UNIT 2

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ON
PHILIPPINE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
(PART II)

The Americans and the Filipinos Before American Colonization

For most people, Philippine-United States relations began in 1898, when Commodore Dewey
defeated the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay. The year 1898 also marked the signing of
the Treaty of Paris, which officially transferred the Philippines from Spain to the United States,
the Filipino proclamation of independence notwithstanding.

Long before 1898, however, Filipinos and Americans were already in contact with each other’s
lands. Americans began arriving on Philippine shores in the late 1700s, after the American
declaration of independence. American ships began sailing to China to open trade relations.
When American ships began plying Asian trade routes, the Philippines had just barely opened
by the Spaniards to informal trade, ending over a century of isolation and Spanish monopoly.
American traders could not ignore the Philippines, especially since the Spaniards gradually
relaxed trade relations in Manila.

American entrepreneurs in the 19th century helped develop new export products for the
Philippines, in particular developing abaca (hemp) as a commercial enterprise. Apart from
developing the abaca plantations, American entrepreneurs also established processing plants,
such as the Santa Mesa Cordage Factory. As American trading interests in the Philippines
increased, so too did the problems they faced. Corruption, red tape and other hindrances
prevented further economic investments. To represent American interests and American
nationals, the U.S. government appointed John Sturt Kerr, an American businessman in Manila,
as consul in 1801. As American business in the Philippines grew, and as additional ports were
opened to trade, consuls were also appointed at Cebu and Iloilo.

Despite the interest of American merchants and businessmen, however, the British eventually
took over the import and export trade in the Philippines, bolstered by their colonies –Hong Kong
and Singapore, the aggressive establishment of banks and financial institutions and government
assistance. The Americans, with no territory of their own close by, with no government support
and facing crop failures in the Philippines, gradually were pushed into the shadows and
eventually out of the game. Major American companies were forced to close shop like Russell
and Sturgis and Peele, Hubbell and Company.

In addition to American commercial interest in the Philippines, the U.S. Navy also had its
interests in the Philippines. The first U.S. navy ships to arrive in the Philippine waters were
those of the naval scientific expedition commanded by Lt. Charles Wilkes. Apart from the
scientific observations, the Wilkes expedition also noted the condition of Spanish defenses in the
Philippines, and economic conditions, particularly hemp, which had been developed by
American entrepreneurs. From Manila, the Wilkes expedition proceeded to Sulu, where a treaty
was negotiated between the Sultan of Sulu and Wilkes to protect shipwrecked American
sailors should any American ship founder or meet an accident in the area. This was the first
treaty signed between an American and a Filipino as representatives of sovereign powers.
The U.S. Navy knew the strategic potentials of the Philippines, particularly bolstered by the
ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan on the projection of naval power and national power through
acquisition and maintenance of naval bases.
American scientists and anthropologists also visited the Philippines to do field research like on
the distribution of flora and fauna. In an expedition, a young student by the name of Dean C.
Worcester went along who later returned with a classmate for further scientific research in 1890.

By 1897, then, American economic, naval, scientific and other interests on the Philippines were
present, but not yet on a substantial level. But what did the Filipinos know about the United
States?

Most Filipinos knew little about the U.S., given the Spanish colonial administration and the lure
of Europe rather than America. Since most of the Americans who visited or resided in the
Philippines were businessmen, they had little contact with the Filipinos to be able to influence
them. However, educated Filipinos knew about the American revolution, about Washington,
and the framers of the American constitutions, and had no doubt read or heard about the civil
war.

In the late 1897, after the establishment of the Biak na Bato

republic, Aguinaldo designated Felipe Agoncillo, then in
Hong Kong, as diplomatic agent of the short-lived republic.
Agoncillo met with the U.S. consul in Hong Kong,
Rounseville Wildman, seeking an alliance between the
republic and the U.S. against Spain. Agoncillo judged that
the U.S. and Spain would soon be at war, given the tensions
building over the Cuban question. Agoncillo also attempted
to negotiate for arms and ammunition with payment to be
made upon U.S. recognition of the Biak na Bato republic.
Aguinaldo already looked to the U.S. as a potential ally and source of weapons. Wildman
seemed sympathetic, transmitting Agoncillo’s proposals to Washington. The U.S. State
Department., however, was more wary and did not look favorably on Wildman’s seemingly
pro-Filipino sentiments.

Apart from this, some Filipinos were actually already residing on American soil. By the late 19th
century, a Filipino community numbering a few thousands- which probably originated from
Filipinos who jumped ship after the Spanish galleons docked in Mexico- existed in New Orleans
and in the bayous of Louisiana.

Both Filipinos and Americans, then, had contact with and knowledge of each other- but these
were not particularly deep and lasting. The year 1898 would change that.

Despite the signing of an armistice between Spain and the U.S., the ultimate fate of the
Philippines was not yet decided, and peace negotiations began in Paris in October. By late
October, McKinley wired the negotiators to demand the cession of the whole Philippines. Not
knowing this, Aguinaldo sent diplomats abroad to negotiate for the recognition of Philippine
independence, to propagandize the Philippine cause and
negotiate for more arms for the young country. To the U.S.,
Aguinaldo sent Felipe Agoncillo as “Minister Plenipotentiary
and Extraordinary” to seek American recognition of the
Philippines. McKinley, however, refused to see Agoncillo as a
diplomat or a representative of the Aguinaldo government,
insisting that he could only see Agoncillo as an ordinary
individual. Agoncillo met McKinley on McKinley’s terms on
October 1 and tried to explain the side of the Philippines, but
McKinley told him to submit it in writing but later did not take
the memorandum seriously, and thus Agoncillo’s meeting turned into little more than a
courtesy call.

Not succeeding in Washington, and realizing that

negotiations had started in Paris, Agoncillo went to
Paris to try to air the side of the Philippine government.
He was, however, not entertained and not even
allowed to enter the conference room. Without
consulting Filipinos, the Spanish and American panel
signed the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898
and was ratified after hearing the news of Filipino-
American War that broke out on February 4, 1899. This
ratification of the treaty led the Philippines to become
legally a territory of the U.S.

The American Colonization and Philippine-U.S. Relations

American colonization of the Philippines paved the way for the first Filipino overseas workers.
The majority of them coming from the Ilocos region, Filipinos went to Hawaii and California as
contract workers. In the early years of U.S. occupation, agents of the Hawaii Sugar Planters
Association (HSPA) sent agents to the Philippines to recruit Filipino laborers for Hawaii’s sugar
plantations to solve the labor shortage there. The first batch left for Hawaii in 1906. As the years
passed, Filipinos moved on to the mainland, especially California, Alaska, Oregon, and
Washington. The bulk of them were Filipino male laborers. Filipinos also went to the United
States either as pensionados of the American government or in their own private capacity.

Bates Treaty

Through the Treaty of Paris, the U.S. employed the same “benevolent assimilation policy” in
Mindanao and Sulu as in the rest of the country. The distinctness of the people, their struggle,
law and customs did not matter to the U.S. Even previous agreements of Spain with the Moros
were taken for granted. The U.S., indeed, was bent on controlling the whole archipelago.

The U.S., in her effort to contain any possible alliance between the Moros and Filipino
“insurrectos,” sent American troops to Sulu and other parts of Mindanao. As war raged in the
north, the Americans were busy neutralizing the Moros. President Emilio Aguinaldo saw the
need to forge a national struggle with the Moros and tried to form an alliance with the latter to
prevent being totally co-opted by America. On January 18, 1899, President Aguinaldo wrote a
letter to Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of Sulu. Due to the Sultan’s ambiguous position, Jamalul Kiram
II did not respond at all.

In order to carry out the U.S. pacification, Jacob Schurman, the President of the First Philippine
Commission, negotiated with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II for the latter to recognize the United
States. The initial phase of negotiation was concluded by an unfavorable climate of suspicion.
The diplomacy of Schurman nevertheless bore results although no formal agreements were
reached. It was only when General John Bates came into the scene that the Sultan agreed to forge
a formal treaty. The initial period of negotiations between Sultan Jamalul Kiram II and General
John Bates revealed the Sultan’s last ditch efforts to assert the sovereignty of Sulu and other
islands in Mindanao. The Sultan questioned the
validity of the Treaty of Paris. After months of
negotiations, the Bates Treaty was signed on
August 20, 1899. Freely or otherwise, the Sultan was
made to recognize the U.S. sovereignty. It granted
American tutelage in Moroland. Except for some
areas in Mindanao, the treaty proposed by General
Bates became the framework for successive American
policy.

In order to penetrate Mindanao, the Americans contacted the Chinese population in Cotabato
through a “Petition to the Provost-Marshal-General in the Philippine Islands” on May 28, 1899.
On February 1, 1900, the U.S. gunboat Panay docked in Dulawan and the American
commanding officer befriended Datu Piang, a half-bred Chinese Muslim. The Philippine
Commission then sent representatives to the area, military districts were established in the
whole of Mindanao.

In 1901, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was created, followed by the Moro Province in 1903.
Subsequently, the Bates Treaty was unilaterally abrogated on March 2, 1904 by President
Theodore Roosevelt. Efforts were made by the Sultan to get the U.S. to honor the treaty.
However, all efforts were in vain. The U.S. wanted to rule the Moros under a provincial governor
who was responsible to the civil governor and the Philippine Commission. The Moro Province,
under General Leonard Wood, was responsible in laying down American pacification policy in
Moroland. Foreign and trade relations were controlled by the Americans. Moro trade with
Chinese and Filipinos remained firmly under American control. Later, many Moros were
beginning to be attracted by the policies employed by the Americans and were themselves
successfully used in pacifying resistance by the Moros.

Negotiating Government Representations and Philippine Independence

In 1902, the U.S. Congress passed the Philippine Bill which clarified American policy in the
Philippines and became the basic American organic act for the Philippines. The Bill provided
for the establishment of the Philippine Assembly, a national legislature to be filled by elective
officials. The Philippine Assembly was inaugurated in October 1907. With its establishment,
Filipinos had a greater role in passing laws for Filipinos. The Philippine Commission, however,
with a majority of American members, remained the upper house in the bicameral legislature.
In 1913, the Filipinos were allowed by the Americans to gain a majority in the Philippine.
Filipinos had gained control of the legislature. To represent Philippine interests in the U.S., the
Philippine Bill had authorized the appointment of two Filipino Resident
Commissioners in Washington D.C. who were granted official recognition by the U.S.
Executive branch. They were allowed to attend the sessions of the House of Representatives and
given the right to debate and discuss issues on the floor, but not allowed to vote. The first two
Filipino Resident Commissioners were Benito Legarda and Pablo Ocampo.

The Filipino quest for independence from the U.S. continued, and Philippine Assembly always
made it a point to approve a resolution for independence. But as long as the Republicans held
control of the American government, the hopes for Philippine independence were dim, no
matter how great the clamor was from Filipinos. In 1913, the possibility of independence loomed
when Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, won the presidency of the U.S. The Democrats had long
stood on the platform of Philippine independence, and the new governor general appointed by
Wilson, Francis Burton Harrison, reflected the Democrat’s party ideas. Under Harrison, the
Philippine government was even more thoroughly Filipinized, and the number of Americans in
the government decreased.

Harrison was backed by the passage of the Jones Law in 1916, which, for the first time in
American legal history, stated that the American purpose in the Philippines was to withdraw
their sovereignty and recognize the Philippine independence as soon as a stable government
could be established. To hasten the development of a stable government, as much as possible of
the domestic affairs should be places in the hands of Filipinos. Harrison thus implemented his
Filipinization plan based on this law.

Since the Jones Law did not provide a timetable for Philippine independence, the Philippine
legislature sent independence missions to the U.S. to lobby for legislation that would set a
specific date for Philippine independence. These missions served to keep the Philippine
independence issue alive in the U.S. Congress, despite a change of government platforms in the
1920s.

The clamor for Filipino independence continued, and was expressed not only in political
missions to the U.S., but also through songs, art, newspapers, and other means. In 1930, an
independence congress was held in Manila to discuss concrete issues regarding independence,
to show Americans the seriousness of the Filipino purpose. With the rise of varied interests
opposing the continued retention of the Philippines, the U.S. Congress took up legislation which
would set the Philippines free.

The bill called for a ten-year transition period

wherein a Philippine government called the
Commonwealth would be established. Known
as the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act (HHC),
this bill was passed when a Philippine
independence mission headed by Sergio
Osmeña and Manuel Roxas, was in Washington
to lobby for Philippine independence, where it
became the subject of partisan politics. Osmeña
and Roxas urged for its acceptance by the
Filipino people, while Osmeña’s rival Manuel
Roxas Quezon, called for its rejection. A
plebiscite was called, which divided the nation
into those in favor of the HHC- the Pros- and those against, or the Antis. In the end, Quezon and
the Antis won, and the HHC Act was rejected.

Quezon went to the U.S. to try to secure a better independence bill, but the law he came home
with- the Tydings-McDuffie Act- was virtually a carbon copy of the HHC Act, with
minor changes in wording (“military and other reservations” was changed to “naval
reservations and fueling stations”). Quezon could get nothing better, but when the act was voted
upon, it was approved. With its adoption, the Philippines was on a clearer road towards
independence from the U.S.
With the acceptance of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the road to independence from the Americans
was clear. A constitutional convention was elected in 1934, which completed its work in
February 1935, and by March 1935, President
Franklin Roosevelt approved the 1935
Constitution which was submitted to the Filipino
people in a plebiscite. On November 15, 1935, the
Commonwealth government was inaugurated
with Manuel Quezon as its first president. The
Commonwealth had ten short years to prepare
itself for independence from the U.S. in
preparing for independence, it had to have the
close cooperation of the U.S. in many of its plans.

Although under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the foreign relations of the Philippines remained in
the hand of the Americans, Quezon attempted to establish informal relations with China, japan,
and Mexico, preparatory to establishing official relations after independence. Some of these trips
were not sanctioned by the Americans, in particular Quezon’s second trip to Japan, which he
tried to keep secret, because the Americans felt Quezon was exceeding his authority.

Quezon, however, sought to obtain from Japan some promise of security, wherein Japan
recognize the neutrality of the Philippines. Although the Tydings-McDuffie Act stated that the
U.S. would take steps for neutrality of the Philippines, no action had been taken.

Another problem which bordered on foreign relations was the issue of immigration. For ten
years alien control- especially Chinese and Japanese- of the retail trade had been aa problem in
the Philippines. The control of immigration into the Philippines would also check the numbers
of Chinese and Japanese. In 1940, the National Assembly of the Commonwealth passed an
immigration act- an American immigration expert helped in drafting the bill- which sought to
limit immigration from any country to 500 a year. The Japanese and Chinese protested and made
threats, but the assembly passed the bill anyway. Since the bill bordered foreign relations, it had
to be sent to President Roosevelt, who approved the bill.

Filipinos continued to emigrate to the U.S., pushed by poverty at home and lured by dreams of
a better life. The Tydings-McDuffie Act, however, restricted immigration to only fifty (50)
Filipinos a year. In 1935, the U.S. Congress passed the Repatriation Act which encouraged
Filipinos in the U.S. to return home.

American Colonization and Philippine External Relations

Independent Filipino diplomacy and foreign relations were interrupted when the United States
decided to annex the Philippines in 1899. This did not mean the end of Filipino interaction with
the outside world. Chinese immigration to the Philippines, although outlawed by the American
colonial government, continued. Manila became an important trading port in Southeast Asia.
European traders, especially the British, the French, the Germans, and the Swiss established
trading offices in Manila. The establishment of free trade between the United States and the
colonial Philippines only meant American dominance; it did not mean American monopoly of
Philippine trade. Soon the Europeans, Americans and the Japanese were not only trading with
the Philippines, they were also investing in the country. From Japan also came the second largest
number, after China, of immigrants to the Philippines.
China

When the United States took over the Philippine government, its immediate policies on the
Chinese appeared to tighten further the Spanish discriminatory laws against the Chinese. The
first few proclamations were the implementation in the Philippines of the exclusion law
applying to the Chinese in the United States, abolition of the Gremio de Chinos (Chinese Guild),
and of the positions of the cabecillas and governadorcillo.

Despite the immediate protest of the Chinese consul against the exclusion law, the U.S. Congress
in 1902 formally extended it to the Philippines. The law prohibited Chinese immigration to the
Philippines, except for students and merchants, who were allowed temporary inhabitancy,
although Chinese who were already residing in the country could bring in their families.

The abolition of the Gremio and the institution of new immigration rules placed a heavy burden
on the Consulate. Despite the war, there were still nearly 50,000 Chinese when the American
military government took over. In 1904, when the Americans restored peace and order in
Manila, commerce and industry started to flourish. Many of the Chinese who fled to Hong Kong
during the revolution returned to the Philippines. The Consulate found itself overburdened by
consular work, involvement in business organizations, fund-raising campaigns, and demands
to supervise the increasing number of educational and charitable institutions in the Philippines.

In 1905, the American colonial government questioned Chinese ownership of public land and
issued an edict demanding the return of the Chinese Cemetery. The sixth Consul-General Chong
Wen Yao contested the edict in court and won. Since then, the proprietor of the Chinese
Cemetery and the Chinese General Hospital has been the Philippines Chinese Charitable
Association. Despite, the application of exclusion laws in the Philippines, the number of Chinese
increased threefold between 1903 and 1909. The increase was due to the colonial government’s
need for skilled labor and on illegal entrance of those who came in as relatives of legitimate
Chinese residents in the Philippines. This marked the start of the entry of Chinese who
possessed two names. Their legal names or the names of their sponsors that appeared on their
immigration papers and their real names.

The opening of the consulate led to a series of visits by emissaries and propagandists from both
the warring Manchu and the Sun Yat-sen factions on the mainland. Officially, the Chinese
emissaries tried to impress upon the overseas Chinese that the Peking government was
concerned with the welfare and well-being of the overseas Chinese communities, in economic
conditions of the Philippines, and in prospects for expansion of trade. These missions were
received by the American Governor General of the islands, fabulously feted by the business
associations and welcomed by most Chinese in Manila.

In 1906, the Chinese Government issued a directive requiring all overseas Chinese commercial
associations to comply with the rules and regulations prescribed by its Department of
Commerce. The Chinese Commercial Council of the Philippines revised its name and charter.
Its name was changed to the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, a move supported by
both the Chinese and Philippine governments. Until the Chinese revolution of 1911, the
Chamber of Commerce was the unofficial instrument of the Manchu Government for fund-
raising, for its efforts in retaining the loyalty of overseas Chinese, and in undertaking political
propaganda, and other intelligence work against Sun Yat-sen’s rebels.

The Philippine Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, aside from taking the lead in dealing
with the Philippine government on problems affecting the Chinese, was the most active and
influential organization in the Chinese community. Not only did it help unite the Philippine
Chinese into a community but it also aligned them with China. The chamber had branches in
nearly all provinces, cities, and major towns of the Philippines. It maintained a school system, a
social club, a cemetery and a modern hospital.

To show concern for the overseas Chinese, one battle which the troika waged during the
American colonial regime was against the Bookkeeping Act of February 10, 1921 which was
issued during the term of Governor Francis Burton Harrison. The Act required every merchant
in the Philippines to keep account of his business in English, Spanish, or any Philippine dialect.
Violation of the law was punishable by a fine of P10,000 or a two-year imprisonment term.

Chinese businessmen protested as the Act ostensibly encroached on their right to carry on with
trade. They hired a European lawyer to present their case all the way to Washington DC. As a
result, the new Governor General Leonard Wood asked the Philippine Legislature to postpone
the implementation of the law to January 1, 1923. The Chinese appealed to their Minister Alfred
Sze in Washington DC. Since the Bookkeeping law was enacted mainly against the Chinese in
the Philippines, Chinese officials demanded in retaliation that Americans doing business in
China must keep their books in the Chinese language. This argument proved forceful.

Aside from the Bookkeeping Act, the Philippine legislature passed many more laws to limit or
keep the Chinese out of certain aspects of Philippine business. The Philippine Chinese Chamber
of Commerce immediately protested against these acts, but the protests were disregarded and
many of the discriminatory acts and ordinances were implemented.

By 1939 total Chinese investments in the Philippines reached $100 million, second to U.S.
investment of U.S. $3,315 million. At the same time, President Quezon told his people that the
Filipino participation in the retail trade of the country had increased from 15 percent at the time
of the inauguration of the Commonwealth to approximately 37 percent in 1939.

Compared to the Spanish colonial authorities, the Americans did not initiate or carry out violent
attacks against the Chinese. But the Americans did not restrain anti-Chinese sentiments among
their colonial subjects, as it was in their interest to let Filipinos turn their nationalist sentiments
against the Chinese, and as far away as possible from the American themselves. However, when
compared to the Spanish colonial regime, the American colonial regime allowed the Chinese
more benefits.

Thus until World War II broke out in the Pacific, Filipino leaders continued to pass laws
discriminating against the Chinese. The Philippine National Assembly on May 2, 1940 passed
an act restricting the immigration quota of any nationality to 500. Again, the goal was mainly to
restrict Chinese immigration. Despite protests from the Chinese and Japanese consuls, President
Roosevelt approved the law. Lamentably, the Filipino leaders who were undergoing democratic
tutelage during the Commonwealth used the moment to make the Chinese the target of
nationalist rhetoric and legislative initiatives, serving only to obstruct Chinese assimilation or
integration to Philippine society.

Japan

With the stabilization of conditions in the Philippines under American rule, the Japanese feeling
of insecurity towards the potential presence of a hostile power on Philippine soil subsided; japan
now wished that the U.S. would stay in the Philippines forever. Especially in the first half of
American rule in the Philippines, Japan had no reason to judge American presence in the
Philippines as antagonistic to its national interest- Japanese trade, investment, and emigration
to the Philippines saw a gradual and stable increase during this period. Even in the 1930s, when
American policy towards foreign trade and investment became relatively restrictive, the
Japanese government and the Japanese business community only had to resort to more
ingenious ways of doing business in the Philippines and of exploiting the country’s natural
resources; legal restrictions only minimally checked Japanese economic expansion.

Under American rule, the Philippines remained an agricultural country with an export
economy. Meanwhile, Japan had progressed into a semi-industrialized Asian power. By virtue
of the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909 and of the Simmons-Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, a system
of free trade was established between the Philippines and the United States. The free trade
system gave the United States a definite advantage over all the trading partners of the
Philippines. On the other hand, Japan, which, by this time, had increased its overseas
possessions through acquisition of lands, continued her policy of peaceful economic expansion
to the south.

Japan’s policy of peaceful economic expansion included, aside from trade, investment and
emigration. The Philippines was, until the 1920s, not a favorite destination of Japanese settlers
and investors. They would rather go to Hawaii, California, and Brazil. Developments in U.S.-
Japan relations, and Japan’s renewed pan-Asianism, however, changed Japanese policy towards
emigration to the Philippines, and this resulted in a considerable increase of the Japanese
population and investments in the country in the 1920s and 1930s.

In the 1920s and 30s Japan was except for a few periods, the most important trading partner of
the Philippines, after the United States. Philippine exports to japan were mainly raw materials.
For 6 years since 1926, Japan was only second to the United States as a heavy importer of
unmanufactured abaca, but in 1932, she surpassed the United States. Japan also became in 1932
the largest importer of Philippine lumber. Other products that Japan bought from the
Philippines were coconut oil, base metals, mineral oil, sugar, and tobacco. On the other hand,
majority of products imported by the Philippines from Japan were manufactured goods. The
largest Japanese export to the Philippines was textile: cotton, silk, and rayon, but especially
cotton. Other export items were coal, iron, steel, and machinery.

The provenance of many Japanese goods was obvious by their names. There was the Imazu fly
paper, advertised as an effective killer of houseflies and other insects; the Imazu insect killer; the
Liquid Katol, which was described by its distributor as an insecticide; and the Fuma-Killa and
Katol mosquito killer coils. “Katol” has since become the Tagalog generic term for mosquito
killer coil, but it was actually a brand name of a product of Azumi and Company of Osaka. Other
Japanese products did not have Japanese brands, and were rather American-sounding.

In the first years of the American colonial rule of the Philippines, three (3) types of Japanese
workers entered the Philippines. These were the Japanese women called “karayukisan,” or
more straightforward, prostitutes who were attracted by the presence of American soldiers in
the Philippines. Second, were the few skilled workers who legally entered the Philippines as
contract workers like miners working in the Batan Coal Mines. The third group consisted of
contract worker, who, on paper, entered the Philippines not as contract workers, but as
immigrants who could support themselves, and would not be a burden to Philippine society; in
Japan they were called jiyû imin (free immigrants). They were actually contract workers, but
their contract was only between them and the Japanese recruitment agencies, and the contract
was not supposed to be shown to the American authorities in the Philippines. Very few of the
workers who entered the Philippines were really skilled, and therefore, to circumvent the law,
they were instructed by the recruitment agencies, with the encouragement of the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, to enter as “free immigrants.” The first largest group that
belonged to this category were the one-hundred-ninety (190) Japanese who arrived in Manila
on October 16, 1903. They were to work in the completion of the Kennon Road in Baguio.
Upon completion of Kennon Road in 1905,
Japanese laborers who were satisfied with
their earnings went back to Japan. Some settled
in nearby Trinidad valley and engaged in
agriculture. Others settled in Manila,
employed as carpenters and furniture makers
while others with capital invested in general
merchandise stores. Some three-hundred of
the laborers on the Kennon Road who became

unemployed became workers in abaca

plantations in Davao. In less than a decade the
person who recruited them Ohta Kyôsaburô,
became the owner of the Ohta Development
Company, the first abaca plantation
corporation to be established by a Japanese in
the Philippines. With a capital of 500,000
pesos in 1915, the investment of the Ohta
Development Company grew to 11 million in
1929. Coconut and lumber production was
added to its business concerns.

The Japanese population in the Philippines in 1927 was more than 11,000. Of these, around 7,000
were in Davao, and only more than 2,000 in Manila. The rest were thinly distributed n other
major cities and provinces.

The Japanese government perceived its population as too big and the rate of its growth too fast
for its limited land and other natural resources. Because of this, foreign investment and
emigration became, aside from trade, the pillars of Japan’s foreign policy in the 20 th century. The
rise of abaca as the primary export of the Philippines also attracted Japanese laborers to the
country, especially in Davao. From 1915 to 1923, the Japanese population in the Philippines
increased and decreased according to the rise and fall of the market price of abaca, then the best
species in the world.

The National Origins Act of 1924, later usually called as the 1924 Immigration Law of the United
States, was generally referred to in Japan as the “Anti-Japanese Law.” It banned nationals
ineligible for American citizenship from entering the United States as laborers or immigrants.
Since the 1924 U.S. Immigration Law did not include the Philippines, the Japanese began to
come to the country in greater numbers. The 1924 Immigration Law added an ideological color
to the way advocates of expansion to the Philippines tried to persuade the Japanese to emigrate
to the Philippines. The Japanese, who had considered themselves as equals of the West and
different from other Asians, took the law as an affront to their national dignity. The Japanese
government turned its back to cooperation with Western powers, and became more determined
in promoting relations with Asia. This meant a more aggressive and systematic policy of
peaceful expansion through emigration, trade, and investment.

In the 1930s, events abroad and in the Philippines initially seemed to hamper Japanese economic
expansion in the Philippines. One such event that affected the Japanese in the Philippines was
the Japanese army’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In retaliation, the Chinese in the Philippines,
who until this time were the major retailers of cheap products, stopped selling Japanese goods
in their stores. The Japanese, not interested at first in retail trade, decided to retail Japanese
products themselves. Meanwhile, the decision of the United States in 1931 to increase tariff on
goods entering the Philippines also appeared to create problems. The Japanese lobbied in vain
against the implementation of the new tariffs which led them to decide to go into manufacturing.
The Japanese stopped importing them and began manufacturing the products in the Philippines.

Many Filipino leaders saw the need to develop trade with countries other than the United States,
in anticipation of the coming independence of the Philippines and the termination of special
economic relations with the United States. In 1933, the Philippine Assembly sent a trade mission
to China and Japan. The trade mission consisted of members of the House of representatives,
educators, local government officials, businessmen, and their respective families, including
children. Hoping to impress the members of the mission, the Japanese government took them
to factories, educational institutions, and tourist places.

Partly to return the visit of the trade mission, a South Seas Inspection Party of the House of Peers
of the Japanese Diet arrived in Manila three months later. The delegation was on its way to
inspect the Marianas, then occupied by Japan under the mandate of the League of Nations. The
mission was received with the proverbial Filipino hospitality.

Neither the trade mission to Japan nor the visit of the members of the Japanese House of Peers
had concrete results. Rather, they may be considered mere exploratory tours to help the
Philippines and Japan adjust their existing relationship in light of the forthcoming Philippine
independence.

The years between 1930 and 1940 saw the closest relationship between the Philippines and Japan
in terms of a growing interest in each other. This was manifested by various
friendship/goodwill organizations and exchange programs participated in by nationals of both
countries. Among the organizations, exchange programs and educational tours that promoted
understanding and goodwill between the two countries were the Firipin Kyokai (the
Philippine Society of Japan) which helped sustain good Japanese-Philippine ties despite the
worsening U.S.-Japan relations, the Philippine Japan Society, the Philippine Educational Tour
to Japan, the Japanese Student Study Tour Party to the Philippines, the Philippine-Japanese
Professional Exchange and the Philippine-Japanese Student Conference.

The reasons behind the sudden surge of exchange programs and similar activities were
imminent Philippine independence and Japan’s economic expansion to the southern areas. The
countries felt the need to develop closer relations apart from merely economic activities.

When the Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated in 1935 one of the major diplomatic
responsibilities of Quezon was to balance Philippine interests vis-à-vis the United States and
Japan. The intensified aggressiveness of the Japanese in Manchuria and the ever-deepening
entrenchment of Japanese economic interests in the Philippines reinforced American and
Filipino suspicion- which had been there since the 1920s- of Japanese intentions in Asia.

The perceived Japanese threat to the coming Philippine independence did not convince the
Filipinos and the Americans to postpone independence. Instead, the Philippine Assembly wrote
in the Constitution the provision that required no less than 60 percent Filipino or American
capital for a corporation to exploit lands and natural resources in the Philippines. It also enacted
laws meant to protect the Philippine economy from foreign exploitation. The Japanese
responded with ingenious methods of coping with these laws. They also launched a cultural
offensive of winning the trust of Filipinos.
Manuel Quezon, as president of the Commonwealth, skillfully avoided antagonizing neither the
United States nor Japan. Regardless of how he evaluated the situation in China and how he
perceived Japan’s intentions towards the
Philippines, his public statements were
not critical of Japan. Quezon visited Japan
twice during his presidency. He made a
brief stop over there from January 31 to
February 2, 1937 on his way to the United
States, and a longer visit from June 29 to
July 10, 1938. On both occasions, Quezon
met with members of the Japanese
nobility and important government
officials. Quezon made clear his loyalty to
the United States, and stated that for as
long as the American flag flew over the Philippines, special trade relations with the United States
would continue. However, he added that he believed that closer commercial and cultural
relations with Japan would be beneficial for the Philippines. The president assured the Japanese
foreign minister of his commitment to protect the rights and privileges of the Japanese residents
in the Philippines. Quezon also declared that he did not think that Japan had aggressive designs
on the Philippines.

Quezon’s visits to Japan gave him opportunities to send signals to the United States that if it did
not show enough concern for the Philippines, he could declare the Philippine neutrality in case
of a U.S.-Japan war. At the same time, he pleased the Japanese by publicly stating that he did
not regard them as a threat to the independence of the Philippines. On the other hand, the
Japanese took the visits as opportunities to express their concern for the Japanese residents in
the Philippines, to reassure the Philippine president that they too were eagerly awaiting the
birth of an independent Philippines, and that they hoped to have a closer commercial and
cultural relations with it.

Of all the decisions made by the Commonwealth government in the 1940s, the one most fiercely
attacked by the Japanese was the passage of the Immigration Law of 1940. A result of two years
of research and consultation between the Philippine and U.S. immigration experts, this law
provided for an annual quota of five hundred (500) immigrants from any country, except the
United States. During the years that the immigration law was being prepared, there was a
noticeable increase of Japanese immigrants in the Philippines. In Davao alone, the 16,100
Japanese residents of 1938 increased to almost 18,000 in 1939. There were indications that the
Japanese, in anticipation of the passage of the Immigration Law, decided to preempt it by
coming to the country before it was passed. The Japanese called the Immigration Law of 1940
the “anti-Japanese Immigration Law,” even though the law did not single out the Japanese. The
Japanese objected to the uniform quota, for they felt they deserved to be treated better than other
immigrants in the Philippines. They claimed that more than any immigrants, the Japanese had
greatly contributed to Philippine economic development. They also argued that since there were
more Japanese than any other nationality, except the Chinese, entering annually, the Japanese
should be given a bigger quota. However, an old-time Japanese businessman in the Philippines
was not too worried, claiming that “it would be easy to manipulate the Filipino immigration
officers, and to get around the restrictions.”

Europe

In the 1900s, the United Kingdom held a dominant position in Philippine trade with a market
share of almost thirty percent of total trade. The market share of the U.S. during this year was
only eleven percent coming after China which had captured one-fourth of the Philippine market.
In this early part of American occupation of the Philippines, forty-four percent of the total
Philippine exports were sent to Europe and only 33.46 percent went to the U.S. The U.K. was
the country’s foremost trading partner and continued to be such until the first decade of the
1900s. The U.K. was a principal buyer of Philippine abaca, which was the latter’s main export,
buying canton fiber, maguey, and hats, while it was a main source for the Philippines of cotton,
iron, steel, spirit and wines, and vegetable fibers and manufactures.

By 1908, the U.K. continued to be the Philippines’ major commercial partner, but its share in
total Philippine trade declined to twenty-one percent. Meanwhile, the U.S. share in the total
Philippine trade grew to thirty-two percent of the total. Aside from Great Britain, Germany,
Spain and France had been the Philippine’s major European partners.

Between 1900 to 1905, trade with Spain had always been in favor of Spain and not the
Philippines. This pattern was reversed in 1908 and remained as such until 1935. From 1899 up
to 1908, Spain was fifth most important trading partner. France was the Philippines’ third most
important export partner in the beginning of the 1900s. Germany’s participation in Philippine
foreign trade came earlier than the French which would probably explain the slow growth of
trade with France in the 19th century. By 1920, Germany’s position as seventh principal market
for Philippine exports had given way to France. However, unlike France and Spain, Germany’s
involvement in Philippine trade developed gradually during the American occupation of the
Philippines. Export trade with Germany grew by 197 percent in the period between 1911 to 1920
compared to the period between 1899 to 1908. From 1921 to 1930, trade with Germany registered
a positive growth rate of 225 percent. Despite this growth, Germany maintained an insignificant
share in the Philippine export market compared to Spain and France.

In general, Europe’s share in Philippine exports declined with the decline of British commercial
interests in the country. In the period between 1911 to 1920, Europe’s purchase of Philippine
export was only one-fourth of total exports, while one-half of the total Philippine exports went
to the United States. During the next nine year-period, from 1921 to 1930, only sixteen percent
of the total Philippine market for export goods were secured by the continent under the
Commonwealth government, this share was further reduced to a little less than ten percent.

Relations with Europe following the end of American rule were constrained by a perception
shared by the United Kingdom, France, and by the Soviet Union, of limited political and
economic independence from the United States. Likewise, the Philippines also dealt with Europe
in a remote and less urgent manner.

Philippine foreign relations during the Commonwealth period were directly affected by
economic nationalism. The national Assembly passed several laws limiting the rights of
foreigners to exploit the country’s natural resources and setting a smaller quota for nationals pf
any country except the United States to immigrate to the Philippines. The Philippine
Commonwealth was to have lasted ten years, after which the Philippine would be granted
independence. It was interrupted, however, when Japan invaded the Philippines in 1941,
occupied the country, and established the Second Philippine Republic in 1942.

Philippine Relations and the Japanese Occupation

Despite the autonomy of the Philippine Commonwealth in most domestic matters, formal
foreign relations remained in the hands of the Americans for the whole ten-year period. The
Philippines, not yet being independent, did not have any department of foreign affairs, nor did
it have offices to handle formal foreign relations. American rule over the Philippine
Commonwealth was to end in 1945. However, this rule was cut short in 1941, although with the
exile of the Philippine government in the United Sates, it continued just the same.

The Japanese landed in the Philippines on December 1941 and entered Manila on January 3,
1942. President Manuel Quezon and Vice-President Sergio Osmeña of the Philippine
Commonwealth had left the country for Australia and the United States with retreating
American forces. Quezon left the administrative a machinery of the Philippine government to
his Executive Secretary Jorge Vargas, who became therefore the highest Filipino official in
authority.

Under instructions from the Japanese High Command, Vargas organized the Philippine
Executive Commission as the national administration in 1942. It exercised both executive and
legislative powers, placed in the hands of important pre-war political leaders selected by the
Japanese. They were Vargas as Chairman, Jose Laurel as Commissioner of Justice, Claro M.
Recto as Commissioner of Education, Health and Public Welfare, and Quintin Paredes for Public
Works and Communication.

Japan announced its intention of liberating West Asians from the

corrupting influence of the West and to create the Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere, to be composed of the independent states of
Burma and the Philippines and Japanese territories, protectorates,
dominions, and autonomous regions in the Southwest Pacific. These
objectives were clarified by Premier Tojo to the Japanese Diet in
January 1942 although the ideas had already been enunciated earlier
in 1938. According to Tojo, the Philippines, Burma, and China would
be liberated from foreign exploitation and must cooperate with
Japan.

On May 5-7, 1943, Premier Tojo visited the Philippines. During this meeting, Tojo said that he
was “convinced more than ever on the propriety of your early independence.” Laurel said that
the promise of early independence was received with some kind of excitement but without
rejoicing nor heartfelt gratitude. The Filipino people themselves had a far different attitude, one
of despise for the Japanese conqueror who were perceived as
backward in their political and social development and a low,
non-Christian civilization. But Filipinos had only a choice
between extermination and freedom, as realized by some
Filipino leaders in a meeting with Tojo in Tokyo, on September
30, 1943. They chose freedom, which meant cooperation with
Japan. After the KALIBAPI (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong
Pilipinas) ratified the constitution on September 25, 1943, an
election was held and Jose Laurel was elected by the National
Assembly as President of the Republic. On September 29, 1943
Laurel, Aquino, and Vargas were invited to Tokyo for official
calls with Japanese officials.

It was in one of these closed door conferences that Tojo read his instructions for the Filipino
leaders to declare war against the United States and Great Britain. President Laurel, Vargas, and
Aquino were shocked over these instructions. Laurel politely said he could not comply with the
request saying that he was not a popular leader and that he would soon be a leader without
followers if he declared war. Filipinos, moreover, would not feel “decent” about declaring war
against the U.S. who had been their benefactor and ally.
During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Japan decided to grant the archipelago “the
honor of independence” provided it collaborated more sincerely with Japan. Japan granted
“independence” in October 1943, after pushing for a Constitution and the establishment of a
government under President Jose P. Laurel. Although the Second World war was still on, and
Japanese military forces continued to occupy the Philippines and controlled key resources, some
semblance of diplomatic relations existed, with Japan establishing an embassy in Manila and the
Philippines in turn setting up an embassy in Tokyo. The Laurel government worked within the
formal- as well as informal- diplomatic channels to resolve key issues and fight for Philippine
sovereignty, even as Japanese diplomats tried to push Japan’s war aims. The result was a test of
wills, with both sides pushing for their respective interests. It was diplomacy under duress.

President Laurel was made to sign a Treaty of Alliance with Japan on the Republic’s
Independence Day, October 14, 1943. On the same day, Laurel issued a statement to explain that
the Alliance was not seen as a declaration of war by the Philippines against any foreign nation.
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 1. Said that the Treaty was a defensive one as
demonstrated by the attached “Terms of Understanding,” which read: “The Philippines and
Japan will closely cooperate with each other to safeguard the territorial integrity and
independence of the Philippines.” Minister of Foreign Affairs Claro M. Recto declared over the
radio, “It should be clear that we Filipinos owe no allegiance to any foreign power.” The said
treaty had three articles:
I. There shall be between the High Contracting Parties perpetual relations of good
neighbors and amity on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
II. The High Contracting Parties shall closely cooperate on matters, political, economic, and
military, for the successful prosecution of the War of Greater East Asia.
III. The High Contracting Parties shall closely cooperate with each other for the
establishment of Greater East Asia.

Murata signed the pact for Japan, while Recto signed for the Philippines, on October 14, 1943.
Both the National Assembly and the Japanese Diet concurred with the pact on October 18, 1943.
Although the pact constitutes an alliance, the military aspect thereof is essentially defensive and
unilateral in character in favor of the Philippines, in that only the defensive of the Philippines is
contemplated.

It was the intention of the Filipino leaders to make full use of the independence of their Republic
in spite of the known program of the Japanese government. In principle, a sovereign state has
the right to enter into official relations with other states. For this reason, a Department of
External Affairs was created by the National Assembly in its only session through Act No. 1.
The Department of Foreign Affairs had three (3) offices, namely, Office of Political Affairs, Office
of General Affairs, and Office of Cultural Affairs. Claro M. Recto became the Foreign Minister.
He was one of the most learned, competent, and experienced Filipino at the time who gave
integrity to Laurel’s cabinet.

The Foreign Ministry was the smallest ministry in the government. Its
only foreign service post was the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo
composed of five persons, headed by Jorge Vargas who arrived on
February 10, 1944 to complete the diplomatic representation in Japan of
the five independent states of Southeast Asia. It was in November 1943
that Laurel’s cabinet decided to purchase land and a building in Tokyo
to house the embassy. The land was in Kudan Hill in Fujimicho,
Kojimachi-ku near Yasukuni Shrine; and the building on it was a
mansion with a Japanese garden surrounding it. Despite all the preparations, the embassy was
opened only on February 10, 1944, when Vargas and his staff arrived in Tokyo. Vargas presented
his credentials to the emperor on February 29, 1944. To facilitate communications between the
Japanese military and the local governments, liaison offices were established throughout the
country. These provided links between the Army and local governments. Where the boundaries
between these and the embassy lay, however, is not clear. The Philippine Embassy in Tokyo was
supposed to represent the Philippine government and Philippine interests in Japan, as well as
look after the welfare of Filipinos in Japan. In practice, it remained more of a formality, with
Vargas giving speeches at various occasions. More serious matters were taken up among Laurel,
Recto, and Murata in Manila.

The Japanese government, on the other hand, was the only one to
open an embassy in the Philippines; the embassy was opened in
Manila on October 26, 1943 with a staff of 42 people. Murata Shozo,
previously chief civilian adviser to the Japanese Military
Administration, was officially appointed as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines by the
Emperor on October 5, 1943. The embassy opened at the former U.S.
High Commissioner’s residence. Murata began making official calls
and hosted a banquet on the opening of the embassy. Murata
formally presented his credentials to Laurel on the morning of
November 29, 1943- the first time such an event ever happened in
Philippine history. Notes verbale were exchanged. Consulates General were also established in
Manila, Davao, Cebu, and Baguio, while consular offices were set up in Legazpi, Iloilo, and
Bacolod to assist Japanese economic activities. Other foreign communities were represented by
private persons who had no diplomatic status. The work of the Foreign Ministry from 1943 was
limited to trying to protect its nationals in the foreign country to which it was accredited.

Attempting to protect Filipinos, the Republic passed a Minimum Wage Act. The Japanese
Embassy, however, “informally protested.” Laurel said that act was an exercise of sovereignty,
and that everybody must abide by it. He decided to ignore the protest, and the cabinet agreed.

On October 14, 1943, the Foreign Ministry had to conduct business with the Japanese Embassy
for the Philippine Government because the Japanese military administration had been dissolved
on that same day. The businesses were mostly requests to trace the whereabouts of Filipino
citizens who had remained unheard of since their arrest by the Japanese military, complaints in
cases of ill treatment and cruelties, and routine administrative matters such as registration of
aliens.

On Independence Day, October 14, 1943, President Laurel sent a formal notice of its
proclamation to some countries such as Japan, Burma, China, Manchukuo, and Thailand, all
fellow members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; to friendly Axis powers, Germany, Vichy France,
Denmark, Croatia, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, and Slovakia; and to neutral states, Afghanistan,
Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the USSR, and the Vatican. Messages of
recognition were sent by Greater East Asian countries and by Free India, Germany, Croatia,
Slovakia, and the Republic of Italy. To the United States, Laurel beamed a message on October
14, 1943: “We now ask America to recognize and respect our independence and forbear to bring
great sufferings and destruction into our midst and among our people….All that we ask is to be
allowed to work out our own salvation in our own way.”
To give substance to the independence of the
states which were members of the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan convened the
“Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations” on
November 5-6, 1943. This was the first time that
Asian Heads of State were meeting as an
international conference. Premier Tojo was
trying to harness the growing anti-imperialist
movement for Japan’s benefit and to make it
difficult for the Western colonial powers to
return to Asia. As for the show of respect and equal treatment for the Sphere states, Japan needed
to see that the weak position of its troops in conquered countries would be offset by the same
respect and equal treatment.

In describing the Assembly, President Laurel said that the two-day conference was one of
friendship, cordiality, and pleasantness, and that these countries were treated at par with all the
best. The Joint Declaration adopted by the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations embodied
five (5) principles, namely:
1. The construction of an order of common prosperity and well-being based on justice.
2. Fraternity among the nations and peoples of Greater East Asia by respecting one
another’s sovereignty and independence.
3. Enhancement of the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia while respecting one
another’s traditions and developing the creativity of each race.
4. Acceleration of their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of
reciprocity
5. Cultivation of friendly relations with all countries of the world and work for the abolition
of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse, and the opening of
resources throughout the world.

In the establishment of the Sphere, respect for autonomy and independence of each member is
essential. The Philippines also sent a delegation to a “Physical Education Conference” of
November 8, 1943 which decided to organize a Greater East Asia Physical Training Society and
which expressed support for the successful conclusion of the war through physical culture.
During the Japanese rule in the Philippine, all government employees, school students, and
laborers were allotted a mandatory exercise time every day. Everybody could follow these
exercises through Radio Taiso, which broadcast programs for exercise.

There was also a Greater East Asia Press Conference on November 17-18, 1943. In Nanking, a
Greater East Asia Medical Conference was held on April 25-27, 1944. Two Filipinos were part of
the seventy-seven delegates who attended. On April 17-30, 1944, some high government officials
such as the Speaker of the National Assembly Benigno Aquino, Chief Justice Recto, two
Ministers, and the Vice-President were sent to Tokyo on a “Gratitude Mission.” Before their
return to Manila they visited Manchukuo. Aquino said in his confidential report that the sorry
condition of that country was a sad foreboding of Philippine future in case of Japanese victory.

Some delegations visited Manila after the Tokyo Conference of 1943. Dr. Ba Maw, Chief of State
of Burma, made a stop-over visit to Manila on November 18, 1943. He stayed at Malacañang
Palace as guest of President Laurel. In an interview with members of the Japanese and Filipino
press, he said:
“I was deeply moved by the history of the struggle of the
Philippines for its rightful place in the sun. In prison two years
ago, I followed the development of the war in the Philippines. I
admired Filipino courage and craved to see the day when the
 courage of the Filipino people would be used on the side of Asia
and not against Asia.”

Later, in July 1944, Dr. Ba Maw would drop by Manila after his mission to Japan and other sister
nations of the Sphere to obtain amelioration for Burma’s economic grievances and to establish
direct contacts with other Greater East Asian states. The Burmese were reportedly deeply
impressed by the uncooperative stand toward Japan which was adopted by the Filipino leaders.
On the other hand, Japanese propaganda organs talked of Burmese “all-out collaboration” and
Filipino lukewarmness.

On November 22-24, 1943, Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Provisiona, Government for Free
India, told the Indian community in the Philippines that his advice to the Filipinos was to unite
and to adopt a new “Outlook,” meaning to make more concrete contributions to Japan’s war
effort.

The roles of the Filipino leaders in foreign relations during the Japanese occupation were limited
to protecting Filipinos in Japan, playing host to the Burmese and Indian delegations that visited
the Philippines, and attending some international conferences in China and in Japan. Their
speeches then were carefully crafted, their words seeming to proclaim support for Japan’s
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity but actually expressing an aspiration for genuine
independence.

Japanese cultural delegations went to Manila to “Nipponize” the “South Seas” countries. On the
other hand, seventy Filipino government pensionados were sent to study in Japan. In the end,
these students found jobs with the American occupation forces in Japan as interpreters, guides,
censors, or others.

On March 22, 1944, upon the organization of the Philippine Chapter of the Indian Independence
League, Recto was asked to contribute a message, which he did through a play of words. To
quote, “These are days of destiny. The mighty struggle between the legions of freedom and the
hosts of despotism is fast approaching a decisive climax.”

The most distinctive behavior of the Filipino leaders was their determination not to comply with
Japanese instructions. President Laurel had dodged the declaration of war on the Western Allies
since September 1943. Ultimately, however, upon the advice of Recto and Roxas, Laurel declared
on September 23, 1944 that a state of war existed between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States and Great Britain. This statement was very well received by Ambassador
Murata who saw the act as making the Philippine Republic not only Japan’s most dependable
ally but also as “a comrade in arms fighting shoulder to shoulder at the Eastern bulwark of
Asia.”

Laurel immediately issued a clarification to the effect that “the Republic has but one recourse
to pursue, and that is to render every aid and assistance to the Imperial Japanese Government
short of conscription of Filipino manhood for active military service.”

Consequently, the Japanese High Command created an armed body of Filipinos, independent
from the Republic, and directly under the Imperial Forces. Such a force supplied laborers to aid
in armed operations but did not take part in actual fighting.

To make matters difficult for the laurel government, the peace and order situation deteriorated
rapidly, with the guerilla movement gaining more adherents and sympathizers daily. In
addition to the guerrillas, there were criminal elements and others posing as guerrillas, but were
actually bandits. Yet without an Army and without resources, the Republic would be helpless
and dependent on Japan. To improve the security status of the Philippine government, laurel
considered expanding the Constabulary to forty thousand men who would serve as the national
security force; with this, Laurel could show that the Japanese armed forces were no longer
necessary. This plan never materialized since the Japanese did not allow it. In reality the Laurel
government was more like a prisoner in the last quarter of 1944.

General Douglas MacArthur “returned” and landed in Leyte on August 1945. Laurel and his
officials were made virtual prisoners by the Japanese in Baguio. There President Laurel
dissolved the Cabinet. On June 27, 1945, Laurel, his family, and some officials reached Japan.
On August 15, 1945, a Japanese Foreign Affairs official formally notified the Philippine
government of Japan’s surrender. On the suggestion of Vargas, Laurel prepared a formal
announcement. “In view of the reestablishment of the Commonwealth government and in view
also of the surrender of Japan, the Republic of the Philippines has ceased to exist.” All Filipino
leaders in Japan were flown back to Manila on July 23, 1946 after being in the custody of the
Americans.

By this time the Commonwealth government had been reestablished in Manila. The second
republic now existed only on paper, and did little while in Japan, apart from trying to show that
the government still existed, looking after the well-being of Filipinos in Japan. When the war
ended on August 15, 1945, Laurel, still following protocol, officially and formally dissolved the
republic on August 17, 1945.

*****
The Laurel government had tried to use independence, which the Japanese had foisted on the
Philippines as propaganda and a strategic ploy, to push for Filipino interests and lessen the hold
of Japan on the Philippines. They had limited success because the Japanese military still held all
the strings- strategic economic resources such as fuel, transportation, and communication,
weapons, and ammunition. The Japanese opted to keep the diplomatic front open to strengthen
the Laurel administration and try to show that the Philippines was sovereign. The diplomats,
however, were not effective at controlling the Japanese military even in the country’s capital.
When the war reached the Philippines in late 1944, diplomacy took a back seat to military
exigencies. Little is now remembered of this aspect of Philippine diplomatic history, although it
did provide hands-on training to a number of Philippine diplomats. Many of those who had
served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became active players in Philippine foreign policy and
foreign relations after the war, after they had cleared the charges of collaboration. In its own
way, diplomacy during the Japanese occupation exposed those Filipinos in the field to the
realities of power in international politics. It had given them an opportunity to test their wills
that of an occupying military power, not winning all the time, but trying to present and serve
Filipino interests, albeit in their own way, and stand up to contrary Japanese plans.
References (including Part 1)

Agoncillo, Teodoro A. (2001). The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-
1945. Quezon City: UP Press. Volume 2.

Friend, Theodore. (1965). Between Two Empires: Ordeal of the Philippines, 19929-1946. London:
Yale University Press.

Gamas, John Harvey D., et.al. (eds.) (2017). Mindanao Muslim History: Documentary Sources
from the Advent of Islam to the 1800s. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

Gloria, Heidi K. (2014). History from Below: A View from the Philippine South. Davao City:
Ateneo de Davao University Publication Office.

Golay, Frank H. (1997). Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946. Quezon
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Hayden, Joseph R. (1950). The Philippines: A Study in National Development. New York: The
Macmillan Company.

Laarhoven, Ruurdje. (1989). The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century: Triumph of Moro
Diplomacy. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

San Pablo-Baviera, Aileen and Lydia N. Yu-Jose (eds.) (1998). Philippine External Relations: A
Centennial Vista. Manila: Foreign Service Institute.

Setsuho, Ikehata and Lydia N. Yu-Jose (eds.) (2003). Philippines-Japan Relations. Quezon City:
Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Tan, Samuel K. (2002). The Filipino-American War, 1899-1913. Quezon City: UP Press.

Terami-Wada, Motoe. (2010). The Japanese in the Philippines, 1880s-1980s. Manila: National
Historical Commission of the Philippines.

*For this MODULE OUTPUT, please refer to the Part 1 of this Notes/Reading Guide.
Activities are explained under LEARNING GUIDE of that file.