PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY

J. O. WISDOM

I Introduction

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PSYCHO-ANALYTIC theory b a body of closely connected theories that
are widely understood m an intuitive way; many could state them
in a broad form and assign to some dieones their roles; but highly
specific formulations ar| ^ tfw rdlcs of other theories have never been
worked out One can find accounts of libido theory, ego theory,
dream theory, instinct dbeory, and so on. To present the subject in
this way can be rn^^^^g; for it can divorce the theory of psycho-
analysis from the problems it is concerned with. It runs counter to a
fundamental point that has been made by distinguished exponents, that
psycho-analysis is first and foremost a method and only secondarily a
theory. Certainly no one can operate without a theory. Hence, when
confronted with a problem, a theory must come first And die various
methods successively used in psycho-analysis were instigated by theories.
But die «'gnifirann» or reference of the dieones gets lost if they are
considered apart from the methods diey guided and die problems they
faced. Moreover, important mough die earliest dbeories were, the
earliest methods acquired the status of a powerful new instrument
because of the striking phenomena diey revealed, anr^ for d**t reason
diey overshadowed the dieories. Indus sense psycho-analysis was and
u first and foremost a method. Another way of putting this is to say
dut psycho-analysis is primarily a technique and a technology and only
secondarily a science. Wn» in «r> fcr at im<Wtfan<4ing nf rti«/->rrtfn wai
separated from dierapy, analysts had a theoretical rather than a tech-
nological aim.
What I wish to attempt is to state die sort of hypotheses that are
involved m the technological framework, so as to distinguish techno-
logical hypodieses from theories, to show their respective rdlcs, to
discuss their status, and to point out certain problems, mostly concern-
ing testing, that have not received attention. I wish to present me
subject technologically, because any other way puts die subject out of
perspective.
13
 J. O. WISDOM
a Remote Goals of Psycho-Analysis
If we try to state the method and technological hypotheses of
psycho-analysis, we first have to ascertain its aimi, The ultimate aim
as it might present itself to analysts cannot be ated from a damca!
text But dearly the problem was to find the source of a symptom
or ofa disease, m order to pass rapidly on to the procedures ofanalysis,
I propose to suggest briefly that the overall aim as it might present
itself is to remove or diminish neurotic conflict Conflicts mat are
not removable I ra^ situational, and I distinguish diem thus : f^ay

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neurotic conflict in a person is not about other real persons, though it
may appear to be, but about himself, while a situational conflict is
about other persons (or derivatives). Analysis may diminish neurotic
Tfflflirf, but may increase sensitivity to situational conflict It may
investigate the processes involved in either.
Penultimate long-term
g aimt that have been suggested
gg byy
h d d l f ' d d
authorities indude : realisation of one's Oedipus desires and fears ;
fnH genital primacy; reduction of die power of die super-ego;
development of the capacity to mourn; reduction of persecutory
and depressive anxiety. These goals may change with change of
dieones. Clearly technological hypotheses are assumed to connect
treatment widi penultimate «"», and also dien widi ultimate aimt
Such hypodieses require to be made explicit because diey can be
questioned and revised. This is not attempted here because of limited
space.
3 Statement of Basic Theory and Technology
We have now to try to describe die technology leading up to die
more remote aims : diat is to say, wim die short-term aims. Analytic
sessions consist of ' free associations' given by die patient, followed
by an interpretation given by die analyst, followed by further free
awxiafinm, followed by a further interpretation, and so on ; that is
afl.1 (The patient may sometimes himself give an interpretation, or
part of one, quite correctly, but this has no bearing on what follows.)
To give ' free associations' u to mention whatever moughts and
feelings come to mind, wimout deliberately making a selection,
i.e. wimout deliberately passing over some of diem—to make a
selection for mention is to make a selection for rejection. What is
said is ' free' in the sense involved m free play. * Free association'
1
Piydw-uulyra cumot be defined m dm way, ix. without specifying namie of
the IIHT r pfi^ wmitj but that is mother ™**w+
 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY
irw»ant not that associations axe fifi*M|frini"#^i uncaused, or anything
y
that, but that tney are rree "ft^twffitTTTy^y^r^^ox a certain Jonc
y deliberate tflfftion atut rejection. Freud used the term
'psycho-analysis' originally for investigations based upon tree associa-
tion. He had previously used and discarded hypnosis and then used
and discarded a ' pressure' technique without hypnosis. For various
reasons he gave these up. Relinquishing the methods and perhaps
some of the technological hypotheses involved did not, however,
necessitate changing die Hmforiyiiw theory when they weie replaced
through *h^ introduction of free association, ^t/haf was behind all

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diese procedures was dut ideas or experiences would come to light
dut die patient could not odierwise realise he possessed by intro-
spection. Now it is dear even from dris early work dtat free associa-
tion alone was inadequate 1 ^*at some ideas could not be made
accessible to introspection even by t^"* method unaided. (Free
association remains today as part of die procedure, because it enables
some ideas to emerge and also because it betrays to die analyst ideas
tfiar are faaT^tiM* by introspection to die pat*rnf which raignf not
be betrayed by selected associations.) To free association was added
interpretations by die analyst, in particular 'transference' interpre-
tations. TfWW tny franifrrwir^ inlyfTiTiff'afiQn of frpf OT h
even early on came to be regarded as being an essential component of
psycho-analysis proper.
It would be ntffiil to try to state t^|/* Aforvf *nA
d
hypodieses l d in die
involved d early l procedures,
d b for brevity I will
but
restrict die attempt to dtose o f die later procedure.
The basic dieory would seem to consist of at least die following :
(i) diere are networks of ideas (we may speak of ideas to cover
attitudes, dbonghts, feelings, objects imagined inside die patient, and
SOOn) dm*1 a pafjfn.f fantm* r w l w l i f P^ITfIfff, bfftqif of tnfiiytv*' ny
odier networks of ideas, which also he cannot realise he possesses,
so long as he relies only on free association. (Has b a way o f stating
what is ordinarily described as ' unconscious' mwflirt) (ii) These
networks a n ^ fhrir rfFrffrtf (d) JnQtjmr* die patient's ideas in all
situations whatsoever, reproducing in various ways and degrees dieir
fniTtml relationships, however «tiffw*nlt it may be to rrcpgni*'* ^ " " ;
pnA flf\ mflti^fiff in particular his emotional nfcai at di&rent rim^ to
dut childhood networks and conflicts mflnence adult emotional ideas.
(Hi) These networks are inter-related in accordance with a large group
o f dieoretical hypodicses, what I a r n here ^aHing * component tfKvvri'*t',
15
 J. O. WISDOM
such as die Oedipus, (rv) The networks inflnwim', in particular, die
ggiven to die analyst,
y (v)() A train of contiguous
g associations
(however unconnectedd dieyd may seem to ordinaryd d off diought)
modes d h )
(a) have a meaningful interrelation, and (b) in particular have a funda-
mental reference to die analyst, (vi) The mutual relationships of die
networks of ideas are reproduced closely in die complex relationship
between patient and analyst. The first might be called die hypodiesis
of die unconscious ; (ii a) die guise 1 hypodiesis ; (ii b) die genetic
hypodiesis ; die durd consists of component theories about specific
structures and functions. These diree togedier may be regarded as

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constituting die dieory of die unconscious. The last diree constitute
fp^ tocorv ot tti£ tr^nyrcrcnoc •
It is important to note dut what counts is not die concept of die
unconscious but die theory of the unconscious. There ii a widespread
habit, usually innocuous, of speaking of an idea (or a concept) when
what u meant is a hypodiesis or a dieory embodying die idea. This
is not at all innocuous ifit leads to attempts to show H*3t die unconscious
exists (or does not exist). This is of no more m*i<-nrifir value dian if
Pasteur had tried to show dut germs exist An explanatory dieory
never merely asserts die existence of somedung; it asserts always
diat diis something has such and such properties, powers, effects, and
die like. N o support for analytic dieory comes from showing diat
diere exists an unconscious so hidden diat no ordinary means will
give access to it. What would be relevant, however, would be to
whedier die hypodiesis
yp diat diere is an unconscious that dis-
lf l our ideas
plays itself in various guises, can explain d andd behaviour.
bh For
over half a centuryy diere have been disputes
p about die fl
bl
or unreasonableness off die
d concept of' f' die
d unconscious'. The basic
concepts in all high level explanatory dieories are nearly always 4 un-
reasonable ' (<£ Newton's force at a distance, Maxwell's displacement
vector, Einstein's absolute velocity of light, Schrddinger's wave un-
dulating in no medium, die kinetic dieory of gases, die atomic dieory,
or die gene). The scientific point concerns not a concept but radier
what consequences follow from a dieory. When Driesch intro-
duced his cnteleche, on die other hand, he introduced a concept but
no dieory ; it was therefore useless for explanatory purposes.
1
1 introduce the word ' gmse' deliberately to avoid the faulty term disguise.
One cannot read a disguise but only remove it, whereas a guise can be read f He
was not deceived by the guise of friendship'). The hypothesis a wider than that of
symbolism m its «*!»«««»• 1 analytic v n y
16
 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY
As regards diese six ingredients, there is no space here to elaborate
diem or consider whether they are accurate or complete. They are
pot in the above summary form, not so much for dbar own sake as
to enable us to see what sort of dung die basic dieory u ; dus will
help us to assess its rdle and also die quite distinct rdle of die com-
ponent thforifi.
Turning to the method, we may describe it as follows: When die
analyst discerns die basic relationship between die networks, and be-
tween die networks and Kimn»1f; he states diem to die patient on the

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technological hypodieris dut dns will make him realise he possesses
diese ideas and the conflicts between them. In doing so die analyst
makes use of die various dieories in (Hi) : dut is to say, he interprets
die ideas in terms of die dieories of die Oedipus situation, guilt,
anxiety, castration, omnipotence, anal eroticism, orality, homosex-
uality, persecution, depression, objects felt to be inside, and so on;
he also interprets whatever prevents certain networks from being ac-
cessible to die patient (dais was originally known as ' reatfanor' and
now comes Wf|<fcr die hca^tpg of * dffriHT tn^rtianiwnt * V The inter-
pretation might be put into die following framework : pointing out
(i) die relationship discerned between patient and analyst (e.g. dut
die patient a afraid die analyst will punish him), (ii) showing die same
relationshiD as Ifnlrinor a number of associations, bruurins out die *am<»
relationship between die patient and odier people m his environment,
and fiii) '"^retfog also when possible jh* pmf relationship in die
patient's childhood life. The first, which is now sometimes loosely
referred to as a transference interpretation, would be more appropri-
ately caTlrH an analytic-situation interpretation or a patient-analyst
interpretation. The second might be called an environment-interpre-
tation (mi*antng rnirwif iiivirnnmfnr) The dlird raigtif be f3^^
a childhood interpretation. Classically, however, die transference
interpretation meant pointing out die durd and first togedier or radier
die carry-over of die relationship in die diird to die first. A substan-
tial body of analysts now use it also for die carry-over from die second
to die first (which is also known as a ' here-and-now' interpretation),
ahhough diey would generally have die childhood situation in mind.
Thus we might say dut the transference interpretation, whedier
classically understood as somedung transferred from childhood to die
analyst or extended to include somedung transferred from the en-
vironment to die analyst, was an interpretation containing interpre-
tations. Each interpretation would contain parts, which might not
B 17
 J. O. WISDOM
inly be brought out at the same time. Thus the Oedipus would
contain die duee parts, hate of fadier, love of modier, and fear of
yrf f^i-inOf iff tf rprfftsifion ^voulu tntrf b e «m
tion am taming two or diree complete l interpretations constituted by
partial interpretations. Since I am not concerned wim technique, I
do not discuss die great variation diere is among analysts as regards die
dement diey choose to interpret at any one time. The diagram will
show how much diere u to select from. Some analysts would operate
in die main on a horizontal level; odiers in die main on a vertical
level; odiers both at once. A complete transference interpretation

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would recfuire all die divisions in die diagram to befiTli*<4in.

wiA tkmtt tcsponst

(of thtnuttipt np)

We have now to enquire into die short-term aim of an interpreta-

tion. It might appear diat die a i r n is much die same whedier a
transference or an environment interpretation is given', is *h» so ?
The aim of an environment interpretation n to make die patient
realise some of die ideas he has and die conflicts between diem diat
he did not know he possessed. This aim is only partially achieved by
any one interpretation. So die day-to-day work is to get him to
realise more and more, especially about ideas diat die analyst believes
on die basis of previous experience, dieory, or odier grounds, to be
particularly important, e g . die Oedipus situation, or persecutory and
depressive anxiety. The aim wim a transference interpretation differs
in th»t overriding all dtese in importance (diough not excluding diem)
is *hc growing ffafijaripn of die patient's relationships to die analyst,
concerning dependence in all sorts of ways, like a child wanting to be
wanned or fed, or an *Hr^ftrrr>t wanting to be told what to do,.
^^i]^imnty i^HKi^tifr nJce Dems aTraici ox vriiICIMHI pnvsicai
18
 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY
being robbed, roncming fear of doing thfff Hwiga to tff analyst,
concerning die need to be appreciated or loved and die need to love,
whether in a childish or odier way. Hie environment interpretation
would aim at a growing realisation of ideas and relationships with
people in die patient's mvimnmnif; the trenTfrTTKT at specific re-
lationships with die analyst
What, then, u die technological hypodiesis involved ? It is dut
die patient an fully understand his fT^iftr only if diey are pointed
out in these terms as well as in environment terms. The short-term

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technological aim may therefore be stated dius : to enable die patient
to perceive certain relationships between l»mn»1f *pA people in his
envimnmmf dirouflh miAi^ttanAiner liii relationship to tiw analyst.*
(It might seem diat dns should be put die odier way round—to get
die patient to see his relationships generally m order to see his relation-
ship to die analyst. Analysts do at times proceed dius, but thai aim
is probably subordinate m that, even diough diey lead mto die trans-
ference in dns wayr diey do so widi die further aim of making die
patient more fully aware of his relationships generally.) Thus die
A aim is c^nfr'atic"1 of his relationship to die analyst, but
die purpose off fhi«
h is to cn?Hc H k'm
k W ^ his
jo mi^Wrt^"^ h environment
relationships and dius Iiwni^if In short, die patient's understanding
of his relationship to die analyst'is die Quintessence f»f tmAfrttanAmo

lification is required here. Though many analysts give a

every day, most analysts would give them only l at much h longer
l inter-
vals. It would dierefbre be incorrect to describe die day-to-day aim
of diese analysts as being to bring out die patient's relationship to die
analyst. That is why I described it as die short-term aim. The day-
to-day aim would be to pave die way to a suitable transference inter-
pretation so as to reveal die pabent-analyst relationship. For analysts
who give a transference interpretation m every session, almost widiout
exception, diere is no difference between die day-to-day aim and die
short-term aim.
4 The RSle of Component Theories
It may seem strange to have gone so far wim hardly a mention of
me dieoretical hypodieses or component theories—infcnrii* sexuality,
superego, instincts, wish-fulfilment, internal objects, and so on—diat
are commonly regarded as constituting die body of psycho-analysis.
i Unless we wish to insert as a pnor M m that of keeping the treatment going.
19
 J. O. WISDOM
Hie reasons for the delay are that they do not constitute die body of
the subject, and that they are of three distinct types, whose rdles cannot
be assigned until die framework of basic theory and technology has
been set out.
I wish to place in one class those thrones or aspects of theories
that have a corresponding technology. This would include that part
of libido theory that concerns die erotogenic zones, that part of ego
dieory that concerns an mt»ma1if^ parent figure as superego, that
part of dream dieory dut deals with wish-fulfilment, and so on.

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These theories play their part, because their technological forms are
constandy used to promote die aims described. There are some
theories or aspects of theories with less imrnfH"^ technological hypo-
dieses to correspond. Thus, that conversion hysteria is due to fixation
at die phallic phase had at one time a technological counterpart: for
it suggested to die analyst to stress (somewhat exclusively) references,
however symbolic, to die phallus (not diat diis hypodiesis is even now
regarded as unimportant or false, but it no longer has such a unique and
dominating status).
Contrasted with these u a class of dieories widi no technological
counterparts. Thns some would hold diere was no clinical bearing
in die dieory of die death instinct (diis concept might be held to have
a clinical use, for instance, if it is equated with a concept of a completely
different dieoretical status, namely, aggressiveness towards oneself),
and die «atn«» might be argued concerning die quantity dieory of
psychic energy, or die dieory diat die function of dreams is to preserve
sleep, or die dieory diat die more developed die ego die more it en-
croaches upon die id. Such dieories would seem to be in a different
class, designed (i) to give greater coherence to die dieones widi clinical
application, and sometimes (ti) to have explanatory power. They seem
also to differ from what I am calling' basic' dieory, in diat diey do not
seem to have a '•Knir^ use.
Thus we have (i) unifying or explanatory dieones (which Freud
called metapsychology *) ; (ii) dieories widi technological counter-
parts ; (iii) theories, confuting of hypotheses about mechanisms and
(iv) bane dieory about mental structure and function. The first are
likely to catch die speculative eye and be turned into a sort of philo-
sophy. The second and diird are commonly regarded as constituting
die body of psycho-analysis, widiout its being realised dut diey are
1
Freod'i use of the prefix * mm-' u not the tame as me me dut has become
standard in logic
ao
 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY
not die only bans but thaf they arc ntiliV*^ only within a rlfnifa,] jetting
based upon a more fundamental theory, L C (iv). (iv) u the bane
theory I tried to state m the preceding section under six headings.
Without this and the technological framework, it u to my mind im-
possible to assess the role of (ii) and (iii).
Thu rdle can now be stated : these two types of theories govern
the contents selected by the analyst in giving the day-to-day inter-
pretations.

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5 Summary Statement of die Framework
To say that a statement is an interpretation, is to say (i) mat the
analyst sees m the associations a relationship between networks of
ideas, which (ii) is governed by one or other of the component theories.
The short-term aim of giving an interpretation (via the transference)
is to enable the patient to understand this relationship and in terms of
it to \TtiAriyt?i\A his relationship to Hit environment, i.e. to understand
his conflicts. Pursuing this leads to greater ""^Tyrap^ircg of the
conflicts, fnr^|1^^ng me ways they interlock, and Ait leads towards
the nifima^ goaL The penultimate goal may be introduced in the
form of the hypothesis dia*1, when a patient ha« understood his Oedipus
conflicts, his persecutory and depressive anxiety, or whatever the
penultimate goal adopted may be, then diere is a satisfactory index
that he has understood his conflicts, whether neurotic or atuational,
i n a fctTuJaypfTifal w a y .

6 The Problem of Testing

I turn now to the fundamental problem—mat of testing. Ways
of testing the following are needed :
(i) The technological hypothesis t^*at die penultimate aim (genital
primacy, Oedipus, persecution and depression) u a satisfactory practical
in^^r for die attainment of die ultimate aim j
(ii) The technological hypodiesis that doe short-term aims conduce
towards die penultimate aim* j
(iii) The technological hypodiesis diat an interpretation (notably
transference) makes a patient a litde more aware ofhis conflicts and their
bearing on reality;
(iv) The component dieories diat govern ttw relationships between
networks of ideas ^ j
(v) The basic theory.
In die interests of brevity I shall not discuss the first two.
21
 J. O. WISDOM
7 Testing Interpretations
The question of toting die hypothesis (iii) about die effects of
interpretations is quite firn^atnnttal, Interpretation would feii if it
were badly done. This u where technique comes in. The techno-
logical hypothesis (iii) u in fact false unless it is taken to mean that
the task of interpreting is carried out with a good *rrJ""q"* But;
assuming dut die technique is one accepted by practitioners, daere is
still die question of testing die validity of interpretations. It would
be easy to argue diat diey do not differ so much from die interpreta-

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tions we give every day about die attitudes of people we meet, and
diat if we trust dicsc, why not trust analytic interpretations ? The
parallel may be admitted, but fh^ cntena for ordinary life interpreta-
tions are not in any better shape dian diose for analytic interpretations.
Besides, science has to have more stringent standards dun common-
sense.
To test an interpretation, whedwr in analysis or ordinary life, we
have to have criteria for recognising when die interpretation is false.
AH analysts, I dunk, have intuitive criteria of this kind, and seem to
have more or less die same criteria, but diese are not articulated. A
minimum criterion might be *h*t it would be a refutation if die as-
sociations in response to an interpretation appeared to die analyst to
be tifMywitif^ffd w i d i ^"* *fi***T||Trftifioiti i
Let us consider in *^** connection T"r^H'*tan<tirig of a symptom
and perhaps its change dirough an interpretation (dus does not bring
h^ffr die dierapeutic aim j it fpmyrpt only die Tn<*^<r>do^''>gir?1 sig-
nificance of a change). The ie facto disappearance of a symptom in
die course of analysis gives no <y"firmatirtn of anything But diere
is a vitally important way in which disappearance, or at least change,
of a symptom is «ig"ifi<-^nt( anrl that j$ when die mtfrprrt'a.tif>n> have
detailed connections widi it. Suppose, for example, a patient came
for treatment on account of a phobia about open spaces and diat he
received interpretations about die Oedipus situation; if he noticed
diat diough bis phobia had not yielded he was much more effective
in his office, dus improvement could not be taken to be firm con-
firmation of die interpretation (his analyst might see a connection, but
thfn, tht» question of testing <hi» would arise). The situation is much
more tigtimVawt and is regarded as-such by analysts when die inter-
pretation has a connection widi die symptom in terms of die dieory,
is understood by die analyst at die "im* as having dus connection,
and is followed within twenty-diree hours by a marked change in
22
 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY
toe tytnptomT Cj^nffiinfCM. ypw Qsu no more sisoohaxtjcc ttum
in die pattern of associations in response to an interpretation, but it is
more striking where a symptom is involved. Him, what we have

by alterations in associations or odier ways intelligible in terms of the

interpretation of <x sitttple extension oj it.
It is here dut confirmation is to be found if it can be found at afl.
By contrast we might say dut an interpretation is false if die subsequent
associations have no bearing on die interpretation. There is indfcd

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a real problem in tpTting -whether die associations have in fact no
bearing on die interpretation. To die outsider no doubt most re-
sponses would appear to have no bearing. What diey must do a to
have a bearing, recognisable in terms of some dieory (diere is die
obvious risk tf|at we may accept a fv v *"ti nm as cf>nfirnutif>T> by bring-
ing in one bit of analytic dieory to support anodier). The most
cautious line would diere&re be to deny die relevance of die responses
^ml<»ff dicy oonld be understood inftwrgfof die «an^ dieory as die one
underlying die interpretation. But this would be too stringent—4t
would be 'p-|pr*wib1<* to pass from one context to anodier. Hence
bringing in anodier dieory to interpret die responses would have to
be allowed. Even so, die methodological consideration of die risk
involved suggests dut all changes from one piece of dieory to anodier
should be noted, and if such changes are constantly occurring instead
of being interspersed wim die continuous use of one piece, dien die
whole process may be suspect and should be reconsidered.
It would appear, then, dut we have die possibility of refutation,
jtirf tncrexore or conp^ inati*^^, ox an i^^y^p^^^ftor^ i But ^yliflt ox
die classical objection dut die effects of an interpretation are due to
suggestion ? Analysts have never been impressed by this objection,
because of die sense dut anyone who really understood die subject
would see at once dut die objection was groundless. There is sur-
prising difficulty, however, in staring an adequate answer. Clinical
examples can undoubtedly be found in which suggestion could not
have played a part; but diis does not suffice to show dut it is absent
from die general body of interpretative work. An adequate investi-
gation of die matter would require a lengmy treatment. It is indeed
unlikely that this would prove fat^ to the technology; but die possi-
bility of far-reaching effects could not be ruled out in advance; it
is even possible dut die investigation might lead to developments
in theory, technology, and technique However unHkely diese
33
 J. O. WISDOM
t tnay be, an^ however hackneyed die objection, it is, I
submit, wormy of attention. Until die possibility of die influence of
suggestion is refuted in a clear and decisive way, die technology of
interpretation must be, from a ""•thodological point of view, un-
certain.
Subject to a reserve on dm *p*»»f. an interpretation would seem
to be refutable in principle, and more specific catena for falsity could
with a litde patience and industry be worked out (die details perhaps
being bound up more wim technique than technology). In short,

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die broad technological position is probably in order from die
memodological point of view.
8 Is the Basic Theory Testable ?
What is die problem involved in testing whedier a person has or
has not a certain network of ideas ? Failure to find it may mean
only dut it has eluded us. If we believe dut a pond contains fishes
10 ^tn- Inng ati<t if our method of fi"fling th^m ij to use a net wim
11 cm- mi^h^, we shall probably catch some fishes, but if we fail we
cannot conclude dut there are no fi«l> If die mrrh is not fow enough
die test is indecisive. When, dien, are we going to accept defeat and
agree dut diere are no fish or no such network of ideas ?
Hie impossibility of answering diis question means dut we have
to approach die problem in some odter way.
One dut suggests itselfconcerns die interplay ofdieory, technology,
and technique, which hat chara/trrisfd psycho-analysis from die be-
ginning, improvements and defects in any one leading to changes m
die odien. The detailed story of diis u most impressive. But it
does not in j**^1f constitute confirmation of die dieory in th* atyf^nn*
of an independent test; for even if we get confirmation of the tech-
nology, we might fail to get confirmation of die dieory. All dut is
justified is die presumption dut it should be taken seriously and
looked into. If, however, we do get a genuine test at some point,
yh^n Ait interplay at OTKT becomes a powerful mediodological
support.
We may dierefbre try some other procedure, such as prediction,
which is often thought of as being decisive. Prediction, however,
constitutes a test for a «H«tirifir dieory only in certain circumstances :
one is dut what is predicted shall be unlikely in relation to die rest
of our knowledge; anodier u dut it shall be specific; a third u
dut it shall follow deductively from die dieory. Closely related is
 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY
die discovery of unsuspected facts. Now analysis has led to un-
expected discoveries, such as infantile sexuality. But this is not
decisive unless it can be exhibited as a deductive consequence of the
basic theory, as opposed to being merely ' m line' with i t Thus die
basic theory about networks of ideas of which a person is unaware
suggests diat diere should be unsuspected facts about human nature,
but it gives no hint of die land of facts. By contrast, Maxwell's
theory of electrodynamics suggested not only die existence of un-
suspected phenomena (wireless waves) but specified exactly what

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properties they would have. When die discoveries cannot be specified
thui from die dieory, we can say only diat it is on hopeful lines but
may have to be completely recast. This can be brought home by
recalling die rnprhan'«tir ' dieory' of physiology, namely, diat die
body functions in accordance widi physical laws. This has been
highly fruitful and led to die discovery of all sorts of unsuspected
facts ; but being irrefutable it is unlike an established hypothesis ; no
one really believes it outside die laboratory; and we can accept or
reject it only as a matter of unfounded belief; which is not at all die
situation where a hypodiesis is of a refutable kind but where attempts
to refute it diat should have succeeded have in fact failed.
In my view Popper's criterion applies to all dieories diat purport
to be scientific : diat is, diey must be refutable in principle, which
means diat we must be able to specify what situation, if die dteory
were false, would show diat it was false. Without diis, as he has
made plain, no amount of supporting evidence provides any real
confirmation at all; it is easy to get endless support for even a false
dieory. But what is needed is die failure of refutation diat ought to
succeed. The next step always consists in making a deduction, from
die basic dieory. Thus, instead of fishing in die pond widi indecisive
results we try to deduce from die hypodiesis about die fish some ob-
servation diat could refute die hypodiesis if it were false. Our prob-
lem is whedier die basic dieory of psycho-analysis is in or can be
cast into such a form as to make this procedure possible.
If this procedure cannot be carried out, dien die dieory would be
in.die position of die mechanistic dieory of physiology—capable of
endless support, yet never established because incapable of refutation
should it happen to be false.1 ' Theories' m such a position are
not dieories on a par with die great classical dieories in die natural
1
J. W. N. Wadras has recently given added sons to dm important pomt of
Popper s.
 J. O. WISDOM
They would be not dieorics but programmes,
pg
rdle would b KA
be Kmit*A to suggesting ( (as opposed
d to compelling)
certain technological hypotheses. Moreover, die testability of the
latter anfi their confirmation would provide no confirmation whatever
for die former.
If we were to isolate from die basic dieory one of its constituents,
to do widi conflicting networks of ideas, we should obviously be
unable to test it. What we have to do is to deal widi die basic dieory
as a whole. We might, however, be able to deal widi die first three

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hypodieses alone. The first hypodiesis concerns networks: die
second gives tfrir inflr|<*T|r* on life's contexts j and ih? third content.
to die networks ; diese might be testable lndependendy of die set of
hypodieses to do widi die transference. But it is clear diat die basic
dieory cannot be tested independently of die component dieories
(Oedipus, iwfanfil* sexuality, and so on) diat give specificity to die
networks. Everydiing hangs, dien, on whether diese dieones are
testable.
9 Are the Component Theories Testable ?
We have to be clear what question u being asked. We are asking
what would constitute a refutation of, say, die Oedipus dieory (resting
on a hypodiesis about highly inaccessible and conflicting networks of
ideas) or die dieory that dreams are failed attempts at wish-fulfilment.
Experimental tfffing of such a component dieory (using diat part
of die basic dieory consisting of diree hypodieses, omitting diose to
do widi transference) should be possible Some of dns work is
striking but not decisive. Consider die experiment in which one
subject under hypnosis was told to dream about a certain conflict,
after which a second subject untrained in analysis was hypnotised,
told die dream, a.n^ asked what it rni»anr It is very striking diat die
second subject should have been able to give die answer correcdy,
but it is not decisive because, if she had failed, dream dieory would
not have been refuted. This sort of situation might, however, be
further developed, so as to provide a test. Outside experiment and
outside die application to patients, it is far from easy to deduce from
die dieory conclusions diat give at all decisive confirmation. But one
possible deduction is diat if excessively harsh punishments are meted
out for a certain action fan\iAemeant\pr\ then diat action ( A
our)) will
ll become
b morefrfrequent. Thish is completely
l l contrary to
commonsense. Nonedieless it appears to be true; however bizarre,
26
 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY
it is die only construction, that can be readily put on the historical records
of crime anf^ punishment.
Hie mam means of testing, however, is through the technology.
Assuming t^af thr technology is twfabir an<^ roughly speaking ac-
ceptable, we might fall jntn the mittatf of thfnVing that what con-
firmed die technology automatically constituted <*n"^rmat*on of the
component thrnri« upon which it draws. Two points are involved
here. One is mat the technology should follow from the theory and
not merely be suggested by i t Now some of the theories, such as
imtinrf theory, *h^ iiff p-nrMwymg function o f drf*rMw atiit fo fwi|

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are not testable, for mere are no technological counterparts to follow
from them. These may be candidates for becoming theories, or
«timii1arir»cr speculations, or be suggestive of technology; but they
are not strictly scientific theories, for they lack the possibility of being
refuted. It is of interest that some practitioners believe they use some
of these untestable theories in mar work. If so, it should be possible
to specify Quite clearly what is the *>r^ltin^ngifa1 equivalent A*** is
used in framing an interpretation. Otherwise the belief reflects only
mat the theories are somehow suggestive. For clinical practice mis
is legitimate c it is legitimate to draw on anything or to ftifnW cm? js
drawing on something d*** li^in* one, provided one achieves one's
goal; but this in no way justifies the supports or gives them the
status of theory or science.
Given that the technology follows from a theory, however, another
important point is d*** thf. consequences nffcring confirmation should
not be of a kind that we should expect independently of the theory.
For example, let the technology vouch for all the Oedipus interpreta-
tions we happen to give. This would not constitute a test of the
theory unless the technological confirmations ran counter to what we
should otherwise expect if we lacked the theory. Now mis condition
is satisfied, for confirmations of Oedipus interpretations weie most
unexpected. Further, the Oedipus theory has been tried in cases
where we should expect it to be refuted—with homosexuals; but
even here Oedipus interpretations have not been refuted, and hence
there is strong technological confirmation.1 'And in mis
1
Tim does not mean that the Oedipus theory has no bounds, given that it passes
the above test; diere u no inherent necessity that it most hold of communities woh
a different cukore pattern. If it did not hold, it woold simply be restricted m in
scope, as happens wnh theories duooghour die whole domain of science. On die
odier hand, u is no evidence agamst die dieory as applied to prinutrra if investi-
gatoo ate unturned in analysis—only a penon fntwil in A> n y ofa microscope ***"
see with it.
 J. O. WISDOM
the technology follows from the theory and is not merely suggested
by i t
Thus, besides theories with no technological counterparts, which
are not testable *n«^ therefore not yirnt1^/*t there are psychoanalytic
component dieones with dfdiKihif technological counterparts t^af
are tntfabif. because in principle rffiifab1ci and therefore explanatory
scientific theories; but this is subject to the provisos mat the several
^ i ] parts p are,, though
g tcfutablft independently
py fit ,
fe f of interpretations are not
and mat the effects d due to suggestion. The

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b1 of basic analytic
y theory
y and component
p theories de-
l f h h l ^ h h
pendsfrtn^atn^nrallyon confirmation of the technologic^ hypotheses
involved in the day-to-day work with patients.
Tlu London Sdiool of Economics **M4 Poliocsl
London W . C a