Pre-Bar Quizzer in Political Law – Part I: Constitution of Government 51-60

51. May the President make temporary appointments involving the members of the Cabinet while Congress
in session or not in session? Distinguish ad interim appointment and appointment in an acting capacity.

Yes provided the temporary appointments of cabinet members do not exceed one (1) year. (SEN. AQUILINO
PIMENTEL, et al., vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., 472 SCRA 587)

1. The temporary appointments are valid. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice
as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a
law cannot impose on the President the obligation of automatically appointing the Undersecretary as her alter
ego. He must be of the President’s confidence and provided that the temporary appointment does not
exceed one (1) year.

There is a need to distinguish ad interim appointments and appointments in an acting capacity. While both are
effective upon acceptance, ad interim appointments are extended only during the recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be extended any time that there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily circumventing the need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

52. What is the “take care power” of the President of the Philippines?
It is the power of the President under Section 17, Art. VII which provides that The President shall have control of
all the executive departments , bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

53. What is the power of control of the President. Distinguish it from power of supervision.

“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
test of the latter.” “Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. (MONDANO VS. SILVOSA)

54. May the President validly require all officers and employees under the executive department to maintain ID
systems and have ID cards?

Yes in accordance with her power of control under Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. (KILUSANG MAYO
UNO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006) But not for a national ID
system which includes civilians as held in Ople vs. Torres, supra.

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55. What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?
It simply means that “the President is not expected to perform in person an the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxillary unit which assists the President.
Under our constitutional set-up, the Executive Secretary acts for and in behalf of the President: and by authority
of the President, he has undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order of the Secretary of
Natural Resources and other Cabinet Secretaries. Where the Executive Secretary acts “by authority of the
President” his decision is that of the President. (Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 21 SCRA 895).

56. What are the differences between the power of the President to declare martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus under the 1987 Constitution and the previous Constitutions?

Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, such acts of the President may be reviewed not only by the Supreme
Court but also the Congress of the Philippines. Previously, such would be considered “political question” which
is beyond the review powers of the courts. Likewise, there is a definite period for the said suspension unlike
before and more importantly, the grounds are only invasion and rebellion WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES
IT. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within 3 days, otherwise, he shall be released.

57. May the President under the 1987 Constitution validly issue decrees after declaring a state of national
emergency. May she direct the take over of business affected with national interest by reason of the
“emergency” which she herself proclaimed?
In the case of PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et Al VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, et al., G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, it was held that in declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. The Supreme Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.

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Likewise, the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, is also unconstitutional. This requires a delegation from Congress.

58. What are the requisites of judicial review?

Courts may exercise the power of judicial review only when the following requisites are present: first, there must
be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of unconstitutionality; third, the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

59. When may the courts still validly decide moot and academic cases?

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events,[1] so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case[2] or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The “moot and academic” principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, .R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004,
429 SCRA 736).
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved (Lacson vs.
Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756);
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo); and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98, Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577, Sanlakas
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656. )

60. Define locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”[3] In private
suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”[4] Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s
standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

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