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Success & failures
of grand concert halls and opera projects
Harpa – Case study
Jón Ólafur Ólafsson
Thesis of 12 ECTS credits
Master of Project Management (MPM)

May 2014

Success & failures
Thesis of 12 ECTS credits submitted to the School of Science and Engineering
at Reykjavík University in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Project Management
May 2014
Supervisor(s):
Dr. Helgi Þór Ingason
Associate professor, Reykjavík University, Iceland

Examiner(s):
___________________________________________
___________________________________________

Success & failures
12 ECTS thesis submitted to the School of Science and Engineering
at Reykjavík University in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Project Management (MPM).
May 2014
Student:
___________________________________________
Supervisor(s):
___________________________________________
Dr. Helgi Þór Ingason
Examiner:
___________________________________________

SUCCESS AND FAILURES
OF GRAND CONCERT HALLS AND OPERA PROJECTS
CASE STUDY ‐ HARPA

Reykjavík University, School of Science and Engineering, MPM ‐ Master of Project
Management, Reykjavík, Iceland
jonsi@arkitekt.is
Paper presented as part of requirements for the degree of Master of Project
Management (MPM) at the School of Science and Engineering, Reykjavik University ‐ May
2014
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the comparable attributes of grand concert halls and opera projects, and
develops a method to evaluate and compare them. The study was based on a case study of
Harpa, the new Concert and Concert Hall in Reykjavik, a questionnaire survey on the fulfilment
of the feature objectives, and by applying four different, recognized assessment tools/lenses
to evaluate projects and project success, with the intention of verifying their applicability for
this type of projects. The study of Harpa and the questionnaire survey revealed several
comparable attributes and important feature objectives that should be taken in account when
planning new concert halls. The outcome of these studies is a conceptual framework applied
on the case – Harpa. The findings show that the method can be used to evaluate success and
can provide to be a useful tool in the initiating and planning phase of new concert halls and
opera projects.
Keywords: Project success; Project management; Concert hall projects; Opera projects; Harpa
‐ Concert and Conference Centre.

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1. INTRODUCTION
Between 2000 and 2012 more than 220 (239 halls or auditoriums) concert halls and
opera buildings have opened for public worldwide (Wikipedia, 2014). On average 18 concert
halls projects are finished each year with annual investment probably greater than $2.500‐
3.000 million.
Can we learn from (grand) concert halls and opera construction projects?
Do these projects differ from other types of public projects?
What is the driving force behind realization of grand concert halls and opera projects?
Concert halls and opera buildings are complex construction projects. They are generally
grand scale, prominent and sensational, and have great influences on the community and
their near surroundings. They are often designed to be iconic, attracting national and
international musicians and tourists. Concert halls and operas are typically state‐owned, the
antecedents and preparation time is often very long and complicated, involving many
stakeholders with different, conflicting and even incompatible views. The strategic decisions
are likely to be made on a political level and they often need political justification. The output
is complex buildings with complicated technical equipment. But to what degree do they have
comparable attributes? What are the relevant factors?

Figure 1: Harpa ‐ Concert and Conference Centre in Reykjavík – Source: Harpa: Pictures of Harpa
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In this paper a conceptual framework for assessing project‐outcome, successes and
failures are defined and presented and tested on Harpa, the newly finished concert and
congress centre in Reykjavík Iceland. The paper explores the applicability of Flyvbjerg´s studies
on big infrastructure overruns and benefit shortfalls, the success dimensions identified by
Shenhar & Dvir and proposes additional factors that might apply in large, high profile public
projects such as concert halls and opera houses, using Snowdon’s Cynefin framework as a lens.
The status of knowledge is explored and literature within the field reviewed. Accessible data
and information is reviewed and evaluated. The outcome of the original objectives and future
vision is assessed and interpreted trough a survey among stakeholders and non‐participants.
 How can we evaluate the success of concert halls and opera projects?
 What does the assessment tool say about the success or failure of the Harpa project?
 Can we use the method to evaluate success of other Concert halls and opera projects?
Key attributes to be looked at are the Characteristics of concert hall projects, Scope ‐
cost and budget change, Justification, Accountability in decision making, Biased estimates,
Complexity and Retrospect evaluation of project success.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The objective of this literature review is to define concert halls and operas according to
common standards, explore the reason for big infrastructure overruns and benefit shortfalls,
describe the common definition of success and failure, the applicability of Shenhar and Dvir´s
diamond approach and project success measures, as well as the use of Snowdens´s Cynefin
framework.
2.1 Definition and standards
According to the German database Emporsis concert halls and operas are categorised
as two of ten subcategories under Entertainment buildings (ESN 80707), which are places
where people go for fun, for non‐athletic recreation, or to enjoy performances or
presentations” Concert location (ESN 83789) is defined as “…a hall, theatre, amphitheatre, or
other facility designated for the performance and listening of live musical concerts … including
… sites for rock concerts, philharmonic halls, orchestral venues, and recital halls. … ” whereas
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Theatre/opera (ESN 84117) “… includes any performance hall used for live musical or dramatic
performances … with permanent seating. (Emporsis, án dags.)
According to Emporsis, several concert halls and opera buildings rank among the most
expensive buildings in the world with Elbphilharmonie, the new Music Hall, hotel and mixed
use building in Hamburg Germany as the most expensive one among concert halls. It ranks as
number six on the list with estimated building cost of $1,027,510,000 and estimated end of
construction in 2016. Den Norske Opera & ballet ranks as the 42nd most expensive building
with building cost of $511,440,162 and end of construction in 2008 following four years
construction. The Danish Koncerthuset or DR Byen in Copenhagen ranks as the 57 most
expensive building with building cost of $430,000,000. (Emporsis, án dags.)
Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre in Reykjavík, Iceland does not make it on to
the list but according to the same resource it´s building cost was $160,000,000. Harpa was
inaugurated in May 2011, but started construction late 2006.
It is not possible to compare the initial cost difference of the mentioned concert halls
and opera buildings, as their different sizes, usage, context, building year and complexity
render them nom‐comparable.
2.2 Definitions of success and failure of projects
The project management literature offers great deal of studies on success and failures,
and definition of the terms. Most common project success is defined as “to produce the
project deliverables within time and budget” but according to IPMA project success is “the
appreciation by the various interested parties of the project outcomes” achieving the project
objectives within the agreed constraints (IPMA, 2006, p. 16 and 40).
According to PMBOK Guide”… the success of the project should be measured in terms
of completing the project within the constraints of scope, time, cost, quality, resources, and
risk as approved between the project managers and senior management. …Project success
should be referred to the last baselines approved by the authorized stakeholders…” (Project
Management Institute, 2012, p. 35)
In his book Project Management, A system Approach to Planning, Scheduling and
Controlling, Harold Kerzner refers to the classic definition of project success as “…the
completion of an activity within the constraints of time, cost, and performance.” According to
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Kerzner “…today project success also includes the acceptance of the customer/user, minimum
or mutually agreed scope changes, without disturbing the main work flow of the organization
and changing the corporate culture” (Harold Kerzner, 2009, p. 7). Kerzner claims that it ”… is
unrealistic to believe that all projects will be completed successfully. Some people contend
that the only true project failures are the ones from which nothing is learned. Failure can be
viewed as success if the failure is identified early enough so that the resources can be
reassigned to other more opportunistic activities.” (Harold Kerzner, 2009, p. 59).
Munns and Bjeirmi identify the overlap between the definition of the project and project
management in their paper, The role of project management in achieving project success. They
argue that as objectives of a project and project management are different improved
distinction between success and failure for the project and project management interests is
needed. Successful project management techniques contribute to the achievement of
projects, but it will not stop a project from failing to succeed. The right project will succeed
almost without the success of project management, but successful project management could
enhance its success. Selecting the right project at the outset and screening out potentially
unsuccessful projects, will be more important to ensuring total project success, (Munns &
Bjeirmi, 1996).
In their paper, A Retrospective look at our evolving understanding of Project success,
Judgev and Müller assess our evolution of understanding project success and discuss
conditions for success, critical success factors and success frameworks. They argue that the
success of individual projects impacts the wider organization in several dimensions and that
makes the concept of project and project management success that much more relevant.
According to Judgev and Müller projects are about managing expectations, and expectations
have to do with perception on success. Project success as a concept is complex and
ambiguous. It changes over the life cycle time of the project and the product, (Judgev &
Müller, 2005)
In their book Reinventing Project Management, Aaron J. Shenhar and Dov Dvir question
the traditional definition; maintaining “… that project success depends on satisfying the triple
constraint – on time, within budget, and according to specifications.” They claim, “…the triple
constraint is no longer sufficient and a new model is needed.” and there still is “… no universal
way to measure and assess project success.” “No matter what the motivation for a project,
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any assessment of project success must be linked to the parent organization´s success and to
its well‐being in the long run.” (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007, p. 22)
According to Shenhar and Dvir the key question is: “what do organizations need to
consider before they launch a new project and how should they assess a project in
retrospect?” “… Projects should be assessed based on their contribution to overall business
results…” Project benefits may be immediate or be realized only later. Therefore project goals
must be set in “… advance to reflect expectations, both short and long term. “ Shenhar and
Dvir believe that project and product success should not be separated, as they are two sides
of the same coin. “It all boils down to a simple question: how did the project contribute to the
organization´s success and effectiveness?” (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007, p. 23).
2.3 Flyvbjerg´s studies of big infrastructure overruns and benefit shortfalls
In his article Policy and planning for large infra‐structure projects: problems, causes,
cures, Bent Flyvbjerg argues that misinformation, biased optimism and strategic
misrepresentation are the main problem in the planning of large‐infrastructure projects,
including concert halls, causing high risk. Flyvbjerg represents seven factors causing the
planning problem:
1. Long planning horizons and complex interfaces
2. Non‐standard technology
3. Decision making process with many actors and conflicting interests
4. Changing project scope and ambition level over time
5. Inadequate budget contingencies
6. Consequent misinformation about cost, benefits and risks
7. Overruns and/or benefit shortfalls as result
Flyvbjerg´s studies indicate that 90% of transportation projects have cost overruns and
average world‐wide cost overrun in transportation projects is 20‐45% depending of the type
of projects. Along with biased forecast in travel‐demand, 90% of rail projects overestimate
traffic. The more complicated the projects are, the higher risk for cost overrun and benefit
shortfalls. They lead to waste (inefficient allocation of resources), delays, destabilized policy,
planning, implementation and operation of projects. Flyvbjerg states that “the problem is
getting bigger because the projects are getting bigger”.
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Flyvbjerg identifies three types of explanations for cost overruns and benefit shortfalls
with technical explanation, as the most common type of inaccuracy in forecasts, caused by
inadequate data, mistakes, lack of experience and so on. The second, psychological
explanation, often called the planning fallacy accounts for inaccuracy in forecasts in terms of
biased optimism, causing unprofitable investments of money and time. The last, political‐
economic explanation, refers to deliberate and strategically overestimation of benefits and
underestimation of costs when forecasting projects outcome to increase the likelihood of
approval and funding.
Flyvbjerg rejects the technical explanation as a primary cause of cost‐underestimation
and benefit overestimation based on his research. The same applies for optimism bias
according to Flyvbjerg, though the psychological explanation better fits the data. His studies
show that in situations promoters and forecasters intentionally underestimate cost and
overestimate benefits to get project approval. Thus the projects that look best on paper are
the projects that get implemented. Flyvbjerg calls for better practice and methods to prevent
biased forecasts. This can be obtained by accountability and critical questioning. He
recommends that claimed cost, benefits and risk made by professional experts should be
examined by independent specialist and organizations, (Flyvbjerg, 2007).
The relevance of Flyvbjerg´s seven factors causing the planning problem will be
evaluated in the case study of Harpa.
2.4 Shenhar, Dvir, Levy & Maltz´s dimensions of project success
According to Shenhar and Dvir et.al. project success is a dynamic concept and
comprehensive assessment of project success should be defined by following five basic groups
of measures (dimensions) addressing both short and long‐term implications (Shenar, Dvir,
Levy, & Maltz, 2001):
1. Project efficiency is a short‐term measure of project completion according to plan.
2. Impact on the customer represents the major stakeholder’s perception of the project
success, such as improvement of live or business and fulfilment of needs – the product
performance measure and level of customer satisfaction.
3. Impact on the team reflect how the project affects the team and its members.
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4. Business and direct success reflects the immediate impact the project has on the
parent organization – the project´s commercial success.
5. Preparation for the future addresses the long range benefits of the project, how it
creates new opportunities, new competences, ideas, innovations and products.
Project success

Project Impact on Impact on Business and Preparation

efficiency customer team direct success for future

 Meeting schedule  Meeting  Team satisfaction  Sales  New technology
 Meeting budget requirements and  Team morale  Profits  New market
 Yield specifications  Skill development  Market shares  New product line
 Other efficiencies  Benefit to the  Team member  ROI, ROE  New core
customer growth  Cash flow competency
 Extent of use  Team member  Service quality  New organizational
 Customer retention  Cycle time capability
satisfaction and  No burnout  Organizational
loyalty measures
 Brand name  Regulatory
recognition approval
Table 1: Specific success measures (Shenhar & Dvir, page 27)
The importance of each dimension shifts depending on when they are looked at relative
to the project´s process. The first can be assessed at the end of project completion, the second
within months of completion, the third in a larger organizational context. The fourth
dimension can usually only be assessed after year or two while the last dimension can be
assessed only much later when the long‐term benefits of the project start to pay of, (Shenhar
& Dvir, 2007, pp. 26‐29).
The relevance of these success factors will be evaluated in relation with the case study
of Harpa.
2.5 The Diamond approach – NTCP model
Shenhar and Dvir introduced a multidimensional Diamond shaped framework for
understanding key dimensions of projects and systematically assessing their uniqueness
trough coherent methodology. According to Shenhar and Dvir despite uniqueness and
considerable variability between projects they also have common features. All project can be
classified trough three drivers: the goal, the task and the environment and each project can
be characterized by the NTCP diamond model which encompasses novelty, technology,
complexity and pace, (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007, pp. 39‐41). Distinguishing between similarities
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and differences of projects can both help assessing project benefits and risks and selecting the
right project management style to manage projects more effectively, and in retrospect
explaining the gaps between expectations and project outcome to point out the possible
failures of projects.

Figure 2: The Diamond model (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007, page 14)
According to Shenhar & Dvir each of the four dimensions of the diamond affects the
project management in its own way. “Novelty affects the time it should take to freeze product
requirements and the accuracy and reliability of marketing data. Technology affects how long
it should take to get the design right and freeze it, the intensity of the technical activities and
the technical skills required by the project manager and the team. Complexity affects the
project organizations and the level of bureaucracy and formality needed to manage it. Pace
affects the planning and reviews, the autonomy of the project team and the involvement of
top management…” (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007, pp. 13‐14).
The diamond model will be used to asses Harpa, the case studied in this paper.
2.6 Snowden’s Cynefin framework
The Welsh word Cynefin is pronounced ku‐neh‐vin meaning “the multiple factors in our
environment and our experience that influence us in ways we can never understand” The
Cynefin framework has its roots in complexity science. It is a decision‐making and sense‐
making model that recognises the causal differences that exist between different types of
systems, (Nilsen, 2013). Cynefin was developed by Dave Snowden for executives and leaders
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to determine the prevailing operative context, helping them to make appropriate choices
(Snowden & Boone, 2007, pp. 2‐4).
Figure 3, The Cynefin Framework (Snowden & Boone, 2007, page 4)
The domains of Cynefin are five: Simple, Complicated, Complex, Chaotic and Disorder.
Each of the domains has its own characteristics and requires different actions or leadership
style.
In the last domain of Disorder cacophony rules, multiple perspectives jostle for
prominence and it is particularly difficult to recognize when one is in it. The leader´s job in this
realm is to break down the situation into constituent parts and assign each to one of the four
realms, (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 7). According to Snowden & Boone leaders face greater
complexity today. They need tools and approaches to guide them as their intuition, intellect
and charisma are no longer enough, (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 8).
In retrospect the Cynefin framework can help analysing and understanding finished
projects. In this context it is interesting to look at Harpa, the concert and conference centre
and figure out how or whether the Cynefin framework works for assessing this type of
projects.
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Characteristics of domain The leaders´s job Danger signals Response to danger
signals
Repeatable & predictable Ensure prober processes Complacency and comfort Create communication channels to
Clear cause‐effect relation Delegate Desire to make complex problems challenge orthodoxy
Simple
Right answer exists Use best practices simple Stay connected without

Known knowns Communicate in a clear way Entrained thinking micromanaging
Fact based management No challenge of received wisdom Don´t assume things are simple
Overreliance on best practice if Recognize both the value and
context shifts limitation of best practice
Domain of experts Create panels of experts Experts overconfident in their own Encourage external and internal
Discoverable cause‐effect relation Listen to conflicting advice solutions or in the efficacy of past stakeholders to challenge expert
Complicated
More than one possible answer solutions opinions to combat entrained

Known unknowns Analysis paralysis thinking
Fact based management Expert panels Use experiments and games to
Viewpoints of non‐experts force people to think outside the
excluded familiar
Flux & unpredictability Experiment Temptation to fall back into Be patient and allow time for

Cause‐effect relation coherent in Allow patterns to emerge habitual, command‐and‐control reflection
retrospect Increase level of interaction & mode Use approaches that encourage
Complex
No right answers communication Temptation to look for facts rather interaction so patterns can emerge

Many competing ideas Help generate ideas than allowing patterns to emerge
Need for creativity & innovation Open up for discussions Desire for accelerated resolution
Pattern‐based leadership Stimulate attractors of problems or exploitation of
Encourage dissent and diversity opportunities
Manage starting conditions
Monitor for emergence
High turbulence Look for what works instead of Applying a command‐and‐control Set up mechanisms (such as
No clear cause‐effect relationship seeking right answers approach longer than needed parallel teams) to take advantage
No point looking for right answers Take immediate actions to re‐ “Cult of the leader” of opportunities afforded by a
Chaotic
Unknowables establish order Missed opportunity for innovation chaotic environment

Many decisions, no time to think Provide clear, direct Chaos unabated Encourage advisers to challenge
High tension communication your point of view once the crisis
Pattern‐based leadership has abated
Work to shift the context from
chaotic to complex
Table 2: Decision in Multiple Contexts: Based on A Leader´s guide (Snowden & Boone, 2007, page 7)
3. METHOD
The main objective of the research is to generate a framework to understand and enable
comparison of grand concert hall projects to assess their outcome and important success
factors. The framework is tested on Harpa, Reykjavík´s new concert and congress centre. The
decision making process is studied and the fulfilment of the original feature objectives
analysed.
3.1 General
Grand concert halls and opera houses as a phenomenon can physically be characterized
by their auditorium, stage and back stages along with the audience foyer area, artist area and
all the necessary complex technical spaces, equipment and supporting areas. But grand
concert halls and opera houses differ both in size, appearance and structure. Their urban
context and architecture varies, their operational model is different and the justification for
their existence is based on different needs, desires and objectives. There are several ways to
assess and understand this kind of projects and to compare their outcome.
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Traditional methods for assessing success and failures of projects have roots in the “Iron
triangle” approach stating that project success depends on the three constraints; time, cost
and quality. Projects delivered within the agreed time and budget, according to the clients
specifications are successful, other fail. Both IPMA ICB and PMBOK have added parameters to
the iron triangle and scholars have questioned this method for assessing success, especially
long term success. Among them are Shenhar and Dvir.
3.2 The assessment tools
Shenhar and Dvir developed a dynamic concept for assessing project success along with
a Diamond shaped framework identifying key dimension of projects (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007).
Their contribution adds to the methodical approach of project success and their nature, but it
does not fully explain the political background and causes for scope change and biased
decisions.
According to Flyvbjerg´s studies, most projects have cost overruns and suffer from
benefit shortfalls caused by biased overestimation of benefits and underestimation of costs,
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). Flyvbjerg´s analytics tool indicates that most project fail, but his seven
causes of planning problems can add to the understanding of what to avoid and be aware of
especially in the initiating and planning phase of projects.
Snowden´s Cynefin decision‐making and sense‐making model helps determine

prevailing characteristics of projects both during the project and in retrospect.
Project success can also be evaluated by building a model or framework trough analysis
of existing data, trough surveys and interviews.
Therefor the research method is based on building a conceptual framework based on
the methods mentioned above, through a survey and by studying and evaluating data from
the case study.
3.3 The case study and definition of the framework
To understand and analyse Harpa and the development of the project, the existing data
describing the major milestones, decisions, change of project scope and estimated cost was
reviewed, and set up in a frame that developed through the research. Among explored data
and information are the following:
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1. The cost estimate for the original winning proposal for a concert hall in Reykjavik from 1985,
(Nefnd um málefni tónlistarhús, 1997).
2. An opinion of the initial committee, appointed by the Minister of education, including the
initial cost estimate for construction and operation, (Nefnd um málefni tónlistarhús, 1997).
3. Concert hall and Conference centre, Utilization and feasibility assessment, (VSÓ Ráðgjöf,
1998).
4. Agreement between City of Reykjavík and the Government of Iceland for the construction of
concert hall and conference centre, (2002).
5. Information Memorandum, Proposed Concert Hall, Conference Centre and Hotel Complex
Reykjavik, (Austurhöfn‐TR ehf, 2003).
6. Descriptive Document no. 13571 for PFI Works Concession for planning, designing, building,
owing and operating a Concert & Conference Centre and Hotel (CCH), along with pertinent
car parking facilities in the east harbour in Reykjavik, (Austurhöfn‐TR; Ríkiskaup; VST;
Landwell, January 2005).
7. Article about the signing of the contract between the Client [Austurhöfn] and the PFI
contractor [Portus], March 09, 2006, (Morgunblaðið, 2006).
8. Annual financial statements for Harpa, 2012 (2013) and 2013 (2014).
9. Overview of the utilization of auditorium and halls in Harpa, year 2013, (Guðmundsson, 2014).
3.4 Consulting interviews
To get a deeper understanding of specific aspects of the project three major participants
in the project were consulted (rather than interviewed). They were Sigurður Einarsson
responsible architect of Harpa (Einarsson, 2014), Sigurður R. Ragnarsson Program Manager of
the Harpa project (Ragnarsson, 2014), and Ríkharður Kristjánsson Design Manager of Harpa
and Project Manager for the glass envelope, (Kristjánsson, 2014).
3.5 The questionnaire
The questionnaire survey was conducted in SurveyMonkey on the Internet. It was
opened on April 07, 2014 and the latest responses where gathered on April 25, 2014. The
questionnaire consisted of 43 questions. 30 questions based on rephrasing the feature
objectives and future vision for Harpa as if they had come true. The participants were asked
on Likert scale whether they: strongly agree, agree, neither/nor agree, disagree or strongly
disagree with the presented statements. The rephrased feature objectives were divided into
four groups; General objectives (6), Location objectives (6), Buildings objectives (6) and
operational objectives (4). Additionally the future vision for Cultural importance was broken
down to eight (8) statements. Those questions were followed with nine (9) question about
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“What went well and what could have been done better, along with question about the most
important function in Harpa”, one (1) about the symbolic meaning of Harpa, one (1) question
about the respondents involvement in the project and finally one (1) question about the
respondents role and responsibility in the Harpa project.
3.6 The questionnaire survey participants
The purpose of the questionnaire survey was to identify the perception of the
respondents toward the feature objectives set at the start of the competitive dialogue of the
Harpa in 2004/2005. The participants were divided into two target groups. Those involved (the
stakeholders) in the project at some stage from antecedent stage to operation, and a control
group not involved in the project.
The involved group was put together by identifying names of people that at some stage
have been mentioned in connection with the project, such as boosters, politicians, promoters
and decision makers, members of several committees, client, advisory groups, members of
the design and construction team, daily operators and art board of Harpa, residents in Harpa,
music and architecture critics, professional gatekeepers of music and architecture and
professionals connected to conference and tourism. The survey was sent to 183 recipients and
93 answered the survey (8 partially and 85 completely), 51%. Additionally the questionnaire
survey was sent to the staff (members) of the primary artistic companies residing in Harpa ‐
through email and Web Link. The sample size is unknown but gathered 36 responses.
A Total of 129 responses were gathered from individuals identified as involved.
A list of those not involved was sent to an email group of people known to the surveyor
as probably not having connection to the project. The survey was sent to 95 recipients and 50
answered the survey (6 partially and 44 completely), 53%. Additionally the questionnaire
survey was sent to an open group at Reykjavik University, University at Bifröst and the MPM
alumni network through email, Facebook and Web Link. The sample size is unknown but
gathered 69 responses.
A Total of 119 responses were gathered from those not involved.
248 answered the questionnaire survey (33 partially and 215 completely). The ratio
between involved/not involved is 129 / 119 ‐ (52% / 48%).
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3.7 Processing and interpretation of data
The result of the survey was partly analysed with help of the internet survey program
SurveyMonkey by filtering and comparing the responses. The results were also analysed in
Excel spread sheet program, calculating average response for each feature objective group
(General, Location, Buildings, Operation and Cultural importance). The relation between those
involved in the Harpa project and those not involved was investigated as well as the relation
between different roles and responsibility of those involved.
4. RESULTS
By studying existing information, and by comparing the different phases of the
development of Harpa, the Concert and Conference Centre in Reykjavik, the research resulted
in a framework addressing four different major attributes that seem characteristic for grand
concert halls and opera projects; Planning, Design & Construction attributes, Operational
attributes, Context & Features and Project Management attributes. Additionally the utilization
of four different assessment tools developed by Flyvbjerg, Shenhar and Dvir, and Snowden
helped understanding and defining the speciality of concert halls. Each of the major attributes
is divided in several sub‐issues.
Attributes
Planning, Design & Construction General
attributes Time span of the project
Building Metrics
Construction cost figures
Operational attributes Seat Capacity & type
Annual number of events
Operating figures
Operational personnel & artists
Context & Features Urban context
Architectural context
Operational features
Feature Objectives
Project Management attributes Project management data
No. of drawings / documents
Specific assessment tools Flyvbjerg´s 7 causes for planning problems
Diamond assessment ‐ NTCP
Project success factors
Snowden´s Cynefin lens
Table 3, The main attributes of the Conceptual framework,
4.1 Planning, Design & Construction attributes
The planning, design & construction attributes are divided in four sub‐issues; General,
Time span, Building metrics and Construction cost figures. Each of the sub‐issues include
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several important parameters that has to be considered depending to the relevant project
phase.
Attributes Relevance for Parameter

project phases
General Planning Date of information
Implementing Scope of project
Closing Justification
Operation Funding
Procurement process
Time span of the project Planning Antecedent period
Planning, Design and Construction attributes
Implementing Planning period
Closing Start of design
Operation Date of contract
Start of Construction
End of Construction
Years under construction
Excelled construction time acc. to plan
Building Metrics Planning Total Area (sqm)
Implementing Increase of area from forecast (%)
Closing Total Volume (m3)
Operation Volume/Area Ratio
Auditoriums / Total Area Ratio
Height (architectural)
Floors (above ground)
No. of indoor parking valets
Construction cost figures Planning Building costs without VAT (MUSD)
Implementing Increase from forecast (%)
Closing Building cost pr. sqm (USD)
Building cost pr m3 (USD)
Increase of sqm‐cost from forecast (%)
Table 4, The Planning, Design & Construction attributes
The Harpa case study indicates a considerable scope‐creep from the initial definition in
1997. It started as a concert hall with a single auditorium to be located 5 km away from the
city centre. Six years later in the beginning phase of the competitive dialogue it was defined
as a “… major complex in central Reykjavik comprising a Concert Hall, [Recital Hall],
Conference Centre and Hotel with a further opportunity to develop office or retail elements
as an integral part of the scheme”, (Austurhöfn‐TR ehf, 2003). During the competitive dialogue
a fourth hall was added to the scheme. The scheme that was chosen for implementation was
31% bigger than requested in the programme. The investor justified this scope change by
arguing it better suited their business strategies. Due to the financial crisis of 2008 only the
Concert and Conference Centre was built. The justification for the project remained
unchanged from the initiating phase in 1997, expressing an unanimous opinion that a new
concert house should be built, due to the extremely flourishing music scene, due to the poor
facilities for concerts available, due to lack of residence for the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra,
due to a demand for equal treatment of all the art forms, and finally that facilities for music
performances in Iceland remain far behind neighbouring countries, (Nefnd um málefni
tónlistarhús, 1997). Initially (1997), the funding was to be divided between the State and City
15
of Reykjavík (52%/48%). The idea of PFI‐Private finance initiative and operation was
introduced early in the planning phase (1998), and remained unchanged until 2009 when the
Government and City of Reykjavik stepped in and took over the project due to insolvency of
the investor. Despite thorough risk assessments of many project factors no special risk
assessment for insolvency of the investor and bankruptcy of the Icelandic banking system was
undertaken, (Kristjánsson, 2014).
The time span of the Harpa project covers more than 30 years. The facilities for the
Icelandic symphony orchestra were sub‐standard for years. The 13 year long antecedent phase
started in 1983 with the establishment of The Association for a New Concert hall. It defined a
brief for a new concert hall, collected funds and held an architectural competition for the
concert hall in 1985. That project was never realized. The nine year planning period started
with a committee appointed by the Minister of Education in 1996. In June 1997 the committee
delivered its report unanimously agreeing that a new concert house should be built. Several
committees followed that confirmed that opinion. The Government of Iceland and City of
Reykjavík signed an agreement for construction of the Concert & Congress Centre and Hotel
(CCH) in April 2002. A year later, a request for prequalification was announced and the start
of the competitive design phase started in late 2004. In the autumn of 2005 the winner, Portus
group was announced. The concession contract was signed in March 2006 follows by the
design of the Concert and Conference Hall. The construction started late 2006, to be finished
in September 2009. Due to the insolvency of the investor in 2008, the project was stalled for
six months, until the company; Austurhöfn, owned in solidum by the State and City of
Reykjavik, (54% / 46%) commenced work, deciding to extend the construction time by almost
two years.
After the insolvency of the investor 2008, a fierce debate was launched whether to
proceed with Harpa or not. According to the total responses in a questionnaire survey
conducted in April 2014 a majority of the respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the
statement that the decision to proceed with construction of the concert hall and conference
hall Harpa in the wake of the economic crisis was wrong. Of 212 responses, 77,1% disagree or
strongly disagree that decision was wrong. 14,2% agree or strongly agree that the decision
was right
16
It took 4,8 years to build Harpa, and the exceeded construction time compared to the
contracted plan was 23 months.
In addition to the scope changes, the size requirements for Harpa changed increased
during the planning period. The committee appointed by the Minister of Education concluded
in 1997 that the size of the Concert Hall building was suitable at approx. 8‐8.500 sqm., more
than 2.000 sqm smaller than the original requirement analysis for a new concert hall from
1985. A year and half later the size had grown by 61%, now almost 13.700 sqm. In April 2002
the Government of Iceland and City of Reykjavik agreed on a scheme that had grown by
another 10%, to 15.000 sqm. At the start of the competitive design phase in late 2004 the
requirement went up by 17% again and the competitors were meant to deliver a 17.500 sqm.
Concert and Conference Hall.
The final project is 29.865 sqm., almost 71% bigger than requested by the Client and
almost 251% bigger than estimated by first committee in 1997 which made the grounds for
the initiating decision to proceed with the project.
With its volume of 249.046 m3 the Volume/Area, Ratio is 8,34 and the Auditorium / Total
Area, Ratio is 0,15.
It has proved difficult to elicit exact construction cost figures for the Harpa project.
The building cost figures are uncertain to the public according to the total responses in
a questionnaire survey conducted in April 2014. Of 212 responses, 2,8% consider it likely that
the building cost of Harpa was within the estimated cost, 6,1% consider the excelled cost to
be under 10%. 7,1% consider the excelled cost to be under 20%. 16,1% consider the excelled
cost to be under 30% and 32,1% consider the excelled cost to be under 40%. 35,9% of the
respondents indicate other. Some consider the he criteria of question to unclear to be
answerable. Other indefinite the cost to have excelled at least 50‐600% and consider it either
a total failure or acceptable because of positive outcome of the project.
As well as the scope and the size of the project have changed, the estimated
construction cost has correspondingly changed. By the initiative cost estimate from 1997 the
cost was equivalent to 32 million US dollars (MUSD) present value (Dec. 2011), 3.809
USD/sqm. At the start of the competitive design phase in late 2004 the cost estimate was
equivalent to 127 MUSD / 7.264 USD/sqm. When the concession contract between the
17
investor Portus and the Client Austurhöfn, on behalf of the Government of Iceland and City of
Reykjavík, was signed, the estimated price tag on the building was 192 MUSD, 51% higher than
the Clients estimated cost.
The price tag on the final project final project is approx. 226 MUSD. The construction
cost is 18% higher than the contract figure, 78% higher than the clients estimated cost at the
start of the competitive dialogue in 2004 and the sqm‐cost of the final project is 4,2% higher
than the clients estimated sqm‐cost at the start of the competitive dialogue.
The building cost pr. sqm. is 7.568 USD and the cost pr. m3 is 908 USD.
4.2 Operational attributes
The operational attributes are divided in four sub‐issues; Seat Capacity, Annual number
of events, Operating figures and Operational personnel & artists. Each of the sub‐issues
include several important parameters that has to be considered depending to the relevant
project phase.

project phases
Seat Capacity Planning Auditorium A (seats)
Implementing Auditorium B (seats)
Closing Auditorium C (seats)
Operation Auditorium D (seats)
Meeting facilities (Seats / rooms)
Total number of auditoriums
Total number of seats
Annual number of events Planning No. of concerts and opera events
Operation No. of conference events & meetings
No. of art events
Operational attributes
Other activities/events
Total no. of events
Average (daily) load (%)
Annual days in use ‐ (Average)
Annual number of concert guests
Annual number of guests
Upland‐market
Inhabitants pr. seat
Operating figures Planning Annual revenue (MUSD)
Operation Annual expenses (MUSD)
EBIDTA (MUSD)
Operational cost pr sqm (USD)
Real Estate Value (MUSD)
Annual property tax (MUSD)
Operational personnel & artists Planning No. of personnel
(equivalent to full positions) Operation Sqm. pr staff member
No. of artists
Total no. of personnel and artists
Table 5, The operational attributes
The case study of Harpa indicates a continued development of the estimated need for
auditoriums in the Concert Hall. The requirement analysis for a new concert hall made by The
Association for a New Concert Hall in 1985, assumed only one auditorium with 1200‐1300 seat
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capacity. The Committee for Concert Hall appointed by the Minister of education in 1996
added a possible smaller auditorium with 300‐400 seats for conferences, In the 1998 feasibility
assessment, the auditorium was slightly bigger >1300 seats, and the conference auditorium
750 seats. In the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the City of Reykjavík in
April 2002 the estimated need for concert auditorium has grown to 1300‐1500 seats and a
smaller recital hall with 450 seats was added to the scheme as well as number of smaller
meeting rooms. At the start of the competitive dialogue the grand auditorium was enlarged
further and could seat 1500‐1800 people. The fourth auditorium with 195 seats was also
added. Specific justifications for these scope changes are nowhere to be found in the
exchangeable data.
The final project has four auditoriums, the biggest one seating up to 1800 people. The
total capacity in the auditoriums is 3.355 seats. Additionally there are 13 smaller meeting
rooms.
The primary criteria for a new Concert Hall is based on estimated annual number of
events and visitors. The initial estimate from 1997 assumes the total number of events to
exceed 450, with more than 158.000 visitors and average seat load 70%. The feasibility
estimate from 1998 assumes 580 total number of events, with more than 320.000 visitors.
The information memorandum dated 2003 assumes the total number of events of 619 and
323.000 annual visitors.
According to the an overview of the annual number of events in Harpa (Guðmundsson,
2014) the total number of events in the year 2013 were 957, divided between 514 concert
and opera events, 291 conference events, 40 art events and 112 other events. The average
load was almost 66% and the average use of the auditoriums was 239 days. The total number
of concert guest is estimated >325.000 and the total number of guests in the house exceeded
1.300.000, an increase of 30% from year 2012.
The Information memorandum (May 2003) forecasted annual revenue of 6,0 MUSD,
annual expenses of 5,2 MUSD and EBIDTA +0,8 MUSD.
Harpa has now been in operation for two whole years. The operational figures show that
in year 2013 the annual revenue was 7,8 MUSD (873,1 MISK), the annual expenses were 12,5
MUSD (1.404,5 MISK) and the EBIDTA therefor ‐4,7 MUSD (‐531,4 MISK). The operational cost
19
pr. sqm. was 419 USD (47.028 ISK). The real estate value is 198,1 MUSD (22.224 MISK). Despite
the operational cost pr. sqm. is up by 52 USD from year 2012 the EBIDTA has increased by 0,5
MUSD (53,5 MISK). Harpa pays annually 3,3 MUSD (353,7 MISK) in property tax which is almost
four times higher than estimated in initial figures.
Harpa is a day to day workplace of 86 employees in 64,5 full positions whereof 62 are
the operating staff of Harpa. The other 14 are employees of the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra
and the Icelandic Opera. The members of the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra are 81 and
Reykjavik Big Band has 18 members. The members of the Icelandic Opera are contracted, and
depending on the performing operas performances, their number varies from 100‐200.
Notably, the initial estimate from 1997 for operational personnel assumed only 3 employees.
Already in the following feasibility assessment, dated 1998, their number had increased to
22+34 in temporary positions and another 20 in undefined temporary positions. The
difference between the first estimate and the actual figures remains unexplained.
4.3 Context and Features
The Context and Features are divided in four sub‐issues; Urban Context, Architectural
context, Operational features and Feature objectives. Each of the sub‐issues includes several
important parameters that have to be considered depending on the relevant project phase.

project phases
Urban context Planning Location
Operation Location objectives
Architectural context Planning Architectural objectives
Operation Acoustics
Nominations and awards
Context and Features
No. of articles in Architecture magazines
Operational features Planning Operational objectives
Implementing Functionality
Closing Auditoriums
Operation Conference facilities
Other specific facilities
Feature Objectives Planning General
Implementing Location
Closing Buildings (Acousitcs)
Operation Operation
Cultural importance
Table 6, Context and Features
The earliest estimate (1997) lists 3 to 4 possible sites for the new Concert Hall. The
feasibility assessment (1998) proposes a location near the old harbour in Reykjavik. The
agreement between the Government of Iceland and City of Reykjavík (2002) consolidates the
choice of location in the East harbour Area in Reykjavik with reference to the result in a
20
planning competition from year 2000. The owner sees Harpa as an important factor for
renewal of the harbour and the city area.
The location objectives were defined in the CCH‐Descriptive document at the start of
the competitive dialogue in January 2005. According to the total responses in a questionnaire
survey conducted in April 2014, 87,7% agree or strongly agree that the location of Harpa
strengthens the heart of city centre, 85,3% agree or strongly agree that the location of Harpa
strengthens the image & identity of the city centre and 79,5% agree or strongly agree that the
location develops impressive settings for culture, tourism, business and services.
The initial estimate (1997) does not mention the Concert hall in an architectural context.
The feasibility assessment (1998) mentions the importance of good design and finishing. The
Information Memorandum (2003) specifies, among other issues, the expectations to create a
“beacon” or icon symbolising Reykjavik City Centre. The architectural objectives were defined
in the CCH‐Descriptive document at the start of the competitive dialogue in January 2005.
According to the total responses in a questionnaire survey conducted in April 2014, 78,04%
agree or strongly agree that Harpa provides strong cultural image which draws the attention
of the world towards Reykjavík and Iceland, 84,7% agree or strongly agree that Harpa
represents high‐quality architecture, 85,3% agree or strongly agree that Harpa is a landmark
near the city centre, a symbol for Iceland and the capital city. Furthermore when asked to sort
by importance, 57,9% define Harpa as a Cultural flagship, 51,4% define Harpa as a Landmark
and 30,3% define Harpa as a Destination Icon. The respondents were asked also to sort the
attributes of Harpa by their relevance for the project outcome. The listed attributes appeared
randomly for each respondent, to be rated by their importance. Of total 215 respondents, the
acoustics in the main auditorium scored highest. The location was rated in second place, the
overall architectural quality ranked as the third most important attribute. The 3‐dimensional
quasi‐brick envelope ranked number four, the conference facilities ranked number five, to be
followed by the open accessible spaces and the meeting facilities. The restaurants and the
shops had the lowest score. The comparison between the answers of the stakeholders,
inhabitants and the control group did not show any significant difference in ranking the
relevant attributes.
The initial estimate (1997) did not specify acoustic demands for Harpa. The feasibility
assessment (1998) specifies excellent acoustic as the determinant factor in the grand hall. At
21
that stage the American firm, Artec consultants that specializes in design of concert halls, were
hired. The acoustic objectives were defined in the CCH‐Descriptive document at the start of
the competitive dialogue in January 2005. According to the total responses in a questionnaire
survey conducted in April 2014, 87,7% agree or strongly agree that Harpa ensures excellent
acoustics. Furthermore when asked, 88,3 % agree or strongly agree that Harpa has proved
useful as concert hall, and 61,8% agree or strongly agree that Harpa has proved useful for
amplified rhythm music.
Number of articles have been written about Harpa in the national as well as
international press and architectural magazines. According to the building data company
Emporsis, modern concert halls have remarkable architecture offering audiences a great show
even before they have taken their seats. They no longer just rely on outstanding
performances. In a released list by Emporsis, Harpa ranks among the 15 of the World’s most
spectacular concert halls, (Emporsis, 2014). Harpa has been nominated and won number of
architectural, performance, musical and conference nomination and awards. The most
honourable is probably the European Union Prize for Contemporary Architecture ‐ Mies van
der Rohe Award 2013 (Fundació Mies van der Rohe, 2013).
Requirements for specific operational features were specified in some context from the
early beginning. A requirement analysis was made before the architectural competition in
1985. The initial estimate (1997) is partly based on the requirement analysis, but adds new
features. The opinion of the committee is that the new concert hall must also be available for
use by conferences and meetings, and a connection to conference facilities is considered of
beneficial. This opinion is consolidated in the feasibility assessment from 1998, along with the
requirement of a direct connection to a four star hotel. Only at this stage the importance of
operational factors such as efficiency and flexibility are highlighted.
The operational objectives were defined in the CCH‐Descriptive document at the start
of the competitive dialogue in January 2005. According to the total responses in the
questionnaire survey conducted in April 2014, 93,0% agree or strongly agree that Harpa is a
centre for music, culture & tourism, 92,0% agree or strongly agree that Harpa ensures high
quality conditions for the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra ‐ ISO. Another 81,8% agree or strongly
agree that Harpa enables high level of utility for pertinent activities. Furthermore 86,0% agree
or strongly agree that Harpa provides unique facilities for conferences & and associated events,
22
but 64,2% agree or strongly agree that Harpa has proved useful for conference centre. 84,3%
of the respondents answer that Harpa is in line or exceeds their expectations, 77,4% agree or
strongly agree that Harpa appeals to ordinary people and offers them welcome. 71,0% of the
respondents had visited Harpa more than 10 times.
Harpa neither has a stage tower nor a rotating stage.
The responses for each of the main feature objectives groups was summarized. 215 of
the 248 respondents answered all questions. The following radar chart shows the distribution
of all the 215 answers, (Figure 4).

Figure 4; Distribution of the 215 respondents who answered all the questions
Of those who answered all questions, 86,7% agree or strongly agree that the six general
objectives for Harpa have been met, 3,8% disagree or strongly disagree. 65,5% agree or
strongly agree that the six Location objectives for Harpa have been met, 8,7% disagree or
strongly disagree. 78,9% agree or strongly agree that the six buildings objectives for Harpa
have been met, 4,3% disagree or strongly disagree. 76,6% agree or strongly agree that the
four operating objectives for Harpa have been met, 3,3% disagree or strongly disagree. Finally,
73,8% agree or strongly agree that the seven vision statements for cultural importance of
Harpa have been met, 5,1% disagree or strongly disagree.
23
The relation between the respondent’s relation to Harpa and their answers is significant.
The “stakeholders” are in general more positive than the “inhabitants” and the “external
control group”. The farther the respondents are from the project the less positive they are,
(Figure 5, 6 and 7).

Figure 5, Responses of the stakeholders, inhabitants and external control group that agree or strongly agree

Figure 6, Responses of the stakeholders, inhabitants and external control group that are neutral

Figure 7, Responses of the stakeholders, inhabitants and external control group that disagree or strongly disagree
24
There is also a visible relation between the roles and responsibility of the respondents
and their answers. The group of the designers, constructors and investors are the most
positive towards Harpa. The group of those who are connected to conferences and tourism
have the most critical attitude, especially towards the location and operational objectives,
(Figure 8, 9 and 10).

Figure 8, Agreeing or strongly agreeing answers in relation with roles and responsibility

Figure 9, Neutral answers in relation with roles and responsibility

Figure 10, Disagreeing or strongly disagreeing answers in relation with roles and responsibility
25
4.4 Project Management
The Project management attributes are divided in two sub‐issues; Project management
data and No. of drawings / documents. Each of these sub‐issues include several important
parameters that have to be considered depending to the relevant project phase.

project phases
Project management data Planning Internal quality management and control
Implementing No. of certified Project managers (IPMA, PMI)
Closing WBS / Number of work tasks
Project Management
Registered official inspections / audits
No. of project meetings
No. of participating companies
No. of main contractor staff
Nationalities involved
No. of drawings / documents Planning No of published drawings to Building Officer
Implementing Total no. of drawings (excl. shop dwg´s)
Closing No. of drawings pr sqm
No. of shop (manufacturing) drawings
Table 7, Project Management
The case study of Harpa indicates an ambitious and complex project. It demanded a
clear organizational structure. The main contractor IAV (Iceland Prime Contractors) was in
charge of the design and construction. The execution of the project was a novelty in project
management with in the firm. Therefor the contractor hired experienced project managers to
lead and manage the project. An on‐side project office was established to enforce
collaboration and prevent gap between the design team and the contractor. It became the
core of the project development. An open dialogue between the design/construction team
and the Client – Austurhöfn, was considered of high importance as well. According to the
responsible architect Sigurður Einarsson and both the Programme Manager Sigurður R.
Ragnarsson and the Design Manager Ríkharður Kristjánsson, Harpa is the most complex and
risky project they have participated in, (Einarsson, 2014), (Ragnarsson, 2014), (Kristjánsson,
2014).
The contractor is certified by ISO 9001 quality management system. More than 30
nationalities, over 1.250 employees and almost 1.000 subcontractors were involved in the
project at various times. At peak, the working force in the building exceeded 700, working on
different work tasks that counted more than 5.000. Registered official inspections counted
more 1.640 and estimated number of project meetings were more than 5.000, (IAV, 2013).
According to the minutes from the final walk down, 5.174 drawing had been published to the
building authorities during construction, many of them issued more than once or twice. It is
26
estimated that the total number of drawings exceeded 20.000. That means 0,67 drawings pr.
sqm. of built space.
4.5 Specific assessment tools
The Specific assessment tools are divided in four sub‐issues; Flyvbjerg´s 7 causes for
planning problems, Project success factors, Diamond assessment – NTCP and Snowden´s
Cynefin lens. Each of the sub‐issues include several important assessment parameters.

project phases
Flyvbjerg´s 7 causes for planning Planning Long planning horizons and complex interfaces
problems Implementing Non‐standard technology
Closing Decision making process with many actors and conflicting interests
Operation Changing project scope and ambition level over time
Inadequate budget contingencies
Consequent misinformation about cost, benefits and risks
Overruns and/or benefit shortfalls as result
Specific assessment tools
Project success factors Planning Project efficiency

Implementing Impact on Customer
Closing Impact on Team
Operation Business & direct success
Preparation for future
Diamond assessment ‐ NTCP Planning Novelty
Implementing Technology
Closing Complexity
Operation Pace
Risk
Snowden´s Cynefin lens Initiating
Planning
Implementing Simple – Complicated – Complex – Chaotic ‐ Disorder
Closing
Operation
Table 8, Specific assessment tools
Flyvbjerg´s 7 causes for planning problems
Flyvbjerg argues that seven following characteristics are the cause of planning problems
in most infrastructures, including concert halls, (Flyvbjerg, 2007).
Planning horizons and interfaces: Flyvbjerg argues that if the planning horizons are long
and if the project interfaces are complex the risk for project derailment will be bigger. As for
the Harpa project, the antecedent and planning period ranged over 20 years. During that time
several shifts occurred within the political arena both on national plan and on regional level.
That also applies for the representatives for the most active stakeholder – the music scene in
Iceland.
Technology: Flyvbjerg argues that non‐standard technology increases the risk for project
derailment. This applies for the Harpa project. The design and construction of the building was
new to the design team and the contractor. The decision for the “Quasi‐brick“ structural and
27
glazing system was probably the single most risky part of the project, (Kristjánsson, 2014). It´s
cost was more than 10% of the total construction cost. With more than 10,000 shop drawings
it had never been done before and demanded very complicated calculations and late design
freeze. Due to failure in the chemical composition of the steel elements, the first iteration of
the 3‐dimensional structure was torn down and replaced with new structural elements.
Decision process, actors and interests: Flyvbjerg argues that many actors and
conflicting interests are likely to have negative or confusing impact on the decision process.
During both the antecedent and planning period of the Harpa project, there were many actors
and divergent interest. Several responsible politicians, committees and representatives from
different sectors of the music scene along with representatives for the tourism and conference
industry were involved. The study of the development of the Harpa project indicates that they
had different views on i.e. the location, the scope, the acoustic demands and additional
services. The satisfaction with the acoustics in the main auditorium varies. It is meant to serve
all music genres, but does not fulfill the expectations for amplified rhythm music according to
information and outcome of the survey in this paper. 87,7% agree or strongly agree that Harpa
ensures excellent acoustics, but only 61,8% agree or strongly agree that Harpa has proved
useful for amplified rhythm music.
Project scope and ambition: Flyvbjerg argues that changing project scope and ambition
level over time may have negative impact on the project success. The study of the Harpa
project reveals significant change in the project scope and the ambition level trough the
planning and tender period of the project. The project scope and ambitions expanded almost
every time a decision was taken or confirmed. It started as a stand‐alone concert hall of 8.500
sqm., estimated to cost 32,4 MUSD. When the project was out for PFI tender it included
17.500 sqm. Concert & conference centre, estimated to cost 127,1 MUSD, to be built in
connection with 18.000 sqm. Hotel complex and business area. The final project is a combined
Concert and Conference Centre, 28.813 sqm. in size and the final cost is 226.000 MUSD.
Budget contingencies: Flyvbjerg argues that inadequate budget contingencies can have
significant impact on the decision process that can lead to cost overruns. The study of the
Harpa project suggests that budget contingencies – if they ever existed – never were
published.
28
Misinformation about cost, benefits & risks: Flyvbjerg argues that promoters and
forecasters intentionally underestimate cost and overestimate benefits to get project
approval. Therefore a deliberate and strategically consequent misinformation about cost,
benefits and risks is common in projects, causing unprofitable investments of money and time,
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). The study of the development of the Harpa project corresponds to
Flyvbjerg´s arguments on deliberate misinformation. The original cost estimate from 1997
assumed a sqm. price of 3.809 USD. The final sqm. price is 7.568 USD, an increase by +98,7%.
The initial space program for the building was 8.500 sqm., 2.000 sqm. smaller than the winning
competition entry from 1985, which had only one auditorium, (1997). In the end of the year
1998 the size had increased with 61% and the sqm. price with 40%, (1998). The operational
cost pr. sqm. was never calculated separately but the study of data indicates an operational
sqm. cost of 187 USD in the initial estimate (1997), and 346 USD in the Information
Memorandum (2003). The actual operational cost pr. sqm for 2013 was 419 USD. There are
no signs of second opinion nor critical questioning of the correctness of cost estimates, space
programs, nor operational calculations, in any of the estimates published. The term “risk
analysis” was first introduced when the project was out for PFI tender in 2004/2005, (January
2005, pp. 47, 55). Risk assessment for possible insolvency of the investor was not
implemented.
Nothing in the data examined indicates that promoters, politicians, appointed
committees or cost analysts ever raised questions about the accuracy of the estimates.
Possible overruns and/or benefit shortfalls: Flyvbjerg argues that many projects suffer
from overruns and/or benefit shortfalls as a result of misinformation, inadequate budget
contingencies etc. The study of the development of the Harpa project indicates significant cost
overruns. The cost overrun is approx. 18% from the negotiated project to the final
construction cost. The final cost is 78% higher than the clients final estimate in the tender
documents (January 2005), and almost 600% higher than the original estimate from 1997. The
cost estimates where never questioned in the planning period. The benefit shortfall is
discernible as the operational revenue was estimated positive at earlier planning stages, and
due to the legal interpretation by the Land Registry, the actual property tax is more than four
times higher than predicted, having major influence on the negative business performance of
Harpa.
29
Shenhar & Dvir´s dimensions of project success
By applying Shenhar and Dvir five dimensions of project success on the Harpa project, it
both failed and is successful, depending on the dimension. In this assessment, following scale
is used for assessing respectively failure and success, 1 meaning total failure, 2 meaning mostly
failure, 3 meaning 50/50 failure/success, 4 meaning mostly success and 5 meaning total
success.
Project efficiency: The project didn’t meet schedule constraint which was exceeded by
23 months. Scope constraints (the size of the building) increased by 65% from the descriptive
document to the accepted offer by the investor and constructed building. The project exceeds
"original" budget constraint, set by the client, by 78%. It final cost is 18% higher than the
investors offer. Finally, the sqm. price decreased by 9,3% from the investors offer in the
contract. The calculated final sqm. price is 4,2% higher than set by the client in the descriptive
document.
This indicates the project efficiency is equal to 1, meaning Total failure.
Impact on Customer: According the outcome of the questionnaire survey, Harpa has
met the client’s specifications, and requirements set out in the feature objectives for the
building and operations by 76‐79%. The project benefits the customers; the client, the
inhabitants and guests by 75‐90%. Harpa has provided excellent facilities for music according
to the survey. The customer; client, inhabitants and guests, are very satisfied with the
outcome for classic music, but they are less satisfied with the outcome for amplified rhythm
music and conference facilities. The vast majority of the respondents share the view that
Harpa appeals to ordinary people and is in line or exceeds their expectations. The survey
reveals negative perception towards two main issues, the fact that the conference hotel has
yet not been built and the surrounding area is still unfinished according to original plans. Harpa
has been nominated and won several international awards, both for architecture and facilities
for musical events. As such Harpa is already a brand.
This indicates the impact on customer is equal to 4, meaning Mostly success.
Impact on Team: The contractor’s top project management team of the Harpa went
through a lesson learned process en the end of the project, (Kristjánsson, 2014) but an overall
assessment on the team satisfaction and morale was never implemented. The Program
30
manager, who was the only IPMA‐B certified project manager on the project, went through
IPMA‐A certification after the project was completed. The fact that Harpa has won
international awards has, without any doubt, made the participating firms and team members
proud of their involvement in the project.
As the overall impact on the team has not been explored it is impossible to draw any
conclusion on this aspect.
Business & direct success: Harpa has been in operation for two full years. The Annual
financial statement for the year 2013, indicates that the sales, profits, ROI, ROE and cash flow
etc. still has not proved positive. The figures are improving, but there still is a way to go.
This indicates the Business & direct success is equal to 2, meaning Mostly failure.
Preparation for future: With the emergence of Harpa, the music scene in Iceland has
received a long waited facility improvement, especially for classical music. The new facilities
have been positively welcomed, by the artist, guests and the gatekeepers of the musical
profession and the musical scene is indeed flourishing. The conference facilities in Reykjavik
improved with Harpa, but are still lacking the conference hotel part, it is too early to assert
that Harpa is prepared for the future of international conferences. With Harpa, the capabilities
of attracting international artists and conferences to Iceland have greatly improved. The
facilities have all the ingredients to meet a positive future and competitive supply of services.
Having received international awards Harpa already has advantage in the competitive world
of cultural tourism.
This indicates the Project for future is equal to 4, meaning Mostly success.
Diamond assessment – NTCP
According to Shenhar and Dvir it is possible to understand the key dimensions of
projects, and explain the gaps between expectations and project outcome in retrospect by
systematically using their multidimensional Diamond framework. By applying the framework,
the uniqueness and similarities of projects emerges as well as project benefits, risks and
possible failures. In the following the Diamond framework, encompassing novelty, technology,
complexity and pace, is used to assess the Harpa project in retrospect.
Harpa´s four major components are; the general layout, the building as an architectural
composition, the envelope, the auditoriums and acoustics.
31
Novelty: According to Shenhar and Dvir Novelty is “… determined by the nature of the
project´s product – how the product is new to the market, the customers, and the potential
users.” (Reinventing Project Management, 2007, p. 63). In the start of the competitive
dialogue, the client envisioned a strong cultural image, high quality architecture and a
landmark that was to become the symbol for Iceland and Reykjavik. The majority (78%‐86%)
of respondents in the questionnaire survey agree or strongly agree that these objectives have
been met. The building, and specially the 3‐dimensional composition of the envelope is a
distinctive architectural novelty, but the layout, especially for the auditoriums are in general
based on existing knowledge, tried and tested before in other contexts, though never in
Iceland, nor by this contractor. The originality of the 3‐dimensional quasi‐brick envelope is
new‐to‐the‐world and probably until now the largest artwork of Olafur Eliasson. It demanded
a very late design freeze and complicated calculations before production and construction
could start. It was also the production of this structure that failed and had to be reproduced.
By this, Harpa is considered an architectural composition, is considered a platform
project. The 3‐dimensional envelope is considered a breakthrough project.
Technology: Shenhar and Dvir “…define Technology as knowledge, capability, and
means needed to create, build, manufacture, and enable the use of a product, process or
service.” (Reinventing Project Management, 2007, p. 81). Harpa can be described as a large,
complicated construction project. The knowledge and capability within the design and
construction team was sufficient to meet the challenge, and as most large prototype
construction projects Harpa is technically complicated. The only part that can be considered
as new‐to‐company was meeting the technical specifications for the acoustics in the
auditoriums and the production and construction of the 3‐dimensional quasi‐brick envelope,
which turned out to be the most technical challenging component of project.
By this, Harpa is considered a Low‐Tech project. The new‐to‐the company acoustic
specifications along with the 3‐dimensional envelope is considered Medium‐Tech project.
Complexity: Shenhar and Dvir define Complexity as “…a hierarchy of systems and
subsystems as a natural way to distinguish among the various project complexities”.
(Reinventing Project Management, 2007, p. 102). Harpa is one of the largest and complicated
buildings ever constructed in Iceland. The design team and major sub‐contractors were spread
over seven countries on three continents. The project is rather to be considered as a
32
programme of projects than a single project. It demanded a thorough programme and project
management on behalf of the main contractor. The Work breakdown structure counted more
than 5.000 different work tasks. This demanded high degree of formality and bureaucracy
along with high degree of communications, both within the design and construction team,
with the local authorities, the client and the political decision makers. After the economic crisis
in 2008, especially due to the insolvency of the investor, the project, had to rely on the
goodwill of political decision makers to get started again and finished. As such Harpa was an
extremely complex project in Icelandic context, with the exception of the 3‐dimensional quasi‐
brick envelope. Despite of its grand novelty and complicated technology, the project
managerial complexity was not as complex as the rest of the project.
By this, Harpa is considered an Array project. The 3‐dimensional envelope is considered
System project.

Figure 11, The Project Diamond for the Harpa project
Pace: According to Shenhar and Dvir Pace “…involves the urgency and criticality of
meeting project´s goals. … The time available to complete a project has substantial effect on
how a project is managed.” (Reinventing Project Management, 2007, p. 123). Harpa has
common with many infrastructure projects that pace of the project is to meet long term goals.
Harpa was of course planned for completion on a certain date, but in the long run it did not
33
hurt the project organizational success missing this deadline. On the contrary it helped,
especially for completing the 3‐dimensional envelope. Because of its own constraints within
the overall project, and because of the production failure, the 3‐D envelope had to be carried
out under more time pressure than the rest of the project.
By this, Harpa is considered a Regular project. The 3‐dimensional envelope is considered
Fast/competitive project.
Risk: Shenhar and Dvir define Risk as “undesired event or condition that, if it occurs, has
negative impact on a project objective.” (Reinventing Project Management, 2007, p. 172).
Furthermore, they suggest a method for assessing and calculating overall project risk and offer
a simple formula, based on the Diamond framework, to do that.
R = a x N + b x T + c x C + d x P
They suggest values for the for the weights as (a=0,2, b=0,15, c=0,5, d=0,15), giving the
possible highest risk score of 3,3 and lowest risk score of 1.
By using Shenhar and Dvir´s calculation formula and suggested weight values the Risk,
both for the overall Harpa project as well as the 3‐dimensional envelope is: R= 2,20.
Snowdens Cynefin lens
Snowden argues that the Cynefin framework helps determine the prevailing operative
context and understand the key dimensions of project. In retrospect it can help analysing and
understanding finished projects. By exploring the complexity trend over the lifetime of the
Harpa project, the danger signals are of special interests, (A Leader´s Framework for Decision
Making, 2007, p. 7).
The first committee (1996‐1997) seems to have worked in the simple domain of Cynefin
and it came to a conclusion based on best practices. In retrospect the dangers signals can be
traced in the committee´s opinion. There are signs of overreliance on best practices and no
signs of challenging available information. The reduction of the space programme, the low
estimated sqm. cost, the miscalculation for need of personnel for daily operation and
forecasted positive operational balance (Nefnd um málefni tónlistarhús, 1997) are either sign
of entrained thinking, desire to make complex problem simple, biased optimism, or deliberate
misinformation (Flyvbjerg, 2007) to increase the likelihood that the project would be realized.
34
The second available information about the decision making process in the Harpa
project was published December 1998. It is the first feasibility study prepared by consulting
engineers (VSÓ Ráðgjöf, 1998). By applying the Cynefin lens, the project moved at this stage
into the complicated domain, the domain of experts, and stayed there for the next seven
years. A panel of experts was established and stakeholders were consulted. As well as the first
committee´s opinion, this feasibility assessment shows signs of dangers as defined by
Snowden. (A Leader´s Framework for Decision Making, 2007, p. 7). The experts study does not
challenge the conclusion of the first committee. Despite the expansion of space programme
and budget, it is still considerably lower than in the descriptive document published at the
start of the competitive dialogue (January 2005). The feasibility assessment, as well as all the
following studies that became the basis of the Harpa project, never indicated signs of external
challenging of the experts results, and no contingencies, neither for the budget, the space
programme nor the forecasted operating figures.
In January 2005, at the start of the competitive dialogue, the project moved into the
complex domain of Cynefin, which is characterised by the need for creativity and innovation,
and the many competitive ideas of the competitors for the project. The next eight months
three teams of investors, contractors, architects, engineers, artists and specialist competed
for their functional, architectural and operational ideas based on the clients envisioned
objectives. The evaluation of the proposals was based on five main factors: Solutions
(architecture, engineering, etc.) 45%, Operations 5%, Program, activity and services 20%,
Quality and strength of the candidate 5% and Business and price 25%. The selected proposal
– Harpa – was 31% bigger than requested by the client, and exceeded the clients cost
estimation by 51%. It is noteworthy that the candidate was requested to deliver a special risk
analysis for the business plan and price, but not for other factors to be evaluated, including
the quality and strength of the candidate. It is interesting to note the danger signals in this
complex domain of Cynefin, embodied in the temptation to look for facts rather than emerging
patterns, and the desire to accelerate resolution of problems. It took the client a month to
select the most promising proposal. As a part of the selection it was specifically mentioned
that the company behind the offer was dynamic and financially strong, (Morgunblaðið, 2005).
A specific risk assessment for long term solvency of the candidate was not implemented
35
(Kristjánsson, 2014). The contract was signed in March 2006. In October 2008 the Icelandic
banking system went bankrupt and the investor’s solvency no longer existed.

Figure 12, The complexity of the Harpa project trough the lens of Cynefin
The project remained in the complex domain with the exemption of the 6 month long
period of Disorder after the insolvency of the investor. In this period there was fierce
discussion whether to proceed or let the half built project remain as it was, as a reminder of
a bankruptcy of a nation. Finally the Minister of culture and education, and the Mayor of
Reykjavik came to the conclusion to take over the project and proceed. It became a challenge
to proceed in an atmosphere of anger and mistrust. This called for increased level of
interactions and communications. It was decided to slow the project down and finally it took
another 35 MUSD and 27 extra months to finish the project. Harpa opened preliminary to
Beethoven’s Symphony no. 9 (Ode to Joy) at May 04, 2011.
5. DISCUSSION
The aim of this study is defining a conceptual framework to assess and compare grand
concert and opera projects, their success and failures. The study is based on exploring
accessible data from Harpa, a questionnaire survey, along with four different methods to
assess projects and project success, with the intention of verifying their applicability for this
type of projects.
The study of Harpa revealed several comparable attributes for concert halls. It confirms
that the justification is basically a cultural statement to peer other cultural activities within
society as well as other societies. The antecedent and planning time of concert hall and opera
projects is very long with the probability of considerable scope creep as a result. With
reference to Harpa, it can by asserted that the trend for concert halls is that they are getting
36
bigger and more magnificent, resulting in ever higher building costs. Comparable attributes
that are both important and interesting, but seldom displayed in publications, is the
Volume/Area Ratio and the Auditoriums/Total Ratio. They are both specific for concert halls
as the difference is so vast. The volume is more than eightfold the total square meters of the
building and the total size of the auditoriums only 15% of the total area. This helps
understanding both a high total building cost as well as higher building cost pr. sqm. This
should be taken in account when planning for new concert halls.
The explanations for determining the size of the biggest auditorium seem to be based
on an emotional and strategic estimate, rather than hard facts. The hard fact is that Harpa is
(still) not sustainable as the EBIDTA is negative.
The comparable attributes for operations of grand concert halls is the operational cost
pr. sqm. and sqm. pr. staff member in the building. These attributes should be taken in
account when forecasting the operational cost for new concert halls.
The results of the survey offer one mode of assessing the project success of Harpa. The
client envisioned the future outcome by defining 22 feature objectives and eight statements
for cultural importance, gathered in five different categories. Somehow it shines through that
the objectives are a result of the many involved stakeholders desires. Despite the numerous
and to some extent conflicting objectives they provide a possibility to assess the outcome and
the possible success of the project.
The client, mainly the City of Reykjavík, saw Harpa as an important factor for renewal of
the harbour and the city area. They wanted a “beacon”, an icon and impressive settings for
culture, tourism and business, and they seem to have got what they desired according to the
overall results of the survey. With reference to Smith and von Krogh Strand study of the Oslo
Opera (Oslo's new Opera House: Cultural flagship, regeneration tool or destination icon?,
2011), the respondents ranked Harpa primarily as a Cultural flagship and secondly as a
Landmark. This indicates, that when envisioning the objectives for a concert hall, it is
important not to forget the primary purpose. This was further confirmed by how the
respondents ranked the most important attributes of Harpa. It did not come as a surprise that
the acoustics were ranked as number one, and location number two. The overall architectural
quality ranked as the third most important feature of Harpa, higher than the 3‐dimensional
quasi‐brick envelope, the artwork of Olafur Eliasson that have had the greatest coverage in
37
architectural magazines and most discussed by the gatekeepers of architecture. This indicates
that when defining and preparing a new concert hall or an opera building one should not
forget the main purpose of the project.
The feature objectives, both have, and ought to have influence on the main
characteristics of concert halls and this seems to stem to some point in Harpa. Despite that
both boosters and gatekeepers of amplified rhythm music fought for perfect amenities on
their behalf, this did not get through into to the main feature objectives, and did not get the
needed focus when the acoustic demands were finally designed and implemented in the
auditoriums, causing reduced satisfaction among rhythm musicians.
One of the main objectives for the conference facilities was the connection to a four star
conference hotel beside Harpa. The responses of the survey indicate that Harpa indeed
provides unique facilities for conferences, but due to lack of the hotel, and the fact that the
area around the building is yet not finished, the satisfaction with this part of the scheme is
lower than aimed for.
Overall the respondents are very positive towards the fulfillment of the feature
objectives. Following the crisis in 2008, and the re‐opening of the project, one extra attribute
emerged; to appeal to the public. It became one of the main goals to welcome the public and
ordinary people. In some extent this seems to be one of the main explanations for the success
of the project. The building is, on day to day basis, accessible to public, without paying special
fee for visiting, and according to the survey, over 70% of the respondents have visited Harpa
more than 10 times. Probably this also explains the justification for proceeding with the
project despite the economic crisis in 2008 that caused to halt.
The project management attributes indicate a complex project, with great many
interfaces. It is somewhat difficult to point to one particular factor but in future the
comparable attributes for project management may lay in the number of the work tasks of
the work breakdown schedule, the number of certified project managers, the number of
stakeholders and other measurable attributes as number of drawings pr. sqm.
The application of the assessment tools revealed the usefulness of Flyvbjerg´s seven
causes of planning problems. It is no doubt that by applying the lens of Flyvbjerg, the question
of misinformation, due to delusion or even deception, becomes valid. At best, the Harpa
38
project has suffered from optimism bias, at worst from deliberate deception. This appears
throughout the lifetime of the project, i.e. due to the total lack of budget contingencies,
continuous underestimation of cost and overestimation of benefits, not at least the forecasted
operational revenue. Flyvbjerg argues this could be prevented by critical questioning,
accountability and independent review.
Snowdens´s Cynefin framework supports Flybjerg´s approach and vice versa. The
Cynefin framework defines danger signals for each of the domains. It warns against
complacency, entrained thinking and the desire to make complex problems simple, especially
in the simple domain, which seem to have been the domain where the initial political decision
was taken to proceed with the project. When the project moved into the complicated domain,
the experts may have been too overconfident in the efficacy of the past that seem to have
confused their estimates. If they i.e. had taken the high Volume/Area ratio in to account, they
might have come to more accurate cost estimates. In line with Flyvbjerg´s approach, the
Cynefin framework suggest challenging the expert’s opinion and combat entrained thinking.
It encourages to recognize both the value and limitation of best practices and urges for
experiments, interaction and communication, diversity and dissent.
Together, by combining Flybjerg´s approach and the Cynefin lens, we may ensure better
decisions and estimates in the long run.
Shenhar and Dvir´s dimensions of project success provide useful method of assessing
projects, project management success and business success of projects. The assessment of
the Harpa project reveals total failure associated with the project efficiency at the deliverance
of the building. Despite effective and focused project management in the implementation of
the building it suffered overruns both in time and budget, but the impact on the customer
seems to be a success. This approach should never be ignored in the initiative and planning
phases of new projects.
The usefulness of the Diamond concept is more controversial. Despite its utility
identifying key dimensions of projects, the universality somewhat prevents the applicability
on construction projects in line with concert halls and operas. The scale is so vast that even
project of significant novelty and technical complexity intend to score low on the Diamond
scale so they appear simpler than they actually are, seen from inside the respective project. It
is understandable when comparing them to totally different breakthrough and super high‐
39
tech projects, but it leaves us with too little difference to distinguish between projects of
similar character. The same applies for the calculation of the Risk factor as represented by
Shenhar and Dvir, an interesting, and useful way of assessing risk in some types of projects.
The formula gives a highest risk score of 3,3 and the lowest risk score of 1, with Harpa scoring
2,2 according to the assessment of the author of this paper. This does not make much sense
in itself, as the upper and lower limits of the scale is so narrow, and the levels of each axis to
few. This indicates that the scale and levels of the Diamond concept is more useful comparing
different kind of projects rather than project of similar kind.
The findings of this study suggest a useful conceptual framework for assessing concert
halls and opera projects, and demonstrates how the Harpa project is arranged within the
framework.
See the table (Framework) on the following page.
40
Attributes Parameter Harpa – Concert and Conference Hall, Iceland
General Scope of project Concert Hall and Conference Centre
Justification Annual EBIDTA over Zero / Flourishing music
scene / Poor existing facilities/ Lacking
Planning, Design and Construction attributes
residence for ISO / Other art forms have better
conditions / Not in line with other countries
and similar sized communities
Time span of the Antecedent period 1983‐1995 (13 years)
project Planning period 1996‐2004 (9 years)
Design and construction period 2005‐2011 (6,7 years)
Years under construction 4,8
Excelled construction time according to plan 23 months
Building Metrics Total Area (sqm) 29.865
Increase of area from forecast (%) 29,8%, *(70,7%)
Volume/Area, Ratio 8,34
Auditoriums / Total Area, Ratio 0,15
Construction **Building costs without VAT (MUSD) 226,0
cost figures Increase from forecast (%) 17,7%, *(77,8%)
**Building cost pr. sqm (USD) 7.568
**Building cost pr. m3 (USD) 908
Increase of sqm‐cost from forecast (%) ‐9,3%, *(8,0%)
Seat Capacity Auditorium A (seats) 1630‐1800
Total number of auditoriums 4
Total number of auditorium seats 3.355
Operational attributes
Annual number of Number of concerts and opera events (2013) 514

events Total number of events (2013) 957
Average (daily) load (%) 65,7%
Annual number of concert guests (2013) >325.000
Annual number of guests (2013) >1.300.000
***Operating figures EBIDTA (MUSD) (2013) ‐4,7
Operational cost pr. sqm (USD) (2013) 419
Annual property tax (MUSD) 3,2
Operational Number of personnel 64,5
personnel Sqm. pr. staff member 463
****Fulfillment of General 0,87
Context and
Features
Feature Objectives Location 0,66

(based on survey) Buildings (Acoustics) 0,79
Operation 0,77
Cultural importance 0,74
Project management Internal quality management and control ISO 9001
Management
data Number of certified Project managers (IPMA, PMI) 1 (IPMA B)

Project
Number of work tasks (WBS) >5.000
Registered official inspections / audits 1.640
Number of drawings Total number of drawings (excl. shop dwg´s) >20.000
Number of drawings pr. sqm. 0,67
Flyvbjerg´s 7 planning Planning horizons and interfaces? Long planning horizons and complex interfaces
problems causes Technology? Partly non‐standard technology
Decision process, actors and interests? Many actors and conflicting interests
Project scope and ambition? Changing scope & ambition level over time
Specific assessment tools
Budget contingencies? (No) Inadequate budget contingencies
Misinformation about cost, benefits & risks? Consequent misinformation
Possible overruns and/or benefit shortfalls? Factual overruns and benefit shortfall
# Project success Project efficiency 1
factors Impact on Customer 4
Impact on Team Not explored (No information)
Business & direct success 2
Preparation for future 4
Diamond assessment ‐ Novelty Platform
NTCP Technology Medium‐tech / (High‐tech)
Complexity System / (Array)
Pace Fast/Competitive / (Time critical)
## Risk 2,2 / (2,2)
* Increase compared to Descriptive Document no. 13571 for PFI Works Concession, 2004/2005; ** Exchange rate USD 31.12.2011 =122,25;

*** Exchange rate USD 30.04.2014 =112,2; **** The percentage of those who agree or strongly agree;
# Project success scale: 1 = Total failure, 2 = Mostly failure, 3 = 50/50 Failure/success, 4 = Mostly success, 5 = Total success;
## Risk = 0,2xN+0,15xT+0,5xC+0,15xP = 0,2*2+0,15*1+0,5*3+0,15*1 = 2,2
Table 9: The conceptual framework, and arrangement of Harpa within the framework.
41
6. CONCLUSIONS
The study reveals a definition and structure of a conceptual framework, providing a
method, an assessment tool, to evaluate success of concert halls and opera projects.
The assessment tool sheds light, both on the failure and the success of Harpa. The
failures, mainly rooted in the strategic decisions taken in the eight yearlong planning phase,
and success rooted in the efficient project management of the contractor, the project
outcome and positive influence within the community.
The combined use of Flyvbjerg’s and Snowden´s lenses reveals the weakness of the
decision making, due to possible entrained thinking and the desire to simplify complexity.
Shenhar and Dvir´s dimensions of project success helps identifying both the failing
project efficiency and lack of business success, as well as the success due to the positive
impact on customer and preparation for the future. The Diamond concept provides a useful
method identifying dimensions of projects, but needs a specific adaption to concert halls and
opera projects, especially for assessment of risk.
The study of the fulfilment of feature objectives through a survey provides important
information, that helps assessing the project success and the project outcome, and the
gathering of metric information revealed important attributes specific for concert halls.
The study indicates that the method can be used to evaluate success of other Concert
halls and Opera projects. It can help describing the internal development of a project and
compare the project´s different stages. It can help make sense of a finished project in
retrospect. It can help comparing different projects, and finally it provides basic information
for defining a benchmark for new projects. As such the framework can provide to be a useful
tool in the initiating and planning phase of new concert halls and opera projects.
7. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER WORK
The author of this paper considers it appropriate to draw attention to the following: The
author is a practising architect. His firm participated in the Harpa project and therefor the
inferences drawn from the study may be coloured by the involvement and closeness to the
project. It should be considered that the questionnaire is composed by the surveyor, and
42
presented as statements as if the objectives had been met. This may have coloured the
responses.
Studying specific cases in retrospect have certain limitations due to the fact that only a
part of the background data is accessible and open to public. This limits the big picture of the
of the strategic decision process and may bias the conclusion. New information may lead to
further studies.
The results of the questionnaire survey has only partially been discussed in this paper
and need further analyses.
As the strategic decisions, that have the biggest influence on the project efficiency, are
taken in the planning phase of projects, further studies might help to a provide a better
understanding of the decision making process and suggest methods for improvements.
Combing the lenses of Flyvbjerg and Snowden, with regard to the diamond framework of
Shenhar and Dvir can point the way to an improved assessment tool.
8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and support of Dr. Helgi Thor Ingason,
associate professor at Reykjavík University in Iceland as a supervisor for this thesis. The author
also thanks Helgi Thor and Michael Young for proposing an idea that led to the research. The
research would not have been able, if not for the tolerance and support from my partners in
Batteriid architects, especially Sigurður Einarsson, the responsible architect for Harpa,
Sigurður Harðarson architect, for reading over and making suggestions for improvements as
well as Guðmundur Osvaldsson for his suggestions for improvements. Thanks to my good
colleague, Halldor Eiriksson, architect and lecturer at Iceland Academy of the Arts, for his good
advices, for reading and correcting. The author would also thank Sigurður R. Ragnarsson,
programme manager and Dr. Ríkharður Kristánsson, design manager for the Harpa project,
for their consulting interviews that provided a deeper understanding of the subject. Thanks to
Halldór Guðmundsson, director of Harpa for important and useful information. Thanks to all
the 248 respondents that offered time answering the questionnaire survey. Finally I am
grateful to Anna, my wife and lifelong partner for her continuous support, tolerance and
guidance.

43
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iv

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Right answer exists Use best practices simple Stay connected without

More than one possible answer solutions opinions to combat entrained

Flux & unpredictability Experiment Temptation to fall back into Be patient and allow time for

No right answers communication Temptation to look for facts rather interaction so patterns can emerge

Unknowables establish order Missed opportunity for innovation chaotic environment

Snowden´s Cynefin decision‐making and sense‐making model helps determine

Attributes Relevance for Parameter

Attributes Relevance for Parameter

Attributes Relevance for Parameter

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Project success factors Planning Project efficiency

Annual number of Number of concerts and opera events (2013) 514

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data Number of certified Project managers (IPMA, PMI) 1 (IPMA B)

* Increase compared to Descriptive Document no. 13571 for PFI Works Concession, 2004/2005; ** Exchange rate USD 31.12.2011 =122,25;

Austurhöfn‐TR ehf. (2003). Information Memorandum, Proposed concert hall, conference

Fundació Mies van der Rohe. (2013, June 06).

VSÓ Ráðgjöf. (1998). Tónlistarhús og ráðstefnumiðstöð, Nýtingar og hagkvæmismat.

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