Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Intelligence

. - 1981- -
Establishment

Andrew, Christopher and Vasili The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and 1991, ISBN
Basic Books
Mitrokhin the Secret History of the KGB 2005 0465003117

Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from
- 1990 -
Gordievsky Lenin to Gorbachev

The Spy Novels of John Le Carré: Balancing Ethics and

Aronoff, Myron J. - 1999 -
Politics

Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of

Bissell, Richard - 1996 -
Pigs'

Bogle, Lori, ed. Cold War Espionage and Spying - 2001- essays

Christopher Andrew and Vasili The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the
- - -
Mitrokhin Battle for the Third World

Christopher Andrew and Vasili The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the ISBN 978-0-14-
Gardners Books 2000
Mitrokhin West 028487-4

Jim Colella My Life as an Italian Mafioso Spy - 2000 -

MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret

Dorril, Stephen - 2000 -
Intelligence Service

Dziak, John J. Chekisty: A History of the KGB - 1988 -

From The Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story Of

Gates, Robert M. - 1997 -
Five Presidents And How They Won The Cold War'

Spyworld: Inside the Canadian and American

Frost, Mike and Michel Gratton Doubleday Canada 1994 -
Intelligence Establishments
Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey
Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America - 1999 -
Klehr

A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central

Helms, Richard - 2003 -
Intelligence Agency

Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret

Koehler, John O. - 1999 -
Police'

Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey-

Persico, Joseph - 1991 -
From the OSS to the CIA

Murphy, David E., Sergei A.

Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War - 1997 -
Kondrashev, and George Bailey

Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert

Prados, John - 1996 -
Operations Since World War II

The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage,

Rositzke, Harry. - 1988 -
Counterespionage, and Covert Action

Srodes, James Allen Dulles: Master of Spies Regnery 2000 CIA head to 1961

Sontag Sherry, and Christopher Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American
Harper 1998
Drew Submarine Espinonage

Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies and Secret Greenwood

2004 -
Operations Press/Questia

[edit]Post Cold War era: 1991-present day

[edit]See also

Author(s) Title Publisher Date Notes

[8]
Anderson, Enigma 2008 eBook and Enigma
NOC
Nicholas Books Books., 2009
The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Encounter deep cover
Ishmael Jones 2008, rev. 2010
Culture Books espionage
The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on
Michael Ross
the Trail of International Terrorists
KGB
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For other uses, see KGB (disambiguation).

This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Please improve this

article if you can. (April 2009)

Committee for State Security

Комитет государственной безопасности

Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

The KGB Sword-and-Shield emblem.

Agency overview
 Dissolved 6 November 1991 (de facto)

3 December 1991 (de jure)

Jurisdiction Council of Ministers of the USSR

Headquarters Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union

55°45′31.2″N 37°37′32.16″E

The KGB (КГБ) is the common abbreviation for the Russian:   Комитет государственной

безопасности (help·info) (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security). It was the

national security agency of the Soviet Union from 1954 until 1991, and its premier internal security, intelligence,

and secret police organization during that time.

The contemporary State Security Agency of the Republic of Belarus uses the Russian name KGB. Most of the KGB

archives remain classified, yet two on-line documentary sources are available.[1][2]

Contents

 [hide]

1 Modus operandi

2 History

3 KGB in the US

o 3.1 The world war

interregnum

o 3.2 During the Cold

War

4 KGB in the Soviet Bloc

5 Suppressing ideological

subversion

6 Notable operations

7 Organization of the KGB

o 7.1 Senior staff

o 7.2 The Directorates

o 7.3 Other units

8 The KGB's evolution

9 See also
 10 Notes

11 References

12 Further reading

13 External links

[edit]Modus operandi

It's stated that the KGB has been the world's most effective information-gathering organization.[3] It operated legal and

illegal espionage residencies in target countries where the legal resident spied from the Soviet embassy, and, if

caught, was protected with diplomatic immunity from prosecution; at best, the compromised spy either returned to

Russia or was expelled by the target country government. Theillegal resident spied unprotected by diplomatic

immunity and worked independently of the Soviet diplomatic and trade missions, (cf. the non-official cover CIA
agent). In its early history, the KGB valued illegal spies more than legal spies, because illegals penetrated their

targets more easily. The KGB residency executed four types of espionage: (i) political, (ii) economic, (iii) military-

strategic, and (iv) disinformation, effected with "active measures" (PR Line),counter-intelligence and security (KR

Line), and scientific–technologic intelligence (X Line); quotidian duties included SIGINT (RP Line) and illegal support

(N Line).[4] At first, using the romantic and intellectual allure of "The First Worker–Peasant State" (1917), "The Fight

Against Fascism" (1936–39), and the "Anti-Nazi Great Patriotic War" (1941–45) the Soviets recruited many idealistic,

high-level Westerners as ideological agents . . . but the Russo–German Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) and the

suppressed Hungarian Uprising (1956) andPrague Spring (1968) mostly ended ideological recruitment. By the 1960s

and 1970s, the Red Army's invasions and the infirm Brezhnev's corrupt, poor leadership repelled young, left-wing

radicals from the Soviet Socialist cause—so, the KGB blackmailed and bribed Westerners into spying for the Soviet

Union.

The KGB classed its spies as agents (intelligence providers) and controllers (intelligence relayers). The false-

identity legend assumed by a Russian-born illegal spy was elaborate, the life of either a "live double" (participant to

the fabrication) or a "dead double" (whose identity is tailored to the spy). The agent then substantiated his or her

legend by living it in a foreign country, before emigrating to the target country; thus the sending of US-bound illegal

residents via the Soviet residency in Ottawa, Canada. Tradecraft included stealing and photographing documents,

code-names, contacts, targets, and dead letter boxes, and working as "friend of the cause" agents provocateur who

infiltrate the target's group to sow dissension, influence policy, and arrange kidnaps and assassinations.

[edit]History

The Cheka was established to defend the October Revolution and the nascent Bolshevik state from its enemies—

principally the monarchist White Army. To ensure the Bolshevik régime's survival, it suppressed counter-revolution

with domestic terror and international deception. The scope of foreign intelligence operations prompted Lenin to

authorise the Cheka's creation of the INO (Innostranyi Otdel – Foreign-intelligence Department)—the precursor to

the First Chief Directorate (FCD) of the KGB. In 1922, Lenin's régime re-named the Cheka as the State Political

Directorate (OGPU).[5]

The OGPU expanded Soviet espionage nationally and internationally, and provided to Stalin the head personal

bodyguard Nikolai Vlasik. The vagaries of Stalin's paranoia influenced the OGPU's performance and direction in the

1930s, i.e. fantastic Trotskyist conspiracies, etc. Acting as his own analyst, Stalin unwisely subordinated intelligence

analysis to collecting it; eventually, reports pandered to his conspiracy fantasies. The middle history of the KGB

culminates in the Great Purge (1936–38) killings of civil, military, and government people deemed politically

unreliable—among them, chairmen Genrikh Yagoda (1938) and Nikolai Yezhov (1940); later, Lavrentiy Beria (1953)

followed suit. Ironically, Yezhov denounced Yagoda for executing the Great Terror, which from 1937 to 1938 is

called Yezhovshchina, the especially cruel "Yezhov era".[6]

In 1941, under Chairman Lavrentiy Beria, the OGPU became the NKGB (People's Commissariat for State Security,

integral to the NKVD) and recovered from the Great Purge of the thirties. Yet, the NKGB unwisely continued

pandering to Stalin's conspiracy fantasies—whilst simultaneously achieving its deepest penetrations of the West.

Next, Foreign MinisterVyacheslav Molotov centralised the intelligence agencies, re-organising the NKGB as

the KI (Komitet Informatsii – Committee of Information), composed (1947–51) of the MGB (Ministry for State Security)

and the GRU (Foreign military Intelligence Directorate). In practice making an ambassador head of the MGB and

GRU legal residencies in his embassy; intelligence operations are under political control; the KI ended when Molotov

incurred Stalin's disfavor. Despite its political end, the KI's contribution to Soviet Intelligence was reliant upon illegal

residents- spies able to establish a more secure base of operations in the target country.[7]

Moreover, expecting to succeed Stalin as leader of the USSR, the ambitious head of the MVD (Ministry of Internal

Affairs), Lavrentiy Beria merged the MGB and the MVD on Stalin's death in 1953. Anticipating a coup d'etat,

the Presidium swiftly eliminated Beria with treasonous charges of "criminal anti-Party and anti-state activities" and

executed him. In the event, the MGB was renamed KGB and detached from the MVD.

Mindful of ambitious spy chiefs—and after deposing Premier Nikita Krushchev—Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and the

CPSU knew to manage the next over-ambitious KGB Chairman,Aleksandr Shelepin (1958–61), who facilitated

Brezhnev's Stalinist palace coup d'état against Khrushchev in 1964—despite Shelepin not then being in KGB. With

political reassignments, Shelepin protégé Vladimir Semichastny (1961–67) was sacked as KGB Chairman, and

Shelepin, himself, was demoted from chairman of the Committee of Party and State Control to Trade Union Council

chairman.

In the 1980s, the glasnost liberalisation of Soviet society provoked KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov (1988–91) to

lead the August 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt to depose President Mikhail Gorbachev. By then, however, Soviet

society's disrespect for the KGB had (among other reasons) exhausted popular support for the régime of the CPSU.

The thwarted coup d'étatended the KGB on 6 November 1991. The KGB's successors are the secret police
agency FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) and the espionage agency SVR(Foreign

Intelligence Service).

[edit]KGB in the US
[edit]The world war interregnum

The GRU (military intelligence) recruited the ideological agents Julian Wadleigh and Alger Hiss, who became State

Department diplomats in 1936. The NKVD's first US operation was establishing the legal residency of Boris

Bazarov and the illegal residency of Iskhak Akhmerov in 1934.[8] Throughout, the Communist Party USA (CPUSA)

and its Gen.-Sec'y Earl Browder, helped NKVD recruit Americans, working in government, business, and industry.

Other important, high-level ideological agents were the diplomats Laurence Duggan and Michael Whitney Straight in

the State Department, the statistician Harry Dexter White in theTreasury Department, the economist Lauchlin

Currie (an FDR advisor), and the "Silvermaster Group", headed by statistician Greg Silvermaster, in the Farm

Security Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare.[9] Moreover, when Whittaker Chambers, formerly Alger

Hiss's courier, approached the Roosevelt Government—to identify the Soviet spies Duggan, White, and others—he

was ignored. Hence, during the Second World War (1939–45)—at the Teheran (1943), Yalta (1945),

and Potsdam (1945) conferences—Big Three Ally Joseph Stalin of the USSR, was better-informed about the war

affairs of his US and UK allies, than they about his.[10]

Soviet espionage succeeded most in collecting scientific and technologic intelligence about advances in jet

propulsion, radar, and encryption, which impressed Moscow, but stealing atomic secrets was the capstone of NKVD

espionage against Anglo–American science and technology. To wit, British Manhattan Project team physicist Klaus

Fuchs (GRU 1941) was the main agent of the Rosenberg spy ring.[citation needed] In 1944, the New York City residency

infiltrated the top secret Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, by recruitingTheodore Hall, a nineteen-year-

old Harvard physicist.

[edit]During the Cold War

Former head of Azerbaijani KGBHeydar Aliyev, ex–Azerbaijani President.

The KGB failed to rebuild most of its US illegal resident networks. The aftermath of the Second Red Scare (1947–

57), McCarthyism, and the destruction of the CPUSA hampered recruitment. The last major illegal resident, Rudolf

Abel ("Willie" Vilyam Fisher), was betrayed by his assistant, Reino Häyhänen, in 1957.

Recruitment then emphasised mercenary agents, an approach especially successful[citation needed][quantify] in scientific and

technical espionage—because private industry practiced lax internal security, unlike the US Government. In late

1967, the notable KGB success was the walk-in recruitment of US Navy Chief Warrant Officer John Anthony

Walker who individually and via the Walker Spy Ring for eighteen years enabled Soviet Intelligence to decipher some

one million US Navy messages, and track the US Navy.[11]

In the late Cold War, the KGB was lucky with intelligence coups with the cases of the mercenary walk-in recruits, FBI

man Robert Hanssen(1979–2001) and CIA Soviet Division officer Aldrich Ames (1985).[12]

[edit]KGB in the Soviet Bloc

KGB[citation needed] prison doors displayed in the Museum of Occupations, Tallinn, Estonia.

It was Cold War policy for the KGB of the Soviet Union and the satellite-state KGBs to extensively monitor public and

private opinion, internal subversion, and possible revolutionary plots in the Soviet Bloc. In supporting those

Communist governments, the KGB was instrumental in crushing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and the Prague

Spring of "Socialism with a Human Face", in 1968 Czechoslovakia.

During the Hungarian revolt, KGB chairman Ivan Serov, personally supervised the post-invasion "normalization" of

the country. In consequence, KGB monitored the satellite-state populations for occurrences of "harmful attitudes" and

"hostile acts"; yet, stopping the Prague Spring, deposing a nationalist Communist government, was its greatest

achievement.

The KGB prepared the Red Army's route by infiltrating to Czechoslovakia many illegal residents disguised as

Western tourists. They were to gain the trust of and spy upon the most outspoken proponents of Alexander Dubček's

new government. They were to plant subversive evidence, justifying the USSR's invasion, that right-wing groups—

aided by Western intelligence agencies—were going to depose the Communist government of Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the KGB prepared hardline, pro-USSR members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), such

as Alois Indra and Vasil Biľak, to assume power after the Red Army's invasion. The courage of the betrayed Prague

Spring leaders did not escape KGB notice; the defector Oleg Gordievsky later remarked, "It was that dreadful event,

that awful day, which determined the course of my own life" (The Sword and the Shield, p. 261).

The KGB's Czech success in the 1960s was matched with the failed suppression of the Solidarity labour movement

in 1980s Poland. The KGB had forecast political instability consequent to the election of the priest Karol Wojtyla, as

the first Polish Pope, John Paul II, whom they had categorised as "subversive", because of his anti-Communist

sermons against the one-party PUWP régime. Despite its accurate forecast of crisis, the Polish United Workers'

Party (PUWP) hindered the KGB's destroying the nascent Solidarity-backed political movement, fearing explosive

civil violence if they imposed the KGB-recommended martial law. Aided by their Polish counterpart, the Służba

Bezpieczeństwa(SB), the KGB successfully infiltrated spies to Solidarity and the Catholic Church, and in Operation

X co-ordinated the declaration of martial law with Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish Communist Party;

however, the vacillating, conciliatory Polish approach blunted KGB effectiveness—and Solidarity then fatally

weakened the Communist Polish government in 1989.

[edit]Suppressing ideological subversion

Monument to KGB victims, Vilnius,Lithuania.

During the Cold War, the KGB actively suppressed "ideological subversion"—unorthodox political and religious ideas

and the espousing dissidents. In 1967, the suppression increased under new KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, who

said all dissent threatened the Soviet state—including anti-Communist religious movements. Most arrested dissidents

were sentenced to indefinite terms in Gulag-administered forced labour camps—where their dissension lacked the

strength it might have had in public. Moreover, Yale University archive documents record that suppressing

"ideological subversion" was the principal preoccupation of Yuri Andropov and Vitali Fedorchuk when each was KGB

Chairman.[1]

After denouncing Stalinism in his secret speech On the Personality Cult and its Consequences (1956), Nikita

Khrushchev lessened suppression of "ideological subversion". Resultantly, critical literature re-emerged, notably the

novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich(1962), by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn; however, after Khrushchev's

deposition in 1964, Leonid Brezhnev reverted the State and KGB to actively harsh suppression—routine house

searches to seize documents and the continual monitoring of dissidents. To wit, in 1965, such a search-and-seizure

operation yielded Solzhenitsyn (code-name PAUK, "spider") manuscripts of "slanderous fabrications", and the

subversion trial of the novelists Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel; Sinyavsky (alias "Abram Tertz"), and Daniel (alias

"Nikolai Arzhak"), were captured after a Moscow literary-world informant told KGB when to find them at home.

After suppressing the Prague Spring, KGB Chairman Andropov established the Fifth Directorate to monitor

dissension and eliminate dissenters. He was especially concerned with theAleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei

Sakharov, "Public Enemy Number One".[13] Andropov failed to expel Solzhenitsyn before 1974; but did internally-exile

Sakharov to Gorky city [Nizhny Novgorod] in 1980. KGB failed to prevent Sakharov's collecting his Nobel Peace

Prize in 1975, but did prevent Yuri Orlov collecting his Nobel Prize in 1978; Chairman Andropov supervised both

operations.

KGB dissident-group infiltration featured agents provocateur pretending "sympathy to the cause", smear

campaigns against prominent dissidents, and show trials; once imprisoned, the dissident endured KGB
interrogators and sympathetic informant-cell mates. In the event, Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost policies lessened

persecution of dissidents; he was effecting some of the policy changes they had been demanding since the 1970s.[14]

[edit]Notable operations

KGB Headquarters on Lubyanka Square, designed by Aleksey Schusev.

 With the Trust Operation, the OGPU successfully deceived some leaders of the right-wing, counter-

revolutionary White Guards back to the USSR for execution.

 NKVD infiltrated and destroyed Trotskyist groups; in 1940, the Spanish agent Ramón

Mercader assassinated Leon Trotsky in Mexico City.

 KGB favoured active measures (e.g. disinformation), in discrediting the USSR's enemies.

 For war-time, KGB had ready sabotage operations arms caches in target countries.

In the 1960s, acting upon the information of KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn, the CIA counter-intelligence chief, James

Jesus Angleton, believed KGB had moles in two key places—the counter-intelligence section of CIA and the FBI's

counter-intelligence department—through whom they would know of, and control, US counter-espionage to protect

the moles and hamper the detection and capture of other Communist spies. Moreover, KGB counter-intelligence

vetted foreign intelligence sources, so that the moles might "officially" approve an anti-CIA double agent as

trustworthy. In retrospect, the captures of the moles Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, proved Angleton—ignored as

over-cautious—was correct, despite costing him his job at CIA, which he left in 1975.[citation needed]

Occasionally, the KGB assassinated the enemies of the USSR—principally Soviet Bloc defectors, either directly or by

aiding Communist country secret services—the (alleged) air-crash assassination of Dag Hammarskjöld in 1961; the

surreptitious ricin poisoning of the Bulgarian émigré Georgi Markov, shot with an umbrella-gun of KGB design, in

1978; and the (alleged) attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981.[15]

The highest-ranking Communist intelligence officer to defect, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa, said the Romanian

Communist party leader Nicolae Ceauşescu told him about the "ten international leaders the Kremlin killed, or tried to

kill": Laszlo Rajk and Imre Nagy of Hungary; Lucretiu Patrascanu and Gheorghiu-Dej of Romania; Rudolf Slansky,

the head of Czechoslovakia, and chief diplomat Jan Masaryk; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran; Palmiro

Togliatti of Italy; US President John F. Kennedy; and Mao Zedong of China via Lin Biao; and noted that "among the
leaders of Moscow's satellite intelligence services, there was unanimous agreement that the KGB had been involved

in the assassination of President Kennedy."[16]

[edit]Organization of the KGB

[edit]Senior staff

The Chairman of the KGB, First Deputy Chairmen (1–2), Deputy Chairmen (4–6). Its policy Collegium comprised a

chairman, deputy chairmen, directorate chiefs, and republican KGB chairmen.

[edit]The Directorates

 First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations) – foreign espionage.

 Second Chief Directorate – counter-intelligence, internal political control.

 Third Chief Directorate (Armed Forces) – military counter-intelligence and armed forces political

surveillance.

 Fourth Directorate (Transportation security)

 Fifth Chief Directorate – censorship and internal security against artistic, political, and religious dissension;

renamed "Directorate Z", protecting the Constitutional order, in 1989.

 Sixth Directorate (Economic Counter-intelligence, industrial security)

 Seventh Directorate (Surveillance) – of Soviet nationals and foreigners.

 Eighth Chief Directorate – monitored-managed national, foreign, and overseas communications,

cryptologic equipment, and research and development.

 Ninth Directorate (Guards and KGB Protection Service) 40,000-man uniformed bodyguard for the CPSU

leaders and families, guarded government installations (nuclear weapons, etc.), operated the Moscow VIP

subway, and secure Government–Party telephony. Pres. Yeltsin transformed it to the Federal Protective Service

(FPS).

 Fifteenth Directorate (Security of Government Installations)

 Sixteenth Directorate (SIGINT and communications interception) operated the national and government

telephone and telegraph systems.

 Border Guards Directorate responsible for the USSR's border troops.

 Operations and Technology Directorate – research laboratories for recording devices and Laboratory

12 for poisons and drugs.

[edit]Other units

 KGB Personnel Department

 Secretariat of the KGB

 KGB Technical Support Staff

 KGB Finance Department

 KGB Archives

 KGB Irregulars

 Administration Department of the KGB, and

 The CPSU Committee.

 KGB Spetsnaz (special operations) units such as:

 The Alpha Group

 The Vympel, etc.

 Kremlin Guard Force for the Presidium, et al., then became the FPS.

[edit]The KGB's evolution

Dates Organisation

December 1917 Cheka

February 1922 Incorporated to NKVD (as GPU)

July 1923 OGPU

July 1934 Re-incorporated to NKVD (as GUGB)

February 1941 NKGB

July 1941 Re-incorporated to NKVD (as GUGB)

April 1943 NKGB

March 1946 MGB

October 1947–November
Foreign Intelligence to the KI
1951

March 1953 Merged to and enlarged MVD

March 1954 KGB

November 1991 FSK

Organization Chairman Dates

Cheka–GPU–
Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1917–26
OGPU

OGPU Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky 1926–34

Genrikh Grigoryevich Yagoda 1934–36

NKVD Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov 1936–38

Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria 1938–41

NKGB Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov 1941 (Feb–Jul)

NKVD Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria 1941–43

NKGB–MGB Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov 1943–46

MGB Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov 1946–51

Semyon Denisovich Ignatyev 1951–53

 Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria 1953 (Mar–Jun)

Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov 1953–54

Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov 1954–58

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin 1958–61

Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny 1961–67

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov 1967–82

KGB

Vitali Vasilyevich Fedorchuk 1982 (May–Dec)

Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov 1982–88

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov 1988–91

Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin 1991 (Aug–Nov)

KGB MEMORIALS

Estonia

The KGB Cells Museum in Tartu is situated in the "gray house", which in the 1940s-1950s housed the South

Estonian Centre of the NKVD/KGB. The basement floor with the cells for prisoners is open for visitors. Part of the

cells, lock-ups and the corridor in the basement have been restored.[1]

[edit]Lithuania
The Museum of Genocide Victims was set up in Vilnius on 14 October 1992 in the former KGB headquarters (which

had been used by the Gestapo during the Nazi occupation). The building also houses the Lithuanian Special Archive,

where documents of the former KGB archive are kept.[2]

[edit]Latvia

"The Black Door", a memorial at the former KGB building on Stabu Street in Rīga, was unveiled in 2003. The

memorial, designed by artist Glebs Pantelejevs, is a half-open steel door and a commemorative plaque.[3]

[edit]Germany

A memorial and exhibition centre is being created in the former KGB prison in Potsdam. Initially used for interrogating

alleged Western spies, some of whom were executed, the prison later mainly held Soviet soldiers who had been

arrested for mutiny, desertion or anti-Soviet activity. [4]

MITROKHIN ARCHIVE

The Mitrokhin Archive is a collection of notes made secretly by KGB Major Vasili Mitrokhin during his thirty years as
a KGB archivist in the foreign intelligence service and the First Chief Directorate. When he defected to Great Britain,
he brought the Archive with him. Two books, Sword and the Shield and The KGB and the Battle for the Third World,
based on the Archive and hundreds other sources were published in 1992 and 2005, which gives details about much
of the Soviet Union's clandestine intelligence operations around the world. The books were written by British
intelligence historian Christopher Andrew. Their publication provoked parliamentary inquiries in the U.K., India, and
Italy.[1][2]

SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Cold War

In 1946, SIS absorbed the "rump" remnant of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), dispersing the latter's

personnel and equipment between its operational divisions or "controllerates" and new Directorates for Training and

Development and for War Planning. The 1921 arrangement was streamlined with the geographical, operational units

redesignated "Production Sections", sorted regionally under Controllers, all under a Director of Production. The

Circulating Sections were renamed 'Requirements Sections' and placed under a Directorate of Requirements.

SIS operations against the USSR were extensively compromised by the fact that the post-war Counter-Espionage

Section, R5, was headed for two years by an agent working for the Soviet Union, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim" Philby.

Although Philby's damage was mitigated for several years by his transfer as Head of Station in Turkey, he later

returned and was the SIS intelligence liaison officer at the Embassy in Washington D.C.. In this capacity he

compromised a programme of joint U.S.-UK paramilitary operations (Albanian Subversion, Valuable Project) in Enver

Hoxha's Albania (although it has been shown that these operations were further compromised "on the ground" by
poor security discipline amongst the Albanian émigrésrecruited to undertake the operations). Philby was eased out of

office and quietly retired in 1953 after the defection of his friends and fellow members of the "Cambridge spy

ring" Donald Duart Maclean and Guy Burgess.

SIS suffered further embarrassment when it turned out that an officer involved in both the Vienna and Berlin tunnel

operations had been turned as a Soviet agent during internment by theChinese during the Korean War. This

agent, George Blake, returned from his internment to be treated as something of a hero by his contemporaries in "the

office". His security authorisation was restored, and in 1953 he was posted to the Vienna Station where the original

Vienna tunnels had been running for years. After compromising these to his Soviet controllers, he was subsequently

assigned to the British team involved on Operation Gold, the Berlin tunnel, and which was, consequently, blown from

the outset. Blake was eventually identified, arrested and faced trial in court for espionage and was sent to prison—

only to be liberated and extracted to the USSR in 1964. In 1956 MI6 Director John Alexander Sinclairhad to resign

after the botched affair of the death of Lionel Crabb.

Despite these setbacks, SIS began to recover in the early 1960s as a result of improved vetting and security, and a

series of successful penetrations, one of the Polish security establishment codenamed NODDY and the other

the GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Penkovsky ran for two years as a considerable success, providing several

thousand photographed documents, including Red Army rocketry manuals that allowed U.S. National Photographic

Interpretation Center (NPIC) analysts to recognise the deployment pattern of Soviet SS4MRBMs and

SS5 IRBMs in Cuba in October 1962. SIS operations against the USSR continued to gain pace through the

remainder of the Cold War, arguably peaking with the recruitment in the 1970s of Oleg Gordievsky whom SIS ran for

the better part of a decade, then successfully exfiltrated from the USSR across the Finnish border in 1985.

The real scale and impact of SIS activities during the second half of the Cold War remains unknown, however,

because the bulk of their most successful targeting operations against Soviet officials were the result of "Third

Country" operations recruiting Soviet sources travelling abroad in Asia and Africa. These included the defection to the

SIS Tehran Station in 1982 of KGB officer Vladimir Kuzichkin, the son of a senior Politburo member and a member of

the KGB's internal Second Chief Directorate who provided SIS and the British government with warning of the

mobilisation of the KGB's Alpha Force during the 1991 August Coup which, briefly, toppled Soviet leader Mikhail

Gorbachev.

SIS activities allegedly included a range of covert political action successes, including the overthrow of Mohammed

Mossadeq in Iran in 1953 (in collaboration with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency), the again collaborative toppling

of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1961, and the triggering of an internal conflict between Lebanese paramilitary

groups in the second half of the 1980s that effectively distracted them from further hostage takings of Westerners in

the region.
A number of intelligence operatives have left SIS. Usually they have found new employment in the civilian world. In

the late 1990s, an SIS officer called Richard Tomlinson was dismissed and later wrote a story of his experiences

entitled "The Big Breach".

Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence

Services   

Cover of book updated in 1994.

Author Ian Black and Benny Morris

Country United States

Language English

Genre(s) Non-fiction

Publisher Grove Press

Publication date 1991

Media type Print

 Pages 634 pp

ISBN 9780802132864

OCLC Number 249707944

Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services (also known as Israel's Secret Wars: The

Untold History of Israeli Intelligence) is a 1991 book written by Ian Black and Benny Morris about the history of

the Israeli intelligence services from the period of theYishuv to the end of the 1980s. It was updated in 1994 to

include the Gulf War period.

It explores the role of secret intelligence and covert activities in the Zionist movement before independence and

explore the operational and political histories all three major Israeli intelligence agencies Aman (military

intelligence), Mossad (foreign intelligence and covert operations) andShin Bet (internal security).[1]

John C. Campbell, writing in Foreign Affairs, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, said that the book

"cannot be the definitive history, but it comes as close as we are likely to get and is especially good in showing how

critical to, and closely interwoven with, the fate of the nation these agencies have been."[1]

Early Cold War Spies

The Espionage Trials that Shaped American Politics
John Earl Haynes & Harvey Klehr
 
 
Cambridge University Press, 2006
Paperback
 (ISBN-13: 9780521674072 | ISBN-10: 0521674077)
Hardback
 (ISBN-13: 9780521857383 | ISBN-10: 0521857384)
Communism was never a popular ideology in America, but the vehemence of American
anticommunism varied from passive disdain in the 1920s to fervent hostility in the early years of
the Cold War. Nothing so stimulated the white hot anticommunism of the late 1940s and 1950s
more than a series of spy trials that revealed that American Communists had co-operated with
Soviet espionage against the United States and had assisted in stealing the technical secrets of
the atomic bomb as well as penetrating the U.S. State Department, the Treasury Department,
and the White House itself. This book reviews the major spy cases of the early Cold War (Hiss-
Chambers, Rosenberg, Bentley, Gouzenko, Coplon, Amerasia and others) and the often-
frustrating clashes between the exacting rules of the American criminal justice system and the
requirements of effective counter-espionage.

• A compact and concise survey of the major spy cases of the early Cold War 
• Offers a retrospective look at the trials in light of evidence that became available at the end of
the Cold War and with the collapse of the USSR 
• Each chapter summarizes a major case or a group of related cases, noting any historical or
legal controversies

Contents

Series Editor’s Foreword  

1   Introduction: Early Cold War Spy Cases  

    Early Cold War Spy Trials  

    A Word about Trials and History  

    Spy Trials and McCarthyism  

    Politics of the Early Cold War  

2   The Precursors  

    Amerasia: The First Cold War Spy Case  

    Gouzenko: A Canadian Spy Case with American Repercussions  

3   Elizabeth Bentley: The Case of the Blond Spy Queen  

    The Silvermaster Group  

    The Perlo Group  

    The Trials of William Remington  

    Venona and Bentley’s Vindication  

    The Bentley Case: A Conclusion  

4   The Alger Hiss–Whittaker Chambers Case  

    Whittaker Chambers  

    Alger Hiss  

    Dueling Testimony  

    The Slander Suit, the Baltimore Documents, and the Pumpkin Papers  

    The Grand Jury  

    The First Hiss Trial  

    The Second Hiss Trial  

    Chambers after the Trial  

    Hiss after the Trial  

    The Historical Argument  

5   The Atomic Espionage Cases  

    Klaus Fuchs: The Background  

    Theodore Hall: The Background  

    Rosenberg and Greenglass: The Background  

    J. Robert Oppenheimer and Communists at the Berkeley Radiation  

Laboratory

    The Red Bomb and the Postwar Trials  

    J. Robert Oppenheimer after the Manhattan Project  

    The Trials of Rudolf Abel and Morris and Lona Cohen  

6   Judith Coplon: The Spy Who Got Away with It  

    Coplon’s Recruitment into Espionage  

    The Washington Trial  

    The New York Trial  

    On Appeal: Justice Frustrated  

7   The Soble-Soblen Case: Last of the Early Cold War Spy Trials  

    Infiltrating the Trotskyist Movement  

    Mark Zborowski  

    Boris Morros: Double Agent  

    The Soble Ring Trials  

    The Robert Soblen Trial  

8   Conclusion: The Decline of the Ideological Spy  

    Spy Trials and Understanding Soviet Espionage  

    Counterespionage and the American Criminal Justice System  

    The Elusive Balance between Security and Liberty

Nathan Gregory Silvermaster

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nathan Gregory Silvermaster

Born November 27, 1898

Odessa

Died October 7, 1964 (aged 65)

possibly Beach Haven, New Jersey

Known for Silvermaster spy ring

Spouse(s) Elena Witte

Nathan Gregory Silvermaster (November 27, 1898 – October 7, 1964), an economist with the United

States War Production Board (WPB) during World War II, was the head of a large ring

of Communist spies in the U.S. government. [1] It is from him that the FBI’s “Silvermaster file”[2],

documenting the Bureau’s investigation into Communist penetration of the Federal government during

the Cold War, takes its name.

Silvermaster was identified as a Soviet agent in the WPB operating under the code names Pel[3], Pal,

“Paul”[4] in the Venona decrypts; and as “Robert” both in Venona[5] and independently by defecting Soviet

intelligence courier Elizabeth Bentley.[6]

Contents

 [hide]

1 Early years

2 Government

3 Spy

4 War Production

Board

5 Death

6 Chronology

7 Silvermaster

group

8 References

9 Sources

10 External links

[edit]Early years

Silvermaster was born of a Jewish family in Odessa, Russia, on October 27, 1898. He moved with his

family to China, where he learned to speak perfect English with a British accent. He emigrated to the U.S.,

and received a B.A. from the University of Washington in Seattle (where he was “stated to be a known

Communist”) and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, where his thesis was entitled “Lenin’s

Economic Thought Prior to the October Revolution.” He became a naturalized American citizen in 1926.

He was reported to be in contact with a very large number of Communist Party USA officials, and was

active in a number of Communist front groups.[7]

[edit]Government

While nominally remaining on the employment rolls of the Farm Security Administration, Silvermaster
arranged in 1942 to be detailed to the Board of Economic Warfare. The transfer, however, triggered

objections from military counter-intelligence who suspected he was a hidden Communist and regarded

him as a security risk. On July 16, 1942 the U.S. Civil Service Commission recommended "Cancel

eligibilities...and bar him for the duration of the National Emergency."

[edit]Spy

Silvermaster denied any Communist links and appealed to Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson to

overrule the security officials. Both White House advisor Lauchlin Currie (identified in Venona as the

Soviet agent operating under the cover name “Page”[8]) and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry

Dexter White (identified in Venona as the Soviet agent operating under the cover names “Lawyer”[9];

“Jurist”[8]; “Richard”[10]) intervened on his behalf. Silvermaster subsequently received two promotions and

pay raises.

[edit]War Production Board

At the War Production Board, Silvermaster was able to provide the Soviet Union with a large amount of

data on arms, aircraft, and shipping production. In June 1943, Silvermaster sent a War Production Board

report on arms production in the United States, including bombers, pursuit planes, tanks, propelled guns,

howitzers, radar and submarines, sub chasers, and the like, to Soviet intelligence.[11] Then, in December

1944, the New York MGB[12]office cabled another Silvermaster report stating: "(Silvermaster) has sent us a

50-page Top Secret War Production Board report ... on arms production in the U.S."[13]

Silvermaster is also associated with Harry Dexter White at the Bretton Woods conference, and his

testimony before the US Senate Internal Security Subcommittee covers "175 pages of interrogation and

exhibits" regarding his espionage activities in the US.

[edit]Death

He died in October 7, 1964 possibly in Harvey Cedars, New Jersey.[14][15]

The Silvermaster group was a major Soviet espionage organization that operated within the United

States Government during World War II. It was investigated by the FBI spanning the years 1945 through

1959. Nathan Gregory Silvermaster was the leader of the spy ring which consisted of 27 principal KGB

operatives gathering information from at least six Federal agencies. The group operated primarily in the

Department of the Treasury but also had contacts in the Army Air Force and in the White House. Sixty-one

of the Venona cables concern the activities of the Silvermaster spy ring.

In 1942 the Silvermaster Group delivered 59 rolls of film to their handler. In 1943, it was 211 rolls, 600 in
1944, and 1895 in 1945.

Contents

 [hide]

1 Investigation

o 1.1 Leaks

o 1.2 Executive

Conference

o 1.3 Morgan

memorandum

2 Members

3 References

Investigation

In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley, the courier from group based in Washington, D.C. to KGB

headquarters in New York defected to the FBI. The KGB had removed Bentley from overseeing at least 80

members of the CPUSA Underground Apparatus in 1944. Realizing she knew too much, was longer of

use to the KGB, and her life was in danger, she told her story to the FBI in a deposition.

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents throughout the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of which

were still employed in the US government at that time. Her story at first was incredible and embarrassing

to the FBI, but her allegations soon were borne out by information already in Bureau files. [1] By December,

no fewer than 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. [2]

The suspects were surveilled throughout much of 1946 in hopes of learning more about the organization

and building a prosecutable case. Meanwhile, other information came from Igor Guzenko [3] , a Soviet

code clerk who defected in Canada, and the Army Signals Intelligence Service which began secretly

reading KGB communications with Moscow.

Leaks

By December 1946 leaks began to develop, [4] copies of an FBI memorandum entitled "Underground

Soviet Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government" [5] had been

disseminated to several government departments and agencies, including the White House, and some

were unaccounted for. In late December, a Justice Department prosecutor in the Criminal Division

requested of a New York Special Agent in Charge (SAC) field investigator a copy of the Bentley

deposition. The SAC telephoned FBI headquarters in Washington to request a copy of the signed affidavit

in the presence of the prosecutor sitting at his desk. In a stinging rebuke to the field investigator, FBI
Agent Edward Tamm noted in a memo to Director J. Edgar Hoover that the Bureau had gone to great

lengths to protect the identity of the informant who was codenamed "Gregory" in the files, and the call in

the presence of the attorney was an "an atrocious exhibition of a complete lack of judgment." [6]

A copy of the Bentley deposition was furnished to the Criminal Division and they then pressed for a

personal interview with Bentley to evaluate her ability to testify. Tamm wrote to the Director how he

informed the prosecutors that “the Bureau was apprehensive for the life of informant since the informant

would probably be killed if [her] identity were inadvertently disclosed” [7]

Executive Conference

An Executive Conference was formed consisting of the prosecutors from the Department of Justice

Criminal Division and FBI field investigators to discuss the Silvermaster subjects and how to proceed with

prosecution. The United Press began running stories on the case with information coming directly out of

the Conference meeting. In a hand written note in the margin of a memo from January 23, 1947, Hoover

writes, "in view of all the 'gabbing' done by the Dept to the Press there is little which can be expected

from any action now." [8] The conference concluded with a request of the Attorney General that the FBI

recommend which of several possible courses of action be taken. Hoover, in a somber tone, responds, "I

am of the opinion...it will be impossible to continue the investigation on an intelligence basis....the

subjects...are now all very security conscious...as a result of this premature and ill-advised publicity, the

Bureau's key informant ...refuses to continue to cooperate with the Bureau. It is needless to point out that

without the cooperation of this informant a real coverage of this case is impossible....any attempt to

interrogate them, either by Bureau agents or before a grand jury, would produce nothing. Obviously, this

situation leaves only the third alternative; that is, that the Department furnish to the employing

departments the basic data concerning the activities of the individual subjects as a possible means of

concluding the case. It is assumed, of course, that the employing departments will take administrative

action against the subjects who are employed in these departments." [9]

Morgan memorandum

Edward Morgan of the FBI was asked to make an objective analysis of where the case stood from a legal

and investigative standpoint. This document, Morgan's memorandum, sheds much light on what was to

follow in the ensuing years. [10] Morgan writes, "there exists a fraternal and intimate social bond" among

the group, the subjects are "extraordinarily intelligent, at least they are unusually well educated," and

some of the finest legal talent in the country could be expected to be retained for their defense.

Without Venona evidence, Morgan declares "the case is no more than the word of Gregory against that of

the several conspirators. The likely result would be an acquittal under very embarrassing circumstances."

Morgan observes, "Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in, with

the rather embarrassing responsibility of having a most serious case of Soviet espionage laid in our laps
without a decent opportunity to make it stick. This very circumstance, however, necessitates pursuing

more direct methods" and states, "this case is one of Soviet espionage or it is nothing." Morgan proposes

developing one of the "lesser lights" as an informant to corroborate Bentley, but acknowledges the

unlikelihood of it occurring. "I doubt if any more can be accomplished of probative value through further

investigation apart from the interviews." Morgan refers to the political problem Bentley laid in their lap 10

years after the fact, "I personally am of the opinion that the Bureau would be subjected to possible

criticism as being derelict in its responsibility in this instance if the various subjects were not thoroughly

and exhaustively interviewed. The odds are not too good that such interviews would terminate

successfully; however, it is quite possible that some of the lesser lights among the subjects would crack

during the course of a careful and pointed interview."

Morgan concludes with the recommendation "That one of the subjects of this case, probably the weakest

sister, be contacted with a view to making him an informant...Failing in this respect, that immediately the

other subjects be exhaustively interviewed. Since an interview with one would virtually amount to putting

all of them on notice, it would seem logical to conduct such interviews as nearly simultaneously as

possible....That failing to break any of the subjects, serious consideration be given to exposing this lousy

outfit and at least hounding them from the Federal Service. Several possibilities exist in this regard but this

would seem to be a bridge to cross when we get to it."

Members

 Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Chief Planning Technician, Procurement Division, United States

Department of the Treasury; Chief Economist, War Assets Administration; Director of the Labor

Division, Farm Security Administration; Board of Economic Warfare; Reconstruction Finance

Corporation Department of Commerce

 Helen Silvermaster (wife)

 Schlomer Adler, United States Department of the Treasury

 Norman Chandler Bursler, United States Department of Justice Anti-Trust Division

 Frank Coe, Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department; Special

Assistant to the United States Ambassador in London; Assistant to the Executive Director, Board of

Economic Warfare; Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration

 Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt; Deputy Administrator of Foreign

Economic Administration; Special Representative to China

 Bela Gold, Assistant Head of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States

Department of Agriculture; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; Office of Economic Programs

in Foreign Economic Administration

 Sonia Steinman Gold, Division of Monetary Research U.S. Treasury Department; U.S. House of

Representatives Select Committee on Interstate Migration; U.S. Bureau of Employment Security

 Irving Kaplan, Foreign Funds Control and Division of Monetary Research, United States

Department of the Treasury Foreign Economic Administration; chief advisor to the Military

Government of Germany

 George Silverman, civilian Chief Production Specialist, Material Division, Army Air Force Air

Staff, War Department, Pentagon

 William Henry Taylor, Assistant Director of the Middle East Division of Monetary Research,

United States Department of Treasury

 William Ullman, delegate to United Nations Charter meeting and Bretton Woods conference;

Division of Monetary Research, Department of Treasury; Material and Services Division, Air Corps

Headquarters, Pentagon

 Anatole Volkov

 Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Head of the International Monetary

Fund

Cold War in the News is an edited review of hand-picked Cold War related news and articles.

Cold War News   [contact]

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The Cold War was the protracted struggle that emerged after Second World War between capitalism and communism, revolving around
the superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States. It lasted from 1946/1947 to the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 1991-12-
25.

Category: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War --- See latest Cold War news here.
How vital were Cold War spies, did they actually make any difference?
The world of espionage is at the heart of the mythology of the Cold War. But
while the tales of adventure, treason, and mole hunts are a great source for
thriller writers, did they really make a difference to the outcome? Did
intelligence make the Cold War hotter or colder? It is difficult to know the
answer, because much of the intelligence collected was military or tactical in
nature, and would only have useful if the Cold War had gone hot. But in the
lack of traditional warfare, intelligence becomes itself the primary battleground.  
by bbc.co.uk :: 2009-08-11 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Anthony Blunt: passing secrets to Communist Russia was the biggest mistake of my life
The memoirs of spy Anthony Blunt reveal how he regarded passing British
secrets to Communist Russia as the "biggest mistake of my life". He passed
secret documents to the Soviets while a WWII agent for MI5. Blunt was part of
the Cambridge spy ring, with Kim Philby, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean.
His memoirs, at the British Library in London, says a "naive" desire to help
Moscow beat fascism motivated him. Blunt penned the 30,000-word document
after PM Margaret Thatcher exposed his treachery in 1979. Blunt says he
became disillusioned with Moscow, wishing only to "return to my normal
academic life". However, his knowledge of the others in the spy ring made this
impossible. 
by bbc.co.uk :: 2009-08-11 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
East German spy swap fixer Wolfgang Vogel dies
East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, who oversaw some of the Cold War's
biggest swaps of seized spies in Berlin, has died aged 82. His swaps included
KGB agent Rudolf Abel for American pilot Gary Powers, shot down over the
USSR, in 1962. He also oversaw the transfer of almost a quarter of a million
people from East to West Germany for billions of marks. After reunification in
1989, Vogel was accused of ripping off some of his former East German clients
of their properties and conning his Western negotiating partners, and was
shortly jailed in the 1990s. 
by bbc.co.uk :: 2008-09-03 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
For Americans who spy against the U.S. it's no longer about the money
Americans who spy against the U.S. are more and more motivated by ideology
rather than by money, with almost half of the known spies since the end of the
Cold War showing allegiance to another country or cause. Prior to 1990 only
20% were ideologically motivated. Recent report compares trends among the
173 Americans known to have spied against the U.S. since 1947, of which 37
began their spying since 1990. Only 5 of those 37 spies are known to have got
payment. Of the 11 spies id'd since 2000, none was paid. In earlier periods,
money has proven to be a much more powerful sole motive.  
by ap :: 2008-04-09 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Spy-vs-spy in Cold War tunnel archives 
The recently revealed details of a U.S.-built tunnel to East Berlin brings new
debate to the spy-vs.-spy Cold War battle. Intelligence officials began building
the tunnel in August 1954 and got 300 yards into Soviet East Berlin 18-months
later. The CIA and British intelligence tapped 3 cables between East Berlin and
Soviet sources, gathering 25-tons of magnetic tape worth of Soviet secrets. The
archives say that in spite of awareness of the tunnel's eventual discovery, U.S.
officials hailed it as an breakthrough. The Soviet Union and East Germans
detected the tunnel April 22, 1956, and called it as a propaganda victory
revealing the enemy's "filthy trick." 
by earthtimes :: 2008-01-28 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
MI5 officer Charles Elwell, who broke the Portland island spy ring, died
A former MI5 officer who helped to crush the Portland spy ring in the 1960s has
passed away at 88. Charles Elwell played a essential part in revealing 5 KGB
agents. He was a master spycatcher who made his name by targeting Russian
agents during the Cold War. Elwell achieved his greatest success when the
KGB tried to get hold of military secrets by using the Portland spy ring, led by
Konon Molody. Elwell's role in the unmasking began when a Russian mole
called Sniper told the CIA secrets were reaching Moscow from Portland. MI5
were informed the information was coming from the Admiralty Underwater
Weapons Establishment on the island. 
by thisisdorset.net/ :: 2008-01-24 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Canada's official spy souvenir shop off limits to ordinary citizens
Canada's official spy souvenir shop is the perfect complement to the country's
spy museum. They're both top-secret building that are off limits to average
Canadians. Word of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's museum,
featuring espionage cameras and other Cold War paraphernalia, leaked to the
media years ago. But a newly released files suggests CSIS also runs a non-
profit "souvenir shop," available only to those with proper security clearance.
"For individuals wishing to purchase items from the Souvenir Shop, they can do
so by stating what they want and putting the money in an envelope," say the
minutes of a meeting at CSIS HQs in Ottawa.  
by 88db.net :: 2008-01-19 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Support group for Spies: From East German Spooks to Victims
Most agree: Those who worked for the East German secret police should not
hold positions of power in the reunified country. But some of the ex-spies feel
they are subject to discrimination, and do what they can to support each other.
"Stasi methods!" It's one of the worst insults at the German state. But even now
it remains a popular insult in Berlin. A former judge Hans-Herbert Nehmer in the
communist German Democratic Republic (GDR)thinks East Germany remains
under constant attack: "Germany is dominated by West propaganda and anti-
communist hardliner politics which bedevil the image of the GDR".  
by spiegel :: 2007-06-13 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
The lost 20 years of CIA spies caught in China trap 
Lured by a double agent and jailed secretly, the story of Jack Downey and
Richard Fecteau is one of the most extraordinary in espionage. On a spring
morning in 1973 an emaciated man made his way across the Lo Wu bridge
from China into Hong Kong. A British soldier at the frontier post saluted him as
he approached. This was 'the first act of dignity shown to him in 20 years'. His
name was Jack Downey. He was a CIA agent, and since 1952 he and Richard
Fecteau had languished in a Chinese prison, often in solitary confinement,
secret hostages in the Cold War between the U.S. and China.  
by timesonline :: 2007-04-26 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Alger Hiss: Cold War's most famous spy case gets a new look
Scholars probing anew into the Cold War's most famous espionage case
suggested that another U.S. diplomat, not Alger Hiss, was the Soviet agent
code-named Ales, and a stepson of Hiss said his chief accuser had invented
the spy allegations after his sexual advances were rejected. The two claims,
presented at a daylong symposium titled "Alger Hiss & History", provided
startling new information that, if true, could point toward a posthumous
vindication of Hiss, who was accused of feeding U.S. secrets to Moscow and
spent nearly 5 years in prison for perjury before his death in 1996 at age 92.  
by newsday :: 2007-04-06 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Czech secret agents trained to infiltrate Germany in the early 1970s
The Czechoslovak communist military counter-intelligence trained secret
commando units to infiltrate West Germany in the 1970s. Some 100 agents in
this top secret setup were meant to carry out tasks such as sabotage and
murders in the event of a World War III. The files were found in the archives of
the military intelligence service. They contain information about a unit that was
set up following warnings from the Soviet Union of a similar plot across the
border in West Germany. A general in the Soviet intelligence service warned of
a danger to the Warsaw Pact, and urged the allies in Prague to set up their own
top secret sabotage unit. 
by dw-world :: 2007-02-25 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Long-forgotten U.S. Cold War spies remembered
During the Korean War, a plane carrying two agents from the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) (John Downey and Richard Fecteau) crashed in the
Chinese province of Jilin on Nov 29, 1952. The two were in a mission to meet
with Chinese anti-government activists. After being caught by Chinese People's
Liberation Army, they spent 20 years in prison. A CIA report "Two CIA
Prisoners in China, 1952-73" documents the men's story. The report shows the
reality of anti-communist operations. At that time, the U.S. undertook operations
to nurture "a third anti-communist force" in China, because the Kuomintang had
been discredited by the Chinese people.  
by hani :: 2007-01-27 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Polish Church and the communist-era secret police
Poland's Roman Catholic Church is to investigate whether any of its senior
members collaborated with the communist-era secret police. The decision was
made at an emergency meeting of the country's 45 bishops triggered by the
dramatic resignation of Warsaw's archbishop Stanislaw Wielgus, who quit after
he confessed to collaborating with the communist police. Historians estimate
that up to 15% of Polish clergy agreed to inform on their colleagues in the
communist era. 
by bbc :: 2007-01-17 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Cold war spying never really ended
The Cold War ended long ago, but the arrest of a Russian spy in Montreal
suggests the stealth battles between spies and spy-catchers that characterized
the Soviet era continue. Although counterterrorism has been at the centre of
Canada's security, the government has been dropping hints about a spike in
spying, called the world's second-oldest profession. Intelligence chief Jim Judd
said in a speech that "foreign espionage is, if anything, growing and, in fact,
becoming more sophisticated than ever through the application of new
technologies." 
by nationalpost :: 2006-11-22 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Secret of Cold War Spy Messages Revealed
The invisible ink formula used by East German secret police to pass messages
during the Cold War has remained classified, until now. The Stasi, a feared and
highly covert police force modeled after the KGB, communicated top-secret
messages with invisible ink. More than 15 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the reunification, a group of scientists believe they've cracked the well-
guarded chemical code. "This is a first, since spy agencies' secret writing
formulas and methods are super-secret and never made public," said Kristie
Macrakis. 
by livescience :: 2006-11-13 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Markus Wolf - East German Spymaster Without a Face - Dies 
Markus Wolf, the East German spymaster known as "the Man Without a Face"
because the West didn't have his photo until the late 1970s, died on the 17th
anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. He was 83. Wolf, who earned the
Russian nickname "Mischa" after spending more than a decade of his youth in
the Soviet Union, died unexpectedly in Berlin, his publisher said. During Wolf's
34-year tenure as the head of the HVA foreign intelligence section of East
Germany's Ministry of State Security, or Stasi, he sent thousands of agents
across the Iron Curtain. 
by bloomberg :: 2006-11-13 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Cold war papers reveal cover-up over diver's mysterious death
Government records released shed new light on a famous cold war mystery
surrounding the disappearance of a navy diver said to have been the model for
James Bond. Commander Lionel "Buster" Crabb went missing during a dive off
Portsmouth in April 1956, the year of Suez and the Hungarian uprising, amid
claims that he had been spying on Soviet ships during the visit of the USSR's
leaders, Nikita Khruschev and Nikolai Bulganin. There was speculation at the
time, including that the Soviet leadership had given him a job or ordered his
execution. 
by guardian :: 2006-10-29 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
History's best spies and covert operators
With the release of the Venona Papers, U.S./British deciphered Soviet secret
messages from 1946 to 1980, and KGB archivist Vasili Mitronkin's two books
on the smuggled-out KGB files, much is now known about the KGB's
espionage. As noted by Peter Earnest, a 35-year CIA vet and the Spy Museum
director: You can't pick up a newspaper without reading how intelligence has
succeeded or failed. "I Lie for a Living: Greatest Spies of All Time" presents the
best spies and covert operators known to history. It contains photos and
profiles of the patriots, traitors and adventurers that have dealt in the dark trade
of espionage. 
by philly :: 2006-08-22 :: Spies, Intelligence, Espionage of Cold War
Spy criticized CIA's handling of defectors
F. Mark Wyatt, a former CIA agent who spent 3 decades on the front lines of
Cold War espionage and who in retirement worked to improve the lives of
Soviet-bloc defectors, died. After years of helping woo potential defectors,
Wyatt believed the CIA could do a better job of helping former spies adjust to
their new lives in this country. Several top officials redefected because of the
shabby treatment they received. 
by washingtonpost :: 2006-07-19 :: CIA during Cold War

Perlo group
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article has been nominated to be checked for its neutrality. Discussion of

this nomination can be found on the talk page.(December 2007)

Headed by Victor Perlo, the Perlo group is the name given to a group of Americans who provided

information which was given to Soviet intelligence agencies; it was active during theWorld War II period,

until the entire group was exposed to the FBI by the defection of Elizabeth Bentley.[dubious  –  discuss]

It had sources on the War Production Board, the Senate La Follette Subcommittee on Civil Liberties; and

in the United States Department of Treasury.

Contents

 [hide]

1 The Perlo group and

Venona

2 KGB Archives

3 Members

4 See also

5 References

6 External links

[edit]The Perlo group and Venona

Much useful additional information on the activities of the Perlo group was given by the Venona project.

The first Venona transcript referencing the Perlo group gives the names of all the members in clear text,

as code names had not yet been assigned.

The Perlo group fits into the Venona project information when transcript # 687 of 13 May 1944 is

examined. Iskhak Akhmerov in New York City personally prepared a report to MGBheadquarters in

Moscow advising that some unspecified action had been taken regarding Elizabeth Bentley in accordance

with instructions of Earl Browder. Akhmerov then made reference to winter and also to Harry Magdoff.

This latter reference was then followed by a statement that in Bentley's opinion "they" are reliable. It was
also mentioned that no one had interested himself in their possibilities.

The name Golovin was mentioned, and it was then reported that Victor Perlo, Charles Kramer, Edward

Fitzgerald and Harry Magdoff would take turns coming to New York every two weeks. Akhmerov said

Kramer and Fitzgerald knew Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, whose cover name was later changed to

"Robert".

Bentley advised that Jacob Golos informed her he had made contact with a group in Washington, D.C.

through Earl Browder. After the death of Golos in 1943, two meetings were arranged with this group in

1944. The first meeting was arranged by Browder and was held in early 1944. The meetings were held in

the apartment of John Abt in New York City and Bentley was introduced to four individuals identified as

Victor Perlo, Charles Kramer, Harry Magdoff and Edward Fitzgerald.

[edit]KGB Archives

Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev in Haunted Wood, a book written from an examination of KGB

Archives in Moscow, report the KGB credits the Perlo group members with having sent, among other

items, the following 1945 U.S. Government documents to Moscow:

February

 Contents of a WPB memo dealing with apportionment of aircraft to the USSR in the event of war

on Japan;

 WPB discussion of the production policy regarding war materials at an Executive Committee

meeting;

 Documents on future territorial planning for commoditiies in short supply;

 Documents on a priority system for foreign orders for producing goods in the United States after

the end of the war in Europe;

 Documents on trade policy and trade controls after the war;

 Documents on arms production in the United States in January 1945;

March

 A WPB report on "Aluminum for the USSR and current political issues in the U.S. over aluminum

supplies" (2/26/45);

April

 Documents concerning the committee developing plans for the U.S. economy after the defeat of

Germany, and also regarding war orders for the war against Japan;
 Documents on the production of the B-29 bomber and the B-32;

 Tactical characteristics of various bombers and fighters;

 Materials on the United States using Saudi Arabian oil resources;

June

 Data concerning U.S. war industry production in May from the WPB's secret report;

Data concerning plans for a 1945–1946 aircraft production from the WPB;

 More data on specific aircraft's technical aspects;

August

 Data concerning the new Export-Import Bank;

 Data concerning supplies of American aircraft to the Allies in June 1945;

 Data from the top secret WPB report on U.S. war industry production in June;

October

 Detailed data concerning the industrial capacities of the Western occupation zones of Germany

that could be brought out as war reparations;

 Information on views within the U.S. Army circles concerning the inevitability of war against the

USSR as well as statements by an air force general supporting U.S. acquisition of advanced bases in

Europe for building missiles.

[edit]Members

Victor Perlo headed the Perlo group. Perlo was originally allegedly a member of the Ware

group before World War II. After receiving a master's degree in mathematics from Columbia University in

1933, Perlo worked at a number of New Deal government agencies among a group of economists known

as “Harry Hopkins’ bright young men.” The group worked, among other things, for creation and

implementation of the WPA jobs program, and helped push through unemployment compensation, the

Wagner National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and Social Security. During World

War II, Perlo served in several capacities, working first as chief of the Aviation Section of the War

Production Board, then in the Office of Price Administration, and later for the Treasury Department. Perlo

left the government in 1947. Perlo also worked for the Brookings Institution and wrote American

Imperialism. Perlo's code name in Soviet intelligence was "Eck" and "Raid" appearing in Venona

project as "Raider".

 Victor Perlo, Chief of the Aviation Section of the War Production Board; head of branch in
 Research Section, Office of Price Administration Department of Commerce; Division of Monetary

Research Department of Treasury; Brookings Institution

 Edward Fitzgerald, War Production Board

 Harold Glasser, Deputy Director, Division of Monetary Research, United States Department of

the Treasury; United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; War Production Board; Advisor

on North African Affairs Committee; United States Treasury Representative to the Allied High

Commission in Italy

 Charles Kramer, Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; Office of Price Administration;

National Labor Relations Board; Senate Subcommittee on Wartime Health and Education;

Agricultural Adjustment Administration; Senate Subcommittee on Civil Liberties; Senate Labor and

Public Welfare Committee; Democratic National Committee

 Harry Magdoff, Statistical Division of War Production Board and Office of Emergency

Management; Bureau of Research and Statistics, WTB; Tools Division, War Production Board;

Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, United States Department of Commerce

 Allen Rosenberg, Board of Economic Warfare; Chief of the Economic Institution Staff, Foreign

Economic Administration; Senate Subcommittee on Civil Liberties; Senate Committee on Education

and Labor; Railroad Retirement Board; Councel to the Secretary of the National Labor Relations

Board

 Donald Wheeler, Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis division

Harry Magdoff and espionage

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Several historians and researchers have come to the conclusion that Harry Magdoff was among a number

of persons inside the U.S. government used as information sources by Soviet intelligence.

Contents

 [hide]

1 Investigation

2 Decrypted

cables

3 Moscow

Archives

4 Chronology
 5 Skeptical

Views

6 Notes

7 References

o 7.1 

Print

o 7.2 

Online

o 7.3 

Images

8 External links

[edit]Investigation

An FBI file description says Magdoff and others were probed as part of "a major espionage investigation

spanning the years 1945 through 1959" into a suspected "Soviet spy ring which supposedly had 27

individuals gathering information from at least six Federal agencies. However, none of the subjects were

indicted by the Grand Jury."1

Soviet cable from New York to Moscow on the 13 th of April, 1944, refers toMAGDOFF - "KANT".

A mass of previously unremarked materials collectively known as the VENONA project was declassified

by the U.S. government in 1995. Among these were Army decryptions of Soviet cables which revealed

there to be some number of American citizens involved in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
Magdoff was among those investigated as a member of what was called the Perlo group.

The public accusation that Magdoff was working for Soviet intelligence was itself not new; it had originated

with defector Elizabeth Bentley who provided this information to the FBI and later testified to that same

effect in open hearings. Bentley told the FBI:

On the date specified I went to the apartment of John Abt, was admitted by him to his apartment

and there met four individuals, none of whom I had ever seen before. They were introduced to

me as Victor Perlo, Charlie Kramer, Henry Magdoff and Edward Fitzgerald. They seemed to

know, at least, generally that they could talk freely in my presence and I recall some

conversation about their paying Communist Party dues to me, as well as my furnishing them with

Communist Party literature. There followed then a general discussion among all of us as to the

type of information which these people, excepting Abt, would be able to furnish. It was obvious to

me that these people, including Abt, had been associated for some time and that they had been

engaged in some sort of espionage for Earl Browder. 2

Victor Perlo, leader of the group, asked if the material was going to "Uncle Joe" (Joseph

Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

The Army Signals Intelligence Corp and the FBI conducted a thirty-eight year investigation into

communist espionage with mixed results. According to Counterintelligence Reader, the Venona

project confirms the accuracy of much of Bentley's testimony. Critics of Bentley point out that some

of her claims were disputed at the time, and that the testimony of Bentley and others before various

Congressional committees during the Red Scare was sometimes exaggerated or involved guilt by

association assertions.

[edit]Decrypted cables

According to A Counterintelligence Reader, Magdoff was a member of the Perlo group.3 Magdoff

was identified by Arlington Hall cryptographers in the VENONA cables and by

FBIcounterintelligence investigators as being a possible Soviet information source using the cover

name "KANT" as of 1944. 4 The name "KANT"

appears in declassified decryptions fromNew

York to Moscow, dated May 5, May 13, and May

30, 1944. The first is described by the decrypters

as being sent from Pavel Ivanovich Fedosimov

in which he requests to "telegraph a reply to No.

139 and advise about the possibility of a meeting

with KANT."
 On the 13 May cable, "MAYOR", according to

Arlington Hall counterintelligence Iskhak Abdulovich

Akhmerov, reports on the first meeting Elizabeth

Bentley had with the Perlo group for the purposes of

obtaining secret government information to transmit to the Soviet Union. Magdoff's surname was

transmitted in the clear. 5

On HELMSMAN'S instructions GOOD GIRL contracted through AMT a new group:

[53 groups unrecoverable]

MAGDOFF - "KANT". GOOD GIRL's impressions: They are reliable FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN

["members of a Communist Party"], politically highly mature; they want to help with information.

They said that they had been neglected and no one had taken any interest in their potentialities.

Magdoff at the time was ending a prolonged leave of absence due to a gall

bladder operation was unsure of the type of material he could deliver.6 As a

person targeted by Soviet intelligence as a potential recruit, or "probationer" in

Soviet parlance, "KANT" was subject to a background check and a request was

made for more information. The 30 May cable transmits personal histories for

several members of the group.

 February 25th, 1945; Vassiliev, Haynes believe "TAN" to be a latter day cover name for Magdoff.

2. "KANT" became a member of the CPUSA a long time ago, being [8 groups unrecovered],

works in the Machine Tool Division of the DEPOT.

A number of U.S. government agencies (as well as locations within the

U.S.) were also given cover names. In this case, "DEPOT" is said

byNSA analysts to be code for the War Production Board, where Magdoff

worked in the Statistics and Tools Divisions.

[edit]Moscow Archives

In Moscow the request was processed. Evidence was unearthed in

the Comintern Archives in the late 1980s has Lt. General Pavel Fitin, head

of KGB foreign intelligence operations, requesting of Comintern Secretary

General Georgi Dimitrov, information to pursue Magdoff's recruitment.7 This

document was published in a book by historians Harvey Klehr, John Earl

Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov 8, and also in the memoirs of the

Soviet Case Officer for Julius Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs), Alexandre

Feklisov, 9 published in 2001.

The Moscow Center then responded to New York KGB headquarters on

February 25, 1945 in Venona decrypt #179,180. The authors ofHaunted

Wood: Soviet Espionage in America, researchers Allen Weinstein,

currently Archivist of the United States, and ex-KGB OfficerAlexander

Vassiliev say cover name "KANT" was replaced with "TAN". Moscow Center

expressed concern that knowledge of some persons being recruited was

widely known among other CPUSA members, so it was not uncommon for

code names to change. The code name "TAN" appears Anatoly Gorsky’s

Memo dated December 1948, a document from the KGB archives analyzed

by Alexander Vassiliev. 10 Gorsky was then a senior official of the

Committee of Information (KI), the Soviet agency at the time supervising

Soviet foreign intelligence. 11

A top secret internal FBI memo dated February 1, 1956 from Assistant Alan

H. Belmont to the Director and head of the FBI's Internal Security Section,

L. V. Boardman, discusses the advantages and disadvantages of

using Venona materials to prosecute suspects. In this memorandum, which

remained classified forty-one years until the Moynihan Moynihan

Commission on Government Secrecy obtained its release to the public in

1997, Boardman quotes the 13 May 1944 Venona transcript, which named

several members of the Perlo group, including Magdoff. Though Belmont

was of the opinion that VENONA evidence could lead to successful

convictions, it was ultimately decided, in consideration of compromising

the Army Signals Intelligence efforts, that there would not be prosecutions.

The memo also raises questions about the disclosure of classified

information to unauthorized persons based upon an exception to the

hearsay rule requiring expert testimony of cryptographers revealing their

practices and techniques to identify specific code names. 12

[edit]Chronology

 25 February or 5 March 1944, a rainy Sunday, Elizabeth Bentley meets

with Harry Magdoff and others in John Abts apartment in New York, the

initial contact with the Perlo group (Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 1999,

pg. 409); "the group specifically discussed the information they would

be able to furnish her and with respect to Magdoff, Bentley advised,

'.....Magdoff, who had just returned from a period of approximately six

months hospitalization, expected to return to the War Production Board

but was uncertain as to what specifically he would be able to furnish.....'

" (pg. 182, paragraph 3)

 5 May 1944, Venona decrypt 629 KGB New York to Moscow asks to

"Urgently...advise about the possibility of a meeting with KANT"; KANT

identified as Harry Samuel Magdoff. [1]

 13 May 1944, Venona decrypt 687 KGB New York to Moscow reports

on Bentley's contact with a new group in Washington, "MAGDOFF -

KANT"..."reliable"...politically highly mature"..."they want to help with

information". KANT identified as Harry Samuel Magdoff. [2]

 30 May 1944, Venona 769, 771 KGB New York to Moscow, addressed

to KGB head Pavel Fitin the probationers of the new group gives

personal histories, " 'KANT' became a member of the CPUSA a long

time ago...works in the Machine Tool Division of the DEPOT" [3]; KANT

identified as Harry Samuel Magdoff. [4]

 29 September 1944, in Moscow, Fitin to Dimitrov Memo asks to

Comintern General Secretary to provide any information to KGB head

 on members of the Perlo group, including "Magdoff, works on

the WPB."

 25 February 1945, Moscow Center to Venona to New York 179, 180

KGB Moscow, uses code name "TAN"; subsequent researchers identify

TAN as Harry Magdoff.

 20 December 1946, "Magdoff indicated that he was happy to be leaving

the Commerce Department..." (pg. 176).

 30 December 1946, Magdoff retires from government service.

 December 1948, Anatoly Gorsky, senior official of the Committee of

Information (KI), the agency then supervising Soviet foreign intelligence

reports in KGB file 43173 vol.2 (v) lists Magdoff as number "3. 'Tan' –

Harry Magdoff, former employee of the Commerce Department" of

Elizabeth Bentley's contacts in his report on compromised American

sources and networks; NKVD operatives are ranked either

alphabetically or in chronological order, beginning with pre-WWII

names, followed by WWII names, with the Soviet Case Officer himself

the last in line.

 1 February 1956, FBI Belmont to Boardman Memo discusses

prosecution of the members of the Perlo group, including " 'Kant' (Harry

Magdoff)" but weighs the disclosure of Government techniques and

practices in the cryptography field to unauthorized persons and would

compromise the Government's efforts in the communications

intelligence field.
[edit]Skeptical Views
Main article:  Venona project#Critical Views

Victor Navasky, editor and publisher of The Nation, has written an editorial

highly critical of the interpretation of recent work on the subject of Soviet

espionage, arguing that historians who rely too much on Venona material

are guilty of using every individual mentioned in the cables as prima facie

proof of their involvement in Soviet espionage.

Appendix A to their book on Venona, Haynes and Klehr list 349 names (and code names) of

people who they say "had a covert relationship with Soviet intelligence that is confirmed in the

Venona traffic." They do not qualify the list, which includes everyone from Alger Hiss to Harry

Magdoff, the former New Deal economist and Marxist editor of Monthly Review, and Walter
 Bernstein, the lefty screenwriter who reported on Tito for Yank magazine. It occurs to Haynes

and Klehr to reprint ambiguous Venona material related to Magdoff and Bernstein but not to call

up either of them (or any other living person on their list) to get their version of what did or didn't

happen. 14

Cold War Spies

A Web Quest by Darcie Rummel
 

Introduction_________________
Imagine this: a world full of secrets, traitors, and danger.  No one to trust
but yourself as you steal quickly through the night, stealing and
concealing both truths and lies from your enemies and comrades.  This is
the life of a spy, which was personified in the subtle workings of the Cold
War.  Without firing a shot, both Soviets and Americans fought against
one another in what historians call the “Invisible Front”.  Today, it is your
mission to discover more about the stories that have emerged from the
shadows of Cold War espionage.  

Tasks_____________________
Divide each group into two opposing sides: the East (USSR) and the West
(USA).  To become an expert spy on either side, you must know who you
are working for and whom you will be working with.  Once you have
chosen a side, meet with your fellow Russian or American spies and
complete the following tasks:
 
Task #1 :  Using the links below, write 1-2 paragraphs on which
intelligence agency you are working for.  USSR spies research the KGB,
and USA spies research the CIA.
About the CIA
About the KGB
 
Task #2:  Using the link below, write a paragraph about one topic found
under each file tab (Assassination, Disinformation, Domestic Espionage,
Infiltration, and Subversion), totaling 5 paragraphs.  Research either the
East or the West, depending on which one you are spying for.
The Spy Files
 
Task #3:  Any spy worth his/her salt must have the best gadgets,
right?  Find 3-4 spy tools that fascinate you and write a brief (1-3 sentence)
description about each.
Tools of the Trade
 
Task #4:  Now that you are set to be a top-secret spy during the Cold War,
it’s time to find out who your comrades are.  Using the link, write a short
paragraph about two people (both must be from your chosen spy faction)
you find interesting.
Who’s Who in Cold War Espionage
 
Extra:  For fun, try out the games under CNN’s Cold War Challenge!
Cold War Challenge
 

Resources__________________
Here are some links to help you along on your
Web Quest, along with a few related sites that
may be of some interest:

CIA Home Page

CNN – Cold War Experience: Espionage

Cold War Espionage Timeline

The Cold War Museum

Crime Library: Spies

FAS: Intelligence Resource Program

Process___________________
The goal of this Web Quest it to provide you, the student, with
interesting information about the two main secret intelligence networks
during the Cold War.   To get the most out of this assignment, these
criteria must be met:
        Students must be divided up into East and West spy factions (with
approximately 5 people per group).
        Both spy groups must complete the given tasks (1-4).  If necessary,
assign each person one of the tasks, with two people working on task
#2.
        Each spy group must then compile and discuss the information they
have found.
        Finally, each spy group must come up with a 5-7 minute speech about
their collected information, which will be presented in front of the
class.  Each person is required to talk, and use of visual aids is
encouraged.
 

Guidance___________________
When you are doing the tasks, narrow down the information you find in
each of the tasks to fit the time restraints of your group’s speech.  Each
person is required to share some of the facts he/she has found with the
class, so be quick, but thorough in your investigation!
 
The format of the 5-7 minute group speech might go like this:
        Introduction (approximately 30-40 seconds) – tell the class which
faction your group is (East or West) and set the stage for your speech.
http://www2.dsu.nodak.edu/users/jbrudvig/Technology%20Projects/webquests/student
%20work/ColdWarSpies.htm

        Body (approximately 1 minute for each topic) – should include

information found in each of the four tasks, allowing for slightly more
time to discuss task #2.
        Conclusion (approximately 30-40 seconds) – tell the class if your group
learned anything, what you found interesting, and bring the speech to
a close.  

Conclusion__________________
Many are not aware of risks intelligence
soldiers take while fighting on the “Invisible
Front”.  They are the spies, the secret-
mongers, who are paid to know everyone’s
business, both at home and abroad.  They are
 stilltoday, but sophisticated spy work did not truly emerge until the 50-year
span of the Cold War.  Hopefully by completing this Web Quest, you will
have gained some appreciation for the art of espionage and what it takes to
be a master spy.
 

TOP 10 SPIES

Although most people think of spies as a Cold War phenomenon, they’ve actually been around for hundreds of years, and include in
their ranks larger than life figures like big game hunters, revolutionary war heroes, and even exotic dancers. While these real life
spies might not have had cool gadgets or fast cars like James Bond, their lives still make for some pretty amazing stories, so sit
back with a shaken-not-stirred martini and have a look at this list of the top ten masters of espionage throughout history.
10. Allan Pinkerton
Allan Pinkerton was a Scottish detective who pioneered many spying techniques that are still used today. He was one of the first
detectives to shadow his subjects, and his undercover operations, what he called “assuming a role,” helped shape modern
espionage. In 1850 he founded the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, a group of private detectives and policemen. The group
was well known throughout the 1800s, and is best remembered for their involvement in the tracking and capture of several old west
outlaws. During the American Civil War, Pinkerton was the head of the Union Intelligence Service, and was a close advisor and
confidant to Abraham Lincoln. He helped foil an assassination plot on Lincoln in 1861, planted agents inside the Confederate army,
and even went undercover as a Confederate officer in order to report on troop movements.
9. Klaus Fuchs

A German theoretical physicist and an expert on atomic bomb technology, Klaus Fuchs passed on a number of significant weapons
secrets to the USSR while working as a scientist for the American government. Fuchs made a number of breakthroughs in nuclear
fission, and was a part of the famed Manhattan Project that led to the development of the first A-bomb. A communist in his youth, he
was recruited by a KGB case officer in 1941, and for years he passed on information about bomb technology and the state of the
U.S. weapons stockpile to the Soviets. Fuchs was apprehended in 1946 after a Soviet cipher was cracked by Allied intelligence
forces, and under interrogation he admitted to working for the Russians. While he is not as well known as Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg, the atomic secrets provided by Klaus Fuchs are said to have had a bigger effect on the Russians’ knowledge of the U.S.
nuclear program, and even helped aid them in the development of their own atomic weapons.
8. Elizabeth Van Lew

Elizabeth Van Lew was a spy who worked on behalf of the Union during the American Civil War. Van Lew operated under the cover
of a charity worker, and was allowed to enter the infamous Libby Prison in the Southern capital of Richmond to bring Union
prisoners food and supplies. While there, she would gather information about Confederate troop movements and pass it on to U.S.
forces. She also operated a small spy ring that was based out of Richmond and included several high profile members of the
Confederate government, and it is rumored that she even managed to get one of her former slaves hired on at the White House of
the Confederacy to act as an informant. After the war ended, Van Lew was credited by Ulysses Grant as the most valuable source
of information on the Confederate capital city. Along with Belle Boyd on the Southern side, she is remembered as the most famous
spy of the Civil War, and she was eventually inducted into the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame.
7. Aldrich Ames
While most spies engage in espionage for political or ideological reasons, for CIA mole Aldrich Ames the motivation was purely
monetary. Ames, who worked as a counter-intelligence analyst in Washington D.C., was desperate for cash, and in 1985 he began
supplying secrets to the Soviets in exchange for a fee, eventually receiving over $4 million from the Russians. Over the course of
nine years, Ames supplied the Soviets with countless secrets, including the names of over 100 U.S. informants working in Russia, at
least ten of whom were eventually executed. Ames used his millions to fund a lavish lifestyle, which attracted the attention of the
CIA, but thanks to his intelligence training he was able to repeatedly pass lie detector tests. He was finally arrested in 1994, and
after pleading guilty to spying, was sentenced to life in prison. Interestingly, at least $2 million of his fee remains in an undisclosed
bank account, and to this day the Russians have refused to turn this money over to American authorities.
6. Richard Sorge

Considered to be one of the most skilled spies of the 20th century, Richard Sorge was a Soviet master of espionage who worked all
over the world before and during World War II. For much of his career, he operated under the cover of a professional journalist,
traveling to various European countries to calculate the chances of possible Communist uprisings. At the outbreak of WWII, Sorge
traveled to Japan under the guise of a Nazi reporter and began supplying the Soviets with valuable intelligence about Japanese and
German combat operations. He warned them about the Pearl Harbor attack, the planned German invasion of Russia, and countless
other missions, but a lot of his intelligence was ignored by Stalin. Sorge was eventually captured by the Japanese in 1944, and
though he never admitted to being a Soviet spy even under torture, was executed shortly thereafter. The Soviets did not recognize
him or his activities until 1964, at which point he was belatedly hailed as a national hero.
5. Sidney Reilly
One of the major models for the James Bond character, Sidney Reilly was a master spy who worked for a number of governments
in the early 20th century. Known as the “Ace of Spies,” Reilly was an expert at deception and self-promotion, so a lot of the
information on his life is unreliable. We do know that he was a master of disguise, and frequently crossed national borders under
assumed identities in order to steal military secrets, building plans, and aircraft prototypes. He was also known for his debonair
character, and often used his charm to seduce the wives of politicians and military officers in order to get information from them. In
his most famous exploit, Reilly worked as the leader of a British intelligence group involved in trying to overthrow the Bolshevik
government in Russia in 1917. He helped stage an unsuccessful coup, and led an attempted assassination plot on Vladimir Lenin,
but his group was eventually found out and he only narrowly escaped arrest by assuming the identity of German national and
escaping to Finland. He was sentenced to death in absentia by the Russian government, and in 1925 he was lured to back into the
Soviet Union as a part of a sting operation and captured. Though he never admitted to being a spy, he was eventually executed by
firing squad.
4. Fritz Joubert Duquesne

Fritz Joubert Duquesne was a larger than life writer, soldier, and adventurer who gained fame as a spy for the Germans during
World Wars I and II. As a young man, he fought against England in his native South Africa during the First and Second Boer Wars,
at one point enlisting in the British army in order to sabotage missions and report on troop movements. This experience helped
foster a lifelong hatred of all things English, and at the outbreak of the First World War, Duquesne began working for the Germans
as a spy, planting bombs on several British ships that eventually went down at sea. He was captured in 1917 and extradited to New
York, but after two years in jail he made a daring escape by cutting through the bars of his cell and scaling the prison walls. He
disappeared for some time, working as a freelance journalist and even writing his own biography, before resurfacing at the outbreak
of WWII and resuming his spy activities for the Germans. His days of espionage came to an end in 1942 when Duquesne, along
with 33 other German spies, were arrested in what became known as the biggest espionage ring conviction in American history.
3. Nathan Hale

Considered by many to be America’s first spy, Nathan Hale was a soldier in the Continental Army who in 1776 volunteered to go on
a dangerous intelligence-gathering mission behind enemy lines. Hale, who was only 21 at the time, ventured into New York City in
disguise in order to report on British troop movements, but after the city fell to the English, he was found out by a British officer and
captured. Although spying wasn’t widely practiced at the time, Hale was charged with being an illegal combatant and was hanged a
few days after being apprehended. Before his execution, he is said to have uttered the now famous line “I regret that I have but one
life to give for my country.” This speech and his espionage activities cemented Hale’s reputation as one of the heroes of the
Revolutionary War, and to this day a statue of him stands outside of the CIA headquarters.
2. Kim Philby
Perhaps the most famous double agent of the Cold War, Kim Philby was a globetrotting British spy who was in actuality a socialist
under the control of the Soviet KGB. In a career that took him to Spain, Africa, the U.S., Istanbul, and Moscow, Philby gained a
reputation as one of Britain’s most capable spies, but all the while he was secretly sending along information to the Soviet Embassy
in Paris. In the late forties, he was assigned to act as an intermediary between the British and U.S. intelligence organizations in
Washington D.C. During this time, he passed along significant information on U.S. armaments and atomic weapons stockpiles, and
many credit these reports with influencing Josef Stalin’s political decisions and helping to lead to the Korean War. Philby was
suspected as a possible Soviet spy by British intelligence throughout his career, but they were unable to prove anything, and he
remained on the periphery of the intelligence community until he defected to the Soviet Union in 1963. He continued to work in
Soviet intelligence until his death in 1988, when he was given numerous posthumous awards by the Russian government.
1. Mata Hari

Now recognized as the prototypical femme fatale, Margaretha Geertruida Zelle, AKA Mata Hari, was a famous exotic dancer and
performer who was executed in 1917 for spying for the Germans during World War I. She gained fame in Paris for her risqué dance
routines and performances, and at the outbreak of the war she was the mistress and escort to many high profile businessman and
military officers. As a citizen of the neutral Netherlands, Mata Hari frequently crossed national borders, a practice that eventually
attracted the attention of the Allies. When questioned by British intelligence, she claimed to be an undercover spy for the French, but
their government denied this. Soon after, the French intercepted a German radio transmission detailing the activities of one of their
most successful spies. Evidence pointed to Mata Hari as the culprit, and she was quickly arrested and charged with contributing to
the deaths of 50,000 people. She was found guilty during a trial and executed in October of 1917 by firing squad. Although it has
never been determined whether she was really working for the Germans or the French, Mata Hari continues to be remembered as
one of the most famous spies of all time.
Category:Cold War weapons of the United States
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The United States was a major developer and producer of weapons during the Cold War. They were the primary

power behind the NATO side of the arms race against the Soviet Union.

Subcategories

This category has the following 7 subcategories, out of 7 total.

A F n

 [+] American Cold War air-dropped  [+] Cold War firearms of the  [+] American Cold War

bombs (30 P) United States (15 P) nuclear bombs (78 P)

 [+] Cold War anti-submarine weapons

M

of the United States (13 P)

 [+] Cold War missiles of the
 [+] Cold War artillery of the United
United States (5 C, 15 P)
States (13 P) R

 [+] Cold War rockets of the

United States (4 P)
Pages in category "Cold War weapons of the United States"

The following 56 pages are in this category, out of 56 total. This list may not reflect recent changes (learn more).

8 G cont. N cont.

 8"/55 caliber Mark 71 gun  GA  N

A M-87 ord

Skybolt SS.11
 ADM-20 Quail I  N
 AGM-28 Hound Dog
orden
 AGM-69 SRAM  Imp
bombsi
 AGM-86 ALCM roved
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Launch
 ASM-135 ASAT P
B Control

System  P
 BLU-43 Dragontooth L GM-19
 BGM-71 TOW Jupiter
 LG
 Bomber gap  P
C M-118
 GM-11
 CAPTOR mine Peaceke Redsto
 CIM-10 Bomarc eper ne
 Command Data Buffer  LG  P
 Convair XSM-74 M-30 GM-17
D Minutem Thor
an S
 Davy Crockett (nuclear device)
chronolo
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M-65
 E14 munition  LG
Atlas
M-25C
 E23 munition
Titan II  S
 E77 balloon bomb
M-68
 LG
 ENTAC
Titan
G M-30

Minutem  SS

 GAM-63 RASCAL an M-N-8

M Regulu

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 M1 T
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bomblet  T2
hapter 4:  WEAPONS OF THE COLD WAR 49
 M1
Vigilant
Procrustes in modern dress, the nuclear scientist will prepare the 8
bed on which mankind must lie; and if mankind doesn't fit-well, recoilless
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that will be just too bad for mankind. rifle  Tit

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 M2
Aldous Huxley1 (rocket
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rifle  H
A Note on Military Jargon  M2
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42
Throughout this book I use as few acronyms and specialized
Titan I
military terms as I can. These terms are not needed to grasp the Bushmas

general picture. Unlike their counterparts in the natural sciences ter Tri

and mathematics, these terms do not economize or clarify  M6

dent
discussions of which they are a part, but needlessly encumber 7
(missile
them, thereby making it harder for citizens to critically evaluate )
recoilless
 rifle
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military policies. And, once we begin to use the war intellectuals'
 M8
terms, we tend to think about military affairs in their terms too. For  U
example, it mattered little to the Russians whether a bomb which 5
GM-
could destroy Moscow made its home in a Nebraskan or a German machine
133
missile site. Endowing these bombs with two different names, gun
Trident
however, made it easier for our war intellectuals to act as if  MG
locations and other trivial characteristics of these bombs made all M-52
II

the difference in the world. This, in turn, was used to support the  U
Lance
fallacious argument that the cause of peace was served by GM-27
negotiating small reductions in one kind of bomb and large  MG
Polaris
increases in another (see Chapter 6). R-3 Little
 U
John
Western governments and military organizations employ terms like GM-73
 Mar
"Minutemen," "Polaris," "initiative," and "shield" (which evoke in Poseid
k 37
most of us positive associations) to promote weapons and policies on
of mass destruction. This miscalling started early; for example, torpedo
 U
giving the name "Peacemaker" to a 1940s' aircraft whose deadly  Mar
GM-96
cargo could destroy at least one large metropolitan area. This k 46
Trident
miscalling still continues; for example, giving the name torpedo
"Peacekeeper" to a ballistic missile which could wipe a few cities I

off the face of the earth. The least this book can do is break away
 Mar W
from this inglorious tradition. k 48

torpedo  W

   MG 25

R-1 (nuclea
Conventional Weapons r
Honest
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In the 1980s, deployment, production, and research of John
conventional weapons accounted for some 75 percent of the United N d)

States' military budget.2a,3 These weapons are familiar to most of X

us, and only call for a few generalizations.  Nor

d SS.10  XS
In this century, dramatic increases in the technological M-73
sophistication and effectiveness of conventional weapons have Goose
taken place. As a result, modern conventional wars are, to a
considerable extent, wars between machines and their operators,
not between soldiers in open combat. It follows that the side with a
more advanced scientific base and a stronger economy has a
decisive edge. Because most poor nations have neither, they must
import most of their weapons, and they often settle internal
political conflicts not through an open fight between the well-
armed state and its poorer opponents, but through guerrilla
warfare.

A new weapon might confer a decisive edge in conventional

warfare on the side which deploys it first. However, soon
opponents acquire the new weapon or invent effective
countermeasures against it, so the edge is of a short duration.
Hence, though new weapons have often helped the side possessing
them win battles, in the long run they have harmed the human
prospect by steadily raising the costs of war.

Weapon development often leads to obsolescence. Cannons

replaced catapults, rifles replaced swords, tanks replaced horses,
and modern anti-tank weapons may outdate tanks.

Throughout history, some devices which were not ordinarily

viewed as weapons found use in warfare. This practice still
continues, albeit at a more advanced technological level. The
primitive method of fighting wars by setting forests or fields on
fire was replaced by methodically poisoning, plowing over, and
setting ablaze large tracts of land. The ancient tactic of defending a
city under siege by pouring boiling oil on its attackers has given
way to the use of incendiary materials that stick to people's skin
and burn them alive.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical and biological weapons may be used to kill and injure

people and other living organisms and to damage non-living
materials. Chemical weapons are made of inanimate substances.
Biological weapons are living organisms. In comparison to nuclear
weapons neither weapon is, at the moment, very effective. They
have both been used in the past and will be used in the future, but,
except for their psychological impact, and (like all other weapons)
their inhumanity, there is nothing particularly unusual or
devastating about them. In 1990, the USA and USSR agreed to
eliminate their stockpiles of chemical weapons, a decision which
may further diminish their importance. On the other hand, their
successful deployment in some recent Third World conflicts may
increase their appeal, especially for hard-pressed non-nuclear
countries.

The chief concern, then, is not with what people can do with these
weapons now, but with what they might be able to do with them in
the future. In this context, biological research appears more
ominous. Over many decades, some biologists have been trying to
develop new varieties of disease-causing living organisms. 4 Future
advances along these lines might tempt nations or terrorists to
vaccinate their people against one such organism in secret, then let
it loose, or threaten to let it loose, on the world. Today this is only
a script for a science fiction thriller, but we have all learned by
now the bitter-sweet lesson that today's science fiction may
become tomorrow's commonplace realities.

Nuclear Bombs

Let us move on to nuclear weapons, the "backbone of American

military power."5 In the late 1980s, the entire nuclear program
accounted for about a quarter of America's military spending. 3 The
nuclear bombs themselves, are, comparatively speaking, cheap;
their production probably consumed less than 1 percent of
America's total defense budget.2a Their yields cover a considerable
range; single bombs in the American arsenal could cause roughly
as much as 100 times, or as little as 1/100th, the damage in
Hiroshima.

A bomb's yield determines, in part, its wartime use. Small bombs

are destined for such things as battlefield situations, mines,
artillery shells, and anti-submarine operations. Medium bombs are
destined against small military targets. Large bombs could be used
against metropolitan areas or against large well-protected military
targets.

Pound for pound, the Hiroshima bomb had a far greater destructive
power than non-nuclear explosives. Since 1945, nuclear scientists
have made even more impressive strides in this respect. In the
1980s, a modern bomb weighing as much as the Hiroshima bomb
(about five metric tons), could have as much as 150 times its
explosive yield.2b In fact, by 1980 at the latest, humanity came
close to the theoretical limit of weight reductions; as far as
contemporary theoretical physics is concerned, further research in
this direction was fruitless.

Delivery Vehicles

Bombers and Cruise Missiles

From 1945 through 1991, several types of airplanes could be used

to deliver nuclear bombs to a target, depending in part on their
starting points. In the event of war between the USA and the
USSR, a large number would have taken off from the USA and
flown to targets in the USSR and elsewhere. These bombers were
large, they could fly to the Soviet Union and back without landing,
and they could carry bombs or cruise missiles (see below). Smaller
airplanes which could carry fewer nuclear bombs and could not fly
so far were stationed in Europe, Korea, and on aircraft carriers.

American bombers were once destined to drop bombs above

targets, but, allegedly, the Soviets air defense system could have
prevented as many as half of our bombers from reaching their
targets. Though the remaining half could still obliterate Soviet
cities and military targets many times over, war planners-who like
to play it safe-developed countermeasures against Soviet air
defense. Of these countermeasures, two deserve special mention.

The so-called stealth bomber should be able to penetrate the

Russian air defense system better than existing American bombers.

The second countermeasure equipped bombers with cruise

missiles. These missiles could be released hundreds of miles from
target, thereby reducing a bomber's vulnerability to Soviet air
defense. A cruise missile is a small, pilotless airplane which can
fly close to the ground. It is equipped with a built-in navigational
system which allows it to deliver its single warhead to target with
great accuracy. By early 1992, the USA was deploying cruise
missiles by the thousand, with the Commonwealth of Independent
States trailing some distance behind. Because these missiles could
be launched from airplanes, they maximized the bomb's chances of
reaching the target and the crew's safe return (it is not clear,
however, whether there will be anyplace safe to return to in an all-
out nuclear war). In addition to large bombers, these little
unmanned airplanes can be readily launched from almost any
platform. As seen in the Persian Gulf War, cruise missiles can also
carry a large load of conventional bombs.

Ballistic Missiles

Among delivery vehicles, ballistic missiles have for a long time

been held in the highest regard by Western and Soviet analysts.
These missiles are equipped with bombs, which, together with the
mechanisms that set them off, guidance systems, and some other
components, are called warheads. A ballistic missile is essentially
a rocket which shoots its warheads out to space and from there
propels them toward their targets. From then on, the warhead's
trajectory is determined by gravity. Because there is no air
resistance in space, warheads there fly with amazing speed-some
25 minutes after a Midwestern missile has been launched, its
warheads would begin exploding over Asian or European soil.

At first, ballistic missiles had only one warhead each. Later, new
missiles were often equipped with several warheads and many of
the old ones were similarly retrofitted. Some ballistic missiles
carried as many as ten warheads (ten MIRVs in jargon), and each
of these warheads could hit a different target. All the bombs
delivered from a single missile have, however, a limited range, and
must fall within an area not exceeding some 90 miles in length and
30 miles in width.6 For instance, bombs from a single missile could
destroy targets in both Baltimore and Washington, D.C. (30 miles
apart), but not in Baltimore and Pittsburgh (210 miles apart).

Ballistic missiles in the American arsenal could be launched from

land and sea. In the 1980s, most Western land missiles were
stationed in Europe and in the American Midwest. The European-
based missiles were smaller, had a shorter range, were not well
protected, and, towards the end of the decade, were being
negotiated out of existence. The Midwestern missiles (ICBM in
jargon) were placed underground, had a longer range, and were
protected by massive concrete silos.

Ballistic missiles could also be launched from submarines. Each

missile-submarine carried a number of ballistic missiles, and each
missile could be equipped with multiple warheads. On the
American side, all missile-submarines were powered by nuclear
reactors. Because these reactors enabled missile-submarines to stay
under water (without surfacing) for more than two months at a
time and to make less noise than conventional submarines, nuclear
submarines were harder to detect and destroy.

Strategic Requirements of Nuclear Weapons and Delivery

Vehicles

Ideally, all warheads and delivery vehicles must meet the

following requirements:

Reliability. Delivery vehicles must take off and discharge their

warheads properly; warheads must reach and pulverize their
targets. Though the U.S. has never fired ballistic missiles over the
North Pole (as it would have in time of war with Russia), most
experts believe that American warheads and delivery vehicles were
reliable.

Penetrability. They must get past any obstacle on their way to

target. Most ballistic missiles are unstoppable, but a certain
fraction of bombers and cruise missiles may have been prevented
by Soviet air defenses from reaching target.

Accuracy. They must hit Moscow and not Paris; a missile site and
not a preschool two miles away. The U.S. has made great strides in
this regard: In 1991, about half of all American bombs, regardless
of their point of origin and delivery vehicle, were reportedly able
to land within one-quarter mile of target.

Survivability. Enough warheads and delivery vehicles must survive

the worst imaginable surprise attack to assure the sufficient
destruction of the attacker in a retaliatory strike. Only this, it is
believed, can deter nuclear blackmail.

Command, Control, and Communication

A nation's Armed Forces must be continuously integrated into one

functional unit. This integration has been achieved through a rigid
chain of command which went all the way to the Presidents in the
USA and the USSR; through various means of gathering
intelligence, including advance warning of impending or actual
nuclear attack; and through an extensive communication network.

The most important mission of the American and Soviet militaries

in times of peace was prevention of accidental or unauthorized
launch of nuclear weapons. For this purpose, a complicated (and so
far remarkably effective) network of safeguards and codes has
been used. The command, control, and communication network
was also believed to be vital to the national interest because it
helped assure nuclear retaliation. Though substantial efforts have
been expended in this direction, it is doubtful whether this network
would have survived a surprise attack in either the USA or the
USSR.7

For obvious reasons, each side had to know what the other was up
to. In part, the needed information has been gathered through
traditional activities such as spying and analysis of open
publications. In part, it has been gathered through sophisticated
technologies such as radar and satellites. Early detection is
considered particularly important in deterring nuclear war. Thus, if
the Soviets knew that Americans were likely to be forewarned of a
surprise attack and save their bombers (by putting them in the air
on time), the Soviets might have been less inclined to launch an
attack in the first place.

Satellites

Like some nuclear warheads, satellites are carried into space by

rockets. But, instead of being propelled back to earth, they are
propelled into orbit around it. In the early 1980s, some three-
quarters of all space missions had military purposes, 8a and every
third day saw the launch of a new military satellite. 8b Throughout
the 1980s, military satellites were not involved in direct warfare;
they only constituted a vital element in integrating the entire
military machine. Their integrative functions included
(1) reconnaissance, which provided, among other things,
surveillance of the entire earth and advance warning of a missile
attack; (2) communication, in fact, 80 percent of all military
communications were carried out via satellites; and (3) navigation,
for example, by helping missile submarines pinpoint their exact
location, satellites enabled them to improve the targeting accuracy
of their warheads.8c

Satellites are gradually being equipped with means of destroying

fellow satellites and of defending themselves from attack. If
military competitions among major world powers overtake
humanity again, these developments could turn out to be critically
important to warfare and to the fate of the earth. In contrast,
although America's spaced-out 1980s' rush to render satellites
capable of missile destruction (SDI in jargon) might produce some
unexpected technological spin-offs, the contribution it will make to
our national security is sure to be far too slight to justify the costs.
Sooner or later, this attempt will be given up as a bad job.

This then is what those exciting first years of peaceful space

exploration have come to. Many among us are too young to
remember the early promise of humanity's reach to the stars. Some
people disdained it even then. Others cannot forget the quarrels
which set them apart from their fellow passengers to the grave. But
those of us who shared the excitement, those of us whose
compassion for their fellows transcends national and ideological
boundaries, can only view the 1980s' militarization of space as a
letdown from that wonderful moment in 1969 when a man first
walked on the moon.

Summary

As much as possible, modern military terms are eschewed in this

book because they only served to encumber, obfuscate, and
degrade the moral and intellectual quality of discourse in Cold War
America. Conventional weapons include such old standards as
tanks and rifles and such relative newcomers as anti-tank guided
missiles and laser beams. Throughout the Cold War, conventional
weapons have been used extensively in international warfare and
consumed a much larger fraction of the world's military spending
than nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons such as mustard gas may
be defined as substances which can be gainfully used to harm
human beings, other living organisms, or non-living materials.
Recent years have seen a marked increase in their use in local
conflicts, but they were not expected to play a major role in a
worldwide conflagration. Biological weapons are toxic or harmful
living organisms, e.g., disease-causing bacteria or submarine-
destroying dolphins. Although they have been relatively
unimportant throughout the Cold War, future research might
greatly increase their significance and appeal. Despite their
overwhelming military importance, nuclear bombs consumed a
relatively small portion of America's total military budget; a far
greater proportion was expended on the development, production,
and maintenance of delivery vehicles. Nuclear bombs could be
launched from many corners of the globe; from air, sea, and land;
from the ocean's and earth's surfaces and subsurfaces; from aircraft
carriers and infantry cannons; from submarines and bombers. They
could be delivered to target through bombers, ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and cannons. These delivery vehicles and the
warheads they carried were expected to meet minimum standards
of reliability, penetrability, accuracy, and survivability. Each
nation has used various means to integrate its armed forces into
one functional unit and gain information about the activities of its
adversaries and allies. Space satellites played important roles in the
military machines of the United States and the Soviet Union, roles
which included reconnaissance, communication, and navigation.

Cold War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For other uses, see  Cold War (disambiguation).

United States President Ronald Reagan (left) andPresident of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev meet in

1985.

Part of a series on the

Cold War

Origins of the Cold War

World War II

War Conferences

Eastern Bloc

Iron Curtain

Cold War (1947–1953)

Cold War (1953–1962)

Cold War (1962–1979)

Cold War (1979–1985)

Cold War (1985–1991)

The Cold War (Russian: Холо́дная война́, Kholodnaya voyna, 1947–91) was the

continuing state of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition

existing after World War II (1939–1945), primarily between the Soviet Union and its satellite

states, and the powers of the Western world, particularly the United States. Although the

primary participants' military forces never officially clashed directly, they expressed the

conflict through military coalitions, strategic conventional force deployments, extensive aid

to states deemed vulnerable, proxy wars, espionage, propaganda, a nuclear arms race,

economic and technological competitions, such as the Space Race.

Despite being allies against the Axis powers and having the most powerful military forces

among peer nations, the USSR and the US disagreed about the configuration of the post-

war world while occupying most of Europe. The Soviet Union created theEastern Bloc with

the eastern European countries it occupied, annexing some as Soviet Socialist

Republics and maintaining others as satellite states, some of which were later consolidated

as the Warsaw Pact (1955–1991). The US and some western European countries

established containment of communism as a defensive policy, establishing alliances such

as NATO to that end.

Several such countries also coordinated the Marshall Plan, especially in West Germany,

which the USSR opposed. Elsewhere, in Latin America and Southeast Asia, the USSR

assisted and helped foster communist revolutions, opposed by several Western countries

and their regional allies; some they attempted to roll back, with mixed results. Some

countries aligned with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and others formed the Non-Aligned

Movement.

The Cold War featured periods of relative calm and of international high tension – the Berlin

Blockade (1948–1949), the Korean War (1950–1953), theBerlin Crisis of 1961, the Vietnam

War (1959–1975), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–

1989), and the Able Archer 83NATO exercises in November 1983. Both sides

sought détente to relieve political tensions and deter direct military attack, which would

likely guarantee their mutual assured destruction with nuclear weapons.

In the 1980s, the United States increased diplomatic, military, and economic pressures

against the USSR, which had already suffered severe economic stagnation. Thereafter,

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the liberalizing reforms

of perestroika ("reconstruction", "reorganization", 1987) andglasnost ("openness", ca.

1985). The Cold War ended after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, leaving the United

States as the dominant military power, and Russia possessing most of the Soviet Union's

nuclear arsenal. The Cold War and its events have had a significant impact on the world
today, and it is commonly referred to in popular culture.

Contents

 [hide]

1 Origins of the term

2 Background

3 World War II and post-war (1939–47)

o 3.1 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939-41)

o 3.2 Allies against the Axis (1941-45)

o 3.3 Wartime conferences regarding post-

war Europe

o 3.4 Beginnings of the Eastern Bloc

o 3.5 Potsdam Conference and defeat of

Japan

o 3.6 Tensions build

4 Containment through the Korean War (1947–53)

o 4.1 Soviet satellite states

o 4.2 Containment and the Truman

Doctrine

o 4.3 Marshall Plan and Czechoslovak coup

d'état

o 4.4 Berlin Blockade and airlift

o 4.5 NATO beginnings and Radio Free

Europe

o 4.6 Chinese Civil War and SEATO

o 4.7 Korean War

5 Crisis and escalation (1953–62)

o 5.1 Khrushchev, Eisenhower and De-

Stalinization

o 5.2 Warsaw Pact and Hungarian

Revolution

o 5.3 Berlin ultimatum and European

integration

o 5.4 Worldwide competition
 o 5.5 Sino-Soviet split, space race, ICBMs

o 5.6 Berlin Crisis of 1961

o 5.7 Cuban Missile Crisis and Khrushchev

ouster

6 Confrontation through détente (1962–79)

o 6.1 Dominican Republic and French NATO

withdrawal

o 6.2 Czechoslovakia invasion

o 6.3 Brezhnev Doctrine

o 6.4 Third World escalations

o 6.5 Sino-American relations

o 6.6 Nixon, Brezhnev, and détente

o 6.7 Late 1970s deterioration of relations

7 Second Cold War (1979–85)

o 7.1 Afghanistan war

o 7.2 Reagan and Thatcher

o 7.3 Polish Solidarity movement

o 7.4 Soviet and US military and economic

issues

8 End of the Cold War (1985–91)

o 8.1 Gorbachev reforms

o 8.2 Thaw in relations

o 8.3 Faltering Soviet system

o 8.4 Soviet dissolution

9 Legacy

10 Historiography

11 See also

12 Footnotes

13 References

14 Further reading

15 External links

Origins of the term

During World War II, George Orwell used the term Cold War in the essay “You and the
Atomic Bomb” published October 19, 1945, in the British newspaper Tribune.

Contemplating a world living in the shadow of the threat of nuclear war, he warned of a

“peace that is no peace”, which he called a permanent “cold war”,[1] Orwell directly referred

to that war as the ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western

powers.[2] Moreover, in The Observer of March 10, 1946, Orwell wrote that “[a]fter the

Moscow conference last December, Russia began to make a ‘cold war’ on Britain and the

British Empire.”[3]

The first use of the term to describe the post–World War II geopolitical tensions between

the USSR and its satellites and the United States and its western European allies is

attributed to Bernard Baruch, an American financier and presidential advisor.[4] In South

Carolina, on April 16, 1947, he delivered a speech (by journalist Herbert Bayard Swope)
[5]
 saying, “Let us not be deceived: we are today in the midst of a cold war.”[6] Newspaper

reporter-columnist Walter Lippmann gave the term wide currency, with the book Cold

War (1947).[7]

Background
Main article:  Origins of the Cold War

Further information:  Red Scare

American troops in Vladivostok, August 1918, during the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War

There is disagreement among historians regarding the starting point of the Cold War. While

most historians trace its origins to the period immediately following World War II, others

argue that it began towards the end of World War I, although tensions between the Russian

Empire, other European countries and the United States date back to the middle of the 19th

century.[8]

As a result of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (followed by its withdrawal

from World War I), Soviet Russia found itself isolated in international diplomacy.
[9]
 Leader Vladimir Lenin stated that the Soviet Union was surrounded by a "hostile capitalist

encirclement", and he viewed diplomacy as a weapon to keep Soviet enemies divided,

beginning with the establishment of the Soviet Comintern, which called for revolutionary

upheavals abroad.[10]

Subsequent leader Joseph Stalin, who viewed the Soviet Union as a "socialist island",

stated that the Soviet Union must see that "the present capitalist encirclement is replaced

by a socialist encirclement."[11] As early as 1925, Stalin stated that he viewed international

politics as a bipolar world in which the Soviet Union would attract countries gravitating to

socialism and capitalist countries would attract states gravitating toward capitalism, while

the world was in a period of "temporary stabilization of capitalism" preceding its eventual

collapse.[12]

Several events fueled suspicion and distrust between the western powers and the Soviet

Union: the Bolsheviks' challenge to capitalism;[13] the 1926 Soviet funding of a British

general workers strike causing Britain to break relations with the Soviet Union;[14] Stalin's

1927 declaration that peaceful coexistence with "the capitalist countries ... is receding into

the past";[15] conspiratorial allegations in the Shakhty show trial of a planned French and

British-led coup d'etat;[16] the Great Purge involving a series of campaigns of political

repression and persecution in which over half a million Soviets were executed;
[17]
 the Moscow show trials including allegations of British, French, Japanese and German

espionage;[18] the controversial death of 6-8 million people in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic in the 1932-3 Ukrainian famine; western support of the White Army in the Russian

Civil War; the US refusal to recognize the Soviet Union until 1933;[19] and the Soviet entry

into the Treaty of Rapallo.[20] This outcome rendered Soviet–American relations a matter of

major long-term concern for leaders in both countries.[8]

World War II and post-war (1939–47)

Main article:  Origins of the Cold War

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939-41)

Further information:  Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and   Nazi–Soviet economic relations (1934–
1941)

Soviet relations with the West further deteriorated when, one week prior to the start of

the World War II, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,

which included a secret agreement to split Poland and Eastern Europe between the two

states.[21] Beginning one week later, in September 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union

divided Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe through invasions of the countries ceded to
each under the Pact.[22][23]

For the next year and a half, they engaged in an extensive economic relationship, trading

vital war materials[24][25] until Germany broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Operation

Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union through the territories that the two countries

had previously divided.[26]

Allies against the Axis (1941-45)

Further information:  Eastern Front (World War II),  Western Front (World War II),  and  Lend-
Lease

During their joint war effort, which began thereafter in 1941, the Soviets suspected that the

British and the Americans had conspired to allow the Soviets to bear the brunt of the

fighting against Nazi Germany. According to this view, the Western Allies had deliberately

delayed opening a second anti-German front in order to step in at the last moment and

shape the peace settlement.[27] Thus, Soviet perceptions of the West left a strong

undercurrent of tension and hostility between the Allied powers.[28]

In turn, in 1944, the Soviets appeared to the Allies to have deliberately delayed the relief of

the Polish underground's Warsaw Uprising against the Nazis.[29] On at least one occasion, a

Soviet fighter shot down an RAF plane supplying the Polish insurgents.[30] A 'secret war'

also took place between the SOE-backed AK and NKVD-backed partisans.[29]

Wartime conferences regarding post-war Europe

The "Big Three" at the Yalta Conference,Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt andJoseph Stalin

Further information:  Tehran Conference and Yalta Conference

The Allies disagreed about how the European map should look, and how borders would be

drawn, following the war.[31] Each side held dissimilar ideas regarding the establishment and

maintenance of post-war security.[31] The western Allies desired a security system in which

democratic governments were established as widely as possible, permitting countries to

peacefully resolve differences through international organizations.[32]

Following Russian historical experiences with frequent invasions[33] and the immense death

toll (estimated at 27 million) and destruction the Soviet Union sustained during World War

II,[34] the Soviet Union sought to increase security by controlling the internal affairs of

countries that bordered it.[31][35] In April 1945, both Churchill and new American

President Harry S. Truman opposed, among other things, the Soviets' decision to prop up

the Lublin government, the Soviet-controlled rival to the Polish government-in-exile, whose

relations with the Soviets were severed.[36]

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allies failed to reach a firm consensus on
the framework for post-war settlement in Europe.[37]Following the Allied victory in May, the

Soviets effectively occupied Eastern Europe,[37] while strong US and Western allied forces

remained in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union, United States, Britain and France established zones of occupation and a

loose framework for four-power control of occupied Germany.[38] The Allies set up

the United Nations for the maintenance of world peace, but the enforcement capacity of

its Security Council was effectively paralyzed by individual members' ability to use veto

power.[39]Accordingly, the UN was essentially converted into an inactive forum for

exchanging polemical rhetoric, and the Soviets regarded it almost exclusively as a

propaganda tribune.[40]

Beginnings of the Eastern Bloc

Further information:  Eastern Bloc

During the final stages of the war, the Soviet Union laid the foundation for the Eastern

Bloc by directly annexing several countries as Soviet Socialist Republics that were initially

(and effectively) ceded to it by Nazi Germany in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. These

included eastern Poland (incorporated into two different SSRs),[41] Latvia (which became

the Latvian SSR)[42],[42][43] Estonia (which became the Estonian SSR),[42][43] Lithuania (which

became the Lithuanian SSR),[42][43] part of eastern Finland (which became the Karelo-

Finnish SSR)[23] and eastern Romania (which became the Moldavian SSR).[44][45]

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was concerned that, given the enormous size of

Soviet forces deployed in Europe at the end of the war, and the perception that Soviet

leaderJoseph Stalin was unreliable, there existed a Soviet threat to Western Europe.[46] In

April-May 1945, the British War Cabinet's Joint Planning Staff Committee

developed Operation Unthinkable, a plan "to impose upon Russia the will of the United

States and the British Empire".[47] The plan, however, was rejected by the British Chiefs of

Staff Committee as militarily unfeasible.[46]

Potsdam Conference and defeat of Japan

Winston Churchill, Harry S. Truman andJoseph Stalin at the Potsdam Conference.

Further information:  Potsdam Conference and Surrender of Japan

At the Potsdam Conference, which started in late July after Germany's surrender, serious

differences emerged over the future development of Germany and eastern Europe.
[48]
 Moreover, the participants' mounting antipathy and bellicose language served to confirm

their suspicions about each others' hostile intentions and entrench their positions.[49] At this

conference Truman informed Stalin that the United States possessed a powerful new

weapon.[50]

Stalin was aware that the Americans were working on the atomic bomb and, given that the
Soviets' own rival program was in place, he reacted to the news calmly. The Soviet leader

said he was pleased by the news and expressed the hope that the weapon would be used

against Japan.[50] One week after the end of the Potsdam Conference, the US bombed

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after the attacks, Stalin protested to US officials when

Truman offered the Soviets little real influence in occupied Japan.[51]

Tensions build
Further information:  Long Telegram,  Iron Curtain,  and  Restatement of Policy on Germany

In February 1946, George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow helped to articulate

the US government's increasingly hard line against the Soviets, and became the basis for

US strategy toward the Soviet Union for the duration of the Cold War.[52] That September,

the Soviet side produced the Novikov telegram, sent by the Soviet ambassador to the US
but commissioned and "co-authored" by Vyacheslav Molotov; it portrayed the US as being

in the grip of monopoly capitalists who were building up military capability "to prepare the

conditions for winning world supremacy in a new war".[53]

On September 6, 1946, James F. Byrnes delivered a speech in Germany repudiating

the Morgenthau Plan (a proposal to partition and de-industrialize post-war Germany) and

warning the Soviets that the US intended to maintain a military presence in Europe

indefinitely.[54] As Byrnes admitted a month later, "The nub of our program was to win the

German people [...] it was a battle between us and Russia over minds [...]"[55]

A few weeks after the release of this "Long Telegram", former British Prime Minister

Winston Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri.[56] The
speech called for an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviets, whom he accused of

establishing an "iron curtain" from "Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic".[57][58]

Containment through the Korean War (1947–53)

Main article:  Cold War (1947–1953)

Soviet satellite states

Formation of the Eastern Bloc

Further information:  Eastern Bloc  and  Cominform

After annexing several occupied countries as Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of World

War II, other occupied states were added to theEastern Bloc by converting them into

puppet Soviet Satellite states,[58] such as East Germany,[59] the People's Republic of Poland,

the People's Republic of Hungary,[60] the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,[61] the People's

Republic of Romania and the People's Republic of Albania.[62]

The Soviet-style regimes that arose in the Bloc not only reproduced Soviet command

economies, but also adopted the brutal methods employed by Joseph Stalin and Soviet

secret police to suppress real and potential opposition.[63] In Asia, the Red Army had

overrun Manchuria in the last month of the war, and went on to occupy the large swath of

Korean territory located north of the 38th parallel.[64]

In September 1947, the Soviets created Cominform, the purpose of which was to enforce

orthodoxy within the international communist movement and tighten political control over

Soviet satellites through coordination of communist parties in the Eastern Bloc.

[65]
 Cominform faced an embarrassing setback the following June, when the Tito–Stalin

split obliged its members to expel Yugoslavia, which remained Communist but adopted

a non-aligned position.[66]

As part of the Soviet domination of the Eastern Bloc, the NKVD, led by Lavrentiy Beria,

supervised the establishment of Soviet-style secret police systems in the Bloc that were

supposed to crush anti-communist resistance.[67] When the slightest stirrings of

independence emerged in the Bloc, Stalin's strategy matched that of dealing with domestic

pre-war rivals: they were removed from power, put on trial, imprisoned, and in several

instances, executed.[68]

Containment and the Truman Doctrine

European military alliances

Main articles:  Containment  and  Truman Doctrine

By 1947, US president Harry S. Truman's advisers urged him to take immediate steps to

counter the Soviet Union's influence, citing Stalin's efforts (amid post-war confusion and

collapse) to undermine the US by encouraging rivalries among capitalists that could

precipitate another war.[69] In February 1947, the British government announced that it could

no longer afford to finance the Greek monarchical military regime inits civil war against

communist-led insurgents.

The American government's response to this announcement was the adoption

of containment,[70] the goal of which was to stop the spread of communism. Truman

delivered a speech that called for the allocation of $400 million to intervene in the war and

unveiled the Truman Doctrine, which framed the conflict as a contest between free peoples

and totalitarian regimes.[70] Even though the insurgents were helped by Josip Broz

Tito's Yugoslavia,[19] US policymakers accused the Soviet Union of conspiring against the

Greek royalists in an effort to expand Soviet influence.[71]

Enunciation of the Truman Doctrine marked the beginning of a US bipartisan defense and

foreign policy consensus between Republicans andDemocrats focused on containment and

deterrence that weakened during and after the Vietnam War, but ultimately held steady.[72]
[73]
Moderate and conservative parties in Europe, as well as social democrats, gave virtually

unconditional support to the Western alliance,[74]while European and American

Communists, paid by the KGB and involved in its intelligence operations,[75] adhered to

Moscow's line, although dissent began to appear after 1956. Other critiques of consensus

politics came from anti-Vietnam War activists, the CND and the nuclear freeze movement.

[76]

Marshall Plan and Czechoslovak coup d'état

Map of Cold-War era Europe and the Near East showing countries that receivedMarshall Plan aid. The red

columns show the relative amount of total aid per nation.

European economic alliances

Main articles:  Marshall Plan  and  Czechoslovak coup d'état of 1948

In early 1947, Britain, France and the United States unsuccessfully attempted to reach an

agreement with the Soviet Union for a plan envisioning an economically self-sufficient

Germany, including a detailed accounting of the industrial plants, goods and infrastructure

already removed by the Soviets.[77] In June 1947, in accordance with the Truman Doctrine,

the United States enacted the Marshall Plan, a pledge of economic assistance for all

European countries willing to participate, including the Soviet Union.[77]

The plan's aim was to rebuild the democratic and economic systems of Europe and to
counter perceived threats to Europe's balance of power, such as communist parties seizing

control through revolutions or elections.[78] The plan also stated that European prosperity

was contingent upon German economic recovery.[79] One month later, Truman signed

the National Security Act of 1947, creating a unified Department of Defense, the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council. These would become the

main bureaucracies for US policy in the Cold War.[80]

Stalin believed that economic integration with the West would allow Eastern Bloc countries

to escape Soviet control, and that the US was trying to buy a pro-US re-alignment of

Europe.[65] Stalin therefore prevented Eastern Bloc nations from receiving Marshall Plan aid.
[65]
 The Soviet Union's alternative to the Marshall plan, which was purported to involve

Soviet subsidies and trade with eastern Europe, became known as the Molotov Plan (later
institutionalized in January 1949 as the Comecon).[19] Stalin was also fearful of a

reconstituted Germany; his vision of a post-war Germany did not include the ability to rearm

or pose any kind of threat to the Soviet Union.[81]

In early 1948, following reports of strengthening "reactionary elements", Soviet operatives

executed a coup d'état of 1948 in Czechoslovakia, the only Eastern Bloc state that the

Soviets had permitted to retain democratic structures.[82][83] The public brutality of the coup

shocked Western powers more than any event up to that point, set in a motion a brief scare

that war would occur and swept away the last vestiges of opposition to the Marshall Plan in

the United States Congress.[84]

The twin policies of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan led to billions in economic

and military aid for Western Europe, and Greece and Turkey. With US assistance, the

Greek military won its civil war,[80] The Italian Christian Democrats defeated the

powerfulCommunist-Socialist alliance in the elections of 1948.[85] Increases occurred in

intelligence and espionage activities, Eastern Bloc defectionsand diplomatic expulsions.[86]

Berlin Blockade and airlift

C-47s unloading at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin during the Berlin Blockade.

Main article:  Berlin Blockade

The United States and Britain merged their western German occupation zones

into "Bizonia" (later "trizonia" with the addition of France's zone).[87] As part of the economic

rebuilding of Germany, in early 1948, representatives of a number of Western European

governments and the United States announced an agreement for a merger of western

German areas into a federal governmental system.[88] In addition, in accordance with

the Marshall Plan, they began to re-industrialize and rebuild the German economy,

including the introduction of a newDeutsche Mark currency to replace the

old Reichsmark currency that the Soviets had debased.[89]

Shortly thereafter, Stalin instituted the Berlin Blockade, one of the first major crises of the

Cold War, preventing food, materials and supplies from arriving in West Berlin.[90] The

United States, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and several other countries

began the massive "Berlin airlift", supplying West Berlin with food and other provisions.[91]

The Soviets mounted a public relations campaign against the policy change, communists

attempted to disrupt the elections of 1948 preceding large losses therein,[92] 300,000

Berliners demonstrated and urged the international airlift to continue,[93] and the US

accidentally created "Operation Vittles", which supplied candy to German children.[94] In

May 1949, Stalin backed down and lifted the blockade.[67][95]

NATO beginnings and Radio Free Europe

Main articles:  NATO, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and  Eastern Bloc information
dissemination

President Truman signs the National Security Act Amendment of 1949 with guests in the Oval Office.
Britain, France, the United States, Canada and eight other western European countries

signed the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO).[67] That August, Stalin ordered the detonation of the first Soviet

atomic device.[19]Following Soviet refusals to participate in a German rebuilding effort set

forth by western European countries in 1948,[88][96] the US, Britain and France spearheaded

the establishment of West Germany from the three Western zones of occupation in May

1949.[48] The Soviet Union proclaimed its zone of occupation in Germany the German

Democratic Republic that October.[48]

Media in the Eastern Bloc was an organ of the state, completely reliant on and subservient

to the communist party, with radio and television organizations being state-owned, while

print media was usually owned by political organizations, mostly by the local communist
party.[97]Soviet propaganda used Marxist philosophy to attack capitalism, claiming labor

exploitation and war-mongering imperialism were inherent in the system.[98]

Along with the broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Company and the Voice of

America to Eastern Europe,[99] a major propaganda effort begun in 1949 was Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, dedicated to bringing about the peaceful demise of

the Communist system in the Eastern Bloc.[100] Radio Free Europe attempted to achieve

these goals by serving as a surrogate home radio station, an alternative to the controlled

and party-dominated domestic press.[100] Radio Free Europe was a product of some of the

most prominent architects of America's early Cold War strategy, especially those who

believed that the Cold War would eventually be fought by political rather than military

means, such as George F. Kennan.[101]

American policymakers, including Kennan and John Foster Dulles, acknowledged that the

Cold War was in its essence a war of ideas.[101] The United States, acting through the CIA,

funded a long list of projects to counter the Communist appeal among intellectuals in

Europe and the developing world.[102]

In the early 1950s, the US worked for the rearmament of West Germany and, in 1955,

secured its full membership of NATO.[48] In May 1953, Beria, by then in a government post,

had made an unsuccessful proposal to allow the reunification of a neutral Germany to

prevent West Germany's incorporation into NATO.[103]

Chinese Civil War and SEATO

Further information:  Chinese Civil War  and  Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

In 1949, Mao's People's Liberation Army defeated Chiang's US-backed Kuomintang (KMT)

Nationalist Government in China, and the Soviet Union promptly created an alliance with

the newly formed People's Republic of China.[104] The Nationalist Government retreated to

the island of Taiwan. Confronted with the Communist takeover of mainland China and the

end of the US atomic monopoly in 1949, the Truman administration quickly moved to

escalate and expand the containment policy.[19] In NSC-68, a secret 1950 document,[105] the

National Security Council proposed to reinforce pro-Western alliance systems and

quadruple spending on defense.[19]

US officials moved thereafter to expand containment into Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in

order to counter revolutionary nationalist movements, often led by Communist parties

financed by the USSR, fighting against the restoration of Europe's colonial empires in

South-East Asia and elsewhere.[106] In the early 1950s (a period sometimes known as the
"Pactomania"), the US formalized a series of alliances with Japan, Australia, New Zealand,

Thailand and the Philippines (notably ANZUS and SEATO), thereby guaranteeing the

United States a number of long-term military bases.[48]

Korean War
Main article:  Korean War

One of the more significant impacts of containment was the outbreak of the Korean War. In

June 1950, Kim Il-Sung's North Korean People's Army invaded South Korea.[107] To Stalin's

surprise,[19] the UN Security Council backed the defense of South Korea, though the Soviets

were then boycotting meetings to protest that Taiwan and not Communist China held a

permanent seat on the Council.[108] A UN force of personnel from South Korea, the United

States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Canada, Australia, France, the Philippines,

theNetherlands, Belgium, New Zealand and other countries joined to stop the invasion.[109]

Among other effects, the Korean War galvanised NATO to develop a military structure.
[110]
 Public opinion in countries involved, such as Great Britain, was divided for and against

the war. British Attorney General Sir Hartley Shawcross repudiated the sentiment of those

opposed when he said:[111]

I know there are some who think that the horror and devastation of a world war now would be so
frightful, whoever won, and the damage to civilization so lasting, that it would be better to submit to
Communist domination. I understand that view–but I reject it.

Even though the Chinese and North Koreans were exhausted by the war and were

prepared to end it by late 1952, Stalin insisted that they continue fighting, and a cease-fire

was approved only in July 1953, after Stalin's death.[48] In North Korea, Kim Il Sung created

a highly centralized and brutal dictatorship, according himself unlimited power and

generating a formidable cult of personality.[112][113]

Crisis and escalation (1953–62)

Main article:  Cold War (1953–1962)

Khrushchev, Eisenhower and De-Stalinization

In 1953, changes in political leadership on both sides shifted the dynamic of the Cold War.
[80]
 Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated president that January. During the last

18 months of the Truman administration, the US defense budget had quadrupled, and

Eisenhower moved to reduce military spending by a third while continuing to fight the Cold

War effectively.[19]

After the death of Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev became the Soviet leader following the

deposition and execution of Lavrentiy Beria and the pushing aside of rivals Georgy

Malenkovand Vyacheslav Molotov. On February 25, 1956, Khrushchev shocked delegates

to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party by cataloguing and denouncing

Stalin's crimes.[114] As part of a campaign of de-Stalinization, he declared that the only way

to reform and move away from Stalin's policies would be to acknowledge errors made in

the past.[80]

On November 18, 1956, while addressing Western ambassadors at a reception at the

Polish embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev used his famous "Whether you like it or not,

history is on our side. We will bury you" expression, shocking everyone present.
[115]
 However, he had not been talking about nuclear war, he later claimed, but rather about

the historically determined victory of communism over capitalism.[116] He then declared in

1961 that even if the USSR might indeed be behind the West, within a decade its housing

shortage would disappear, consumer goods would be abundant, its population would be

"materially provided for", and within two decades, the Soviet Union "would rise to such a

great height that, by comparison, the main capitalist countries will remain far below and well

behind".[117]

Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, initiated a "New Look" for

the containment strategy, calling for a greater reliance on nuclear weapons against US

enemies in wartime.[80] Dulles also enunciated the doctrine of "massive retaliation",

threatening a severe US response to any Soviet aggression. Possessing nuclear

superiority, for example, allowed Eisenhower to face down Soviet threats to intervene in the

Middle East during the 1956 Suez Crisis.[19]

Warsaw Pact and Hungarian Revolution

Main articles:  Warsaw Pact and Hungarian Revolution of 1956

Map of the Warsaw Pact countries

While Stalin's death in 1953 slightly relaxed tensions, the situation in Europe remained an

uneasy armed truce.[118] The Soviets, who had already created a network of mutual

assistance treaties in the Eastern Bloc by 1949,[119] established a formal alliance therein,

the Warsaw Pact, in 1955.[48]

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 occurred shortly after Khrushchev arranged the removal

of Hungary's Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi.[120] In response to a popular uprising,[121] the

new regime formally disbanded the secret police, declared its intention to withdraw from

the Warsaw Pact and pledged to re-establish free elections. The Soviet Red Army invaded.

[122]
 Thousands of Hungarians were arrested, imprisoned and deported to the Soviet Union,
[123]
 and approximately 200,000 Hungarians fled Hungary in the chaos.[124] Hungarian

leader Imre Nagy and others were executed following secret trials.[125]

From 1957 through 1961, Khrushchev openly and repeatedly threatened the West with

nuclear annihilation. He claimed that Soviet missile capabilities were far superior to those of

the United States, capable of wiping out any American or European city. However,

Khrushchev rejected Stalin's belief in the inevitability of war, and declared his new goal was

to be "peaceful coexistence".[126] This formulation modified the Stalin-era Soviet stance,

where international class struggle meant the two opposing camps were on an inevitable

collision course where Communism would triumph through global war; now, peace would

allow capitalism to collapse on its own,[127] as well as giving the Soviets time to boost their

military capabilities,[128] which remained for decades until Gorbachev's later "new thinking"

envisioning peaceful coexistence as an end in itself rather than a form of class struggle.[129]

US pronouncements concentrated on American strength abroad and the success of liberal

capitalism.[130] However, by the late 1960s, the "battle for men's minds" between two

systems of social organization that Kennedy spoke of in 1961 was largely over, with

tensions henceforth based primarily on clashing geopolitical objectives rather than

ideology.[131]

Berlin ultimatum and European integration

During November 1958, Khrushchev made an unsuccessful attempt to turn all of Berlin into

an independent, demilitarized "free city", giving the United States, Great Britain, and France

a six-month ultimatum to withdraw their troops from the sectors they still occupied in West

Berlin, or he would transfer control of Western access rights to the East Germans.

Khrushchev earlier explained to Mao Tse-tung that "Berlin is the testicles of the West.

Every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin."[132] NATO formally

rejected the ultimatum in mid-December and Khrushchev withdrew it in return for a Geneva

conference on the German question.[133]

More broadly, one hallmark of the 1950s was the beginning of European integration—a

fundamental by-product of the Cold War that Truman and Eisenhower promoted politically,

economically, and militarily, but which later administrations viewed ambivalently, fearful that

an independent Europe would forge a separate détente with the Soviet Union, which would

use this to exacerbate Western disunity.[134]

Worldwide competition

Nationalist movements in some countries and regions, notably Guatemala, Iran,

the Philippines, and Indochina were often allied with communist groups—or at least were

perceived in the West to be allied with communists.[80] In this context, the US and the Soviet

Union increasingly competed for influence by proxy in the Third World

as decolonization gained momentum in the 1950s and early 1960s;[135] additionally, the

Soviets saw continuing losses by imperial powers as presaging the eventual victory of their

ideology.[136]

The US government utilized the CIA in order to remove a string of unfriendly Third World

governments and to support allied ones.[80] The US used the CIA to overthrow governments

suspected by Washington of turning pro-Soviet, including Iran's first democratically elected

government under Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953 (see  1953 Iranian coup

d'état) and Guatemala's democratically elected president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954

(see 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état).[105] Between 1954 and 1961, the US sent economic aid

and military advisors to stem the collapse of South Vietnam's pro-Western regime.[19]

Many emerging nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America rejected the pressure to choose

sides in the East-West competition. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia,

dozens of Third World governments resolved to stay out of the Cold War.[137] The
consensus reached at Bandung culminated with the creation of the Non-Aligned

Movement in 1961.[80]Meanwhile, Khrushchev broadened Moscow's policy to establish ties

with India and other key neutral states. Independence movements in the Third World

transformed the post-war order into a more pluralistic world of decolonized African and

Middle Eastern nations and of rising nationalism in Asia and Latin America.[19]

Sino-Soviet split, space race, ICBMs

Charting the Space Race in context ofSputnik and other nuclear threats.

Main articles:  Sino-Soviet split  and  Space Race

The period after 1956 was marked by serious setbacks for the Soviet Union, most notably

the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, beginning the Sino-Soviet split. Mao had

defended Stalin when Khrushchev attacked him after his death in 1956, and treated the

new Soviet leader as a superficial upstart, accusing him of having lost his revolutionary

edge.[138]

After this, Khrushchev made many desperate attempts to reconstitute the Sino-Soviet

alliance, but Mao considered it useless and denied any proposal.[138] The Chinese and the

Soviets waged an intra-Communist propaganda war.[139] Further on, the Soviets focused on

a bitter rivalry with Mao's China for leadership of the global communist movement,[140] and

the two clashed militarily in 1969.[141]

On the nuclear weapons front, the US and the USSR pursued nuclear rearmament and

developed long-range weapons with which they could strike the territory of the other.[48] In

August 1957, the Soviets successfully launched the world's first intercontinental ballistic

missile(ICBM)[142] and in October, launched the first Earth satellite, Sputnik.[143] The launch

of Sputnik inaugurated the Space Race. This culminated in the Apollo Moon landings,

which astronaut Frank Borman later described as "just a battle in the Cold War"[144] with

superior spaceflight rockets indicating superior ICBMs.

Berlin Crisis of 1961

Soviet tanks face US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie, on October 27, during the Berlin Crisis of 1961

Main articles:  Berlin Crisis of 1961,  Berlin Wall, and  Eastern Bloc emigration and defection

The Berlin Crisis of 1961 was the last major incident in the Cold War regarding the status of

Berlin and post-World War II Germany. By the early 1950s, the Soviet approach to

restricting emigration movement was emulated by most of the rest of the Eastern Bloc.

[145]
 However, hundreds of thousands of East Germans annually emigrated to West

Germany through a "loophole" in the system that existed between East and West Berlin,

where the four occupying World War II powers governed movement.[146]

The emigration resulted in a massive "brain drain" from East Germany to West Germany of

younger educated professionals, such that nearly 20% of East Germany's population had

migrated to West Germany by 1961.[147] That June, the Soviet Union issued a

new ultimatumdemanding the withdrawal of Allied forces from West Berlin.[148] The request

was rebuffed, and in August, East Germany erected a barbed-wire barrier that would

eventually be expanded through construction into the Berlin Wall, effectively closing the

loophole.[149]

Cuban Missile Crisis and Khrushchev ouster

Main article:  Cuban Missile Crisis

The Soviet Union formed an alliance with Fidel Castro-led Cuba after the Cuban

Revolution in 1959.[150] In 1962, President John F. Kennedy responded to the installation of

nuclear missiles in Cuba with a naval blockade. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world

closer to nuclear war than ever before.[151] It further demonstrated the concept of mutually

assured destruction, that neither nuclear power was prepared to use nuclear weapons
fearing total destruction via nuclear retaliation.[152] The aftermath of the crisis led to the first

efforts in thenuclear arms race at nuclear disarmament and improving relations,

[118]
 although the Cold War's first arms control agreement, the Antarctic Treaty, had come

into force in 1961.[153]

In 1964, Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues managed to oust him, but allowed him a

peaceful retirement.[154] Accused of rudeness and incompetence, he was also credited with

ruining Soviet agriculture and bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war.[154] Khrushchev

had become an international embarrassment when he authorised construction of the Berlin

Wall, a public humiliation for Marxism-Leninism.[154]

Confrontation through détente (1962–79)

Main article:  Cold War (1962–1979)

The United States reached the moon in 1969—a symbolic milestone in the space race.

United States Navy F-4 Phantom IIintercepts a Soviet Tupolev Tu-95 D aircraft in the early 1970s

In the course of the 1960s and '70s, Cold War participants struggled to adjust to a new,
more complicated pattern of international relations in which the world was no longer divided

into two clearly opposed blocs.[80] From the beginning of the post-war period, Western

Europe and Japan rapidly recovered from the destruction of World War II and sustained

strong economic growth through the 1950s and '60s, with per capita GDPs approaching

those of the United States, while Eastern Bloc economies stagnated.[80][155]

As a result of the 1973 oil crisis, combined with the growing influence of Third World

alignments such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and

the Non-Aligned Movement, less-powerful countries had more room to assert their

independence and often showed themselves resistant to pressure from either superpower.
[106]
 Moscow, meanwhile, was forced to turn its attention inward to deal with the Soviet

Union's deep-seated domestic economic problems.[80] During this period, Soviet leaders

such as Alexey Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev embraced the notion of détente.[80]

Dominican Republic and French NATO withdrawal

Main article:  United States invasion of the Dominican Republic

President Lyndon B. Johnson landed 22,000 troops in the Dominican Republic in Operation

Power Pack, citing the threat of the emergence of a Cuban-style revolution in Latin

America.[19] NATO countries remained primarily dependent on the US military for its

defense against any potential Soviet invasion, a status most vociferously contested by

France's Charles de Gaulle, who in 1966 withdrew from NATO's military structures and

expelled NATO troops from French soil.[156]

Czechoslovakia invasion
Main articles:  Prague Spring  and  Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia

In 1968, a period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia called the Prague Spring took

place that included "Action Program" of liberalizations, which described increasing freedom

of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of movement, along with an economic

emphasis on consumer goods, the possibility of a multiparty government, limiting the power

of the secret police[157][158] and potentially withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.[159]

The Soviet Red Army, together with most of their Warsaw Pact allies, invaded

Czechoslovakia.[160] The invasion was followed by a wave of emigration, including an

estimated 70,000 Czechs initially fleeing, with the total eventually reaching 300,000.[161] The

invasion sparked intense protests from Yugoslavia, Romania and China, and from Western

European communist parties.[162]

Brezhnev Doctrine
Brezhnev and Nixon during Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to Washington; this was a high-water mark in détente

between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Main article:  Brezhnev Doctrine

In September 1968, during a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers'

Party one month after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev outlined the Brezhnev

Doctrine, in which he claimed the right to violate the sovereignty of any country attempting

to replace Marxism-Leninism with capitalism. During the speech, Brezhnev stated:[159]

When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards
capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and
concern of all socialist countries.

The doctrine found its origins in the failures of Marxism-Leninism in states like Poland,

Hungary and East Germany, which were facing a declining standard of living contrasting

with the prosperity of West Germany and the rest of Western Europe.[163]

Third World escalations

Main articles:  Vietnam War,  Operation Condor, and  Yom Kippur War

The US continued to spend heavily on supporting friendly Third World regimes in Asia.

Conflicts in peripheral regions and client states—most prominently in Vietnam—continued.

[164]
Johnson stationed 575,000 troops in Southeast Asia to defeat the National Front for the

Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) and their North Vietnamese allies in the Vietnam War,

but his costly policy weakened the US economy and, by 1975, ultimately culminated in

what most of the world saw as a humiliating defeat of the world's most powerful superpower

at the hands of one of the world's poorest nations.[19]

Additionally, Operation Condor, employed by South American dictators to suppress leftist

dissent, was backed by the US, which (sometimes accurately) perceived Soviet or Cuban

support behind these opposition movements.[165] Brezhnev, meanwhile, attempted to revive

the Soviet economy, which was declining in part because of heavy military expenditures.[19]
Moreover, the Middle East continued to be a source of contention. Egypt, which received

the bulk of its arms and economic assistance from the USSR, was a troublesome client,

with a reluctant Soviet Union feeling obliged to assist in both the 1967 Six-Day War (with

advisers and technicians) and the War of Attrition (with pilots and aircraft) against US ally

Israel;[166]Syria and Iraq later received increased assistance as well as (indirectly) the PLO.
[167]

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, rumors of imminent Soviet intervention on the Egyptians'

behalf brought about a massive US mobilization that threatened to wreck détente;[168] this

escalation, the USSR's first in a regional conflict central to US interests, inaugurated a new

and more turbulent stage of Third World military activism in which the Soviets made use of

their new strategic parity.[169]

Sino-American relations
Main article:  1972 Nixon visit to China

As a result of the Sino-Soviet split, tensions along the Chinese-Soviet border reached their

peak in 1969, and US President Richard Nixon decided to use the conflict to shift the

balance of power towards the West in the Cold War.[170] The Chinese had sought improved

relations with the US in order to gain advantage over the Soviets as well.

In February 1972, Nixon announced a stunning rapprochement with Mao's China[171] by

traveling to Beijing and meeting with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. At this time, the USSR

achieved rough nuclear parity with the US while the Vietnam War weakened US influence

in the Third World and cooled relations with Western Europe.[172] Although indirect conflict

between Cold War powers continued through the late 1960s and early 1970s, tensions

were beginning to ease.[118]

Nixon, Brezhnev, and détente

Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter sign SALT II treaty, June 18, 1979, in Vienna

Main articles:  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,  Helsinki Accords, and Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe

Following his China visit, Nixon met with Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev in Moscow.
[173]
 These Strategic Arms Limitation Talks resulted in two landmark arms control

treaties: SALT I, the first comprehensive limitation pact signed by the two superpowers,
[174]
 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which banned the development of systems

designed to intercept incoming missiles. These aimed to limit the development of costly

anti-ballistic missiles and nuclear missiles.[80]

Nixon and Brezhnev proclaimed a new era of "peaceful coexistence" and established the

groundbreaking new policy of détente (or cooperation) between the two superpowers.

Between 1972 and 1974, the two sides also agreed to strengthen their economic ties,
[19]
including agreements for increased trade. As a result of their meetings, détente would

replace the hostility of the Cold War and the two countries would live mutually.[173]

Meanwhile, these developments coincided with the "Ostpolitik" of West German

Chancellor Willy Brandt.[162] Other agreements were concluded to stabilize the situation in

Europe, culminating in the Helsinki Accords signed at the Conference on Security and Co-

operation in Europe in 1975.[175]

Late 1970s deterioration of relations

In the 1970s, the KGB, led by Yuri Andropov, continued to persecute distinguished Soviet

personalities such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who were criticising

the Soviet leadership in harsh terms.[176] Indirect conflict between the superpowers

continued through this period of détente in the Third World, particularly during political

crises in the Middle East, Chile, Ethiopia and Angola.[177]

Although President Jimmy Carter tried to place another limit on the arms race with a SALT

II agreement in 1979,[178] his efforts were undermined by the other events that year,

including the Iranian Revolution and the Nicaraguan Revolution, which both ousted pro-US

regimes, and his retaliation against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December.[19]

Second Cold War (1979–85)

This map shows the two essential global spheres during the Cold War in 1980–the US in blue and the USSR

in red. See the legend on the map for more details.

Main article:  Cold War (1979–1985)

The term second Cold War has been used by some historians to refer to the period of

intensive reawakening of Cold War tensions and conflicts in the late 1970s and early

1980s. Tensions greatly increased between the major powers with both sides becoming

more militaristic.[13]

Afghanistan war
Main article:  Soviet war in Afghanistan

During December 1979, approximately 75,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in order

to support the Marxist government formed by ex-Prime-minister Nur Muhammad Taraki,

assassinated that September by one of his party rivals.[179] As a result, US President Jimmy

Carterwithdrew the SALT II treaty from the Senate, imposed embargoes on grain and

technology shipments to the USSR, demanded a significant increase in military spending,

and further announced that the United States would boycott the 1980 Moscow Summer

Olympics. He described the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as "the most serious threat

to the peace since the Second World War".[180]

Reagan and Thatcher

In 1980, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the US presidential election, vowing to

increase military spending and confront the Soviets everywhere.[181] Both Reagan and new

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher denounced the Soviet Union and its ideology.

Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and predicted that Communism would be

left on the "ash heap of history".[182]

Polish Solidarity movement

Main articles:  Solidarity (Polish trade union), Soviet reaction to the Polish Crisis of 1980-
1981, and Martial law in Poland

Pope John Paul II provided a moral focus for anti-communism; a visit to his native Poland

in 1979 stimulated a religious and nationalist resurgence centered on the Solidarity

movementthat galvanized opposition and may have led to his attempted assassination two

years later.[183] Reagan also imposed economic sanctions on Poland to protest the

suppression of Solidarity.[184] In response, Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's top ideologist,

advised Soviet leaders not to intervene if Poland fell under the control of Solidarity, for fear
it might lead to heavy economic sanctions, representing a catastrophe for the Soviet

economy.[184]

Soviet and US military and economic issues

US and USSR/Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, 1945–2006

Further information:  Brezhnev stagnation, Strategic Defense Initiative,  RSD-10

Pioneer,  and  MGM-31 Pershing

Moscow had built up a military that consumed as much as 25 percent of the Soviet Union's

gross national product at the expense ofconsumer goods and investment in civilian sectors.
[185]
 Soviet spending on the arms race and other Cold War commitments both caused and

exacerbated deep-seated structural problems in the Soviet system, which saw at least a

decade of economic stagnation during the late Brezhnev years.

Soviet investment in the defense sector was not driven by military necessity, but in large

part by the interests of massive party and state bureaucracies dependent on the sector for

their own power and privileges.[186] The Soviet Armed Forces became the largest in the

world in terms of the numbers and types of weapons they possessed, in the number of

troops in their ranks, and in the sheer size of their military–industrial base.[187] However, the

quantitative advantages held by the Soviet military often concealed areas where the

Eastern Bloc dramatically lagged behind the West.[188]

After ten year old American Samantha Smith wrote a letter toYuri Andropovexpressing her fear of nuclear

war, Andropov invited Smith to the Soviet Union.

By the early 1980s, the USSR had built up a military arsenal and army surpassing that of

the United States. Previously, the US had relied on the qualitative superiority of its

weapons, but the gap had been narrowed.[189] Ronald Reagan began massively building up

the United States military not long after taking office. This led to the largest peacetime

defense buildup in United States history.[190]

Tensions continued intensifying in the early 1980s when Reagan revived the B-1

Lancer program that was canceled by the Carter administration, producedLGM-118

Peacekeepers,[191] installed US cruise missiles in Europe, and announced his

experimental Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed "Star Wars" by the media, a defense

program to shoot down missiles in mid-flight.[192]

With the background of a buildup in tensions between the Soviet Union and the United

States, and the deployment of Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer ballistic missilestargeting Western

Europe, NATO decided, under the impetus of the Carter presidency, to deploy MGM-31

Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, primarily West Germany.[193] This deployment

would have placed missiles just 10 minutes' striking distance from Moscow.[194]

After Reagan's military buildup, the Soviet Union did not respond by further building its

military[195] because the enormous military expenses, along with inefficient planned

manufacturing and collectivized agriculture, were already a heavy burden for the Soviet

economy.[196] At the same time, Reagan persuadedSaudi Arabia to increase oil production,
[197]
 even as other non-OPEC nations were increasing production.[198] These developments

contributed to the 1980s oil glut, which affected the Soviet Union, as oil was the main

source of Soviet export revenues.[185][196] Issues with command economics,[199] oil prices

decreases and large military expenditures gradually brought the Soviet economy to
stagnation.[196]

On September 1, 1983, the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, a Boeing

747 with 269 people aboard, including sitting Congressman Larry McDonald, when it

violated Soviet airspace just past the west coast of Sakhalin Island near Moneron Island —

an act which Reagan characterized as a "massacre". This act increased support for military

deployment, overseen by Reagan, which stood in place until the later accords between

Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.[200] The Able Archer 83 exercise in November 1983, a

realistic simulation of a coordinated NATO nuclear release, has been called most

dangerous moment since the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the Soviet leadership keeping a

close watch on it considered a nuclear attack to be imminent.[201]

US domestic public concerns about intervening in foreign conflicts persisted from the end of

the Vietnam War.[202] The Reagan administration emphasized the use of quick, low-

costcounter-insurgency tactics to intervene in foreign conflicts.[202] In 1983, the Reagan

administration intervened in the multisided Lebanese Civil War, invaded Grenada,

bombed Libya and backed the Central American Contras, anti-communist paramilitaries

seeking to overthrow the Soviet-aligned Sandinista government in Nicaragua.[106] While

Reagan's interventions against Grenada and Libya were popular in the US, his backing of

the Contra rebels was mired in controversy.[203]

Meanwhile, the Soviets incurred high costs for their own foreign interventions. Although

Brezhnev was convinced in 1979 that the Soviet war in Afghanistan would be brief, Muslim

guerrillas, aided by the US and other countries, waged a fierce resistance against the

invasion.[204] The Kremlin sent nearly 100,000 troops to support its puppet regime in

Afghanistan, leading many outside observers to dub the war "the Soviets' Vietnam".
[204]
 However, Moscow's quagmire in Afghanistan was far more disastrous for the Soviets

than Vietnam had been for the Americans because the conflict coincided with a period of

internal decay and domestic crisis in the Soviet system.

A senior US State Department official predicted such an outcome as early as 1980, positing

that the invasion resulted in part from a "domestic crisis within the Soviet system. ... It may

be that the thermodynamic law of entropy has ... caught up with the Soviet system, which

now seems to expend more energy on simply maintaining its equilibrium than on improving

itself. We could be seeing a period of foreign movement at a time of internal decay".[205]

[206]
 The Soviets were not helped by their aged and sclerotic leadership either: Brezhnev,

virtually incapacitated in his last years, was succeeded by Andropov and Chernenko,

neither of whom lasted long. After Chernenko's death, Reagan was asked why he had not
negotiated with Soviet leaders. Reagan quipped, "They keep dying on me".[207]

End of the Cold War (1985–91)

Main article:  Cold War (1985–1991)

Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan sign the INF Treaty at the White House, 1987

Gorbachev reforms
Further information:  Mikhail Gorbachev,  perestroika,  and  glasnost

By the time the comparatively youthful Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in

1985,[182] the Soviet economy was stagnant and faced a sharp fall in foreign currency

earnings as a result of the downward slide in oil prices in the 1980s.[208] These issues

prompted Gorbachev to investigate measures to revive the ailing state.[208]

An ineffectual start led to the conclusion that deeper structural changes were necessary

and in June 1987 Gorbachev announced an agenda of economic reform called perestroika,

or restructuring.[209] Perestroika relaxed the production quota system, allowed private

ownership of businesses and paved the way for foreign investment. These measures were

intended to redirect the country's resources from costly Cold War military commitments to

more profitable areas in the civilian sector.[209]

Despite initial scepticism in the West, the new Soviet leader proved to be committed to

reversing the Soviet Union's deteriorating economic condition instead of continuing the

arms race with the West.[118][210] Partly as a way to fight off internal opposition from party

cliques to his reforms, Gorbachev simultaneously introduced glasnost, or openness, which

increased freedom of the press and the transparency of state institutions.[211] Glasnost was

intended to reduce the corruption at the top of theCommunist Party and moderate the

abuse of power in the Central Committee.[212] Glasnost also enabled increased contact

between Soviet citizens and the western world, particularly with the United States,
contributing to the accelerating détente between the two nations.[213]

Thaw in relations
Further information:  Reykjavík Summit,  Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, START I,  and  Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany

In response to the Kremlin's military and political concessions, Reagan agreed to renew

talks on economic issues and the scaling-back of the arms race.[214] The first was held in

November 1985 in Geneva, Switzerland.[214] At one stage the two men, accompanied only

by a translator, agreed in principle to reduce each country's nuclear arsenal by 50 percent.

[215]

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988

A second Reykjavík Summit was held in Iceland. Talks went well until the focus shifted to

Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative, which Gorbachev wanted eliminated:

Reagan refused.[216] The negotiations failed, but the third summit in 1987 led to a

breakthrough with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The

INF treaty eliminated all nuclear-armed, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with
ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (300 to 3,400 miles) and their infrastructure.[217]

East–West tensions rapidly subsided through the mid-to-late 1980s, culminating with the

final summit in Moscow in 1989, when Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush signed

the START I arms control treaty.[218] During the following year it became apparent to the

Soviets that oil and gas subsidies, along with the cost of maintaining massive troops levels,

represented a substantial economic drain.[219] In addition, the security advantage of a buffer

zone was recognised as irrelevant and the Soviets officially declared that they would no

longer intervene in the affairs of allied states in Eastern Europe.[220]

In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan[221] and by 1990

Gorbachev consented to German reunification,[219] the only alternative being

a Tiananmen scenario.[222] When the Berlin Wall came down, Gorbachev's "Common

European Home" concept began to take shape.[223]

On December 3, 1989, Gorbachev and Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, declared

the Cold War over at the Malta Summit;[224] a year later, the two former rivals were partners

in the Gulf War against longtime Soviet ally Iraq.[225]

Faltering Soviet system

Further information:  Economy of the Soviet Union, Revolutions of 1989,  and  Baltic Way

By 1989, the Soviet alliance system was on the brink of collapse, and, deprived of Soviet

military support, the Communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact states were losing power.

[221]
 In the USSR itself, glasnost weakened the bonds that held the Soviet Union

together[220] and by February 1990, with the dissolution of the USSR looming,

the Communist Party was forced to surrender its 73-year-old monopoly on state power.[226]

At the same time freedom of press and dissent allowed by glasnost and the festering

"nationalities question" increasingly led the Union's component republics to declare their

autonomy from Moscow, with the Baltic states withdrawing from the Union entirely.
[227]
 The 1989 revolutionary wave that swept across Central and Eastern Europe overthrew

the Soviet-style communist states, such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria,
[228]
 Romania being the only Eastern-bloc country to topple its communist regime violently

and execute its head of state.[229]

Soviet dissolution
Further information:  January 1991 events in Latvia,  1991 Soviet coup d'état
attempt,  and  History of the Soviet Union (1985–1991)

Commonwealth of Independent States, the official end of the Soviet Union

Gorbachev's permissive attitude toward Eastern Europe did not initially extend to Soviet

territory; even Bush, who strove to maintain friendly relations, condemned the January

1991 killings in Latvia and Lithuania, privately warning that economic ties would be frozen if

the violence continued.[230] The USSR was fatally weakened by a failed coup and a growing

number of Soviet republics, particularly Russia, who threatened to secede from the USSR.
The Commonwealth of Independent States, created on December 21, 1991, is viewed as a

successor entity to the Soviet Union but, according to Russia's leaders, its purpose was to

"allow a civilized divorce" between the Soviet Republics and is comparable to a

loose confederation.[231] The USSR was declared officially dissolved on December 25,

1991.[232]

Legacy
Main article:  Cold War Legacies

Following the Cold War, Russia cut military spending dramatically, creating a wrenching

adjustment as the military-industrial sector had previously employed one of every five

Soviet adults[233], meaning its dismantling left millions throughout the former Soviet Union

unemployed.[233] After Russia embarked on capitalist economic reforms in the 1990s, it

suffered a financial crisis and a recession more severe than the US and Germany had

experienced during the Great Depression.[234] Russian living standards have worsened

overall in the post-Cold War years, although the economy has resumed growth since 1999.
[234]

The legacy of the Cold War continues to influence world affairs.[13] After the dissolution of

the Soviet Union, the post-Cold War world is widely considered as unipolar, with the United

States the sole remaining superpower.[235][236][237] The Cold War defined the political role of

the United States in the post-World War II world: by 1989 the US held military alliances with

50 countries, and had 1.5 million troops posted abroad in 117 countries.[238] The Cold War

also institutionalized a global commitment to huge, permanent peacetime military-industrial

complexes and large-scale military funding of science.[238]

Military expenditures by the US during the Cold War years were estimated to have been

$8 trillion, while nearly 100,000 Americans lost their lives in the Korean War and Vietnam

War.[239] Although the loss of life among Soviet soldiers is difficult to estimate, as a share of

their gross national product the financial cost for the Soviet Union was far higher than that

of the US.[240]

In addition to the loss of life by uniformed soldiers, millions died in the superpowers' proxy

wars around the globe, most notably in Southeast Asia.[241] Most of the proxy wars and

subsidies for local conflicts ended along with the Cold War; the incidence of interstate wars,

ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, as well as refugee and displaced persons crises has

declined sharply in the post-Cold War years.[242]

No separate campaign medal has been authorized for the Cold War; however, in 1998,
the United State Congress authorized Cold War Recognition Certificates "to all members of

the armed forces and qualified federal government civilian personnel who faithfully and

honorably served the United States anytime during the Cold War era, which is defined as

Sept. 2, 1945 to Dec. 26, 1991." [243]

The legacy of Cold War conflict, however, is not always easily erased, as many of the

economic and social tensions that were exploited to fuel Cold War competition in parts of

the Third World remain acute.[13] The breakdown of state control in a number of areas

formerly ruled by Communist governments has produced new civil and ethnic conflicts,

particularly in the former Yugoslavia.[13] In Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War has

ushered in an era of economic growth and a large increase in the number of liberal

democracies, while in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, independence was
accompanied by state failure.[13]

Historiography
Main article:  Historiography of the Cold War

As soon as the term "Cold War" was popularized to refer to post-war tensions between the

United States and the Soviet Union, interpreting the course and origins of the conflict has

been a source of heated controversy among historians, political scientists, and journalists.
[244]
 In particular, historians have sharply disagreed as to who was responsible for the

breakdown of Soviet–US relations after the Second World War; and whether the conflict

between the two superpowers was inevitable, or could have been avoided.[245] Historians

have also disagreed on what exactly the Cold War was, what the sources of the conflict

were, and how to disentangle patterns of action and reaction between the two sides.[13]

Although explanations of the origins of the conflict in academic discussions are complex

and diverse, several general schools of thought on the subject can be identified. Historians

commonly speak of three differing approaches to the study of the Cold War: "orthodox"

accounts, "revisionism", and "post-revisionism".[238]

"Orthodox" accounts place responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its

expansion into Eastern Europe.[238] "Revisionist" writers place more responsibility for the

breakdown of post-war peace on the United States, citing a range of US efforts to isolate

and confront the Soviet Union well before the end of World War II.[238] "Post-revisionists"

see the events of the Cold War as more nuanced, and attempt to be more balanced in

determining what occurred during the Cold War.[238] Much of the historiography on the Cold

War weaves together two or even all three of these broad categories.[48]
Following World War II many of the factories that had been devoted to
military production during the fighting were converted back to their
prewar, civilian uses. However, the cessation of fighting in Europe and
Asia was not greeted—as the end of World War I had been—with a wave of
revulsion against American arms makers. Instead, the nation's military
industries were widely viewed as a major pillar of American military
strength and an important source of technological innovation. Thus, when
the Cold War began in earnest, most members of Congress were prepared
to support a new round of arms transfers along the lines of the lend-lease
program.

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The resumption of U.S. arms aid to friendly powers abroad did not occur
without prodding from the White House, however. With World War II
barely concluded, many in Congress were at first reluctant to authorize
significant military aid to the European powers—fearing, as had their
counterparts in the 1920s and 1930s, that this would eventually lead to
U.S. military involvement in overseas conflicts. To overcome this
resistance, President Harry S. Truman and his close advisers, including
Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and George C. Marshall, sought to
portray the expansion of Soviet power in eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean as a vital threat to the Western democracies and, by
extension, to U.S. national security.

The first significant test of U.S. attitudes on this issue came in early 1947,
when Great Britain announced that it could no longer afford to support the
royalist government in Greece—which at that time was under attack from a
communistbacked insurgency. Fearing that the loss of Greece to the
communists would invite Soviet aggression in neighboring countries,
including Turkey, President Truman concluded that it was essential for the
United States to provide arms and military training to the Greek military.
On 12 March 1947, Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to
request funding for this purpose. In what became known as the Truman
Doctrine, the president articulated a new guiding principle for American
foreign policy: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures."

As noted by many historians since then, this speech shaped U.S. security
doctrine for the next several decades. Henceforth it would be the
unquestionable obligation of the United States to provide economic,
political, and especially military assistance to any nation threatened by
Soviet (or Soviet-backed) forces. As the first expression of this principle,
Congress voted $400 million in military assistance for Greece and Turkey
on 15 May 1947; this was soon followed by the appropriation of even larger
amounts for these two countries and for many others in Europe and Asia.

In time the transfer of arms to anticommunist governments abroad came

to be seen in Washington as a critical component of "containment," the
strategy that governed American foreign and military policy throughout
the Cold War. As articulated by its original architects, containment held
that the totalitarian Soviet system was forced by its very nature to seek
domination over the rest of the world, and thus, in response, the United
States had no choice but to join with other nations in resisting Soviet
aggression. And because many of the nations on the periphery of the Soviet
empire were too poor to provide for their own defense, it was up to
Washington to supply the necessary arms and equipment.

This principle was given formal expression in the Mutual Defense

Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949. Signed into law by President Truman on 6
October of that year, the MDAA (later incorporated into the Mutual
Security Act of 1950) gave the president broad authority to conclude
mutual defense assistance agreements with friendly powers and to provide
these countries with a wide range of military goods and services. In its
initial authorization Congress awarded $1 billion to members of the newly
formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); $211 million to Greece
and Turkey; $28 million to Iran, the Philippines, and South Korea; and
$75 million for the "general area" of China. These appropriations were
increased in subsequent years, reaching a peak of $5.2 billion after the
outbreak of the Korean War.

These arms aid endeavors were accompanied, of course, by U.S. efforts to

strengthen its own military capabilities. If a full-scale war were to break
out, it was believed, the United States would have to provide the bulk of the
required forces. But the initial tests of strength were assumed to take place
in the border zones between East and West. As a result, much of U.S.
diplomacy during the Cold War was directed at the establishment of
military alliances with friendly states in these areas and at bolstering the
defensive capabilities of their armies. The linkage between military aid
programs and U.S. national security was formally articulated in National
Security Council policy document number 68 (NSC 68) of April 1950.
Described by Representative (later Senator) Henry Jackson as "the first
comprehensive statement of national strategy," NSC 68 called on
Washington to aid any nation that might conceivably fall under Soviet
influence.

At first U.S. arms aid was given primarily to the NATO countries and to
other friendly powers on the periphery of the Soviet Union and China,
including Iran, South Korea, Turkey, and the Nationalist government on
Taiwan. In later years such assistance was also supplied to friendly nations
in Africa and Latin America. Between 1950 and 1967 the United States
provided its allies with a total of $33.4 billion in arms and services under
the Military Assistance Program (MAP), plus another $3.3 billion worth of
surplus weaponry under the Excess Defense Articles program. The United
States also sold weapons to those of its allies that were sufficiently
recovered from World War II to finance their own arms acquisitions;
between 1950 and 1967 Washington exported $11.3 billion worth of arms
and equipment through its Foreign Military Sales program. (All of these
figures are in uninflated "current" dollars, meaning that their value in
contemporary dollars would be significantly greater.)

Although the basic premise of American arms transfers—to strengthen the

defenses of U.S. allies facing a military threat from the Soviet Union—did
not change over the years, many aspects of these programs underwent
significant transformation. Thus, while the bulk of U.S. weaponry was
originally funneled to the industrialized powers of Europe and Asia, by the
late 1950s an increasing portion of these arms was being provided to
friendly nations in what was then called the Third World. The primary
impetus for this shift was Moscow's apparent success in using arms
transfers to establish military links with Egypt (beginning in 1954), Syria
(in 1955), Iraq (in 1958), and Cuba (in 1961). In order to combat the
growing Soviet presence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America,
Washington began supplying vast quantities of arms and ammunition to its
own allies in these regions— thereby triggering fresh Soviet arms transfers
to its Third World clients, in what was to become an ongoing pattern of
U.S.–Soviet arms competition.

Although the primary objective of U.S. arms transfer policy during this
period was to bolster the defensive capabilities of key allies, American
leaders did on occasion emphasize other priorities. In the early 1950s, for
example, the United States joined with Great Britain and France in
restricting arms deliveries to the Middle East. As noted in the 1950
Tripartite Declaration, the aim of this effort was to prevent the outbreak of
an uncontrolled and destabilizing arms race in the region. (This effort
collapsed in 1954, when the Soviet bloc began selling arms to Egypt and
the United States responded by increasing its arms deliveries to Israel and
other friendly powers in the area.)

In another attempt at restraint, the Kennedy administration attempted in

the early 1960s to dissuade Latin American countries from acquiring
expensive, "big-ticket" weapons such as jet fighters and armored vehicles.
Believing that persistent underdevelopment—rather than the distant threat
of Soviet power—represented the greatest threat to these states' long-term
stability, President John F. Kennedy suggested that any funds saved by
reducing arms imports be devoted to economic and social development.
When supplying U.S. arms to these countries under the MAP program,
moreover, Kennedy favored the transfer of "counterinsurgency" gear—
small arms, light vehicles, helicopters, and so on.

For the most part, however, U.S. policymakers favored a liberal approach
to arms transfers, permitting the flow of increasingly costly and
sophisticated arms to American allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle
East. This policy was strongly backed by U.S. military leaders, who saw
arms transfers (and their accompanying training and advising operations)
as a valuable instrument for establishing and nurturing ties with the
military elites of friendly countries. It also enjoyed strong support from the
domestic arms industry, which consistently opposed any restrictions on
the sales of weapons to friendly powers abroad.

Arms control
With the end of the Cold War, huge amounts of various types of weapons from the former
Eastern Bloc arsenals became available on the market. At the same time, a number of armed
conflicts broke out in the OSCE area that required urgent action to stop the violence.
All this gave new impetus to the development of measures aimed at preventing the
uncontrolled spread of arms. The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), which is the main
OSCE body dealing with politico-military aspects of security, contributes to these efforts by
developing documents regulating transfers of conventional arms and establishing principles
governing non-proliferation.
Due to its legal status, the OSCE does not deal with arms control issues directly. However, it is
currently involved in various politico-military activities ranging from confidence- and security-
building measures (CSBMs) aimed at fostering trust among member states to projects providing
assistance on the destruction of small arms and light weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles
(known as MANPADS), as well as conventional ammunition.
While the FSC in Vienna provides a forum for political dialogue for diplomats from OSCE states,
most of the practical work, including training and assistance in the safeguarding and destruction
of ammunition and stockpiles of small arms, is conducted through the Conflict Prevention
Centre (CPC) at OSCE headquarters and OSCE field operations in such countries as Moldova,
Georgia.

 Cold War: A Brief History

The Beginnings of the Cold War

As the world began recovering from World War II, the first General Assembly of the
United Nations met in London in January 1946, and created the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission. Part of their charge was to eliminate all weapons of mass
destruction, including the atomic bomb.

America's first effort to define a policy on the control of atomic energy was The Report On
The International Control Of Atomic Energy (informally known as the "Acheson-Lilienthal"
Report), and was published March 16, 1946. Its premise was that there should be an
international "Atomic Development Authority" which would have worldwide monopoly
over the control of "dangerous elements" of the entire spectrum of atomic energy.

Drawing heavily on the information in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the U.S. proposal to
the United Nations on international controls on nuclear material (named the Baruch Plan
for its author Bernard Baruch) was presented. It called for the establishment of an
international authority to control potentially dangerous atomic activities, license all other
atomic activities, and carry out inspections.

The Soviets rejected the Baruch Plan, since it would have left the United States with a
decisive nuclear superiority until the details of the Plan could be worked out and would
have stopped the Soviet nuclear program. They responded by calling for universal nuclear
disarmament. In the end, the UN adopted neither proposal. Seventeen days after Baruch
presented his plan to the United Nations on July 1, 1946, the United States conducted the
world's first postwar nuclear test.

Meanwhile, the control of the U.S. atomic efforts transferred from military control to
civilian. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the Atomic Energy Commission,
putting the AEC in charge of all aspects of nuclear power. The agency consisted of five
civilian members who were advised by a scientific panel called the General Advisory
Committee and chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Cold War: A Brief History

Operation Crossroads

In July 1946, two atomic tests--code named "Operation Crossroads"--were conducted at

Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. These tests explored the effects of airborne and underwater
nuclear explosions on ships, equipment, and material. A fleet of 95 surplus and captured
ships were used as targets, including the Saratoga, the Arkansas, and the Japanese
battleship Nagato. These tests were witnessed by hundreds of reporters, politicians, and
international observers, along with 42,000 military and scientific personnel. The two
bombs used in Crossroads were identical in design and yield to the bomb used on
Nagasaki.

Operation Crossroads ABLE test

The first test, ABLE, was dropped on July 1, from a B-29 and detonated over the target
fleet. The bomb was exploded between 1,500 and 2,000 feet off target, perhaps due to a
collapsed tail fin. The radioactivity created by the burst was minor, and within a day
nearly all the ships could be reboarded.

Operation Crossroads BAKER test

The second test, BAKER, on July 25, was exploded underwater; it formed a 1/2-mile-wide
column of water over a mile and a half into the sky. Serious contamination of the lagoon
occurred. Bikini Island, some 3 miles from surface zero, could not be safely landed on
until a week had passed. The blast sunk or capsized eight ships and severely damaged
eight more.

The Soviet Atomic Bomb

The Soviet effort was led by Igor Kurchatov at a secret site known as Arzamas-16. Early
efforts were greatly aided by spies inside the Manhattan Project, most notably by Klaus
Fuchs. After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the program accelerated into high
gear. The Soviets began construction of a near copy of the Fat Man bomb, using the
detailed design descriptions provided by Fuchs. This replica, named Joe-1 by the West,
was detonated at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan on August 29, 1949. Its
estimated yield was about 22 kilotons.

Russia's first nuclear test, named Joe-1 by the west

A few weeks later, a specially-equipped U.S. weather plane flying off the coast of Siberia
collected radioactive debris suggesting a recent atomic explosion. President Truman was
slow to accept the news. Although this event shocked most of the world, many scientists
had pointed out that given sufficient time, any industrial nation could construct an atomic
bomb.

The Soviets did not test another atomic bomb for more than two years.

The Hydrogen Bomb

After the Soviet atomic bomb success, the idea of building a hydrogen bomb received
new impetus in the United States. In this type of bomb, deuterium and tritium (hydrogen
isotopes) are fused into helium, thereby releasing energy. There is no limit on the yield of
this weapon.

The scientific community split over the issue of building a hydrogen bomb. Edward Teller,
who had explored the idea of a 'super' during the Manhattan Project, supported its
development.
 Edward Teller

Men like J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and I.I. Rabi opposed its development.

Fermi and Rabi wrote, "Since no limit exists to the destructiveness of this weapon, its
existence and knowledge of its construction is a danger to humanity as a whole."

However the Cold War was beginning to escalate. A group of scientists led by Edward

Teller supported its development. They made direct approaches to the military and the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

In 1950, President Harry S. Truman announced work on the hydrogen bomb was to
continue. Savannah River, South Carolina, became the site for the nation's hydrogen
bomb production facility the following year. The facility produced tritium for the nation's
nuclear arsenal until safety concerns halted production in 1990.

The MIKE Test

On November 1, 1952, the United States detonated a 10.4-megaton hydrogen device in

the Pacific on the Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The test, code-named "Mike,"
was the first successful implementation of Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam's concept for
a "Super."
 The MIKE Test

Since scientists had limited information on how well lithium deuteride would work, they
chose instead to use liquid deuterium, which needed to be kept below -417° F (-250° C).
A six-story cab was built to house "Mike" with its complex cooling system. Weighing 65
tons, the apparatus was an experimental device, not a weapon. A two-mile-long tunnel
that extended from the device to another island was filled with helium that would provide
data on the fusion reaction.

Even those who had witnessed atomic tests were stunned by the blast. The cloud, when it
had reached its furthest extent, was about 100 miles wide and 25 miles high. The
explosion vaporized Elugelab, leaving behind a crater more than a mile wide, and
destroyed life on the surrounding islands.

The BRAVO Test

Fourteen months later, on March 1, 1954, a deliverable hydrogen bomb using solid
lithium deuteride was tested by the United States on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands.
By missing an important fusion reaction, the scientists had grossly underestimated the
size of the explosion.
 The BRAVO Test

The predicted yield was 5 megatons, but, in fact, "BRAVO" yielded 14.8 megatons,
making it the largest U.S. nuclear test ever exploded.

The blast gouged a crater more than 1/2 mile wide and several hundred feet deep and
ejected several million tons of radioactive debris into the air. Within seconds the fireball
was nearly 3 miles in diameter.

Effects on Islanders

No one was living on the Bikini atoll at the time of the BRAVO blast. However, a total of
236 people were living on the atolls of Rongelap and Utirik, 100 and 300 miles east of
Bikini, respectively. The residents of Rongelap were exposed to as much as 200 rems of
radiation. They were evacuated 24 hours after the detonation. The residents of Utirik,
which were exposed to lower levels of radiation, were not evacuated until at least two
days later. After their evacuation, many experienced typical symptoms of radiation
poisoning: burning of the mouth and eyes, nausea, diarrhea, loss of hair, and skin burns.

Ten years after the blast, the first thyroid tumors began to appear. Of those under twelve
on Rongelap at the time of BRAVO, 90% have developed thyroid tumors. In 1964, the U.
S. Government admitted responsibility for exposing the islanders to radiation and
appropriated funds to compensate them.

Effects on Fishermen

The Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) was a small Japanese tuna boat, fishing about 90 miles
east of Bikini at the time of the test. About two hours after the explosion a "snow" of
radioactive ash composed of coral vaporized by BRAVO began to fall on the ship. Within
hours, the crewmembers began to experience burning and nausea. Within a few days,
their skin began to darken and some crewmembers hair started to fall out. Upon
returning to Japan, many were hospitalized and one eventually went into a coma and
died. Though the U.S. denied responsibility, it sent the widow a check for 2.5 million yen
"as a token of sympathy."

The Soviet Response

The Soviet Union also pursued the development of a hydrogen bomb. Initial Soviet
research was guided by the information provided by Klaus Fuchs. Then Andrei
Sakharovsuggested a different idea. This design, known as, the "Layer Cake", consisted
of alternating layers of hydrogen fuel and uranium. However, this design limited the
amount of thermonuclear fuel that could be used and therefore the bomb's explosive
force.

On August 12, 1953, the Soviet Union tested its first fusion-based device on a tower in
central Siberia. The bomb had a yield of 400 kilotons. Though not nearly as powerful as
the American bomb tested nine months earlier, it had one key advantage: It was a usable
weapon, small enough to be dropped from an airplane.
 The mushroom cloud from the Soviet's first hydrogen bomb

Shortly after the "BRAVO" test, Sakharov's team had the same idea of using radiation
implosion. Work on the "Layer Cake" design was halted. On November 22, 1955, the
Soviet Union exploded its first true hydrogen bomb at the Semipalatinsk test site. It had
a yield of 1.6 megatons.

This began a series of Soviet hydrogen bomb tests culminating on October 23, 1961, with
an explosion of about 58 megatons. Khrushchev boasted, "It could have been bigger, but
then it might have broken all the windows in Moscow, 4,000 miles away."

Reagan's Star Wars

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan proposed the creation of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), an ambitious project that would construct a space-based anti-missile
system. This program was immediately dubbed "Star Wars."

An artist's rendering of an X-ray laser hit an incoming missile.

The SDI was intended to defend the United States from attack from Soviet ICBMs by
intercepting the missiles at various phases of their flight. For the interception, the SDI
would require extremely advanced technological systems, yet to be researched and
developed. Among the potential components of the defense system were both space- and
earth-based laser battle stations, which, by a combination of methods, would direct their
killing beams toward moving Soviet targets. Air-based missile platforms and ground-
based missiles using other non-nuclear killing mechanisms would constitute the rear
echelon of defense and would be concentrated around such major targets as U.S. ICBM
silos. The sensors to detect attacks would be based on the ground, in the air, and in
space, and would use radar, optical, and infrared threat-detection systems.

This system would tip the nuclear balance toward the United States. The Soviets feared
that SDI would enable the United States to launch a first-strike against them. Critics
pointed to the vast technological uncertainties of the system, in addition to its enormous
cost.

Although work was begun on the program, the technology proved to be too complex and
much of the research was cancelled by later administrations. The idea of missile defense
system would resurface later as the National Missile Defense.

Chernobyl

On April 26, 1986, the world's worst nuclear-power accident occurred at Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. The accident occurred when
technicians at reactor Unit 4 attempted a poorly designed experiment. The chain reaction
in the core went out of control. Several explosions triggered a large fireball and blew off
the heavy steel and concrete lid of the reactor. This and the ensuing fire in the graphite
reactor core released large amounts of radioactive material into the atmosphere. A partial
meltdown of the core also occurred.

Chernobyl

A cover-up was attempted, but on April 28, Swedish monitoring stations reported
abnormally high levels of wind-transported radioactivity and pressed for an explanation.
The Soviet Union finally acknowledged that the accident had occurred.

An estimated 100 to 150 million curies of radiation escaped into the atmosphere before
cleanup crews were able to bring the fires under control and stabilize the situation some
two weeks later. The radioactivity was spread by the wind over Belarus, Russia, and the
Ukraine and soon reached as far west as France and Italy.
Finally, workers erected an enormous concrete-and-steel shell or "sarcophagus" over the
damaged reactor to prevent radioactive materials, including gases and dust, from further
escaping.

Initially, the Chernobyl accident caused the deaths of 32 people. Dozens more contracted
serious radiation sickness; some of these people later died. Millions of acres of forest and
farmland were contaminated; and although many thousands of people were evacuated,
hundreds of thousands more remained in contaminated areas. In addition, in subsequent
years many livestock were born deformed, and among humans several thousand
radiation-induced illnesses and cancer deaths were expected in the long term.

In December 2000 the last of the four reactors at Chernobyl was shut down.

The End of the Cold War

With the passing of several Soviet leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed control of the
Soviet Union. His rise to power ushered in an era of perestroika (restructuring) and of
glasnost (openness).

Reagan and Gorbachev leaving the Reykjavik Summit

U.S.-Soviet relations improved considerably during the middle 1980s. At a dramatic

summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, Gorbachev proposed a 50-
percent reduction in the nuclear arsenals of each side, and for a time it seemed as though
a historic agreement would be reached. The summit ended in failure, owing to differences
over SDI. However, on December 8, 1987, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treatywas signed in Washington, eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons. The INF
Treaty was the first arms-control pact to require an actual reduction in nuclear arsenals
rather than merely restricting their proliferation.

As the decade came to an end, much of the Eastern Bloc began to crumble. The
Hungarian government took down the barbed wire on its border with Austria and the
West. The Soviet Union did nothing in response. Although travel was still not completely
free, the Iron Curtain was starting to unravel. On November 10, 1989, one of the most
famous symbols of the Cold War came down: the Berlin Wall. By the end of the year,
leaders of every Eastern European nation except Bulgaria had been ousted by popular
uprisings.

By mid-1990, many of the Soviet republics had declared their independence. Turmoil in
the Soviet Union continued, as there were several attempts at overthrowing Gorbachev.
On December 8, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Boris Yeltsin, president of the
Russian Republic, formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). After 45
years, the Cold War was over.

Nations on the Threshold

Just as India and Pakistan have come out of the nuclear shadows, several other nations
also have advanced nuclear programs.

World's Nuclear States (2006)

South Africa

South Africa is the only nation to have successfully developed nuclear weapons and then
voluntarily dismantled its entire nuclear-weapons program. In March 1993, then-
President De Klerk announced that the nation had produced nuclear weapons, but
destroyed them before signing the NPT in 1991. South Africa also became a member of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995.
It was further revealed that on the night of September 22, 1979, the flash detected by
the U.S. VELA satellite was from a nuclear explosion. South Africa also acknowledged that
it had received assistance from Israel in exchange for 550 tons of raw uranium.

Israel

Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has not
acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons, but generally is regarded as a de facto
nuclear-weapon state. Based on the real or perceived threat from its Arab and Persian
neighbors, Israel continues to maintain a highly advanced military, a nuclear-weapons
program and offensive and defensive missiles.

Israel's nuclear program, the most advanced in the Middle East, began in the late 1950s
to meet the perceived threat to the state. Its missile program began in the 1960s with
French assistance. Its nuclear arsenal is estimated at between 20 and 100 Nagasaki-sized
bombs. The country has formally stated that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear
weapons into the Middle East. Israel has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
but has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Iraq

After Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
discovered that Iraq had violated the NPT by secretly pursuing a nuclear-weapons
program. The IAEA investigation revealed details of Baghdad's efforts to design an
implosion-type nuclear explosive device and to test its non-nuclear components, including
Iraq's plans to produce large quantities of lithium-6, a material used usually for the
production of "boosted" atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs. IAEA officials estimated that
Iraq might have been able, had the war not intervened, "to") to manufacture its first
atomic weapons, using indigenously produced weapons-grade uranium, as early as the
fall of 1993.

IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002 after a four-year lapse and stayed
until their March 2003 evacuation, which preceded the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The subsequent invasion by U.S.-led coalition forces was rooted in the belief that Saddam
Hussein's regime had been deceiving the IAEA and hiding its WMD arsenals and
capabilities.

Although investigations confirmed that Iraq's nuclear programs were destroyed after the
first Gulf War, it was believed that Iraq had not abandoned its quest for nuclear weapons.
It was estimated that Iraq could probably rebuild its nuclear-weapons program and
manufacture a device in five to seven years, if United Nations sanctions were removed.
While Iraq's WMD arsenals and capabilities were never discovered, troubling reports have
emerged about missing nuclear-related equipment and materials in Iraq that, according
to the IAEA, has been disappearing from previously monitored sites since the start of the
war in 2003.

Iran

Iran is another threshold nation. Although Iran had been a party to the NPT since 1970, it
is believed to have pursued a secret nuclear-weapons program since the mid-1980s.
China and Russia have been Iran's main suppliers of nuclear technology.

As Iran's nuclear capabilities grew, the EU-3 (France, Great Britain and Germany) sought
to negotiate with Iran about the issue of peaceful nuclear-research activities, including
the development of a nuclear fuel-cycle infrastructure in mid-2005. Attempts were made
to persuade Iran to give up its fuel-cycle ambitions and accept nuclear fuel from abroad,
but Tehran made it clear that any proposal that did not guarantee Iran's access to
peaceful nuclear technology would lead to the cessation of all nuclear-related negotiations
with the EU-3.

Tensions were further heightened when highly enriched uranium (HEU) particle
contamination was found at various locations in Iran. In August 2005, the IAEA
announced that contamination was found to be of foreign origin and concluded that much
of the HEU found on centrifuge parts was from imported Pakistani equipment, rather than
from any enrichment activities conducted by Iran. However, The EU said Iran had lost its
right to nuclear energy under Article 4 of the NPT because it violated Article 2-"not to
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear-related weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices." The country refused to comply with the resolution from the
IAEA to halt its nuclear program. The next month, the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance
of the NPT. The resolution passed with 21 votes of approval, with Russia and China
among the 12 who abstained from voting.

The IAEA's report on Iran's nuclear ambitions topped the agenda of a closed-door
meeting of the United Nations Security Council on March 17, 2006. After the meeting, the
Council announced that it was close to agreement on elements of a text reaffirming that
Iran should comply with calls from the IAEA Governing Board and was seeking a report
from the agency's director-general on the matter.

Iran is attempting to finish its Bushehr reactor and "establish a complete nuclear fuel
cycle." Though it is not clear how close Iran is to developing a nuclear device, estimate
range from a few years to nearly a decade.

North Korea

Although North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, it is believed to have pursued an active
nuclear-weapons program, in violation of the Treaty. The country did not permit the IAEA
to conduct required inspections, until May 1992. It is assumed that North Korea has made
enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons. In a tentative agreement with the
U.S. in 1994, North Korea agreed to suspend further development of nuclear weapons in
exchange for increased aid and heating oil.

In February 2005, a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that
North Korea had manufactured nuclear weapons. This announcement followed
Pyongyang's January 2003 declaration that the country was withdrawing from the NPT. In
early April 2005, North Korea shut down its 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbuon-kun and
declared that the spent fuel would be extracted to "increase North Korea's nuclear
deterrent." Since North Korea had been operating the reactor since late February 2003,
its technicians should be able to extract enough plutonium from the spent fuel for 1-3
nuclear bombs.

In September 2005, the North Korean delegation to the Six-Party Talks in Beijing signed
a "Statement of Principles" whereby Pyongyang agreed to abandon all nuclear programs
and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. However, on the following day a spokesman
for the Foreign Ministry declared that the U.S. would have to provide a light-water reactor
to North Korea in order to resolve the lack of trust between the two countries. The Six-
Parties agreed to meet again.

Additionally, in mid-2002, U.S. intelligence discovered that North Korea had been
receiving materials from Pakistan for a highly enriched uranium-production facility. In
October 2002, the U.S. State Department informed North Korea that the U.S. was aware
of this program, which is a violation of Pyongyang's nonproliferation commitments. North
Korean officials initially denied the existence of such a program, but then acknowledged
it. The IAEA has not been able to verify the completeness nor correctness of North
Korea's initial declaration submitted in 1992, and the agency cannot verify whether fissile
material has been diverted to military use.

Libya

Another nation of concern was Libya. In December 2003, Libyan leader Col. Muammar
Qadhafi publicly confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle WMD programs in
his country following a nine-month period of negotiations with U.S. and UK authorities.
He also pledged to adhere to the NPT, which Libya had ratified in 1975, and to sign the
Additional Protocol, which was done on March 10, 2004. He then invited the IAEA to
verify the elimination of nuclear-weapon-related activities in Libya, which the agency did
in December 2003. Inspectors found imported equipment and technology at a number of
previously secret nuclear facilities in and around Tripoli. It has been revealed that Abdul
Qadeer Khan of Pakistan is responsible for providing Libya with its nuclear warhead plans,
raw uranium and enrichment centrifuges through his black-market network.

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