1.

Fukushima and the evolution of Defence-in-Depth

After Fukushima, a set of safety weaknesses regarding catastrophic natural disasters

were discovered. In general, the nuclear industry had always worked under the
premise that if there would be an incident, there would always be a fast response
from outside backup sources to help. But in Japan, just after the earthquake and the
tsunami, the roads, electric grids, and in general the area around Fukushima, was
devastated. The authorities and Tepco were not able to answer as fast as they
expected because of the destruction.
And there were some lessons learned:

Fukushima lessons learned, by Álvaro Pablo Muñoz Rodrigo, 2019, Tecnatom

The accident commission board stated that there were 5 important issues. The first
one, was that the accident could be classified as a manmade disaster. There was an
ineffective coordination and also a lack of leadership, both as a result of a collision
between the government, the regulators and TEPCO. The organization and the
regulatory systems didn’t support issues related to the competency of any specific
person.
Also, the document says that TEPCO was fast in denying the earthquake damage,
putting all the damages on the tsunami, but they didn´t prove that the earthquake did
not affect systems needed for safety.
There were many organizational issues within TEPCO. Their personnel was not ready
for a situation like that, there was not the highest level of knowledge, nor the training
or the equipment inspection level related to severe accidents.
The regulator was pointed out by the commission too. The document stated that
safety was good under the regulator´s view and that the entire entity had to change
in a substantial way. Especially because they were ignoring international standards,
as part of their culture of distrusting what came from abroad.
Additionally, a deep changes in the operator, laws and regulations were needed, and
not just cosmetic changes. All those changes should lead to an alignment with
international safety regulations and standards, and the use of the latest technological
improvements in terms of safety.

2. Understanding how our work affects safety

From the safety analysis point of view, we should understand how our work affects
safety, and specially how we can help to keep the PSA hypothesis.
The actions summary involves the following measures:
An accident which involves core
damage and uncontrolled
radioactive releases, is
absolutely inacceptable. Nuclear
operation main ideas are to be
safe and clean. Although the
sequence of events in
Fukushima are improbable to
happen in the USA or in Europe,
mainly due to regulation, once
again their problem was their
confidence regarding possible
accidents, their main error was
not to adhere to a healthy safety
culture.
Actions summary involves the following measures,
by Álvaro Pablo Muñoz Rodrigo, 2019, Tecnatom

However, applying the defence-in-depth philosophy using the definition of risk would
provide a stronger regulating frame, more logic, coherent, systematic and more
understandable. This application would be strengthened adding new events beyond
the design basis accidents. Following we list the main actions taken by different
countries:
• Clarification of the regulation frame, always achieving a balance between risk
and defence-in-depth.
• Reevaluation of the design basis accidents, especially against earthquakes and
floods. In Europe, the European Union and the national regulators run stress
tests, to see if the installations could withstand Beyond Design Basis Accidents,
and proceeded with the required actions to improve safety.
• Evaluation of the capability to prevent fires and floods provoked by
earthquakes, especially in a devastating situation like that of Fukushima
Daiichi surroundings, destroyed due to the earthquake and the flooding. In
Spain, for example, the Emergency Support Center was created, serving all
nuclear power facilities, that can provide personnel and additional equipment
to any facility in less than 24 hours. This Emergency Support Center has
 equipment for fire extinction, water supply, and others. The power plants have
landing places for helicopters. Also, Ancillary Emergency Management Centers
have been prepared. They are independent, seismic class I, and radiologically
protected buildings, where people involved in emergencies can rest and eat.
• There are now portable diesel generators, able to be plugged into the plant to
supply power to the safety systems. And also pumping equipment to supply
water to the reactor vessel and containment sprays.
• Not just in BWRs, in Spain for example for all plants it is necessary to have
Containment Filtered Vents, which are passive systems, with no power supply.
They can produce a controlled depressurization of the containment building if
there is a core melt and decrease the radioactive airborne radioactivity.
• To control the H2, it is mandatory in many countries to have Passive
Autocatalytic Recombiners, also known as PARs. They can reduce the
hydrogen produced during the core melting by combining it with oxygen,
producing water.
Ancillary water supply
equipment, fixed and portable, to
supply water to the Spent fuel
Pool (SFP). This equipment can
work without power supply to
compensate at least water
evaporation.
• It was necessary to
improve the Emergency
Operating Procedures, as well as
to develop Severe Accident
Management Guidelines (SAMG),
and extended damage mitigation
guidelines.
Main fukushima action taken,
by Álvaro Pablo Muñoz Rodrigo, 2019, Tecnatom

• Finally the emergency plans also considered extended SBO (Station BlackOut)
and multiple events in different units. Also, it included new decision-making
guides, radiation and radioactive airborne surveillances, and new
communication channels for the public. The emergency plans recommended
that the Regulator should be more concerned about the defence-in-depth
systems.