Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Facts:
● Estrada was charged with the murder of Rogelio Mararac. On DATE, in the St John’s Cathedral in
Dagupan, a ceremony was being conducted.
● After the said ceremony, Estrada came up from the crowd and approached the altar. He later sat
on the Bishop’s Chair
● Crisanto Santillan then asked Estrada to vacate the seat but instead of complying, he gripped the
armrest and replied “No matter what will happen, I will not move out” - so Santillan moved away
● Some churchgoers summoned the victim, Mararac. He then asked Estrada to leave the chair but
the latter only stared at him intensely. Mararac then proceeded to tap Estrada hand using his
nightstick but still to no avail, he did this twice. As he was about to do it for the third time,
Estrada pulled out a knife and lunged at Mararac, stabbing him in his left throat. He tried to stab
Mararac again but Mararac was able to deflect
● Estrada then looked up and around him and saw that people were looking. He then got up and
approached the microphone and said: “No one can beat me here” and then proceeded to sit on
the Chair again
● A police officer who was conducting the traffic outside was called on by the churchgoers. He
along with Chief Inspector Rosario, who was in the Church ceremony, came and subdued
Estrada. They then proceeded to take in to the police station and put him in jail
● During the arraignment trial, Estrada’s defense filed for a Motion to Suspend the proceedings
and to commit Estrada to the Psychiatric Ward of Baguio General Hospital
○ It was alleged that he could not properly or intelligently enter a plea due to a mental
defect and before he committed the crime, he was confined in the said Psychiatric ward.
● The Trial Court asked Estrada some questions and after he had answered, they declared him fit
to stand trial
○ They said that he answered the questions intelligently
Docket Number:
Ponente:
Case: Magno v. CA
Topic: Utilitarian Theory
Docket Number:
Ponente:
Facts:
● On May 29, 2013, President Noynoy Aquino signed into law RA 10592
○ Amending Articles 29,94,97,98 and 99 of Act No. 3815 of the RPC
● Pursuant to the amendatory law, DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Secretary Rocas jointly issued
an IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations)
● Petitioners are assailing the validity of Sec 4, Rule 1 of the RA that it directs the prospective
application of the GCTA, TASTM and STAL for being violative of Article 22 of the RPC.
○ Art 22 - Retroactive effect of penal laws insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony.
● Petitioners are contending that the provisions of the RA are penal in nature and beneficial to
them and pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC, it must be retroactively applied
○ They are puzzled on why it would be complex for the BUCOR and the BJMP to
retroactively apply the statue when the prisoners’ records are complete and the
distinction between the provisions of the RPC and the RA are easily identifiable
● They further contend that the MSEC should not override their constitutionally guaranteed rights
to liberty and due process and the principle in Art. 22.
● Later on, other petitioners assailed the IRR for the following grounds:
○ Against the equal protection of the law clause of the Constitution and the right to due
process.
○ Contrary to the RA
■ The RA does not state that the provisions shall be prospective in application
○ Contrary to Art. 22 of the RPC
Issue:
● W/N Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR shall be null and void for being contrary to the provisions of the
RA and the RPC AND for being unconstitutional? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● It is well settled that every new law has a prospective effect. There are, however, some
exceptions to this rule and one of which can be found in Art. 22 of the RPC.
○ Retroactive effect of penal laws
● The principle of faborabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restigenda means that penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect
DieJess
● PENAL LAW
○ Penal provisions define crime or provide a punishment for one.
○ PL and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation.
○ Statutes are penal when it imposes a punishment for an offense committed against the
state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon
○ All statues which command or prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violation and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a
penalty upon their commission.
● Petitioners are asserting that Art. 22 of the RPC should apply to the RA because the said RA is a
penal law.
○ Edgao et.al further argue that onerous and prejudicial penalties shall not be applied
retroactively. (Art 22 expressly says that it must be favorable for the accused)
○ Ex post facto law
● The Court agrees with the petitioners in this sense. Although the RA does not define nor penalize
a crime, its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment applied to
the crime.
● The reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is beneficial to detention and
convicted prisoners, thus Art 22 applies
● The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of the RA works against the benefit of
the petitioners and others who are in the same situation. It bars them from their just
entitlement to the reduction of their penalties of imprisonment.
● The RA only provides the Secretaries authorization to promulgate rules and regulations on the
classification system for good conduct time allowances.
○ With the IRR, they went beyond the bounds of their legal mandate.
● The IRR must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law cannot be expanded by such IRRs
because Administrative Agencies CANNOT amend Congressional acts.
● The contention that a Classification Board handling the functions of the MSEC and implementing
the provisions of the RPC on time allowances, even before the issuance of the assailed IRR and
the enactment of the RA
HELD:
● Section 4, Rule 1 is DECLARED invalid
DieJess
Facts:
● This case involves an issue on jurisdiction
● A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union by Eulalia
Banayat
○ The complaint was for the crime of direct assault upon a person in authority against
Rilloraza
● The petitioner moved to quash on grounds of lack of jurisdiction but this was denied.
● The court exercised original jurisdiction and the hearings commenced
● On June 3, 1964, the petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of La Union on certiorari and
prohibition
● In October of the same year, the CFI came out with an order declaring the proceedings
conducted by the respondent judge (Arciaga) null and void and directing him to desist from
continuing the hearing of the case and transmit the record to the Municipal Court of Naguillan,
La Union.
Issue:
● W/N RA 3828 can be applied retroactively? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The original “Judiciary Act” is RA 296, it was then amended by RA 2613 and then amended again
by RA 3828
● The initial case was filed in January 18, 1963 and the RA 3828 took effect in June 22 of the same
year
○ The charge is direct assault upon a person in authority, encompassed in Article 148 of
the Revised Penal Code. The penalty provided therein is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos.
● A rule long respected is that jurisdiction of a court of justice to try a criminal case is determined
by the law in force at the time the action is instituted.
○ The statute in force when the action was instituted gave the jurisdiction to the Court in
San Fernando, La Union
● Furthermore, the RA cannot be applied retroactively because it is not a penal statute.
○ The amendments merely delineate the jurisdiction of courts. It does not define not
provide penalties for acts or omissions punishable by law.
DieJess
HELD:
● Proceedings in the court must continue and the petition for certiorari and prohibition are
dismissed.
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal question w/o due process ( Art. III, Sec 14)
DieJess
Section1, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that in criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled:
● To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt
● To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
● To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
arraignment to promulgation of the judgement
● To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by
direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him
● To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself
● To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial
● To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of
other evidence in his behalf
● To have a speedy, impartial and public trial
● To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law
Rights of the accused which may be waived rights which may not be waived
● Waivable rights:
○ Right to confront and cross-examine
● Non-waivable right:
○ To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
Waivable rights are personal while non waivable rights involve public interest.
DieJess
Reading: Reyes p. 1
Topic: Sources of Criminal Law
1. The Revised Penal Code (Act. No. 3815) and its amendments
2. Special Penal Laws passed by the Legislature
3. Penal Presidential Decrees issued during the Martial Law
DieJess
Case: US v. Taylor
Topic:
Docket Number:
Ponente: J. Johnson
Facts:
● The case involves a libel charge against Carson Taylor
○ Taylor, the editor and proprietor, manager, printer and publisher of the Manila Daily
Bulletin, composed, printed, edited, published and circulated certain false and malicious
defamation and libel concerning one Ramon Sotelo - a member of the Bar of the
Philippines
● He was claiming that Sotelo caused a fire in a building to collect insurance
● Taylor was then arrested, tried and found guilty of the crime charged
● He then appealed on the grounds that the court erred:
○ In finding him responsible and guilty
○ In finding that he was the proprietor and publisher of the Newspaper
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in finding Taylor responsible as the proprietor and publisher of the
Newspaper and therefore guilty?
Ruling/Ratio:
● Common crimes are non existent in the Philippines, compared to the US and UK
○ Crimes in the Philippines must be made by law
● Libel is made a crime by Act No. 277
○ This statute does not only describe the crime but it also prescribes the conditions
necessary to constitute it and names the persons who may be guilty of the crime.
● The liability of “authors, proprietors, editors and others” is well expressed in Act No. 277
● Taylor is assailing that he is merely the “manager” of the publication, so he must not be held
liable as his position is not under the enumeration of liable officers
○ Although he might just be the “manager”, if there was proof of his relation to the
publication/newspaper that would prove that he is indeed the “proprietor, author or
editor”, then we will still be held liable
○ The prosecution attorney, however, failed to prove such connection or relation
● There being no proof in the record showing that the defendant is indeed among the liable
officers or any relation to such duties, the Court ruled to reverse the trial court’s decision.
DieJess
ARTICLE 31
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He
shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
a. A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the
mission;
b. An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
c. An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases
coming under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this article, and provided that the
measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his
residence.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt
him from the jurisdiction of the sending State.
ARTICLE 37
1. The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are
not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29
to 36.
2. Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission, together with members of
their families forming part of their respective households, shall, if they are not nationals of or
permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in
articles 29 to 35, except that the immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving State specified in paragraph 1 of article 31 shall not extend to acts performed outside
DieJess
the course of their duties. They shall also enjoy the privileges specified in article 36, paragraph
1, in respect of articles imported at the time of first installation.
3. Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of or permanently resident in
the receiving State shall enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed in the course of their
duties, exemption from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their
employment and the exemption contained in article 33.
4. Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently
resident in the receiving State, be exempt from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive
by reason of their employment. In other respects, they may enjoy privileges and immunities only
to the extent admitted by the receiving State. However, the receiving State must exercise its
jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the
performance of the functions of the mission.
DieJess
Section 4.
Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines,
or by any judge or justice, whf any foreign State, authorized and received as such by the Presidereby the
person of any ambassador or public minister oent, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such
ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or
attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted,
whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it, shall upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos
in the discretion of the court.
Section 5.
The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to any case where the person against whom the
process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines, in the service of an
ambassador or a public minister, and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered
upon such service; nor shall the said section apply to any case where the person against whom the
process is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a public minister, unless the name of the
servant has, before the issuing thereof, been registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and
transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who shall upon
receipt thereof post the same in some public place in his office. All persons shall have resort to the list of
names so posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take copies without fee.
DieJess
Facts:
● Petitioner was charged with two counts of grave oral defamation before the Mandaluyong MeTC
○ Complainant is Joyce Cabral, petitioner’s co-worker
● Petitioner was working as an economist with the ADB
● He was then arrested and then posted bail. He was then released to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB.
● The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that the
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the headquarters of the ADB
● Given this notice of immunity, the MeTC judge dismissed the two criminal cases
● The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied so they appealed to the
RTC. The RTC set aside the MeTC rulings. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner is covered by immunity in this case? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● Under the invoked section of the ADB Agreement with the Government. Immunity is given to
acts performed in their official capacity
● It is therefore implied that said immunity is not absolute but subject to the exception that the
act was done in “official capacity”
○ In view of this, it is necessary to determine if the case falls within the ambit of the said
Section
○ Dismissal of the case w/o allowing the prosecution to rebut the DFA’s contention is
denying the former of due process
● Slander could not possible be covered by the immunity agreement because existing laws do not
allow the commission of such crime in the name of official duty
● Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, enjoys immunity from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions
○ The commission of the crime is not part of the official duty of Liang
Held:
DieJess
Petition is DENIED
DieJess
Article 41
Personal inviolability of consular officers
1. Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a
grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority.
2. Except in the case specified in paragraph 1 of this article, consular officers shall not be
committed to prison or be liable to any other form of restriction on their personal freedom save in
execution of a judicial decision of final effect.
3. If criminal proceedings are instituted against a consular officer, he must appear before the
competent authorities. Nevertheless, the proceedings shall be conducted with the respect due to him by
reason of his official position and, except in the case specified in paragraph 1 of this article, in a manner
which will hamper the exercise of consular functions as little as possible. When, in the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, it has become necessary to detain a consular officer, the
proceedings against him shall be instituted with the minimum of delay.
DieJess
Facts:
● Petitioners are assailing the decision of the CA and prays for its decision to be set aside. This
petition commenced under the Amparo Rule
● The petitioners are claiming that they were being harassed and threatened by law enforcement
officials. Lourdes Rubrico was kidnapped and then subsequently interrogated relentlessly.
● After she was released, harassment began as various men were tailing them.
Issue:
W/N the CA committed reversible error in
dropping President GMA as a party respondent?
Ruling/Ratio:
● The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit
not expressly reversed in the present constitution
● The Court already made it clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo that the President enjoys immunity
during her incumbency
● Even though it was removed in the 1987 Constitution, Fr. Bernas explained that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his/her tenure
● Allowing the President to be allowed to be sued in any civil or criminal case would degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President.
● Being free from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction enables the President to fully
attend to the performance of his/her official duties and functions.
● Compared to the other Branches of Government, only one person constitutes the Executive
Branch.
DieJess
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
DieJess
Article 27
Irrelevance of official capacity
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament,
an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person.
Crime:
Genocide
Crimes Against Humanity
War Crimes
Wars of Aggression
DieJess
Facts:
● The petitioner is assailing the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the Pasay RTC
convicting him for violating Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866
● Evangelista was arrested in NAIA for illegal possession of 2 firearms and ammunition:
○ 9mm pistol
○ 9mm Uzi SMG
○ ammunition
● He then posted bail and filed an Urgent Motion for a Suspension of Proceedings and the Holding
of A Preliminary Investigation. These were granted by the RTC and the preliminary investigation
ensued
● In a Resolution dated March 9, 1996, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to indict the
petitioner and recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable cause and the
dismissal of the complaint. A Motion to Withdraw Information was then filed but it was denied
by the trial court
● Evangelista’s Version
○ He was in Dubai, waiting for his flight to Manila, when Arab policemen suddenly
accosted him and brought him to their headquarters where he saw guns on top of the
table.
○ He was then maltreated and made to admit ownership of the guns
○ PAL Station Manager Umayaw then came and talked to the Arab policemen
○ Umayaw then told Evangelista that he will only be released if he admits ownership of the
guns. He denied ownership. This was reiterated but Evangelista declined to admit
ownership again.
○ Upon the request of Umayaw, Evangelista was then brought to the Duty Free area of his
flight.
○ When he was aboard the plane, he saw the Arab policemen handing the guns to the
pilot.
○ Upon his arrival to the Philippines, he was arrested by the Customs police.
Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in not holding that Evangelista was never in possession of any firearm or
ammunition within Philippine jurisdiction and he therefore could not have committed the crime
charged against him? - NO
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● Evangelista contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the case against him because the
alleged possession transpired while he was at the Dubai Airport and his possession thereof has
ceased when he left for the Philippines.
● He insists that since Dubai is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and his
situation is not one of the exceptions provided in Article 2 of the RPC, our criminal laws are
applicable
● He insists that he had not committed a crime within the Philippines
● It is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. The courts would only acquire
jurisdiction when the offense has been committed or any one of its essential ingredients have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
● In the case, however, the accomplishment of the Customs Declaration Form by Evangelista upon
his arrival at NAIA is a very clear piece of evidence that he was already in possession of the
subject firearms in the Philippines
● Since it was been proven that Evangelista was already in the Philippines when he was found in
possession of the unlicensed firearms, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
perpetrated and completed in no other place except the Philippines
● The jurisdiction of the court over the criminal case is determined by the allegation in the
complaint or information
● The information on the case specifically and categorically alleges that he was in possession,
custody and control of the unlicensed firearms at NAIA, certainly a territory within the
jurisdiction of the trial court
● Furthermore, he failed to establish sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge
happened in Dubai
● There is also no record of any criminal case having been filed against him in Dubai. W/o such, it
stands to reason that there was no crime committed in Dubai.
DieJess
Facts:
● The defendant, Wong Cheng, was accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two
and a half miles from the shores of the city.
● The defendant filed a demurrer alleging that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case.
Issue:
● W/N the court has jurisdiction over the crime? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The trial court has jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard the vessel.
● There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
○ Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the
courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction there were committed, unless
their commission affects the peace and security of the territory (French Rule)
○ Crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within whose territory they are committed (English Rule)
● Between the two rules, the English one is the rule applied in this jurisdiction. This is because
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the US on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the US
● The mere possession of opium is not considered a disturbance of the public order
● But to smoke opium within the territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order established. Because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory
DieJess
Case: US v. Bull
Topic: Territoriality
Docket Number:
Ponente:
Facts:
● Defendant Mr. H.N. Bull was a master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard
● The vessel was engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos and other animals from a
foerign port
○ Port of Ampieng, Formosa (Present day Taiwan) to Manila
● The charge against Mr. Bull is that he was carrying and transporting the said animals, without
providing suitable means for securing them as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering
● The animals aboard the ship were not properly secured. They were not put into stalls. A result of
this negligence was the torn noses of the said animals and some of the animals were killed due
to the failure to secure them properly
● The provisions used against Mr. Bull were those of Acts No. 55 and 275 of the Philippine
Commission
○ These provisions prescribe the necessary protocols and safety guidelines when
transporting animals from ports to and within the Philippines
● The defendant in the case is questioning the jurisdiction of the court because the ship was of
foreign nationality (Norweigan)
Issue:
● W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction?
Ruling/Ratio:
● Yes, the court has jurisdiction over the ship regardless of its nationality.
● This is because the offense committed was within the territorial waters of the Philippines,
wherein the country has jurisdiction over.
● It is true that no Philippine court has jurisdiction on the high seas or the territorial waters of any
other country, but since the Standard was within 3 miles from the entrance to Manila Bay, then it
was within the territorial waters of the Philippines
● The completed illegal act was done within the American waters and therefore, the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter
DieJess
● The nationality of the ship is immaterial because the ship was under the sovereign territorial
jurisdiction of the country
● The Philippines, while under the US, subscribes to the English rule that merchant vessels that
enter into a foreign port are subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities
○ Exception: The local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty
arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction
Held:
Court had jurisdiction and defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine
DieJess
Facts:
● Isidoro Baldimo was charged along with 4 other with the crime of murder committed by a band
before the First branch of the former CFI of Borongan Eastern Samar
● The information against the accused is as follows:
○ The accused were alleged to have murdered one Perpetua Adalim on January 1, 1982
○ The accused then shot and stabbed Adalim and then left the scene of the crime, leaving
Adalim deceased
● Out of the 5 accused, only Baldimo was apprehended and brought to trial
● He initially pleaded not guilty in the arraignment but after the prosecution has rested, he
withdrew his earlier plea and substituted the same with one of guilty
● The court then propounded a series of questions to test Baldimo’s voluntariness and
comprehension of the consequences in making his new plea of guilty. The court were satisfied
with his answers so the trial court convicted him of the crime of murder defined and punished
under Article 248 of the RPC
● He believes that his plea of guilty would amount to mitigating circumstances that could modify
his sentence to reclusion perpetua instead of death. In People v. Coronel, the court modified that
penalty from death to life imprisonment.
○ However, the decision in that case cannot be applied to Baldimo’s case because the plea
of guilty in this case cannot be considered mitigating because it was not of the similar
nature and analogous to the plea contemplated in Article 13 (7)
■ A plea of guilty is considered mitigating on the rationale that an accused
spontaneously and willingly admits his guilt at the first opportunity as an act of
repentance
● Despite such plea, the trial court still sentenced him to the penalty of death
Issue:
● W/N the provisions in the 1987 Constitution, prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, can be
applied to this case retroactively? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the conviction of the accused
on October 12, 1986, the sunstantive law in force with dealing with the crime of murder was
Article 248 of the RPC which took effect on January 1, 1932.
○ This provided that the penalty for murder must be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death.
DieJess
● On February 2, 1987, however, the new Constitution came into force. The 1987 Constitution
proscribes in Section 19 of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be imposed with the death
penalty unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress provides for it. It
also stated that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua
● On December 31, 1993, the law passed by Congress imposing the death penalty on certain
heinous crimes took effect. RA 7659. This RA amended the aforementioned Article 248 of the
RPC and provided a new penalty for murder: Reclusion perpetue to death
○ Due to its nature as a penal law, it may not be applied to the case due to the fact that
the crime against Baldimo was committed in 1982.
○ Penal laws may only be applied retroactively if it favors the accused
● Since the penalty enforced during the commission of the crime was modified by Section 19 of
the Bill of Rights and because RA 7659 cannot be given retroactive effect, Baldimo shall not be
imposed with the death penalty
● The crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and he was convicted
after the effectivity of the said Constitution and it was before the imposition of death pursuant
to RA 7659.
Ruling/Ratio:
● The amendments introduced by RA 8249 to PD No. 1866 with regard to the illegal possession of
firearms:
○ If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicencesed firearm, such use as an
unlicencsed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance
● However, the said amendatory RA took effect on July 6, 1997 and the crimes involved in the case
at bar were committed on September 17, 1995
DieJess
○ In view of this and with regard to Article 22 of the RPC, the provisions of RA 8249 is
generally prospective in nature, unless it's retroactivity favors the accused
● In the case at bar, the retroactive application of the RA would spare Valdez from a separate
conviction and is therefore favorable to him
● However, in the case that the consideration that the violation of PD No. 1866 as an aggravating
circumstance will raise his penalty to the penalty of death, it is clearly unfavorable for him
HELD:
Case involving PD No. 1866 DISMISSED
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the penalty for Lapitaje and Reyes should be modified due to the absence of any
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime charged - NO
● W/N the use of firearms during the robbery should be considered as an aggravating
circumstance? - NO
Ruling/Ratio
● A previous case decided by the SC held that aggravating or qualifying circumstance must be
expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise it cannot be
considered by the trial court, even if proved during the trial
● The above ruling took effect on December 1, 2000
DieJess
● The commission of the crimes charged happened before this ruling took effect but by virtue of
Article 22 of the RPC that gives retroactive effect to penal laws that are beneficial to the the
accused, it must be applied to the present case
● The 2 should have only been found guilty of the simple crime of Robbery
○ The testimonies failed to prove BRD that the gunshots that killed Saavedra came from
them
● Although it was proven in the trial that the commission of the robbery was with the aid of armed
men, it was not specifically alleged as an aggravating circumstance in the Amended Information
filed before the trial court.
● It was not in compliance with Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure
Held:
● Baluyos and Arellano are ACQUITTED
● Charges against Lapitaje and Reyes modified to the simple crime of Robbery
DieJess
Facts:
● Norma De Joy was charged with the violation of BP. Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
● During the arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. As the trial ensued, however, De Joya jumped
bail.
● In her absence, trial was done in absentia. The prosecution presented their evidence and no
evidence was adduced in her defense for the two cases
● The Trial Court found her guilty of the 2 charges but she remained at large. She also failed to
appeal the decision of the trial court
● 5 years later, while applying for an NBI clearance, she was apprehended and then detained at the
Batangas City Jail
● She filed a motion to the MTC of Batangas and asked to apply the SC Administrative Circular
retroactively and release her from her detention. She contends that the said circular deleted the
penalty of imprisonment on the crime that she committed
○ The Circular merely gives judges the discretion when deciding on the penalty. It can be
single or conjunctive penalty
○ A rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of the said BP such that
where the circumstances of bothe the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine a lone should
be considered as the more appropriate penalty
Issue:
● W/N the SC Administrative Circular should be applied retroactively? - NO
Ruling/Ratio
● The Court ruled that the SC Admin Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law and therefore, it
cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the RPC
● It merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of the
said BP. It does not amend the BP nor does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law
● It is therefore understood that:
○ The Circular does not remove imprisonment for as an alternative penalty for violations
of BP Blg 22
○ The judges are given sound discretion in imposing the penalties
○ If the accused fails to pay the fine, then there should be an application of subsidiary
imprisonment
DieJess
Facts:
● The Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape of his 8 year old
daughter , a deaf-mute minor, against her will and consent
● The said commission of the crime was done on or about May 12, 2001
● The prosecution presented their witnesses including
○ The son of the appellant
○ The victim
○ Dr. Guialani
○ And SP02 Venus
● The defendant denied all the charges against him and even contended that the people who were
making the allegations, had a grudge against him
● Trial ensued and he was found guilty and sentenced to receive the penalty of death
● The case was brought up to the CA and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision
Issue:
W/N the sentence should be modified to reclusion perpetua in light of the enactment of RA 9346? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● Article 22 of the RPC provides an exception to the prospectivity of laws
○ It provides that laws can be applied retroactively if it favors the accused
● In the present case, the enactment of RA 9346 on June 24, 2006, prohibited the imposition of
the death penalty
● In view of this and the principle of favoribilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda or penal laws
which are favorable to the accused are to be given retroactive effect.
● Therefore the sentence should be modified to reclusion perpetua
Held:
● Court modified the penalty in view of RA 9348 in relation to Art. 22 of the RPC
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N RA No. 9344 can be applied retroactively in this case? - YES
Ruling/Ratio
● RA 9344
○ AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
● The OSG is positing that the petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 4 of RA
9344 since the petitioner was convicted by the RTC as early as 1999, the CA affirmed this in
2001 and the RA was passed only in 2006. At this time, the petitioner was already 25 years old
and cannot be qualified as a child as defined in the RA.
Section 4 of RA 9344
DieJess
○ A child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. (But not from civil liability)
○ Subject to an intervention program instead of imprisonment
● In the said RA, the CCIL should be exempt of criminal liability if the child was 15 years old or
younger at the time of the commission of the offense.
○ Sec. 64 of the same RA provided that the cases involving CCIL’s shall be immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development office
● What is controlling is the age at the time of the commission of the offense, and not the age at
the time of the promulgation of judgement
● The said RA raised the age of criminal responsibility from 9 to 15 years old
● In view of this, the court must accord retroactive application of the increase in criminal
responsibility to Ortega pursuant to Article 22 of the RPC
○ Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony….
● The legislative intent for the said RA’s retroactivity was even patently stated in the deliberations
on the bill in the Senate
● The court therefore, is bound to enforce the legislative intent of the legislator for the said RA
● After further review, the court discovered that Ortega was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. In light of the RA, he shall be exempted from criminal liability
DieJess
Facts:
● The case originated from an Information for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and
7 of RA 8042 filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao on October 5, 1998
● Nasi-Villar was found guilty BRD of Illegal Recruitment
● The act was allegedly committed on or about January 1993 in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Province of Davao del Sur against Nila Panilag
● The trial court held Nasi-Villar liable for the offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
● This was appealed to the CA and the appellate court declared that the petitioner should have
been charged under the Labor Code and not under RA 8042.
○ Because RA 8042 was enacted after the commission of the crime charged.
○ Hence, they modified the sentence to and found the petitioner liable for under the
Labor Code
● The petitioner is now raising the issue before the SC that the CA erred in failing to consider that
RA 8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.
○ Since the RA was not in effect when the crime was allegedly committed, then it can’t be
used as the basis for the filing of a criminal action.
Issue:
● W/N RA 8042 can be given retroactive effect? - NO
● W/N the RTC decision violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The court found no reversible error in the decision arrived at by the CA
○ As the SC held in Gabrial v. CA, the real nature of the crime charged is determined by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information, not the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated.
○ The name of the crime cannot override the performed acts alleged in the body of the
information filed against the defendant
● Although the information erroneously designated the offense as covered by RA 8042, the
conviction was under the Labor Code - which was the proper law in effect during the commission
of the crime
● There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive application of
RA No. 8042
DieJess
○ The assailed RA gave a new definition to the crime of Illegal Recruitment and it provided
a higher penalty
● A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively
● Neither did the trial court nor the CA give the said RA a retroactive effect since both courts
passed upon the case under the Labor Code.
Facts:
● Mediatrix Carungcong was the duly appointed administratirix of the intestate estate of deceased
Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong. She filed a complaint affidavit for estafa against his
brother in law, William Sato, a Japanese national
● Sato was the husband of Mediatrix’ sister who passed away before Manolita died.
● Mediatrix is arguing that the death of her sister cut the familial ties of her family and William
Sato
● As the in-law of the Carungcongs, William Sato, by means of deceit, made the deceased
Carungcong to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney, which he used to sell 3
properties in Tagaytay. He told the mother that the SPA was for tax purposes.
● The complaint was initially dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City but upon appeal, the
DOJ Secretary reversed and set aside the resolution and directed the said Prosecutor to file an
information against Sato.
● Sato moved to quash on ground that under Article 332 of the RPC, his relationship with the
defrauded person was an exempting circumstance.
○ Article 332 provides the persons exempt from criminal liability for the crimes of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons
■ Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line
■ The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another
■ Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
● The trial court granted the motion and ordered for the dismissal of the criminal case
● The interstate, dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling , appealed to the CA. The CA also
dismissed the appeal
● Hence this petition
Issue:
● W/N death affects the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased wife? - NO, it continues to survive
Ruing/Ratio:
● The petitioner is arguing that the wife of the accused never became a co-owner of the three
parcels of land because she predeceased her mother. Hence, no succession happened. The
death of the wife also extinguished the relationship between Sato and the family
DieJess
● The OSG claims that Sato is covered by the from criminal liability provided under Article 332
○ Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports the claim that the death of Zenaida (the
wife) dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita (the mother)
● There are two views with regard to the matter:
○ Terminated affinity view: the relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of
the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
between the parties
■ Exception: the relationship by affinity continues when there is a surviving issue
○ Continuing affinity view: The relationship of affinity continues between the surviving
spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.
● The court ruled that the second view (continuing affinity view) is more consistent with the
language and spirit of Article 332 of the RPC
● This interpretation of the law intends to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory clause in Article 332 is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the
degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
● The fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in
favor of the accused. Thi is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused
shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt
○ Intimately related to this principle is the rule of lenity. This applies when the court is
faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute. The rule calls for the adoption
of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
○ This rule becomes all the more appropriate when the case is viewed through the lens of
the basic purpose of Article 322 to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory
clause.
● The court held that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the
blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which
created the affinity
NOTE: Sato was not absolved of the crime. It was remanded back to the trial court because the charge
against him is the COMPLEX crime of Estafa and not the SIMPLE crime. The Article 332 is only applicable
to the simple crime of estafa.
DieJess
Facts:
● The accused, Ignacio Poras, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclustion perpetua by the RTC Branch 222 of Quezon City.
○ The information is as follows:
■ On or about November 27 1994, Poras had secual intercousrse with the
complainant AAA, while the latter was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious
■ AAA was made to drink milk that had sleeping substance and this resulted to her
being reduced into a state of unconsciousness and deprived of her will power
■ She later woke up the next day, beside the accused. He was moving on top of
her and touching her private parts. She noticed that the strap of her bra had
been removed and her panty already lowered to her knees
■ She pushed the accused then the latter raised his brief and went to his room, he
also threatened to kill her if she chooses to disclose the incident to anyone.
● The RTC convicted Poras and on appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
● Poras appealed and argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
According to him, AAA gave different versions of the incident, but never testified that there was
any penetration of her private parts. She only concluded that she had been raped when she
learned of the result of the medical examination and because she felt weak when she woke up.
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in finding Poras guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt?
- YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The court found that the prosecution failed to prove Poras’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape.
● By definition, the crime of rape must have the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the
pudendym of the female organ
● In this case, there is no direct evidence that shows the required penetration.
○ AAA could not have seen the insertion of Poras’ penis into her vagina because she was
unconscious
○ However, RUle 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rule on Evidence allows the courts to rule
on the basis of circumstantial evidence when
■ There is more than one circumstance
■ The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven
DieJess
Facts:
● The defendant was found guilty of rape by the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros
● The defendant and his counsel appealed to the court on the following grounds
● The case was initially filed by the chief of police of Dumaguete against Pedro Manaba. Trial in
this case was ensued but the defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the subject matter of the action, because
the complaint had not been filed by the offended party, but by the chief of police
● Next was the case filed by the offended girl. This was filed in the COurt of First Instance and was
referred to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for preliminary investigation.
○ The defendant waived his right to the preliminary investigation, but asked for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that he had previously been placed in jeopardy
for the same offense. This was denied by the justice of the peace and the case was
remanded to the CFI
○ He renewed his motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy but this was
denied. He was then found guilty and sentenced for the crime charged
Issue:
● W/N the accused was tried on a valid complaint in the first case? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● To determine whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time when he was
tried in the present case depends on the validity of the complaint in the first case.
● The Spanish word equivalent of the word “filed” is not found in the Spanish text, which is
controlling.
● The first complaint filed against the defendant by the chief of police. Since this was not the
complaint filed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the law.
The judgement of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and the defendant was never in jeopardy
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the crime committed can be absorbed as the crime of robbery with homicide
Ruling/Ratio:
● There was an argument that the killing of Pason was unpremeditated and that the English
version of Article 294 of the RPC only punished any persons guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of any person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
○ This english version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing spanish text
● The court, upon examination of the Spanish text, ruled that in order to determine the existence
of the crime of robbery with homicide, it is not enough that a homicide would result by reason
of on the occasion of the robbery. It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident , provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes, modes, or persons intervening tint eh commission of the crime, that has
to be taken into consideration.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the crime committed by Geronimo is the complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion? -
Ruling/Ratio:
● Following the Court’s resolution in the case of People v. Hernandez,: the crime of rebellion is
integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in article
134 of the RPC and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of article 135,
similar to trason.
● Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without either one
of them, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
● The crime of murder is weighed heavier than the crime of rebellion independently.
● The crime of rebellion with the felonies committed t
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N palay is comprehended by the term “cereal” used in Article 303 of the RPC? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● Upon examination of the Spanish text, the court ruled that palay (unhulled rice) is more
consistent with “cereal” than with “seedling”. Hence, it falls under Article 303 and not Article 302
of the RPC
● The court affirmed the ruling of the trial court in dismissing the case
●
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● It is settled that Article 326 of the old Penal Code does not appear in the Revised Penal Code,
which contains no offense denominated as “acusacion o denuncia falsa” or its equivalent.
○ The only provision of the RPC which may be said to refer to the same subject is Article
363
■ Incriminatory Machination
● However, Article 363 does not contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution in the sense of
someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge
○ Article 326 punishes false prosecution
○ Article 363 punishes any act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution
DieJess
● The more sensible interpretation to limit Article 363, in view of the Spanish text, is to acts of
“planting evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecution but
tend directly to cause false prosecution”
●
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellants may be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
in light of the proven facts? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● Robo con Homicidio
○ The government needs to prove the following elements
■ Taking of personal property is committer with violence or intimidation against
persons
■ The property taken belongs to another
■ Taking is done with animo lucrandi
■ By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed
● In the case, the prosecution has convincingly proven that:
○ Appellants asported a gun with violence and intimidation against the victim
○ The gun belonged to the deceased
○ The security guard was killed
*animus lucrandi is presumed when there is proof of asportation
the detachment, movement, or carrying away of property, considered an
essential component of the crime of larceny.
● There was no showing that the death of the security guard occured merely by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.
○ The prosecution was silent on the primary criminal intent of the appellants
○ They did not prove that it was either the intention of the appellants to kill the guard in
order to steal the gun or only kill the guard and the taking of the gun was merely an
afterthought
● The Court has already ruled that a conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that
the robbery was the main purpose and objective of the criminals and that the killing was merely
incidental, resulting merely by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
● The Spanish version of the Article on this crime was explained by CJ Aquino
DieJess
○ The use of the words “con motivo… del robo” permits of no interpretation other than
that the intent of the actor must supply the connection between the homicide and the
robbery in order to constitute the complex offense.
● The crime of Robo con Homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special complex crime. The penalty is
higher because the men placed lucre above the value of human life
○ When the homicide is not conclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose
of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven, there can be no conviction
of robo con homicidio
● In the case at bar, the primary intent of the appellants remains an enigma
○ The fact that the appellants took the firearm after killing the security guard did not
prove that their primary intent was to commit robbery
● In view of the facts established and consistent with jurisprudence, the Court can convict the
appellants only of the separate offenses of theft and homicide, which were duly proven.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in considering evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance on
the Attempted Murder case?
● W/N the court erred in not considering jealousy as a mitigating circumstance?
Ruling/Ratio:
● The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space
of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgement. For it to be appreciated, the following must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt:
○ The time when the accused determined to commit the crime
○ An act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination
○ Sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the circumstances of his act
● There was also no mitigating circumstances present to offset the foregoing aggravating
circumstance
○ Even though the court noted that the initial motivation to commit the crime was the
belief that an affair was existent, it ruled out passion or obfuscation or immediate
vindication of a grave offense as mitigating circumstances
● For the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance, it is necessary that the act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
○ “Immediate vindication” should be construed as “proximate” vindication in accordance
with the controlling Spanish text of the RPC, still this mitigating circumstance cannot be
considered where sufficient time elapsed for the accused to regain his composure.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the lower court erred in finding the herein accused of being guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
DieJess
● The court held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was insufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged
● The Court reviewed the pieces of evidence that led to the conviction of the herein accused
● The Court noted that nothing in the findings of the trial court and the CA would categorize the
criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation
○ There is also nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by
inducement or by indispensable cooperation
■ Article 4 of the RPC provides how criminal liability is incurred:
● Any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended
● Any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
● Criminal liability in incurred through the commission of a felony
○ Either by deceit or fault
○ Deceit: act is performed with deliberate intent
○ Fault: wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, or lack of skill.
● The elements of felonies are:
○ There must be an act or omission
○ The act or omission must be punishable under the RPC
○ The act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault
● In the case of the appellant, the witness admitted that he did not see who “stabbed” or who
“hacked” the victim.
○ As a principal witness, he could not say whether the appellant stabbed or hacked the
victim. In fact, he does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant
○ This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Art. 3 of the
RPC
● There was not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds,
coupled with the prosecution;s failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the court erred in convicting the appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was
suffering from insanity? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused was subjected to psychological examinations during the pendency of the trial.
Initially he was ruled to be incapable of standing trial due to his mental defect. However, upon
the third examination, he was ruled to be capable of standing trial.
● For his defense, he presented Dr. Nerit. The witness testified to the mental condition of the
accused and suggested that the appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into
the hospital and in effect, implied that appellant was suffering from schizophrenia when he
raped the complainant.
● The appellant’s plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the RPC (Exempting circumstances)
○ An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
● The court in People v. Formigones elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity. They
quoted the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the RPC:
○ The SC of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken in to
account:
■ It is necessary that there be complete depreciation of intelligence in committing
the act
■ The accused be deprived of reason
■ There be no responsibility for his own acts
■ He acts without the least discernment
■ There is an absence of the power to discern
■ There be a total deprivation of freedom of will
DieJess
○ Imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive
a person of intelligence or freedom of will, became mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.
● The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.
○ There must be positive evidence that the defendant lost reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime. Without this, he is presumed
to be in a normal condition.
● 2 tests were adopted from the Formigones case
○ Test of cognition: “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act”
○ Test of volition: “there be a total deprivation of freedom of will”
● Philippine caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than the test of
volition.
○ A person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as
desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.
● The testimony of Dr. Jovellano negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current status of our caselaw, is critical if the
defense of insanity is to be sustained.
○ The threats by the accused to Estelita shows that he was aware of the reprehensible
moral quality of the assault.
● It must be pointed out that it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the
exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found
● The law presumes every man to be sane.
○ A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of
insanity
○ Rafanan failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind
immediately before or during the sexual assault on the victim.
○ It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner, who was a minor above 9 years but below 15 years of age at the time of the
crime, acted with discernment? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● Discernment: mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong
○ The minor must also fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act
● The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had carnal
knowledge of the offended party
● Article 12 (3) of the RPC provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment.
○ Ratio: complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender, which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa.
○ Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act.
○ Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong
● The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and
that it was wrong
○ In the present case these was proven by:
■ His methodical fashion of dragging the victim
■ His hasty flee from the scene
■ His hiding in his grandmother’s house
■ His testimony as an outstanding grade school student
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N RA No. 9344 can be applied retroactively in this case? - YES
Ruling/Ratio
● RA 9344
○ AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
● The OSG is positing that the petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 4 of RA
9344 since the petitioner was convicted by the RTC as early as 1999, the CA affirmed this in
2001 and the RA was passed only in 2006. At this time, the petitioner was already 25 years old
and cannot be qualified as a child as defined in the RA.
Section 4 of RA 9344
DieJess
○ A child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. (But not from civil liability)
○ Subject to an intervention program instead of imprisonment
● In the said RA, the CCIL should be exempt of criminal liability if the child was 15 years old or
younger at the time of the commission of the offense.
○ Sec. 64 of the same RA provided that the cases involving CCIL’s shall be immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development office
● What is controlling is the age at the time of the commission of the offense, and not the age at
the time of the promulgation of judgement
● The said RA raised the age of criminal responsibility from 9 to 15 years old
● In view of this, the court must accord retroactive application of the increase in criminal
responsibility to Ortega pursuant to Article 22 of the RPC
○ Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony….
● The legislative intent for the said RA’s retroactivity was even patently stated in the deliberations
on the bill in the Senate
● The court therefore, is bound to enforce the legislative intent of the legislator for the said RA
● After further review, the court discovered that Ortega was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. In light of the RA, he shall be exempted from criminal liability
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court does not see any reversible error in the decisions of the lower court and the CA
● The Court agrees that the death of the victim was not occasioned by self defense
● For the court to consider self defense as a justifying circumstance, the following essential
elements must be proven:
○ Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim (MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT)
○ Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression
○ Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense
● The person invoking self-defense has the burden to prove all the elements.
● 2 kinds of unlawful aggression (People v. Fontanilla)
○ Actual or material unlawful aggression
○ Imminent unlawful aggression
● The defense failed to discharge its burden to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
by sufficient and satisfactory proof.
● The accused relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the RPC in the trial court and appellate courts,
but adopted in this COurt two divergent theories:
○ He killed the victim to defend himself against unlawful aggression (justifiable under
Article 11)
○ His bolo accidentally hit the victim and is , thus, exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the RPC
● Self-defense necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means
DieJess
● The basis of the exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the RPC is complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the
accused.
○ Lack of negligence and intent
● The accused failed to prove that he was acting in self-defense and thus, the inescapable
conclusion is that he is guilty of the crime
○ The burden of proof shifts to the accused when self-defense is invoked.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused-appellant should be charged with the consummated crime of acts of
lasciviousness or attempted rape? - Attempted Rape
Ruling/Ratio:
● In light of the evidence presented, the accused cannot be charged with the crime of
consummated rape becuase there was no introduction of the penis of the accused-appellant into
the vagina of the complainant
● The court finds that the accused-appellant should be charged with attempted rape instead
● The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
○ The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
○ He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
○ The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance
○ The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance
● The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements:
○ That there be external acts
○ Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed
● An overt or external acts is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense
● It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation
of the design
DieJess
○ It is sufficient if it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards
the commission of the offense after the preparations are made”
● The overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense
● Overt acts must be distinguished from preparatory acts
● The spontaneous desistance exempts a criminal from liability for the intended crime, but it does
not exempt him from the crime committed by him before the desistance
○ In the case, the desistance was not spontaneous as it was the arrival of the brother that
caused the accused to stop
● By the series of overt acts, the accused has commenced the execution of rape.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the demurrers to
evidence - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The prosecution has failed to prove that a conspiracy exists among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
● The prosecution was trying to show that the conspiracy was implied based on the collective
actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement
○ The gravamen of the conspiracy charge is that each of the members, by their individual
acts, agreed to participate , directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation, and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
● The prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte, and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of
an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers.
DieJess
○ The prosecution points out that the sole overt acts of GMA to become a part of the
conspiracy was her approval via the marginal note of “OK” of all the requests made by
Uriarte for the use of additional intelligence funds.
DieJess
ISSUE
● W/N Dizon is guilty of homicide — NO
DieJess
● W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Amelda, and
Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries — YES
HELD
● NO. We cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249
of the RPC on the basis of the existence of intent to kill
○ We adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court, in part, insofar as it ruled that none
of the frat members had specific intent to kill Lenny Villa
○ Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person,
so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions.
○ Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required malicious intention, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and
intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission the act does not, in itself, make a
man guilty unless his intentions
● Not able to prove the intention to kill
○ Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
felony
○ the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
○ Set aside in part.
● Dizon was just found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide
●
DieJess
Case: Beradio v. CA
Facts:
● Beradio is a lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the COMELEC
○ Nature of her job was field work so she was required to fill up and submit her daily time
records
○ Based on Beradio’s records, she made it appear in her daily time records that she was in
her office when she was actually attending court sessions
● COMELEC granted her request for permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and
cousins-in-law
● Afterwards, Valdez filed an administrative complaint against her for unauthorized practice of law
● On the other hand, she tendered her resignation which COMELEC accepted
○ Granted clearance and received her retirement benefits
● When Valdez found out about her retirement, he filed criminal charges against Beradio on the
grounds of falsification of daily time records
○ Penalized under article 172, par 4 of the RPC as falsification of public documents
○ Valdez claims that petitioner was absent the whole day on some of the days in her daily
record, but made it appear as if she was in her office
○ Trial court and CA found her guilty
ISSUE
● W/N the alleged acts of falsification of public documents imputed against the petitioner were
tainted with criminal intent -- NO
HELD
● Requisite elements
○ Offender makes in a document false statements in a narration of facts
○ He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him
○ Facts narrated by him are absolutely false
○ Perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person
● Court believes that the alleged false entries made in the time records on the specified dates
contained in the information do not constitute falsification for having been made with malice or
intent
○ Beradio never denied this, but admitted in all candor her appearances in 6 different
ways
○ Petitioner said her appearances were authorized by COMELEC in certain instances where
she was counsel de oficio
● In preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evident that she believed she was just
making of record the fact that she was entitled to receive full payment even on those days she
appeared in court, which she believed was no less a public service
○ The court was just 2 meters away, closer than if she were to grab a snack
○ She was only in court for a few minutes, an hour at most
DieJess
Case: Luague v. CA
● Pilar was charged with 3 counts of the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document
for signing the name of her husband as payee
● Pilar contends that she acted in good faith or no criminal intent
○ On January 23, while Illuminado was in the hospital, the Principal handed him his check
and advised Pilar to get the same from Guillermo so that she could pay for the medicine
and hospital expenses
○ Pilar went to Guillermo to claim it in the afternoon of the same day
○ Illuminado died the next day, January 24
○ Pilar claims that it was upon her honest belief that heirs of deceased government
employees were entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the deceased failed to receive so
she indorsed the treasury warrants by signing the name of Illuminado Luague
● CA convicted Pilar of falsification only on the date the first paycheck was delivered.
ISSUE
● W/N Pilar acted in good faith when she cashed her deceased husband’s paycheck -- YES
HELD
● It was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due to the encashment
○ This is why the petitioner was not convicted of estafa, but falsification only
● Absence of damage is an element to be considered to determine whether or not there was
criminal intent
● SC decided to show some compassion for the accused who is a poor widow
● Court granted petitioner’s appeal and acquitted her
●
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the crime charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping? - MURDER
Ruling/Ratio:
● The general rule is that the nature of the crime is dependent on the material inculpatory facts in
the information.
DieJess
● The accused appellants assert that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the
accused to kill Modesto, and therefore they should not be criminally liable for his death, but only
for the kidnapping.
● Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged, such specific
intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.
○ Specific intent: used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances
indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively
desired, a specific result to follow his act or failure to act.
○ It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act
○ It may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence
○ It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by
the evidence on record
○ Specific intent is not synonymous with motive
● It was held in People v. Puno that for kidnapping to exist:
○ There must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to
deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of freedom of
action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by
the malefactor.
● If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill, the incidental deprivation of the
victim’s liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but merely a preparatory act to the
killing.
● What is primordial then is the specific intent as disclosed in the information or criminal
complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with.
● In the crime of murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim while in kidnapping, the specific
intent is to deprive on of his liberty.
● In the case, it is evident that the specific intent of the accused is to kill Modesto and he was
kidnapped precisely to kill him.
○ The act of adducting the victim was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing
him
● There was no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the accused was to
deprive the victim of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to the
kidnapping.
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that her guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
● Recuerdo is invoking the ruling of the Court in the Ojeda case, wherein the Court held that a
debtor’s offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor and payment of the obligation
indicate good faith .
● Estafa through false pretense or fraudulent act under the RPC is committed as follows
○ By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check
○ The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within 3 days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act
● The essential elements of the felony of Estafa are:
○ A check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation at the time it is issued
○ Lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check
○ Damage to the payee thereof
● Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by false or
misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which
deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury
● Estafa is a felony committed by dolo.
○ For one to be criminally liable for estafa under the RPC, malice and specific intent to
defraud are required
○ General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied only to
deliberate acts done on purpose and with design.
○ Specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some particular thing
● The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of any general
intent is relied upon as a defense, such absent must be proved by the accused
○ Specific intent is not presumed.
● In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove that the elements of the felony of estafa
were present.
● Furthermore, on her defense of good faith, the court ruled that the Ojeda case cannot be
applied to the present case
○ First of all, the Ojeda case was only invoked in the motion for reconsideration
○ The evidence adduced by the prosecution overrides the good faith defense.
●
DieJess
ISSUE
● W/N Manuel is guilty of bigamy even if he insists that he married Tina in good faith and without
malicious intent — YES
HELD
● Prosecution provided that petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence,
the marriage is presumed to subsist
● Art 3, par 2 of the RPC provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent
● Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury
● Mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony, but
ignorance of the law excuses no one
● Petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant
DieJess
● Petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with private
complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter
● For the accused to be guilty of bigamy (Art 349 acc to Albert)
○ Undissolved marriage
○ New marriage
○ Fraudulent intention constituting the felony to act
● Petition is denied
DieJess
Case: US v. Ah Chong
Facts:
● One night, Ah Chong was awakened by someone trying to push open the door of his room
● He asked if anyone was there, but no one responded
● He began to fear that it was might be a robber so got up and said “if you enter the room, I will
kill you”
● Using the common kitchen knife under his pillow, the defendant struck the intruder who turned
out to be his roommate, Pascual
● Afterwards, he called his employers who just lived next door and ran back to the room to care
for Pascual
● There had been several robberies within the area which is why he kept a knife under his pillow
● Ah Chong and Pascual made an agreement that when either of them returns at night, he should
knock at the door and identify himself
○ Pascual didn’t do this that’s why Ah Chong thought he was an intruder
● Defendant was placed under arrest, and Pascual died the following day
● Defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide
○ He admitted that he killed his roommate, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do the wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self
defense
ISSUE
● W/N Ah Chong should be exempted from criminal liability by reason of a mistake as to the facts--
YES
HELD
● Malice or criminal intent is an essential requisite for the crime of homicide and assassination
● Commission of acts contemplated in the absence of malice, negligence, and imprudence, does
not impose criminal liability on the actor
● The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him (Reg v.
Thurborn)
● Although there was no real harm to himself or his property, he was made to believe that there
was
● Defendant, at that time, acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was exercising his right of self-defense
● Court acquitted Ah Chong
●
DieJess
ISSUE
● W/N Oanis and Galanta may be held responsible for the death cause to Tecson -- YES
HELD
● Relied on the case of Ah Chong in terms of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact
○ Applies only when the mistake committed is without fault or carelessness
● An officer is never justified in using unnecessary or unreasonable force when arrest could be
effected otherwise
● Even if Balagtas was a notorious criminal, at the time of his arrest, there was no resistance
because he was asleep
● The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental
○ Act must be performed without malice
○ A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence
● However, the mitigating circumstance is that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right
● Court declared appellants guilty of the crime of murder with the mitigating circumstance above
mentioned
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N aggravated illegal possession of firearms and murder/homicide should be considered
separate offenses - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● Aggravated illegal possession of firearms and muder are separate offenses
● It was settled in prior cases that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm
committed two separate offenses of either
○ Homicide or murder under the RPC
○ Aggravated illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866
● There are two conflicting doctrines as regards to the case: Barros and Tac-an
○ Barros: conviction of the appellant for murder would be set aside and he would only
suffer the penalty for aggravated illegal possession of firearm
○ Tac-an: the two are separated offenses as it applies the laws concerned according to
their letter and spirit, thereby steering away from judicial legislation
DieJess
● The Tac-an case settled that the two are separate offenses and the constitutional bar against
double jeopardy will not apply.
● Murder and homicide as defined and penalized by the RPC as crimes against persons are mala in
se because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefore
● Illegal possession of a firearm as defined by a special law, is a malum prohibitum.
○ If the intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its
policy or purpose would be difficult to achieve
○ There is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of firearm without taking into
account the criminal intent of the possessor
● All that is needed is intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled by animus
possidendi.
● There is nothing in PD 1866 that manifests a legislative intent to decriminilize homicide or
murder if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the
offense of illegal firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm so illegally possessed is used
in the commission of homicide or murder
● It would be a case of judicial legislation if the court interprets the provision in PD 1866 in a way
that would make it define and punish a single integrated offense and give to the words “with the
use of” a similar meaning as the words :as a result or on the occasion of”.
DieJess
Issue:
Ruling/Ratio:
● The court ruled that plunder is a mala in se as it requires proof of criminal intent (J. Mendoza)
○ Because the crime is mala in se, the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder
○ In the deliberations for the original bill, Senator Tanada stated that the elements of the
crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown
○ The degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent
● Any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a mala in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
DieJess
● The legislative declaration in RA 7059 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum
in se.
○ When the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se
and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the
case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se
●
DieJess
■ Petitioners argue that lack of notice that the Angelo was under embargo is not a
defense in copyright infringement and cites the case
■ HOWEVER, these cases refer to film and literary work where obviously there is
“copying” from an existing material so that the copier knew that he is copying
from an existing material not owned by him
■ BUT how could respondents know that what they are “copying was not theirs”
when they were not copying, but merely receiving live videos
● RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT FAILS.
○ They knew that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN’s footage in their
broadcast that’s why GMA allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBN’s
logo and reporter
● Court held that CA erred in holding that good faith is a defense against criminal prosecution for
copyright
○ In its current form, the IPC is malum prohibitum and prescribes a strict liability for
copyright infringement
ISSUE
● W/N Dungo and Sibal are guilty of the crime of violating section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law -- YES
HELD
● Crime of hazing under RA No. 8949 is malum prohibitum
○ Sen. Lina: no one will admit that their intention is to maim or kill, so the act criminalizes
the fact of inflicting pain
○ Under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or maim.
What’s important is the result of the act of hazing
○ section 4 states that any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable
● 3rd class: officers or members of an organization group, frat, or soro who knowingly cooperated
in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present there
● presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless
he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein
● RA 8949 shows that it is complete and robust in penalizing the crime of hazing
○ Made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of good
faith
● “Planned initiation rite” includes the act inducing Villanueva to attend it
● Petition is DENIED. Resolution of CA is affirmed
DieJess
ISSUE
● W/N petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft only -- NO
HELD
● People v. Diño and People v. Flores
○ CA modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft
○ The crime of theft is produced when the actor has the ability to freely dispose of the
articles stolen, even if it were only momentarily
○ Not yet expressly adopted as precedents by this Court
● Consummated – when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present
● Frustrated – when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator
● Attempted – when the offender fails to complete all the acts of despite commencing the
commission of a felony, the crime is in the attempted stage
● Art. 308 of the RPC – theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter’s content (elements)
● Justice Regalado (court adopted this): no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of
his property to constitute an unlawful taking
● US v. Adiao
○ A custom inspector abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreigner, but was
never able to bring it out of the Custom House
○ Initially, he was just convicted of frustrated theft, but the Court reversed it and held the
accused guilty of consummated theft because all the elements to complete the crime
were present
DieJess
● The crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent
to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. Theft can
only be attempted or consummated
● Petition is denied
DieJess
ISSUE
● W/N the appellant is exempt from criminal liability -- NO
HELD
● Appellant failed to prove his defense with clear and convincing evidence
○ His testimony contradicted his defense that it was an accident
○ He said that the chamber of his pistol was loaded with bullets and was cocked when he
placed it on his right waistline
○ He also testified that the gun’s safety lock was on
○ He also said that if the safety lock was in place, even if he pulled the trigger hard, the
gun would not fire
● Court found Fallorina y Fernando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
○ Abuse of superior strength need not be a separate aggravating circumstance from
treachery
○ No evidence that the appellant took advantage of his position as a policeman when he
shot the victim
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant is assailing the credibility of Alberto as he was not listed as a prosecution witness
and that he was convicted of murder
○ Alberto was a former detainee
● However, the court does not see anything in the circumstances that would preclude Alberto
from being a credible witness
○ Due to the fact that no police investigation occurred and the crime was investigated by a
special counsel of the fiscal’s office, it could be explained why Alberto was not
immediately discovered as a witness
● Ultimately, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Alberto
● Under the RPC, the presumption is that the person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act
○ Rationale behind this article: if the act of the accused was the cause of death, no more is
required (American jurisprudence
● Rule: an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person, which result in the
death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not
receive proper medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility
○ This offsets the mitigating circumstance that the offender did not intend to commit so
grace a wrong as that committed.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused should be criminally liable? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant contends that his intention was not to wound Omamdam, but instead, it was to
wound his opponent (Pacas)
● Based from the facts, the appellant would have to answer for his acts
○ Since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incur criminal liability,
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
● However, the Court does not see this as the case
● The defense’s witness corroborated that the incident happened when Pacas and Bindoy were
struggling for possession of the bolo. It was due to the violent pull of the appellant that the bolo
flew to the victim who was coming up behind him
● The testimony also claims that the victim stated that the wound was an accident for the accused
did not aim at him, it was merely a mishap.
● The motives of the accused is an important aid in the completion of the proof of the commission
for the crime
● The court then saw fit to acquit the accused based on the foregoing.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N Page is guilty of robbery with homicide or robbery only? - Robbery with homicide
Ruling/Ratio:
● In ruling in the case, the Court first addressed the issue on conspiracy
● In this, they found that the circumstances the led to the crime proved that conspiracy existed
between the accused in the commission of the crime
● Now on the issue of the criminal liability of Page, the court held that he should be likewise liable
for the death of the victim
● The rule is that if a man creates in another person’s mind an immediate sense of danger, which
causes such person to try to escape, and, in doing so, the latter injures himself, the man who
creates such state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries
● Once robo con homicidio has been proven, all those who had taken part in the robbery are guilty
of the special complex crime unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide
● Under the rules of conspiracy, Page is deemed to be a co-principal in the robbery with homicide
○ Despite the fact that he did not kill the victim and was in the front seat when the victim
jumped out of the jeepney
● The court affirmed the conviction of Robbery with Homicide
DieJess
ISSUE
● W/N Oanis and Galanta may be held responsible for the death cause to Tecson -- YES
HELD
● Relied on the case of Ah Chong in terms of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact
○ Applies only when the mistake committed is without fault or carelessness
● An officer is never justified in using unnecessary or unreasonable force when arrest could be
effected otherwise
● Even if Balagtas was a notorious criminal, at the time of his arrest, there was no resistance
because he was asleep
● The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental
○ Act must be performed without malice
○ A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence
● However, the mitigating circumstance is that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right
● Court declared appellants guilty of the crime of murder with the mitigating circumstance above
mentioned
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The court ruled in the affirmative, the fact that the defendant had no intention to kill the victim
and the crime was a mistake doesn’t free him from liability
● In Mendieta, the Court ruled that a mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is
proved that he acted maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused is criminally liable for frustrated murder? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The defense contends that the crime must be discharge of weapon with injuries because there
was no intention from the accused to kill anyone
● The court finds this contention erroneous
● The intention of the accused to kill was proven by the attendant circumstances surrounding the
case
● The fact that a person received the shot intended for another, does not alter the criminal liability
of the offender
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant contends that if found guilty, he must only be punished for slight physical injuries
instead of murder
● The court stated that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but in order that a
person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he proposed to commit, it
is indispensable that the two following requisite be present:
○ That a felony was committed
○ That the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the offender
● In a prior case, the Court ruled that death that results as the direct consequence of the use of
illegal violence, the offender is still criminally responsible, despite the weakened condition of the
victim.
● In the case, the health condition of the victim is immaterial because the death was a direct
consequence of the illegal act
● The case is still murder, instead of homicide because the act was treacherous.
● But because of the mitigating circumstance of non-intention, the penalty was reduced to
reclusion temporal instead of death
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court struck down the self-defense theory of the defense as it did not see any of the
elements of self-defense to warrant its invocation
○ W/o such, it is presumed that the offender realizes the natural consequences of his act
● Next, the defense contends that if the victim had secured proper surgical treatment, then the
wound would not have been as fatal
● This is not exempting of the liability
● The general rule is that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound
inflicted is dangers, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate
cause of death was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the defendant is liable for the death of the deceased Bataclan?
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court agrees with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract on behalf of the
carrier
○ They have a duty to safely carry the passengers to their destination
● The Court also agrees that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent,
Saylon
○ There was evidence that the driver was speeding and was driving recklessly
● This proves that the carrier is liable
● Now the court looks at the degree of liability of the carrier
● The Court presents the concept of proximate cause of death
○ Definition: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occured.
○ In the present case, the proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.
■ The overturning lead to the leaking of the gasoline, which is a natural and
expected result
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in convicting the appellant? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● It is undisputed that the accused strangled Laura and that the cause of death, as stated by the
doctor, was heart failure.
● However, the heart failure was due to the fright and shock caused by the strangling, and
consequently, the defendant was responsible for the death, notwithstanding the fact that the
victim was already sick.
● Had he not strangled his wife, she, notwithstanding her illness, wouldn't have died
● In view of this, the defendant directly caused her death
● US v. Brobst:
○ Where death results as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere
fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contribute to his
death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner incurred criminal liability in the death of Javier? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● It is undisputed that the petitioner had an earlier altercation with Javier and that the latter
sustained injuries from the said encounter
○ The two amicably settled the injuries with the help of the Councilman
● The case involves the application of Article 4 of the RPC
○ An accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
● The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the inquiry, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs
● The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected
with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound
● The Court then looked into whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier’s death
DieJess
● The Court then looked into the nature of tetanus and concluded that the more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier’s wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe f-orm of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present
● Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died
● The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused
● The medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime
● The petitioner;s criminal liability was wiped out by the victim’s own act
○ He tended to his farm before the wounds could even heal fully
DieJess
Case: Intod v. CA
Facts:
● The petitioner in this case, along with 3 others, were accused of the crime of attempted murder
○ The petitioner allegedly fired shots towards the bedroom of one Bernardina
Palangpangan but the latter was not in her house and no one was hit by the gun fire
○ The accused was later found guilty by the RTC for attempted murder and this was
affrimed by the CA
● The petitioner is now before the Supreme Court to appeal the ruling of the lower court that he
was guilty of the crime of attempted murder
● Impossible crime:
○ Criminal act by any person performing an act which would be a felony against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account
of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner is guilty of the crime of attempted murder? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● As mentioned in the facts, the petitioner and his group had the intention to kill the target and
this would have been consummated if not for the fact that the target was not present during
that attack
● Now the petitioner is arguing that the criminal liability should be modified to the liability for an
impossible crime
● The Court stated the elements of an impossible crime
○ The commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment
○ The means employed are either inadequate or ineffectual
● That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition
● For a crime to be considered as impossible, it must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment
○ There must either be legal impossibility or physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime
● Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime
○ The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
○ There is intention to perform the physical act
○ There is a performance of the intended physical act
○ The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
● Factual impossibility occurs when the extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime
○ The case at bar belongs to this category
DieJess
■ The petitioner shoots the place where he thought the victim would be, but the
victim was not present, thus he failed to accomplish his goal
● The RPC expressly provides for impossible crimes and made them punishable
● In view of the foregoing circumstance, the sentence is modified to an impossible crime
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner incurred criminal liability even though the subject check was dishonored? -
YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The case falls within the ambit of impossible crimes
● The case is an example of the legal impossibility that constitute an impossible crime
● The requisites of which are as follows
○ That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property
○ That the act was done with evil intent
○ That its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employes was either
inadequate or ineffectual
● Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, the petitioner would’ve been successful in
receiving the stolen money
DieJess
● There is no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N Hesson was guilty of the crime of murder? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused is contending that he can only be charged for an impossible crime for when he
stabbed the victim, the latter was already dead.
● However, the Court held that the evidence sufficiently establishes Hesson’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder
● He is not liable for an impossible crime
○ Requisites:
■ That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property
■ That the act was done with evil intent
■ That its accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual
DieJess
● The victim’s fact of death before he was stabbed by the accused was not sufficiently established
by the degens
● The testimony of Sario was only due to the fact that he saw the victim on the ground, bu he
never ascertained this fact
● Assuming that the latter has died, even before Hesson stabbed him, there would still be criminal
liability due to the presence of a conspiracy
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused-appellant should be charged with the consummated crime of acts of
lasciviousness or attempted rape? - Attempted Rape
Ruling/Ratio:
● In light of the evidence presented, the accused cannot be charged with the crime of
consummated rape becuase there was no introduction of the penis of the accused-appellant into
the vagina of the complainant
● The court finds that the accused-appellant should be charged with attempted rape instead
● The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
○ The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
○ He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
○ The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance
○ The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance
● The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements:
○ That there be external acts
○ Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed
● An overt or external acts is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense
● It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation
of the design
DieJess
○ It is sufficient if it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards
the commission of the offense after the preparations are made”
● The overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense
● Overt acts must be distinguished from preparatory acts
● The spontaneous desistance exempts a criminal from liability for the intended crime, but it does
not exempt him from the crime committed by him before the desistance
○ In the case, the desistance was not spontaneous as it was the arrival of the brother that
caused the accused to stop
● By the series of overt acts, the accused has commenced the execution of rape.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in concluding that there was conspiracy anent the assailed incident? -
NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and
Lagliba in stabbing the victim to death
○ He contends he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation
● The Court ruled against the appellant
● There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it
● Conspiracy, as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself
DieJess
● There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders,
and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the
scheme from the beginning.
○ One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it
○ When one joins a criminal conspiracy, he/she adopts the criminal designs of his
co-conspirators as his own
● If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be
the act of all.
○ Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others
● To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy
○ There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance
of the common design and purpose
○ This does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence
● From a legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution
○ The concurrence of wills is the essence of conspiracy
● As distinguished from being an accomplice wherein the elements are:
○ The community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose
○ The performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime
● Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the
plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment
● However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which
by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an
accomplice
● In this case, the overt acts of the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing indubitably
show that they conspired to kill the victim
● Note that the victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons
○ There is no evidence that before the arrival of the appellant in the scene, the victim was
already dead
○ Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the crime has been committed prior to their
arrival
○ The stab wounds inflicted by the appellant cooperated in bringing about and
accelerating the death of the victim or contributed material thereto
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner is criminally liable for the death of JR? - NO
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that petitioner is not criminal liable for reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide
● He was a general practitioner and was not responsible for the failure to conduct an operation on
JR
● Furthermore, the Court ruled that the finding of guilt on Ynzon cannot be the same for the
petitioner
● Conspiracy is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa
○ Therefore, the petitioner will be found guilty. Muse be shown to have demonstrated an
act executed without malice or criminal intent, but with lack of foresight, carelessness or
negligence
● The evidence on record clearly points to the reckless imprudence of Ynzon, but this cannot be
the same with the case of the petitioner
● The Court therefore acquitted the petitioner
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in finding the petitioner guilty for the crime of homicide? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● Initially, the petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that there was conspiracy
between Dado and Eraso
● The Court held that the prosecution failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy
○ There was no mention of conspiracy in the information filed against the accused
○ Conspiracy must be alleged and not merely inferred from the information
● Even if conspiracy is alleged, the same cannot be considered against Dado
● Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it
○ this conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt
● In the case at bar, the petitioner and Eraso did not conspire to commit the crime
○ Mere spontaneous reactions rather than the result of a common plan is not enough to
demonstrate a concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be the
basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals
● In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense
● In this case, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be
proved to have been committed by him personally
DieJess
● After ruling out conspiracy, the Court acquitted Dado for homicide but they still found him guilty
of illegal discharge of firearm
○ Because intent to kill was not proven
○
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the intent to kill Ruben was proven beyond reasonable doubt to elevate the charge to
attempted murder? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court affirmed the decision of the CA
● The elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
○ The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
○ He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
○ The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance
○ The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance
● The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of 2 elements:
○ That there be external acts
○ Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed
● It is an essential element of murder and homicide that intent to kill is proven
○ This must be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence
○ The Court declared in Delim that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist of the following:
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crimes charged? - Partly Yes
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the appellants are both liable for the death of Eugene and the injuries
sustained by Arnold
○ The conspiracy among the appellants were proven by the prosecution
○ Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily
of a meeting of minds and intent
○ This must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself
■ However, direct proof is not required
○ The Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence
DieJess
■ It may be proved through the collective acts of the accused, before, during and
after the commission of the felony
○ The overt acts or acts of the accused may consist of active participation or moral
assistance
● In the case, the appellants were united in one common objective - to kill Eugene
○ The injury to Arnold was due to his intervention
● They are then all liable for the death of Eugene and the Injury to Arnold
● However, for the case of Leonel, the Court believes that they are not liable
○ In fact, the person liable for the death of Leonel is the accused at large, Robito
● The Prosecution failed to adduce evidence that appellants and the accused Robito conspired to
kill Leonilo
○ Only Robito was liable for killing Leonilo for the other did not even know of Leonilo’s
involvement when he was stabbed by Robito
● As for the charge for the frustrated felony against Arnold, The Court found the appellants guilty
of frustrated murder
● The essential elements of a frustrated felony are:
○ The offender performs all the acts of execution
○ All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence
○ But the felony is not produced
○ By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator
DieJess
ISSUE
● W/N petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft only -- NO
HELD
● People v. Diño and People v. Flores
○ CA modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft
○ The crime of theft is produced when the actor has the ability to freely dispose of the
articles stolen, even if it were only momentarily
○ Not yet expressly adopted as precedents by this Court
● Consummated – when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present
● Frustrated – when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator
● Attempted – when the offender fails to complete all the acts of despite commencing the
commission of a felony, the crime is in the attempted stage
● Art. 308 of the RPC – theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter’s content (elements)
● Justice Regalado (court adopted this): no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of
his property to constitute an unlawful taking
● US v. Adiao
○ A custom inspector abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreigner, but was
never able to bring it out of the Custom House
○ Initially, he was just convicted of frustrated theft, but the Court reversed it and held the
accused guilty of consummated theft because all the elements to complete the crime
were present
DieJess
● The crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to
appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. Theft can only
be attempted or consummated
● Petition is denied
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in declaring the accused guilty for the crime of frsutrated rape? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused is contending that there is no crime of frustrated rape
○ The Solicitor General shares the same view
● The elements of the consummated crime of rape are as follows:
○ There is carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
■ By using force or intimidation
■ When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
■ When the woman is under 12 years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the 2 next preceding paragraphs shall be present
● Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
woman (Black’s Law Dictionary)
● Article 6 of the RPC provides for the stages of a crime
○ Consummated
○ Frustrated
DieJess
○ Attempted
● The Court is not resolving the issue on whether the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape
○ The requisites of a frustrated felony are:
■ That the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony
■ That the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s
will
● For the crime of rape, the frustrated stage cannot apply.
○ The moment the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim, he actually attains his
purpose and, from the moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished
■ There is nothing left to be done by the offender because he has performed the
last act necessary to produce the crime
● The Court has ruled in a long line of cases that consummation of rape does not need perfect
penetration
○ Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient
○ Attempted rape is when there is no penetration becasue not all acts of execution was
performed
● Now that the question on frustrated rape has been resolved, the Court held that the crime
committed is actually the consummated crime of rape
DieJess
Case: US v. Burns
Facts:
● The case on appeal is from the CFI of Samar.
● Accused Frank Burns was found guilty of crime of arson
● The crime happened as follows:
○ The victim was one Pedro De La Cruz
■ He was the competitor of the accused in the automobile for hire industry
○ A fire broke out in the house of De La Cruz at about 11 pm on September 5 1918
○ The flames spread and it took the life of the young servant of De La Cruz, one Cipriano
Jazmin
○ The other houses that were adjacent to the De La Cruz home were engulfed as well
○ Casimiro Breva testified against the accused
○ He alleged that the accused hatched a plan to burn the car of the victim because he
resented the same as they were competitor
● The accused was charged with 2 crimes resulting from the same act
○ Homicide
○ Arson
Issue:
● W/N there is a crime of frustrated arson? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● For one to be charged with the crime of murder, the design or intent to kill must be proven
● In this case, there is no such intent to kill Jazmin, in fact, the death was an incident only of the
arson
○ Given that there is no intent, the crime cannot be murder
○ Therefore, the crime committed is Arson with homicide
● It is understood that the crime of arson is consummated in the mere act of setting a house afire
and the fact that a fire may be extinguished before appreciable damage is done in no wise
reduces the gravity of the offense
○ SC of Spain: where the fire is once actually set, the offense cannot be considered
frustrated arson merely because the fire is put out before the flames have extensively
spread
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in finding Buniag guilty of violating Section 26 (b), Article II of RA 9165?
Ruling/Ratio:
● The CA correctly ruled that the accused can only be convicted of the attempted sale of the
dangerous drugs
● The sale was never consummated due to the events of the buy-bust operation, therefore, the
offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution to produce the felony
● In the case, the accused attempted to sell the drugs and commenced by overt acts, the
commission of the intended crime.
○ However, as pointed out earlier, this was never finished due to the buy-bust operation
● However, the Court ruled that Buniag cannot be convicted of the crime charged
● A successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs needs these elements
to be proven:
○ The transaction or sale took place
○ The corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence
○ The buyer and the seller were identified
● In this case, the corpus delicti - which was the confiscated drug - was not handled in compliance
to the requirements laid down by RA 9165
● Therefore, the second element needed by the prosecution to convict the offender is absent
● There was blatant disregard of the chain of custody rule
DieJess
● Considering the failure of the law enforcers to comply with the requirements of the statute,
Buniag was acquitted
○
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the crime of rape was never consummated in the first encounter
○ This is because no penetration was made inside the vagina of the victim
■ Penetration is an essential element of the crime of rape for this shows that the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim
● The Court held that the accused should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness and not
consummated rape
● Again, the offender did not successfully penetrate at least the labia of the victim
● The Court noted that the crime could have been attempted rape but the Complaint was only for
acts of lasciviousness
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in convicting the petitioners of the crime of attempted estafa? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court first discussed the elements of the felony of estafa:
○ There must be a false pretense, fraudulent ac or fraudulent means
DieJess
○ That such false pretense, fraudulent act or means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud
○ That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or means
that is, he wa induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or means
○ That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage
● In the present case, the Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the Bacoor transaction
was a continuation of the Muntinlupa transaction
○ When the offended party discovered that the certificates were fake, the petitioner
offered the Bacoor property as a substitute
● As it turns out, Elca did not own the Bacoor property
○ He was in no position to transfer ownership of the property at the time petitioners
offered it to Lucero
● The petitioners commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but failed to perform all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of their own spontaneous
desistance but because of their apprehension by the authorities before they could obtain the
amount
● Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown, the RTC and
the CA correctly convicted the petitioners of attempted estafa
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused should be free from liability? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused confessed to killing Reed but insisted that he was attacked without any cause or
reason and that he only shot the victim in proper self-defense
● However, it was seen that , without previous provocation, Paras was attacked by Reed
● The Court held that Paras did not exceed his rights in his defense or employ unnecessary means
to repel an attack already commenced
● The reasonable necessity of the means employed in the defense, does not depend upon the
harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner in this case should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court listed the requisites for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be invoked
○ Unlawful aggression on behalf of the victim
○ Reasonable means to repel the unlawful aggression of the offended party
○ Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
● In ruling, the RTC and the CA found that the use of the gun was unreasonable
● The petitioner stated that Pitalio was armed with a knife when the Lacsons were confronted
● The Court ruled that the petitioner was entitled to an acquittal based from the facts of the case
● There was an imminent danger on the lives of the petitioner and his wife from the unlawful
attack of an enraged, drunken and armed Pitalio
○ The gun was the only reasonable means of warding off the attack
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellant is entitled to acquittal? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● Defense of one’s person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance as long as the following
requisites concur:
○ Unlawful aggression
○ Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
○ Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
● The Court ruled that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victims
○ The fencing that was being conducted resulted in the damage of the property of the
accused
○ Thereafter, the words uttered and the hostile order from the victim shows actual danger
to the rights and the person of the accused
● The Court held that there was actual physical invasion of the property which he had the right to
resist pursuant to Article 429 of the Civil Code
● As for the reasonableness of the resistance, the Court found that the using of a shotgun was
disproportionate to the attack
○ However, the third element of defense of property was present
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner should be acquitted? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the justifying circumstance applies in this case
● It is worth noting that a separate criminal case was filed against the victim and Cahilog
○ The victim, in that case, entered a plea of guilty
● Now it is not disputed that Cahilog and Jimenez attacked the husband of the petitioner
● The petitioner had not sent he commencement of the assault on her husband
○ She couldn’t have known if her husband had given sufficient provocation
● The Court held that the petitioner’s action was a justifiable defense of her husband
○ Hence, she is entitled to acquittal
● She was justified in believing that her husband was the victim of an unlawful aggression
○ She had no way of finding out if her husband had given sufficient provocation
○ The means that she employed were reasonable as she was no match for either of the
assailants
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in finding that the accused should not be acquitted on the ground of
self-defense? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● In invoking self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to prove that the attack was
justifiable
○ This is because corollary to the invocation is the admission of doing the offense
● The requisites of self-defense are as follows
○ Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
○ Reasonable necessity of the means employed by the person being attacked to prevent or
repel it
○ Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
● Out of these, unlawful aggression, is a condition sine qua non
○ It contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger and not
merely threatening or intimidating attitude
○ The attack must have been done with actual physical force or with actual use of a
weapon
○ This element is indispensable
● In this case, the Court held that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
○ That act of pulling out a gun is not considered as unlawful aggression in this
circumstance
○ This does not constitute imminent danger
○ Actual or material unlawful aggression is necessary for the invocation of self-defense
● Furthermore, the location and presence of the gunshot wounds belie the claim of the petitioner
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● By invoking self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the one invoking as this constitutes the
admission of the killing
● Requisites of self-defense:
○ Unlawful aggression
○ Reasonable means
○ Lack of provocation
● The Court upheld the rulings of the RTC and the CA
● The test for the presence of unlawful aggression is whether the aggression from the victim put in
real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself
○ The peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N Arnold and Joven should be absolved of criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and the CA
● The Court held that Arnold and Joven did not act in self-defense and in defense of strangers
● The following are the requisites for self defense:
○ Unlawful aggression
○ Reasonable means
○ Lack of sufficient provocation
● Meanwhile, these are the requisites for defense of strangers
○ Unlawful aggression
○ Reasonable means
○ The person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive
● In both cases, unlawful aggression is a primordial element
● Arnold and Joven did not adequate prove unlawful aggression
● Neither of the two attested seeing any of the victims holding any weapon
DieJess
● The allegation that one of the victim had held the hand of Winifreda did not indicate that the act
had gravely endangered the life of Winifreda
○ Similarly, the act of drawing something from the waists did not put Arnold and Joven’s
lives in actual or imminent danger
○ There were no weapons recovered from the victims
● The accused also hacked the victims repeatedly, not being in line with their invocation of
self-defense
○ They also did not sustain any physical injury
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N Nacnac is entitled to acquittal? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● On unlawful aggression
○ The Court ruled that there was material and actual aggression on the part of the victim
○ The trial court held that the mere act of drawing a gun (the victim) cannot be considered
unlawful aggression
○ However, the SC disagrees due to the following circumstances
■ The drunken state of the victim
■ He was a policeman that is professionally trained at shooting
■ The warning shot of the petitioner was ignored
■ A lawful order was ignored by the victim
■ The victim was known for his combative and drunken behavior
● On reasonable means employed
○ The lone gunshot wound suffered by the victim supports the claim of self-defense
○ The lone gunshot was a reasonable means chosen by the petitioner in defending himself
in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience of an
unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning shot
● On sufficient provocation
○ Petitioner gave the victim a lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the
victim
○ The warning shot cannot be indicative of provocation
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense
● The credibility of the accused was tainted by the surrounding circumstances
○ It was possible that Avenido waas not yet drunk when the incident occurred
○ The blood on the shirt of the accused was not even definitively shown to be human
blood and there was merely a spot of blood
○ He did not mention nor obtain an X-ray for the bullet that remained his shoulder
● Assuming that there was unlawful aggression initially, this ceased when Jesus was first shot and
fell to the ground
○ At that point, the threat to Flores’ life was no longer attendant
● The nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the claim of
self-defense by the accused
● When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound
the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against
the original aggressor
○ Retaliation is not the same as self-defense
● The means employed were not necessary and reasonable to prevent the alleged unlawful
aggression from the victim
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of
Cristina? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the presence of unlawful aggression was still there even if Gerry was
disarmed
● The unlawful aggression must be continuous
○ In this case, there was still unlawful aggression even though Gerry was disarmed
● The peril to Cristina’s life continued and persisted until she put an end to it
● After she took the knife, he did not stand down, but instead, continued to move towards her
despite her plea that he should not come nearer
● It would’ve ceased if Gerry had just walked away, but he did not
● Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in danger
● The husband was taller and stronger than her
● The action of pushing the husband did not constitute aggression on the part of Cristina
○ She manifested a passive attitude towards him when she just stood her ground, with the
knife in hand, asking him not to come near her
● Furthermore, the means she employed were reasonable
○ The location and nature of the wounds support this
● Her shoving cannot be considered as a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of
aggression
● Lastly, her flight cannot be indicative of guilt
○ She merely feared for her safety because of possible retaliation from her husband’s
siblings
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner is entitled to an acquittal? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court sustained the conviction of the petitioner
● For the exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur:
○ The evil sought to be avoided actually exists
○ The injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it
○ There be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it
● The fear must be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb
○ A mere threat of a future injury is not enough
○ It should not be speculative, fanciful or remote
● A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well
● In this case, the fear is speculative
● There was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her continued
stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death
● Furthermore, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability
much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide
○ The fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition
and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s
threats or demands
● She also failed to convince the court that she was left with no other choice but to commit the
crime
○ She was given the choice of jewelry or checks
● She also had sufficient knowledge that issuing checks without funds may result to a violation of
the law
DieJess
● • After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis and although he
surrendered himself, he did not surrender the murder weapon
● o The appellant never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the
victim in a state of necessity.
● • The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
● Ruling: RTC ruling is affirmed with modification; accused is guilty of homicide only
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused invoked paragraph 4, Article 11 of the RPC, which provides avoidance of a greater
evil as a justifying circumstance
● For this ground to be successfully invoked, the following requisites should be complied with:
○ The evil sought to be avoided exists
○ The injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
○ There be no practical and less harmful means of preventing it
● In this case, the appellant was unsuccessful in satisfying the 3rd requisite
● The Court noted that the road where the incident happened was wide and the place was well-lit
○ He failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available means of preventing the
evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office
● There are two requisites for this circumstance
○ That the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office
○ That the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or lawful exercise of such right or office
● The Court held that there is no legal basis to justify the actions of Toling
● Firstly, his claim of being a barrio policeman is null and void for he was appointed by the
Municipal Mayor - who did not have the authority to appoint for such power is vested to the
barrio captain.
● Furthermore, the Court found that Toling’s action was not indicative of a person clothed with
authority performing a lawful duty
○ After the incident, Toling ran away
○ Such unnatural action negates and rendered improbable the claim that he was acting in
the fulfillment of a duty
DieJess
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N Cabanlig should be entitled to an acquittal? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled for the acquittal of the accused
● The policeman invoked self-defense and the fulfillment of duty
● The requisites of fulfillment of duty are:
○ The accused act in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
○ The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office
● A policeman in the performance of duty is justifies in using such force as is reasonably necessary
to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if
he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm.
● The justifying circumstance demands that the policeman had used necessary force
● Unlike in self defense, unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite in the performance
of duty
○ It may appear that the public officer was the aggressor, but his aggression was not
unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty
● Without a doubt, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty when Cabanlig
shot Valino
○ Therefore, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance that is applicable to this case
DieJess
NOTE: Cabanlig may not have been guilty of homicide, but they may be guilty of gross negligence for not
handcuffing the deceased upon transport
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused is entitled to an acquittal? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused invokes fulfillment of his duty and self-defense as justifying circumstances
● The requisites of fulfillment of a duty are as follows
○ That he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office
○ That the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office
● The Court ruled that the second requisite is lacking
● As noted, there were 2 stages in the incident
○ The victim threatened the safety of the officers by advancing towards them
○ The victim was already on the ground and the police officer shot him in the head
● The Court ruled that the accused cannot be exonerated from overdoing his dirty during the
second stage
● It was unnecessary
● Self-defense may not be invoked as well
○ The unlawful aggression has ceased when the victim fell from the first shot that was
fired
○ Thereafter, all the actions were unnecessary
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N should be availed of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a
right or office
Ruling/Ratio:
● The justifying circumstance requires the following requisites:
○ The accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or
office
○ The injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty to the lawful exercise of such right or office
■ This is based on the complete absence ofintent and negligence
● The Court held that the requisites for the justification do not obtain in this present case
● The defense of the accused that the victims were suspected to be rebels are not supported with
substantial proof
○ There was nothing in the evidence that suggest that the accused were acting under an
official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances
DieJess
○ There was no reference to the victims having launched such aggression that would
threaten the safety of any one of the accused
● There was no material evidence presented to show that the accused were placed in real mortal
danger in the presence of the victims
○ Except for mere suspicion
○ Rules of engagement do not require that law enforcers immediately draw or fire his
weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his/her call
○ Pursuit without danger should be the next move
● A law enforcement in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonable
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm
● Unnecessary force is never justified
○ The right to kill an offender is not absolute, it is only as a last resort
● The failure of the victims to heed the call does not justify the using of firearms
○ They were not rationally necessary
○ They exceeded the fulfillment of police duties when they inflicted mortal wounds on the
victims
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioners in the present case should be acquitted? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled to acquit the petitioners in this case on the ground that they were only following
orders from a superior
○ “Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose”
● Tabuena had no other choice but make the withdrawals pursuant to the order from the
President himself
○ He cannot be faulted for strictly obeying and complying with the presidential directive
● It is clear that Marcos is the superior of the accused as he was no less than the President of the
Philippines
● On the legality of the order, the Court found that the order was patently legal and that Tabuena
acted under the honest belief that the 55 million was a due and demandable debt
DieJess
○ Even though the order was illegal but it was patently legal making the subordinate
unaware of the illegality, the subordinate is not liable
● The liability of the accused should only be administrative or civil in nature
○ Due to their negligence
● The Court held that petitioners were merely obeying in good faith of a duly executed order
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioners are entitled to the justifying circumstances? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The requisites for fulfillment of duty are as follows
○ The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office
○ The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office
● The requisites for obedience of a superior are as follows:
○ An order has been issued by a superior
○ Such order must be for some lawful purpose
○ The means used by the subordinate to carry out the order is lawful
● For Ambil, both requisites are lacking
○ He exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adamlim at
his house
● For Apelado, only the first requisite is present in the case
● Neither the order not the means employed by Apelado were lawful
○ They were not armed with a court order when the transfer was conducted
○ Apelado, a law graduate, cannot be ignorant to such fact or procedure
● Furthermore, the circumstances of the case proves that conspiracy between the two were
subsisting, therefore, making them both liable for the violation
DieJess
● The Court held that the behavior of the accused during his confinement may be attributed either
to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at
having killed his wife
● The Court then ruled out the claim that the appellant was an imbecile when he did the atrocious
act
○ Evidence shows that he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to
warrant the opinion that he was an or is an imbecile, in his marriage of 16 years
○ His act of killing his wife out of jealousy could not be regarded as imbecility
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellant should be exempt from criminal liability? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant argues that he was first admitted to a Mental Hospital in 1972 and was diagnosed
of Schizophrenic Psychosis
○ He was then confined for a month
○ The second time was in 1977 - confined for 3 weeks
○ Third time in 1988 - confined for a month
● For a person to be adjudged insane under the exempting circumstance, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime
● Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code defines insanity as:
○ A manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellectual faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition
● However, there is a difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up
into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgement in what he does
DieJess
● The appellant was diagnosed and was treated for schizophrenia, paranoid type. It is defined as a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and
often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions
● Schizophrenia does not automatically exempt the accused in a case
● The Court stated that the evidence must prove that at the time preceding the act, the offender
was completely deprived of reason
● In order to prove this, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition during a
reasonable period before or after
○ Direct testimony is not required nor are specific acts of disagreement essential to
establish insanity as a defense
○ The Court must rely on external acts
● In the present case, the Doctor testified that the long-standing sickness of the accused is
incurable
○ The Doctor further testified that when the crimes occurred, the appellant was suffering
auditory hallucinations and having a relapse
● The Court held that the appellant was legally insane at the time he committed the crimes
○ He must therefore be criminal exempt but still civilly liable
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused-appellant should be acquitted? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant invokes the defense of imbecility as an exempting circumstance
● Imbecility is defined as feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching that of one who is
insane
○ It is analogous to childishness and dotage
DieJess
● For someone to be exempt from criminal liability under this circumstance, he/she must be
completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing
the crime.
● In the case of the appellant, his act of cutting grass rather than guarding his victim could hardly
be indicative of imbecility
○ It may be considered as negligence but definitely not childishness or even that of one
completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will
● The accused appellant admitted that he can tell what is right and what is wrong
● Furthermore, it was stated in Formigones, that feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the
offender could distinguish right from wrong
○ Whereas, an insane or imbecile cannot
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused-appellant should be exempted from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● Drug psychosis occurs when a patient is heavily under the influence of prohibited drugs and
alcoholic beverages, so that he manifested some psychotic behavior
○ In this case, the accused was also suffering from auditory hallucination
● The Court held that the trial court did not err in their decision
● The report of the National Center for Mental Health and the testimony of Dr. Cheng do not prove
insanity of the accused appellant
● The defense of insanity requires that the accused suffered from a complete deprivation of
reason in committing the act
○ He must be completely deprived of reason
● There must be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence
of the power to discern
● The law presumes every man to be sane, so the defense of insanity shifts the burden of proof to
the claimant
● Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude imputability
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the appellant cannot be considered insane and exempt from criminal
responsibility
● For insanity to be considered, the accused must be completely deprived of rationality in the
commission of the act
● This must clearly proved, for there is a presumption that acts penalized by law are voluntary
● For his defense, the accused claims that he was confined at the National Center for mental
health prior to the incident
○ Furthermore, the accused claims that the circumstance that he had his pants and briefs
down when the victim saw him is indicative of his insane state
● The Court rejects these contentions
● Mere confinement does not prove that he was deprived of reason at the time of the incident
○ Neither did he submit proof that he was adjudged instance by the said hospital
○ Furthermore, his discharge implies that he was already considered well
● If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in nature, the presumption of its continuance
does not arise
○ The existence of insanity must be at the time of the commission of the crime
○ Furthermore, the fact that he had his pants and briefs done does not indicate
deprivation of reason, at the least, it demonstrates perversion and lechery
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court rejects the plea of insanity
● Insanity under Article 12 of the RPC exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act or there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will
● The allegation of insanity was not substantiated by sufficient evidence
● The following circumstances clearly negative the plea of insanity
○ He was apparently well until about 3 or 4 months prior to his admission in the hospital
○ That he became irritable at home and easily angered by his children’s slightest mistakes
○ That due to his jealousy he claimed that he only wanted to frighten his wife with his bolo
but instead, hacked her to death
○ He denied having hallucinations at that time or being possessed by an evil spirit
○ Immediately after the incident, he went to the Barangay captain and felt guilty about
what happened
○ In jail, he refused to elaborate on his alleged hallucinations when he was in jail
○ He claimed that he frequently thought of his 3 children whom he missed so much
DieJess
● The testimony of the accused shows that he was aware of his emotions, bearing and
temperament
● Furthermore, his memory of the vital circumstances surrounding the event proves that he must
have been in full control of his mental faculties
● The testimony of the witnesses that the accused was insane is insufficient as well
○ The fact that a person behaves crazily is not conclusive that he is insane
○ Insane is not synonymous with crazy
● Furthermore, the diagnosis of schizophrenia was months after the killing occurred
○ The general rule is that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to
the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused argues that the manner of which he committed the act does not constitute an act
of a normal person
● Furthermore, he states that the trial court branded him as a homicidal maniac, which for him
was, judicial notice of his mental sickness
● The Court held that the appellant should not benefit from the exempting circumstance of
insanity
● The defense utterly failed to discharge the burden of proof of proving that the appellant was
insane
○ The testimony or proof of appellant’s insanity must relate to the time preceding or the
very moment of the commission of the offense charged
● From the events of the case, the appellant was seen to have been aware of what he had just
committed and was capable of distinguishing right from wrong
○ He ran away and went into hiding after the incident
● The expert testimony of Dr. Guanzon cannot provide refuge for the accused as well
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellant should be exempt from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled that the appellant failed to overcome the presumption of sanity
● The defense failed to prove that the appellant was completely deprived of intelligence in
committing the acts
● Proof of the existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will not exempt the accused
from culpability, if it was shown that he was not completely deprived of freedom and
intelligence
● The appellant’s recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions afterwards
indicate that he was sane before, during, and after the commission of the crime
○ He felt guilty after killing the victim and apprehensive for being in jail for a longer time
DieJess
A feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his
acts
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused should be exempt from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The accused claims that the gun went off accidentally
○ He claims that the spouses were arguing and he was about to end his life when the gun
suddenly fired
○ He claims that he did not have any intent to end the life of his wife
● The Court ruled that the appellant cannot be exempt from criminal liability
● Requisites for the successful defense of accident
○ Act done must be lawful
○ With due care
○ Causes an injury to another by mere accident
○ Offender is without fault or intention of causing it
● For the exempting circumstance of accident to be invoked, the acts done must be lawful and
with due care
● In this case, the drawing of the weapon is unlawful - it constitutes light threats
● Therefore, there is no room for the invocation of accident as a ground for exemption
● Furthermore, the gun was not even licensed or registered in his name,hence, he could have
been charged with illegal possession of a firearm
● The claim of the appellant is negated by the testimony of the NBI
○ The distance would not have been in line with the testimony that the spouses were
grappling over the control of the weapon
DieJess
● The appellant’s testimony with regard to the relative positions of the spouses when the gun fired
is also contrary to his claim
○ The paraffin test conducted on the victim states that no traces of nitrates are present;
this means that the could not have been that close to the victim
○ The physical evidence belies the claim of the appellant
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the victim should be exempt from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the appellant cannot benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident
● For one to invoke the exempting circumstance of accident, the act must be lawful and done with
due care
○ This exempting circumstance is based on the lack of criminal intent
● The following requisites must be present for the accused to benefit from the exempting
circumstance:
○ A person is performing a lawful act
○ This was done with due care
○ He causes an injury to another by mere accident
○ He is without any fault or intention of causing it
● As for the first requisite, the firing of the shotgun at another is not a lawful act
● Following the testimony of the relatives of the accused, the appellant got his shotgun and
returned to shoot his son, who had intervened
● It is also worth noting that a shotgun would not have fired if it wasn’t cocked
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner should be exempt from criminal liability? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● In determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into account the
dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence
● After reviewing the facts, the Court stated that the petitioner was not in control of the gun when
it fired
○ The testimony of Erna Basa demonstrates that the petitioner did not have control of the
gun during the scuffle
○ The victim persistently attempted to wrestle the weapon from him, which he resolutely
tried to thwart those attempts
○ The Court was convinced that the petitioner was not in control for he gun when it fired
● As for the safety lock, the Court was convinced that the safety lock could have been released
during the scuffle and the technical mechanism of the gun can result to it firing more than once
○ The gun he had was a semi-automatic pistol
● The necessary elements of an accident are present in the case
○ The accused was performing a lawful act with due care
○ The resulting injury was caused by mere accident
○ There was no fault nor intent to cause injury on the part of the accused
DieJess
Case: US v. Elicanal
Facts:
● The accused in this case was convicted of murder
○ Victim: Juan Nomo
● The facts of the case are as follows:
○ The accused was a member of the crew of the Iorcha Cataluna, cruising in the
waters of the Philippines off Iloilo
○ The chief mate then told the accused that he was gonna kill the captain because
he was very angry with him and asked the accused to assist the Guillermo
■ The accused did not pay attention to it
○ The following morning,Guillermo assaulted the captain and seized the latter and
tied him with a rope
○ After seizing the captain, Guillermo struck him in the back of the neck with an
iron bar then he gave the weapon to the accused and ordered him to assist the
former in disposing of the captain
○ The accused thereupon, struck the captain on the head, which caused his death
● The accused claims that he was acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a
great injury induced by the threat of Guillermo when he struck the captain
○ He claims that he acted without his own volition and was an instrument to the
crime
Issue:
● W/N the accused should be exempt from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court upheld the findings of the lower court
● The Court then quoted the SC of Spain
○ A threat, in order to induce insuperable fear, must promise such grave results, and such
results must be so imminent, that the common run of men would succumb
● The threat must be greater than or equal to that which he was compelled to commit
● The Court stated that before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce
such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere
instrument and , as such, incapable of committing a crime
● He must act not only without will but against will
● The threat which caused the uncontrollable fear related to a crime of such a gravity and so
imminent that it might safely be said that the ordinary run of men would have been governed by
it
● The Court held that the fear was not insuperable
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused should be exempt from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the exempting circumstance was not sufficiently proved in the case
● The appellant claims that he should be exempted from criminal liability pursuant to paragraph 5
of Article 12 of the RPC
● He allegedly joined the armed Dorados against his will because of fear of his own safety
● The Court cannot sustain such defense
● The irresistible force must have reduced the accused to a mere internment that acted not only
without will, but also against his will
● The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend
himself or to escape
● The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent , and impending
○ It must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
errors bodily harm if the act is not done
○ A threat of future injury is not enough, neither is a speculative, fanciful or remote fear
● The accused failed to show such compulsion
○ He did not mention that the Dorados physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt him
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear should be considered in favor of Delos
Reyes? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● Delos Reyes as found guilty by the trial court and this was affirmed by the CA
● He is now on appeal claiming that he only acted under the “compulsion of an irresistible force”
● The defense of compulsion due to irresistible force must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner is entitled to an acquittal? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court sustained the conviction of the petitioner
● For the exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur:
○ The evil sought to be avoided actually exists
○ The injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it
○ There be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it
● The fear must be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb
○ A mere threat of a future injury is not enough
○ It should not be speculative, fanciful or remote
● A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well
● In this case, the fear is speculative
● There was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her continued
stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death
● Furthermore, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability
much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide
○ The fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition
and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s
threats or demands
● She also failed to convince the court that she was left with no other choice but to commit the
crime
○ She was given the choice of jewelry or checks
● She also had sufficient knowledge that issuing checks without funds may result to a violation of
the law
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused should be exempt from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● For the crime of carnapping, the appellant claim that Leal forced them to the the Tamaraw jeep
to facilitate their escape
● Under Article 12 of he RPC, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury
● For this to prosper the following must concur:
○ The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending
○ It must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done
● A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced
him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The evidence does not show that she caused the death of her child willfully, consciously or
imprudently.
● She had no cause to kill nor abandon it, to expose it to death, because of her affair with a former
lover
○ The claim that the child was not her husband’s is also erroneous as the past relationship
between her and her former lover took place 3 years before the incident
● The Court held that the appellant should be acquitted
○ Her act was lawful
○ The incident happened not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility
○ The incident all happened by mere accident, with no fault nor intention on her part
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The petitioner is invoking the JJWA to exempt him from criminal liability considering that he was
only 15 years old at the time the crime was committed
● RA. 9344 was enacted after judgement has been rendered on the accused
● The avail of the exempting circumstance of minority, the minor offender is presumed to have
completely lacked intelligence to distinguish right from wrong
○ Hence, the acts are deemed involuntary for which they cannot be held accountable
● The Court held that the lack of a birth certificate to prove the age of the accused in not sufficient
to not allow him to be exempt from criminal liability
○ Section 7 of the said RA expressly states that the age of the CICL may be determined not
just through a birth certificate or any other documents
● The controlling age is the age of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime, not
the age at the time of the promulgation of judgement
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N RA No. 9344 can be applied retroactively in this case? - YES
Ruling/Ratio
● RA 9344
○ AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
● The OSG is positing that the petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 4 of RA
9344 since the petitioner was convicted by the RTC as early as 1999, the CA affirmed this in
2001 and the RA was passed only in 2006. At this time, the petitioner was already 25 years old
and cannot be qualified as a child as defined in the RA.
Section 4 of RA 9344
○ A child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. (But not from civil liability)
○ Subject to an intervention program instead of imprisonment
● In the said RA, the CCIL should be exempt of criminal liability if the child was 15 years old or
younger at the time of the commission of the offense.
DieJess
○ Sec. 64 of the same RA provided that the cases involving CCIL’s shall be immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development office
● What is controlling is the age at the time of the commission of the offense, and not the age at
the time of the promulgation of judgement
● The said RA raised the age of criminal responsibility from 9 to 15 years old
● In view of this, the court must accord retroactive application of the increase in criminal
responsibility to Ortega pursuant to Article 22 of the RPC
○ Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony….
● The legislative intent for the said RA’s retroactivity was even patently stated in the deliberations
on the bill in the Senate
● The court therefore, is bound to enforce the legislative intent of the legislator for the said RA
● After further review, the court discovered that Ortega was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. In light of the RA, he shall be exempted from criminal liability
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in their decision exempting Raymund and convicting Rodel? - NO
Ruling/Ratio
● The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA
● For Raymund, he was under the age of 15 so he is covered by RA 9344, and exempt from
criminal liability
DieJess
● As for Rodel, the CA correctly ruled that he acted with discernment. Rodel was 16 years old at
the commission of the crime
● Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act
● Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances afforded by the records in each case
● The act of Rodel and his cohorts in warning Jovencio not to reveal the act to anyone proves that
he was conscious of the act and that it was unlawful
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● RA 9344, or the JJWA, exempts a child above 15 but below 18 of age from criminal liability,
unless the child is found to have acted with discernment
● Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act
○ Capacity to determine whether the act is right or wrong
● In the case, the Court agrees that the accused acted with discernment given the following:
○ The choice of the location to perpetrate the crime
○ Boxing the victim to weaken her
● The above mentioned circumstances prove that the appellant fully understood the
consequences of his unlawful action
DieJess
● The penalty was reduced pursuant to RA 9344 and minority was appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance instead
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the entrapment operation conducted by the police valid? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant is arguing that the operation was not in the nature of an entrapment operation,
but is an instigation
○ She claims that the police did not conduct a surveillance and did not even know who
their subject was
○ Neither did the police know the identities of the victims
● Furthermore, the appellant argues the she should be acquitted following the subjective test
○ For the prosecution has failed to adduce evidence that would prove she had a history of
engaging in human trafficking or any other offense
● The Court held that the conviction of the accused must be affirmed
● First of all, the entrapment operation was valid, notwithstanding the lack of a surveillance
operation - which is not a requisite for the validity of such
● The Court discussed in Doria, the tests for the validity of an entrapment operation
DieJess
○ Subjective test: focus is the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime, his state
of mind, and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents
■ Relevant facts about the accused’s mental and character traits are considered to
assess his state of mind before the crime
■ If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense
at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment is valid, even if the police used an
unduly persuasive inducement
■ The difference is between a trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal
○ Objective test: considered the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of
police conduct
■ Inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, police
conduct, and not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime
■ The goal of this is to deter unlawful police conduct
● The Courts this jurisdiction are not precluded from using both or either one of these tests
● The difference between entrapment and instigation was also discussed by the Court
○ Entrapment is when a law officer employs ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime
■ Mens Rea originates from the mind of the criminal
○ Instigation is when the accused is induced to commit the crime
■ The law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the
accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution
● Following the two tests, the accused is guilty and the entrapment operation is valid
○ Subjective: the accused initiated the transaction
○ Objective: the police merely proceeded to the red light district, it was the accused who
asked them to solicit girls for prostitution
● For the surveillance, it is not a prerequisite for a valid entrapment or buy-bust operation
These operations are allowed as long as they do not violate the rights of the accused
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in their decision to convict Garcia and Ortega for the crime of Murder?
- YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled to acquit Garcia and to reduce the crime charged to Ortega to Homicide
● The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength to convict
the accused Ortega for Murder
○ However, this was not clearly proven in the trial
● The Court stated that abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to take advantage of such superiority
○ It must be shown that the accused used excessive forehead
○ It is necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of the protagonist
but also the various incidents of the event
● The accused was 5’5 while the victim was 6’0
○ There was also no testimony as to how the attack was initiated
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the accused should benefit from the absolutory and exempting cause provided in Article
247 of the RPC? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● An absolutory cause is present “where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public
policy and sentiment, there is no penalty imposed”
● The essential elements of the defense are as follows:
○ That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person
○ That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter
DieJess
○ That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse
● The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity.
○ Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery
● The first element is clear in this case. Manolito caught his wife and her paramour having sex
prompting him to kill Jesus and his wife out of anger and jealousy
● The Court cited Wagas and stated that the vindication of a Man’s honor is justified because of
the scandal an unfaithful wife creates.
○ The unfaithful wife must be caught flagrant deli to and it must be resorted to only with
great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted during the sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellant should benefit from the mitigating circumstance of BWS and impulse?
Ruling/Ratio:
● A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or phycological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights
● To be classified as such, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice
● The battered woman exhibit common personality traits: low self-esteem, traditional beliefs
about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant
DieJess
male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; false hopes that the
relationship will improve
● BWS is characterized by the so called “cycle of violence”
○ Tension-building phase
■ Involves minor battering, either verbal or physical. The woman usually tries to
pacify the husband through a kind behavior. She allows herself to be abused in
ways that are comparatively minor.
■ All the wife wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence.
■ This is a double-edged sword as her “placating” and passive behavior legitimizes
the husband’s belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place
○ Acute battering incident
■ This is characterized by brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death
■ The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
■ During this phase, she has no control
■ This phase brings a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain
○ Tranquil, loving phase
■ The couple experience profound relief
■ This causes dependence and emotional attachment despite the abuse
● In the present case, it is clear that there was a history of abuse on the part of the deceased
husband
● A battered woman is immobilized from her ability to act decisively in her own interests, making
her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape
○ The woman experiences trauma from the cycle of violence, both physical and emotional
○ This is paired with low self-esteem and anxiety
● After going through the records, the Court ruled that there were insufficient proof that the wife
was a battered woman.
○ The Court held that the accused failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern
○ There was failure on the part of the accused to show that the third phase of the cycle
(loving phase) occurred.
○ In sum, the appellant failed to elicit the factual experiences and thought that would
clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome
● For BWS to be successfully invoked as self defense, the appellant must prove the state of mind at
the time of the offense - she must have actually feared imminent harm from her husband and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life
○ In this light, the Court held that unlawful aggression was not present
● However, the Court ruled that the mitigating circumstances of psychological paralysis and,
passion and obfuscation
● For passion and obfuscation to be invoked, the following requisites must concur:
○ There is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind
○ This act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a consider at least
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity
DieJess
● Given the two mitigating circumstances and the lack of an aggravating circumstance, the
appellant is ordered to be released from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole.
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellants should be acquitted?
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled that the testimony of the 2 appellants and the lone witness
○ De los Santos claims that it was De Jesus who fired the fatal shot
○ While the appellants claim that it was only Yalong who fired the gun
● The Court finds more convincing the testimony of the appellants that only Yalong fired the two
shots that hit the deceased
○ Yalong admitted to this fact
○ De Jesus’ testimony serves to corroborate this admission
● With this, the testimony of de los Santos is now in grave doubt
○ The motive for his committing the falsehood is manifest
● The fabricated nature of the testimony of de los Santos becomes more evident in light of the
testimony of Dr. Salvador
DieJess
○ Salvador testified that the muzzle of the gun could have been only 5 inches from the
body of the deceased. A better marksman that the trial court found De Jesus to be was
not needed
● The inconsistencies with the testimony of de los Santos shows that he was not at the scene of
the crime when it happened
● From the evidence on record, it the Court ruled that de Jesus had no participation in the
shooting
● The Court then looked into the claim of self-defense by Yalong
○ In this, they found that the defense was incomplete for the means that Yalong resorted
to repel the aggression was unreasonable
● The Court then ruled that De Jesus must be acquitted and only Yalong must be convicted but
with the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense
DieJess
Case:Nadyahan v. People
Facts:
● Petitioner in this case was found guilty for the crime of homicide by the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao
○ Victim: Mark Anthony Pagaddut
● The facts of the case are as follows:
○ Petitioner was driving him his motorcycle on the way to Poblacion with a certain Mark
Apilis
○ As they reached the marker of the junction road going to Bontoc, they were flagged
down by the victim and others
○ Acangan, one of the people who flagged them down, asked petitioner for a ride home
and the latter obliged
○ Acangan then asked petitioner to treat them to a drink, petitioner declined and this
angered Acangan
○ Acangan then slapped petitioner and kicked his foot
○ Thereafter, petitioner got off his motorcycle and prepared to fight Acangan
○ The companions of Acangan then picked up pieces of wood, this prompted petitioner to
instruct Apilis to start the motorcycle
○ Before petitioner could leave, he was struck on the back with a piece of wood by one of
the companions of Acangan
○ Petitioner then took his knife and ran towards his house, he was followed by Acangan’s
group
○ He was then met by Binwag, one of the members of the group, and the petitioner asked
why he was being ganged up on.
○ As this was happening, he was hit by Pagaddut with a belt buckle
○ As he was starting to lose consciousness, he thrusted his knife and stabbed Pagaddut,
they both fell down
○ Thereafter, petitioner got up and went home
○ He eventually surrendered to the authorities
● The trial court found that his self-defense was incomplete and therefore convicted him for
homicide
○ The trial court ruled that the means were unreasonable
● This was brought up to the CA and the same affirmed the ruling of the trial court
● Hence, this petition
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in ruling that there is an incomplete defense? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● For the justifying circumstance of self defense to be sustained, 3 requisites must be present:
○ Unlawful aggression (Indispensable)
○ Reasonable means
DieJess
○ Lack of provocation
● In this case, the Court held that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner
● However, the means resorted to were unreasonable
○ The equivalence of a belt-buckle to a knife cannot be rational
○ There is clearly a disproportion
● In view of this, the petitioner cannot benefit from the complete defense of self-defense
● But he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense
DieJess
Facts:
● The present case is on mandatory review before the Supreme Court
● The accused was found guilty of the crime of Murder and were sentenced to death
○ Accused: Alfonso, Edilberto, Cecilio Pajenado, Aniceto Toling
○ Victim: Jorge Tapong
● The facts of the case are as follows:
○ Aniceto Toling admitted responsibility for the injuries sustained by the deceased, Tapong
○ Toling is a barrio policeman
○ There was a party at the house of Constancio Pajenado
■ The accused and the victim were guests at the said party
○ The accused was already drunk and was brought home on the order of the Mayor,
Jolejole
■ Jorda, Pajac, Sacay were charged of bringing the accused home
○ While on their way, the 5 accused, emerged and attacked the victim
○ Jorda, Pajac and Sacay brought Tapong to his house but he was already in a coma, he
died later on
○ As stated earlier, Toling assumed responsibility
■ He claims that Tapong became angry and got a bolo and attacked the accused
■ He was asked to drop his weapon but he instead, lunged at Toling
Issue:
● W/N the accused should be exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he acted in the
fulfillment of a duty or in lawful exercise of a right or office? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office
● There are two requisites for this circumstance
○ That the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office
○ That the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or lawful exercise of such right or office
● The Court held that there is no legal basis to justify the actions of Toling
● Firstly, his claim of being a barrio policeman is null and void for he was appointed by the
Municipal Mayor - who did not have the authority to appoint for such power is vested to the
barrio captain.
● Furthermore, the Court found that Toling’s action was not indicative of a person clothed with
authority performing a lawful duty
○ After the incident, Toling ran away
DieJess
○ Such unnatural action negates and rendered improbable the claim that he was acting in
the fulfillment of a duty
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioners are entitled to the justifying circumstances? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The requisites for fulfillment of duty are as follows
○ The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office
○ The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office
● The requisites for obedience of a superior are as follows:
○ An order has been issued by a superior
○ Such order must be for some lawful purpose
○ The means used by the subordinate to carry out the order is lawful
● For Ambil, both requisites are lacking
○ He exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adamlim at
his house
● For Apelado, only the first requisite is present in the case
● Due to this, he may not be exempt but he benefits from the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense
● Neither the order not the means employed by Apelado were lawful
○ They were not armed with a court order when the transfer was conducted
○ Apelado, a law graduate, cannot be ignorant to such fact or procedure
○ Furthermore, the circumstances of the case proves that conspiracy between the two
were subsisting, therefore, making them both liable for the violation
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in convicting the accused appellants?
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and the CA
● They believe that the court a quo correctly found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
● The credibility of the victims are credible and as the nature of rape is intimate and often times,
only the victim and the offender are present, the credibility of the witness receives primordial
consideration
● Therefore, the defense of alibi from the appellants should fail as the evidence against them is
too strong to be countered by their alibis
● On the penalties for the accused, the Court held that the presence of conspiracy among the
accused appellants is clear, therefore, their acts are taken collectively
● However, due to the minority of appellants John, Mark and Jaypee, they are afforded with the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
○ This lowers their penalty to a degree lower than that prescribed by the law
● They cannot benefit from the exempting circumstance provided in RA 9344 because it was clear
that they acted with discernment
DieJess
Case: People v. Yu
Facts:
● Appellants in this case were convicted for the crime of murder but the CFI of Leyte
○ Appellants: Esteban Yu and Antonio Novilla (Principals) Felipe Villafuerte and Teotimo
Paala (Accomplices)
○ Victim: Cipriano Velardo
● The crime happened as follows:
○ Velar de was the referee at the local sabungan
○ In a match between the roosters of Diosdado Yu and Nicolas Jamora, Velarde ruled that
the fight was a draw
○ This prompted a quarrel to ensue
○ Esteban Yu was the brother of Diosdado, he insisted that his brother’s rooster should
win as it was still alive
○ Velarde stood with his decision and this angered the Yu brothers, one Alfonso Yu then
stoop up and he approached Velarde and stuck him with a knife
○ Thereafter the other brothers stepped in to assault Velarde
○ A policeman, who was in the cockpit, fired his gun into the air to stop the commotion
○ Velarde was then able to get out of the ring and he was followed by Esteban and
Diosdado
○ Upon reaching the door, Villafuerte stabbed him at the back
○ Velarde then continued running but Paala met him and stabbed him as well
○ Despite the wounds, he still continued to run
■ He was then stoned by Novilla
○ When Velarde eventually stopped, Novilla approached him and struck him on the head
with a piece of bamboo causing him to spin around and fall into a kneeling position
○ The assailants then surrounded him and continued to assault him
○ After a while, the assailants dispersed and left him on the ground
○ Thereafter Sinforosa Yu, wife of Esteban, arrived and, upon seeing Velarde’s legs still
moving, stabbed him at the base of the neck, uttering: How long will it take you to die,
you son of a bitch. If I ever meet a relative of yours, I will kill him”
○ Velarde died on the spot
● The postmortem examination on Velarde showed that he sustained 17 wounds on his body
● Thereafter, the chief of police filed complaints against the assailants
● Alfonso Yu died before the trial, Sinforosa Yu was found guilty of an impossible crime, Tomas
Saldao, Diosdado Yu and Jovito Villafuerte were acquitted
● The case was brought to the CA and the same affirmed the decision of the trial court for Paala
and Villafuerte
● For Yu, the CA increased the penalty to death due to the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
and reclusion perpetua for Novilla
● Appellants then moved for reconsideration and the case was certified to the CA
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the trial court erred in not holding that Esteban Yu acted in self-defense or in defense of a
relative - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court could not accept the claim of self-defense by appellant Yu
○ The record shows that Yu was the aggressor in this case
● In regards with the alleged accomplices, Villafuerte and Paala, the Court held that they are not
merely accomplices, but also co-principals to the crime
● As for the penalty for Yu, the aggravating circumstance of recidivism applies to him as he was
convicted of homicide in 1940
○ Therefore the penalty that should be imposed on him is death
● However, in 1972, Yu was already 70 years old
○ In view of this, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him due to his age
● The Court then commuted the penalty to reclusion perpetua
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in concluding that the petitioner has to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts as to the guilt of the petitioner
● The elements of the crime of theft were both present in the case:
○ That the property was lost by the owner
○ That it was lost by felonious taking
● Therefore, the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt
● As to the penalty, the Court agreed with the RTC that the petitioner should benefit from the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
○ Her extrajudicial confession letter is analogous to voluntary surrender
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellant should benefit from the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit
so grave of a wrong and voluntary surrender - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The appellant contends that he never or did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed to so grave an offense as the felony charged against him and that he voluntarily
surrendered to the authority its
● Furthermore, he claims that the dying declaration of her wife showed that it was an accident
DieJess
● If he would not be acquitted, appellant argues that he should benefit from the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and no intention to commit so grave a wrong
● The Court upheld the conviction of the appellant
● For the mitigating circumstances the court discussed the two that were being invoked by the
appellant
● No intent to commit so grave a wrong:
○ This mitigating circumstance arrested itself to the intention of the offender at the
particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act
○ This is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed
○ For this, the appellant cannot benefit from it
■ This is due to the fact that there was no disparity between the means he used in
injuring his wife and the resulting burns on her body
● On voluntary surrender, the Court held that he should benefit from this
○ The elements of this mitigating circumstance is as follows:
■ The offender has not been actually arrested
■ The offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent
■ The surrender was voluntary
○ In the case of the appellant, all 3 requisites are present
■ At the time of his surrender, he had not actually been arrested
■ He surrendered to the authorities
■ His surrender was voluntary, as borne by the certification issued by the police
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court upheld the ruling of the lower court
● In ruling that the mitigating circumstance attended the commotion of the crime, the Court held
that Ranio did not intend to kill his uncle when he punched him.
● The fact that the death was not primarily caused by the boxing but due to the subsequent falling
of the victim and incidental hitting of his head on the improvised stove proves that there was no
intent to kill
○ However, he may not be acquitted
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the petitioner shall benefit from the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation? -
YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the petitioner was indeed guilty of the crime charged
DieJess
● As for the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the Court stated that they should
not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances
● The Court held that the circumstances attending the crime shows that the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation were present
○ Petitioner was threatened but he victim
○ This provoked him and angered him and further obfuscated him
○ The fact that the lives of his wife and children were in danger also supports the
conclusion that passion and obfuscation attended the crime
DieJess
Case: People v. CA
Facts:
● The facts of the case are as follows:
○ Navy Captain Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard.
○ He came from Brenda Avenue on an intelligence operation
○ At the same time, Generoso and Manuel Miranda were driving in the same direction,
after coming from Ramada Hotel
○ Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan when, suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in
Generoso’s way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan’s path
○ This angered Tangan so he blew his horn several times
■ Generoso then slowed down to allow Tangan to overtake him
○ Thereafter, Tangan kept blocking the right lane, keeping Generoso behind him
○ As Generoso approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-Turn
○ Generoso passed him and pulled over and got out of his car
○ They then had a verbal altercation with each other
○ As this was happening, Tangan pointed at Generoso, the latter slapped it
○ Later on, Tangan countered and then got his .38 caliber handgun from his car
○ Thereafter, Generoso got shot in the stomach
○ From here, the narration of the events are conflicting
■ The prosecution claims that Tangan shot Generoso
■ The defense invoked an accident, as the gun fired while the accused and the
victim were grappling possession for the gun
○ Tangan ran away after the gun went off
○ Generoso was rushed to the hospital but he expired on the way
● Tangan was initially charged with murder and this was amended to homicide with the use of a
licensed firearm
○ A separate charge of illegal possession was filed
● Tried ensued and Tangan was convicted for the crime of homicide and acquitted for the charge
for illegal possession
○ The trial court appreciated the following mitigating circumstances :
■ Privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
■ Ordinary mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party and passion and obfuscation
● Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgement and was allowed bail
in the homicide case
● Tangan appealed to the CA, the appellate court affirmed the judgement of the trial court
● The Office of the Solicitor General is now before the court, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging
that the CA acted in grave abuse of discretion
○ The OSG prayed that the accused be convicted without the appreciation of the
mitigating circumstances
● Tangan, likewise filed a petition for review
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the court a quo erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstances? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● In view of the conflicting testimonies, both the trial court and the CA found the version of the
defense as more convincing
○ Not because it is the absolute truth but because it is the best approximation of the truth
based on the witnesses and the material evidence
● The Court then held that it finds no reason to depart from the factual findings of the trial court
and the CA
● The Court ruled out the accident as a justifying circumstance
○ The medical examination belies the claim of the accused that it was an accidental firing
● Now on the invocation of self-defense, the Court held that the accused should not benefit from
it as well
○ Unlawful aggression is vital to both the justifying and the mitigating circumstance
○ In the present case, the verbal exchange between the accused and the victims cannot be
considered as unlawful aggression
● The mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation cannot be
appreciated as well
○ The honking of the horn cannot be considered as sufficient provocation for the accused
to act violently
○ The cutting of lanes is likewise, not considered as sufficient provocation
● For passion and obfuscation, there are 2 requisites:
○ There be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind
○ Said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover
his normal equanimity
● In this case, there was no occurrence which would have created such condition in the mind of
Tangan
○ Tangan’s acts were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness
● In total, no mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N death affects the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased wife? - NO, it continues to survive
Ruing/Ratio:
● The petitioner is arguing that the wife of the accused never became a co-owner of the three
parcels of land because she predeceased her mother. Hence, no succession happened. The
death of the wife also extinguished the relationship between Sato and the family
● The OSG claims that Sato is covered by the from criminal liability provided under Article 332
○ Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports the claim that the death of Zenaida (the
wife) dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita (the mother)
● There are two views with regard to the matter:
DieJess
○ Terminated affinity view: the relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of
the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
between the parties
■ Exception: the relationship by affinity continues when there is a surviving issue
○ Continuing affinity view: The relationship of affinity continues between the surviving
spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.
● The court ruled that the second view (continuing affinity view) is more consistent with the
language and spirit of Article 332 of the RPC
● This interpretation of the law intends to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory clause in Article 332 is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the
degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
● The fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in
favor of the accused. Thi is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused
shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt
○ Intimately related to this principle is the rule of lenity. This applies when the court is
faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute. The rule calls for the adoption
of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
○ This rule becomes all the more appropriate when the case is viewed through the lens of
the basic purpose of Article 322 to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory
clause.
● The court held that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the
blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which
created the affinity
NOTE: Sato was not absolved of the crime. It was remanded back to the trial court because the charge
against him is the COMPLEX crime of Estafa and not the SIMPLE crime. The Article 332 is only applicable
to the simple crime of estafa.
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled to grant the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense
to the accused
● This is based on the fact that the accused belong to a family of old customs to whom the
elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes
disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home and at the same time, spreads uneasiness
and anxiety in the minds of the family members
● Furthermore, the accused should likewise benefit from the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation
○ The fact that the victim ran away when he saw them and that he was done a grave
offense against them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a
fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit the crime
DieJess
● Lastly, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender must also be appreciated in favor of
Epifanio
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● Appellant pleads for consideration of the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave
offense committed to a relative
● However, the Court finds no basis to justify the application of this mitigating circumstance
● This mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated due to the time lapsed from the time he
heard Gina call his daughter a flirt and the time when the stabbing incident happened
○ 2 months
● It cannot be appreciated because the appellant has had sufficient time to recover his serenity
● The supposed vindication should happen immediately or proximately from the alleged grave
offense on the relative
● Furthermore, the damage caused by the act must be proportionate and adequate to stir one to
its commission
DieJess
● The remark that Gina made to appellant’s daughter does not warrant and justify his act of
slaying the victim
DieJess
Case: US v. Ampar
Facts:
● Appellant, Clemente Ampar, was convicted for the crime of murder by killing Modesto Patobo
● The crime happened as follows:
○ It happened in a fiesta in barrio Magbaboy, San Carlos, Occidental Negreos
○ Appellant went to the kitchen and asked Patbobo for some delicacy
○ Patobo answered: “there is no more, come here and I will make roast pig of you”
○ Appellant contends that this made he feel like a child
○ With that provocation, while Patobo was squatting down, Ampar came up behind him
and struck him on the head with an ax
○ This caused the death of Patobo
● In rendering a decision, the Court a quo gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense
Issue:
● W/N the application of the mitigating circumstance is proper? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● For the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense to be appreciated,
the act committed against the offender should be a “grave offense”
● To the a layman, the act committed to the appellant would be considered as a mere trifle, but
for the defendant it was a serious matter
● The appellant, being an old man, was made to be the butt of a joke in the presence of so many
guests
○ The nature of which and the location of the insult would make it a serious matter
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and passion and
obfuscation should be appreciated? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court appreciated lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong because the only intent of the
appellant was to chastise Ferdinand due to what he did to appellant’s son
○ This was appreciated in favor of the accused
○ This was further strengthened by the remorse that appellant exhibited after the crime
was committed
■ He accompanied the victim to the hospital and volunteered to pay for the
medical and hospital expenses
■ He also bought medicine for the victim
● On the second mitigating circumstance, the trial court ruled that the act of the victim of boxing
appellant’s 4 year old son was too trivial and insignificant to have produced the passion and
obfuscation contemplated by law
● However, the Court ruled that the act of the appellant arose from a natural instinct that impels a
father to rush to the rescue of a beleaguered son, regardless of whether the latter be right or
wrong
● Therefore, when appellant saw his son being boxed by the victim, a much bigger boy, and the
latter was in the act of delivering another blow, the appellant was then blinded by anger and lost
sight of the fact that his son’s adversary was a 9 year old boy
DieJess
● Clearly, the act was done on the impulse of passion and obfuscation
● Crime reduced to homicide
DieJess
Case: US v. Taylor
Facts:
● Appellant in this case was convicted for the crime of resisting arrest and violently assaulting an
officer
○ Officer: Leoncio Martinez, a policeman of Manila
● The event happened as follows:
○ The appellant and his companions were using threatening and insulting language on the
public streets of Manila and in the presence and within the hearing of the policeman
○ The police officer then attempted to make the arrest
○ Contending that the arrest was improper, the appellant resisted and assaulted Martinez
● The trial court was of the opinion that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
should be appreciated
Issue:
● W/N the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation attended the crime? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The passion and obfuscation defense must only be taken into consideration when it appears that
it was provoked by a prior unjust or improper act (Spanish Supreme Court)
● In this case, the arrest which gave rise to their anger and indignation was a lawful one, therefore
the trial court erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
● The penalty imposed to Anderson TAylor was raised to the medium degree from the minimum
degree
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation attended the commission of
the crime? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled to modify the decision and reduce the crime to homicide
● Appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and of
voluntary surrender
DieJess
● In this case, the presence of treachery was out sufficiently established by the
prosecution
○ Treachery or alevosia means that the offender did not give the victim a chance to
defend himself
● Passion and obfuscation is also present in the case
● This mitigating circumstance requires the following:
○ That there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind
○ That said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity
● The “considerable length of time” is not a clearly defined
● The provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so fat apart that a
reasonable length of time has passed to calm the accused down and be able to reflect
on the consequences of his or her actions
○ The important thing is that the accused has not yet “recovered his normal
equanimity” when he committed the crime
● The facts must be examined on a case-to-case basis for passion and obfuscation to be
appreciated
● Acts done in the spirit of revenge cannot be considered acts done with passion and
obfuscation
○ Caber
● Passion and obfuscation must not be narrowly understood as to referring only to the
emotions felt seconds before the commission of a crime
○ Passion may linger and build up over time as repressed anger enough to
obfuscate reason and self-control
● The context of both the victim and the accused must also be taken into account
○ The victim was a rich man and the appellant was a Barangay tanod
○ There is clear economic ascendancy over the other
● The victim not only threatened to molest the daughter of the appellant but also insulted
him in front of his superior
○ Both the parties lived in a small locality wherein insults could be made to
measure the character of one
● There was neither a reason why Gulane would act that way towards the appellant nor
evidence showing that the appellant had previously wronged him
○ Nag titrip lang
● There was no reasonable certainty that Gulane did not provoke the appellant a few
seconds before the incident
DieJess
Facts:
● Appellant, Felix Magpantay, was jointly convicted for the crime of murder along with
Arnulfo Estabaya and Eugenia Alcatraz
○ Victim: Lope Cadacio, Emilio Claveria, Dorothea Malabanan, Albino Syrian,
Rosendo Raes, Ignacio Francisco, Hermogena Atilano, Catalina Gervacio,
Filomeno Macalalad and Alejandro Fernandez
● The events of the case is as follows:
○ The accused-appellants ambushed and killed the victims with the use of carbine
rifles while the victims were riding a passenger-jeep
■ TPU-14016
○ The appellants insists on the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty
○ Magpantay and Alcatraz contend that after committing the crime, they weren’t to
a certain, Labo, a former barrio lieutenant, to surrender
○ Labo then refused to accept their surrender because he was no longer the
incumbent official of the barrio
○ They then proceeded to barrio Rosacara but the barrio lieutenant refused to
accept on the ground that the crime was committed outside his jurisdiction
○ The trio then proceeded to barrio Sapang Dagat and prepared a letter to PC Sgt.
Araman
○ The route they took was towards the mountains
○ On the second day, they were informed that the PC soldiers had been issued a
shoot-to-kill order on them
○ The Mayor of Bongabon was then informed of Magpantay’s desire to surrender,
this was reported to the PC detachment in Sumagui and to Colonel Ver
○ That same morning, Magpantay surrendered to the Mayor
■ He was delivered to Colonel Ver
○ The other accused then surrendered and handed over their rifles
● The prosecution rebutted this and claimed that civilians informed the PC of the
whereabouts of the accused and that the area was surrounded by soldiers
○ This provided them no means of escape
Issue:
● W/N the accused-appellants Magpantay and Alcatraz are entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
DieJess
● The Court held that the 2 should benefit from the mitigating circumstance
● There was a failure to prove that the accused felt that they had no other alternative
course than to surrender
○ Furthermore, the fact that the PC had waited at a designated place for the
surrender shows that they conformed to his offer of voluntary surrender
○ Colonel Ver waited at the agreed ares to receive the surrendered and not to
capture him
● Same can be said for Alcatraz because the PC had prior knowledge of his offer to
surrender, when Fajardo’s letter to Sgt. Araman was referred to the provincial
commander
● The flight of the accused to the mountains cannot be taken against their intention to
surrender
● After the commission of the crime, the appellant defied no law or agent of authority
○ And when they did surrender, they did so with meekness and repentance
● Alcatraz, unarmed, slept with Sgt. Araman in an isolated place
○ If he had wanted to defy the authorities, he and Fajardo could have easily
overpowered Araman, but they did not do so
DieJess
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court held that the defense failed to establish the existence of the mitigating
circumstances
● The defense failed to prove that the deceased was then drunk when the incident
happened
● Furthermore, the appellant did not go to the PC headquarters after the shooting to
surrender, but merely to report the incident
● This shows that the appellant had no desire to own the responsibility for the killing
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N Joaquin Velez should benefit from the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
DieJess
● The evidence for the appellant is the police blotter that stated that he has “surrendered”
after learning that they were involved and accused in connection to the death of the
victim
● However, the Court held that the word “surrender” was merely a euphemism for actual
arrest
○ Joaquin was actually arrested while buying rice, he yielded to the authorities
because of the warrant of arrest
● Hence, the voluntary surrender to the authorities in this case is not mitigating
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the decision is void due to the grave abuse of discretion and legal error of the
respondent judges? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● First of all, the Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he allowed
the the changing of the plea to guilty to a lower offense
● On the mitigating circumstances, the respondent Judge has appreciated the 2 mitigating
circumstances without the presentation of evidence that will prove such
● For the mitigating circumstances to be appreciated, the accused must be able to
sufficiently prove that these circumstances did attend the commission of the crime
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellant should be exempt from criminal liability? - NO
Ruling/Ratio:
● The Court ruled that the appellant failed to overcome the presumption of sanity
● The defense failed to prove that the appellant was completely deprived of intelligence in
committing the acts
● Proof of the existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will not exempt the accused
from culpability, if it was shown that he was not completely deprived of freedom and
intelligence
● The appellant’s recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions afterwards
indicate that he was sane before, during, and after the commission of the crime
○ He felt guilty after killing the victim and apprehensive for being in jail for a longer time
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation should be
applied? - YES
Ruling/Ratio:
● The case was born out of a lovers quarrel that spiraled into a destructive crime that
affected 5 residences
● The Court held that the trial court should have appreciated the mitigating circumstance
similar and analogous to passion and obfuscation
● An impulse of invidious or resentful feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion and
obfuscation
● The situation in this case is similar to passion and obfuscation insofar as it diminishes
one’s intelligence and intent and reduces one’s mental and rational faculties
● The chain of events was ignited by the lover’s quarrel
DieJess
● Emotions took over in the situation paired with the resentment and the frustration of the
appellant
● Appellant was in a state of extreme emotional stress
DieJess
Issue:
● W/N the appellant should benefit from the mitigating circumstance of BWS and impulse?
Ruling/Ratio:
● A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or phycological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights
● To be classified as such, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice
● The battered woman exhibit common personality traits: low self-esteem, traditional beliefs
about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant
DieJess
male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; false hopes that the
relationship will improve
● BWS is characterized by the so called “cycle of violence”
○ Tension-building phase
■ Involves minor battering, either verbal or physical. The woman usually tries to
pacify the husband through a kind behavior. She allows herself to be abused in
ways that are comparatively minor.
■ All the wife wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence.
■ This is a double-edged sword as her “placating” and passive behavior legitimizes
the husband’s belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place
○ Acute battering incident
■ This is characterized by brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death
■ The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
■ During this phase, she has no control
■ This phase brings a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain
○ Tranquil, loving phase
■ The couple experience profound relief
■ This causes dependence and emotional attachment despite the abuse
● In the present case, it is clear that there was a history of abuse on the part of the deceased
husband
● A battered woman is immobilized from her ability to act decisively in her own interests, making
her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape
○ The woman experiences trauma from the cycle of violence, both physical and emotional
○ This is paired with low self-esteem and anxiety
● After going through the records, the Court ruled that there were insufficient proof that the wife
was a battered woman.
○ The Court held that the accused failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern
○ There was failure on the part of the accused to show that the third phase of ssthe cycle
(loving phase) occurred.
○ In sum, the appellant failed to elicit the factual experiences and thought that would
clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome
● For BWS to be successfully invoked as self defense, the appellant must prove the state of mind at
the time of the offense - she must have actually feared imminent harm from her husband and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life
○ In this light, the Court held that unlawful aggression was not present
● However, the Court ruled that the mitigating circumstances of psychological paralysis and,
passion and obfuscation
● For passion and obfuscation to be invoked, the following requisites must concur:
○ There is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind
○ This act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a consider at least
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity
DieJess
● Given the two mitigating circumstances and the lack of an aggravating circumstance, the
appellant is ordered to be released from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole.