Canons of statutory construction are rules of construction for the interpretation of statute law

Canons give common sense guidance to courts in interpreting the meaning of statutes. Proponents of
the use of canons argue that the canons constrain judges and limit the ability of the courts to legislate
from the bench in US. Rules of construction or statutory construction is the process of determining how
the provisions of the general law relate to a specific legal case, and distinguishes the rules of statutory
interpretation from other rules or aids for the interpretation of law in common law jurisdictions. Rules of
construction has also been defined as "the drawing in inference by the act of reason, as to the intent of
an instrument, from given circumstances, upon principles deduced from men's general motives, conduct
and action.

There are certain general principles of interpretation which has been applied by the courts from time to
time. And one of them viz. Construction Ejusdem Generis has been explained herein below.

Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the same kind," it is used to interpret loosely
written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in
general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically
listed. Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-
powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based
transportation. The term Ejusdem Generis in other words means words of a similar class. The
rule is that where particular words have a common characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general
words that follow should be construed as referring generally to that class; no wider construction
should be afforded

Construction Ejusdem Generis

According to the Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem Generis is
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned. it is a canon of statutory construction, where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying
only to things of the same general class as those enumerated.

The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words should be given their
natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires otherwise. But when a general word
follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may be given a restricted meaning of the
same category. The general expression takes it's meaning from the preceding particular expressions
because the legislature by using the particular words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to that
effect. This principle is limited in its application to general word following less general word only. If the
specific words do not belong to a distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable. Consequently, if a general
word follows only one particular word, that single particular word does not constitute a distinct genus
and, therefore, Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case. Exceptional stray instances are,
however, available where one word genus has been created by the courts and the general
wordfollowing such a genus given a restricted meaning. If the particular words exhaust the whole genus,
the general word following these particular words is construed as embracing a larger genus. The
principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a universal application. If the context of legislation rules out the
applicability of this rule, it has no part to play in the interpretation of general words. The basis of the
principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted
sense, it would not have bothered to use particular words at all.

It is an ancient doctrine, commonly called Lord Tenterden's Rule, dating back to Archbishop of
Canterbury's Case in 1596. Singer 47:17, at 272-73. It provides that when general words follow specific
words in a statute, the general words are read to embrace only objects similar to those objects of the
specific words. The rule recognizes and gives effect to both the specific and general words by using the
class indicated by the specific words to extend the scope of the statute with the general words to
include additional terms or objects within the class. In using the doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is
important to keep in mind that it is not applied in a vacuum, and disputes cannot be resolved by merely
tying the issue to the procrustean bed of Ejusdem Generis. In fact, there are several conditions that have
been identified for the doctrine to apply, but none more important than the identification of the class.
There are five conditions that have been identified:

(1) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words;

(2) The members of the enumeration suggest a class;

(3) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration;

(4) A general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually following it; and

(5) There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the
doctrine requires.

Classes can be defined in a vast number of ways, but the key to unlocking the true value of the doctrine
is to ensure that the

identified class has some objective relationship to the aim of the statute. In other words, the basis for
determining, which among various semantically correct definitions of the class should be given effect is
found in the purpose and subject of the statute as revealed in the legislative intent.

The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution, because, it implies a departure from
the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning on a supposed intention of the
legislature. The rule must be controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as
to carry out the object sought to be accomplished. The rule requires that the specific words are all of
one genus, in which case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus.

For example, the words 'or otherwise' are generally used as ancillary to the specific proposition which
precedes them.