As described above, the disaster of Fukushima occurred, not because the very basis of nuclear safety

was wrong, but because it was not implemented and maintained properly. Defense-in-depth is the most
basic strategy of nuclear safety that had been established at an early stage of nuclear development,
before sophisticated methods of risk-informed safety management were introduced. After Fukushima,
some people claim that we should rely more on risk-informed methods for safety management and we
should evaluate more precisely the risks of external hazards. It is necessary to do so, but only
introducing more sophisticated risk-informed methods is not the final answer.

However, just because the system status is in the acceptable range does not mean that the danger is no
longer present. The residual risk is the risk that remains after the risk limit has been satisfied. After
we've satisfied the risk limit, we still have to deal with the residual risk. The occurrence of an
unexpected event frequently leads to a further drop in the risk limit and then an increase in safety
regulation, but this is a never-ending cycle. Risk retention and risk transfer, which are typically outside
the reach of regular safety regulations, are used to manage residual risk, and a strategy for their
implementation must be developed. In a social situation, risk transfer is normally accomplished through
insurance, and risk retention is accomplished through disaster planning, damage compensation, and so
on. The method of risk retention, however, for damage that exceeds the scale of commercial insurance
is disputable.

As well as, Renovating deterministic approaches following the defense-in-depth principle will be a key.
In July 2013, Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) implemented new regulatory criteria for
commercial power reactors in the aftermath of Fukushima. The revised standards call for improved
design foundations, earthquake and tsunami protection, and increased requirements for major
incidents. To meet the standards, Japanese utility companies are presently repairing their plants and
implementing various safety measures, which are in accordance with enhancing defense-in-depth rather
than adopting new principles. After that, Measures to Prevent Damages from Natural Disasters also
importance. The maximum seismic motion and tsunami height are reevaluated based on current
seismology knowledge, and the hazards of active faults near the plant location are reevaluated. The
seawalls are rebuilt, and if necessary, reinforcement structures are installed to the plant components.
Countermeasures are also taken against other natural disasters such as tornados, volcanic eruptions,
and external fires.

Thus, Installation of Watertight Structures and Countermeasures Against Internal Flooding .The reactor
building has been fitted with watertight doors. To prevent water intrusion, the structures of ventilation
apertures are changed. Installing pipe and cable penatration seals, water protection covers, weirs, and
other flood-prevention devices are also used to prevent interior flooding. Moreover, Reinforcement of
Emergency Power Supply and Water Injection. For emergency power and water injection, not only
permanent but also transportable equipment is installed, taking into account scenarios that are beyond
the scope of the design. These machines' capacities are designed with sufficient margins to account for
maintenance outages and equipment failures. The mobile equipment's storage locations and
connectivity points are diverse. The injection of water into the used fuel pits has also been enhanced.

Furthermore, Prevention of Reactor Containment Damage . Auxiliary containment spray systems have
been added, which can be powered by both fixed and mobile water injection pumps. For cooling core
debris, water injection lines to the bottom of the containment tank are being investigated. Filtered
containment venting systems are used to prevent overpressure damage to the containment vessel.
Monitoring, evacuation, and recom- bination of hydrogen gas are all used to prevent hydrogen
explosions. Additionally, Preventing Dispersion of Radioactivity . There are other precautions taken to
avoid a hydrogen explosion in the reactor building. In the event that the containment vessel or the spent
fuel pits are damaged, water cannon trucks are equipped to mitigate radiation dispersion. At the
drainage canal exits, pollution control screens are constructed.