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Canons of statutory construction are

rules of construction for the
interpretation of statute law Canons give
common sense guidance to courts in
interpreting the meaning of statutes.
Proponents of the use of canons argue
that the canons constrain judges and
limit the ability of the courts to legislate
from the bench in US. Rules of
construction or statutory construction is
the process of determining how the
provisions of the general law relate to a
specific legal case, and distinguishes the
rules of statutory interpretation from
other rules or aids for the interpretation
of law in common law jurisdictions.
Rules of construction has also been
defined as "the drawing in inference by
the act of reason, as to the intent of an
instrument, from given circumstances,
upon principles deduced from men's
general motives, conduct and action.

There are are certain general principles

of interpretation which has been applied
by the courts from time to time. And one
of them viz. Construction Ejusdem
Generis has been explained herein
below. Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term
which means "of the same kind," it is
used to interpret loosely written
statutes. Where a law lists specific
classes of persons or things and then
refers to them in general, the general
statements only apply to the same kind
of persons or things specifically listed.
Example: if a law refers to automobiles,
trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other
motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles"
would not include airplanes, since the
list was of land-based transportation.
The term Ejusdem Generis in other
words means words of a similar class.
The rule is that where particular words
have a common characteristic (i.e. of a
class) any general words that follow
should be construed as referring
generally to that class; no wider
construction should be afforded.

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According to the Black's Law Dictionary
(8th edition, 2004) the principle of
Ejusdem Generis is where general words
follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same general
kind or class as those specifically
mentioned. it is a canon of statutory
construction, where general words
follow the enumeration of particular
classes of things, the general words will
be construed as applying only to things
of the same general class as those
enumerated.

The expression Ejusdem Generis means

of the same kind. Normally, general
words should be given their natural
meaning like all other words unless the
context requires otherwise. But when a
general word follows specific words of a
distinct category, the general word may
be given a restricted meaning of the
same category. The general expression
takes it's meaning from the preceding
particular expressions because the
legislature by using the particular words
of a distinct genus has shown its
intention to that effect. This principle is
limited in its application to general word
following less general word only. If the
specific words do not belong to a
distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable.
Consequently, if a general word follows
only one particular word, that single
particular word does not constitute a
distinct genus and, therefore, Ejusdem
Generis rule cannot be applied in such a
case. Exceptional stray instances are,
however, available where one word
genus has been created by the courts
and the general word following such a
genus given a restricted meaning. If the
particular words exhaust the whole
genus, the general word following these
particular words is construed as
embracing a larger genus. The principle
of Ejusdem Generis is not a universal
application. If the context of legislation
rules out the applicability of this rule, it
has no part to play in the interpretation
of general words. The basis of the
principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if
the legislature intended general words
to be used in unrestricted sense, it
would not have bothered to use
particular words at all.

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It is an ancient doctrine, commonly

called Lord Tenterden's Rule, dating back
to 1&(23)$2"4*"5*!6#%.&3'&78$*!6$. in
1596. Singer 47:17, at 272-73. It provides
that when general words follow specific
words in a statute, the general words are
read to embrace only objects similar to
those objects of the specific words. The
rule recognizes and gives effect to both
the specific and general words by using
the class indicated by the specific words
to extend the scope of the statute with
the general words to include additional
terms or objects within the class. In
using the doctrine as an interpretative
aid, it is important to keep in mind that it
is not applied in a vacuum, and disputes
cannot be resolved by merely tying the
issue to the procrustean bed of Ejusdem
Generis. In fact, there are several
conditions that have been identified for
the doctrine to apply, but none more
important than the identification of the
class. There are five conditions that have
been identified:
(1) The statute contains an enumeration
by specific words;
(2) The members of the enumeration
suggest a class;
(3) The class is not exhausted by the
enumeration;
(4) A general reference supplementing
the enumeration, usually following it;
and
(5) There is not clearly manifested an
intent that the general term be given a
broader meaning than the doctrine
requires.
Classes can be defined in a vast number
of ways, but the key to unlocking the
true value of the doctrine is to ensure
that the
identified class has some objective
relationship to the aim of the statute. In
other words, the basis for determining,
which among various semantically
correct definitions of the class should be
given effect is found in the purpose and
subject of the statute as revealed in the
legislative intent.
The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be
applied with great caution, because, it
implies a departure from the natural
meaning of words, in order to give them
a meaning on a supposed intention of
the legislature. The rule must be
controlled by the fundamental rule that
statutes must be construed so as to
carry out the object sought to be
accomplished. The rule requires that the
specific words are all of one genus, in
which case, the general words may be
presumed to be restricted to that genus.

For example, the words 'or otherwise'

are generally used as ancillary to the
specific proposition which precedes
them.

In 926:'&*1/6&*;)#<2,)*=>*;%6%.*"5
?6,6$%26#, the validity of the Rajasthan
Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs
Act, 1952 was impugned. One of the
tenures was known as Bhomichar tenure
and it was contended that its holders
were not jagirdars. It was held: We agree
with the petitioners that a jagir can be
created only by a grant, and that if it is
established that Bhomichara tenure is
not held under a grant, it cannot be
classed as a jagir. We do not base this
conclusion on the ground put forward
that the word 'Jagir' in Article 31-A of the
Constitution should be read Ejusdem
Generis with 'other similar grants',
because, the true scope of the rule of
'Ejusdem Generis' is that words of a
general nature following specific and
particular words should be

construed as limited to things which are

of the same nature as those specified
and not its reverse, that specific words
which precede are controlled by the
general words which follow.

In ;%6%.*"5*@"/367*=>*1A)*0'A$26#, the
question was whether the appellant was
entitled under Section 6(4)(a) of the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, to
requisition, as for a public purpose,
premises for housing a member of a
foreign consulate. The sub-section
provided that the State Government
may requisition for the purpose of a
State or any other public purpose . . ..
The High Court held that the words 'any
other purpose' should be read' Ejusdem
Generis' with the purpose of the State
that accommodation for a member of
the foreign consulate staff is a 'purpose
of the Union' and hence the State
Government was not entitled to
requisition. Allowing the appeal, the
Supreme Court held: With great respect,
we are constrained to say that the
'Ejusdem Generis' rule of construction,
which found favour in the court below
for reaching the result that the words
'any other public purpose' are restricted
to a public purpose which is also a
purpose of the State, has scarcely any
application. Apart from the fact that the
rule must be confined within narrow
limits, and general or comprehensive
words should receive their full and
natural meaning unless they are clearly
restrictive in their intendment, it is
requisite that there must be a distinct
genus, which must comprise more than
one species, before the rule can be
applied.

In B)A6=6%)*@6)*=>*@"/367*;%6%., the
petitioner was the widow of a tenant of
certain premises and she had vacated
from such premises. Finding the
premises vacant, the respondent
requisitioned the premises under
Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948, for the public
purpose of housing a government
servant. One of the contentions of the
petitioner was that under the
Explanation to the sub-section there
would be deemed to be a vacancy when
the tenant 'ceases to be in occupation
upon termination of his tenancy, eviction
or assignment or transfer in any other
manner of his interest in the premises or
otherwise', and that the words 'or
otherwise' should be construed as
Ejusdem Generis with the words
immediately preceding them. It was
held:
the rule Ejusdem Generis sought to be
expressed in aid of the petitioner can
possibly have no application. The
legislature, when it used the words 'or
otherwise', apparently intended to cover
other cases which may not come within
the meaning of the preceding clauses,
for example, a case where the tenant's
occupation has ceased as a result of
trespass by a third party. The legislature
intended to cover all possible cases of
vacancy occurring due to any reasons
whatsoever. Hence, far from using those
words Ejusdem Generis with the
preceding clauses of the explanation,
the legislature used those words in an
all-inclusive sense. The rule of Ejusdem
Generis is intended to be applied where
general words have been used following
particular and specific words of the
same nature on the established rule of
construction that the legislature
presumed to use the general words in a
restricted sense that is to say, as
belonging to the same genus as the
particular and specific words.

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Such a restricted meaning has to be

given to words of general import only
where the context of the whole scheme
of legislation requires it. But where the
context and the object and mischief of
the enactment do not require such
restricted meaning be attached to words
of general import, it becomes the duty of
the courts to give those words their
plain and ordinary meaning.

In C.$%.&#*D#-)6*92.6%&.$*=>
E'#)()46A*!"&4"&6%)"#, Poona , the
respondent levied a tax of Rs. 2 per day
as license fee on the appellants, who
were lessees of a cinema house. The levy
was under Section 59(1)(xi) of the
Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901,
which provides that the municipality
could levy 'any other tax to the nature
and object of which the approval of the
Governor shall have been obtained'. It
was contended that Section 59(1)(xi) is
unconstitutional in that the legislature
had completely abdicated its-functions
and delegated the power to the
municipality to determine the nature of
the tax to be imposed. The contention
was rejected by the Supreme Court and
one of the reasons given for the decision
is: Although the rule of construction
based on the principle of Ejusdem
Generis cannot be invoked in this case,
for items (i) to (x) do not, strictly
speaking, belong to the same genus,
they do indicate, to our mind, the kind
and nature of tax which the
municipalities are authorized to impose.

In F"(2'##)*=>*;%6%.*"5*E6-&6$, it was
observed: The rule of Ejusdem Generis is
that when general words follow
particular and specific words of the
same nature, the general words must be
confined to the things of the same kind
as those specified. But it is clearly laid
down by decided cases that the specific
words must form a distinct genus or
category. It is not an inviolable rule of
law, but is only a permissible inference
in the absence of an indication to the
contrary.

In*G6<.*?6/*=>*;%6%.*"5*H6&76#6, the
respondent issued a notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, for the acquisition of the
appellant's land. The notification
directed that action under Section 17(2)
(c) of the Act shall be taken on the
ground of urgency and that the
provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply
in regard to the acquisition. The
appellant contended that though
Section 17(2)(c) read by itself covers a
very large field, that provision should be
given a narrower meaning because of
the provisions of Section 17(2)(a) and (b).
It was held: The Ejusdem Generis rule is
not a rule of law but is merely a rule of
construction to aid the courts to find out
the true intention of the legislature. If a
given provision is plain and
unambiguous and the legislative intent
is clear, there is no occasion to call in aid
that rule. Ejusdem Generis rule is
explained in HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND thus: 'As a rule, where in a
statute there are general words
following particular and specific words,
the general words must be confined to
things of the same kind as those
specified, although this, as a rule of
construction, must be applied with
caution, and subject to the primary rule
that statutes are to be construed in
accordance with the intention of
Parliament. For the Ejusdem Generis
rule to apply, the specific words must
constitute a category, class or genus,
then only things which belong to that
category, class or genus fall within the
general words'.

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The Supreme Court in I%%6&*J&6-.$2

;%6%.*+A.(%&)()%7*@"6&-*=>*H6&)$26#:.&,
has laid down the following five essential
elements of this rule:
(1) the statute contains an enumeration
of specific words;
(2) the subjects of enumeration
constitute a class or category;

(3) that class or category is not

exhausted by the enumeration;
(4) the general terms follow the
enumeration; and
(5) there is no indication of a different
legislative intent. If the legislative
purpose of a statute is such that a
statutory series should be read Ejusdem
Generis, so be it, the rule is helpful. But
if not, the rule is more likely to defeat
than to fulfill the purpose of the statute.
The rule like many other rules of
statutory interpretation is a useful
servant but a bad master.

In ;%6%.*"5*@"/367*=>*1A)*0'A$26#, the
interpretation of Section 6 (4) (a) of the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
which said: 'State Government may
requisition for the purpose of State or
any other public purpose , was' involved.
It was contended that under the
provision the appellant was entitled to
requisition premises for housing a
member of the foreign consulate. The
High Court held that the expression any
other public purpose should be read
Ejusdem Generis with purpose of state,
and providing accommodation to a
member of the foreign consulate being a
purpose of the Union and not of the
State, the State Government had no
authority to requisition. The Supreme
Court held that the High Court was in
error in applying the principle of
Ejusdem Generis. The general
expression any other public purpose
follows only a single expression for the
purpose of a State which is not a distinct
genus. In the absence of a genus the
rule has no application. Further, the
intention of the legislature is quite clear
by the words used in the enactment. By
giving the words their natural meaning it
is apparent that the expression any
other public purpose includes providing
accommodation to a member of a
foreign consulate.

In ?6,6$%26#*;%6%.*+A.(%&)()%7*@"6&-*=>
E"26#*B6A , the respondent raised a
question of his seniority in service and
filed a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution praying that suitable
directions may be given to the appellant
Board. The appellant contended that it
was not 'State' as defined in Article 12
and that therefore no direction could be
given to it. The High Court rejected the
appellant's contention. In the Supreme
Court the appellant relied on certain
decisions46 in which 'other authorities'
in the Article were read Ejusdem Generis
with 'State'.

K)$/)$$)#<*%2.*644.6AL*%2.*;'4&./.
!"'&%*2.A-M
In our opinion the High Court [in these
cases] fell into an error in applying the
principle of Ejusdem Generis when
interpreting the expression 'other
authorities' in Article 12 of the
Constitution, as they overlooked the
basic principle of interpretation that, to
invoke the application of Ejusdem
Generis rule, there must be a distinct
genus or category running through the
bodies already named. Craies
summarizes the principle as follows:
'The Ejusdem Generis rule is one to be
applied with caution and not pushed too
far.. .. To invoke the application of the
Ejusdem Generis rule there must be a
distinct genus or category. The specific
words must apply not to different
objects of a widely differing character
but to something, which can be called a
class or kind of objects. Where this is
lacking, the rule cannot apply, but the
mention of a single species does not
constitute a genus'. Maxwell explained
the principles by saying, 'But the general
word which follows particular and
specific words of the same nature as
itself takes its meaning from them, and
is presumed to be restricted to the same
genus as those words . . .. Unless there is
a genus or category, there is no room for
the application of the Ejusdem Generis
doctrine.'

In the Old English case of +=6#$*=>*!&"$$

the words 'other devices' had to be
interpreted in Section 48 (9) of the Road
Traffic Act, 1930 which defined a 'traffic
sign' to include 'all signals, warning sign
posts, direction posts, signs, or other
devices'. Applying the rule of Ejusdem
Generis the Court held that a painted
white line on a road could not be called
a traffic sign because devices are things,
which a painted line on road is not.
Similarly, in re Latham Deceased, the
words 'or other person' in the
expression 'trustee, guardian, committee
or other person' in Section 8 (4) of the
Finance Act, 1894 was 'interpreted
Ejusdem Generis to mean a person in a
similar position to a trustee etc. and as
such a person who was beneficially
interested could not be included within
it.

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Where the preceding words do not

belong to a distinct genus, the rule of
Ejusdem Generis does not apply.

For instance, in N>1>B>0>O>*=>*@"A%"#

!"&4"&6%)"#, the words 'or otherwise'
had to be interpreted in the definition of
a 'workman' as any person who has
entered into a work under a contract
with an employer whether the contract
be by way of manual labour, clerical
work or otherwise: The court refused to
apply the principle of Ejusdem Generis
saying the preceding words manual
labour' and 'clerical work' did not form a
distinct category to be called a gems.

In*B)A6=6%)*@6)*=>*;%6%.*"5*@"/367 the
petitioner, the widow of a tenant of a
certain premises, was not residing in it at
the time. The respondent requisitioned
the premises under Section 6(4) (a) of
the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
for providing accommodation to a
government servant. The petitioner
challenged the requisition on the ground
that the premises was not vacant within
the meaning of the explanation attached
to the section according to which a
vacancy will exist when the tenant
'ceases to be in occupation upon
termination of his tenancy, eviction or
assignment or transfer in any other
manner of his interest in the premises or
otherwise: According to her the
expression or otherwise should be
construed Ejusdem Generis with the
expressions preceding it. The Supreme
Court held that the rule has no
application in the present instance
because the expressions preceding the
words or otherwise are not species of
the same nature, and therefore, do not
belong to any identifiable genus.
Assigning the natural meaning to the
words used in the enactment it is clear
that the expression or otherwise is
intended to include all cases not covered
-by
the preceding expressions. This
interpretation is quite consistent with
the object of the legislation.

In*H6/-6&-*K6P6:26#6*=>*I#)"#*"5
D#-)6*through the Fruit Products Order,
1955, issued under Section 3 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955, it was
made obligatory that the peonage of
fruit juice in fruit syrup should be
twenty-five. The appellant argued that
the order did not apply to its product
Rooh Afza even though it contained fruit
juices because clause 2 (d) (v) of the
Order includes squashes, crushes,
cordials, barley water, barrelled juice
and ready-to-serve beverages or any
other beverages containing fruit juices
or fruit pulp and that the expression any
other beverages containing fruit juices
or fruit pulp
should be construed Ejusdem Generis.
The Supreme Court rejected the
contention and held that the rule had no
application here because the things
mentioned before the general
expression any other beverages
containing fruit juices or fruit pulp did
not fall under a determinable genus.
Further, the context makes it clear that
all beverages containing fruit juice are
intended to be included.

In EQ$*;)--.$2P6&)*!"%%"#*E)AA$
J&)=6%.*B)/)%.-*=>*I#)"#*"5*D#-)6, the
Supreme Court observed that the
expressions 'bleaching, mercerizing,
dyeing, printing, water-proofing,
rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie
processing, which precede the
expression 'or any other process' in
Section 2 (f) (v) of the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944 contemplate processes
which import a change of a lasting
character to the fabric by either the
addition of some chemical into the
fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process'
in the section must share one or the
other of these incidents. The expression
is used in the context of what
constitutes manufacture in its extended
meaning and the expression
'unprocessed' in the exempting
notification draws its meaning from that
context.

In*G6<-)$2*!26#-&6*0'4%6*=>*F6,6&)6
9&6-.&$*RD#-)6S*B%-., interpretation of
the words 'or other proceeding' in the
phrase 'a claim of set off or other
proceeding to enforce a right arising
from contract' appearing in . Section 69
of the Partnership Act, 1932 was
involved. The Supreme Court did not
apply the principle of Ejusdem Generis
because the preceding words /a claim of
set off did not constitute a genus. The
court also observed that interpretation
Ejusdem Generis or Noscitur a Sociis
need not always be made when words
showing particular classes are followed
by general words. Before the general
words can be so interpreted there must
be a genus constituted or a category
disclosed with reference to which the
general words can and are intended to
be restricted.

In G)76,)&6"*!"%%"#*E)AA$*B%-*=Q$
E6-276*J&6-.$2*+A.(%&)()%7*@"6&-
interpretation of the words 'any other
relevant factors' was involved. The
Electricity Board has been empowered
under Section 49 (3) of the Electricity
Supply Act, 1948 to fix deposit tariff for
the supply of electricity to any person
having regard to the geographical
position of any area, the nature of the
supply and the purpose for which the
supply is required and any other
relevant factors'. The Supreme Court did
not apply the Ejusdem Generis principle
because the preceding words did not
belong to a distinct category.
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