Canons of statutory construction are rules of construction used to interpret statutes.

Canons
provide courts with common sense direction in interpreting statutes. The rules of statutory
construction distinguish the rules of statutory interpretation from other rules or help interpret the
law in common law jurisdictions. They determine how the provisions of the general law related
to a specific legal case. "The drawing in conclusion by the act of reason, as to the intent of an
instrument, from given circumstances, upon principles drawn from men's general motives,
conduct, and action," according to another definition of rules of construction.

There are some general principles of interpretation that the courts have applied from time to
time. The Verba legis or the plain-meaning rule is based on the justified presumption that the
words used by the legislature in a statute accurately express the legislature's intent or will,
preventing the court from construing it otherwise. Meanwhile, it is contended in the Casus
Omissus that words should not be inserted into a statute by implication unless it is required to
give the language sense and meaning in its context. The doctrine of Stare Decisis refers to a
judicial doctrine in which a court adopts the doctrines, statutes, or standards of its previous
judgments or judgments of higher tribunals when determining a case with seemingly analogous
facts. Ejusdem Generis is another legal maxim that means "of the same class or genus." It states
that if a word is employed as a general word and a disagreement emerges as to whether it
encompasses a specific class, the decision must be made based on whether the word in question
belongs to the same class as the general word. Expressio unius est exclusio ullerius is another
legal maxim that courts applied. This rule states that the expression of one thing excludes the
expression of any other thing of the same class. This rule specifies that if a statute employs a
specific term without using general terms, the statute's application is limited to the situations
described. Furthermore, how are these legal maxims applied to jurisdictions, and how do they
differ?

According to a basic rule of statutory construction, there is no room for construing or

interpretation when the legislation is clear and free of any uncertainty or ambiguity. The
legislation must be given its exact meaning and applied without any attempts at interpretation
since it is clear, plain, and free of ambiguity. This is called the plain-meaning rule, or verba
legis, which means "from the words of a statute, there should be no departure." [Victoria vs
COMELEC, G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994]

The second maxim to be discussed is the Casus Omissus which means "case omitted." A casus
omissus occurs when a statute or other written document commits to foreseeing and providing
for certain contingencies. Yet, a case goes accounted for owing to a mistake or other cause.
Construction cannot make up for omissions in a statute. Though a case is omitted from the
statute's term, even if it falls within the statute's evident objective and the omission appears to
have been made by accident or unintentionally, the court cannot incorporate the omitted case by
filling in gaps. [COA vs. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001]

Moving on to stare decisis, the English translation of the Latin phrase is the best way of
explaining how this doctrine works. "To stand by decided matters," as "stare decisis" literally
translates. When the material facts in the two cases are the same, the doctrine of precedent states
that they must be decided in the same way. When the Supreme Court establishes a legal principle
that applies to a specific set of facts, it will follow that principle and apply it to all subsequent
cases in which the facts are substantially the same. However, all of the facts don't need to be the
same. We know that all the facts in a case will never reoccur in the flow of life, but the legally
material facts may, which the doctrine is concerned with.

Additionally, as stated in Tala Realty vs. Banco Pilipinas [GR No. 137980, 20 June 2000], the
stare decisis follows previous precedents and does not disturb what has already been decided. As
in this case, the concept of stare decisis bars any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The same
questions relating to the same occurrence have been raised by parties similarly situated in a
previous case litigated and ruled by a competent court [Tuason vs. Mariano, G.R. No. L-33140,
23 October 1978].

Another legal maxim is the Ejusdem Generisis, a Latin term which means "of the same kind."
When general terms follow the numeration of particular classes of things, it is a rule of statutory
construction that the general words will be considered to apply only to things of the same general
class as those enumerated. For example, suppose a statute mentions automobiles, trucks, tractors,
motorcycles, and other motor-powered vehicles. The term "vehicles" does not include airplanes
because the list is restricted to land-based transportation. If two or more words share a common
characteristic (e.g., they belong to the same class), any subsequent general words should be
interpreted as referring to that class.

The Court explained in National Power Corporation v. Angas [G.R. Nos. 60225-26 May 8,
1992] that the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words
by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that
is embraced in said class, even if not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified
by the fact that if the enacting body had wanted the general terms to be used in their broadest
sense, it would not have included specific subjects but instead used only general terms.

As stated in San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. CIR [G.R. No. 147749, June 22, 2006],
where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as
excluding all those not expressly mentioned from its effects. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning
that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be
placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.