“The Dark Sphinx From Stagira”.

Mediating, Interpreting, and Contesting Aristotle in

the Greek Middle Ages

To start with, I shall explain the title of my presentation and the expression “the dark
sphynx from Stagira”. Around the 1150, a Byzantine scholar named Michael of
Anchialos delivered his inaugural address in front of the emperor Manuel Komnenos as
part of his taking of the oath of office for his term as consul of the philosophers, namely
the head of the school of philosophy empire school of philosophy. In a key passage of
his speech, Michael explains talks describes his task as head of the school as follows:

“And this is going to be the limit, this is going to be the boundary of our scholarship and
consulate. Within this framework I investigate the definition of beings along with the
dark sphynx of Stagira, and I examine and solve Aristotle’s enigmatic riddles; I fly with
her and I dance around the heaven: I myself become heavenly as I surround the earth”
(καὶ οὗτος ὁ θεσμὸς καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πέρας τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφιστείας καὶ ὑπατείας.
ἐπὶ τούτοις τῇ Σταγειρόθεν κελαινῇ Σφιγγὶ τοὺς τῶν ὄντων λόγους συνδιασκέπτομαι,
καὶ τοὺς γρίφους περισκοπῶ καὶ ἀναζητῶ τὰ αἰνίγματα. μετεωροπολῶ μετὰ ταύτης,
περιχορεύω τὸν οὐρανόν· περίγειος ὢν οὐράνιος γίνομαι.)

This text is very interesting for the following reasons:

1) The author discusses the place and function of Aristotle within the Byzantine
curriculum of studies. Tellingly, he implies that he will confine himself to
Aristotle’s logic and natural philosophy, in particular meteorology. Michael does
not include Plato in his curriculum and implies that logic and meteorology are
safe as they do not include unorthodox teachings from the Christian point of
view;
2) The text is an important witness to the institutional framework for the circulation
of Aristotle’s work.
3) Michael’s vocabulary – i.e. the ‘sphynx’, the ‘grifoi’ and the ‘ainigmata’ –
relates to the Byzantine understanding of the antique topos of Aristotle’s
obscurity.

All in all, Michael’s text is perfect for introducing this lecture. In fact the reception
of Aristotle and his work in the Greek Middle Ages is a complex phenomenon that
encompasses problems of textual tradition and the analysis of the social and cultural
aspects that characterized Aristotle’s Byzantine readership. In many respects some
of these aspects hark back to Late Antiquity 1) the Church Fathers’ assessment of
Aristotelianism with respect to its compatibility with the Christian dogmata of the
time, 2) the place of Aristotle within the late antique Neoplatonic curriculum, and
the commentators’ hermeneutics of Aristotle’s standpoints vis-à-vis that of Plato
and the Platonic tradition; 3), the cultural and social aspects for the reception and
circulation of the Aristotelian corpus in the Greek Middle Ages. 4), Finally the
Byzantine reception of Aristotle must include an evaluation of the place and
function of the Aristotelian corpus vis-à-vis other classical philosophers.

1
 Since Late Antiquity Aristotle’s works have been read, exploited and challenged by
Christian and non-Christian authors alike with respect to what was deemed instrumental
in his philosophy (in particular logic) and the rest of his works which were considered
of primary interest, in particular those discussing natural philosophy, the Metaphysics
and to a lesser extent his ethical and political treatises. This process took place first in
the Hellenistic period thanks to the middle Platonists, then through the selective
readings of the Church Fathers (in particular after the impulse of the fourth century
Trinitarian controversies), and finally during the fifth and sixth centuries, when
Aristotle’s commentators established the hermeneutic and textual basis on which
Aristotle was transmitted and read in the following centuries. The close interconnection
between these aspects of Aristotle’s heritage in Late Antiquity is for example evident in
the Cappadocian Fathers’ usage of Aristotle’s logic in their polemics and in the later
acceptance of the partition of philosophy established by the Neoplatonic Aristotle
commentators in Athens and Alexandria.
The next slide is taken from Hadot’s introduction to Simplicius’ on Categories and
exemplifies the structure of the Aristotelian corpus in Late Antiquity. It is worth
noticing that the lower part of the scheme reflects the corpus as known to the Byzantine
scholars. In spite of all criticisms that characterize the Byzantine perception of Aristotle
and his philosophy it seems that the Stagirite’s works played a very important role in
Byzantine culture and education, just as they did in Late Antiquity. Accordingly, the
Byzantine intellectuals mostly inherited those Aristotelian works which were granted a
certain importance in Late Antiquity in light of their role within the Neoplatonic
curriculum. These mostly include the works of Aristotle known in late-antiquity as
autoprosopa (i.e. those works in which Aristotle speaks in the first person): the
instrumental works (the logical works), the practical works (ethical works), the physical
works (Physics, De caelo, De gen. et corr., Meteorology, De anima), mathematical
works (De lineis insecabilibus, Mechanics), theological works (Metaphysics) (see Hadot
1990: 80-93). Interestingly, while inheriting this picture of Aristotle’s work, the
Byzantines did not accepted it blindly, and also commented 1) upon works, such the
ethical ones, which, though recognized in late-antiquity as propedeutical in the
Neoplatonic curriculum, had received little attention among commentators (see below
1.3 for the cases of Eustratios of Nicaea, Michael of Ephesus, George Pachymeres,
George Scholarios); and 2) upon works, such as the zoological ones, which on the
contrary had been excluded from the list of the Aristotelian works considered worthy of
study in Late Antiquity (Michael of Ephesos, Sophonias, George Pachymeres, Theodore
Metochites, Gennadios Scholarios).

The existence of an important Byzantine commentary tradition on Aristotle is

witnessed by a notable amount of Byzantine exegetical works on the corpus
aristotelicum (see Moraux 1970: 29-31). These can be classified as follows according to
their literary genre:
1) Short treatises, sometimes written following the question-and-answer model of
literature, summarizing, presenting or excerpting from a specific Aristotelian work or
some passage of it;

2
 2) Independent treatises which, while being unrelated to immediate exegetical
purposes, nevertheless depend upon Aristotle and the commentary tradition directly
with respect to the state of the art of the topic under discussion;
3) Letters, Dialogues, Poetry;
4) Prolegomena and Protheoroumena;
5) Paraphrases;
6) Epitomai, synopseis and compendia, to be found either isolated, either as part of a
wider ‘encyclopaedic’ project;
7) Commentaries and scholia;
8) Literal commentary after the late-Antique model (lexis/theoria)
While inheriting this scheme from Late Antiquity, the Byzantine scholars approached
Aristotle’s work in a way which differs from that of both their Arabic and Latin
speaking counterparts with respect to the cultural and institutional framework of their
scholarship.  In the Latin West Dante noticeably labelled Aristotle “mio maestro”
(Conv., I 9 9), “maestro dei filosofi” (Conv., IV 8 15), “maestro e duca de la ragione
umana” (Conv., IV 6 8), “preceptor morum” (Mon., III 1 3), “’l maestro di color che
sanno” (Inf., IV 131), His appraisal of Aristotle reflects the tremendous impact that
Aristotle’s work had on Medieval scholasticism and, before on the Arabic philosophers.
In Byzantium things were not quite the same. As you can see from this text, according
to Theodore Metochites, a learned scholar who died in 1332, Aristotle was no prince of
perfection with regard to several classical philosophical topics. Metochites exemplifies
a widespread view in Byzantium that with regard to specific topics Aristotle was no
better than Proclus (for what concern metaphysics and theory of knowledge) and Galen
(for what concern physiology). And yet, in spite of this and several other negative
appraisal, the tremendous amount of manuscripts preserving Aristotle’s works produced
in Byzantium suggested that deep in their heart the Byzantines never ceased reading,
interpreting and even contesting Aristotle.

2. Aristotle in the Byzantine History of Philosophy

In spite of the Byzantine criticisms to Aristotle, mss. and literary evidence suggest that
the Philosopher’s work vastly dominated the fields of philosophy, culture and education
in the Eastern Roman Empire. Just as the points of critique had been inherited from Late
Antiquity, so also the image of Aristotle developed by Byzantine scholars partly harks
back to Late antique Aristotle commentators and the Church Fathers. As a matter of fact
at the very beginning if the Byzantine period, the works of Aristotle and that of the Late
Antique commentators had an grater impact on Byzantine readers than the platonic and
neoplatonic works. Manuscript evidences from the 9th to 13th c. demonsrate that the
corpus aristotelicum and the Aristotelian commentaries were thoroughly read and
transmitted, whereas the in many instances the works of the neoplatonists did not
survive or survived in fragmentary form. Take for instance the case of Proclus. Only
half of his work has come down to us, often in a fragmentary form. By contrast,
Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentators fared much better.
Two aspects of this image are of particular interest: 1) the explanation of Aristotle’s
obscure style and 2) Aristotle’s relationship with Plato and the Platonic tradition.

3
2. 1 Obscurity (asafeia) and inconsistency
Aristotle’s obscurity (asafeia) was not a Byzantine invention. Already in late-antiquity
the alleged obscure style of Aristotle’s acroamatique writings were a matter of debate.
Some Christian authors criticized it as a negative feature (cf. e.g. Ps.-Justin, Confutatio
quorundam Aristotelis dogmatum, ed. Otto, 117A-B), whereas Aristotle’s commentators
usually defended Aristotle’s obscurity as a deliberate authorial strategy to keep the
uninitiated away from philosophy.
Byzantine scholars mostly reflect these different attitudes, although often the negative
and the positive evaluation of Aristotle’s asafeia coexist in one and the same author. For
example, Theodore Metochites (Semeioseis Gnomikai 3.4-5, ed. Hult 2002) reviews the
ancient interpretations of Aristotle’s obscurity, but insinuates that the cause for
Aristotle’s obscure style rests in his disingenuous escape from providing the
explanations which the Philosopher promised his readers; or, even worse, Metochites
suggests that obscurity is motivated by Aristotle’s incapability to provide counter-
arguments when refuted. In Metochites’ view this is particularly evident in the
Metaphysics, a work in which Aristotle discussed issues whose answers are unattainable
to men see Semeioseis gnomikai 21, ed. Hult). In the same vein, the earlier Michael
Psellos disdained Aristotle’s obscurity as unpleasant for the reader, but is aware that
obscurity is a deliberate strategy to hide his doctrines from an unprepared audience (e.g.
Theologica, II, 6, ed. Duffy and Westerink, 53.16-21). Sophonias, on the contrary,
mentions Aristotle’s brachilogical and obscure prose with respect to the task of the
paraphrast, who must unfold and clarify the meaning of Aristotle’s obscure words
(Sophonias, In de an., ed. Hayduck, 1.11-22. On this text, see Blumenthal 1997; Bydén
2006; Ierodiakonou 2012). By contrast, the later Gemistos Plethon provides an entirely
negative account of Aristotle’s obscure style and venture questioning the status of wise
among the Greeks granted to Aristotle by his arch-enemy Scholarios.
A related charge against Aristotle found both in Late antique Christian apologists and
in Byzantine scholars such as Theodore Metochites is that of providing different views
on the same subject in one and the same work or in different ones. In the same vein, the
earlier Michael Psellos (Philosophica Minora, I, 5, ed. Duffy, 16.58-17.72) describes
Aristotle’s inconsistency by comparing the Philosophers’ many divergent views on one
and the same subject to the many heads of the Lernaean Hydra that keep growing when
cut off. Apparently this comparison suggests that when reading Aristotle one gets the
impression that whenever he solves a problem, that same problem comes back
elsewhere with different solutions. The only difference with the Hydra is that, whereas
the new heads of the Hydra look the same as those that have been cut off, Aristotle’s
views always differ from each other and are variegated.

2.2 Aristotle’s relationship with Plato and Platonism

Many Late antique sources responded to Aristotle’s criticism of Plato as found, for
example, in Metaphysics Alpha and Nicomachean Ethics 1 by charging Aristotle with
arrogance and ingratitude to his master Plato (see Düring 1957: 373-395). Given the
fortune of Proclus’ works among consequential scholars such the Byzantine
commentators, it is no surprise that in many instances Proclus lurks behind many of the
Byzantine criticisms to Aristotle both with respect to their content and polemical
undertones. In early 12th c. Eustratios of Nicaea defends Plato’s Ideal Good from

4
Aristotle’s critique in Nicomachean Ethics 1.4. In particular, Eustratios (In Eth. Nic., ed.
Heylbut, 45.28-38) charges Aristotle with sophistry for accepting (Nic. Eth. 1.1) the
Platonic definition of ‘good’ as “that which all things desire” without qualifying the
term ‘good’ as a transcendent principle. According to Eustratios (In Nic. Eth., ed.
Heylbut, 50.30-33), Aristotle criticized Plato out of vanity and paradoxically his
criticism of the Platonic ideal Good is so weak that it confirms, rather than dismisses,
this Platonic doctrine (on this text see Giokarinis 1964). While reminiscent of the Late
antique topos of Aristotle’s vanity as the reason for criticizing Plato (cf. e.g. Atticus, fr.
6, 7, 8 ed. Baudry), Eustratios relies heavily on Proclus’ anti-Aristotelianism. The
“Platonic” definition of ‘Good’ referred to by Eustratios is in fact that of Proclus’
critique of the Aristotelian definition of ‘good’ in the beginning of the Nicomachean
Ethics (cf. Elements of Theology, 8, ed. Dodds, 8.31-32), according to which such
definition is acceptable only when by ‘good’ one means a transcendent principle.
Plethon and his arch-enemy Scholarios are probably the most fascinating Byzantine
scholars discussing Aristotle and his philosophy in the whole of Byzantine intellectual
history. Plethon’s attack on Aristotle and Scholarios’ pro-Aristotelian reaction animated
the very last period of the Byzantine philosophical tradition. Against Plethon,
Scholarios defended that not Plato, but rather Aristotle, was the best among ancient
Greek philosophers. According to Scholarios, Aristotle was the first among Hellenes to
deny polytheism and foreshadow Christian monotheism (see his Praise of Aristotle’s
Monotheism, ed. Jugie / Petit / Xiderides). The interest in the debate between these two
intellectuals lies in its simultaneously involving 1) the evaluation of Aristotle as a
philosopher (see above 2.1 And 2.2); 2) the discussion of his doctrinal standpoints (see
above 1); 3) the exploitation of Aristotelian material unknown until the second half of
14th c. such as the commentaries on Aristotle written by the champion of Western
scholasticism Thomas Aquinas. After the end of Byzantium (1453) the clash between
Plethon and Scholarios will merge into a ferocious controversy among Greek émigrés in
Italy, known as the ‘Plato-Aristotle controversy’ in the Italian Renaissance. Even in this
case, however, the Byzantine understanding of Plato and Aristotle is determined and
carried by later authors such as the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias, the
Neoplatonist Proclus, the Late antique commentators and Western scholasticism.

1.1 Logic
Among all Aristotle’s works, the logical ones were probably taught and read most
consistently throughout the history of Byzantine culture and education. The first witness
of this trend which can be documented by means of paleographical data is that of late
ninth century Byzantine scholar Arethas of Caesaria, although there is evidence
favouring the existence of earlier logical school-texts composed between the sixth and
eighth centuries. In particular ms. Urb. gr. 35, a huge codex containing Aristotle’s
Organon, Porphyry’s Isagoge and some commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works, was
commissioned by Arethas himself and shows signs of Arethas’ scholarship in the
extensive marginal notes taken from earlier material at ff. 2-29, in correspondence to the
text of Porphyry’s Isagoge and to part of Aristotle’s Categories up to 4b15. As a matter
of fact in Late Antiquity Aristotle’s vocabulary and its exploitation in theology had
already become a matter of harsh debate. The Categories in particular were a battlefield.
Given the rising prominence of this Aristotelian work in the curriculum of philosophical

5
studies between first and second centuries, the middle Platonists first and later the
Cappadocian Fathers debated over the realm of application of Aristotle’s theory of
predication and questioned its validity as an explanatory model for the intelligible world
and theological matters respectively.
While being open to all these developments, the fourth century theological
controversies pushed the Church Fathers in the direction of Aristotle’s more hostile
critiques. Following the middle Platonic denial of the validity of logic with regard to the
non-sensible world, charges of misinterpreting Aristotle’s Categories (e.g. Basil of
Caesarea, Against Eunomius, ed Sesboüé, 200.8-16) and in general of abusing
Aristotelian logic and syllogistic were frequently addressed at Arius and Eunomius and
the monophysite christology (e.g. Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, 1.46 ed. Jaeger,
37.19-22. See also the later John of Damascus, De haeresibus, 76, ed. Kotter, 40.9-11).
But at the same time there seems to have been quite an agreement among Church
Fathers in granting logic the function of tool for better understanding the Holy
Scriptures and refuting heresies (see e.g. Theodorete of Cyrrhus, Ecclesiastical History,
ed. Parmentier/Scheidweiler, 269.20-24, on Didymus). Based on the assumption that
Greek religion was not at all identical with Greek education (on this see Agapitos 1998),
this pedagogic approach to logic and other disciplines such as rhetoric carries its
influence to many later Byzantine scholars, like thirteenth century erudite Nikephoros
Blemmydes (Epitome logica, PG 142, 688C; Autobiographia sive curriculum vitae, ed.
Munitiz, 75.1-8) and may account in part for the fortune of Aristotelian logic in
Byzantium.
The tension between the refusal of logic in theological discourse and its acceptance for
rejecting erroneous opinions can be found in Byzantium as well. The propedeutic
function of logic within the curriculum of studies was never questioned (see
Constantinides 1982, 113-158), but in this case too its validity with respect to
theological matters in general was contested at numerous times. The vast number of
Byzantine citations of Gregory’s appeal to practice theology as simple fishermen
(Gregory Nazianzene, Orations, 23.12, PG 35: 1164C), rather than as Aristotelians,
may give the wrong impression of consistency in the Byzantine approach to the usage of
logic in theology. However, unlike their Western counterparts, it seems that Byzantine
scholars never reached a definitive agreement on the methodology proper to theological
discourse and on the proper limits of employability of logical arguments for
constructing (and not just for defending) the dogmata.
At the time of the Iconoclastic controversy (eighth-ninth century) Aristotle’s
Categories and in particular the section on relative names formed the basis of the
vocabulary used by iconodules for defending the cult of images This is reminiscent of
the earlier Church Fathers’ emphasis on the logical notion of ‘relation’ for rejecting
Arianism and preserving the integrity of the Trinity. But among all moments in which
the Byzantine approach to logic was challenged, surely the Filioquist controversy is the
most interesting, for in this case the Byzantine scholars were confronted with Western
developments in theological methodology. The more Late Byzantine scholars got to
know Western scholasticism, in particularly Thomism, the more crucial an issue the
value of syllogism and logic for addressing theological issues became. Clearly for
fourteenth century scholars such as Demetrios and Prochoros Kydones, who first
translated Thomas Aquinas into Byzantine Greek, using syllogisms and logical

6
arguments in theology became a way to defend the power of human reason in its quest
for truth.

1.2. Psychology
Though to a lesser extent, the Late antique Christian apologetics and the Neoplatonic
commentators shaped the Byzantine understanding of the Philosopher’s view on the
topic of psychology as well. Taking their cue from the anti-Aristotelian Atticus and the
peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the
entelecheia of a body having life in potency opened the way for charging Aristotle with
denying the immortality of the soul, something unacceptable for a Christian author (e.g.
Gregory Nazianzene, Orations, 27,10; Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, 2, ed.
Morani, 26.10-29.18).
Since the stereotypical account of Aristotle’s theory on the soul, according to which
the Philosopher denied the immortality of the soul, frequently circulated in Byzantium
in the form of citations from earlier Patristic critiques, one may have the wrong
impression of an antiquarian approach to the issue by the Byzantines. This is however
not the case. For many Byzantine monks who endorsed this anti-Aristotelian prejudice,
the whole issue retained its importance, as at different moments figures of the Byzantine
intellectual elite questioned, for example, that after leaving the body the soul has
memory of earthly matters and, accordingly, that the saints can interfere or play some
role with respect to these. In heretical terms such denial is named Thnetopsychism after
the authority of John of Damascus (De haeresibus, 90, ed. Kotter, 57) and was often
challenged by relying on sixth century Eustratios of Constantiople’s De statu animarum
post mortem. The identification between, on the one hand, the Thnetopsychism attacked
by Eustratios and others, identified earlier as an “Arabian” heresy by Eusebius
(Ecclesiastical History, 6,37, ed. Bardy, 139) and possibly related to the theory of the
sleep of soul espoused by several Syriac Late antique writers, and, on the other hand,
the alleged Aristotelian perishability of the soul became apparent in eleventh c. At this
time monks such as Niketas Stethatos (scholion to his Treatise on the Soul, 74, ed.
Darrouzès, 136) and an otherwise unknown John the Deacon (ed. Gouillard) attacked
Michael Psellos and John Italos as supporters of Thnetopsychism, as the latter two
allegedly denied on philosophical basis that when separate from the body the soul can
act or have memory of things the way it had when it was attached to the body through
its sensible and vegetative faculty. Yet, Byzantine commentators also accepted the Late-
Antique interpretation of Aristotle’s theory on te soul by conceding that the intellects
survives the death of the body.

1.3 Moral Philosophy

The Byzantine reception of Aristotelian moral philosophy is still an unexplored field.
Contrary to what happened in the Late antique Neoplatonic school, when Aristotle’s
ethical works (in particular the Nicomachean Ethics) were propedeutic to the Platonic
curriculum but were not, as far as we know, the object of any commentary, the
Byzantine scholars authored some exegetical work on the Philosopher’s moral
philosophy. However, it is not clear whether or not Aristotle’s Ethics played any role in
the Byzantine curriculum of studies. Commentaries, paraphrases, scholia, on the
Nicomachean Ethics are found in quite good number among Byzantine commentaries

7
on Aristotle. Between eleventh and twelfth century Eustratios of and Michael of
Ephesus commented respectively on books I and VI and V, IX and X of this
Aristotelian work (see below 3.7 and 3.8). Some years before, Eustratios’ master John
Italos authored a treatise (Apories and Solutions, 41, ed. Joannou) on the difference
between phronesis and sunesis, which obviously discusses Nicomachean Ethics 6, and a
piece on ethical and dianoethical virtues (Apories and Solutions, 63, ed. Joannou).
Aristotle’s virtues are also the topic of part of Michael Psellos’ De omnifaria doctrina
(De omnifaria doctrina, 66-81, ed. Westerink 1948), which apparently introduces
neoplatonic elements into the discussion of Aristotelian virtues. The commentary on
Rhetoric ascribed to Stephanos Skylitzes (early twelfth century) refers to this author’s
scholia to the Nicomachean Ethics (ed. Rabe, 277.28). These have not yet been
identified. In the thirteenth century George Pachymeres twice commented on this same
work (see below 3.5 and 3.6), once in a commentary, once within his compendium of
Aristotelian scholarship known as Philosophia. The latter project later influenced
Jospeh Rhakendites, who composed his Synopsis variarum disciplinarum in the same
manner, containing a section on ethics. Around the mid fourteenth century the ex-
emperor John VI Kantakouzenos commissioned the copy of an anonymous paraphrase
of the Nicomachean Ethics (which relies heavily on the earlier Eustratios of Nicaea and
Michael of Ephesus) ascribed in modern times to Andronicus of Rhodes, Olympiodorus
and Heliodoros of Prusa (see below 3.5). Finally, Gennadios Scholarios composed a set
of Protheoroumena or introductory notes to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
Whereas the Byzantine historians’ reliance on Aristotelian ethical virtues for depicting
characters in their narratives may have been a commonplace for the time, on several
occasions the Byzantines displayed an interest in Aristotle’s moral philosophy as a tool
for interpreting contemporary events. On other occasions, they made it clear they knew
Aristotle’s ethical and political works by allusions to them or by the exploitation of
some passage contained therein. For example, twelfth century historian Anna Komnene
defends the trustworthiness of her account of her father’s reign by stating that in her
work truth prevails over the bond with the loved one, “as a philosopher once said”.
Clearly Anna refers to Aristotle’s own statement that philosophers should look for the
truth and leave aside friendship (Nicomachean Ethics 1, 1096a15) (see Frankopan
2009). Later Emperor Theodore II Laskaris († 1258) wrote a treatise devoted to
friendship which depends on Aristotle’s discussion of the same issue in the
Nicomachean Ethics (see Angelov 2007: 250-252). In the early thirteenth century,
Thomas Magistros’ treatise On Polity discussed issues such as the common good and
the citizens’ duties. Social equality and the division of classes are discussed in Alexios
Makrembolites’ mid-fourteenth century Dialogue Between the Rich and the Poor where
the issue of inequality is discussed at length.
While interpreting Aristotle’s moral philosophy, on many occasions the Byzantine
scholars took the opportunity to developing personal observations of contemporary
events. This is the case for example of eleventh – twelfth century scholar and
commentator Michael of Ephesus, whose comments on Aristotle’s Politics reveal the
disappointment for the incoming corruption and social inequalities under the reign of
John II Komnenos (1118-1143) (on twelfth century critiques to current state of affairs,
see Magdalino 1983). As Byzantium faced the beginning of the social, political and
military decline that would eventually lead to the capture of Constantinople (1453),
commentary of this kind became more frequent. Complaints about the current situation,

8
the debate over social justice and the role of the state, the problem of the best regime
and the political future of the empire are at the core of the speculations of historians and
philosophers such as Theodore Metochites (1270-1332), John VI Kantakouzenos (1292-
1383), Nikephoros Gregoras (ca. 1295-1359/60), George of Trebizond (1394-ca. 1472),
George Gemistos Plethon († ca. 1454), Laonikos Chalkokondyles (ca. 1423-1490).
Intriguingly, many of these thinkers did not confine themselves to the classical
Aristotelian list of different regimes, nor did they simply rely on ancient historiography
as a source for exempla. By contrast, they also addressed the new case-studies of the
Italian independent municipalities in a way that combined the traditional critique of
their moral decline with an emphasis on the excess of democracy as the causes for their
misfortunes with the attempt at providing their contemporaries with clues to the current
state of the empire and new perspectives for the future.

1.4 Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics

All the evidence suggests that, together with logic, Aristotle’s natural philosophy was
read and taught as a basic discipline within the Byzantine cursus studiorum. Surely this
reflects the place and function of these disciplines within the Neoplatonic curriculum as
introductory to Plato’s dialogues, if not the Late antique idea that, while being
unreliable as a theologian Aristotle was a reliable physiologist and natural philosopher
in general (e.g. Michael Psellos, Theologica, II, 6, ed. Duffy and Westerink: 53.16-17).
Theodore Metochites famously invited his pupil Nikephoros Gregoras to study
Aristotle’s logic and physics, as if the two disciplines went together as part of one and
the same path of study (see also Id., Semeioseis gnomikai, 11, ed. Hult). This was no
novelty, for intellectuals of the earlier generation such as Gregory of Cyprus (1241-
1289) and his master George Akropolites († 1282) had already emphasized Aristotelian
logic and natural philosophy as essential disciplines within the Byzantine cursus
studiorum. A few years later, George Pachymeres would regard logic and physics as the
cornerstones of his teaching activity. Unsurprisingly, the afore-mentioned Nikephoros
Blemmydes epitomized Aristotle’s logic and physics in view of the usefulness of these
disciplines (on the notion of ‘usefulness’ with respect to the reception of classical
literature, see Cavallo 2001) where these do not contradict the Christian dogmata (see
Epitome logica, PG 142, 688C). In a similar vein, the eleventh – twelfth century ‘consul
of the philosophers’ Michael of Anchialos (Oration to Manuel I Komnenos, ed.
Browning, 190.105-110) regarded Aristotle’s logic and natural philosophy (including
meteorology) as the cornerstone of his own syllabus, although Michael is well aware
that not everything of Aristotle’s natural philosophy can be reconciled with the
Christian dogmata.
All the evidence suggests that the above mentioned Michael of Anchialos did not
personify a conservative view on this subject, but rather a well established approach to
Aristotle’s natural philosophy endorsed even by open-minded intellectuals like the
earlier Michael Psellos. The latter invited his students to study the natural philosophy of
the “Hellenic wisdom” in general as being more trustworthy than “Hellenic” theology
(Oratoria Minora, 24, ed. Littlewood, 86.70-85), but warned to reject the ancient
philosophers’ view on uncreated matter as heretical (Philosophica Minora I, 3, ed.
Duffy, 11.211-213). Psellos’ pupil John Italos went even further by writing two treatises
condemning the inconsistencies of the “Hellenes” on the notion of ‘matter’ and ‘physis’

9
(Apories and Solutions, 92 & 93, ed. Joannou). On such issues, argues Italos, one has to
follow the Church Fathers strictly rather than the philosophers of the past (Quaestiones
Quodlibetales, 92, ed. Joannou, 149.179-181 and 93, ed. Joannou, 149.10-13). That this
approach was a traditional one is confirmed by Italos’ follower as ‘consul of the
philosopher’, Theodore of Smyrna, who wrote an Epitome of natural philosophy which
discusses Aristotle’s Physics and the Late antique commentary tradition through the
looking glass of Revelation (ed. Benakis 2014. On this work see Trizio 2012). Thus it
comes as no surprise that in spite of the few extant mss. Philoponus’ writings against
Aristotle and Proclus on the eternity of the world gained remarkable popularity in
Byzantium.
There are several minor issues of disagreement between the Byzantines and Aristotle,
mostly concerning meteorological or physiological matters. Also in this case the Late
antique commentary tradition played the role of intermediary. Michael Psellos
(Philosophica Minora, I, 24, ed. Duffy, 91.53-67), for example, disagreed with
Aristotle’s view of the Milky Way as a sidereal phenomenon on the basis of the
authority of Ammonius as reported by Olympiodorus (In meteor., ed. Stuve, 75.24-
76.22). The later Nikephoros Gregoras would ridicule several Aristotelian theories, such
as that on reproduction, in his dialogue Phlorentios. By contrast, potentially relevant
issues such as the alleged Aristotelian denial of any providential activity of the Prime
Mover on earthly matters, though discussed at length by Church Fathers in Late
Antiquity, did not receive much attention in Byzantium (see Bydén 2013b: 159-162).
Another controversial point of Aristotle’s natural philosophy and cosmology was
Aristotle’s allowance of a fifth element (De cael., 1, 268b11-269b17) for explaining the
non-rectilinear movement of celestial bodies. Also in this case the basis for the
Byzantine criticism of Aristotle had been laid down in Late Antiquity by Platonists and
Christian authors In the twelfth century the historian, theologian and astrologist Michael
Glycas, for instance, mentions Aristotles’ fifth element as unacceptable from the point
of view of Revelation. The same happens in Theodore of Smyrna’s Epitome of physics,
in late eleventh- or early twelfth century, and in the later Nikephoros Blemmydes. The
late eleventh century scholar Symeon Seth mentions Aristotle’s fifth element and
Philoponus arguments against it (Conspectus rerum naturalium, ed. Delatte, 3.36sq.).
Philoponus is also the source for Theodore Metochites’ critique of Aristotle’s fifth
element (cf. Bydén 2003, 178-199). The earlier Michael Psellos is a more interesting
case. While being aware of the Late antique debate on this matter, Psellos shares with
the readers his preference for Philoponus’s criticism of Aristotle’s fifth element, but
ends up quoting verbatim from his theological hero Gregory Nazianzene and his
refutation of the fifth element (cf. Theologica, I, 50, ed. Gautier, 195.56-195.102,
quoting from Gregory Nazianzene, Orat., 28, ed. Barbel, 11-24). By contrast, John
Italos (Apories and Solutions, 42 ed. Joannou) witnesses Simplicius’ attempt (e.g. In de
cael., ed. Heiberg, 12.11-27. But see also Proclus, In Tim. 1, ed. Diehl, 6.29-7.2 and 2,
ed. Diehl, 49.25-50.6) at harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on the basis that Plato’s
reference to a solid cubic with respect to the heavens (Timaeus 55a) would not
contradict Aristotle’s theory of the fifth element. Yet, later in Byzantine intellectual
history Aristotle’s fifth element would be criticized harshly by George Gemistos
Plethon in favour of the Platonic four elements (Contra Scholarii pro Aristotele
obiectiones, 29, ed. Maltese), in the context of his debate with Gennadios Scholarios
over the primacy between Plato and Aristotle.

10
 This attitude towards Aristotle’s natural philosophy suggests that Byzantine
intellectuals read ancient philosophy by carefully distinguishing between those aspects
which were useful according to them and those which were not in so far as they
contradicted the dogmata accepted at the time. From this point of view some of
Aristotle’s standpoints were no less problematic than those held by other classical
philosophers such as Plato. Nikephoros Choumnos’ treatise against the pre-existence of
matter (on which see Marchetto 2013), for example, targets Plato openly, thus
suggesting that, when read under the light of the Christian dogmata of the time, Plato
and the Platonic tradition did not rate better than the Stagirite.
It is more difficult to discern whether or not Byzantine interest for Aristotle’s natural
philosophy was supported by an equally strong philosophy of nature, i.e. whether or not
the study of the Philosophers’ Physics, De caelo, Metereologica etc. aimed at building
the basis for a coherent system of physical theories within a Christian explanation of the
world and its laws. A relevant case witnessing such an attempt is that of George
Pachymeres’ prefatory poem to his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (late thirteenth
c.), where the author praises Aristotle’s Prime Mover (cf. Physics 8 and Metaphysics
12) as compatible to Christianity. Thus on the basis of the affinities between Aristotle
and Christianity, Pachymeres not only suggests that commentaries on philosophical
works are means to express in philosophical terms the commentators’ devoutness to
God, but excludes Aristotle from the list of pagan authors on the ground that his
knowledge, in Pachymeres’ words, surpassed that of the other Greek philosophers (see
Golitsis 2012). Eventually the interest in Pachymeres’ emphasis on the affinities
between, for example, Aristotle’s Prime Mover and a productive cause of the universe
lies in his reliance on Late antique commentators such as Simplicius, an author
otherwise well-known to Pachymeres.
However, in spite of the several criticisms addressed at Aristotle’s natural philosophy,
when dealing with more earthly matters such as biology and zoology the Byzantine
scholars were more favourable to the Stagirite. In this respect the Byzantines did not
confine themselves to inheriting the late-Antique emphasis on Aristotle’s natural
philosophy and its propeduetic role within the curriculum of studies, but went further
than this commenting on those works which had not been deemed relevant by Late
antique commentators (see Hadot 1990: 63-93). This is presented as a novelty by the
Byzantine’s themselves, as in George Tornikes’ Funeral Oration for Anna Komnena
(Orationes, 14, ed. Darrouzès, 283.4-12), written around the mid twelfth century. While
introducing the figure of Michael of Ephesus, Tornikès states that the scholars that Anna
gathered around her for pursuing her love of wisdom commented upon Aristotelian
works in which no commentary was known at the time. Tornikès probably refers to
Michael of Ephesus commentaries on the Parva Naturalia (ed. Wendland), De
generatione animalium (ed. Hayduck), De motu animalium (ed. Hayduck), De partibus
animalium, De incessu animalium, De generatione animalium (ed. Hayduck), De
coloribus (ed. Papari). The absence, or unavailability, of earlier commentaries on
Aristotle’s biological and zoological works at the time of Michael of Ephesus is
confirmed by the latter’s reliance on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De anima and De sensu
for commenting on the Parva Naturalia and other Aristotelian zoological works (On
Alexander of Aphrodisias as a source for Michael of Ephesus, see Wendland 1903: xii;
Donini 1968; Todd 1982).

11
 But Michael was not the only one in Byzantium to witness an interest for these
Aristotelian works. Before him, Michael Psellos and his pupil John Italos devoted some
of their short treatises on these Aristotelian works. In particular, Michael Psellos
composed a piece on the Parva Naturalia (Philosophica Minora, I, 18, ed Duffy),
whereas John Italos devoted a piece to Aristotle’s De partibus animalium (Apories and
Solutions, 70, ed. Joannou) In the late thirteenth c. the monk Sophonias (on which see
Searby 2011) wrote paraphrases of the same treatises composing the Parva Naturalia
including also the De motu animalium (ed. Wendland), the latter often being transmitted
among the treatises composing the Parva (the same order is found in Michael of
Ephesus, in spite the way in which the modern editor published Michael’s
commentaries). The late thirteenth century erudite and scholar George Pachymeres also
commented on Aristotle’s biological and zoological works in his miscellaneous
Philosophia adding to those works previously commented by Michael of Ephesus,
Aristotle’s De sensu and including (like Michael of Ephesus), the pseudo-Aristotelian
De coloribus.
Just as Michael of Ephesus’ commentaries influenced that of Sophonias (see Bloch
2005: 4), Pachymeres’ commentaries are the main source for the Synopsis variarum
disciplinarum, composed in the first half of fourteenth century by Joseph Rakendites
(on the Synopsis see the recent Gielen 2013). Influenced by Pachymeres’ compendiary
approach, Theodore Metochites would, in ca. 1320, compose a Paraphrase of
Aristotle’s Writings on Natural Philosophy, which depends on earlier sources as well
(on this see Bloch 2005: 3-7). This set of paraphrases is largely unedited. Metochites’
paraphrase on De Somno has been edited by Drossaart Lulofs in 1943, that on De
insomniis and De divinatione per somnum by Drossaart Lulofs in 1947. In 2005 David
Bloch published an edition of Metochites’ paraphrase on De memoria. The text of the
paraphrasis is transmitted mostly in the ms. Vat. gr. 303. For an overview of the on-
going project of editions of the as yet unedited paraphrases, see below 3.5). Finally, like
in a chain of uninterrupted intertextualities, Metochites’ paraphrases are the textual
basis for Scholarios’ own paraphrases (ed. Jugie / Petit /Xiderides) on Aristotle’s Parva
Naturalia (see Demetracopoulos 2015).

Though dependent on late antique sources, the Byzantine reception of Aristotle

involves a complex series of authorial and textual practices which, at least in part, the
Byzantines developed independently from the classical heritage. There remains a
tremendous amount of unedited or little-studied material, so our understanding of
Aristoteles Byzantinus is as yet incom- plete. The project Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca et Byzantina, spon- sored by the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, will surely fill some gaps in our knowledge in the coming years. This
is a project whose historical importance for the western reception of Aristotle is
comparable to that of the edition itself of Aristotle and the commentators by Aldus
Manutius as well as the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca project produced by the
most important German philologists at the turn of the twentieth century. However,
before the Renaissance, the west profited from Byzantine scholarship on Aristotle and
the commentators: first, in the twelfth century, through the collaboration between
Burgundio of Pisa and the scribe Ioannikios, then in the thirteenth century through the
translations from Greek into Latin carried out by various scholars.It was then that

12
western scholars realized that Aristotle was read not only in the Arab world, but by
Byzantine scholars as well. But this is another story.

13