VICTORIA LEGARDA, 

petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.

G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992

Facts: Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint filed by New Cathay House, Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was filed in order to compel
Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract for her house and lot at 123 West Avenue in Quezon
City, which New Cathay House, Inc. planned to use for the operation of a restaurant. The lower
court imposed a temporary restraining order prohibiting Victoria Legarda and her agents from
interfering with New Cathay House, Inc.'s rehabilitation of the property. The lower court imposed
a preliminary injunction after hearing the case. Following that, lawyer Dean Antonio P. Coronel
appeared as Victoria Legarda's attorney. He also filed an urgent application for a 10-day
extension from February 6, 1985 to file an answer to the complaint. The court granted the
motion, giving Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to respond to the complaint. His client
was eventually ruled in default, Cathay was given the opportunity to present evidence ex parte,
and the trial court issued a judgment by default on March 25, 1985, ordering Legarda to execute
the lease contract in Cathay's favor and pay damages to Cathay.

On April 9, 1985, Atty. Coronel obtained a copy of the lower court's verdict, but he did not file an
appeal within the reglementary period. As a result, the decision became final, and the lower
court issued a warrant of execution on the motion of New Cathay House, Inc.

During March of 1990, Atty. Coronel did not advise petitioner of this development. Atty.
Coronel's secretary notified petitioner that New Cathay House, Inc. had sought her eviction from
the property as a result of her repeated phone calls. As a result, petitioner had no choice but to
comply and depart the premises. Mr. Justice Gancayco issued a decision in this case on March
18, 1991, which included: (a) granting the petition; (b) nullifying the trial court's decision dated
March 25, 1985, the Court of Appeals decision dated November 29, 1989, the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985, and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the
same property; and (c) ordering Cathay to reconvey said property to Legarda.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence

Ruling:

Yes. Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He failed to
observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable." Without a doubt, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in preserving and
attending to his client's interests resulted in the latter's material prejudice in the case at hand.
It's important to remember that when a lawyer accepts a client's case, he promises to put up
every effort to see it through to its end. A lawyer who fails to perform necessary diligence or
abandons his or her client's claim is unworthy of the client's faith. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is
hereby found guilty of gross negligence in the defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil
Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution.
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
Facts: President Corazon Aquino nominated the respondent Christian Monsod for the position
of Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The nomination was confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner Renato Cayetano objected to Monsod's
nomination, claiming that he lacks the requisite qualification of having practiced law for at least
ten years. Monsod's nomination as Chairman of the COMELEC was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on June 5, 1991. He took the oath of office on June 18, 1991. He
was appointed Head of the COMELEC on the same day.
Monsod worked in his father's law office after graduating from the College of Law and passing
the bar exam, as everybody knew. After that, he spent around two years as an operations
officer with the World Bank Group. After returning to the Philippines, he worked as a Chief
Executive Officer for Meralco Group, and then as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer for a number of companies. He was also the former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL), as well as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and the
Davide Commission (1990), as well as the Chairman of the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers.
Issue: Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification of ten years of law practice.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court declared that Atty. Monsod possesses the required
qualifications for the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court, as in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs.
Agrava. The Supreme Court stated \“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.” Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences
made him engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Hence, Monsod possesses the
required qualifications, therefore, the petition is dismissed.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. V. Court of Appeals
G.R. NO. 86100-3, JAN. 23, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Metrobank and Trust Company filed a petition for review on certiorari impugns
after the Court of Appeals determined that petitioner must pay a particular sum based on a
charging lien on a civil lawsuit filed against them that was dismissed. Thereafter, private
respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates filed a petition to fix its attorney's fees in the sum of
P936,000.00, based on quantum meruit, sparking a debate between the parties. Petitioner
demonstrated that private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates had been fully
compensated. Private respondent reacted and attempted to reach an agreement with petitioner
in order to avoid a lawsuit, but the agreements failed through.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney's fees.

Ruling:

No. Private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its
attorney's fees. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner. Section 37, Rule 138, deals with
attorney's liens and says: “He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for
the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.”

Petitioner claims that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in the civil
cases before the court below because the complaints were dismissed because they were not
judgments for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, as
defined by Section 37, Rule 138.