uniform
○ The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the government entities
under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format
● Under Sec. 17, Art. 7 of the Constitution, the power of the President to direct all government
entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and format is valid
○ This power is self-executing and needs no implementing legislation
● However, such power of control is limited to the Executive branch and cannot extend to the
co-equal branches or constitutional commissions.
DieJess

○ Clearly, the EO does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to
establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government
● The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
○ There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase
efficiency, and in general, improve public services
○ The adoption of the EO is simply in performance of the constitutional duty of the
President
● Clearly, the EO is within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate
● She has not usurped on the legislative power by issuing the assailed EO as it was an exercise of
the Executive power of control.
○ It is also in compliance to the mandate to ensure that laws are faithfully executed
DieJess

Case: Drilon v. Lim

Topic: Power of DOJ Sec. to declare illegal a city code is mere exercise of supervision
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The present petition questions the constitutionality of Section 187 of the LGC
○ This provides the procedure for approval and effectivity of tax ordinances and revenue
measures
● The DOJ Secretary, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared the
Ordinance as null and void for non compliance with the he prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and fro containing provisions contrary to law and public policy
● The City of Manila initially filed a petition before the RTC which resulted in the revocation of
Drilon’s resolution and the upholding of the ordinance
● Moreover, the decision declared that Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional because it vests
the DOJ Sec. with the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local
autonomy and of the specific provision conferring on the President the power of supervision
over local governments
● The petitioner argues that the provision is constitutional and the procedural requirements had
not been observed in the passage of the questioned Ordinance

Issue:
● W/N Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional? —

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the subject provision is Constitutional
● The RTC judge declared the provision as unconstitutional for giving the Secretary of Justice the
power of control which is only vested in the President
● The subject provision authorized the DOJ Secretary to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds
● When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute
his own judgement for the judgement of the local government
○ Drilon did set aside the ordinance, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
the Code should be
● He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment
● What he found only was that it was illegal
○ All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law and the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances pursuant to the LGC
● This was not an act of control but merely an act of supervision
● An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act
DieJess

○ If it not followers, he may order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself
● Supervision does not cover such authority
○ The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, not does he have the discretion to modify or replace the
○ If he sees that the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or redone but
only to confirm to the prescribed rules
○ He may not prescribe his own manned for the doing of the act — he has no judgement
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed
● The petitioner only revoked the ordinance on the grounds of legality, not on its wisdom or
reasonableness
DieJess

Case: Almario v. Executive Secretary

Topic: Faithful Execution Clause
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Facts:
● The present petition involves the 2009 Order of National Artists
● The National Artists Awards Committee, the body which administers the conferment of the
category of national Artist upon deserving Filipino artists, was created pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1144
○ The Committee was composed of members of the Board of Trustees of the CCP
○ The NAAC is authorized to administer the conferment of the National Artist Award
● Later, RA 7356 created the NCCA and gave it an extensive mandate over the development,
promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and Filipino cultural heritage
○ One of their mandates is to extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards,
grants and services to artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to the
Filipino cultural legacy
○ They were then mandated with the power to advise the President on matters pertaining
to culture and the arts
● Since there were two bodies tasked for the same purpose, the two teamed up and jointly
administered the National Artist Award
○ The two then promulgated the guidelines for the nomination, selection and
administration of the National Artist Award
● In 2009, the body submitted a list to the President containing the list of National Artist
Nominees, it included 4 people, namely:
○ Manuel Conde
○ Ramon Santos
○ Lazaro Francisco
○ Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz
● The list was then sent to the President
● Meanwhile, the Office of the President received nominations from various sectors, cultural
groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents:
○ Bobby Manosa
○ Jose Moreno
○ Carlo J. Caparas
○ Cecile Guidote-Alvarez
● The Committee on Honore then submitted a memorandum to PGMA recommending the
conferment of the Order of National Artists to the 8 artists
○ Acting on said memorandum, PGMA declared 7 national artists in several Proclamations
— except Ramon Santos
● Believing that the NCCA Board and CCP Board had exclusive jurisdiction to select those who will
be conferred the award, petitioners filed this present petition
DieJess

● What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to confer the Order of the National
Artists and how should it be exercised
● Petitioners aver that PGMA gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the
rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in submitting her
own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels
○ They claim that the President’s discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but
limited to those recommended by the NCCA and the CCP
○ They also claimed that the choice of Guidote-Alvarez’s was illegal and unethical for she
was the Executive Director of the NCCA and presidential adviser on culture and arts,
making her disqualified from even being nominated

Issue:
● W/N PGMA committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the title to the respondents? —
YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the Proclamations granting the respondents the title of National Artists were
issued in grave abuse of discretion
● The respective powers of the CCP and the NCCA with respect to the conferment of the Order of
National Artists are clear
○ They jointly administer the award and , upon their recommendation or advice, the
President confers the Order of National Artists
● To recommend is essentially persuasive in character and not binding upon the party to whom it
is made
● Therefore, in conferring the award, the President may or may not adopt the recommendation or
advice of the boards
○ In other words, the advice of the 2 bodies is subject to the President’s discretion
● However, the President’s discretion is not totally unfettered, not the role of the Boards
meaningless
● Discretion is not in confined and vagrant but canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing
● The power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws
○ Sec. 17 mandates that the President shall ensure the laws be faithfully executed
● The Presidential discretion should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute
the relevant laws.
○ This faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the
President, not a separate grant of power
● It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollary, the cardinal principle that the President is
not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them
● As stated earlier, the powers granted to the recommendatory bodies were institutionalized by 2
laws
DieJess

● By virtue of judicial doctrine that administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the
force and effect of law, the rules, guidelines, and policies issued by the two bodies vis-a-vis the
conferment of the Order of the National Artists have the force and effect of law
○ Until it is set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies —
including the President
● In connection with this, the Committee on Honors merely serves as a screening committee to
ensure that the nominees received from the 2 Boards have met two tests
○ There has been no grave abuse of discretion in making the nomination
○ The nominee is in good standing
● Clearly, the Committee on Honors is limited to determining whether the nominations submitted
have met the two criteria
● The discretion of the President is therefore confined to the names submitted by the Boards
○ The President could not have considered conferment on any person not considered and
recommended by the Boards
DieJess

Case: Ocampo v. Enriquez

Topic: Faithful Execution Clause
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, Rodrigo Duterte made a verbal promise that he would
allow the burial of Former President Marcos in the LNMB
● He won that year’s election and formally assumed office in June 30, 2016
● On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana issued a memorandum addressed
to AFP Chief of Staff Visaya. The memorandum is regarding the internment of Marcos at the
LNMB
● On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army
Commanding General with regard to the Funeral Honors and Service
● Dissatisfied with the issuance the following Petitions were filed:
○ Ocampo Petition
○ Saguisag Petition
○ Lagman Petition
○ Pargas-Rosales Petition
○ Alvarez Petition
○ Baniaga Petition
○ Latiph Petition
○ De Lima Petition

Issue:
● W/N the Burial of Marcos at the LNMB contravenes the law and international human rights law?
— NO (ULOL GAGO)

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the order of the President is consistent with the Constitutional mandate
under Sec. 17, Article 7
● Petitioner contend that the burial of Marcos would desecrate the sacred and hallowed place that
is the LNMB
● The LNMB was created pursuant to EO No. 77 which transferred the remains of war veterans
from various memorial cemeteries to the present LNMB (formerly known as Republic Memorial
Cemetery)
● This was later reserved for military purposes and under the administration of the AFP Chief of
Staff by President Garcia
● Later, Marcos excluded the LNMB from the military reservation and reserved the same for
national shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines Commission under
the DND
● The NSC was later abolished and was transferred to the NHI under the DEC
DieJess

● Later President Aquino issued an Administrative order which retained the PVAO under the
supervision and control of the DND Secretary
● The LNMB was not included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105
● The President, being the Chief Executive, represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department
● Under the faithful execution clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper
steps to carry into execution the law
● Such mandate is self-executor to by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is
intimately related to the other executive functions — it is construed as an imposed obligation,
not a separate grant of power
● The decision of the President to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political question
○ In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, he
allowed the internment of Marcos at the LNMB
● He decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness
● In ordering the burial of the former President, the President was merely executing existing laws
vis-a-vis the LNMB, namely;
○ RA 289
○ RA 10368
● RA 289 established the LNMB and provided for the legal standard by which a person’s mortal
remains may be interred at the LNMB, and the AFP REgulations G 161-375 merely implements
the law
● Petitioners maintain that public respondents are not members of the Board on National
Pantheon, which is authorized to cause the burial at the LNMB of the deceased Presidents of
the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots
○ On this, the Court disagrees
● The petitioners have failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their position that the
LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same
○ The National Pantheon, does not exist at present — therefore RA 289 is irrelevant to the
issue
● Petitioner claim that RA 10368 modified the AFP regulations by implicitly disqualifying Marcos’
burial because the legislature has statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has
recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the Human Rights Violations Victims under his regime
DieJess

Section 18- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

POWERS
Case: Lansang v. Garcia — PLAZA MIRANDA BOMBING
Topic: Habeas Corpus Reviewable by SC
Docket Number:
Ponente: CJ. Concepcion

Facts:
● During a Liberal Party meeting in 1971, 2 grenades were thrown in the crowd which caused the
death of 8 people
● Pursuant to this, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 889 which suspended the privilege
of habeas corpus
○ He believed that the attack was caused by communist groups
○ The present petitioners were then apprehended and invited by the Philippine
Constabulary (Present day AFP) for interrogation and investigation
● They were detained because there was belief that they participated in the crime of insurrection
or rebellion and that their continues detention is justified by PP 889
● Petitioners then filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus
● They question the validity of the proclamation and their detention
● Respondents contend that the detention was justified pursuant to PP 889 and that public safety
and security so requires it

Issue:
● W/N the findings of the Executive as to the basis of the privilege of habeas corpus are conclusive
upon the Court? — NO

Ruling/Ratio
● NOTE: This was promulgated under the 1973 Constitution
● The presidential determination of the existence of the Constitution to justify a suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus is NOT CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS
● The Constitution provides 2 requisites for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
○ There must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
○ Public safety so requires the suspension
● The President has 3 courses of action (extraordinary powers)
○ Call out the AFP
○ Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
○ Place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law
DieJess

● The President has called out the armed forces pursuant to the Plaza Miranda Bombing, but this
proved to be inadequate to eliminate the imminent danger
○ Out of the 2 remaining powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
was less harsh
● The Court held that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual basis in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency of the order
○ The suspension is vested exclusively in the Executive, but this is exercised under
specified limits
■ There must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
■ Public safety so requires the suspension
● The authority of the Courts to review such exclusive power is under the authority of the Judiciary
to determine whether there was GADALEJ (Judicial Review)
○ The Court’s authority is limited to merely checking the Executive or to ascertain merely
whether the same had gone beyond the constitutional limits which have been drawn out
● The power to suspend the privilege is not absolute or unqualified
● The circumstances surrounding the proclamation clearly shows that rebellion did exist at that
time and public safety so required the proclamation
○ Intelligence received by the president involving waves of violence
○ Serious conditions in Mindanao and the expansion of Communist activities in Central
Luzon
○ Killing of several public officials by the CCP
● From the present data, the Court held that the Executive did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion
DieJess

Case: David v. Arroyo

Topic: Calling out the AFP;Immunity from Suit
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 and GO No. 6 as to implement it.
● The reasons that the President stated for declaring such General Order to implement the
Presidential Proclamation were that over the past several months, elements in political
opposition have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF-CCP-NPA and military
adventurists.
○ This presented a clear danger to the president as political opposition tried to oust her as
president and take over the government.
○ On March 3, Presidential Proclamation 1017 was lifted by President Arroyo.
○ The Solicitor General defended the basis of President Arroyo for declaring PP 1017, was
that the intent of the Constitution was to give the President full discretionary powers in
determining the necessity to call out the AFP.
○ Notwithstanding the SG’s contentions, the Magdalo group instigated the Oakwood
mutiny and wore red bands on their left arms to show disgust.
● Simultaneously, Oplan Hackle I (plans of bombings and attacks on the PMA alumni homecoming
in Baguio, where the President was invited) was discovered.
○ The next morning, after the discovery of the plan, a bomb was discovered in the campus.
○ Also, information was intercepted by PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao regarding PNP-SAF
members that are planning to defect from the Arroyo administration, along with
Congressman Peping Cojuanco who planned out moves to bring down said
administration.
● A large number of soldiers joined the rallies as critical mass and armed components to
anti-arroyo protests. Another factual basis after the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation
and General Order was the bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan. These events show a clear and present critical situation, leading the
President to cancel all events related to EDSA People Power I.
● Executive Secretary Mike Arroyo declared that warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be
implemented.
○ One of these warrantless arrests was Randy David (Filipino journalist, UP professor) , due
to the mistake of fact that he was a participant in the street rallies.
○ Also, Cong. Crispin Beltran (representative of Anakpawis party).
○ The following facilities were taken over:
■ Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante (local news publications). This was
done, according to the PNP. to show a strong presence to tell media outlets not
to connive or help out rebels to take down the government.
DieJess

Issue:
● W/N the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic? - NO
● W/N the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The issuance of the PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
● During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners,
committed illegal acts in implementing it.
● The vital issues that must be resolved in the present petition are as follows:
○ Are PP 1017 and G.O no. 5 constitutional or valid?
○ Do they justify these alleged illegal acts?
● The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic if:
○ There is a grave violation of the Constitution
○ The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved
○ When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bence, the bar and the public
○ The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
● The foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over
the instant petitions.
○ Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O No. 5 violates the Constitution
○ There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as
they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press
○ The court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules
■ It has the symbolic function of educating the bence and the bar, and in the
present petitions, the military and the police, to the extent of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees.
○ The contested actions are capable of repetition
● It is therefore certain that the petitions are subject to judicial review
● The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the President’s exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point
○ The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining “political questions’, particularly
those questions “in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government”
● There are two contrasting views on the matter
○ The authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his
decision is final and conclusive on the courts (Barcelon and Montenegro)
○ The Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to
determine their constitutional sufficiency (Lansang)
● From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and
balances, “under which the President is supreme only if and when he acts within the sphere
DieJess

allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted
is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.”
● The extended power of the court of Judicial review enables the courts of justice to review what
was before a forbidden territory, to the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
○ It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty
● As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test
that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President;s decision
is correct”, but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.”
○ The standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
● In IBP v. Zamora, this Court further ruled that “it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that
the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by way of proof, to
support his assertion, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.”
● Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP
1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.
● The Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events that justified the issuance of the
assailed Presidential Proclamation.
● Absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
PP1017 calling for military aid.
DieJess

Case: Ampatuan v. DILG

Topic: State of Rebellion
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista
Facts:
● The day after the “Ampatuan Massacre”, the President issued Proclamation 1946. This placed the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency
○ Thereafter, the President directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake measures to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence
● 3 days later, President Arroyo issued AO 273 which transferred the supervision of the ARMM to
the DILG
○ This was later amended to “delegating” supervision of the ARMM to the DILG
● The petitioner is now before the Court assailing the issuances as it encroaches upon the
authority of the ARMM as it takes over the ARMM’s operations and seizes the regional
government’s powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy
● Furthermore the Petioner claims that the president had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Provinces of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no
critical violent incidents occurred.
● Petitioner claims that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an
invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers

Issue:
● W/N the President invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petition must fail
● The Orders of the President is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood
under Section 23 (2), Article 6 of the Constitution
● The President did not proclaim a national emergency, but only a state of emergency in the places
mentioned
● Furthermore, the President did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized
her to exercise extraordinary powers
○ She merely exercised her Constitutional powers of calling out the armed forces
● She does not need Congressional approval/authority to exercise such power
DieJess

Case: Kulayan v. Tan — KIDNAPPING IN SULU OF RED CROSS MEMBERS

Topic:
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The petition before the Court challenges the validity of Proclamation 1-09 that was issued by the
respondent Governor
● The Proclamation was in response to a kidnapping incident that occurred in the Provincial
Capitol of Sulu by the Abu Sayyaf
○ Notter — Swiss
○ Vagni — Italian
○ Lacaba — Filipino
● The 3 Red Cross members were inspecting a water and sanitation project in Sulu when they were
kidnapped
● A task force was then created by the ICRC and the PNP named Sulu Crisis Management
Committee
○ The leader was respondent Governor
● Governor Tan then organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians
coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul
● Meanwhile the DILG Secretary Puno announced that government troops had cornered some 120
Abu Sayyaf members along with the 3 hostages
● However, the ASG made contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its
troops back from the jungle area
○ The government troops then pulled back
● ASG then threatened to behead the hostages and demanded that the government troops
evacuate the military camps in Jolo
● The Governor then issued Proclamation 1-09 which declared a state of emergency in the
province of Sulu
○ It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the declaration
○ It also invoked section 465 of the Local Government Code which bestows on the
Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence
● The proclamation called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and choke points,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety
● Several people were then detained pursuant to the proclamation as suspected ASG supporters
● The next day, the Filipino hostage was released by the ASG
● The petition was then filed the petitioners

Issue:
DieJess

● W/N the Governor issued the Proclamation with GADALEJ? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing guidelines were issued ultra
vires, for violations Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 of the Constitution
● The Court agrees with this. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Philippines
●
DieJess

Case: Lagman v. Medialdea

Topic: Faithful Execution Clause
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● As an offshoot of the Marawi Siege, President Duterte issued Proclamation 206 putting the
whole Mindanao under Martial Law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
● In view of this, a report was sent to Senate as to the factual grounds for the issuance
○ Senate issued a Resolution expressing support of the proclamation
● Lagman et.al questions the proclamation for lack of factual bases on the presence of rebellion or
invasion and on the President’s report which contained “false, inaccurate, contrived and
hyperbolic accounts
● The petition before the court is assailing the constitutionality of the third extension of the
martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in Mindanao
● Prior to this, the martial law in Mindanao has already been extended
● The President then sent a letter to Congress with regard to the extension
● In response to this, the Houses of Congress instituted a joint session adopting the Resolution of
the President which declared the martial law extension from January 1, 2019 to December 31,
2019
Issue:
● W/N the Court may review the manner by which Congress approved the proclamation? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the manner by which Congress approved the extension of Martial Law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question, therefore,
cannot be reviewable by the Courts
● The Constitution itself grants Congress with the power to promulgate its own rules to govern its
proceedings
● As stated in Pimentel, the power is recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority to
Congress in formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules
● This power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute due process
● The freedom from judicial interference was explained in Arroyo
○ The courts have no power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals
● The Courts cannot review the rules promulgated in the absence of any constitutional violation
○ Petitioners have not shown that the rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or
right under the Constitution
DieJess

Case: Lagman v. Pimentel

Topic: Faithful Execution Clause
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista
DieJess

Section 19- PARDON AND AMNESTY

Case: San Diego v. People
Topic: Purpose of Executive Clemency
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● Petitioner Diego was convicted for the crime of qualified theft by the RTC of Malolos
● The facts of the case are as follows:
○ Petitioner was a accountant for the Obando Fisherman’s Multi-Purpose Cooperative
○ She suddenly stopped working, the General Manager and the bookkeeper discovered
that there were discrepancies between the cash positions and the total amount that
petitioner reported
○ Around 6 million pesos was missing
○ Thereafter, an information was filed against her for qualified theft
● In sentencing, the RTC declared that petitioner would suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without pardon
● Petitioner then appealed to the CA but the appellate court ruled against her but modified the
indemnity to 2 million
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the RTC can impose a penalty which precludes pardon? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the penalty imposed insofar as the sentence is concerned was correct.
However, the imposition of the “without pardon” clause was not.
● The RTC cannot put a limitation of the power of the Chief Executive to Pardon
● This power is discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or
reversed by the court unless it contravenes the limitations set forth by the Constitution
DieJess

Case: Llamas v. Orbos

Topic: Constitutional Limits on Executive Clemency
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● Petitioner is the incumbent Vice-Governor of Tarlac and eventually assumed governorship by
virtue of a decision of the OP
○ The incumbent Governor then was suspended from office for 90 days
● The suspension of Ocampo was due to an investigation of the DILG of complaints alleging that
the Governor violated certain provisions of the LGC and for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
● The administrative complaint was then tried before the DILG
● The case involves a Loan Agreement with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, which was headed by
the governor himself and controlled by his brother in law
○ A total of 20 million pesos was disbursed to the Foundation
● After the trial, Ocampo was found guilty by the DILG and was suspended from office — not a
preventive suspension but a penalty of suspension
● Ocampo then appealed to the OP when its MR was denied
● Responding to the appeal, the respondent ES dismissed the appeal and affirmed the DILG
decision
● Upon the finality of the decision, petitioner then assumed office as acting governor
● Suddenly, Ocampo issued an administrative order stating that he would continue to exercise his
functions as governor in the belief that the pendency of his MR precludes the finality of the DILG
decision
● Without ruling on the MR, Respondent ES then issued a Resolution granting executive clemency
● By virtue of the assailed Resolution, Ocampo reassumed governorship
● Petitioner claims that executive clemency can only be granted in criminal cases

Issue:
● W/N the President can issue executive clemency in an Administrative case? — YES

Ruling/Ratio
● It must be noted that before the executive clemency was granted, petitioner withdrew his MR to
the effect of making the DILG Decision final
● Now on the validity of the grant, the Court applies the statutory construction principle of “ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos” or if the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish
● The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases the clemency may be exercised
○ The sole exclusion is of impeachment cases
● If it was limited to criminal cases, the exclusion of impeachment cases would be unnecessary
DieJess

● The Court also sees no valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases
○ The Court views that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses
● A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of executive clemency
in administrative cases
● There was a proposal to add “power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt
practices laws may be limited by legislation”
○ This, however, was removed at it would be a derogation of the powers of the president
● Clearly, the executive elements powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as
already provided in the Constitution
○ No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC
DieJess

Case: Torres v. Gonzales

Topic: Constitutional Limits on Executive Clemency
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Feliciano

Facts:
● Petitioner was presently confidential in the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
● This petition is a habeas corpus petition
● Petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa and was sentenced to a prison term of 11 years
and 10 months
● Later, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President with he condition that
petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines
○ This was accepted and he was subsequently released
● Later, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner
● The Board relied on 2 decisions of the Court
○ Evidence showed that petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of Estrada before
the RTC of QC and he was convicted of the crime of sedition
■ The sedition charge was on appeal
○ The records of the NBI also showed that petitioner had a long list of charges
■ Some were dismissed but the statues of the others were not stated
● The Minister of Justice then informed the President of the recommendation which she acted on
by cancelling the pardon
● An Order of Arrest and Recommitment was then issued against the petitioner
● Petitioner now assails the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment
○ He claims that he has not been convicted by final judgement in the cases pending
against him
○ He also claims that his due process right was violated

Issue:
● W/N conviction of a crime by final judgement of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny
● The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny (under the Administrative Code) or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under the RPC
● When the President opts to proceed under the Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement
of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgement of
DieJess

a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon
● What is involved in this case is not the prosecution of the parolee in the regular course of
administration of the criminal law but involves the ascertainment of whether the convict has
breached his undertaking in the conditional pardon
● The choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject judicial
scrutiny
● The acceptance of the conditions imports the acceptance of the condition that the President
will also determine whether the condition has been violated
DieJess

Case: People v. Casido

Topic: Constitutional Limits on Executive Clemency
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● In a past resolution issued by the Court, the conditional granted to Casido and Alcorin were
declared void for being issued during the pendency of this appeal
● The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon was then asked to show
cause why they shouldn’t be cited in contempt of court for what they did
● In their reply, the Committee mentioned that the applications for conditional pardon of the
prisoners were recommended by the Committee to the President for the grant of Conditional
Pardon after evaluating that the prisoners committed the crimes in pursuit of their political
beliefs
○ The pardon was then issued
● Prior to their release, the prisoners filed an “Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal” but the
Committee failed to verify first whether the counsel of the accused had also withdrawn their
appeal or that the NGO lawyers had filed in their behalf a motion
○ It was then the honest belief of the Secretariat that the NGO lawyers would perform
their agreed undertaking (simultaneous with the processing of the applications,
motions for the withdrawal of the appeal must be filed by them in the SC), that the
Secretariat endorsed the applications for conditional pardon to the Committee and
thereafter to the President
● The Secretariats who reviews the cases stated that they recommended to grant of pardon to the
accused in view of a determination that they were charged or convicted of crimes that may
have been committed in pursuit of political objectives
● The National Amnesty Commission then informed the Court that the applications for amnesty of
the accused were favorably acted upon by the NAC
○ The Commission found that the accused were confirmed members of the CPP/NPA/NDF
whose killing of Victoriano Mapa was committed in pursuit of their political beliefs

Issue:
● W/N the amnesty rendered the question of premature pardon moot and academic — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that while the pardon in this case was void for being done in violation of Section
19, Article 7 of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty was valid
● The Proclamation which granted amnesty to the accused was concurred with by both Houses of
Congress in a Concurrent Resolution
● Therefore, the release of the accused can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the
pardon
● Amnesty v. Pardon
DieJess

○ Pardon:
■ Granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof
■ Granted to one after conviction
■ Looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted — it abolishes or forgives the punishment
● Does not restore the rights to hold public office, suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon
● It does not exempt the person from payment of civil indemnity
○ Amnesty
■ By Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress
● It is a public act which the courts shall take judicial notice of
■ Granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses
● Generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution
and sometimes after conviction
■ Looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself
● It overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had not committed no offense
DieJess

Case: Cristobal v. Labrador

Topic: Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The petition before the Court seeks to review the decision of the CFI of Rizal which sustained the
right of Reofilo Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in the Municipality of Malabon,
Rizal
● Santos was found guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of aresto mayor and
the accessories provided by law
● Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos continued to be a registered elector in Rizal and for the
period between 1934-1937, seated as the municipal president of the municipality
● Later, the Election Code was enacted, which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having
been declared by final judgement guilty of any crime against property
● In view of this provision, Santos applied to the President, for an absolute pardon
○ This was later granted and Santos’ full civil and political rights, except with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, were restored
○ He will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involves no money or property responsibility
● Cristobal then filed a petition for exclusion of his name from the list of voters on the ground that
he is disqualified under the Election Code
○ The RTC then ruled that he is eligible
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the pardon granted by the President to Santos restored the respondents full enjoyment of
his political rights? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioner contends that the pardoning power of the President does not apply to legislative
prohibitions and that the said exercise of power in this case would amount to an unlawful
exercise by the President of a legislative function
○ And that the respondent has served his sentence so there was nothing to pardon
● The nature and the extent of the power to pardon was then discussed by the Court
● Only two limitations are imposed on the Constitutional prerogative
○ That the power be exercised after conviction
○ Cannot extend to cases of impeachment
● The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action
● It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest
authority to whom it is entrusted
DieJess

● An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction
● In this case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting
● When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is
left of the consequences of conviction
○ In this case, the pardon extended is conditional as he is only eligible to be appointed in
clerical or manual positions
● The absoluteness of the pardon is in how it restored his FULL civil and political rights
● To say that the provisions of the Election Code does not fall within the purview of the pardoning
power, would lead to the impairment of the said power — which is not contemplated in the
Constitution and would lead to the result that there would be no way of restoring political
privilege in a case in this nature except through legislative action
DieJess

Case: Monsanto v. Factoran

Topic: Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● Petitioner Monsanto was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 years
● Petitioner was the assistant treasurer of Calbayog City
● Petitioner appealed the conviction to the SC and this was denied
● She then filed an MR but while this was pending, President Marcos extended her absolute
pardon which she accepted in December 1984
● By reason of the pardon, she wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored
to her former post which was still vacant
● This was then transferred to the Ministry of Finance, the body which had jurisdiction over the
matter, and the said body eventually ruled that reinstatement would not need a new
appointment
○ It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the indemnification required by the
Sandiganbayan be satisfied
● Petitioner then wrote to the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped
out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted
○ The date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension
○ She is entitled to back pay for the entire period of her suspension
○ She should not be require to pay the indemnification of 4K
● On this, the Ministry referred the letter to the OP for further review and action
● In its reply, through herein respondent, the OP stated that petitioner is not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the pardon because only acquittal is the only ground
for such
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N a public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon is entitled to reinstatement to
her former position without need for a new appointment? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioner grounds her claim in the fact that her conviction was still pending approval when the
absolute pardon was extended to her
● This is erroneous — it is noted that the petitioner was convicted of the crime which carries
accessory penalties
○ Even if she was pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain
unless the same have been expressly remitted by the pardon.
DieJess

● Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed.
○ It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the
Court
○ It is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential and not complete without
acceptance
● Pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action — only limitation is that
imposed by the Constitution
○ An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction
● Ex Parte Garland
○ A pardon reaches both the punishment and the guilt of the offender. When it is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so in the eye of the law,
the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense
● The very essence of pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt
● It does not erase the facts of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof.
● Full pardon relieves the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including
the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt.
○ But it does not relieve him from nothing more
● To say, however, that the offender is a ‘new man’, and ‘as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense;’ is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged
guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society
than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his
conviction
● The Court sees and respects that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal
indictment only as to give meaning to the fiat that it is a presidential prerogative
○ However, the Court stresses that it does not subscribe to the fictitious belief that
pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent
● Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights
○ BUT unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence, it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
● Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or
forfeited by reason of the conviction although it restores his eligibility for appointment to that
office.
○ This is because public officers are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety
and benefit of the common good.
DieJess

○ To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion on pardon would be

grossly untenable
● Pardon cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed
to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction
● By virtue of their pardon, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office
○ She must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
DieJess

Case: Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC and Estrada

Topic: Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The case involves a disqualification case filed against Former President Estrada for his election as
Mayor of Manila
● Some factual antecedents:
○ Estrada was initially found guilty of plunder by the Sandiganbayan and was given the
sentence of reclusion perpetua and perpetual absolute disqualification
○ Eventually, President GMA extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to the
former President
■ This restored his civil and political rights
○ On 2009, Estrada tried to run for President and subsequently, petitions for his
disqualification were filed
■ These were dismissed on the ground that the pardon that he got restored his
right to vote and be voted for public office
○ He again ran for Mayor in the 2013 elections, and the present petitioner filed a
disqualification case against him alleging that he has been perpetually disqualified due
to his conviction
○ While the case was pending, Estrada won and was proclaimed as the Mayor of Manila
○ The disqualification case was also dismissed
○ Hence, the petition at bar
● The petitioner invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC as ostensible requirements
○ She avers that it is not enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such
pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights.
■ She considers that the specific civil and political rights restored must be stated.
Issue:
● W/N Estrada is eligible to run for office? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● A fundamental principle in statutory construction is: “From the words of a statute, there should
be no departure”
○ This means that if a state is clear, plain and unambiguous, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
● In the case at bar, the Court provides for the proper interpretation of the codal provisions
○ The provisions cannot serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative
of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes
○ The Court, therefore, cannot sustain the interpretation of the Petitioner that the
provisions contain specific textual commands which must be strictly followed in order to
free a person from the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them
DieJess

● Article 36 provides that a pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to vote and be voted,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon
● A rigid and inflexible reading of the provisions is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or
unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive clemency
● The Court therefore view that the phrase in that presidential pardon at issue which declares that
former President “ is hereby restored to his civil and political rights” substantially complies
with the requirement of express restoration
○ Part of the said rights are the rights to suffrage and to hold public office
● The above mentioned articles should be construed in a way that will give full effect to the
executive clemency granted by the President
○ Instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or
diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and
duly signed by the President him/herself
● The Articles only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the
penalties imposed in accordance with law
● The pardon extended shows that both the principal penalty and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon
○ The conviction of plunder and the penalty of reclusion perpetua
● Even if the articles are applied, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua
● The Court then reiterates that the pardon admits no other interpretation other than to mean
that, upon acceptance of the pardon, he regained full civil and political rights - including the right
to seek elective office.
● Whereas clauses are not binding, the fact that there was no express declaration in the next,
would not counter the categorical expression of restoration of Estrada’s full civil and political
rights
DieJess

Case: Cristobal v. Labrador

Topic: Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista
DieJess

Section 20 — POWER TO CONTRACT OR

GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS
Case: Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TRB
Topic: Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Sereno

Facts:
● The Philippine National Construction Corporation entered into an agreement with an Indonesian
company PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CITRA)
○ CITRA would provide PNCC with a pre-feasibility study on the proposed Metro Manila
Expressways project (Skyways)
● Upon the return of the studies, PNCC and CITRA submitted a Joint Investment Proposal to the
Republic of the Philippines
○ This was done through the TRB
○ This embodied the implementation schedule for the financing, design and construction
of the 3 stages of the Metro Manila Expressways
● TRB then reviews, evaluated and approved the Proposal
○ Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2
○ Stage 2, Phase 1 of the SMMS
● PNCC and CITRA then entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement and created the Citra
Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC)
○ This was organized under Philippine laws to serve as a channel through which CITRA
shall participate in the construction and development of the project
● A Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement was then executed with:
○ Republic of the Philippines — through the TRB as the grantor
○ CMMTC as the investor
○ PNCC as the operator
● Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and
exclusive privilege and responsibility of the CMMTC
○ While the operation and maintenance was of the PSC — a subsidiary of the PNCC
● Thereafter, the assailed ASTOA was executed between the parties
○ This included the amendments, revisions, and modifications necessary to cover the
design and construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway
○ Also, the SOMCO replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1
of the South Metro Manila Skyway
● The DOTC Secretary Mendoza then approved the ASTOA through a Memorandum
● This prompted the petitioners to file the instant petition
DieJess

○ They aver that the approval of the DOTC Secretary could not take the place of the
presidential approval required by PD 1113 and PD 1894 concerning franchises granted to
PNCC

Issue:
● W/N the approval was valid? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was equivalent to approval
by the President
○ Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, the acts of cabinet secretaries are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter
○ Also, if it is not expressly required by the Constitution to be exercised by the President
himself, it may be delegated to his Cabinet secretaries
● In Constantino, the Court upheld the authority of the DOF Secretary to execute debt-relief
contracts
○ Such authority emanates from the power of the President to contract foreign loans
under Sec. 20
● In this case, the approval of the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President
DieJess

Case: Land Bank v. Atlanta Industries

Topic: Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The petition before the Court seeks to challenge the ruling of the RTC of Manila which declared
the results of the rebidding for the supply of water pipes conducted by the Bids and Awards
Committee of the City Government of Iligan for violating the rules and procedure prescribed
under the Government Procurement Act
● LandBank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development entered into a Loan
Agreement for the implementation of the latter’s Support for Strategic Local Development and
Investment Project
○ The loan was in the amount of 11 billion yen and it was fully guaranteed by the
Government on the condition upon the participation of 2 LGUs by way of a Subsidiary
Loan Agreement with Land bank
● LandBank then entered into an SLA with the Iligan City Government to finance the development
and expansion of the city’s water supply system. It had 2 components
○ Procurement of civil works
○ Procurement of goods for the supply and delivery of various sizes of pipes and fittings
● The SLA expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to be financed out of the
proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be procured in accordance with the provisions of
the IBRD Procurement Guidelines
○ Pursuant to this, the City Government, through its BAC, conducted public bidding for the
supply and delivery of the pipes and fitting using the IBRD Procurement Guidelines
● Respondent then participated in the bidding and came up with second to the lowest bid at 193
million
○ However, the BAC informed respondent that the bidding was declared a failure upon
recommendation of Land Bank due to the IBRD’s nonconcurrence with the Bid
Evaluation Report
○ Also, the BAC informed Atlanta of its disqualification from the bidding because it lacked
several documentary requirements
● In response, respondent sought to correct the erroneous assumption of BAC with regard to the
disqualification
○ Respondent asserted that the declaration of failure of bidding was incorrect for had it
not been improperly disqualified, there would have also been no need to declare the
bidding a failure because its tender would be the sole responsive bid necessary to save
the process
● The rebidding was thereafter scheduled and Atlanta called the attention of BAC for not its use of
Bidding Documents which did not conform with the guidelines prescribed by the Government
Procurement Policy Board and also for containing provisions contrary with RA 9184 and its IRR
● BAC contended that the project was not covered by the RA or by any of the GPPB issuances
DieJess

● Apprehensive of BAC’s use of bidding documents, Respondent filed a petition before the RTC of
Manila
● Meanwhile, the rebidding process commenced and Atlanta was the lowest bidder

Issue
● W/N the SLA between Land Bank and the City Government of Iligan is an executive agreement
similar to the Loan Agreement? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the Loan Agreement is in the Nature of an executive agreement
○ The Court defined what an executive agreement is in Bayan v. Romulo as one concluded
between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation
○ It may be in the form of
i. Treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification
ii. (APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE) executive agreements that are similar to treaties,
except that they do not require legislative concurrence and usually less formal
and deal with a narrower range of subject matters that treaties
● The Agreement between IBRD and Land Bank is an integral component of the Guarantee
Agreement executed by the Government of the Philippines and IBRD
○ Both have the capacity to enter into international agreements
● Being an executive agreement, the Loan Agreement is governed by international law
○ Therefore, the government is obligated to observe its terms and conditions under the
rule of pacta sunt servanda
● Now on the SLA, the Loan Agreement has been incorparated and made part of it
○ Therefore, the SLA cannot be treated as an independent and unrelated contract but as a
conduct of, or having a joint and simultaneous occurrence with the Loan Agreement
● It is merely an accessory contract to the LA; thus, its nature and consideration is the same as that
of its principal contract from which it receives life and without it cannot exist an independent
contract
● Land Bank correctly asserted that the SLA has attained indivisibility with the Loan Agreement
and the Guarantee Agreement through the incorporation of each other’s terms and conditions
such that the character of one is likewise become the character of the other
● Given that the Loan Agreement expressly provides that the procurement shall be in accordance
with the IBRD Guidelines and provisions of Schedule 4, the accessory SLA contract merely
follows its principals terms and conditionsA\
○ Therefore, the procedure under RA 9184 does not apply to the present case
DieJess

Section 20 — TREATIES
Case: Gonzales v. Hechanova
Topic: nature of executive agreements
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● The present petition questions the validity of the authorization of the Executive Secretary of
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice
● Petitioner, a rice planter and the president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association,
avers that the act of the respondent is explicitly prohibited by RA 3452
○ Prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency

Issue:
● W/N the respondent acted with excess of jurisdiction when he granted the authority for the
importation? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● Respondents contend that the Government has already entered into 2 contracts for the
purchase of rice with Vietnam and Burma
○ These contracts constitute executive agreements under international law and have
become binding and effective upon signing of the representatives of the parties
● They aver that if there is conflict between the Republic Acts and the Executive Agreements, the
latter shall prevail because if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the
conflict must be resolved in favor of the one which is latest in point of time
● The Court held that the respondents failed to sufficiently establish that the said contracts are
executive agreements
● The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements
● Even assuming that it may be properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void
○ INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS RA 2207 and 3452
● Although the President may enter into executive agreements without previous legislation, he
may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto.
● The Constitution states that the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress
● The former may not interfere with in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter
○ Except in the exercise of his veto power
DieJess

● He may not defeat defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance
of the very act prohibited by said laws
● The American theory that the one which is enacted later prevails is not applicable to the case at
bar because the contracts are not treaties
○ This is grounded on the fact that treaties are concurred with by Congress, the same
cannot be said for executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without
completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances
● RA 2207 enjoins the Government not from entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from
importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in the act
● RA 3452 on the other hand, has 2 main features
○ It requires the Government to purchase rice and corn from our local planters, growers or
landowners
○ It prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves such importations to
private parties
● The judicial declaration of illegality does not compel the Government to abandon its obligations
to the contracting parties, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the
provisions of the aforementioned laws
DieJess

Case: Vinuya v. Romulo

Topic: Termination of Treaty; Other Foreign Affairs Power
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bautista

Facts:
● Petitioners are all members of the Malaya Lolas, an organization established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the
Second World War
● The petitioners were victims of atrocious human rights violations by Japanese Soldiers during the
Second World War
● In 1998, petitioner approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DOF, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines
● However, the officials declined to assist petitioners and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Philippines
● Petitioners claim that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippines in the Treaty of
Peace with Japan is VOID
○ They allege that the prohibition against international crimes is jus cogens norms from
which no derogation is possible
○ As such, waiving the claims of the victims and failing to espouse their complaints against
Japan, the Philippine Government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford
impunity for crimes against humanity
○ They also claim that the government’s acceptance of the apologies of Japan as well as
the funds from the Asian Women’s Fund were contrary to international law
● Respondents claim that all claims were dealt with in the Treaty of Peace
○ Further, the claim that the apologies made by Japan have been satisfactory and that
Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the money paid to the
AWF

Issue:
● W/N respondents committed GADALEJ in refusing to espouse the claims of the petitioners? —
NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● This is not the first lawsuit proposed or pursued against the Japanese Government for the
atrocities during the Second World War
○ Numerous lawsuits have been filed internationally, but they have all been denied
● The Court held that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the respondents
● From a domestic law perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claim against Japan
DieJess

○ This case is of the nature of a political question

● However, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements
○ In this case, the question is vested upon the political branches and not with the courts
● The Executive has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims
of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
○ The wisdom of this decision is not for the Courts to question
● In Secretary of Justice, the Court stated that the conduct of foreign relations is full of
complexities and consequences
○ It is the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential
information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly
brief him on meaningful events all over the world
○ The presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally
accorded a wider degrees of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs
○ The validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial
repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with
equally undesirable consequences.
● The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse the claims of the
petitioner
● The only means available requires the individual to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individual’s behalf.
○ Even then, it is the state’s own rights being asserted
● Therefore, it is the state which is the sole judge whether its protection will be granted, to what
extent it is granted and when it will cease
○ It has discretionary power
DieJess

ARTICLE 8 — JUDICIAL BRANCH

DieJess

Section 1 — Judicial Power

Case: Marbury v. Madison
Topic: Judicial Review; essence of judicial duty
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Marshall

Facts:
● The petition before the SCOTUS involves a case compelling the respondent to deliver the
commissions signed by former President Adams
● Before the end of Adams’ term as President, he made 42 appointments in various courts in the
District of Columbia
○ This was an attempt for his party to take control of the Judiciary
● The commissions, however, were not delivered as Adams’ term ended
● Once President Jefferson took office, the Secretary of State (respondent) denied the deliverance
of the commissions and the State ignored further inquiries and requests by the applicants
● This prompted petitioner to file the present petition

Issue:
● W/N the appointments were valid? — YES
● W/N the Courts can issue a mandamus? — NO
● W/N the Court has the power to review? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the appointments are valid
○ The commission was completed when the appointment was made and once the seal of
the US was affixed to the same
● Having made the appointment, the President is also divested of all his power to the office and
the right to the office is vested to the person appointed
● The petitioner, definitely has a remedy in this case as the refusal to deliver the commissions
violates his right to office — which was validly granted
● The Court also held that the Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine its Constitutionality
○ The Judiciary has the DUTY to interpret the laws
○ As a matter of principle, the Constitution must govern over legislation, especially when
conflicts between the laws arise or questions on constitutionality are presented
○ This is the very essence of judicial duty
DieJess

Case: Santiago v. Bautista

Topic: Concept of Judicial Function
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Barredo

Facts:
● The petition before the Court is on appeal from the order of the CFI of Cotabato which dismissed
the civil case of the petitioner and the subsequent motion for reconsideration
● Santiago was then a pupil in Grade 6 at a public school in Cotabato City
○ He was was among the top students in his class (3rd honors)
■ 1 — Medina
■ 2 — Lingat
■ 3 — Santiago (wawa naman toy)
● 3 days before the graduation exercises, petitioner, represented by his parents, sought the
invalidation of the ranking by instituting the civil case
● In the complaint, petitioner was said to have been prejudiced by the respondents and that he
had been a consistent honor student and that the 2nd placer had never been a close rival of
petitioner before
○ Their teacher became the tutor of his close rival since the summer vacation
○ That the committee was illegally constituted for being in violation of the Service Manual
for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools — since it was composed of all the Grade 6
teachers only
○ Committee members committed grave abuse of discretion in changing the final grades
of the other 2 students and some teachers giving Santiago a starting grade of 75
○ That there was a unanimous and understanding among the committee members to
insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Medina with a perfect sore
○ That the words 1st place in petitioner’s certificate in Grade 1 was erased and replaced
with the words 2nd place
○ Santiago personally appealed the matter to the School Principal and other high officials,
but the latter passed the buck to each other to delay the grievances
● The case as therein dismissed by the CFI on the following grounds
○ Santiago failed to attach a certified true copy of the judgement complained of and all
pleadings and documents which are relevant as required by Rule 65
○ Santiago did not show that he availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of
DepED
○ No grave abuse of discretion by the teachers
● In this petition, the respondents contend that the CFI did not err and that the committee whose
actions are being assailed in this case is NOT the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions against which an action for certiorari may lie under Rule 65

Issue:
DieJess

● W/N it was proper for Santiago to seek judicial intervention to review the Committee’s honor
list? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petition for certiorari is not apt for this case
● Certiorari is a special civil action instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions
○ JF — act performed by virtue of judicial powers
● The requisites to invoke certiorari are:
○ Specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is
brought before a tribunal, board, or officer for hearing and determination of their
respective rights and obligations
○ The tribunal, board, or officer must have the power and authority to pronounce
judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to
that end
○ The tribunal, board, or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which
belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or
executive department
● The judicial function is determined by the nature of the act to be performed; not the tribunal,
board, office, or body which performs it
● It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial
○ It is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial
○ Ir is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their
public character
● State v. Dunn: the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions
● In the case, the Committee exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions
● It is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board of officer clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties
● There seems to be no record about any rule of law that provides that the acts of the Committee
constitute determination of what the law is
DieJess

Case: Radiowealth v. Agregado

Topic: Implied power; acquisition of equipment
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Moran

Facts:
● The clerk of the SC certified that the purchase of apparatus and its installation on the 2nd and
3rd floor of the Annex, which houses the Supreme Court, were urgent character and necessary
to public service
● This was disapproved by the Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee as it was:
○ contrary to the provisions of EO 302 and
○ the policy adopted by the Cabinet which discontinued open market purchase
○ and for also violating the requirements of EO 298
● Petitioner then took the matter up with the Auditor General with the request that the payment
be approved
○ Petitioner informed the AG that the warrant was in the process of issuance to cover this
amount but the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant
● In reply, the AG stated that there is no evidence to show that the requirements of law and/or
regulations had been complied with and the Constitution enjoins the AG to audit in
accordance with law and administrative regulations
● The AG then informed the CJ about this and that EO 302 needs to be followed in making regular
and emergency purchases of supplies, materials, furniture and equipment for the National
Government — includes the SC
● Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant case

Issue:
● W/N the court’s independence is limited to the exercise of Judicial functions and the purchase of
property does not belong to this category? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the prerogatives of the Court which the Constitution against interference
includes not only the power to adjudicate but all things reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice
○ Doctrine of Necessary Implication
● Under the Implied Powers, the Court must also have independence in their pursuit of their
Constituional Mandate. — FOLLOWING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
● Without the power to provide itself with appropriate instruments for the performance of its
duties, the express powers with with the Constitution endows it would become useless
● The Court’s independence of the legislative with regard to acquisition of supplies is bound up
with and subject to its dependence upon Congress for appropriation
● In this sphere, however, the Judiciary is independent of the executive
DieJess

○ In the acquisition for fixtures, equipment and supplies, both the executive and judicial
departments are on the same footing
○ BASED ON — derive their authority from the same source and represent the sovereignty
in equal degree
● Therefore, the Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the Supreme Court in the
choice of the instruments needed to carry on its functions
● The invoked orders by the AG are based on express legislation.
○ These administrative/executive orders are not being applied to the legislative
department
● The Revised Administrative Code does not include co-equal branches of government
● The arguement that the provisions of the Code are being enforced on the clerk of court and NOT
the court is also fallacious
○ The clerks is an officer of the court entirely subordinate and working under its orders
○ He has no functions or duties conferred by law independent of the court
● The expenditures of the Court are not irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant
DieJess

Case: In Re Laureta
Topic: power to preserve its honor
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Marshall

Facts:
● This administrative matter involves a letter sent by petitioner Ilustre to the members of the First
Division of the Supreme Court threatening to effect a change of the Court’s adverse Resolution in
her case before it
○ Calling it unjust and being railroaded with such hurry
○ Threatening to hold responsible the members of the First Division who promulgated 3
minute-resolutions in question
● The letters are requesting to inform the petitioner of the participation of the Justices in the
promulgation of the resolutions
● The Court en Banc reviewed the case and found no reason to take further action; thus, referred
it back to the First Division
● After the en consulta with the Court en Banc, petitioner wrote to the justices of the First Division
again in the same arrogant and disrespectful tone
○ There were threats of exposing to the nation the way the Supreme Court performs its
duties
○ The letter also questions the integrity of the judiciary
● After losing her case, petitioner filed a complaint before the Tanodbayan in total disregard of the
facts and circumstances and legal considerations
○ There were malicious charges against members of the Court in connection to the
promulgation of the questioned Resolutions
● Laureta circulated copies of the Complaint to the press without furnishing copies to the court or
the members charged
○ This made in appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court were corrupt
● The Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint
● Thereafter, petitioner Maravilla and Laureta were required to show cause why they should not
be held in contempt or why no disciplinary action should be taken against them

Issue:
● W/N the petitioners should be held in contempt and face disciplinary actions? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● Upon receiving their respective answers, the Court found these unsatisfactory
● Their claims that they had not done anything to affront the honor and dignity of the Court is
belied by the facts and circumstances that surrounds the matter
● In imposing penalties, the Court stated that there is no vindictive reprisal involved.
● The Court is merely acting to preserve its honor and dignity, and to safeguard the morals and
ethics of the legal profession
DieJess

● There members of the Judiciary and the Institution itself was subject to public ridicule and its
integrity was being challenged by the publication of the complaints filed against the officers of
the court
○ It is to be noted that the complaint filed with the Ombudsman was dismissed
○ The Court cannot be faulted for proper and sound judgements made in good faith by
disgruntled litigants and losing lawyers
● The repetition of the remarks in the letters and the complaint reveals the hand of Laureta in the
attack on the integrity of the Court
● The Respondents’ action is brazenly unjustifiable and they cannot plead ignorance
● Illustrated was made to pay a fine and Laureta was found guilty of grave professional
misconduct and was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
DieJess

Case: Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

Topic: power to delay execution of sentence
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Puno

Facts:
● Petitioner Echagaray was sentenced to be executed by lethal injection for raping the 10 year old
daughter of his common-law wife
● On the day of the execution, the SC issued a TRO
○ It is to be noted that the SC has affirmed the imposition of the death penalty when the
case was in automatic review and that the judgment has been final and executory
● The Supreme Court issued the TRO due to the public clamor with regard to death penalty
○ Echagaray was the first person to be executed under the death penalty law
○ The Court issued the said order as a matter of precaution due to the interest of life
involved
● The Sec. of Justice assails the issuance of the TRO on the ground that it violates the rule on
finality of judgement and encroaches upon the powers of the Executive to grant pardons to
convicts on death row

Issue:
● W/N the Court may suspend or delay the execution of a sentence? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that it has the authority to delay the execution of a sentence
● What the Court loses with the rules of finality is the power to amend, modify or alter their
previous decision
● However, the Court retains their jurisdiction to execute or enforce their decision, in this case —
the execution of Echagaray
● There is a basic difference between the two
○ Jurisdiction to execute sentence continues even after the judgement has become final
because after the judgement, facts and circumstances may transpire which can render
the execution unjust and impossible
○ Courts jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter terminates upon the finality of the
judgement
● It is also for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life
● It cannot also be argued that the TRO serves as an encroachment on the power of the Executive
○ Not only the Executive has the ability to protect the right to life of an accused who is
convicted
● If this was the case, then there would be a breach in the principle of co-equality of powers
DieJess

Case: In Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty

Topic: contempt power
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Facts:
● The petition before the Court questions the Show Cause Resolutions issued to the UP Law
Faculty for alleged denial of freedom of expression and academic freedom as law professors
● The SC was issued on the grounds that the UP Law Faculty, in the manner presenting the
arguments and the language used therein, was deemed by the Court as inappropriate
considered that the signatories are lawyers
● The subject document was the statement of the Faculty on the allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation of Justice Del-Castillo in his decision in the Vinuya case
○ This was posted on the online bulletin board of the UP College of Law
○ This was also submitted to the Court by former dean Leonen
○ Signed by 37 faculty members
● Thereafter, a show cause order resolution was issued to the respondents as to why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar
● The present matter is a MR filed by 2 members of the faculty arguing that the proceeding
involved here is premised on a finding of indirect contempt

Issue:
● W/N the proceeding involved here, while ostensibly docketed as an administrative matter, is
premised on a finding of indirect contempt? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that a charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it
penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine or both
● The speech and conducted directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member
of the Bar, may subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional
Responsibility
○ This prescribed that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts
● In such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as:
○ Disbarment
○ Suspension
○ Reprimand
○ Admonition
● Contrary to the position of the petitioners, the same speech and/or behavior against the COurt
on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in
the discretion of the Court
● When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought
DieJess

to be prevented is the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of
justice
● Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against the members of the UP
Faculty, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of
jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a
disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt
● Had the Court opted to cite them for contempt of court, the same would have initiated
contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court
DieJess

Case: Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary

Topic: ODES no power to try and decide cases; EO No. 13 empowering it is unconstitutional
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Perlas-Bernabe

Facts:
● The petition before the Court assails the validity of EO 13 which abolished the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission and transferring its investigative, adjudicators and recommendatory to
the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
● In early 2001, PGMA issued EO 12 which created the PAGC vesting it the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President
○ It’s jurisdiction involved hearing administrative cases or complaints
● In 2010, President Aquino issued the assailed EO, abolishing the PGCA and transferring its
functions to the ODES
● Later, Finance Secretary Purisima filed a complaint against the petitioner before the ODES
○ Pichay was the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the LWUA
● Thereafter, petitioner received an order signed by the ES requiring him and his co-respondents
to submit their explanations
● In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the case involving the
same matter is already pending in the Office of the Ombudsman
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N EO 13 is unconstitutional? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court reiterated the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Department under
EO 292
○ The administrative code vests continuing authority to the President
● Following this power, the abolition and the transfer of functions was properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing legislative authority to reorganize
○ Since both offices are within the Office of the President PROPER, it is allowable under
Section 31(1) of the Administrative Code
● The Reorganization did not entail the creation of a new office, it merely altered the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division — the
investigative and adjudicators division
● It cannot also be argued that the ODES was illegally vested with judicial power
○ He grounds his claim on the name of the division which includes ADJUDICATORY
● THIS IS MISPLACED
DieJess

● While the name includes the word adjudicatory, the ODES cannot try and resolve cases as its
authority is limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations
○ This is explicitly stated in EO 13 under the functions and powers of the ODES from the
PAGC
● The ODES is merely a fact-finding and recommendatory body and has no power to settle
controversies and adjudicate cases
○ Fact finding is not adjudication — they only receive evidence and ascertain therefrom
the facts of a controversy
● This constitution of the new division is well within the power of the President under Section 17
— faithful execution clause
● The ODES did not encroach upon the Ombudsman as well as the latter’s primary jurisdiction is
over criminal cases and not administrative cases
DieJess

Case: Tan v. Matsura

Topic: power to review findings of prosecutor preliminary investigation
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Reyes

Facts:
● Respondents in this case were charged with the crime of falsification under the RP by the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Makati
● The charges were denied by Matsuura and he countered by stating that the complaint was
merely a scheme resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures
○ He also stated that he had obtained a favorable resolution in a complaint for estafa
against Tan
○ He further explained that the transfer of the shareholding covered by the subject Deed
of Trust was a result of Tan’s offer to compromise the intra-corporate dispute
■ He insisted that it was Tan who notarized the deed on the condition that he
accepts the compromise
● The Office of the City Prosecutor later dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack or probable
cause
○ It cited the fact that Tan had voluntarily signed the deed and that no element of damage
has been sufficiently shown
○ This prompted Tan to file a petition for review before the DOJ
● The DOJ Secretary, likewise, denied the petition
○ He ruled that no evidence was presented to show that there was falsification on the
subject deed
○ A motion for reconsideration was later filed
● On the MR, the Acting DOJ Secretary Gutierrez, granted the petition on the ground that the
copies of the subject deed in an intra-corporate dispute before the SEC was not yet notarized
○ Furthermore, the print and font of the deed’s entries on its covered shares and date
remarkably differed from the other portions of the document
● Due to this decision, the OCP of Makati was directed to file an information against the
respondents
● The respondents then filed a petition before the CA, which granted the same on the ground that
there was no sufficient allegation of the actual participation of the respondents and no
elements of damage were sufficiently shown
● Tan’s MR was denied; hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in taking Cognizance of the two petitions filed before it, assuming the role of a
reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
DieJess

● The Court held that the Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in
preliminary investigations
● It is to be noted that the finding of probable cause is essentially an executive function
● However, it is also a settled rule that courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors
in preliminary investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases showing GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION
● Under Sec. 1, Art. 8, the jurisdiction of the Judiciary extends to the determination of whether
there was GADALEJ committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government in the
discharge of its functions
● The Courts cannot shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant the
determination of whether the prosecutors’ findings are supported by facts or by law
○ In doing so, the courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are
exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules
to settle cases and controversies
● The court’s power of review ensures 2 things
○ Probable criminals are prosecuted
○ Innocent people are spared from baseless prosecution
● The finding of the Court in Tan v. Ballena that the findings of the prosecutors are reviewable by
the DOJ, does not preclude the courts from intervening and exercising their review powers
● When there is grave abuse of discretion, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence
to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the CA may take cognizance of the case via a
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
● Therefore, the CA’s exercise of the power of review is warranted and proper
○ It was based on a clear issue on the Secretary of Justice’s appreciation of facts
DieJess

Case: Garcia v. Drilon

Topic: power to granted to Punong Barangay/Kagawad to issue TPO not judicial but executive function
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Marshall

Facts:
● Petitioner Garcia is assalailing the constitutionality of RA 9262
○ For being violative of the equal protection clause and the due process clause as well as
for unduly delegating judicial power to barangay officials
● The spouse of the petitioner, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a complaint against her husband on
behalf of her and her son
○ She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse, emotional, psychological and economic
violence.
○ She was also threatened with deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support
● The RTC of Bacolod found reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against the Rosalie and her son exists so the said court issued a TPO
● The petitioner filed a petition before the CA assailing the constitutionality of the said RA but this
was denied by the appellate court

Issue:
● W/N RA 9262 is unconstitutional as it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to the
Barangay officials — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● Petitioner contends that the protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power
○ Under the Constitution, this is placed only upon the Supreme Court and such other
lower courts as may be established by law
● Sec 14, which governs the Barangay Protection Orders provides that the Barangay Chairman shall
issue the protection order to the applicant after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application
○ If the Brgy Chairman is unavailable, the Brgy. Kagawad may issue the same accompanied
by an attestation by the latter that the former was unavailable
● Judicial power includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether there has been
GADALEJ on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
● On the other hand, executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance
DieJess

● The BPO merely orders the perpetrator to desist from causing physical harm to the woman or
her child and threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
○ Such function is purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the LGC to
enforce all laws and ordinances and maintain public order in the Barangay
● This is similar to a public prosecutor ascertaining through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
whether there is reasonable ground to prosecute
○ The Brgy Chairman must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO
● Assistance by Barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order
DieJess

Case: Noblejas v. Teehankee

Topic: no power to discipline officers in other branch with equivalent rank of judge
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Reyes

Facts:
● The petition before the Court seeks to retrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the
official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his
suspension by the Executive Secretary
● Petitioner is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration
○ RA 1151, Section 2 provides that the compensation, emoluments and privileges of the
Commissioner shall be the same as those of a Judge of the CFI
○ 19,000
● The Secretary of Justice wrote a letter to the petitioner requiring him to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess
of the areas covered by the original titles
○ In response, the petitioner invoked Section of RA 1151 that he could only be suspended
and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the CFI
○ Therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the SC for action
■ Sec. 67 of JA and Rule 140
● Later on, petitioner received a letter signed by the ES that he has been suspended due to the
finding of prima facile case for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to public interest
● Hence, this petition
● Respondents contend that the investigating charges against petitioner is administrative or
executive in nature; thus, the court does not have power to discipline the petitioner

Issue:
● W/N the CLR may only be investigated by the Supreme Court? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled on the negative
● The invoked provision of the Judiciary Act only pertains to District Judges — petitioner is not a
district judge, nor a member of the Judiciary
● The doctrine of implication does no apply as well
○ This would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive
officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges
■ Judicial Superintendent
■ Ass. SolGen
■ City Fiscals of Manila and QC
■ SEC Commissioner
DieJess

● Adopting the theory of the petitioner would place upon the Supreme COurt the duty of
investigating and disciplining all the other executive officials whose functions are plainly
executive
○ This would impede on the Presidential power of control and supervision
● The petitioner’s stand is a misappreciation of what was intended by the Legislature when it
granted some executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance
○ In support of this are the organic statutes of the CAR and CTA which expressly provides
that they are to be removed in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First
instance or members of the judiciary of appellate rank
○ This shows that the legislative design to make suspensions or removal procedure
prescribed for Judges of FI applicable to other officers, the provision is made in plain and
unequivocal language
● FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION: if the legislature had really intended to include in the general grant
of privileges or rank and privileges of Judges of the CFI, the right to be investigated by the SC,
and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional
○ It would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging the SC
with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing the control of the President over such officials
● As in the case of Manila Electric Co., the SC and its members should not and cannot be required
to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administration of judicial functions
○ It cannot be argued that the petitioner exercises judicial functions as its decisions are
only binding upon registers of deeds alone
● Even assuming that the resolutions of consultas of the petitioner should constitute a judicial
function, analysis of the powers and the duties of the CLR will show that the said resolutions are
but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the
latter
DieJess

Case: SBMA v. COMELEC

Topic: No controversy when resolution is at proposal stage
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Panganiban

Facts:
● The present petition seeks to nullify the COMELEC’s ruling and resolution denying petitioner’s
plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall the PK of
the SB of Morong, Bataan
● In 1992, Congress enacted RA 7227 which provided for the creation of the Subic Special
Economic Zone and the SMBA
○ The petitioner was created to implement the declared national policy of converting the
Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses
● When the US navy turned over the military reservation to the Philippines, petitioner started the
implementation of its task
● In 1993, the SB of Morong passed a Pambayang Kapasyahan, expressing its absolute
concurrence, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone
○ This was later submitted to the Office of the President
● Later on, respondents filed a petition to annul the said PK which was later acted upon by the SB
by promulgating the assailed PK
○ This requested Congress to amend certain provisions of RA 7227
● Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power if initiative under the LGC (Sec. 122)
● This was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that the PK was merely a resolution and
not an ordinance
● Pursuant to this, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before
the Court to set aside the COMELEC’s decision
● Meanwhile, the President issued Proclamation 532 which defined the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ which included Grande Island, a portion within the territorial jurisdiction of Morong
● Thereafter, COMELEC issued a resolution indicating the scheduled Referendum date, rules and
guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan
Blg 10 of the SB
● Hence, this petition contesting the validity of the COMELEC Resolution

Issue:
● W/N the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong
to enact? — premature, Court will not pass upon the issue

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court did not pass upon this issue on the ground of prematurity
● In ruling, the Court agrees with the private respondent that the municipal resolution is still in
the proposal stage
○ It is NOT yet an approved law
DieJess

● Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate.
○ It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or
resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder.
● At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
possibility
● The Courts may only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases
● The Initiative and Referendum act provides that the courts’ jurisdiction to declare a proposition
null and void arises when it has been approved
● The SC passes upon errors of law of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been
GADALEJ on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government
● In this case, it is clear that the Court does not have the authority in regard to the proposed
initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any “branch or
instrumentality” or lower court, for that matter
○ The COMELEC has made no reviewable pronouncement about the issues brought by the
pleadeings
● The proposal was merely included verbatim in the questioned Resolution
● Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.
● The matters are within the initiatory jurisdiction of the COMELEC
○ The issue here may be ruled upon by the COMELEC upon remand
DieJess

Case: In Re: Save the Supreme Court

Topic: SC can't declare a proposed bill unconstitutional; no right arises therefrom
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Leonen

Facts:
● The case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and replacing it
with the Judiciary Support Fund
○ These funds collected from the JSF shall be remitted to the national treasury and
Congress shall determine how the funds will be used
● The petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel the court to
exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress
● The complaint raised implies that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after
the promulgation of certain cases (Araullo and Belgica) show a threat to judicial independence
● In the first week of July 2014, Rep. Farinas filed HB 4690, which would require the court to remit
its JDF collections to the national treasury
● A week later, Rep. Tupas Jr. filed HB 4738, which would create the JSF
● On the same day, the President addressed the nation with regard to the decision of the Court in
the above mentioned cases

Issue:
● W/N the petitioner has sufficiently shown ground for the Court to grant the petition and issue a
writ of mandamus? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petitioner has failed to comply with the requisites for judicial review
○ Actual case or controversy
○ Person challenging must have legal standing
○ Question of constitutionality must be revised at the earliest opportunity
○ Issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
● In this case, the petitioner has failed to comply with the first 2 requisites
● No actual case or controversy — means that there must be an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.
○ A justiciable controversy is essential for the court to rule on constitutional issues
■ Angara v. EC — court does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation….presumption of constitutionality
● If the Court acts on the petitioner’s allegations, then the Court would be exercising powers that
are not vested upon it by the Constitution
○ The proposed bill abolishing the JDF is yet to be an actual case or controversy
● The filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and and is “not subject to judicial
restraint”
DieJess

○ A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law

○ Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws — it cannot
speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or
may not pass.
● The Court cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial
determination
● Neither does the petitioner have locus standi in this case
○ There is no “direct injury”
○ EXP: transcendental importance
■ Determined on a case-to-case basis
DieJess

Case: Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio

Topic: no power to give advisory opinions or recommend executive action
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Zaldivar

Facts:
● This petition seeks for this court to strike out the the portion in a past decision recommending
to the Executive Secretary to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the Country in the first available
transportation aboard
● Ang Cho Kio had been charged, tried and convicted of various offenses committed in the
Philippines and was sentenced to suffer at least 45 years of imprisonment
● After serving 6 ½ years of the sentence, he was granted conditional pardon by the President
○ Condition: he will voluntarily leave the philippines upon his release and never return to
the country
● This was duly accepted by the respondent and he left the Philippines for Taipei
● Suddenly, Ang Kio Chip, traveling under the name Ang Ming Huy, arrived at the Manila
International Airport
○ He was held several tickets to the US, Canada, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand and Hongkong
● He surrendered his passport to the immigration authorities and was issued a note of departure
for his flight to Hawaii
● He registered for a 3-day stay at the El Presidente Hotel at Paranaque
○ He then contacted his 2 friends in Manila, Lim Pin and Go Bon Kim
○ They invited him to stay longer in the Philippines
● Pursuant to this, the 3 went to the BI, where Lim Pin signed a letter requesting for a 14 day
extension for respondent
● However, he was identified by Inspector Cristi as the man who was deported to Taipei in 1959
● He was then arrested and a investigation was conducted with regard to his presence in the
country — he was not allowed to proceed with his trip to Hawaii
● The Executive Secretary then ordered him to be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of the sentence that was imposed on him, for violating the condition of his pardon
● Later on, respondent filed a habeas corpus petition before the CFI of Pasay, which was later
dismissed
● This was appealed to the CA and it was affirmed
○ However, it included the assailed recommendation
● Thereafter, the SolGen filed a motion for reconsideration with regard to the deletion of the
recommendation
○ But this was denied
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in making the recommendation? — YES
DieJess

Ruling/Ratio:
● The SolGen maintains that the recommendation is not a part of the decision binding upon the
parties and that it is uncalled for; that it gives the decision a political complexion, because court
are not empowered to make such a recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the
exercise of judicial powers; that there is no law which gives authority to recommend to the
President such
● The only question being resolved in the case was whether the CFI was correct in dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus
● The CA was not called upon to review any sentence imposed upon the respondent
● The sentence has long become final, in fact, he has served a portion of which until he was
extended the conditional pardon
○ Which he violated
● The majority opinion should have been limited to the affirmative of the decision of the lower
court, and no more
● The recommendatory power of the courts is limited to those expressly provided in the law
○ Sec.5 of the RPC
● Clearly, the recommendation by the CA was not authorized by any provision
● The Court’s act of recommending would interfere with the functions of the President
○ An interference, or an attempt to influence, the exercise of the President of the political
powers of his office
● Principle of Separation of Powers — it is not within the province of the judiciary to express an
opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of
the Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature
● Even though the recommendation reflects the private opinion of the justices, it is better left
outside of a decision of the court
○ COURTS ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH THE WISDOM OR MORALITY OF LAWS, BUT ONLY
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW
DieJess

Case: Tano v. Socrates

Topic: hierarchy of courts
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Davide Jr

Facts:
● Petitioners in this case are challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance 15-92, issued by the SP
of Puerto Princesa
○ Includes Office Order 23 and Resolution 33
● The Ordinance banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa from
1993-1998
○ This is to free the city waters from cyanide and other obnoxious substances
● To implement this, the Acting Mayor issued the assailed office order
● Similarly, the provincial government issued the assailed Resolution which prohibited the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of various aquatic organisms
● The respondents then implemented the ordinances and deprived all fishermen of the whole
province of Palawan and the city of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood
○ It also deprived petitioner association and other marine merchants from performing
their lawful occupation and trade
● Petitioners Tano, et.al were even charged criminally
● Petitioners Lim were also charged
● Without seeking redress from the local government units, prosecutor’s office and courts,
petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction by filing the present petition

Issue:
● W/N the petition was prematurely charged? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the action for certiorari must fail due to prematurity amounting to lack of
cause of action
● The petitioners that have been charged criminally failed to show proof that they have filed
motions to quash the information and that the same has been denied
● Therefore, it cannot be said that the lower court committed GADALEJ to justify recourse to the
Supreme Court
● NOTE: certiorari is to review a decision of the lower court — in this case, the decision of the
lower court has yet to attain finality, therefore it is premature
● In all, the petitioners have yet to exhaust the available remedies in the regular course of the law
○ MR — Appeal — MR
● The petition for declaratory relief must likewise fails — because the SC does not have original
jurisdiction over such case
● Assuming that the Tano group had a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
there is a clear disregard of the heir of courts and no special and important reason or
DieJess

exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to the SC
should be allowed
● The concurrence of the Court with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari is not to be
taken as an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application will be
directed
● The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs
● The direct recourse to the SC should only be allowed when there are special and important
reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition
○ THAT IS THE ESTABLISHED POLICY
● It is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court’s docket
DieJess

Section 2 — Power of the Legislature to

Apportion Jurisdiction
Case: Malaga v. Penachos
Topic: Injunctions against infrastructure projects
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Cruz

Facts:
● The present case questions the extent and applicability of PD 1818, which prohibits any court
any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructures projects of the government
● The Iloilo State College of Fisheries through its PBAC, caused the publication of an invitation to
bid for the construction of the Micro Laboratory Building in the Western Visayas Daily
● Thereafter, petitioners submitted their prequalification documents
○ Petitioners are doing business under the name of B.E. Construction and Best Built
Construction
● All petitioners were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were
considered late
● The petitioners then filed a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and members of the
PBAC
○ They claimed that the PBAC had no cause to disqualify them from the bidding
● The judge, issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding
process
● Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to life the TRO on the ground that the Court was
prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory
injections pursuant to PD 1818
● Aside from this, they claimed that the case had become moot and academic due to the bidding
being conducted already
○ Received at 2 pm — bidding occurred at 11:30
● The petitioners questioned the applicability of PD 1818 due to the fact that the ISCOF is not
within the coverage of the PD
○ And even if it was applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government
project
● The trial court later lifted the tro and denied the petition for preliminary injunction
○ In ruling, the trial court stated that the building was an infrastructure project of the
government falling within the coverage of PD 1818
○ Regardless, the petition would have been moot due to the bidding already being finished
DieJess

Issue:
● W/N PD 1818 covers the ISOF? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the ISCOF is a chartered institution and is covered by PD 1818
● It is within the contemplation of an instrumentality of the Administrative Code
○ Chartered Institution — an agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state
● It’s Charter also shows that ISCOF is a govt instrumentality
○ Created pursuant to the integrated fisheries development policy of the State
○ Treasurer of the Philippines is the ex-officio treasurer of the college and its expenses are
audited by the COA
○ Heads of bureaus and offices are authorized to loan or transfer to it
● However, it does not automatically follows that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the PD
● The case is similar to the Dalites case — the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions
or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases
● The injunction issued was justified due to at least 2 irregularities committed by PBAC
○ The deadlines set by PBAC without prior notice to prospective participants
○ F
● The present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of an administrative body not
does it merely involve technical matters
○ What is involved is non compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required
strict observance
● The PD was not intended to shield from judicial struciny irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as the anomalies described above.
○ Hence the judge did not err in issuing the restraining order and the preliminary
injunction should not have been denied
DieJess

Section 4 — Compositions and Sessions

Case: Fortich v. Corona
Topic: Involves matters
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts:
● The case involves a 2-2 resolution on a motion for reconsideration of the petitioner of the
Court’s earlier decision
● The 2-2 resolution effectively affirmed the decision of the court in that case
● Movants argue that the tie resolution should have been referred to the Court En Banc pursuant
to Article 7, Section 4(3)
● The movants claim that the required number of a majority was not reached to carry a decision

Issue:
● W/N a MR needs a majority vote to finalize a decision? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the constitutional provision invoked refers to decisions and not matters
● Decisions are decided while motions are resolved
● Therefore, the need for a majority vote contemplated by the constitution refers to decisions only
● In the case at bar, the 2-2 vote effectively affirms the decision and is not needed to be brought
up to the Court en Banc
● When there is a tie in a division decision, it gets referred to the Court sitting en banc — this does
not occur in motions
DieJess

Case: Republic v. Garcia

Topic: Modification of Doctrine; Sandiganbayan can't modify doctrine
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The case before the Court is assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan in the case involving the
respondent General
● The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of the Garcias upon the filing by the Republic of a 1 million
attachment bond
● In response, the Republic posted the required bond to avoid any delay in the issuance of the writ
● Later, the Republic filed a motion for partial reconsideration claiming that it was exempt from
filing an attachment bond
● In ruling, the Sandiganbayan denied the MR in view of the Tolentino ruling that there was
nothing in the Rules of Court that exempted the Republic from filing an attachment bond
○ The Tolentino ruling was decided under the Old Code of CivPro

Issue:
● W/N the Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ when it denied the Republic’s motion? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the Rules of Court requiring a bond does not cover the State
● The issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is conditioned on the filing of a bond unless the
applicant is the State
○ The state is excused from filing the attachment bond
● WHY? — attachment bond is a security for the payment of the costs and damages to which the
adverse party may be entitled in case there is a subsequent finding that the applicant is not
entitled to the writ
● In this case, the Republic of the Philippines need not give this security as it is presumed to be
always solvent and able to meet its obligations
● The GADALEJ is present when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence
● In this case, the Sandiganbayan ruled in contravention to the Tolentino ruling, therefore it is
committed with GADALEJ
● Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan arrogated upon itself a power that it did not possess —
modifying a doctrine set by the Supreme Court
● No other than the Constitution states that only the Supreme COurt sitting in Banc may modify
or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
DieJess

Section 4 — Powers of the Supreme

Court
Case: Republic v. Sereno
Topic: Quo Warranto
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Tijam
DieJess

Case: PACU v. Secretary of Education

Topic: Locus Standi
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bengzon

Facts:
● The petition before the Court asks for Act No. 2706 to be declared unconstitutional as it:
○ deprived the petitioners of liberty and property without due process of law
○ Deprived the parents of their natural and primary duty to rear their children
○ The provisions of which conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constituting undue delegation of legislative
powers
● The questioned Act provides that the inspection and recognition of private educational
institutions is now obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction (Sec. of Education)
● The subject provision requires private schools to obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education
before it can be made open to the public
● Respondents argue that the petitioners have suffered no wrong nor alleged any from the
enforcement of the subject law

Issue:
● W/N the petitioners have incurred direct injury? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petitioners do not have legal standing in this case
● The Solicitor General pointed out that none of the petitioners has cause to present the issue
because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits
○ Neither have they alleged that the Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their
permits
● The Court held that there is likewise no justiciable controversy in this case.
○ Mere apprehension that the respondent will withdraw their permits does not constitute
such
● The Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
● On their assertions, the petitioners have failed to show how the standards set have injured any
of them or interfered with their operation
DieJess

Case: Sulpico v. NEDA

Topic: ZTE Contract Moot
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Reyes

Facts:
● The resolution before the Court asks for the Consideration of the Court with regard to the
mootness of the ZTE case
● Petitioner cites several cases wherein the Court has taken cognizance of the case and ruled on
the merits despite the mootness of the case
● The petitions before the Court partake of different types of petitions
○ Certiorari — annul the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal
○ Mandamus — compel the respondents to produce and furnish a certified true copy of
the contract or agreement covering the NBN-ZTE project
○ Prohibition — enjoin the respondents from pursuing the ZTE deal
● In pursuance to the petitions, the COurt issued a TRO which enjoined the parties from pursuing
the deal
● However, pending the case, the parties to the deal have decided not to pursue the project
anymore
● Thereby, making the prayers in the petitions moot and academic

Issue:
● W/N the Court shall still rule on the case despite its mootness — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the discontinuance of the Project are self-serving and hence, inadmissible
○ The court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official act of the
President
○ JN — includes official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines
● The rules of Court (Se. 1 Rule 129) states that it is mandatory for the Court to take notice of such
official acts, without introduction of evidence
● Aside from this, the political departments also enjoy the presumption of regularity
● Pontificating on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will
do more harm than good to the nation as a whole
○ This entails wise exercise of judicial discretion against resolving academic issues
○ This is especially true where the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without
previously establishing factual basis or antecedents
● The task of adjudication requires an actual case or controversy to be resolved
○ This includes a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution
DieJess

● Even assuming that the Court chooses to brush aside the mootness, the Court cannot
completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the 3 petitions involves
settling factual issues which definitely requires reception of evidence.
● There is not an iota of doubt that this may not be done by the Court in the first instance,
because the Court is not a trier of facts
○ It would be impossible for the Court to annul and set aside the award without evidence
to support a prior factual finding pointing to a violation of law
DieJess

Case: Concepcion v. COMELEC

Topic: Aggrieved Party
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Brion

Facts:
● The case before the Court assails the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which ruled that the
accreditation of NAMFREL will be conditioned on the removal of petitioner from the organization
by virtue of the prohibition against Barangay officials
● In response, NAMFREL accepted that conditional grant of its petition for accreditation but
requested to reexamine the validity of the COMELEC’s Resolution 7798
● The COMELEC denied the request and NAMFREL did not question such decision
● The petitioner is now before the Court assailing the Resolution

Issue:
● W/N the COMELEC has acted with GADALEJ? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The prohibition stems from E.O. 94 which prohibited the appointment of Barangay officials as
members of the BEI or as official watchers of each duly registered major political party
● Petitioner argues that the EO could not be the basis for the assailed resolution
● Despite the arguments, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for blatant misuse of Rule 65
of the Rules of Court
● In essence, the petitioner seeks to assail the COMELEC’s adjudicatory resolution, in his individual
capacity
● The petitioner is before the Court on his own initiative and the direct party to the assailed
Resolution, NAMFREL, has no participation
● The petitioner does not have personality to assail the decision of the COMELEC because he was
not a direct party to such decision
○ Neither was he an intervenor
● Clearly, the petitioner is not a party-in-interest who can directly assail the Resolution in an
original Rule 65 petition
● The petitioner is not an aggrieved party, as contemplated by Sec. 7, Article 9
○ AP — one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original
action for certiorari
● Person aggrieved does not mean any person who feels injured by a lower court’s decision, it
pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court
DieJess

Case: Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works

Topic: Requisites in questioning use of public funds
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Concepcion

Facts:
● The petitioner in this case was the Provincial Governor of Rizal. He instituted this instant petition
for declaratory relief on the ground that RA 920 contained a section providing 85k for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals
● Petitioner argues that the feeder roads were nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision situated in Pasig, Rizal
○ These roads did not connect any government property or any important premises to the
main highway and that the Subdivisions were owned by Private Respondent Zulueta,
who was a member of the Senate when the Act was passed and approved.
● Zulueta addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig offering to donate the roads
○ This was accepted by the council on the condition that the donor would submit a plan of
the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them
○ Also, no deed of donation was executed in favor of the Municipality of Pasig
● Zulueta then wrote a letter to the Municipal Council to call their attention on the approval of the
RA and the appropriation of the 85k for the construction of the feeder roads
○ The council then endorsed the letter to the District Engineer of Rizal, who has not made
any endorsement therein
● Inasmuch as the roads were in private property at the time of the passage and approval of the
RA and the appropriation of the 85k was illegal and therefore, void ab initio
● The appropriation was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the
roads were public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision”
● In order to give a semblance of legality, Sen. Zulueta executed a deed of donation of the land
constituting the roads in favor of the Government of the Philippines
○ This was then accepted
● The petitioner is contesting that the donation violated the provision that prohibits members of
Congress from directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government
● Petitioner claims that the construction of the roads would greatly enhance or increase the value
of the subdivision of Zulueta
○ Aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads
as the these would be undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways

Issue:
● W/N the contested item of RA 920 should be declared null and void and the alleged deed of
donation be declared unconstitutional? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
DieJess

● The Court held that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but public purpose
○ Furthermore, taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only
● To test the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds, the Court looks into
whether the statute is designed to promote public interests
● With regard to the 85k appropriation, the legality of this is dependent upon whether the roads
were public or private property when the bill became law or when this was passed by Congress
and was signed by the President
● On this, the Court held that when the bill become law, the appropriation sought was for a private
purpose, the donation to the Government being 5 months after the approval and effectivity of
the law
○ This subsequent donation does not cure the basic defect
● The Court cited the principle according to Ruling Case Law
○ General rule is that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose
○ Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify
their aid by the use of public money.
DieJess

Case: Galicto v. Aquino

Topic: No Material Interest in future increases in benefits
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Brion

Facts:
● The case before the court involves a petition assailing EO 7 for being issued beyond the powers
of the President and being in breach of existing laws
● The petitioner is an employee of PhilHealth and is currently the Court Attorney IV in PhilHealths
CARAGA Regional Office
● The assailed EO was born out of a statement made by President Aquino during his first SONA
wherein he alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members
of the Board of the MWSS
● Thereafter, a Senate inquiry was conducted in regard to the reported excessive salaries,
allowances and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions
● After the Senate Inquiry, the Senate issued SR 17 urging the President to order the immediate
suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and
other perks of members of governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs
● Pursuant to this, the President issued the assailed EO
○ A Task Force was then created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees
and the GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit information regarding their
compensation
○ The EO also ordered a moratorium on increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation and suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of
the Board of Directors/Trustees until the end of 2010
● The EO, in effect, precluded the Boards from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to
members of the board of directors and from increasing salaries and granting additional benefits
and allowances to their employees

Issue:
● W/N the suit may prosper? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petition shall be dismissed on procedural grounds and for mootness
● First, the petition for Certiorari is not the proper remedy for the petitioner
○ Again, certiorari entails a prior judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act that needs
correction from the court.
○ Instead of a petition for certiorari, the proper remedy is a petition for declaratory relief
filed with the RTC (Rule 63)
● A Rule 63 declaratory relief petition must be filed by any person whose rights are affected by an
executive order
DieJess

● The President, in issuing EO 7, did not exercise any judicial function

● Second, the petitioner lacks legal standing as he has no personal or substantial interest
○ Personal and substantial interest — someone who has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of a governmental act
● Material Interest is an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree
○ It means a present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest
● Despite the insistence of the petitioner, the Court is not convinced that he has a personal stake
or material interest in the outcome of the case
○ His interest is speculative and is based on a mere expectancy
○ He has no vested rights to salary increases and therefore, the absence of such right
deprives petitioner of legal standing
● The lack of legal standing cannot be cured under the doctrine of transcendental importance or
paramount interest
○ Again, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings
● He has failed to demonstrate that he is filing on behalf of PhilHealth’s Board
○ No material and personal interest
DieJess

Case: Joya v. PCGG

Topic: Private Funds
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Bellosillo

Facts:
● The case before the Court seeks to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the action sale of
several pieces of silverware and artworks seized from ill gotten wealth of the Marcoses
● The then Chairman of the PCGG, Caparas, wrote to the President requesting her authority to
signed the proposed COnsignment Agreement between the Philippines and Christie’s NY for the
sale of 82 Paintings and antique silverware alleged to be part of the ill gotten wealth of the
Marcoses
● Pursuant to this, the President, thought ES Macaraig Jr., authorized the agreement
● COA Commissioner then submitted the audit findings and observations of COA on the
Agreement. It stated that:
○ The authority of PCGG Commissioner Caparas to enter to such agreement was legally
doubtful
○ The contract was highly disadvantageous to the government
○ PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US
○ The assets subject to the action were historical relics and had cultural significance —
disposal was prohibited by law
● In response, the new PCGG Chairman, Castro, defended the integrity of the agreement in a letter
sent to the President
○ The Director of the National Museum likewise stated that the Items were not cultural
properties that are part of the Filipino cultural heritage
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the petitioners have standing? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The petitioners failed to present a clear legal right to a restraining order
● The Court held that the petition has failed to comply with the legal requisites for the Court to
exercise its power of judicial review over the case
● On the first requisite, legal standing, the petitioners failed to prove material and substantial
interest in the case
● The subject artworks were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundtion
○ This is a non-profit and non-stock corporation established to promote non-Philippine
arts
DieJess

○ In view of this, the ownership of the paintings legally belongs to the foundation or
corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given opportunity to
view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit
● Similarly, the silverware were donated to the Marcoses
● The confiscation of these items is not indicative of ownership being passed on to the
government
● Therefore, having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the
valued pieces have become publicly owned, the petitioners clearly do not possess any clear
legal right to question the alleged unauthorized disposition
● The petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers as well, because the subject properties, again, are not
public property.
○ No expenditure of public funds have been done
● On the second requisite, actual case or controversy, the petition has been moot due to the
consummation of the sale
● Despite mootness, the Court can still take cognizance of a case upon its discretion
○ However, in this case, the Court does not see any justification for such
DieJess

Case: Board of Optometry v. Colet

Topic: Unregistered Organizations
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

Facts:
● The petition before the Court is questioning the validity of the order issued by the respondent
granting a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners from enforcing the Revised
Optometry Law or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder
● The private respondent initially filed a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and
injunction before the RTC claiming that
○ There were unauthorized insertions in the reconciled bill
○ It is violative of several constitutional rights
● The RTC later issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from enforcing and implementing the
assailed law
● Petitioners then questioned the TRO for having no proper grounds that warrants the issuance of
such
● The trial court later issued the challenged order granting the writ of preliminary injunction
against the petitioners
● Hence, this petition

Issue:
● W/N the respondent judge acted in GADALEJ? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The principal defect of the issuance of the subject writ is that the petitioners therein did not
have the legal personality to be real parties in interest
● Only natural and juridical entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest
● The private respondents have failed to show that they are juridical entities with legal personality
to sue
● Not being legally recognized parties, they cannot be real parties in interest
○ RPI — party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit
● In this case, the private respondents’ names do not appear in the registration books of the Board
of Optometry as authorized practitioners in the philippines
○ Therefore, they do not have the requisite personal and substantial interest in the case
● The private respondents’ claim that they are suing as taxpayers must fail as well
○ This was not alleged as a class suit and it has failed to meet the requisites for such
■ Subject matter is one of common or general interest to many persons
■ Parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court
DieJess

● Furthermore, the private respondents have failed to meet the requisites for a petition for
declaratory relief
○ Existence of justiciable controversy
○ Controversy between persons whose interests are adverse
○ That the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the controversy
○ Ripe for adjudication
● The Court held that the first and the fourth requisites are not present
○ There is no actual case or controversy, mere speculation or anticipatory
○ The private respondents have no standing
DieJess

Case: Tondo Medical v. CA

Topic: Modification of Doctrine; Sandiganbayan can't modify doctrine
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario

Facts:
● Petitioners before the Court assail the issuance of the Health Sector Reform Agenda and EO 102
of President Estrada
● The DOH launched the assailed HSRA which provided several areas of reform for the Health
Sector
● Petitioners questioned the agenda involving fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,
particulate the collection of socialized user fees band the corporate restructuring of
government hospitals
● The ratio behind this reform is to reduce the dependence of hospitals on direct subsidies from
the government
● Moreover, the petitioners assailed the issuance of EO 102 which provided changes in the roles,
functions, and organizational processes of DOH
● The assailed order provides that the DOH shall refocus its mandate from being the sole provider
of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance
○ This was meant to streamline the deployment of DOH personnel to regional offices and
hospitals
● Petitioners contend that the EO was issued in abrogation of legislative powers
● The DOH employees assailed that the EO 102 would result in them losing their jobs and that
some of them will suffer inconvenience due to the possible relocation

Issue:
● W/N the petitioners have standing due to transcendental importance — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The transcendental importance doctrine cannot apply to this case
● The Court, in the past, has used this doctrine to brush aside the lack of substantial interest of the
petitioners
● After closely examining the substantive claims of the petitioners, the Court found no reason to
rule on the case based on the transcendental importance doctrine
● The petitioners allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to
pass upon
● The petition failed to show that the petitioners who were working in the DOH, were entitled to
receive RATA at the time the petition was filed
○ Nor was there any allegation that they suffered any diminution of compensation
● The persons involved are not identified, details of their appointments and transfers are not given
and the circumstances which attended the alleged violations are not specified
● In invoking transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest
DieJess

○ Sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement

DieJess

Case: Anak Mindanao v. Executive Secretary

Topic: Abstract Claims
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales

Facts:
● Petitioners in this case are assailing the validity of EO Nos. 364 and 379
● EO 364
○ Transformation of the DAR to the Department of Land Reform
○ It placed the PCUP (Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor) under the supervision
of the DLR
● EO 379
○ Amending EO 364
○ Making the NCIP an attached agency of the DLR
● The petitioners claim that the subject EO was unconstitutional for being violative of the
separation of powers doctrine, the constitutional scheme and policies for agrarian reform, urban
land reform, IP rights and ancestral domain
● The case became moot and academic due to the issuance of EO 456 which reverted DLR back to
its former name
● The issue before the Court now is the legality of the placing of the PCUP under the supervision
and control of the DAR and the NCIP under the DAR as an attached agency
● Petitioners claim that the Executive intruded into the domain of Congress as it injures the
institution as it impaired its powers

Issue:
● W/N petitioner MDOI has standing? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court upheld the standing of AMIN, as a member of the legislature
● The alleged injury of Congress as an institution can be invoked by a member thereof
● However, for MDOI, the Court held that it does not have standing
● A concerned party must show that:
○ It has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government
○ The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action
○ The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action
● For MDOI, their claims of negative impact and probable setbacks are too abstract to be
considered judicially cognizable
● The vague propositions that the implementation will work injustice and violate the rights of its
members cannot cure the lack of standing
● Furthermore, the petitioner raises no issues of transcendental importance to justify the
relaxation of the rule on standing
DieJess

● Issuance of such requires:

○ The public character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
○ Presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of government
○ The lack of any other party with more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised
● Petitioner MDOI has failed to establish, much less allege such grounds
DieJess

Case: Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec. Reyes

Topic: Modification of Doctrine; Sandiganbayan can't modify doctrine
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona
Facts:
● The petition before the court concerns Service Contract No. 46, which allowed the exploration,
development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of
water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu
● The Government entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX
○ This involved geological and geophysical studies in the Strait
● This was eventually converted into the assailed Service Contract
● Thereafter, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the strait

Issue:
● W/N the Service Contract is legal? - NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the Service Contract is null and void for not complying with the requisites for
a valid service contract, namely:
○ President as a signatory
○ Notice to Congress
○ General law
● The Court settled the issue on whether service contracts are still allowed under the Constitution
○ The Court held in the case of La Bugal that the deletion of the words “service contracts”
did not amount to a ban on them per se
● The Court held that the phrase “agreements involving either technical or financial assistance”
referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts
○ The new ones under the Constitution are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand and the government as principal or “owner” of the works
● After looking into the deliberations of the ConCOm, the Court further stated that paragraph 4,
with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article 12
● The next question raised is the validity of PD No. 87
○ The petitioners claim that because the PD was enacted before the operation of the
present Constitution, it remains valid until otherwise repealed
● The Court could not simply assume that while the PD had not been expressly repealed, it had
been impliedly repealed
○ The two laws must be absolutely incompatible
○ The rule is that every statue must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other
laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence
DieJess

● Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, the latter should be
preferred
○ The basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law
determines its construction for that reason, a statue must be read according to its spirit
and intent
DieJess

Case: People v. Vera

Topic: exception to the rule on earliest opportunity
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Laurel

Facts:
● The petition before the Court seeks the issuance of the writs of prohibition and certiorari to the
CFI of Manila so that the SC can review the actuations of the CFI in the case People v Cu
Unjuieng
● The private respondent applied for probation to the respondent judge, claiming that he was
innocent of the crime and that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good
conduct in the future
● This was intitially denied by Judge Tuason, upon recommendation from the IPO
● Later, the CFI of Manila, presided by the respondent judge, set the petition for hearing
● The prosecutors then assailed this alleging that:
○ Act No. 4221 is violative of the equal protection clause for not being uniformly applied in
the country and because Section 11 of the act gives the provincial boards the power to
make the law effective or not in their provinces
○ It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
● Despite the opposition, the respondent judge ruled in favor of the private respondent but
denied the petition for probation
○ He ruled that the private respondent was not guilty of the crimes charged

issue:
● W/N the validity of the act can be attacked for the first time in this case considering that it has
already been elevated to the SC on certiorari? -- YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● Generally, the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition
where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court
● Even if the issue on constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court, it does not
follow that the issue may not be raised in an original action for certiorari and prohibition
● The general rule is that the question on constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity.
● However, this admits to exceptions
● Courts may exercise sound discretion on the determination of the time when a question
affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented
○ In criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal
○ In civil cases, if the deteremination of the question on constitutionality is necessary to
a decision of the case
DieJess

○ Can be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction
of the court below
● In Yu Cong Eng, the Court was faced witht he question of constitutionality of a criminal statute
because it affected numerous persons and extensive property rights and was likely to cause a
multiplicity of actions
○ In this case, the Court exercised sound discretion to bring the issue before it and decide
in the interest of the orderly administration of justice
● Furthermore, the presence of the Republic as a party to the case shows that there is a proper
party to question the constitutionality
● The rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement
● Since the act violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, has a substantial interest in
having it declared unconstitutional
DieJess

Case: Narra Nickel Mining v. Redmont

Topic: capable of repetition;need to formulate principles
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The case before the Court questions the application of the petitioners for rights to undertake
mining and exploration activities in DENR
● Respondent in this case is a domestic corporation that took interest in mining and exploring
certain areas in Palawan
● Respondent then inquired with the DENR, and discovered that the subject area that they
wanted to cover was already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement applications of
Narra, et.al
● Redmont then filed a petition before the POA of the DENR to deny the applications of the
petitioners for the MPSA
○ Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of the petitioners are owned and
controlled by a 100% Canadian corporation, MBMI
○ It was also alleged that the petitioners are disqualified from mining activities through
MPSAs, because these are reserved only for FIlipino citizens
● The POA ruled in favor of Redmont and disqualified petitioners from obtaining the MPSAs
● This was appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board, and the decision of POA was reversed
● Redmont then filed with the RTC praying for a TRO, which was granted
● The RTC decision was appealed to the CA, it it was partially granted
○ The CA used the grandfather rule in discovering that MBMI owned majority of the
common stocks of the petitioners as well as at least 60% equity of interest
● The case is now before the Court to resolve whether the petitioners can be eligible to MPSAs

Issue:
● W/N the case has been moot and academic due to supervening events? — NO
● W/N the petitioners are Filipino-owned — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The moot and academic doctrine states that a case which has ceased to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events would have no practical value or use to resolve
● However, there are exceptions to this:
○ There is a grave abuse of the Constitution
○ The exceptional character of the situation and paramount interest involved
○ When constitutional issues raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public
○ The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
● The above mentioned exceptions are present in this case
DieJess

○ On the first, there is a grave violation of Sec. 2 Art. 12 of the Constitution because the
petitioners is a foreign company committing a violation through a myriad of corporate
layering under alleged Filipino corporations
○ The intricate corporate layering being utilized by the petitioners os of exceptional
character and involves paramount public interest — exploitation of natural resources
○ The actions of petitioners during the lifetime and existence of the case raise questions as
what principle is to be applied to cases with similar issues
○ Given that there is no definite ruling on such principles has been pronounced by the
Court, the decision in this case will serve as a guide to the bench, bar, and public
○ Finally, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review since the foreign company
can keep utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate
layering and conversion of applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition
● On the issue of nationality, the Court held that the petitioners are foreign
● There are 2 tests in determining the nationality of corporations:
○ Control Test
○ Grandfather Rule
DieJess

Case: Torrecampo v. Metropolitan

Topic: executive policy; political question
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Carpio

Facts:
● The case before the Court sought to enjoin the respondents from implementing the C-4
Extension project that will connect SLEX to NLEX
● Petitioner is the Barangay Captain of Barangay Matandang Balara and filed the suit in his
capacity as taxpayer and on behalf of his constituents and the 8 million Metro Manila
residents
● Petitioner claims that the project will prejudice the MWSS water supply to the 8 million residents
of Metro Manila
○ 3 aqueducts will be put at risk
○ Petitioner then suggested other better alternatives for the project
● The MWSS’ participation in the C-5 Project is by virtue of its charter, which gives it jurisdiction
over the supervision and control of all waterworks and sewerage systems within the
development path of the Metro Manila Area
● Several parcels of land in the RIPADA area were declared and reserved for the purpose of the
project by virtue of PP 1395
○ At the time the proclamation was issued, MWSS did not have any participation in the C5
project
● Later, the MMDA Chairman proposed to the MWSS that certain properties of MWSS would be
utilized for the construction of MRBs for the displaced families due to the C5 project
● Later, the MWSS issued a Resolution allowing DPWH to use 60 meters of its property for Right of
Way for preliminary studies in the implementation of the C5 project

Issue:
● W/N the issue is a justiciable matter? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petition is not subject to judicial review because it involves a question of
Executive Policy
● A question of Executive Policy is one which looks into the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
● The determination of whether a certain area is a better alternative than the actual site is not
within the ambit of the Judiciary
○ It involves the wisdom of the project
● Furthermore, the DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to determine the safety of the road
construction
○ Without such, there can be no decision from the MWSS
○ Hence, no GADALEJ can be alleged against the respondents
DieJess

Case: De Agbayani v. PNB

Topic: operative fact
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Fernando

Facts:
● The petition before the Court assails the decision of the lower courts enjoining the respondent
from executing the foreclosure proceedings against the petitioner
● Petitioner obtained a loan from the respondent and mortgaged his real property to cover the
costs
● Later, the defendant instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the
balance of the loan remaining unpaid
● In response, petitioner filed suits against the respondent claiming that the mortgage had long
prescribed, 15 years having elapsed from the date of maturity
○ Petitioner then obtained a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent Sheriff
which was made permanent by the decision
● The respondent bank claimed that the prescription defense is not tenable due to EO 32,
notwithstanding its declaration of invalidity

Issue:
● W/N the respondent can seek redress from EO 32? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the operative fact doctrine applies insofar as the effects of EO 32 when it
was valid
● Although the EO was declared invalid for being repugnant to the Constitution, its effects during
its validity must remain valid
● The actual existence of a statute, prior to the determination of unconstitutionality, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored
● Such an approach is more applicable when police power intended to promote public welfare but
adversely affects property rights is involved
● Ignoring such operative fact would cause injustice
● In this case, RA 342, as continued by EO 32, was struck down for being unreasonable and
oppressive
○ However, during its effectively, it had factual justifications
● These justifications, however, are not present anymore; hence, the unconstitutionality
● In all, the prescription during the moratorium period, when EO 32 was in effect, is considered
valid
DieJess

Case: Phil Coconut v. Republic

Topic: retroactive application to avoid injustice
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● When martial law was declared, several PD’s were issued to improve the coconut industry
through the collection and use of the coco levy fund
○ The PH Coconut Administration (PCA) was charged with the collection and
administration of the fund
○ PD 755 authorized the PCA to utilize the collections to acquire a commercial bank and to
deposit the levy collections in said bank
● the coco levy fund was used to acquire the First United Bank (Now UCPB) and its shares of stock
○ The bank was controlled by the Cojuangco group
○ Original plan was for PCA to buy all of Cojuangco’s shares in the FUB
● Instead, it made it appear like Cojuangco has the exclusive option to acquire the controlling
interests of PCA
● When the EDSA revolution took place, Aquino ordered the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses
○ This included the purchase of the shares of stock with UPCB
● CIDF - Coconut Industry Development Fund
● CCS Levy - Coconut Consumers Stabilization Levy
● The question is the ownership of petitioners of UCPB and SMC because they claim that the
COCO Levy Funds are private funds and are owned by the coconut farmers in their private
capacities
● Furthermore, they claim that they are allowed to make transfers and acquisitions because, again,
the funds are not public in nature
Issue:
● W/N PD 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional? - YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the aforementioned decrees are unconstitutional
● The reason for this is because the coco levy funds are in the nature of special public funds
○ Therefore, they are to serve public purposes only and cannot be transferred and used to
acquire like private funds
● Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose.
○ They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private
persons.
○ When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue
benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that
law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose.
DieJess

● Coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and
582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
○ Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of
the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private
individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the
rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
● It is fairly established that the coconut levy funds are special public funds.
○ Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should
likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions
attached by law to such property.
● Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation,
enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which it
was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer
forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government.
● If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance,
if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
DieJess

Case: Kalipunan v. Robredo

Topic: implementation of infrastructure project not subject to judicial review
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The petition before the Court seeks the declaration that Section 28 (a)(b) of RA 7279 or the
Urban Development housing Act as unconstitutional
● Petitioners were occupying parcels of land opened and located in the San Juan, Navotas and
Queson.’
● These LGUs sent notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to the assailed provisions in order
to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas
illegally occupied by the petitioners
● The RA authorizes evictions and demolitions w/o any court order when:
○ Persons are occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, etc.
○ Persons occupying government infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented
● The petitioners assert that the eviction and demolition cannot prosper without a court order
○ Hence, eviction without such court order would violate their constitutional right to due
process
● All the respondents point to the procedural and lack of jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the
petition

Issue:
● W/N the petition may prosper? -- NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petition must be dismissed for procedural and jurisdictional defects
● First, the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts by directly filing the petition with the
Supreme Court
○ The petitioners cannot insist on paramount importance to escape such a procedural
lapse for the trial court would have been a better venue for such petition
○ The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, the RTC is
● Second, the petition for mandamus and prohibition are the wrong remedies for the
petitioners.
○ Prohibition is only used against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person’s
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
○ Mandamus is directed against those who unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station or who
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled
■ Used only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty
DieJess

● In the case, a reading of the subject provision of RA 7279 shows that the acts complained of are
beyond the scope of a petition for prohibition and mandamus
○ The use of the permissive word “may” implies that the public respondents have
discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed
● Lastly, the constitutionality of the assailed provision IS NOT THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE
○ The exercise of the Court’s judicial review powers requires the following requisites:
■ Actual case or controversy
■ Existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising
the constitutional question -- locus standi
■ Recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity
■ Resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of
the case -- Lis mota
○ In this case, the petition incidentally passes on the issue on the constitutionality of the
provision
● Lis mota means that it is the cause of the suit or action
○ It is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is thus, merely an offshoot of
the presumption of validity accorded to the political branches
○ This requirement requires for the petitioners to show that the unconstitutionality of the
law is needed for the disposition of the case
■ There must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one
that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative
● The petitions fail to show that there is a compelling need to examine the constitutionality of the
assailed provisions
○ The Court has, in Magkalas v. NHA, ruled that a similar provision is valid.
● In all, the implementation of an infrastructure project is not subject to judicial review
DieJess

Case: Sameer v. Cabiles

Topic: re-enactment of void law declared unconstitutional can’t be done
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona
DieJess

Case: Film Dev. Council v. Colon Heritage

Topic: acted in good faith — operative fact
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The petition before the Court questions the constitutionality of RA 9167 for being violative of
the local fiscal autonomy rule
● The LGU of Cebu passed an ordinance which required proprietors, lessees or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and other places of amusement to pay an amusement
tax equivalent to 30% of the gross receipts of admission fees to the treasurer of the LGU in Cebu
● A decade later, RA 9167 was enacted, creating the Film Development Council of the Philippines
○ Sections 13 and 14 provide that the producers of grade A and B films shall be entitled to
incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films
○ The RA also states that the revenue from the taxes shall accrue to the cities and
municipalities in Metro manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities
● Petitioners state that when the RA took effect, all the cities and municipalities have complied
with the mandate of the law, except for Cebu
● In response, the Cebu LGU filed a petition before the RTC praying that the law be declared
unconstitutional
○ The RTC ruled in favor of the Colon Heritage, et.al
● Hence this petition

Issue:
● W/N Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 are unconstitutional? -- YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the RA violated the fiscal autonomy of the Cebu LGU
● The revenue from the taxes levied by LGUs will not accrue to them, despite the fiscal autonomy
of said LGUs, not even partially
○ Fiscal autonomy requires that the LGUs have the taxing authority for their respective
jurisdictions
● In all, the Congress went beyond their plenary powers by going beyond the guarantee of local
autonomy inscribed in the Constitution
● However, despite the provisions of the law being ruled unconstitutional, the amounts paid to
Colon Heritage need not be returned
○ The money has already been given to the respective film producers pursuant to the
provisions of the law
● Despite the well settled rule that a law which has been declared unconstitutional is no law at all,
confers no rights, imposes no duties, affords no protection, creates no office, an exception exists
○ The exception to this well settled rule is the doctrine of operative fact -- it applies as a
matter of equity and fair play
DieJess

● The doctrine of operative fact nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to the determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be ignored
● It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law
● In this case, to order the petitioner and the producers of grade films to return the amounts
received to the respective taxing authorities would impose a heavy, and possibly crippling,
financial burden upon them who merely and presumably in good faith, complied with the
legislative mandate of the law
● The above mentioned proves that the doctrine of operative fact applies in this case
○ FDCP and the producers shall not be penalized for having complied with the legislative
command of the law in good faith
● The remaining unremitted amounts shall, however, be returned to the taxing authorities
DieJess

Case: People v. Mateo

Topic: Automatic review
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The case before the Court is on automatic review
● The appellant was convicted of the crime of rape by the RTC of Tarlac
● The victim of the rape was the common law husband of the her mother, Rosemarie Capulong
○ The victim claimed that the she was raped 10 times by the appellant
● The mother and the appellant both denied the charges filed against the latter, but in the end,
the trial court found the appellant guilty of all the counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer
the penalry of reclusion perpetua

Issue:
● W/N the appellant must be acquitted? -- NOT NECESSARILY, REMANDED TO THE CA

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
● This practice is rooted from Sec. 5(2)(d), Article 8 of the Constitution
● However, the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character and it does not prevent the
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in
favor of the accused
● In the deliberations of the Court, there was a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point
of guilt or innocence of the appellant
● So, while the fundamental law requires mandatory review by the SC of cases where the penalty
imposed is the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, nowhere has it
prescribed an intermediate review
● Where liberty or life is at stake, the Court deems it wise and compelling to provide theses cases a
review by the CA before the case is elevated to the SC
○ All avenues must be accorded to the accused due to the sensitivity of the matter
○ Such determination of the CA, especially on the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error in judgement
● This decision of the Court is not without constitutional grounds, as the Court has discretion to
amend its rules by virtue of Section 5(5), Article 8 of the Constitution
○ This is merely a procedural matter, which does not intrude in legislative matters
● Therefore, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure are hereby modified as to provide an
intermediate appeal for the above mentioned cases.
DieJess

Case: People v. Gutierrez

Topic: Transfer of venue
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Reyes

Facts:
● The case before the Court seeks the annulment of the order of the respondent which denied the
motion of the petitioners to transfer the Criminal Case of the CFI to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District
● The charges in the case (People v. Pilotin) involves a number of arson with homicide and arson
charges against the accused for attacking several houses in Ilocos Sur
● The accused then voluntarily appeared before the judge and pleaded not guilty to the charges
filed against them
● On the same day, the Secretary of Justice issued AO 221, which authorized Judge Anover to hold
a special term in Ilocos Sur
○ 3 days after, the Secretary issued AO 226, authorizing Judge Gutierrez to transfer the
case to the Court of Judge Anover pursuant to RA 5179
● Pursuant to this, the prosecutors moved to have the case transferred invoking the AO and due to
the request of the witnesses fearing for their security and personal safety
● The respondent judge declined the transfer on the ground that the AO only provided for transfer
of cases where the interest of justice so required it
○ If the proposed transfer was to obtain a change of venue from the SC under Section 4 of
RA 5179, the AO would have done it
● Due to this, the prosecutors are now before the Court claiming that the respondent judge
committed GADALEJ

Issue:
● W/N the respondent committed GADALEJ in denying the motion of the prosecutors? -- NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the present laws do not confer upon the SOJ the power to determine what
court should hear specific cases
○ Such power is only conferred upon the SC due to the separation of powers doctrine
● The invoked law does not permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts
○ Neither does the AO
●
DieJess

Case: Santero v. CFI-Cavite

Topic: rules of court v. Civil code
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The petitioners Santero are the children of the late Pablo Santero with Pacursa while the
Respondents Santero are 4 of seven children of Pablo Santero with Diaz
● Both the sets of children are the natural children of Pablo since neither of their mothers was
married to Pablo
● The private respondents filed a motion for allowance that the respondent court include the
respondent Santeros as children of Pablo Santero and that an order be grated directing the
administrator, Evaristo, to deliver the sum of 6k to each of the 7 respondents as their allowance
of the estate of Pablo Santero
● The CFI granted the motion
● Hence, this pettition

Issue:
● W/N the trial court acted in grave abuse of discretion when it granted the motion of the private
respondents? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The petitioners argue that the respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have
already attained the age of majority
○ In fact, 2 are employed and one is married
○ Under Sec. 3 Rule 83 of the Rules of Court
● Furthermore, the administrator of the state does not have sufficient funds to cover the
allowances asked for
● The Court held that the lower court did not act with GADALEJ
● The controlling provision is Arts. 290 and 288 of the Civil Code and not the Rules of Court
● The invoked provision is of no moment as Art 188 provides for the allowance to be received
despite of age
● In this case, the private respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in
the inheritance from their father
● The Civil Code is a substantive law while the Rules of Court is a procedural law
○ A substantive law cannot be impaired by a procedural one
DieJess

Case: Damaso v. Laqui

Topic: Prescription of crimes v. Rules of court
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Padilla

Facts:
● The case before the Court questions the prescription of the crime of grave threats filed against
the petitioner
● The petitioner, a lawyer, was charged with the crime of grave threats for threatening to kill a
certain Sumaduhat
● The trial court, then found him guilty of light threats
○ He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of 100 pesos
● The petitioner contended that he cannot be convicted of grave threats because the charge
against him was for light threats
○ And that even if he can be convicted for light threats, the same would have already been
prescribed. — 60 day prescription
● The trial court denied the motion of the petitioner, hence this petition

Issue:
● W/N the respondent erred in still convicting the petitioner? — YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petitioner cannot be convicted of light threats
● The case of Francisco is enlightening as it stated that an accused that has committed a lesser
offense including within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser
offense if it has already prescribed
● The Philippine jurisprudence considered prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver
by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law
● The prescription of the crime partakes in the nature of a substantial law, contained in Art. 69
of the RPC, while the rules on Criminal Procedure states that the extinction of an offense is one
of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a
motion to quash
● The rules of procedure, considered as procedural laws, shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights
DieJess

Case: In Re: Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of All Court and Sheriff’s Fees of
Cooperatives
Topic: SC rule cannot be modified by law
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona
DieJess

Case: In Re: Cunanan

Topic: Admission to the Bar
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Diokno

Facts:
● The matter before the Court seeks the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953
● The act was born from the appeal of several postwar bar candidates who claimed that they
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequacy of preparation
● The act provides that the passing grade for the bar exams shall be reduced to 70% from the
usual average of 75%
● Before the passage of the law, the Court has already reduced the passing grade to 74%
● The RA then adjusted the rates as follows:
○ 1946-1951 -- 70%
○ 1952 -- 71%
○ 1953 -- 72%
○ 1954 -- 73%
○ 1955 -- 74%
● Pursuant to this, several candidates filed petitions for their admission to the bar invoking RA 972
● Note that the affected years were during the aftermath of the second world war

Issue:
● W/N RA 972 is unconstitutional? -- YES

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the law is unconstitutional
● First, the law is against public interest because it qualifies law graduates who, had admitted
themselves, that received inadequate preparation to practice the legal profession
● To allow these people, who again has admitted themselves that they are inadequately prepared,
to practice such a demanding profession, would be against the interest of the public
● Furthermore, the Congress cannot impose on the Supreme Court to admit people to the legal
profession
● This is against the constitutional provision that provides that the Supreme Court is the sole
authority when it comes to the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
lawyers
● The admission to the practice of law is the exercise of judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court
DieJess

Case: In Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty

Topic: contempt power
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Facts:
● The petition before the Court questions the Show Cause Resolutions issued to the UP Law
Faculty for alleged denial of freedom of expression and academic freedom as law professors
● The SC was issued on the grounds that the UP Law Faculty, in the manner presenting the
arguments and the language used therein, was deemed by the Court as inappropriate
considered that the signatories are lawyers
● The subject document was the statement of the Faculty on the allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation of Justice Del-Castillo in his decision in the Vinuya case
○ This was posted on the online bulletin board of the UP College of Law
○ This was also submitted to the Court by former dean Leonen
○ Signed by 37 faculty members
● Thereafter, a show cause order resolution was issued to the respondents as to why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar
● The present matter is a MR filed by 2 members of the faculty arguing that the proceeding
involved here is premised on a finding of indirect contempt

Issue:
● W/N the proceeding involved here, while ostensibly docketed as an administrative matter, is
premised on a finding of indirect contempt? — NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that a charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it
penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine or both
● The speech and conducted directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member
of the Bar, may subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional
Responsibility
○ This prescribed that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts
● In such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as:
○ Disbarment
○ Suspension
○ Reprimand
○ Admonition
● Contrary to the position of the petitioners, the same speech and/or behavior against the COurt
on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in
the discretion of the Court
● When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought
DieJess

to be prevented is the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of
justice
● Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against the members of the UP
Faculty, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of
jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a
disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt
● Had the Court opted to cite them for contempt of court, the same would have initiated
contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court
DieJess

Case: PNB v. Asuncion

Topic: substantial v procedural rights
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona
DieJess

Case: People v. Lacson

Topic: time bar rule
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona
DieJess

Case: Ampong v. CSC

Topic: exclusive supervision
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona
DieJess

Section 6 — Administrative Supervision of

Lower Courts
Case: Marquez v. Vasquez
Topic: exclusive supervision
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:
● The case before the Court questions the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain a criminal
complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the Supreme Court
● Petitioner in this case is a judge in the RTC of Antique and was the subject of a complaint filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged falsification of his Certificate of Service
● The alleged falsification was with regard to a claim that the all civil and criminal cases have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days when in act, no decision was
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision
● Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an
extension of 90 days to decide the remaining cases

Issue:
● W/N the Ombudsman can take cognizance of a case filed against a member of the Judiciary? —
NO

Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the investigation by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers
● Section 6, article 8 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel
○ From presiding Justices of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk
● By virtue of this provision, only the Supreme Court can oversee the judge’s and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, and take proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof
○ No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers
● The Ombudsman contention that it was granted investigative powers by the Constitution falls
against the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme
Court over all courts and their personnel
○ Allowing such would undermine the independence of the judiciary