System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS)

Network Stability and Optimization

A Wide range of Solutions for Smart Grid Applications
SIPS – Why?
General Power System Contingency Criteria

The reliability criteria for transmission planning and operation in Majority of Power
Systems is the N-d criterion, which requires a transmission system to be developed and
operated at all load levels and to meet the most severe double circuit contingency in
addition to any scheduled outages

Increase of Load or Generation Management

Increase in the amount of generating capacity or Load Increase keeping the above
criteria in a short term require one of the following two alternatives:

• Reinforce the Infrastructure (more expensive alternative)

• More Intelligent use of the Infrastructure (Wide Area Monitoring, System
Integrity Protection Schemes)

Economic Impact
Power outages cost globally over $350B annually in productivity and lost business
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SIPS – What is it?

“A customised solution for utilities to detect disturbances occurring across

interconnected networks and take actions to prevent the disturbances from
cascading to other networks within milli-seconds..”

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SIPS – Worldwide experience
 GE can Monitor, Control & Protection at speeds that that cannot be achieved by central control system SCADA and
Wide Area Monitoring systems
o Reaction time of ~200 ms can be achieved.
 GE has Engineered and Validated Algorithms for performing SIPS protection functions

 Global projects and regional centers of excellence teams for engineering, executing, & supporting SIPS projects

 GE has been executing SIPS interconnect protection that have been in service for over 20 years all over the world

2016 - CIEG Grid, Channel Islands, UK – RTE, France

Implementation and Operational Experience of
a Wide Area Special Protection Scheme on the
SRP System - Salt River Project
Need for mitigation
 Palo Verde Unit 2 Was Up-Rated by
121MW.

 This Impacted the safe Operation of

California Oregan Intertie. (COI is 3
500KV lines, WECC Path 66)

Malin / Round Mountain #1

Malin / Round Mountain #2
Captain Jack / Olinda

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Initial operation scheme
 Palo Verde is the largest nuclear power plant in the western hemisphere and is located approximately 50 miles
west of Phoenix Arizona, in the United States. The power plant has 3 reactors that originally produced 1287 MW
each yielding a total output of approximately 3,860MW.

 The plant is situated in a transmission corridor that supplies power to the Los Angeles basin and Southern
California.

 Loss of multiple units at Palo Verde can cause voltage dips, frequency excursions, and cascading problems
throughout the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region.

 WECC modeled the loss of 2 of these units to determine stability guidelines for loss of single blocks of generation
in the region. With the originally planned generation output levels, the WECC region remained stable with the
loss of 2 units and, as such, no remedial action was needed.
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Problems originated when generation capacity
increased
The design of the original units allowed room for augmenting the
output of the generators. The owners of Palo Verde decided to
avail themselves of this additional generating capability and re-
rated the output of the generators.

This re-rating initiated a new study to review the stability in the

WECC region. In the re-study, it was found that the loss of 2 units
plus this upgraded margin caused problems on flows of the
California Oregon Intertie (COI). Specifically, the studies indicated
that the loss of these units could cause COI lines to overload and
indicated that the frequency in the region would decay to slightly
less than 59.75 Hz.

Upgrade of the unit allowed for extra power generation, and loss of
the generation now can cause stability issue.

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What was needed?
Mitigation studies showed that shedding the up-rated portion of
the generation would mitigate the problem. This required the
implementation of a load-shedding scheme to shed only a value
of load equal to the upgraded amount.

Since the first unit was being upgraded by 120MW, the system
had to shed 120MW on the loss of 2 units operating at the up-
rated level.

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Solution
The solution decided on by the owners was to provide an intelligent tripping system that
would arm when needed and provide load shedding in various locations throughout the
owners control area.

To prevent inadvertent load shed based on frequency alone, logic would be needed that could
dynamically measure the unit loading, arm the required amount of load to shed, and only
operate the scheme when the proper generation loss criteria were met.

This scheme required the relays to measure the generation level of each unit and sum the
totals of each pair of units. This sum could be compared to a set point equal to the original
output of 2 units and provide arming if the paired unit loading was exceeded.

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Solution implementation
The monitored sites were required to provide at
least 120MW of sheddable load at the system
minimum in 14 Sites

To implement high system availability, redundant

measuring relays were implemented – each with
redundant communication channels, namely, an
Ethernet channel and 64,000 bps synchronous
serial communication channels via a G.703 physical
interface.

The solution required Watt flows to be measured at all 15 sites and then communicated to each site.

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Communication systems
Cart- Falls Sage
wright Indian Buck-
Beeline Stapley
Bend horn

JMUX JMUX JMUX JMUX JMUX

OC-1 OC-1 OC-1 OC-1 OC-1
Ring 6 Ring 1 Ring 3 Ring 14 Ring 16

Papago VT TIE Papago Thunder- VT TIE Thunder-

Orme
Buttes Buttes stone stone

VT TIE
VT TIE VT TIE
VT TIE VT TIE
Papago Thunder-
Orme

RAS A
Buttes stone

Kempton

JMUX JMUX JMUX

Topography
JMUX
Palo OC-12 CBW OC-12 CBW OC-12
POB POB PBF PBF Santan Santan OC-1
Verde RING 250 TIE RING 100 TIE RING 200 VT TIE Ring 11

Gilbert

(G.703) Agua
Fria

VT TIE
Ward

VT TIE
Corbell

VT TIE

Agua
Ward Corbell
Fria

JMUX JMUX
JMUX OC-1 OC-1
OC-1 Ring 4 Ring 9
Ring 20
Pringle Gaucho
Alameda Chandler

Cart-
Falls Alameda
wright
Indian
Beeline
Bend

JMUX JMUX JMUX

JMUX
OC-1 OC-1 OC-1
OC-1
Ring 6 Ring 1 Ring 4
Ring 3

Orme Papago Papago

Ward Buck-
Buttes Buttes
horn
Ethernet Ethernet
CAT 5 Ethernet Ethernet
CAT 5
CAT 5 CAT 5

RAS B
Orme Papago JMUX
Ward Thunder OC-1
Buttes -stone Ring 14

Ethernet
CAT 5 Stapley

Topography
JMUX
Nortel
Palo Ethernet OC-1 Ethernet Nortel Thunder
OC-3 Rudd Rudd KY5 KY5
Verde CAT 5 Ring 28 CAT 5 OC-48 -Stone

Ethernet
CAT 5

(Ethernet) AF2 Corbell Santan

Thunder
-stone
JMUX
OC-1
Ring 16
Sage

Ethernet Ethernet Ethernet

CAT 5 CAT 5 CAT 5
Agua
Fria Corbell Santan

JMUX
JMUX OC-1 JMUX
OC-1 Ring 9 OC-1
Ring 20 Ring 11
Pringle Gaucho
Gilbert Kempton
Chandler

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Operation performance of the SIPS in the
interconnection between the Turkish and
ENTSO-E power systems
Scope of the Project
TEIAS Special Protection Scheme

Project: “Rehabilitation of the frequency control performance of the Turkish power system for synchronous
operation with continental Europe (formerly called UCTE)”.

Customer: TEIAS – Turkish Electricity Transmission Co…

Objectives:

 Get benefit of synchronous parallel generation

 Integration of the Turkish Electricity Market in to “Internal Electricity Market” of EU.

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Power system
 UCTE Approx. 400 GW

 Turkey (end of 2010)

49.5 GW of installed P

1/3 hydro 1/3 lignite-coal fired 1/3 natural gas

Interconnection with Bulgaria and Greece

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Summary results of Static Studies
The connection of Turkish EPS to UCTE by three lines
provides the necessary technical conditions for
import/export of significant amount of electricity:

 UCTE for the import to Turkey is within the range

of 800–1300MW;
 UCTE for the export from Turkey is within the
range of 1000–1100MW

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TEIAS Special Protection Scheme
 Studies sponsored by the European Union have demonstrated the feasibility of the interconnection of the
Turkish Power System to UCTE system, but the necessity of the frequency control improvement (1st line of
defense)

 As the second line of defense a Special Protection System or System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) has been
required as a condition to authorize the Interconnection.

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Solution: TEIAS Special Integrity Protection Scheme (1/5)
The System performs the following functions:

 Generation dropping based on the rate of change of the Active Power (above three different levels of Active
Power for normal operation) in the Interconnection between Europe and Turkey. ∆P/∆t in three levels.

 Load Shedding based also on the rate of the change of the Active Power (above three different levels of Active
Power for normal operation) in the Interconnection.

 Inter-area oscillations detector based on the oscillation of the frequency or the Active Power in the
Interconnection in a frequency band of 0.1 to 0.2 Hz. This detector give an alarm at certain oscillation level and a
trip at another level. The trip will disconnect the entire Interconnection between Europe and Turkey.

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Solution: TEIAS Special Integrity Protection Scheme (2/5)

P1

P3  P2  P1

P2 P3  P2

P3

P3

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Information and process flow (3/5)

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Inter-area oscillations (4/5)
 Low frequency oscillations (LFOs) are
generator rotor angle oscillations having a
frequency between 0.1-3.0 Hz

 Of special interest here, inter-area oscillations

are of the order of 0.1-0.7 Hz and are
characterized by groups of coherent
generators swinging against each other.

ENTSOE Turkey

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Inter-area oscillation’s detection (5/5)

 Inter-area oscillations detector based on the oscillation of the frequency or the Active Power in the
Interconnection in a frequency band of 0.1 to 0.2 Hz. This detector will give an alarm at certain oscillation
level and a trip at another level. The trip will disconnect the entire Interconnection between Europe and
Turkey.

 The frequency signal will be processed by a filter to eliminate the DC-offset and frequency noise, and to
detect the oscillation components only in the range of 0.1Hz to 0.2Hz

 In Continental Europe, the permanent interarea oscillations have an amplitude not exceeding 5 mHz in the
border areas (Greece, Spain).

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Testing Special Protection System
GE Real-Time Digital Simulator Testing of the System

SIPS Turkey RTDS

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Modelling of ENTSO-E/ Turkey interconnection for SPS test

Bulgaria Turkey
Turkey
Greece Thermal Equivalent
Plant Generation
Equivalent Three
Hydro
Plants

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What happens without SPS?

Power flow at the interconnection line following a Loss of 2500 MW of generation

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Power loss results (action: Load Shedding)

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System in operations, connected to Europe on 20/09/2010

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Operational Experience
Event on July 26, 2011 at 11:02:32 CET. Load Shedding

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Event on July 26, 2011 at 11:02:32 CET. Load Shedding

 4 seconds prior to disturbance, Turkey was importing from Bulgaria 806MW and was exporting to Greece
190MW, with a balance import from the rest of ENTSO-E of ~616MW. Immediately after the blackout of the
North-Eastern region, the imports into Turkey increased to 1510MW from Bulgaria and to 127MW from
Greece, i.e., in total to ~1637MW.

 About 2 seconds thereafter, the SIPS located at Hamitabat SS intervened because the |∑∆Pi / ∆t|1.5'' and
|∑∆Pi|1.5'' exceeded the thresholds for activation of the 1st block of load shedding. About 400MW of load was
shed in three 154/34.5kV substations of North-Western Turkey, thus suddenly reducing the power import
from the rest of ENTSO-E system and maintaining the synchronous interconnection.

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Event on July 26, 2011 at 11:02:32 CET

Virt Analog 25 (∑P) -1571.0 MW (after 1,65 sec.)

Virt Analog 26 (Δ∑P) -676.00 MW (sec)
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Event on February 27, 2012 at 08:32:16 CET. Generation
Dropping

 During the replacement of the contacts of some 400kV disconnecting switches in the Adapazari substation, a
busbar 3-phase short circuit occurred which caused cascade tripping of the three 400kV lines Adapazari –
Tepeoren (Istanbul East), the consequential increase of transfer impedance between the Central - Eastern
Turkish subsystem and the Istanbul - Trakya sub-system and overloading of the lines in the parallel corridors
to Istanbul.

 At time 08h 52’ 18”, the 1.5” average derivative of the sum of power flows on the interconnection lines,
dP/dt1.5”, exceeded the SIPS threshold of + 800MW/s; at same time, the sum of power flows, P,
exceeded the SIPS threshold of + 1000MW export from Turkey (thresholds for 2nd block of generation
dropping). The SIPS has therefore ordered the disconnection of N° 4 out of the 7 generators in service in the
Ataturk HPP (hydroelectric units, if in service, have the automatic priority for generation dropping). The
disconnection of 955MW of generation in the Ataturk HPP occurred at time 08h 52’ 19”.

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Conclusion on this project
The SIPS has correctly operated and prevented separation of the Turkish from the ENTSO-E system in 5
events: in four events by ordering LS and in one event by ordering GD.

 SIPS has demonstrated to be a very useful tool to prevent Major Events in the Power System.

 Investment is relatively low compared with the benefits. A single correct operation payback the investment

 SIPS in Turkey has operated successfully 5 times in less than two years, and none incorrect operation was
reported. Two reported non operations were because the system was disabled or locked out

 A correct Project Management and Test plan is vital for a correct design and validation

 With complex interconnected networks and with growth of renewables SIPS solutions are an integral means to
ensure steady state stability of power system.

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Capability : Solution Life Cycle
Solution life cycle
Solution Development
Model Development
Bi-Annual System model review
Model the system topology RTDS Model for Dynamic
RTDS Modeling Simulation & Test Results
Has there
Yes been No
Application Development significant
changes
Contingency Development

Oscillation Damping Response Development

Define Hardware requirements

Review changes in Load
and Generation Distribution
Configure contingency/damping algorithms

RTDS Testing and simulation

Validation and Verification of Application

System Operation
Factory Acceptance Test

Site Acceptance Test

System Running and
Protecting Interconnection

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General : What GE’s SIPS Solution includes
(1) System modelling & development of solutions
• Understanding & development of system model for load distribution
• Understanding & development of system model for generation capability

(2) Contingency development & test

• Develop scenarios for each system disturbance
• Validation of contingency in real time modeling systems

(3) Oscillation dampening response development

• Oscillation studies for various disturbances
• Define the conditions for generator, load shedding & interconnection tripping

(4) H/w components

• Measurement device (PMUs for system oscillation (#3 above))
• Communication network
• Grid node controller (GPG)

(5) Bi-Annual System model review

• Reviewing changes to load distribution & generation capability
• Identify the effect of loads added to different parts of network
• Identifying the (RE sources penetration) to different parts of the network
• Modifying the contingency & oscillation actions to address the effect of changes to #2 & #3 above
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THANK YOU