(Routledge International Studies in The Philosophy of Education) Stephanie Chitpin - Popper's Approach To Education - A Cornerstone of Teaching and Learning-Routledge (2016)

Popper’s Approach to Education
Challenging the theory of induction in teacher education, this book

proposes a knowledge-building framework based on the critical rationalism
of philosopher of science, Karl Popper. The Objective Knowledge Growth
Framework developed in this book is designed to be an effective critical
analysis framework for empowering teachers and schools to build and
share professional knowledge. This book is essential reading for educational
scholars, researchers, professionals, policymakers, and all those interested in
exploring the application of Popperian philosophy to the field of education
and re-envisioning educational practice.
Stephanie Chitpin is Associate Professor of Leadership, Evaluation, Curriculum

and Policy Studies at the Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa, Canada.
Routledge International Studies in the Philosophy
of Education
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29 Social Reconstruction Learning 38 Popper’s Approach to Education

Dualism, Dewey and Philosophy A Cornerstone of Teaching and
in Schools Learning
Jennifer Bleazby Stephanie Chitpin
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Popper’s Approach to
Education
A Cornerstone of Teaching
and Learning
Stephanie Chitpin
First published 2016
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
The right of Stephanie Chitpin to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Names: Chitpin, Stephanie, author.
Title: Popper’s approach to education : a cornerstone of teaching and
learning / by Stephanie Chitpin.
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge
international studies in the philosophy of education ; 38
Identifiers: LCCN 2015036727 | ISBN 9781138940772 (hbk) |
ISBN 9781315674063 (ebk)
Subjects: LCSH: Education—Philosophy. | Teachers—Training of—
Philosophy. | Popper, Karl R. (Karl Raimund), 1902–1994.
Classification: LCC LB14.7 .C475 2016 | DDC 370.1—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015036727
ISBN: 978-1-138-94077-2 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-67406-3 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
To my two boys, Jeremy and Justin
Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
1 Why a Popperian Approach to Teacher Education:

Critical Rationalism in Teaching and Learning 1
2 A Popperian Approach to Building Teachers’ Knowledge 16
3 Why Popper’s View of Rationality Should Be Considered

for Promoting Teacher Knowledge 33
4 Guiding Pre-Service Teachers’ Reflections: A Popperian

Analysis Using the Objective Knowledge Growth
Framework 46
5 Capturing Pre-Service Teachers’ Knowledge Growth:

Popper’s Philosophy of Science and the Objective
Knowledge Growth Framework 63
6 Advancing Pedagogy Through Counter-Inductivity 79
7 The Objective Knowledge Growth Framework: A Framework

for Principals’ Emotional Decision-Making 92
8 Principals and the Professional Learning Community:

Learning to Mobilize Knowledge 108
9 Making Just Tenure and Promotion Decisions Using

the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework 124
Index 141
Figures
2.1 Schematic representation of the Objective Knowledge

Growth Framework 23
2.2 The Popperian schema 27
5.1 The Objective Knowledge Growth Framework 66
5.2 Popper’s schema 68
7.1 The Objective Knowledge Growth Framework 102
Tables
2.1 Evidence of Emily’s knowledge building 27

2.2 Evidence of Vanessa’s knowledge building 28
4.1 The journal frames 51
4.2 Successive stage of reflections corresponding to
World 1 frames 52
4.3 Evidence of Joan’s knowledge growth 56
5.1 Evidence of Emily’s knowledge building 69
5.2 Evidence of Vanessa’s knowledge building 70
1 Why a Popperian Approach to
Teacher Education
Critical Rationalism in Teaching and
Learning
The first teacher education program in Ontario, Canada, was established in

1847 with the inauguration of the Provincial Normal School in Upper Can-
ada (now known as Ontario). For most of the twentieth century, Ontario
teachers have been required to obtain at least one year of teacher training,
consisting of coursework and a practicum component, in addition to a sec-
ondary school diploma, in order to qualify them to teach.
From the 1970s to the present day, the Province of Ontario requires that
potential teachers have an undergraduate degree and at least one year of
a Bachelor of Education program before they become certified to teach in
Ontario. However, beginning in September 2015, the Ontario government
and the Ontario College of Teachers (established in 1997 to regulate and
govern the teaching profession) are expanding the Bachelor of Education
program to two years, which they hope will address the current oversupply
of teachers, thus enabling Ontario-qualified teachers to find jobs in their
teaching fields. Since Ontario faculties of education are moving to a two-
year Bachelor of Education program, it might be appropriate for educators
to examine what Popper (as cited in Bailey, 2000, p. 155; Popper, in Pop-
per & Lorenz, 1985, p. 116) says: “I believe that teachers are duty bound to
educate young people to think critically, so that they can make a contribu-
tion to the Open Society in the future.”
Sir Karl Popper is one of the most distinguished contemporary philoso-
phers whose reputation is based upon his work as a philosopher of the
scientific method. Surprisingly, his is still not a household name among edu-
cators, even though his work has permeated and informed a multiplicity of
educational issues (McNamara, 1978). In fact, Popper’s work is still rela-
tively unknown in the educational community despite the wide appeal and
general applicability of his ideas (McNamara, 1978). He was often mistaken
for being a positivist or a scientist (Popper, 1992). Even though Popper has
not written directly on educational matters, he was a teacher of children. He
appreciated his first teacher and stated:
. . . my first teacher, Emma Goldberger, who taught me the three R’s.

They are, I think, the only essentials a child has to be taught; and some
2 Approach to Teacher Education
children do not even need to be taught in order to learn these. Every-
thing else is atmosphere, and learning through reading and thinking.
(Popper, 2002, p. 7)
In 1918, at the age of sixteen, Popper studied on his own at the University
of Vienna and, while still a student, did volunteer work in Alfred Adler’s
child guidance clinics and became a qualified primary teacher. Because there
were no teaching jobs available, he became a social worker and worked with
neglected children. He went on to study at the Pedagogic Institute, where his
philosophical method was influenced by his explorations into the psychol-
ogy of children’s thinking. It was here that he made some critical comments
about schools and schooling.
Popper is best known for his work as a philosopher of scientific method,
which was also his main interest. He is equally well known to the non-
scientific community through his work as a political philosopher and phi-
losopher of social sciences, especially as a critic of Marxism and other
totalitarian ideologies. Thus, scientists, such as Eccles and former Minister
of Education, Lord Boyle, spoke of their gratitude to Popper. In fact, Lord
Boyle spoke of the influence that Popper had on his life (McNamara, 1978).
This chapter begins with a discussion of how teacher knowledge is viewed
in schools—what teachers need to know in order to teach their students as
well as the knowledge base required of teachers in Ontario schools. Next, a
discussion of Popper’s views on knowledge and his innovative critical fallibil-
ist epistemology, centring on a conjectural division of the universe into three
Worlds of experience, is presented. This chapter attempts to illustrate how
educators and policymakers can benefit from Popper’s ideas as they imple-
ment the two-year Teacher Education Program in Ontario, Canada, and how
his ideas may stand on firmer footing than the inductionist approach, which
currently prevails. The chapter concludes with some implications for adopt-
ing Popper’s ideas into teacher education programs in Ontario and beyond.
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE CREATION

AND LEARNING
The nature of teaching is changing and, to use Darling-Hammond’s (1995)

words, “Teaching is not talking and learning is not listening” any more
(p. 9). In other words, teaching is not about acquiring limited amounts of
information, on the one hand, and transmitting them as such to the students,
on the other. In fact, teaching is seen as much more complex than previously
articulated. It requires not only a deeper knowledge of the content and a
wider repertoire of teaching strategies but also an intimate knowledge of the
students, so as to engage them in inquiry, discovery, and practical problem-
solving while concentrating on critical thinking skills (Chitpin, 2014).
In addition, teachers of the twenty-first century have the task of instruct-
ing an extremely diverse student population that resists pat solutions
Approach to Teacher Education 3
(Kinsler & Gamble, 2001). These demographic changes also increasingly
make traditional whole class instruction less practical as a dominant mode
of teaching because the situation demands the flexible and skilled use of
a wide variety of instructional and organizational approaches (Darling-
Hammond & Cobb, 1996). They must also be able to select from an
increasingly wide range of organizational techniques, instructional strate-
gies, learning materials, and support services, as appropriate, to implement
their varied individual, small-group, and whole-class lessons and to bring
all these entities into an integrated, cohesive whole (Kinsler & Gamble,
2001). Some theorists suggest that teachers engage in some form of trial
and error, as knowledge of instructional techniques and methods is insuf-
ficient to provide solutions to the multiple dilemmas of teaching (Chitpin,
2014; Chitpin & Evers, 2012; Chitpin, Simon, & Galipeau, 2008). Instead,
they suggest that teachers draw Popper’s insights into their teaching prac-
tices, as learning does not take place by the direct transference of teachers’
subject-matter knowledge, or knowledge from primary data from the social
or physical environment (Chitpin, 2011; Swann, 2009).
The knowledge base suggested by the current teacher education program
is a fixed, externally imposed one. In models of teacher education programs,
the goal is often the creation of educational practitioners who respond to the
classroom in a similar manner, even though they may emphasize different
skills. The current, dominant teacher education model assumes that teach-
ers’ competence is based on possession of a discrete set of skills that can
be acquired and honed during pre-service training (Nayler & Bull, 2000).
However, according to McNamara (1978), attempts to make available poor
examples of practice and inappropriate behaviours for pre-service teachers
may be more worthy than searching for ideal models to put before them.
In fact, McNeil and Popham (1973) state that there is a danger that pre-
service teachers and new teachers might be learning practices that are not
only irrelevant but may, in fact, be harmful to pupil progress. They argue
that, in some cases, teachers are learning contradictory skills at different
institutions. Unfortunately, notions of involving the learner in the process of
creating knowledge are not a common practice in many teacher education
programs.
Within faculties of education, the focus tends to be on the inductively ori-
ented delivery of subject matter. Furthermore, new teachers, to be accepted
within schools, often assume the roles that are assigned to them. Perhaps
because of this they rarely attempt to articulate new knowledge, and any
attempts at this are often not readily accepted by their colleagues. It is no
wonder that these teachers, once they have their own classrooms, often have
difficulty breaking out of the structures into which they have been moulded
by their education.
Teachers tend to lose their personal voices through the inculcation of the
dominant model of teacher education, a top-down construction that assumes
that teacher competence is based on the possession of a discrete set of skills
that can be acquired and honed during isolated and decontextualized sessions
(Nayler & Bull, 2000). Furthermore, Bereiter (2002) claims that teacher
education currently serves to perpetuate and even increase the cultural sepa-
ration between teachers and their students, instead of making teaching for
understanding its centre. Even though new teachers are being introduced to
the theory of language or mathematics education through action research
and participation, these demonstrations of language or mathematics are
rarely used in meaningful ways for meaningful purposes (Rich, 1991). The
neophyte teacher then moves from the teacher education institution to the
world of the classroom and discovers gaps that exist between the theory
in the methodology of teaching and the reality of the practical world. The
teacher developer who works within the context of traditional in-service
education accepts that knowledge exists outside of the classroom and basi-
cally attempts to train teacher candidates to use their knowledge that has
been developed elsewhere, or to dispense with it altogether in the face of
“practical” issues in teaching and learning.
If student learning is to be reformed, teachers must play a key role in
allowing students to build knowledge (Nayler & Bull, 2000) within the
curriculum, hold discussions which cannot be acquired by simply read-
ing and thinking alone, an aspect that Popper (2002) may have inadver-
tently downplayed. These discussions not only enable students to discover
different perspectives and interpretations but also promote their critical
skills in the interpretation of different discourses. For instance, when stu-
dents encounter other traditions or cultures in the curriculum and are
provided with proper understanding of the role of error and criticism
in the learning process, this may prompt them to re-evaluate their own
cultural beliefs, while making them aware that “traditional” solutions
may not be the only ones. It should be emphasized that errors need to
be viewed as an essential component of learning and that students will
not be penalized for making errors. Unfortunately, in our school system,
errors are often viewed as obstacles to learning, which should be avoided.
Swann (2006) states:
[I]f we expect the discovery of error . . . to incur a penalty, we are likely

to try to avoid errors . . . being discovered: we do less, we learn less. The
worst case scenario is that this becomes habitual.
(p. 264)
Instead, teachers should encourage students to find errors in their beliefs

and/or theories by providing them a safe and supportive environment for
learning, where they are not penalized for discovering errors. Since the
detection of errors is done through criticism, teachers should create situ-
ations where beliefs and theories are challenged. Notturno (2000) states:
Every criticism is an attempt to show that a given statement is inconsis-

tent with something that we believe to be true. But only valid deductive
arguments allow us to exercise rational control over a critical discus-
sion. This is because valid deductive arguments are the only arguments
in which the conclusions actually follow from the premises.
(p. 65)
Teachers can use valid deductive arguments to encourage students to

re-examine or criticize their assumptions. Using the Popperian approach,
teachers themselves should become open to criticism by giving up their
authoritarian style of instruction, by encouraging and welcoming students
to challenge their own and their teachers’ assumptions, thereby instilling a
self-critical attitude in their students and in themselves in order to generate
knowledge (Popper, 1966).
Notions of involving the learner in the process of generating knowledge
are not a common practice in many teacher education programs. Yet, knowl-
edge creation is regarded as the best and most important kind of knowledge,
which Popper (1989) calls “scientific” knowledge. Scientific knowledge
begins with the identification of problems, practical or theoretical. A prac-
tical problem may be, for example, the struggle to improve literacy and
numeracy skills.
This struggle has been fairly successful with the establishment of the Lit-
eracy and Numeracy Secretariat in 2004 in Ontario, Canada, to help boost
student achievement. Here, highly skilled and experienced educators work
directly with schools and school districts to build capacity and implement
strategies to improve students’ reading, writing, and math skills (http://www.
edu.gov.on.ca/eng/literacynumeracy/). However, this initiative has also led
to unintended consequences, such as a lack of cultivation of critical thinking
skills and reason in children. Thus, such unintended consequences create a
vacuum, with a citizenry unable and indisposed to “conceive, consider, and
properly evaluate reasons for and against alternative policies and practices
concerning the many varied matters that require public deliberation and
decision” (Seigel, 2010, p. 8). As such, the state has citizens who can read
and write but who lack critical abilities and dispositions to contribute to dis-
cussions, voice their concerns, and protect their own interests. This means
that another old problem has acquired a new urgency: the need for critical
thinking skills. One of the most important tasks for educators is to find a sat-
isfactory solution to this problem which, of course, leads to new problems.
POPPER ON KNOWLEDGE
Bereiter (2002) draws a clear distinction between learning and knowledge

building (Popper, 1979) by defining learning as acquiring knowledge and
knowledge building as helping others to know. Moreover, Bereiter claims
that teachers need to move beyond the knowledge acquisition stage (the
“know how”) to build knowledge (the “know that”).
Knowledge can be gained from experience, intellect, tradition, or dreams
but not from any authority (Popper, 1989). He proposes that, instead of
assuming that there is an authoritarian source of knowledge, we criticize
our own theories and the conjectures of others and one’s own when attempt-
ing to solve problems. Moreover, he states that our knowledge cannot start
from nothing. For example, teacher knowledge of everyday classroom con-
text becomes important as the filter through which the teacher receives new
information. The knowledge base is not static but shifts as new information
is received and responded to critically, through the modification and cor-
rection of earlier knowledge as it becomes incorporated into our existing
schemas. Of course, it is sometimes possible for teachers to make a step for-
ward, through an observation or through a chance discovery. For instance,
a teacher might discover that increasing the length of “wait time” from one
to two seconds also increases the correctness of student responses. However,
the significance of the observation or of the discovery depends upon whether
it enables the teacher to modify the existing theory to solve his or her prob-
lem. Every solution of a problem will create new, unsolved problems. In
the above example, the teacher’s observation becomes a starting point that
reveals a problem. In other words, it shows the teacher that there was some-
thing not quite right about her previous knowledge of “wait time.”
Popper (1966) insists that we adopt a rational mode of thought. His
use of the word “rational” is meant to describe a way of thinking which
values intellectualism and empiricism, which seeks to solve problems by
clear thought (reason) and experience, instead of appealing to emotion and/
or passion (McNamara, 1978). For Popper, a rationalist has an attitude of
mind and a general mental disposition that would admit to errors and that
the search for truth would involve cooperation, argumentation and reason-
ing. He notes that
. . . rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments

and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of admit-
ting that “I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we
may get nearer to the truth.”
(p. 225)
What is truth? Popper (1992) defines truth as “A theory or a statement

[that] is true, if what it says corresponds to reality” (p. 5). He adds:
1. Every unambiguously formulated statement is either true or false; and

if it is false, then its negation is true.
2. There are therefore just as many true statements as there are false
ones.
3. Every such unambiguous statement (even if we do not know for cer-
tain if it is true) either is true or has a true negation. It also follows
from this that it is wrong to equate the truth with definite or certain
truth. (p. 5)
It is possible that some of our theories are, in fact, true and, even though
they are true, we can never be certain that they are true. Truth is defined as
searching for objectively true, explanatory theories, not certainty. As such, a
distinction is drawn between truth and certainty. In searching for the truth,
Popper goes on to state that our knowledge as humans is fallible because to
err is human, and we cannot be certain that we have not made a mistake,
however great the care we have taken (Popper, 1989).
If a teacher is asked by the court to provide a character statement for her
student, she is required to tell the truth. Assuming that she understands this
requirement, her statement should correspond with the facts; it should not
be influenced by her subjective convictions or influenced by her colleagues
or others. If her statement does not agree with the facts, she is either lying or
has made a mistake. However, a relativist philosopher would agree that her
statement is true, for she merely means by “the truth” something other than
that which corresponds to the facts (Popper, 1992). Popper further states
that the alleged relativity of truth, defended by some philosophers, may be
the result of confusing notions of truth and certainty. In other words, truth
is something objective while certainty is subjective judgment. Truth and cer-
tainty, therefore, are utterly different.
We cannot comprehensively prove an assertion, no matter how certain
we are in our knowledge, as there remains always the possibility that what
we “know” may turn out to be incorrect (Bailey, 2000, p. 59). Thus our
knowledge will always be hypothetical or conjectural knowledge and will
constantly be changing.
Knowledge can grow, and . . . science can progress—just because we

can learn from mistakes. The way in which knowledge progresses . . .
is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tenta-
tive solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are
controlled by criticism: that is, by attempted refutations, which include
severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never
be positively justified: they can neither be established as certainly true
nor even as probable.
(Popper, 1963, p. vi)
According to Popper, all knowledge grows through a process of conjec-

tures and refutations and emphasizes the necessity for critical discussions to
uncover weaknesses before grave mistakes are made (Popper, 1963). If we
accept knowledge based on the above premise, then “there are no authorita-
tive sources of knowledge, and no ‘source’ is particularly reliable” (Popper,
1972, p. 134). We would examine our hypotheses critically by interrogating
them so that we could find the errors contained within these hypotheses in
the hope of eliminating them and, thus, getting closer to the “truth.”
For example, we regard one hypothesis, a new hypothesis, as better than
the other hypothesis if it fulfills three requirements. The first requirement is
that the new hypothesis must explain all the things that the old hypothesis
successfully explained, which is the first and the most important point. The
second requirement is that the new hypothesis has avoided some of the errors
of the old hypothesis. In other words, the new hypothesis has withstood
some of the critical tests that the old hypothesis could not withstand. Finally
the new hypothesis should, as much as possible, provide explanations that
could not have been predicted or explained by the old hypothesis. The above
three requirements are, therefore, the criterion of scientific progress, which
can also be regarded as a criterion for the approximation of truth (Popper,
1992). When a hypothesis satisfies the criterion for progress and can thus
withstand critical tests at least as well as its predecessor did, this cannot be
regarded as a coincidence. When the hypothesis withstands the critical tests
even better, then one can assume that it comes closer to the truth than its
predecessor did (Popper, 1992).
The aim of science is to seek truth. The process or activity of understand-
ing consists, essentially, of a sequence of states of understanding. It is the
sequence of the preceding states that constitutes the process, and it is the
work of criticizing the state reached (i.e. of producing “third World” criti-
cal arguments) that constitutes the activity. Popper states: “Problem-solving
always proceeds by the method of trial and error: new reactions, new forms,
new organs, new modes of behavior, new hypotheses, are tentatively put
forward and controlled by error elimination” (1979, p. 242). Popper (1979)
represents the activity by a general schema of problem-solving, utilizing the
method of conjecture and refutation. The schema is:
P1  TS  EE  P2
Here, P1 is a problem from where the individual starts, which could be a

day-to-day problem. Whatever the problem the individual is presented with
that he or she is not prepared for, he or she comes up with a tentative solu-
tion (TS). Through error elimination in solving the identified problem, the
individual is led to the objective knowledge (EE) and, as a result, another
problem (P2) emerges from his or her first attempt, and so on. The learning
process is not a repetitive one, but rather it is a cumulative process driven
by error elimination. A satisfactory understanding will be reached if the
interpretation, the tentative solution, finds support in the fact that it can
shed light on new problems or more problems than the teacher expected, or
if it finds support in the fact that it explains many sub-problems, some of
which were not seen at the beginning. Therefore, the individual can gauge
the progress he or she has made by comparing P1 with some of his or her
later problems, identified, for example, as Pn.
UNDERSTANDING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
The activity of understanding is the same as that found in all problem-

solving. Like all intellectual activities, it consists of subjective “World”
processes. Yet, the subjective world can be analyzed as an operation with
objective “third World” items. If teachers are interested in the process of
understanding their own professional growth and development, or in some
of its results, then they have to describe what they are doing or achieving,
almost entirely in terms of these objects of understanding, the ineligibles,
and their relationships. They have to first ask, “What is the problem?” Then,
they must proceed to proposing a tentative solution (TT1); and, later, to a
method of implementing the changes designed to eliminate errors (EE1). The
method of error elimination leads to a new problem (P2). Thus, the cycle is
iterative.
Popper’s method opposes the passive, classical empiricist view of learn-
ing, which is through the accumulation of information external to the
individual. For example, beginning teachers are asked to observe more
experienced teachers deal with classroom management and then use the
strategies gleaned from this experience in their own classrooms. Using this
approach, new teachers do not amass information or methods by observing
experienced teachers. Instead, they identify the problem they are facing and
find solutions to solve the identified problem. In other words, teachers do
not wait to be instructed by the environment. Rather, they actively generate
solutions that are tested, then eliminated or modified. There is no certainty
that the solutions that have survived at one moment will be effective at
another, as the teachers may soon find themselves in a position in which their
assumptions no longer hold (Bailey, 2000, p. 70). With every problem they
solve, they discover not only new and unsolved problems but also discover
that, just when they believe that they are standing on firm and safe ground,
all things are, in reality, insecure and unstable. This is Popper’s method of
creating and building knowledge through the elimination of untenable the-
ory, practices, and methods.
POPPER’S THREE “WORLDS”
According to Popper (1979), individuals engage with their surroundings on

three levels. The first is the physical world, or the world of physical states
(World 1); the second is the mental world, or the world of mental states, such
as perceptions, feelings of pain and pleasure, of joy and anger, and of memo-
ries (World 2); and the third world is the world of ideas in the objective sense
(World 3). World 3 is a world of possible objects of thought: the world of
theories in themselves and their logical relations; of arguments in themselves;
and of problem situations in themselves. Popper’s three Worlds progress in
linear fashion from World 1 to World 2 and from World 2 to World 3.
The three Worlds are so interrelated that the first two can interact with
one another just as the last two can interact. Thus, we can say that the
second world, which is the world of subjective or personal experiences,
interacts with each of the other two Worlds. The first and third Worlds
cannot interact. They can only do so though the intervention of the second
World, the world of subjective or personal experiences. World 3, the world
of ideas, values, and human language is most impressive because the ideas,
values, and human language could not be discoverable and criticizable with-
out some sort of linguistic competence. World 3 also represents significant
achievements and thus stands at the pinnacle of Popper’s hierarchy.
It is important to describe and explain the relationship between the three
Worlds. The second World acts as a mediator between the first and the
third. In the case of the Ontario Curriculum documents, prescribed by the
Ministry of Education, teachers’ minds can see a physical body, the physi-
cal documents, in the literal sense of “see” in which the eyes participate in
the process. Although “see” is used in a metaphorical way, it nevertheless
denotes a real relationship between the mind of the teacher and its intel-
ligible object, the Ontario Curriculum documents. Thus, a teacher’s mind
(World 2) may be linked with objects from both the first World (physical
Ontario Curriculum documents) and the third World (the ideas contained
in the curriculum). A teacher’s thinking establishes an indirect link between
the first and the third World. The expectations contained in the curriculum
documents belong to world of knowledge, World 3.
Popper argues that a book belongs in World 1, the world of physical
objects, not World 3. It is the ideas contained in the book that can accurately
be attributed to World 3. The physical school setting, where teaching and
learning occur, corresponds to the external world of physical reality, while
the internal world of thoughts and perceptions refer to teachers’ thoughts
in implementing the expectations outlined in the curriculum documents.
Teachers’ thought processes can neither contradict those of other teach-
ers nor contradict their own at some other time. However, the contents of
their thoughts can in themselves contradict the contents of someone else’s
thoughts. So, thoughts, in the sense of contents or statements in themselves,
differ from thoughts in the sense of thought processes, and they belong to
two different worlds; the former belongs to World 3 while the latter belongs
to World 2 (Popper, 1974).
A distinction needs to be drawn between subjective and objective knowl-
edge. Subjective knowledge is made up of states of mind, or of conscious-
ness, and thus belongs to World 2. Subjective knowledge equates with
common usage, as in the phrase, “I don’t know much about poetry, but I
know what I like.” This sense of knowledge does not fully account for the
growth of scientific knowledge. An example of objective knowledge would
be, “Water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen.” Popper (1974) furthers
states that it is necessary to understand objective knowledge in order to
have an adequate understanding of subjective knowledge. He emphasizes
that objective knowledge exists prior to and independent of any individual
coming to know. He states:
Knowledge in the objective sense is totally independent of anybody’s

claim to know; it is also independent of anybody’s belief, or disposition
to assent, or to act. Knowledge in the objective sense is knowledge with-
out a knower; it is knowledge without a knowing subject.
(Popper, 1979, p. 109)
In light of what Popper avers, it seems appropriate to view World 3 as

the world of knowledge without a knowing subject. Books, libraries, works
of art are merely the physical containers of the knowledge. Eccles (1979)
describes books and the like as objective knowledge that is “coded sym-
bolically in the actual structures that serve as vehicles for this knowledge”
(p. 100). It is similar to teachings of Confucius, which appear, concretely,
in different versions, each within World 1, but the ideas, organized beliefs,
and teachings exist quite independently within World 3. Thus, Eccles (1979)
defines World 3 as “the world of objective knowledge” (p. 145).
Some objects in World 3 are encoded in physical form; for example, theo-
ries contained in books or songs, recorded in CDs. Others exist without
embodiment, such as systems of beliefs carried through oral tradition. Still
others exist both in embodied and disembodied forms, such as primitive
myths and legends that have survived for centuries and have been passed
from generation to generation in an oral form before being written down
(Bailey, 2000).
A key point within Popper’s Three Worlds hypothesis is his insistence
upon the reality of World 3 by showing that the world of ideas and objective
knowledge satisfies the same criteria of real-ness as states of consciousness
and physical objects. He argues that World 3 exists partially autonomously
and independently of the other two Worlds. To illustrate what Popper means,
for example, educational beliefs, values, philosophical and “abstract” theo-
ries can inspire individuals to act and make changes to existing educational
systems. Ideas, when mediated through individual psychology (World 2)
can exert a causal effect upon the physical world. As for the second criteria,
Popper claims that theories and ideas belong to World 3 and that these are
“man-made” inventions. Also, as soon as ideas are expressed linguistically—
that is, recorded or discussed—they belong to World 3, since they take on
an existence independent of any individual’s psychology (Popper, 1979). The
ideas contained in a book remain, regardless of whether the author has died
or whether the book has been read. Similarly, a theory has the potential of
never being discovered, but this does not mean that it does not exist. An
example might be the Theory of Numbers, where even natural numbers are
a product of human thought and language. With an infinity of numbers and
true equations in relation to those numbers, one cannot pronounce upon
the theory’s totality, even by using the fastest computer (Bailey, 2000). Fur-
thermore, unexpected consequences, or by-products, may arise in the form
of new problems—for example, prime numbers. Others remain insoluble in
our attempts to resolve them.
As a result, ideas and theories, which reside in World 3, will always
present challenges and problems, and to address them requires creativity,
originality, and innovation. The properties in World 3 have their own inter-
nal logic of development that cannot be reduced to physical or psychological
realms and contain a potentially infinite range of possibilities and potentiali-
ties, of which Bailey (2000) says, “World 3 transcends its makers; although
the product of human creativity, it takes on a super-human character in its
enormous opportunity and potential” (p. 113).
IMPLICATIONS: POPPER’S OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

AND THREE WORLDS HYPOTHESIS
According to Popper, the aim of education is to nurture students’ abilities,

skills, and dispositions in order for them to participate fully and actively in
society, which Siegel (2010) calls the cultivation of reason, or critical think-
ing skills. Such skills are both critical for individuals and for society. More-
over, Popper’s deductive approach can be effective in assisting educators in
their attempts to improve their teaching by actively searching out and elimi-
nating errors in their practice, which are not grounded in the verification
of theories and external instruction—the so-called inductive method. The
practice of argument and discussion are not strongly evident in our schools
through induction, as educators are not frequently exposed to argument
in their own education and they are not directly aware of the benefits that
accrue from discussion and criticism. Students taught under the inductive
method may not be exposed to argumentation and discussion skills and, as
a result, they may or may not develop these skills at home or in the wider
society.
If our Ontario education system is to prepare individuals capable of ratio-
nally discussing issues and evaluating the force of their own arguments and
those of others, in preserving an open society it is important to develop the
powers of argumentation and critical discussion in students. This can only
be achieved if educators are provided with the inputs of World 3. Students
and educators alike can benefit from visiting World 3, and Popper is quite
explicit that, without exposure to and immersion in World 3, our quality of
life will be affected. For example, a teacher can feel inadequate in the face
of changing curricula and policy. On the other hand, a teacher who is given
the opportunity to actively participate in the generation of knowledge (i.e.
teaching strategies) is far more likely to come up with different solutions
when faced with a teaching problem, and this allows for greater control
of her teaching environment. A teacher who has a strong sense of self may
recognize that she is, to a large extent, in control of her world (Bailey, 2000).
Moreover, the teacher may also be able to build knowledge based on his or
her cultural and contextual conditions, which often vary from one class-
room to another.
The discussion of Popper’s notion of knowledge and the three Worlds are
relevant to educators and policymakers because grasping World 3 objects is
essentially an active process. Rather than simply absorbing an object from
within World 3, as in the case of inductive learning, the learners must take
that object, process it, and recreate it in their own minds (Popper, 1979).
Popper emphasizes the active re-creation of skill and theory rather than the
nature of the skill or theory, which is irrelevant.
Furthermore, the process of actively rather than passively acquiring
World 3 inputs is not corrupted, as it resembles the original object in its
entirety. For example, an educator learning about a particular theory will
give it a unique interpretation based on his or her context and background
knowledge. Thus, there is potential for building knowledge as new perspec-
tives and new understandings are added. The process of grasping World 3
objects follows the same Popperian schema, that of trial-and-error elimina-
tion, provided earlier (P1  TS  EE  P2), as this represents attempts
by World 2 to understand World 3 objects. The activities of understanding
and the degrees of understanding belong to World 2, as they are subjective
(Popper, 1979). In other words, attempts to come to understand an activity
are different from the interpretations that an individual makes of a theory,
which is a World 3 object which remains anchored within World 3, since
interpretations can be discussed and criticized. Thus, Popper (1979) says,
“the activity of understanding consists, essentially, in operating with third
World objects” (p. 164).
Given the relevance of the third World, the role of education is to initiate
students into World 3. Initiation into World 3 applies to all humans, from
infants learning a language, to university students, to educators, and to poli-
cymakers. For example, classrooms can be seen as physical places (World 1)
where teachers identify problems, think about them, and develop tentative
solutions to overcome them. These activities are cognitive processes that
take place in World 2. The interpretations of ideas or solutions that come
out of these activities reside in World 3. In this sense, teachers are given the
opportunity to test their ideas and practices. This approach can be adjusted
incrementally depending on the context and on the teachers’ backgrounds
and experiences.
The potential of Popper’s ideas lies in the possibility for teachers to artic-
ulate and test their tentative solutions through error elimination. Popper
(1979) states that the best theory is one that competes more successfully
against its rivals. For example, in the history of science, there are often com-
peting theories adopted by different research teams, with each team trying to
explain all the relevant phenomena. A study by Chitpin et al. (2008) on stu-
dent teachers—who were exposed to Popper’s ideas of (1) analyzing student
progress in relation to the identified goals; (2) formulating tentative solutions
based on the identified outcomes to bring about the changes; (3) devising a
plan for implementing the tentative assessment strategies; and (4) assess-
ing the impact of using the assessment strategies from “Growing Success
Assessment, Evaluation and Reporting in Ontario Schools,” provided by
the Ontario Ministry of Education through feedback from colleagues and
students—suggests that student teachers exposed to Popper’s ideas were far
more likely to engage their classes in critical discussions and argumentation,
to use more authentic assessment, to engage their students in higher levels of
discourse processing, and to reveal more reflective thinking about their own
teaching and assessment of their students than student teachers who were
not exposed to Popper’s ideas.
I am convinced, based on our work with pre-service, in-service teachers
and school administrators, that Popper’s ideas systematically allow educa-
tors to reflect, to analyze their practices after implementing their trial solu-
tions, and to refine their tentative solutions through the error elimination
process. These ideas have the potential to contribute to knowledge growth
and also to give educators the opportunity to reflect and engage in critical
discussions with colleagues (Chitpin, 2011, 2013, 2014; Chitpin & Evers,
2012; Chitpin & Simon, 2008). An historically significant example would
be two teachers, each trying to deal with the same cluster of problems but
each having systematically different tentative solutions. Teacher A’s tentative
solution is that Black students do not do very well at school because there
are all kinds of subtle and not-so-subtle forms of discrimination going on,
while Teacher B’s tentative solution is that these students do not do well
at school because, on average, their IQs are a standard deviation below
other kids. It would be fascinating to trace through Popper’s schema for
two teachers facing the same problem to find out which theory better meets
Popper’s criteria. As well, it would be interesting to see if the “better” theory,
based on Popper’s criteria, changes with context and teaching style.
In the following chapter, I will advocate Popper’s approach for empow-
ering teachers to build knowledge and the need for schools to use such an
approach for knowledge development and sharing. I will also illustrate the
usefulness of Popper’s schema for promoting teachers’ critical thinking and
knowledge growth.
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2 A Popperian Approach to Building
Teachers’ Knowledge
“Critical thinking” is a term that appears frequently in educational reform

literature (Mason, 2008). Much of this literature concludes that, although
critical thinking is touted as an educational ideal, research suggests that it
is not being put into practice, and traditional transmissive teaching prac-
tices abound (Paul, Elder, & Bartell, 1997; Swartz, 2004). This is due to
the fact that some scholars believe that “experienced teachers are analo-
gous to ‘master craftsmen’ . . . in school-based components of their pre-
service education, student-teachers should learn through gaining access to
the craft knowledge of experienced teachers” (Brown & McIntyre, 1993,
p. 12). However, if we want our teachers to produce active, creative, and
critically thinking learners, teachers need to evaluate critically the proposed
curriculum activities and also be able to articulate their reasoned decision to
adopt or adapt these curriculum activities to meet the learning needs of their
students. In other words, teachers need to become aware of confirmation
biases that appear in various guises so they can be more open to opinions
that differ from their own.
As humans, we have a natural tendency to look for instances that confirm
our story and our vision of the world. These instances are always easy to find
because we take past instances that corroborate our theories and we treat
them as evidence (Baron, 1995; Lam, 2008; Nickerson, 1998; Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987). This is particularly relevant when it comes to profes-
sional knowledge development (Chitpin & Evers, 2005; Chitpin, Simon, &
Galipeau, 2008). For example, teachers in Chitpin et al. (2008) used “tricks
of the trade,” clever ways of performing a task or activity, especially slightly
dishonest or unfair ones, to imply that the theory behind critical thinking
is valid. The fact that the strategies they have used in a particular situation
have turned out to be successful proves very little, if anything. One cannot
infer much from a single experiment in a random context simply because
an experiment needs replicability, showing some causal component (Popper,
1980). If we wish to develop skills and attitudes in students, consonant with
critical thinking (Siegel, 1980), this necessitates the teacher being a critical
thinker (Siegel, 1980). Research shows that a teacher who holds critical
Approach to Building Teacher Knowledge 17
thinking skills and possesses a critical disposition will have the ability and
desire to teach in a way that helps students attain similar skills and disposi-
tions (Paul, 1993; Paul, Elder, & Bartell, 1997).
There is also the difference between what teachers actually know and
how much they think they know. They certainly know a lot, but they
do not know what they do not know (Lam, 2008; Taleb, 2005). For
example, “tricks of the trade” can be repeatedly successful over time,
thereby confirming, as a result of successful usage, that the practice
works, even if based on faulty theories, that is, doing the right things for
the wrong reasons. Lack of knowledge about the quality of their knowl-
edge comes together—the same process that makes them know less also
makes them satisfied with their knowledge (Matlin & Stang, 1978; Polya,
1954). In fact, much empirical evidence supports the view that people
have a tendency to demand less hypothesis-consistent evidence for accept-
ing a hypothesis than hypothesis-inconsistent information for rejecting
a hypothesis (Baron, 1995; Lam, 2008; Nickerson, 1998; Pyszcynski &
Greenberg, 1987).
Moreover, there are confirmation bias and belief perseverance at play,
as we tend to treat ideas like possessions, and it is hard for us to part
with them. When testing a hypothesis, we tend to look for instances
where the hypothesis proves true (Henrion & Fischhoff, 1986; Tweney,
1989). However, this is misleading, as we are building general rules from
observed facts (Popper, 1989). Contrary to conventional wisdom, our
body of knowledge does not grow from a series of confirmatory observa-
tions (Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; Lam, 2008). In fact, Popper
(2002) argues that knowledge does not progress from tools designed to
verify or help theories but rather the opposite, as illustrated by the Chitpin
and Simon (2009) study. The study reveals that the use of the Objective
Knowledge Growth Framework has helped teachers to refute their con-
firmation biases, thereby enabling them to develop the habit of reflection,
which contributes to their knowledge growth (Chitpin & Evers, 2012). As
well, because of our inability to predict the future course of history, and
not because of our inability to predict the future growth of human knowl-
edge, but, as Popper (2002) puts it, “if there is such a thing as growing
human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate today what we shall know
only tomorrow” (p. xii).
This chapter advocates the use of a Popperian approach to build teacher
knowledge. It begins with a discussion of the need for schools to use a criti-
cal approach for knowledge development and knowledge sharing. Next, a
discussion of Popper’s three core concepts of critical rationalism is presented
for its relevance in teachers’ knowledge development, followed by an illus-
tration of how Popper’s (1979) schema promotes teachers’ critical thinking
and knowledge growth. The chapter concludes that this method of critical
self-learning does facilitate a useful trajectory for knowledge growth.
18 Approach to Building Teacher Knowledge
POPPER’S CRITICAL APPROACH FOR TEACHER
DEVELOPMENT
Fullan (2006) argues that schools need to focus on knowledge production

and sharing if teaching is to be seen as an intellectual profession—that prin-
cipals need to understand the role of knowledge development in the perfor-
mance of their schools. He further argues that the role of the principal in
promoting knowledge growth is through teacher professional development
and by having mechanisms in place for teachers to actively collaborate and
share with colleagues their ideas, teaching strategies and identification, and
resolution of problems encountered in their teaching contexts to build pro-
fessional knowledge.
Information is not synonymous with knowledge. In fact, Brown and
Duguid (2000) argue that information is mechanistic and technical, whereas
knowledge is inherently people-oriented. By sharing perspectives and rea-
sons with colleagues, a superior performance is achieved, and this perfor-
mance is attributed to collaborative reasoning rather than to peer pressure
or imitation (Lam, 2008; Moshman & Geil, 1998). Therefore, for teachers
to create knowledge, they need to assess their underlying assumptions and
evaluate their beliefs and actions in a socially processed environment. Such
an environment is created when “. . . we digest rather than merely hold.
It entails the knower’s understanding and some degree of commitment”
(Brown & Duguid, 2000, p. 120). For this reason, mandating teachers to
attend professional workshops or external training has not always been
highly successfully. Rather, teachers need to be provided with environments
and settings where they feel safe in sharing their experiments, their successes
and their mistakes (Brookfield, 1995). As Brookfield (1995) states, “. . . new
possibilities for our practice and new ways to analyze and respond to prob-
lems. Colleagues can open up unfamiliar avenues for inquiry, and they can
give us advice on how they deal with the problems they are facing” (p. 141).
In fact, Rooney (2007) and Loughran (2006) argue that student success
depends on the expertise of teachers, which, in turn, depends on the quality
of their professional development. However, schools are finding it harder
to provide teachers with opportunities for professional development due to
funding constraints (Rooney, 2008). But, if student learning is to improve,
teachers must be supported through time and money to create a culture
where they continuously develop themselves as professionals (Chitpin &
Knowles, 2009). Popper’s critical approach has been proven to be power-
ful in helping teachers to critically examine their teaching practices and to
refine their theories and practices. This kind of examining or thinking can be
developed both autonomously and in a collegial and collaborative manner.
In fact, studies have shown beneficial effects of peer interactions in solving
problems of practice (Butraa, Caverni, & Rossi, 2005; Moshman & Geil,
1998). By engaging in critical conversations, teachers are making visible the
inadequacies of their teaching practices so as to effect changes that eliminate
or minimize those adequacies (Fugelsang et al., 2004; Lam, 2008). This also
prevents them from prematurely accepting theories or solutions that may be
spurious while allowing them to revise their theories for building knowledge
(Chitpin & Evers, 2012).
POPPER’S CRITICAL RATIONALISM: THREE CORE CONCEPTS
Popper’s (1966) philosophy of “critical rationalism” can be understood, in

Popper’s own words, as admitting that “I may be wrong and you may be
right,” and that “by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (p. 225).
The effort he has in mind is that of critical discussion. It is an effort by which
we discover a problem, propose a theory as a tentative solution, implement
the solution to eliminate errors contained in the solution, and, by eliminating
those errors, we progress to the discovery of a new problem. His three core
concepts of critical rationalism are fallibilism, criticism, and verisimilitude.
Popper’s (1966) fallibilism views human beings and their scientific knowl-
edge as inherently fallible and subject to error. Although his idea was quite
controversial in the 1930s, when Popper published his Logik der Forschung
(Popper, 1934), his idea is now well accepted by most contemporary philos-
ophers of science, even though it is not the most distinctive feature of Pop-
per’s epistemology. He argues that what was once substantiated historically
by fact may later turn out to be false. In fact, he states that the very best of
our scientific knowledge is fallible because we cannot “justify” our theories
by showing that they are actually true. In addition, there is also the limita-
tion of our ability to predict the future course of history, not because of our
inability to predict the future growth of human knowledge but because, as
Popper (2002) puts it, “. . . if there is such a thing as growing human knowl-
edge, then we cannot anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow”
(p. xii). Thus, his fallibilism disregards certain knowledge and, more specifi-
cally, authoritative sources of knowledge. Instead, he argues that nothing is
secure and that our knowledge is conjectural and fallible.
Since we learn from our mistakes, fallibilism should not lead to skepti-
cal or relativist conclusions. Popper (1966) claims that criticism “. . . is the
only way we have of detecting our mistakes, and of learning from them in
a systematic way” (p. 376). Criticism includes criticizing the theories or
conjectures of others and of our own because, for Popper (1989), criticism
consists of deductive logical reasoning to remove inconsistencies from our
theories and to modify or refine or replace our theories when they do not do
what they are intended to do or when contradictions occur. In other words,
the application of deductive or formal logic to criticism adopts the rules by
which truth is transmitted from premises to conclusions, whereas falsity is
re-transmitted from conclusions to premises. This re-transmission of falsity
is also called “refutation.” In fact, Popper (1989) rejected all attempts to
justification of theories; instead he replaced justification with criticism in his
non-justificationist or falsificationist view of rationality. Because a theory
may stand up to criticism better than its competitors, Popper says that we
can sometimes “justify” our preference for a theory in the negative sense if
the theory finds some kind of support instead of securing positive evidence
without being subjected to severe criticism.
Crucial to Popper’s (1979) concept of critical rationalism is the concept
of verisimilitude (getting closer to the truth) because it is only the idea of the
truth that allows us to speak sensibly of fallibilism and criticism. In other
words, it is through searching and eliminating mistakes through critical dis-
cussions that we can come nearer to the truth. Popper (1989) adopted Tar-
ski’s (1936) correspondence theory of objective truth that a statement is true
only when it corresponds to the facts. Although Tarski’s objective theory of
truth allows us to make certain assertions and appears correct to Popper,
his theory is self-contradictory within the subjective theories of truth; for
example, a theory may be true even though no one believes it and when there
is no reason to believe that it is true. Conversely, another theory may be false
even when we have reason to accept it. In our search for truth, we may never
know when we have found it because we have no criterion of truth but are
guided only by the idea of truth as a regulative principle. To alleviate suspi-
cion about the idea of getting closer to the truth, Popper (1979) introduces a
logical idea of verisimilitude by combining truth and content. He defines all
true statements and false statements following from a statement p as the truth
content and falsity content of p, respectively. His explanation is as follows:
Intuitively speaking, a theory T, has less verisimilitude than a theory

T2 if, and only if, (a) their truth contents and falsity contents (or their
measures) are comparable, and either (b) the truth content, but not the
falsity content, of T1 is smaller than that of T2, or else (c) the truth con-
tent of T1 is not greater than that of T2, but its falsity content is greater.
(p. 52)
Thus, he regards the search for verisimilitude rather than truth as a more
realistic aim of science because, while we cannot have sufficiently good argu-
ments for claiming that we have attained the truth, we can have good arguments
for claiming that we have made progress towards the truth. In other words,
T2 is epistemically more progressive than its predecessor T1 and, therefore,
it is preferred. In asking whether the critical rationalism approach can pro-
mote teacher knowledge growth, it is a good idea to start with what is teacher
knowledge.
TEACHER KNOWLEDGE
The concept of a knowledge base for teaching has been extensively stud-
ied by a number of researchers (e.g. Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 1999; Elbaz,
1981; Fenstermacher, 1994; Grossman, 1990; Shulman, 1987). It con-
stitutes the most essential basis for teaching because it is embedded in
practice (Schon, 1995). According to Schon (1983) and Danielson (2002),
teachers’ action needs to be sustained with reflection for knowledge to be
refined and for teachers to master their craft. As well, knowledge does
not grow through accumulation of ideas or theories or by observations
or process of induction. Rather, it grows when teachers try to refute their
theories by drawing predictions and then conducting experimentation or
tests to try to refute or falsify these predictions. For example, teachers can
conjecture a trial theory (solution) when faced with a problem of teaching
practice, improve the trial theory by trying to refute it and subjecting it
to criticism so that they can uncover its errors and inadequacies, and, in
the process, eliminate the errors that criticism has uncovered. This process
helps teachers create successful trajectories for their decisions and actions
in their teaching contexts and, hence, enhances the advancement of teacher
knowledge (Chitpin & Evers, 2012).
Many problems encountered by teachers are not necessarily created by
teachers; these problems are autonomous. They still exist and need to be
solved by teachers (Popper, 1979). In a teacher’s attempts to solve problems,
for example, of how to teach students in order to gain an appreciation of
literacy and its components, new theories (theory-in-use) are invented (Chit-
pin, 2010). These new theories are produced by teachers; they are the prod-
uct of teachers’ critical and creative thinking. The moment teachers have
produced these theories, they discover new, unintended and unexpected
problems—autonomous problems.
The growth of the problems results from a kind of feedback effect. Many
of these problems may never be mastered or solved, and there will always
be the challenging task of discovering new problems, for an infinity of prob-
lems will always remain undiscovered. Because of that, and because of the
autonomy of the third World, there will always be scope for original and
creative work; that is, for authenticity (Popper, 1979).
In the case of teachers’ professional knowledge, teachers’ interpretations
of an outcome or activity are regarded as a theory. For example, teachers
provide explanations that are supported by a chain of arguments and teach-
ing material. Therefore, when teachers make interpretations, these can be
regarded as a kind of theory and, like every theory, they are anchored in
other theories, and in other third World objects. In this way, the third World
problem of the merits of the interpretation can be raised and discussed,
including, and especially, its value for our historical understanding (Chitpin,
2003, 2006, 2010).
The process or activity of understanding consists, essentially, of a sequence
of states of understanding. It is the sequence of the preceding states that con-
stitutes the process, and it is the work of criticizing the state reached (that
is, of producing third World critical arguments) that constitutes the activity
(Chitpin, 2003, 2010). Popper (1979) represents the activity by a general
schema of problem-solving by the method of conjecture and refutation. The
schema is: P1  TT  EE  P2. Popper’s (1979) argument is that indi-
viduals and organizations would do better if they were to employ a form of
empirical testing in their attempts to falsify their hypotheses because there is
no finite body of evidence that can prove or establish the truth of a universal
hypothesis.
Although Popper did not formulate the schema P1  TT  EE  P2 to
capture cognitive processes, the schema can provide teachers with a struc-
ture to build knowledge through critically reflecting on their actions and
decisions (Chitpin, 2010; Chitpin & Evers, 2012; Evers & Chitpin, 2003).
Here, P1, or Problem Identification, means the problem from which
teachers first start. TT1, or Tentative Theory, represents a first tentative
theory that teachers offer to solve the problem identified. According to
Nickles (1981), a problem “consists of all the conditions or constraints
on the solution plus the demand that the solution (an object satisfying the
constraints) be found” (p. 109). Nickles further states that there are differ-
ent agreed ways of solving a problem within a given set of constraints. For
example, if teachers have, at the early stage, more than one conjecture at
their disposal, it will consist of a critical discussion and comparative evalu-
ation of the competing conjectures. The difference in problem strategies
used also lies in the prioritizing, or ranking of the constraints; that is, does
the teacher deal with the disruptive behaviour of a student at the moment it
occurred, or later? The way the teachers rank their priorities will determine
the structure of their web of belief, with the least revisable claims at the
centre of the web.
Therefore, teachers’ expectations are driven by a tentative theory (TT1),
formulated on their belief system. Popper’s schema requires that a bold
conjecture be formulated in such a way that it can be, in principle, refuted.
A tentative theory is, thus, both a conjecture that purports to solve the
problem and an object that admits of testing through practice. EE1 refers
to an error elimination process, where specific propositions in TT1, or parts
therein, are subject to tests that attempt refutation. If the first TT is, in fact,
refuted, or found to be inadequate, we move to TT2. P2 refers to a new
problem that emerges from critical reflection and testing, and so on (see
Figure 2.1).
A satisfactory understanding will be reached if the interpretation, the ten-
tative theory, finds support in the fact that it can shed light on new problems
or more problems than the teachers expected, or if it finds support in the
fact that it explains many sub-problems, some of which were not seen at the
beginning. Teachers can gauge the progress they have made by comparing
P1 with some of their later problems, identified, for example, as Pn.
Given the fact that teachers hold a vast amount of background knowl-
edge regarding any problematic situation, there is no doubt that the number
of possible constraints will be large. This means that teachers must find
ways of framing the problems/solutions so that much of the background
P1 Problem Identification
Pn Problem Identification
after self-reflection
TT1 Tentative Theory

EE1 Error Elimination
Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework
information does not interfere with their cognitive processing. This is where
the subjectivity-objectivity continuum comes into play (Chitpin & Evers,
2012). Nagel (1986) defines the subjectivity and objectivity continuum as
follows:
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies

less on the specifics of the individual’s makeup and position in the
world, or on the character of the particular type of creature he is. The
wider the range of subjective types to which a form of understanding
is accessible—the less it depends on specific subjective capacities—the
more objective it is.
(p. 5)
In other words, teachers must solve their problems or make them more
epistemically progressive by effectively bracketing the background and focus-
ing on one or two aspects of the situation. Alternatively, they need to agree
on the bodies of background knowledge. The field of education is beset with
conflicting theories and viewpoints, all of which are based on observations or
experiences. Merely adding to the stock the reasons why certain theories are
right contributes little to knowledge growth. We need to re-orient ourselves
to think in terms of rigorous attempts to refute our hypotheses instead of
employing confirmation techniques (Chitpin & Evers, 2012).
The Popper schema is cyclical, widely applicable, and is intended to
converge over a succession of these “Popper Cycles” to successful theories,
that is, those that solve the problems at hand. For example, in a teacher’s
attempt to become a more effective math teacher (P1), Martha wanted
to use the constructivist “hands-on” approach in her math lessons (TT1).
She discovered, after reading up on the constructivist approach, that her
learning style is that of “I need to read, hear, and see in order to best under-
stand” (EE1). She attended a hands-on math workshop and arrived at a
new problem: “How to apply/adapt this hands-on approach to teaching
math” as (P2).
UNDERSTANDING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
The activity of understanding is the same as that for all problem-solving. Like
all intellectual activities, it consists of subjective second World processes (Pop-
per, 1979). Yet, the subjective work involved can be analyzed as an operation
with objective third World objects. If teachers are interested in the process of
understanding their own professional growth, or in some of its results, they
have to describe what they are doing, or achieving, almost entirely in terms of
these objects of understanding, the intelligibles, and their relationships (Chit-
pin, 2003, 2010). When teachers use a journal, which Bridgman (1951) calls a
“paper and pencil operation,” they must first ask: “What was the problem?”
And to eliminate the error, they reflect on the activity with a pencil and paper.
Though teachers start from dealing with an underlying problem (P1), they
proceed from there to a proposition or tentative theory (TT1) and later to
a method of implementing the changes designed to eliminate errors (EE1).
This method of error elimination leads to a new problem (P2). For example,
the framework allows Martha to expand her capacity to solve her problem of
how to use a hands-on approach to teaching math. Through elimination of
errors in solving her identified problem, she is led to the objective knowledge
growth. The learning process is not a repetitive one, but rather it is a cumu-
lative process driven by error-elimination (Chitpin et al., 2008). Teachers’
knowledge growth would, thus, appear to fit the following Popperian schema:
P1  TT  EE  P2
In addition, Chitpin and Evers’ (2012) study with pre-service teachers,

using Popper’s schema, also answers the question in relation to ways in
which knowledge growth takes place when pre-service teachers adopt the
practice of writing in their journal as to how they evaluate themselves and
others fairly in their group work. Pre-service teachers said:
We look at the list of assessment principles from the Growing Success

document from the Ontario Ministry of Education and discussed it
among ourselves and we came to the conclusion that using UbD Design
Standard Stage 2, that of using a variety of assessments to provide evi-
dence of our students’ learning, would solve our problem because we
can gather lots of information from our students using this assessment
principle. If one assessment tool can’t give us the answer we want, we
can use another assessment tool. We can even have our students evalu-
ate each other. This way we are showing them how to be responsible.
But we also need to take into consideration that students who are popu-
lar and get high marks from their friends, based on our experiences as
students. So, peer evaluation has disadvantages.
Through critical discussions, they questioned the validity and reliability

of such an assessment. They recounted their experiences as students and
how they gave high marks to their friends, not based on the quality of their
work but mostly based on popularity (EE1). When the group found that the
tentative theory they chose did not completely solve their problem, they did
not try to seek justification by asking for evidence, proof, or good reasons to
support it. Instead, they showed the identified theory had unacceptable con-
sequences. In fact, their tentative theory raised difficulties worse than what
it was supposed to surmount. The group reframed their problem to that
of “how do we get students to fairly assess their peer work without inflat-
ing it?” (P2). Their tentative theory was to use the UbD Design Standard
Stage 2: “Appropriate criterion-based scoring tools used to evaluate student
products and performances” (TT2). They brainstormed all the weaknesses
contained in their newly proposed theory and said:
Even though students are given specific criteria as to how to evaluate

the work of their peers, they can still be negative towards each other if
they do not like each other. Because the criterion-based assessment tells
the teacher how well the student is performing on the specific goal(s)
that they are being tested or evaluated on, it is possible that their peers
will interpret the work to mean comparing the work of one student with
another. Instead of giving full marks to a short concise answer, they can
give only half of the marks because they expect a lengthier response or
read a lengthier response from another peer. What do you do?
(EE2)
This became their third problem of, how do we get students to evalu-
ate their peers objectively (P3)? They applied their proposed theory taken
from the Growing Success document, namely, that of “using appropriate
learning activities, for purposes of instruction and meeting the needs and
experiences of the students” (TT3). They brainstormed ideas as to how this
tentative theory would translate into practice. They started their discussions
with their understanding of instruction and meeting the needs of students.
Through discussions, they believed that applying this principle would entail
that they present the concepts of their lesson in a way that all students would
be able to gain varying degrees of knowledge, based on their levels of under-
standing, and that they take the following into consideration: (1) the learn-
ing styles of their students, (2) their cognitive level of ability, (3) allowance
for assignment based on students’ needs, and (4) differentiated evaluation of
their students. As to the question as to whether Popper’s critical approach is
effective in building knowledge, the answer is “Yes.”
POPPER’S CRITICAL APPROACH AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS

IN BUILDING TEACHER KNOWLEDGE
Despite Popper’s influence on the philosophy and practice of science, the

question still remains of the effectiveness of his methodology for solving
problems. There is controversy in the psychology literature over the feasibil-
ity and utility of falsification as a strategy for solving problems. Literature
on psychological studies suggests that scientists have difficulty in disconfir-
matory reasoning (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Mahoney & Kimper, 1976).
However, Tweney et al. (1980) attempted to teach their participants dis-
confirmatory strategies using “2–4–6 problems.” The results of their study
revealed success in eliminating most attempts at confirmation and in chang-
ing the inquiry strategy of participants in the disconfirmatory group. Thus,
their study shows that it is feasible to induce the use of disconfirmation.
Confirmation bias can partially be attributed to the fact that people have
the tendency to consider only one hypothesis at a time. In fact, Tweney et al.
(1980) found that individuals seldom employ this thinking strategy success-
fully because they prefer “to evaluate several pieces of data against a sin-
gle hypothesis, rather than one datum against several hypotheses” (p. 119).
Through Popper’s (1979) schema (see Figure 2.2), teachers can be encour-
aged to think of several alternative hypotheses simultaneously in attempting
to solve a problem of practice. For example, several teachers teaching similar
grades can work on different hypotheses to solve a classroom-related problem.
This is further illustrated in Chitpin and Simon (2006), where Emily and
Vanessa, two pre-school teachers, attempted to solve their problem of teach-
ing sequencing to their kindergarten students using different theories. Emily
chose to read the story If You Give a Mouse a Cookie to explore the meaning
of the word sequencing (TT1), whereas Vanessa’s tentative solution (TT1)
was to get her students to make predictions and to notice the sequence of
the story The Very Hungry Caterpillar. Through students’ feedback, both
Vanessa and Emily discovered that their students did not grasp the concept
of sequencing (EE1). As a result, they both refined their initial problem of
introducing the concept of sequencing to “How to improve students under-
standing of sequencing?” (P2) (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Readers may refer to
Chapter 5 for more details on how Emily and Vanessa had used the OKGF
to build professional knowledge.
Evers (2008) argued that regardless of background and teaching experi-
ences, there are common constraints in problems and in reaching solutions
for these problems. Nickels (1981) defined it:
My short answer is that a problem consists of all the conditions or

constraints on the solution plus the demand that the solution (an object
satisfying the constraints) can be found. For this reason . . . I call it the
constraint-inclusion model of problems. The constraints characterize—
in the sense “describe”—the sought-for solution.
(p. 109)
There are different ways of solving a problem within a given constraint.

However, regardless of background or the number of teaching experiences,
Popper’s (1979) schema provides participants with a tool to solve problems
TTb EEb P2b
P1 TTb EEb P2b
TTn EEn P2n
Figure 2.2 The Popperian schema
Table 2.1 Evidence of Emily’s knowledge building
Popper Cycle 1 Popper Cycle 2 Popper Cycle 3 Popper Cycle 4 Popper Cycle 5
P1: How to P2: How to P3: How to P4: How to P5: How to get all
introduce improve stu- teach sequenc- get individual students under-
concept of dents’ under- ing to some student to stand sequencing?
sequencing to standing of students? retell the story
kindergarteners? sequencing? sequentially?
TT1: This is TT2: This is TT3: This is TT4: This is TT5: This is
achieved by achieved by achieved by achieved by achieved by read-
reading the story having students asking these asking the stu- ing another story
If You Give a participate in students to dents to copy Brown Bear,
Mouse a Cookie the creation of retell the story and complete Brown Bear,
and exploring a class story If by looking the following What Do You
the meaning You Give a Kid at the events sentence from See? to the class
of the word a Marker. and respective the board: and having the
“sequencing.” order. “If I get a students paste
cookie, I will items related to
want_____.” the story in order.
EE1: Feedback EE2: Feedback EE3: Feedback EE4: Feedback EE5: Feedback
from students’ from cooper- from students from students’ from the students
oral response ating teacher indicates work indicates indicates that all
indicates that and students’ that students that the above of the students
they had dif- work indicates continued to strategy works have a better
ficulty with that some experience better for some understanding of
sequencing the of them still difficulty with than for others. sequencing.
story. have problems sequencing
understanding skill.
sequencing.
that their own system of priorities says is worth solving. In other words,
the schema provides participants with a framework that respects the pri-
orities that define the problem (Chitpin, 2006; Chitpin & Evers, 2003;
Chitpin et al., 2008). Given that we bring an enormous amount of back-
ground knowledge to solve a given problem, the number of constraints will
no doubt be large. However, we must find ways to frame our problems
and solutions so that this background knowledge will not interfere with
Table 2.2 Evidence of Vanessa’s knowledge building
Popper Cycle 1 Popper Cycle 2 Popper Cycle 3 Popper Cycle 4

P1: How to introduce P2: How to P3: How to P4: How to
the concept of improve students’ improve students’ teach students
sequencing? understanding of understanding of to find the miss-
sequencing? sequencing using 1 ing number on
to 10? a number line?
TT1: This is achieved TT2: This is TT3: This is TT4: This is
by reading the story achieved by using achieved by hav- achieved by
The Very Hungry Cat- flash cards to ing students count dividing stu-
erpillar to the class and teach students objects found in dents in groups
having students make days of the week the classroom. of four with
predictions that lead and counting prompts from
them to noticing the from 1 to 10. peers.
sequence of the story.
EE1: Feedback from EE2: Feedback EE3: Feedback EE4: Feedback
students’ verbal from students’ from students from students
responses indicates that response indi- and cooperating indicates that
most of them did not cates that they teacher indicates some still have
have the concept of the are able to order that they can count difficulty with
days of the week and days of the week from 1 to 10 with filling the miss-
its order as well as the but still have ease but can’t ing number.
counting pattern. difficulty with 1 write the missing
to 10. number to follow a
sequential order.
the cognitive processing (Dietrich & Fields, 1996; Evers, 2008). In fact, if
we effectively bracket much of the background and focus on one or two
aspects of the problematic situation, we can often make epistemic progress
in solving the problem. This is further illustrated using the examples of Van-
essa and Emily in solving their problem of teaching sequencing to their pre-
schoolers (see Chapters 3, 5). Emily and Vanessa’s initial problem was: How
to teach students sequencing? For this problem, they each formulated an
initial tentative theory (TT1) as a hypothesis, with everything else assumed
as background. They then put their theory to the test to eliminate errors
or weaknesses that emerged from the test (EE1). Popper’s (1979) schema
repeats with a new problem as a result of addressing the errors in the initial
problem. As illustrated in Table 2.1, there is no guarantee that knowledge
growth will end at a particular point. In fact, Vanessa’s initial problem, that
of teaching students sequencing, ended with “how to teach students to find
the missing number on the line.” However, there is evidence that there are
gains in Vanessa’s knowledge, as depicted in Table 2.2.
*******
To sum up, I have argued that knowledge growth requires a critical approach.
Using Popper’s critical rationalism approach as a professional develop-
ment tool exposes teachers to the concept of thinking of several alternative
hypotheses simultaneously in seeking an explanation of a phenomenon. It
also encourages them to assess, individually or collectively, evidence objec-
tively in the formation and evaluation of their theories, not to mention that
it prompts them to look at inconsistent data with a critical attitude. I have
also argued that it is through criticism and through making visible what is
wrong that errors or inadequacies can be eliminated or minimized. Mandat-
ing teachers to attend workshops or enlisting them as consultants to provide
workshops is not highly effective.
Popper’s critical approach is powerful for critical self-learning, and ought
to be a central goal of teacher education. As Shulman (1987) stated:
The goal of teacher education is not to indoctrinate or train teachers to

behave in prescribed ways, but to educate teachers to reason soundly
about their teaching as well as to perform skillfully. Sound reasoning
requires both a process of thinking about what they are doing and an
adequate base of facts, principles and experiences from which to reason.
Teachers must learn to use their knowledge base to provide the grounds
for choices and action. . . . Good teaching is not only effective behav-
iourally, but must also reset on a foundation of adequately grounded
premises.
(p. 13)
Popper’s critical approach does not require a reconstruction of the existing

educational arrangements before it can be implemented in schools. Instead,
it asks educators to be open to the theoretical underpinnings of practice and
to view growth as a process of systematic elimination of errors in tentative
theories. This critical approach places the responsibility for improvement
on the teachers. Furthermore, it provides educators with the opportunity to
give and receive rational criticism in a professional community where the
goals are to improve education and to educate for improvement. This criti-
cal approach provides educators with a grounded perspective on the issues
at hand when colleagues point out the inadequacies of whatever they fail
to approach critically. The critical approach is not only a way for teachers
to build or grow knowledge but is also a way for teachers to maximize stu-
dent success by allowing educators, curriculum developers, and policymak-
ers to view teacher knowledge and how that knowledge informs the debate
on what teachers need to know and how they might develop it in a way
that would lead to knowledge growth. More importantly, it preserves what
works, eliminates inadequacies, and preserves what is adequate by modify-
ing or abandoning whatever traditions inhibiting student success. This topic
will be the focus of the following chapter.
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3 Why Popper’s View of Rationality
Should Be Considered for Promoting
Teacher Knowledge
This chapter reveals how a Popperian approach can advance teacher

knowledge (our knowledge about learning and teaching) and how such an
approach can contribute to the improvement of educational practice. Pop-
per’s epistemology has had a significant influence on practice in the natural
sciences but very little in the social sciences and education. There are various
factors that have contributed to this situation (Burgess & Swann, 2003); for
example, some influential scholars have misunderstood his ideas (see Pop-
per’s Replies to My Critics, 1974). In education, these misunderstandings
have been exacerbated because there is a tendency for educational theorists
to read about Popper rather than to study his works (Swann, 2009). Fur-
thermore, critiques take issue with the definition of the terms “knowledge,”
“growth of knowledge,” and their relationship to conjecture and refuta-
tion (Lakatos, 1970, 1978; Maxwell, 1972, 2002; Settle, 1996). Thus, in
educational debate at conferences, Popper’s theory of learning is sometimes
met with incredulity because Popper claims that there is no transference of
knowledge or knowledge elements from outside the individual, either from
the physical environment or from others. Instead, he claims that knowledge
advances by searching for and eliminating error contained in our theories.
In other words, we can improve our present theories by finding out their
inadequacies. Once we uncover the inadequacies, we can eliminate them by
modifying or refining the original theory. By doing so, we are improving our
theory through criticism.
Criticism is often viewed as an act of “putting someone down,” or
“destroying someone’s ideas.” Criticism is also viewed as a way of “proving”
that someone else’s ideas are wrong and that our ideas are right. However,
Popper’s critical approach is rooted in human fallibility, with its recognition
that we can never prove that our ideas and solutions are right or correct; we
can only discover what is wrong with them through criticism. It is through
criticism that we can revise or replace our ideas so as to improve them. The
critical approach is simply looking for the error or the issue at hand. But
before other alternatives can be considered, there must be an acceptance of
the criticism of what exists—a recognition of some error or inadequacy. It
is only then that there is a critical quest to modify or replace what exists.
34 Popper’s View of Rationality
Popper advocates that we approach theories critically. However, once a the-
ory has withstood criticism—that is, when we no longer can refute it—then
we can accept it and begin to work together critically to refine, change, alter,
modify, or abandon what exists in order to eliminate a recognized wrong.
This chapter presents arguments for educators to view Popper’s approach
critically in order to build their professional knowledge by eliminating what
is inadequate and preserve what is adequate by modifying or abandoning
whatever traditions or practices are inadequate in their teaching practice.
Popper’s approach also enables teachers to ask penetrating questions so as to
obtain answers on important educational questions, to enrich their inquiry
process to build knowledge, which is different from the learning by training
(induction) that is still prevalent (I discuss counter-inductivity in more detail
in Chapter 6). Through error elimination, teachers solve problems of daily
teaching practice, which leads to the objective growth of knowledge. The
learning process is not a repetitive one, but rather it is a cumulative process
driven by error elimination (Chitpin, Simon, & Galipeau, 2008). In what fol-
lows, I will illustrate my discussion of why we need criticism and not justifica-
tion by utilizing the example of Nicole’s use of a lesson plan from the web.
There are two ways in which Nicole can respond to a piece of information.
She can either engage in a detailed critical examination of the lesson plan
presented, which can be a very time-consuming exercise because everything
she reads needs to be subjected to scrutiny. The other more common way for
teachers like Nicole to deal with web lesson plans is by simply accepting the
plan, unless there are obvious reasons not to do so. Teachers encounter so
much information on a daily basis that they cannot help but accept most of
it because they do not have the time to critically examine it all. It should be
noted that if a teacher encounters a piece of information that is inconsistent
with her beliefs, it may necessitate the revision of her belief system. However,
the discussion on the nature of such revision is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter. Instead, the chapter will emphasize the need for educators to find ways
of putting their hypotheses to the test in their school and classroom practice
if they wish to uncover new knowledge and improve their teaching practice.
WHY CRITICISM AND NOT JUSTIFICATION?
Many foundationalists and social constructivists view criticism as mono-

logic because, according to the former, criticism is used to point out to indi-
viduals their ignorance in failing to recognize the sources of knowledge;
whereas, for the latter, the main function of criticism is to disabuse individu-
als of the erroneous view that knowledge claims may have informed them
about the extra-discursive reality. Therefore, according to both the foun-
dationalists and the social constructivists, criticism would not have much
to add to knowledge because the very concept of knowledge is eschewed
(Cruickshank, 2007).
Popper’s View of Rationality 35
In contrast to the post-positivists, such as Popper, they claim that criti-
cism “is the only way we have of detecting our mistakes, and of learning
from them in a systematic way” (Popper, 1966, p. 376). It includes criticiz-
ing the theories or conjectures of others and of our own because, for Popper
(1999), criticism consists of deductive logical reasoning to remove inconsis-
tencies from our theories and modifying, refining, or replacing our theories
when they do not do what they are intended to do or when contradictions
occur. In other words, deductive or formal logic as applied to criticism
adopts the rules by which truth is transmitted from premises to conclu-
sions, whereas falsity is re-transmitted from conclusions to premises. This
re-transmission of falsity is also called “refutation.” In fact, Popper (1989)
rejected all attempts to justify theories; instead, he replaced justification with
criticism in his non-justificationist or falsificationist view of rationality. He
said, “Previously, most philosophers had thought that any claim to rational-
ity meant rational justification (of one’s beliefs); my thesis was, at least since
my Open Society, that rationality meant rational criticism (of one’s own
theory and of competing theories)” (Popper, 2002, p. 173). Because a theory
may stand up to criticism better than its competitors, Popper conceded that
we can sometimes “justify” our preference for a theory in the negative sense
if the theory finds some kind of support instead of securing positive evidence
without being subjected to severe criticism (Chitpin, 2010; Lam, 2007).
What Popper is saying is that human beings and their scientific knowledge
are inherently fallible and subject to error. Thus, there is a need to search
for and eliminate mistakes through critical discussion, experimentation, or
application of our theories so as to increase knowledge. In the next section,
I will use Popper’s criticism to illustrate how teachers need to criticize and
not justify the materials (in this case lesson plans) presented to them so as
to eliminate the errors contained in them. Let us examine how a teacher can
develop hypotheses that are inconsistent with well-established facts, such
as the one presented in the lesson plan. The first step is to break the circle.
Feyerabend (2010) suggests that we invent “a new conceptual system
that suspends, or clashes with, the most carefully established observational
results, confounds the most plausible theoretical principles, and introduces
perceptions that cannot form part of the existing perceptual world” (p. 15),
which is called the “counter-inductive.”
APPLYING COUNTER-INDUCTION TO TEACHING
The free lesson plans of various grade levels are available on different educa-
tional web sites for teachers to download. A few months ago, I had the privi-
lege to observe a kindergarten teacher named Nicole (a pseudonym) who
had decided to follow the lesson plan on the book There’s a Zoo in Room
22, by Judy Sierra, on the Scholastic web site, to teach her kindergarten class
the alphabet. The story is about a teacher who allowed her class to choose a
pet for every letter of the alphabet. The lesson plan started with the objective
of the lesson, followed by three suggested activities for teachers after read-
ing the story to the class. Here, an underlying assumption is made in that if
Nicole follows the steps outlined in the lesson plan, this “fun” rhyming book
would reinforce her children’s knowledge of alphabetic principle, phonemic
awareness, and scientific concepts, and thus she achieves her objective.
However, one always needs to take into consideration the sensitive nature
of the teaching context. All of the information contained in the lesson plan
is presented as being of the same standard. There is nothing to distinguish
one statement from another. All statements are presented as being correct.
In addition, there is no mention of the socio-cultural contexts in which the
lesson plan has been successfully tried out with children. Therefore, Nicole
can either assume that all of the statements in the lesson plan, “There’s a
Zoo in Room 22,” are either justified or they are not.
First, let us consider the possibility that every belief Nicole acquired as
a result of absorbing the information she read in the lesson plan is justi-
fied. This is not only true for her but for every teacher who acquired beliefs
by reading the lesson plan. Given that some of those beliefs are false, this
means that some of her false beliefs are now justified. In following the les-
son plan, she discovered that some of those beliefs are false when preparing
her kindergarten children to learn the alphabet by associating the name of
the animal to the letter of the alphabet. For example, when she asked her
class “to imagine what it would be like if they turned their classroom into
a zoo. What types of animals would they want to have? What would their
classroom look like?”, some of them responded that they would prefer not
to have any animals living in the classroom because they would ruin the fur-
niture and the books. Others said that their classroom was not big enough
for all the animals to live together. It is likely that she would still have some
other justified false beliefs that she had acquired from reading the lesson
plan “There’s a Zoo in Room 22.” Other teachers who read the lesson plan
may still believe that following the lesson plan as a recipe would result in
children learning the alphabet and, during that time, those false beliefs of
theirs are as justified as the true beliefs they derive from the lesson plan.
However, if every belief acquired from the lesson plan is justified, then we
have justified both false beliefs and true beliefs and have no way of telling
them apart. What makes the beliefs true or false is how they relate to our
expectations. But it is pointless to justify false beliefs as readily as true beliefs
(Diller, 2008; Popper, 1979). What role do beliefs play in our teaching? How
do we choose to act on those beliefs?
Let us assume that none of the beliefs we acquire from our reading of the
lesson plan are justified. Perhaps the information in the lesson plan is just
there to help teachers decide what to do after reading the book. Nicole’s
knowledge after reading the lesson plan of how to teach the alphabet to
youngsters is no doubt enhanced by the information contained in the lesson
plan. She was able to test the memory skill of the children by playing a game
that required them to name the different pets they remembered in Room 22.
She was also able to identify children who were able to recall the differ-
ent animals that match each letter of the alphabet. However, as a result of
reading the lesson plan, she tried having the children pretend that they were
going to have an alphabet zoo in their classroom using the activity from
the lesson plan. The lesson plan also led her to ask the children to come
up with a silly name for their pet using the first letter sound of the name of
the animal. When she asked them to use their own imagination and match
up the alphabet with a new list of pets, most of the children experienced
difficulty. They would give her “cat” or “cattle” or “cow” for the letter K
and “chamois” for the letter S. They needed further assistance with coming
up with a silly name for their pet. It also led her to find out if the children
were able to name the reptiles in Room 22, the animals living in water,
the biggest and the smallest animals, as well as to tell what a “zorilla” is,
after reading the book. Her actions were based on the beliefs she acquired
from the lesson plan and, as it turned out, some of those beliefs, when put
into practice, were justified (effective), but others turned out to be unjusti-
fied (ineffective). Even if none of these beliefs were justified, it is irrelevant
because she made use of the information contained in the lesson to teach
her students the alphabet. The alternative would be not to read the lesson
plan or disregard any beliefs acquired from it and just come up with some
activities on the spot. Thus, any concept of justification that fails to justify
any belief acquired through reading the lesson plan is irrelevant to what
we actually do with such beliefs. We still have to act on those unjustified
beliefs (Diller, 2008).
Often, emphasis is placed on justifying false beliefs rather than discussing
either the best ways of getting rid of them or of decreasing the number of
false beliefs so as not to acquire them in the first place. We cannot deny that
we all have some false beliefs. It is a pity that more effort is not expended in
working out how those incorrect beliefs can be removed so as not to waste
our time in acting on false beliefs and not to lead us into error by using them
in our reasoning. The emphasis on justification downplays the importance
of the criticism to eliminate errors or mistakes (Chitpin, 2013).
Furthermore, Popper (1966) stated that the very best of our scientific
knowledge is fallible because we cannot “justify” our theories by showing
that they are actually true. In addition, there is also the limitation of our
ability to predict the future course of history, not because of our inability
to predict the future growth of human knowledge, but because, as Popper
(1957/1961) put it, “if there is such a thing as growing human knowledge,
then we cannot anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow”
(p. xii). Further criticisms of justificationism can be found in the work of
Popper and Bartley (Bartley, 1962, 1982, 1990; Popper, 1983). Popper was a
great critic of many specific aspects of justificationism throughout his career,
especially induction, which is an important part of most justificationist phi-
losophies (Diller, 2008).
CONJECTURE AND REFUTATION
Popper denies the existence of induction, a view put forth by many (e.g.
Francis Bacon and J. S. Mill). This view says that the scientist arrives at
theories from reports of individual observations and experiments to univer-
sal conclusions (laws and theories). Popper believes that a scientific theory
could not be proved but could only be disproved or falsified. The theory that
“all swans are white” is disproved by the observation of a single black swan.
Instead, Popper and others (e.g. William Whewell) propose that scientific
reasoning works by setting up conjectures or hypotheses and deducing con-
clusions from them by testing the conclusions to see if these conclusions are
true. If the conclusion is false, then the hypothesis is false. Popper calls this
procedure the hypothetico-deductive method or the method of conjecture
and refutation (Popper, 1957/1980), p. 125).
Popper’s method of conjecture and refutation is powerful and consists of
four stages: First is the “ ‘identification of problem.” Second is the attempted
solution or “theory.” Third is the attempted falsification of the theory by
“testing,” through “critical discussion” and, finally, there is the generation
of new knowledge, which creates “new problems” and “new facts.” The
process can be described using a simple schematic outline of how to solve
an identified problem. We start with the identification of a problem (P1) and
an attempted solution also called tentative theory to solve it (TT1), which
may or may not be effective. The theory will then be subjected to “error
elimination” (EE1) either by applying the theory or through critical discus-
sion; a new fact will then appear, Problem 2 (P2), which will then require an
explanation. This is called a “Popper sequence.” If each “Popper sequence”
generates new facts, it produces new knowledge; the original problem also
becomes richer in that it has more questions to resolve, but at the same time
we are getting closer to the truth of the inquiry, to the core of the problem.
The new facts arising from the sequence must also be explained and, in so
doing, we increase our knowledge of the problem as we explain or account
for these new discoveries. Popper’s approach has an additional advantage
in that any discovery made or any new fact revealed is now the subject
of further investigation within the theory under discussion. We must also
explain or account for these new facts that are uncovered through Popper’s
approach of analysis. The sequence is summarized as follows:
P(1)  Problem

TT(1)  Tentative Theory

EE(1)  Error Elimination

P(2) New Facts and New Problem
Problem 2 (P2) is different from Problem 1 (P1) as a result of the new
situation arising from the tentative theory (TT1) and the error elimination
(EE1), which consist of applying the tentative theory to solve the identified
problem (P1). New facts are produced, thus increasing our knowledge of the
situation under investigation. In this context, “knowledge” is used to mean
all kinds of expectations, some of which are conscious; others are uncon-
scious, still others are inborn or acquired through learning. It can also be
used to mean implicit and/or explicit assumptions and theoretical constructs
(true or false). Knowledge is often understood in education to mean “justi-
fied belief” (Swann, 2009). However, Popper says that we cannot justify our
beliefs because we do not know if they are true and also because, when these
beliefs enter into the public domain, they exist independently of us.
“Theory” in this volume refers to explicit statements of all kinds, includ-
ing general and singular statements as well as implicit assumptions and
unstated expectations (ideas). To make a theory testable, it is necessary to
combine it with statements of one or more specific initial conditions—the
circumstances under which the theory is to be tested—to form a positive
prediction. A prediction has the same structure as an explanation, except
that the theory and specific initial conditions are assumed to be known and
what remains to be discovered are the logical consequences, which have not
yet been observed (Popper, 1979, p. 352). For example, when a teacher uses
a theory (asking students to imagine what it would be like if they turned
their classroom into a zoo; what types of animals would they want to have?
[www.scholastic.com]) to develop her students’ literacy skills, she needs to
specify the condition(s) under which the theory will be tested to achieve an
anticipated result (e.g. during “circle time”). The theory is then subjected to
criticism (i.e. checking) to ascertain whether or not the prediction has been
fulfilled (in this case, feedback provided by students). According to Pop-
per, the prediction must be sufficiently precise in order for counter evidence
to emerge. If it is not sufficiently precise, the process is mere soothsaying
(Swann, 2009). The prediction needs also to be bold in the sense that it
is not overly consistent with prior expectation(s). The best predictions are
those that are specific, inconsistent (with some prior expectations), and can
be fulfilled. The bolder the prediction, the more challenging to our expecta-
tions and thus potentially the more stimulating to the growth of knowledge.
A situation needs to be created to refute the prediction. For example,
the teacher predicted that during circle time she would be provided with
animals’ names when the children were asked to name the types of animals
they would want to have in their classroom (when she adopted the strat-
egy proposed on the Scholastic web site). Even if she were provided with
animals’ names as she predicted, it does not prove that the theory is true.
In fact, the prediction may be fulfilled for reasons unrelated to the pro-
posed theory and the stated initial condition(s). The teacher (Nicole) did not
obtain the animals’ names from her class. Instead, her class responded by
saying that classroom was not big enough to be a zoo (first response). The
prediction in this case is not fulfilled and, thus, indicates that there was an
error or errors. However, the nature of the error is not clear, as we are not
sure whether the theory is in error or whether the conditions of the experi-
ment had been badly set up and/or poorly conducted (using the circle time to
elicit responses from students or using one instructional strategy for all stu-
dents’ language skills). The falsification of the theory requires that we make
a judgment based on the evidence and feedback, and our judgment may be
incorrect. Furthermore, we can adopt only one trial solution at a time to
solve our identified problem, not to mention that there are many possible
trial solutions to a problem and various ways in which we can respond to
the identified problem. Even though we can adopt a number of solutions, we
need to be aware that one or some are more successful than others.
P(1)  Problem = How do I get my students to name the types of animals they
would like to have in their classroom during circle time?

TT(1)  Tentative = By adopting the strategies proposed on the scholastic web
Theory site.

EE(1)  Error = Teacher did not obtain animals’ names from her class.
Elimination

P(2)  New Facts = How do I get my students to name or recall the types of
and New Problem animals they encountered in the story and wish to have in
their classroom?
Popper’s (1992) discussion on the logic of the social sciences, proposes the
method of “objective understanding or situational logic” in analyzing the
situation of the acting person sufficiently to explain the action with respect to
the situation without any help from psychology. Objective “understanding”
means that the action was objectively appropriate to the situation (p. 79).
This situational logic assumes the existence of both the physical and social
world. The latter includes social institutions and people. Popper (1992) went
on to suggest that we might “construct a theory of intended and unintended
institutional consequences of purposive action” (p. 80). Purposive action means
not only what individuals do when they act for themselves but also when they
act as agents of institutions. It is important to note that “institutions do not
act; rather, only individuals act, within or on behalf of institutions” (p. 80).
Thus, individuals can develop both theories of intended and unintended conse-
quences of action. Examples of the latter, based on Nicole’s lesson plan, would
be that teachers are more inclined to use the activities presented in the commer-
cially available lesson plans than to create activities that target specific needs of
individual students. An example of the intended consequences of action is that
Nicole was able to identify students who have grasped the concept of sounds.
THEORETICAL VERSUS PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
Even though there is a tendency for researchers and scholars to focus on

the analysis of theoretical problems and their solutions rather than on the
practical problems and their solutions, Popper (1974) agrees that a distinc-
tion between them be drawn since they are two distinct kinds of problems
which require different kinds of solutions (Burgess, 1977, 1985, 2002;
Naish & Hartnett, 1975; Pratt, 1999; Swann, 1999, 2009). According to
Krick (1969), a practical problem is a problem of how to get from one state
of affairs to another (p. 3). The solution to a practical problem requires a
new state of affairs that comes about as a result of having something done
regardless of whether the solution is successful or unsuccessful. Teachers
are engaged in practical activities because they are involved in addressing
practical problems. They formulate their problems by using questions, such
as “How can . . .?” Their answers formulated in words are “By doing or not
doing. . . .” In contrast, the solution to a theoretical problem lies in a theory
or set of theories, which can be divided into three categories: (1) problems
of value, (2) problems of facts, and (3) problems of logic (Swann, 2003).
If, for example, Nicole wishes to improve her practice on how to teach her
students the alphabet, it is insufficient for her to merely learn more about
how to teach the alphabet. At some point, she needs to make changes to
the way she teaches and evaluate the outcomes of the activities that she
has presented to her students. In deciding what to do, she may formulate a
range of theoretical questions, such as “What ought I do?” This question
may influence Nicole’s subsequent actions, but the solution to her practical
problem is yet to be determined.
EDUCATION: A TOOL FOR SOCIAL ENGINEERING
Many of our assumptions regarding facts are erroneous, and there is much
we think we know but do not know. In some cases, our ignorance has no
major consequences as to whether we succeed despite errors and limitations
in our knowledge, and in other cases, our ignorance can be an impediment
to our success. For example, Nicole believes that she can effectively teach
her students the alphabet (X) by following the activities in the lesson plan
(Y) or believing that doing (Y) is the most effective way of achieving (X).
Let us pretend for argument’s sake that Nicole succeeded in teaching her
students the alphabet successfully (X) by following the lesson plan (Y). She
thinks that she has achieved X by doing Y, but one or more unknown fac-
tors may have come into play in her specific situation. If this is the case, her
assumption is wrong and she has misunderstood the situation to which it
seemed to apply. In her case, wrongly assuming that following the activities/
steps described in the lesson plan (Y) is a means by which she can achieve
her goal of teaching her students the alphabet (X) does not constitute an
impediment to success. However, it may become an impediment in some
future situation. Even though ignorance does not invariably prevent us
from succeeding, Swann (2003) suggests that there is still much to gain
from trying “to (a) avoid solutions to practical problems that embody erro-
neous assumptions about the effectiveness of the solution, unintended con-
sequences, and the existence of better alternative solutions, and (b) advance
our knowledge” (p. 262). These actions become even more important when
a large number of people are affected by the decisions made. Educators
intervene in the lives of their students with the intention of achieving spe-
cific educational goals. There are situations where teachers can address
practical problems without the help of explicit theory. However, there are
many situations where it would be dangerous for them to do so because
their students would be adversely affected by their actions. The unintended
consequences resulted in teachers’ actions may also be harmful and farther
reaching (Popper, 1961, sect. 20). There is no doubt that some courses
of actions are better than others because they have better (less harmful)
consequences and solve more problems. Often we see teachers taking a
course of action that is radical without being clear about the problem that
the action is intended to solve. When Nicole states that her goal is to teach
her students the alphabet, she is merely describing that her students do not
know the alphabet. However, she needs to problematize the situation by
saying why she needs to teach them the alphabet (a practical problem) or
ask why they don’t know how to read the alphabet (a theoretical problem).
There is no doubt that there is more than one way in which a mismatch
between expectation and experience can be turned into a problem. But the
task of formulating problems is not often straightforward and value-free
(Swann, 2003, 2009). This is due to the fact that one has a particular set
of values and preferences. Our view of what is desirable is affected by who
we are as individuals, our personal and cultural experiences and position or
role in society, and all of these factors influence our choice of doing things,
such as our choice of using one instructional method over another to teach
literacy or numeracy. This is not a sound reason for assuming a relativistic
position with respect to how we best go about doing things because some
ways of doing things are better and more effective than others (Diller, 2008;
Popper, 1979).
If schools are concerned with improving their practice, educators need to
find ways of putting their hypothesis to the test in their school and classroom
practice. When evaluating a practice, it is easy to find evidence of some sort
to support our practice, especially if we are either disposed to do so or if
our colleagues have recommended that we adopt these practices. However,
if we are committed to genuinely improving our practice, Swann (2009)
suggests that we become critical and ask “what are the unintended and
undesirable consequences of doing things this way?” (p. 8). For example,
Nicole can address this question by setting up a parallel activity to test the
unintended consequences of asking the children to name the animals they
would like to have in the classroom. When she investigates the consequences
of her teaching practice, she also needs to take into account the unintended
consequences that may arise, even though they have not been formulated as
part of a testable theory; these unintended consequences may be desirable.
Nicole’s use of the web lesson plan illustrates that the adoption of Pop-
per’s approach does not necessarily require large-scale experiments. In fact,
a well-conducted case study can be effective in casting doubt on existing
assumptions. Regardless of the nature of the research strategy and the scale
of the experiment devised to test an educational hypothesis, the task of testing
can and will be problematic. For example, in Nicole’s case, the major chal-
lenge would be that of controlling the variables, such as circle time, alpha-
bet knowledge, maturity of students, and so forth. Furthermore, nothing is
proven when predictions are fulfilled or when they are refuted. However,
it is possible to devise tests that have the potential to challenge construc-
tively existing expectations. In order for Nicole to create new knowledge,
she needs to uncover the error(s) in the existing knowledge (Feyerabend,
2010; Swann, 2009).
Popper’s approach needs to be developed or learned through stages and
with time. Teachers need to be aware that it takes time to master the use
of this approach. Merely introducing or having teachers learn the differ-
ent theories has only a limited effect in improving their ability to deal with
teaching issues in different contexts. If teachers were taught to falsify their
hypotheses or theories, they would become more sensitive to their own ways
of thinking and less likely to misapply their theories or make hasty judg-
ments. The acceptance of this critical method might also serve as an antidote
to the prevailing induction model in the field of education.
*******
There are many pre-scientific theories in the conduct of education, the truth
of which is assumed, such as, that the task of the student is to learn the
materials presented to them, not to question or criticize the materials. It is
also expected that they provide prescribed answers—e.g. name animals that
are only encountered in the story rather than coming up with answers of
their own, such as naming animals that are not in the story. It is to our detri-
ment that these assumptions are not tested in the critical manner described
by Popper. Popper’s (1979) approach can serve to challenge many of the
taken-for-granted assumptions about the organization and conduct of edu-
cation. For example, schools should be places where students are provided
with opportunities to discover errors and inadequacies. Often, when stu-
dents reveal their inadequacies, they tend to receive a penalty of some kind
(the need to pay more attention to the story). This is because teachers are
pressured to produce individuals who are able to perform tasks according to
narrowly conceived standards. In these circumstances, there is a tendency to
penalize students who fail to understand, give the prescribed answer, agree
or conform (Swann, 2009).
There are potential risks involved in experimenting, but leaving things
as they are may also be risky. Many of the assumptions that influence edu-
cational practice have not been critically tested. It should be noted that,
although a practice may have a long history of acceptance, it does not mean
that attention has been paid to its unintended consequences. It does not
mean that there is no better alternative. Although one may argue that it is
risky to change one’s practice because matters could be made worse, the
need to experiment with the application of new practices is warranted when
the existing practice appears to be unsatisfactory, when proposed changes
to the existing practice have withstood criticism. One may discover that the
new practices have solved the problems they were intended to solve and
have no undesirable unforeseen consequences. As frequently as possible, one
should test rigorously the theories that are used to guide the changes one
makes, which is the subject of my next chapter.
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257–282.
4 Guiding Pre-Service Teachers’
Reflections
A Popperian Analysis Using the Objective
Knowledge Growth Framework
Journal writing is one among many common techniques used in pre-service

teacher education programs for encouraging students to reflect on their pro-
fessional practice during field experience placements. This chapter describes
the Curriculum and Assessment course using the Objective Knowledge
Growth Framework (OKGF), a Popperian model of reflection. The object
of the course was to gather information as to whether the OKGF provided
a structure for pre-service teachers to reflect on teaching practice issues that
arose during their practicum, and how they solved the identified problem(s).
The question asked was, “Does real and sustained knowledge growth occur,
as defined by the OKGF, through reflection using a journal?”
Popper (1979) believes that individuals engage with their surroundings on
three Worlds. World 1 is the physical world, World 2 is the world of men-
tal states, and World 3 is the world of ideas in the objective sense, such as
the solutions or ideas contained in pre-service teachers’ journals. Using Pop-
per’s three Worlds, this study attempts to show how these constructs can be
adapted for teachers to grow their knowledge using an analysis of data from
24 pre-service teachers’ journal entries. This chapter begins with a discussion
on journal-keeping as a form of self-directed professional inquiry, which is
also a vehicle for understanding oneself as a teacher. This discussion is fol-
lowed by an overview of the literature on reflection. Next is a description of
how journal-keeping can be situated in Popper’s three Worlds by addressing
the theoretical question that incorporates a view of reflection into the OKGF;
that is, an explanation is provided as to how reflection (World 2) can be
made to conform to the demands of knowledge growth (World 3) by link-
ing them together. Furthermore, an explanation of the connection between
World 2 reflection and the physical World entries of the journal is provided.
Finally, the study shows that real and sustained knowledge growth can occur,
as defined by Popper’s schema through the act of reflection using a journal.
JOURNAL-KEEPING
Proust once said, “The voyage of discovery lies not in seeking new vistas
but in having new eyes” (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/
Pre-Service Teachers’ Reflections 47
marcelprou391558. html). New eyes can often be found through many sim-
ple procedures, such as keeping a journal. Journal writing can be a vehicle
for understanding oneself as a teacher. It also offers a place for teachers to
explore the planning and outcomes of curricular, instructional, relational
and other classroom activities (Cole & Knowles, 2000). Most of all, it can
be a place for teachers to review the events of their day, to ask those nagging
questions, big or small. One cannot pursue them all unless one writes them
down: the key is to relive the day from a new perspective. Journal writing
is effective, especially for difficult questions with no easy answers. Further-
more, it is a place to record honest perceptions of and reactions to classroom
situations (Fletcher, 1996), especially with the increased demands put on
teachers by students, parents, administrators, colleagues, and policymakers.
Teachers are continuously being challenged to perform. However, little or
no emphasis is placed on thinking, challenging, or questioning educational
policies, practices, or assumptions.
THE IMPORTANCE OF REFLECTION
Loughran (2002) argues that reflection emerges as a suggested way of help-

ing educators better understand what they know and do in developing their
knowledge of practice through reconsidering what they learn in practice.
Furthermore, reflection is important in order to sustain the professional
health and competence of teachers and the ability to exercise professional
judgment which is, in fact, informed through teachers’ reflection on their
practice (Day, 1999).
Brookfield (1995) emphasizes the importance of the reflective practice
literature for offering teachers a variety of approaches to examine their prac-
tice so that they may discover and research taken-for-granted assumptions
that influence their approaches to practice:
We can learn about, and start experimenting with, different approaches

to assumptions hunting. Many of these approaches outline ways in
which a program for the encouragement of reflective practice in others
can be systematically developed.
(pp. 218–219)
John Dewey (1933) argued that “we do not learn from experience. We
learn from reflecting on experience” (p. 78); that is, the experience alone
does not lead to learning. It is the reflection on the experience that enhances
learning. Building on Dewey’s statement, journal writing can be viewed as
a reflective bridge that enables teachers to think, challenge, and question
educational policies or practices.
Some of the definitions of reflective teaching put emphasis on a rather
solitary process of introspection and retrospection, focusing specifically on a
teacher’s actions and thoughts before, during, or after the lessons or teaching.
48 Pre-Service Teachers’ Reflections
Cruickshank and Applegate (1981, cited in Barlett, 1990) define reflective
teaching as “the teacher’s thinking about what happens in classroom lessons,
and thinking about alternative means of achieving goals or aims” (p. 202).
This version of reflective teaching could be practiced in isolation.
Richards and Lockhart’s (1994) definition of reflective teaching also sug-
gests that it can be carried out by individuals working alone. Furthermore,
they believe that, in reflective teaching, “teachers and student teachers col-
lect data about teaching, examine their attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, and
teaching practices, and use the information obtained as a basis for critical
reflection about teaching” (p. 1). They argue that reflective teaching can be
practiced by both in-service and pre-service teachers, as long as the persons
have some current, ongoing, teaching experience that can serve as the basis
for reflection (Chitpin, 2006).
Other definitions take a broader stance and embed the concept of reflec-
tion within the social and political contexts of programs, schools, and com-
munities. For example, Zeichner and Liston’s (1996) definition of reflective
teaching is more socially oriented since they have worked as elementary
school teachers and teacher educators. For them, reflective teaching involves
a “recognition, examination, and rumination over the implications of one’s
beliefs, experiences, attitudes, knowledge, and values as well as the opportu-
nities and constraints provided by the social conditions in which the teacher
works” (p. 6). While the cognitive processes of recognition are still carried
out by individuals, this definition puts emphasis on the social contexts in
which our teaching occurs.
Zeichner and Liston (1996) were influenced by the work of John Dewey.
They quote Dewey’s definition of reflection as “active, persistent and careful
consideration of any belief or practice in light of reasons that support it and
the further consequences to which it leads” (p. 9). Furthermore, they believe
that simply thinking about teaching does not necessarily constitute reflective
teaching. It must have a reflexive dimension:
If a teacher never questions the goals and the values that guide his or her
work, the context on which he or she teaches, or never examines his or
her assumptions, then it is our belief that this individual is not engaged
in reflective teaching.
(p. 1)
In other words, simply planning the lessons or thoughtfully marking papers

does not necessarily entail reflective teaching. Reflective practice, by defi-
nition, involves critical examination by teachers of their own motivation,
thinking, and practice (Chitpin, 2006). Stanley (1998) explains what teach-
ers do when they engage in reflective teaching:
Developing a reflective teaching practice can be represented as a series

of phases: (a) engaging with reflection, (b) thinking reflectively, (c) using
reflection, (d) sustaining reflection, and (e) practicing reflection. The
phases do not represent a sequence that is followed but rather moments
in time and particular experiences that constitute a particular phase.
(p. 585)
These phases are not linear. At “certain points in time, given personal and
contextual circumstances, teachers may find themselves in any of these
phases” (p. 585). Stanley’s research with both in-service and pre-service
teachers indicates that teachers can become more adept at reflective teach-
ing. It is a skill that can be developed over time.
Dewey (1933) believed that three key attitudes are necessary for teach-
ers to be reflective: open-mindedness, responsibility, and wholeheartedness.
Building on Dewey’s work, Zeichner and Liston (1996) state that “open-
mindedness and responsibility must be central components in the profes-
sional life of the reflective teacher” (p. 11). They again cite Dewey as saying
that reflection “emancipates us from merely impulsive and routine activ-
ity . . . [and] enables us to direct the actions with foresight and to plan
according to ends in view of purposes of which we are aware” (p. 17). In
short, in order to be reflective, one must be open-minded, responsible and
wholehearted in one’s desire to improve. Reflection not only changes teach-
ing practices, it changes teachers.
However, none of the above accounts of reflection conforms precisely to
the demands of the growth of knowledge concept portrayed by Karl Pop-
per (1979). This is largely because they have been shaped by considerations
of psychological processes or, sometimes, social processes. The following
paragraphs consider the nature of reflection from a knowledge growth
perspective.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE WORLDS
Since the framework used for analyzing the journal entries of the 24 pre-
service teachers is based on a knowledge growth framework, it is impor-
tant to describe the relationship of the three Worlds. According to Popper
(1979), World 1 is the world of physical bodies and their physical and physi-
ological states. World 2 is the world inhabited by our own mental states
(human consciousness). World 3 is the world of ideas, art, science, language,
ethics, and institutions. World 2 interacts not only with World 1 but also
with World 3 objects. In addition, World 3 objects can act upon World 1
through World 2, which functions as an intermediary. Popper states that
all our actions in World 1 are influenced by our World 2 grasp of World 3.
Furthermore, Popper believes that we cannot understand World 2, the world
of human consciousness, without understanding that its main function is to
produce World 3 objects. The concept of a man-made yet autonomous third
World is one of the most promising growth points for Popper (Magee, 1985).
However, in order to improve reasoning, a World 2 psychological process,
it needs to conform to the demands of World 3 logic; that is, by requiring
World 2 to meet the normative demands of World 3 logic. As far as Popper
is concerned, all the Worlds’ entities are products of the human mind that
exist independently of any knowing subject (Chitpin, 2006).
KNOWLEDGE GROWTH AND REFLECTION: A LINK

BETWEEN WORLD 3 AND WORLD 2
Since the basic framework used in analyzing pre-service teachers’ journal

entries is that of a knowledge growth framework, it is important to describe
the role of reflection, a World 2 phenomenon, with respect to knowledge
growth, a World 3 entity.
For reflection, a psychological World 2 process, to be epistemically pro-
gressive and to conform to the demands of knowledge growth, teachers’
reflections need to mirror Popper’s schema: P1  TT  EE  P2. The
“P1” refers to the problem from which pre-service teachers started. It may
be a practical or a theoretical problem. More often than not, “P1” is a
practical problem. “TT” is a tentative theory, which the pre-service teach-
ers offered in their attempt to solve the problem. “EE” refers to a process
of error elimination, by way of critical tests, or of critical discussion. “P2”
refers to the problems with which pre-service teachers ended up; that is, the
problems that emerge from the discussions and tests. The more teachers’
reflections conform to Popper’s schema, the more this can be regarded as
a form of knowledge growth. The same principle applies to learning. The
more it conforms to this schema, the more it can be regarded as a form of
knowledge growth. Teachers’ journals belong to World 1, and their mental
representations to World 2, and the ideas expressed in the journals, a World
3 phenomenon. These can all be fitted together in a way that provides a
model of epistemic progress, or knowledge growth, and that can be used to
provide evidence as to whether reflections contribute to pre-service teachers’
professional knowledge growth, as evidenced by Joan’s summary of knowl-
edge growth (see Table 4.1).
THE JOURNAL FRAMES
World 1 represents a sequence of events through a period of time. Frame 1

represents objects relevant to pre-service teachers in the context of practice.
The objects can be a world of classrooms, students, other teachers and a host
of journal entries. The frame changes over time, a change that is captured by
delineating the next temporal stage as depicted in Frame 2. Furthermore, the
difference between frames over time is captured by the completion of a “Pop-
per Cycle,” a complete run through the Popper schema P1  TT  EE  P2.
Table 4.1 The journal frames
Frame 1 Frame 2 Frame 3 Frame 4

P1: How to record P2: How to P3: How to provide P4: How to meet
learning that takes improve the pace remedial support the needs of all
place on a particular of the lessons? to these students students?
day? without destroying
their self-esteem?
TT1: This is achieved TT2: This is TT3: This is
by videotaping the achieved by using achieved by
class when lessons a journal to record grouping students
were in progress and the difficulty heterogeneously.
transcribing the details that some of the
of classroom events in students were
a journal. experiencing.
EE1: Feedback from EE2: Feedback EE3: Feedback
journal entry reveals from the journal from students’
that the pace of the entry reveals those work reveals that
lessons was too fast students who this strategy works
for some students, and were experiencing for only some
thus some disruptive difficulty needed students but not for
behaviour was noted. remedial support. all students.
World 1 Journal 1 World 1 Journal 2 World 1 Journal 3 World 1 Journal 4
Thus, Frame 2 starts with a new problem or issue calling for further develop-
ments in pre-service teachers’ tentative theories, as shown in Table 4.1. It is
assumed that the successive developments of solutions to pedagogical prob-
lems are incorporated into the journal entry, so that the entry is itself different
for each frame. Pre-service teachers’ identification of problems, development
of trial solutions, or tentative theories to overcome the problems are all cogni-
tive processes that take place in World 2, where reflection takes place.
For reflection to contribute to knowledge growth, it needs to be more
than learning, it needs to be epistemically progressive; that is, it needs to
mirror Popper’s schema of problem-solving by the method of imaginative
conjecture and criticism, or the method of conjecture and refutation. The
evidence will reside in the extent to which pre-service teachers’ reflections
match this schema. When this occurs, the succession of tentative theories
corresponding to each of the World 1 frames will reflect epistemically pro-
gressive learning, as shown in Table 4.1. Although these tentative theories
belong to World 2 mental objects, they will have a cognitive content that is
characterized by sets of ideas residing in World 3.
When World 2 reflective processes are constrained by the demands of
our epistemology, the existence of World 3 abstract counterparts follows
automatically. Thus, we can move between World 2 tentative theories and
their knowledge growth World 3 counterparts freely. This is due to the fact
Table 4.2 Successive stage of reflections corresponding to World 1 frames
Frame 1 Frame 2
P1: How to improve P2: How to get the whole

classroom management class to be on task?
skills?
TT1: This is achieved by TT2: This is achieved by

introducing positive circulating around the
classroom discipline. classroom while students
are at work.
EE1: Feedback from EE2: Feedback from

students’ actions suggests observations reveals that
some improvement in there is a reduction in
behaviour in some students, disruption but an increase
but not all students. in helpless hand raisers.
World 2 reflection: (P1 TT1 EE1 P2) (P2 TT2 EE2 P3)
that the specification of the cognitive content of World 2 tentative theories

constitute ideas that are products of the human mind, belonging to World 3
(see Table 4.2).
DIMENSIONS OF REFLECTION
According to the OKGF, the process of reflecting has four elements. The
first element begins with the identified problem (P1) to be solved. The prob-
lems can range from academic to social to developmental to behavioural.
In this study, pre-service teachers learned to formulate problems before they
switched their attention to the search for possible solutions or tentative
theories (TT1). The second element is the tentative theory (TT1), which
pre-service teachers first reached; for example, their tentative interpretations
for dealing with their identified problem. The third element, error elimina-
tion (EE1), consists of a severe critical examination of pre-service teach-
ers’ conjecture, their tentative interpretation. It consists, for example, of
the critical use of documentary evidence and, if there is at this early stage
more than one conjecture at their disposal, it also consists of a critical dis-
cussion and comparative evaluations of the competing conjectures leading
to the revised problem (P2). Journal entries of pre-service teachers either
contained examples of how their tentative theories fared against the peda-
gogical problems and how the tentative theories were revised, or it revealed
how pre-service teachers have developed professionally in contributing to
knowledge growth. The fourth and final element of the process is the iden-
tification of a new problem (P2). P2 is the problem situation as it emerges
from pre-service teachers’ first attempt to solve their problems. It leads up
to their second attempt. A satisfactory understanding is reached if the inter-
pretation, the conjectural theory, finds support in the fact that it can throw
new light on new problems, on more problems than pre-service teachers
expected. This is also the case if it finds support in the fact that it explains
many sub-problems, some of which were not seen to begin with. Thus, pre-
service teachers may say that they can gauge the progress they have made by
comparing P1 with some later problems, say Pn.
The Popper cycle is both cyclical and progressive, since the output of one
cycle figure is the input of the next. When viewed over time within World 1,
it marks the transition between frames. The epistemic progressive trajectories
of theorized practice would therefore be the succession of clusters of problems
and solutions that travel through the succession of frames (Chitpin, 2006).
REFLECTION AND JOURNAL WRITING: A LINK

BETWEEN WORLD 2 AND WORLD 1
Just as it was important to state the connection between World 2 reflection

and World 3 ideas arising from the reflection, so it is equally important
to state the link between reflection and the journal, World 1. Journals are
viewed as an extension of the mind in the same way the cognitive process of
doing mental calculations is viewed. The mental process of doing arithmetic
is a World 2 process. It is reflection on arithmetic.
However, the power of mind can be greatly extended by externalizing
the process of using paper and pencil. These World 1 entities serve to repre-
sent mental processes while internalizing them so as to become objects for
reflection. The powers of the World 2 mind are thus greatly enhanced by
offloading cognition onto World 1 cognitive journal entries that can func-
tion recursively in World 2 reflection (Chitpin, 2006).
The question of whether journal writing enhances pre-service teachers’ pro-
fessional growth and development therefore admits of World 1 evidence. This
resides in the extent to which the journal entries can be characterized in terms
of approximation to the Popper cycle: P1  TT  EE  P2. It is important
to note the contribution that the “externalized” World 1 journal can make to
aspects of epistemically progressive World 2 reflection (Chitpin, 2003, 2006).
METHODOLOGY
Data for this study were collected during a fall section in the Curriculum and
Assessment course, offered as part of an eight-month Bachelor of Education
in an Ontario University. In the fall semester, pre-service teachers spend two
days per week for two weeks observing in a classroom. They then spend two
days per week, for three weeks, working with individual students or a small
group of students in a classroom, and finally they do a four-week practicum.
The 24 pre-service teachers enrolled in the Curriculum and Evaluation
Design course were asked to identify an area of growth related to a classroom
issue that they dealt with in their first placement as part of the course require-
ment. There were a total of three assignments: (a) journal writing (40%), unit
planning (35%), and journal article synopsis (25%). In the journal-writing
component, pre-service teachers were asked to reflect on their field experience
using the OKGF to solve classroom-related problems. A minimum of eight
journal entries was required. The participants were provided with opportuni-
ties to actively engage in testing their tentative theories in a variety of teaching
contexts both within the course and during their practicum. They were first
introduced to the framework at the beginning of the fall semester where they
were required to read the article “From Uncertainty to Knowledge Growth
Through Individual Reflection” (Evers & Chitpin, 2003). They also partici-
pated in a three and a half hour discussion on how teachers in the study
formulated their tentative theories based on the identified problems. Further-
more, they had six hours to explore, in small group settings, the different ways
teachers went about (1) identifying the problems at hand; (2) formulating and
refining their tentative theories; and (3) eliminating errors based on feedback
from their mentor teachers, students, and reflection. Each participant was
asked to complete five Popper cycles using the template described in Evers and
Chitpin (2003) and based on the Popper schema.
The focus was centred upon the nature, content, and evolution across
cycles of pre-service teachers’ tentative theories, theory application, error
elimination, and epistemic growth. With respect to the tentative theories,
the analyses focused on how pre-service teachers articulated their theories
(solutions) to resolve their problem of practice, whether these theories were
bold, daring, and grounded in the literature, and whether they were apt to
produce long-term sustainable teaching practices related to classroom man-
agement. In other words, pre-service teachers were expected to go beyond
seeking student and collegial feedback and to propose concrete measures to
refute their theories. They were also required to provide the timeline, indica-
tor, measure, and criteria for refuting their tentative theories. The bases pre-
service teachers used to eliminate a theory were also examined. The cycles
were examined for epistemic growth in the following manner: (1) looking
for the extent to which the identified problem is dealt with in a thought-
ful, continuous, and systematic way; (2) looking for evidence in each cycle
showing evidence of an increased sense of awareness of their own teaching
beliefs, style, and perspective. The data reveal that unsuccessful attempts to
solve a problem by pre-service teachers have taught them something new
about where its difficulties lay, and what the minimum conditions were in
order to alter the problem situation.
RESULTS
The 24 participants critically reflected on their practice by going below the

surface of memory to identify learning derived from specific experiences,
and articulated when, why and how the OKGF was applied. Furthermore,
they found that reflection played an integral part because, by reflecting on
their experiences and actions, they were able to determine the most effec-
tive course of action to solve their identified problem, that of classroom
management. As their initial problem, 11 pre-service teachers identified
minimizing class disruptions, 11 others identified getting one or a few stu-
dents to behave, and two pre-service teachers identified issues related to
having control/authority in the classroom. Given the prevalence of class-
room management concern among the participants, the analysis will be
focused on their use of the OKGF as a Popperian model for reflection in
dealing with classroom management and linking writing, reflection, and
practice.
Popper cycle charts were very structured and designed to facilitate and
document iterative, logical problem-solving. The Popper cycle method
forced me to be much more concise and thus focus on the essentials of
the problem to be solved, the theorized solution, and the outcome when
the tentative theory was applied. The cycle naturally drew attention to
further problems to be addressed. It required me to reflect on each stage
(P1, TT1, EE1, P2) and see the relationship between them.
The many reflection assignments that I completed this semester have
strongly demonstrated the benefits of actively and regularly reflecting
on my teaching experiences. It is only through this reflective process that
my teaching practices will improve and will be responsive to the needs
of my students. In addition, I learned new ways of practicing reflection
and problem solving, most notably the use of Popper cycles. The knowl-
edge I gained of self-evaluation is a powerful tool that will strengthen
my ability to teach and to be a life-long learner.
(Joan, pre-service teacher)
Although the critical analysis is based on all 24 participants’ journal

entries of their use of the OKGF, a detailed description of Joan’s (pseud-
onym) experience is chosen to illustrate how the OKGF is applied when
dealing with classroom-related issues through her journal experience. Joan’s
example typifies other pre-service teachers in the first category of classroom
issues in that the focus was on the whole class. Her documented number of
cycles approximates the mean number of cycles offered by all participants,
and, like all the participants in the study, she consistently dealt with the same
issue throughout the cycles. Thus, a detailed discussion of Joan’s knowledge
growth (see Table 4.3), intercepted by occasionally referring to other partici-
pants’ cycles on specific issues, will ensue.
Table 4.3 Evidence of Joan’s knowledge growth
World 3 Frame 1 World 3 Frame 2 World 3 Frame 3 World 3 Frame 4 World 3 Frame 5 World 3 Frame 6
P1: How to get P2: How can students’ P3: How can the P4: How can the P5: How can every P6: How can
the students to be attention be obtained students sit at circle students move from student complete a interest in the
attentive during quickly during circle time time without speaking circle time to their smooth transition? transitionsong be
circle time? without wasting time? out of turn? desks without talking maintained?
and wasting time?
TT1: This is TT2: This is achieved TT3: This is achieved TT4: This is achieved TT5: This is
achieved by stopping by clapping hands in by introducing the by rewarding points achieved by singing
and waiting quietly a rhythm and having talking feather. Students to the first group that a “transition song”
until everyone the students repeat the can only talk when is settled and ready to as a group while
notices and is ready clapped rhythm. holding the feather. begin. walking to their
to continue. next destination.
EE1: Feedback from E2: Feedback from EE3: Feedback from EE4: Feedback from EE5: Feedback from
students reveals that students reveals that students reveals that students reveals that students reveals that
a sufficient amount it takes a few claps the feather eliminates a select few are still the amount of time
of time is wasted. before all the students talking out of turn having difficulty, and wasted has been cut
are attentive. Students during circle time, but talking still occurs. down significantly.
continue to speak out of children continue to Students begin to
turn even after repeating talk and waste time lose interest in the
the clapping rhythm. during transitions. song and act silly.
The data reveal that journal writing using the OKGF helped to facilitate
the process of student articulation and documentation of their development.
The pre-service students recorded the classroom management-related chal-
lenges and concerns they encountered as depicted in Table 4.3.
Pre-service teachers came up with various tentative theories to overcome
the classroom management challenges and concerns they faced. They also
reflected on the ways they tested their tentative theories and documented
the evolution of their teaching style as a result of the error elimination pro-
cess. They found that incorporating the Popper cycles into their reflective
practice led them to articulate clearer goals and demonstrate who they are
as future practitioners. The following excerpt from Tally’s journal illustrates
the above point:
The reflections were developed after the assessment assignment was

completed and helped clarify the problems encountered, solutions
attempted, and professional growth that occurred. These reflections
were based on personal feedback rather than student performance. The
application of the Popper cycles not only addressed specific problems
encountered in the task but helped shape and document my own growth
and learning.
(Tally, pre-service teacher)
Terry’s experience is another example of how reflection using Popper

cycles has helped him meet his students’ needs. Towards the end of the
semester, he acknowledged his successful attempts at meeting the individual
needs of his students by clearly articulating what he wanted his students to
do at the end of the lesson and explained how reflecting and writing about
his lessons had helped him grow his professional knowledge:
Through self-reflection I found my job to be much easier and much

more satisfying in the end. My lessons were more well-developed and
defined. Popper cycles had me thinking of ways to improve my lessons
all the time. Prior to that, I had not thought about what to do with
two separate groups of students; one who was ready to go on and
learn the next lesson and another who needed some review to gain a
firmer understanding of the first concept. I was then able to determine
that the students who understand the original subject material would
move on the next lesson and begin their drawings while I gave indi-
vidual instruction to the two students who did not get the material,
by using a different story to walk through or possibly use flash cards
with expressions.
(Terry, pre-service teacher)
Furthermore, pre-service teachers found that reflecting on their teach-

ing and classroom management style or strategies led them to demonstrate
what they initially perceived as indemonstrable because teaching is like dry
ice at room temperature. It evaporates and leaves no visible trace (Shulman,
1992). The process of reflecting helped pre-service teachers make the uncon-
scious conscious and the implicit explicit, as far as possible. Sally states:
Writing my reflections causes me to break apart every individual section

of my lesson and actual teaching and truly analyze and separate what
did and did not prove effective. I found Popper cycles to be helpful in
that it allows for not only a form of reflection but it also emphasizes a
step-by-step look at what I did. Through this method of reflection, I was
able to think about my lesson in an organized way so as not to overlook
any aspect.
(Sally, Pre-service teacher)
SUMMARY OF JOAN’S KNOWLEDGE GROWTH
Joan’s reflective journal entries addressed classroom management issues. As

her initial problem (P1), Joan chose to work on better managing the transi-
tion time when students came in from outside. Her first TT was to stop and
wait until the whole class quieted down after coming inside. When she put
her theory to the test, she discovered that her method took far too long to
be effective and a great amount of time was wasted. She therefore decided
to eliminate this option or ‘‘error’’ (EE1) of waiting for the whole class to
quiet down after coming inside by revising her problem (P2) to “how to get
students’ attention quickly without wasting time.” Incorporating the knowl-
edge that waiting for the whole class to quiet down after coming inside does
not work that she gained from testing her first tentative theory (TT1), she
proposed another strategy, that of clapping a rhythm to get their attention,
a second tentative theory (TT2) which she explained as follows: “The idea
behind this is that the students stop immediately in order to clap back. The
teacher therefore knows that she has their full attention.”
In implementing her (TT2), Joan found that, while she did appear to have
some success with her new tentative theory (TT2), it did not fully address
the issue of student attention during circle time because some of her students
were still speaking out of turn (EE2). Joan decided to revise her problem
once again in order to focus on getting students’ to sit down and not speak
out of turn (P3). As to what she considered her next tentative theory (TT3),
Joan introduced the idea of the talking feather—mimicking what she likely
witnessed other experienced teachers using in other contexts to deal with the
problem of speaking out of turn. Joan explained: “This idea is taken from
the Native Gathering customs. An authentic feather is brought in for the
explanation, and then replaced with two craft feathers: green for boys and
white for girls. This is adopted into circle time customs.” Joan tested her the-
ory during circle time and found that, although the strategy eliminated the
issue of talking out of turn, some students continued to waste time during
transitions (EE3). The example above reinforces Popper’s argument against
the solution to the problem of induction. Each teaching situation is different
and, just because the talking feather had worked in the past for some teach-
ers, does not mean that it will work well in every situation. Like Popper, I
would advise teachers to devise confrontations and, if they discover that
some of the strategies that were recommended are not practical, they are in
fact making a discovery that would add to their knowledge in search of a
better theory. Joan continued to work on her identified problem and said,
“Feedback from students shows this strategy works very well during circle
time.” However, during transitions from “Meeting Place” to their desks,
chatting occurs and time is wasted. It takes several minutes to settle down to
work. This, in turn, becomes the next step in the Popper cycle. As mentioned
in Joan’s statement, she appeared to have eliminated her original problem of
students talking out of turn during circle time as depicted in (P1), (P2), and
(P3), posited in cycles #1, #2, and #3 (How to get students to be attentive
during circle time). She then moved to a broader or more general problem
in cycle #4; that of getting her students to be attentive beyond circle time.
She thus revised her problem (P4) to include getting students to not talk or
waste time during transitions. She used a points system as an incentive to get
the students to settle down quickly, which she described as her fourth ten-
tative theory (TT4). Through implementing the points reward system, she
discovered that some of the students were still having difficulty following the
rule of not talking and, therefore, discarded the theory’s effectiveness (EE4).
Joan articulated her fifth problem (P5), that of achieving a smooth tran-
sition from the carpet to their seats. She explained her attempts to get her
students to make smooth transitions from one activity to another as a chal-
lenge, saying,
This is a frustrating struggle for my mentor teacher. Upon talking to

another primary teacher, my mentor and I are reminded of singing dur-
ing transitions. This is a strategy she [another primary teacher] uses in
her grade one class and it works very well for her.
(Joan, pre-service teacher)
As for her tentative theory (TT5), she thus proposed to incorporate the
idea of singing a song to help her students during transitions. She soon
discovered that, although the amount of wasted time had been cut drasti-
cally, her students were nevertheless losing interest in the song (EE5). Her
newly articulated problem (P6) revealed her intention of directing her focus
to maintaining the interest of her students through songs. She even thought
of changing the song every two weeks as a strategy for maintaining her stu-
dents’ interest during transition periods.
The analysis of Joan’s data reveals that reflecting upon her classroom
management issue was a beneficial activity. It allowed her to test her tentative
theories through the error elimination process to discover the weak spot(s)
in her trial solutions. She learned through the error elimination process
that it was important for her to see first-hand whether her trial solutions
worked with her students and, according to Popper (1979), which can only
be achieved “by trying to solve it, and by failing to solve it” (p. 181). She
encountered difficulties with her classroom management, and attempted to
solve this by improving her tentative theories. In her attempts, she discov-
ered the need to reflect on her actions and students’ actions and interactions
to be aware of possible pitfalls. Also, she has now a greater appreciation
for the different ways classroom management problems can be handled.
By keeping a journal, Joan was able to refine her teaching by reflecting and
problem-solving using the OKGF.
DISCUSSION
Teachers’ professional knowledge is a fluid concept. In its limited sense it

means teachers’ basic knowledge of the subject matter and their ability to
teach it effectively. In its broader sense, teachers’ knowledge includes reflec-
tion, which consists largely of affective and cognitive processes practiced by
individuals.
Pre-service teachers’ identification of classroom management issues and
the proposition of tentative theories to solve them are all cognitive processes
that take place in World 2, where reflection occurs. Reflection, therefore,
records the changes experienced by the problem solver over time in response
to theorized experience. In fact, when teachers are able to reflect on their
teaching, reflection contributes more than learning. It contributes to knowl-
edge growth because its four basic elements (P1, TT, EE, PE) are organized
in an epistemically progressive way.
Journal writing has offered some insight into the pre-service teachers’
thinking and understanding of the problems they encountered. A problem
is defined as a matter of handling World 3 structural units (Popper, 1979).
All pre-service teachers in the study gained experience in wrestling with real-
life problems. Like all teachers, these pre-service teachers wanted to avoid
making errors. Yet, to avoid error is a poor ideal, because teachers cannot
avoid making errors in tackling difficult problems. If teachers do not dare
to tackle problems, there is no knowledge growth. In fact, Popper said, “It
is from our boldest theories, including those which are erroneous, that we
learn most. Nobody is exempt from making mistakes; the great thing is to
learn from them” (1979, p. 186).
All the participants in the study saw the robust and wide applicability of
the OKGF. The framework forces them to be much more concise with their
identification of problem(s). It focuses on the essentials of the problem(s) to
be solved, the theorized solution(s), and the outcome(s) that derived from
applying the tentative theory. The Popper cycles draws attention to further
problems to be solved. It requires pre-service teachers to reflect at each stage
(P1, TT1, EE1, P2) to see the relationships between them.
The participants claimed that completing the OKGF chart (i.e. Popper
cycle) was much quicker than writing an entire reflective piece in paragraph
form. Furthermore, they claimed that it was easier and quicker to glance at a
Popper cycle to capture all the information needed in one simple, structured
chart rather than reading an entire reflective paper. There is no doubt that
the OKGF is a thorough, logically structured, concise and precise model
which has the aim of improving teachers’ own performance through reflect-
ing on their practice.
*******
The use of the OKGF by pre-service teachers to document their professional
knowledge growth through journal writing as depicted in this study is not
only an innovative approach but also a reasonable one for researchers,
particularly when it helps pre-service teachers to cognitively and critically
confront the complexities of the teaching/learning process and their rela-
tionship to pedagogical knowledge. The findings in this study suggest that
the OKGF, when used as a process for documenting professional growth
of pre-service teachers, can help them solve complex teaching issues, such
as classroom management. Moreover, the OKGF provides them with the
possibility to clearly articulate, test, and reflect on their tentative theories,
thus developing a sound, progressive knowledge base and reflexive capac-
ity. Finally, the framework allows pre-service teachers to document their
own teaching practices, which promotes ongoing improvement in those
practices. In this way, individual teachers are not only contributing to their
individual growth and development but they are maximizing their students’
success as well. Chapter 5 proposes an innovative model for capturing
teachers’ knowledge growth to assist them in charting their own profes-
sional growth when faced with the many challenges in their professional
contexts of complexity and change. The model proposes to develop teach-
ers’ own knowledge, as autonomous learners and problem solvers, in order
to be successful practitioners.
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ards & D. Nunan (Eds.), Second language teacher education (pp. 202–214). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Brookfield, S. D. (1995). Becoming a critically reflective teacher. San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass.
Chitpin, S. (2006). The use of reflective journal keeping in a teacher education pro-
gram: A Popperian analysis. Reflective Practice, 7(1), 73–86.
opment: A knowledge building analysis. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Toronto.
Cole, A. L., & Knowles, J. G. (2000). Researching teaching: Exploring teacher devel-
opment through reflexive inquiry. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Cruickshank, D. R., & Applegate, J. H. (1981). Reflective teaching as a strategy for
teacher growth. Educational Leadership, 38(7), 553–554.
Day, C. (1999). Developing teachers: The challenges of lifelong learning. New York:
Falmer Press.
Dewey, J. (1933). How we think. Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery.
Evers, C., & Chitpin, S. (2003). From uncertainty to knowledge growth through
individual reflection. In Australian College of Educators (Ed.), Teachers as lead-
ers in a knowledge society (pp. 33–44). Deakin West, A.C.T.: Australian College
of Educators.
Fletcher, R. (1996). Breathing in and breathing out: Keeping a writer’s notebook.
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Loughran, J. (2002). Effective reflective practice: In search of meaning in learning
about teaching, Journal of Teacher Education, 53(1), 33–43.
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London, England: Open Court Publishing Company.
Popper, K. (1979). Objective knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Richards, J. C., & Lockhart, C. (1994). Reflective teaching in second language class-
rooms. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
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Stanley, C. (1998). A framework for teacher reflectivity. TESOL Quarterly, 32(3),
584–591.
Zeichner, K. M., & Liston, D. P. (1996). Reflective teaching: An introduction. Mah-
wah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
5 Capturing Pre-Service Teachers’
Knowledge Growth
Popper’s Philosophy of Science and
the Objective Knowledge Growth
Framework
Teaching is a complex and problematic endeavor despite being perceived as

‘‘a well ordered, technically proficient and purposefully directed routine’’
(Loughran, 2006, p. 30). In spite of teachers’ thoughtful planning, the very
act of teaching creates situations that can be anticipated but that cannot
always fully addressed until they arise in practice. Teaching evokes the image
of an ”indeterminate swampy zone” (Schon, 1983) because it is messy and
difficult to understand and master (Berry, 2004, p. 1312).
Teacher learning is fundamental to the health of the profession, which,
in turn, contributes to the quality of education experienced by children in
public schools. If continuous professional growth is to occur, then teachers’
engagement with their own learning is essential. Myers and Simpson (1998)
suggest that teachers learn about teaching “by teaching and from teaching”
(p. 58) because the range of teaching experiences are “ logged intellectually
into a teacher’s conceptual framework and built into his or her personal-
ized professional set of knowledge, skills and values” (p. 58). If such a view
of teaching is to prevail, educators need to understand their teaching as
investigation, experimentation, reflection and analysis of what goes on in
their classroom practice, and how they use their own personal professional
theories to guide them in their future practice (Myers & Simpson, 1998,
p. 58). Furthermore, curricular reform must be deeply rooted in the daily life
of schools and teaching (Darling-Hammond, 1998; Elmore & Burney, 1997;
Emihovich & Battaglia, 2000) and must feature opportunities for teach-
ers to inquire systematically about how teaching practice produces learning
opportunities for students (Little, 1993).
This chapter uses the OKGF for promoting learning, or professional
knowledge growth in pre-service teachers. This framework is based on Karl
Popper’s ideas of the philosophy of science, which provides teachers a spe-
cific schema for solving the problems identified in their teaching practices.
Because many of the challenges teachers face occur in professional con-
texts of complexity and change, teachers must be able to develop their own
knowledge, as autonomous learners and problem solvers, to be successful
practitioners (Chitpin, 2003).
64 Pre-Service Teachers’ Knowledge Growth
Popper’s fallibilism claims that all knowledge is fallible and may be in
need of revision. A teacher’s tentative theory or solution may meet with
mixed success when it comes to solving problems of practice, which can
prompt additional revisions. Practice provides the immediate context in
which teacher’s tentative theories are tested for their problem-solving capac-
ities. Knowledge growth occurs when teachers criticize or eliminate errors
contained in their theories to solve problems. This falsification approach to
knowledge growth becomes a necessary condition for teachers to grow their
professional knowledge and thus change their classroom practices.
This chapter seeks to answer the following research question: “How
does pre-student teachers’ work provide evidence of professional knowledge
growth based on the OKGF?” Educators may benefit by moving beyond the
idea that learners construct meaning as they critically think about and ques-
tion their own and others’ assumptions, beliefs, and actions within learning
communities (Cobb, 1994). Furthermore, pre-service teachers need to do
more than merely listen to the instructor and watch the instructor demon-
strate teaching methods and strategies. Pre-service teachers need to subject
their assumptions to the kind of critical testing described in Karl Popper’s
philosophy of science. They need to demonstrate their understanding of the
theories by testing them in their teaching context and revising their tenta-
tive theories through feedback and self-reflection. This study is of interest
for two reasons. First, there is an abundance of research on the benefits of
a constructivist approach in which students are active participants in the
teaching and learning processes (Darling-Hammond & McLaughlin, 1995;
Lieberman, 1995). However, these studies do not identify problems teach-
ers encountered in their teaching practices nor do they look at the many
different theories that teachers use to solve given problems (Zeichner &
Liston, 1996). Second, this study proposes an innovative way of applying
the theory to promote teachers’ knowledge growth. It looks at the use of the
Objective Knowledge Growth Framework to examine pre-service teachers’
professional knowledge growth in teaching reading and writing (Chitpin &
Simon, 2006).
THE OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE GROWTH FRAMEWORK (OKGF)
The Objective Knowledge Growth Framework (OKGF) is based on trial and

error (Popper, 1959, 1979) and focuses on the critical and constructive atti-
tude towards errors—errors that are consciously and cautiously uncovered
so as to refute them with searching arguments, including the designing of
alternate experimental tests.
The OKGF can be translated to teaching situations because it takes into
account the complexities and challenges associated with teaching. It enables
pre-service teachers to articulate and test their beliefs and biased assump-
tions as well as challenges their expectations of students. Teachers are often
Pre-Service Teachers’ Knowledge Growth 65
taught how, without necessarily understanding why, particular teaching
strategies or methods work with students simply because these strategies/
methods have proven to work well in the past. However, as Popper suggests,
at no stage are we able to prove that any given approach, that was shown
to work with students in the past, will necessarily continue to work with
students in the present and/or in the future because of the contextually sensi-
tive issues of teaching practice. Furthermore, it is always possible that these
strategies will turn out not to be as successful as predicted or demonstrated.
OKGF provides teachers with a structured process to consistently test their
theories or assumptions by devising confrontations between consequences
and new observable experience. If by doing so they discover that some of
the theories said to have been successful with students in the past are not
successful with their students, then they are, in fact, making a discovery that
would add to their knowledge in their quest for a more appropriate theory
(Chitpin et al., 2006).
Knowledge is used in this context in an objective sense, one in which
it may be said to be contained in a book, or stored in a library, or taught
in a university (Popper, 1979, p. 286). We are not only producers but also
consumers of theories. In other words, we have to consume other people’s
theories and sometimes consume our own to keep on producing knowledge.
Consumption of theories means criticizing them, changing them, and often
even demolishing them in order to replace them by better ones for knowl-
edge growth to occur (p. 288).
Criticism of Popper’s work, such as Kuhn (1970) and Lakatos (1963–
1964, 1970), come primarily from researchers in the field of philosophy
and focus on Popper’s definition of the terms “knowledge,” “growth of
scientific knowledge,” and their relationship to conjecture and refutation.
Furthermore, Feyerabend (1970) argued against Popper’s scientific method,
insisting that science must be far more open and willing to examine all pos-
sibilities because none are better than any other. He also believed that Pop-
per’s notion of falsifiability is too strict. Despite these criticisms, it is my
contention that the OKGF, which is based on Popper’s schema, can offer
great promise in the field of education, primarily as it relates to the profes-
sional growth of teachers, since the framework is well accepted in the scien-
tific community and was, in fact, used by Sir John Eccles in his Nobel Prize
winning research in 1963 (Bohm & Hiley, 1993; Pratt, 1995).
The framework can be represented by the following schema:
P1  TT1  EE1 P2.
P1 is the problem to be solved, TT1 is a tentative theory (TT) that the learn-
ers offer in order to solve the problem, EE1 is the process of error elimina-
tion (EE), and P2 is a new or revised problem.
Empirical studies have been conducted on the use of the OKGF as the
basis for professional development for teachers (Chitpin, 2003, 2006, 2013,
2015; Chitpin & Evers, 2005, 2013; Chitpin & Simon, 2006; Evers & Chit-
pin, 2003). In a series of case studies, the authors attempted to demon-
strate whether teachers’ professional learning, from their documentation of
experience, could be fitted to the OKGF. Findings from all of these studies
suggest that, regardless of the teachers’ professional training (pre-service or
in-service teachers), of their background, or of their prior experience, the
OKGF helps re-orient the participants to think in terms of rigorous attempts
to refute the hypotheses they are interested in.
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the framework can benefit and contribute to
teacher professional knowledge growth, and why teachers who use this
framework are expected to become more successful teachers.
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Although the study involved 28 pre-service teachers enrolled in a Bachelor of

Education program, in this chapter, two examples will be used to illustrate
how pre-service teachers used the OKGF to formulate their tentative theories
and to eliminate errors contained in those theories in order to maximize
learning outcomes and, thus, validate the suggestion that the objectivity of
problems lies beyond the subjectivity of individuals. The use of two care-
fully selected contrasting cases, typical of the group, allows for a full, deep,
and rich description of pre-service teachers’ use of the OKGF in building
knowledge about specific teaching strategies. The participants, procedures
and analyses are presented in the following paragraphs (Chitpin et al., 2008).
Participants
Twenty-eight pre-service teachers between the ages of 20 to 45 participated
in this study. There were 2 men and 24 women who were enrolled in the lan-
guage arts course in the Bachelor of Education (BEd) four-year concurrent
program. Half of the participants were in their second year and the other

Figure 5.1 The Objective Knowledge Growth Framework

half were in their final year of the program. Each participant was typical of
one of two types of students; those who entered the BEd concurrent program
after completing their high school and those who entered the program after
being in the work force for several years (Chitpin et al., 2008).
These participants were provided with opportunities to actively engage in
testing their tentative theories in a variety of classroom settings, both within
the course and during their field placements. As part of the course require-
ment, these pre-service teachers were expected to spend eight hours in a
classroom where they were to observe and teach one or two lessons to the
class or to a group of pupils, depending on the context (Chitpin et al., 2008).
Procedure
At the beginning of the course, students were introduced to the framework
by reading the paper “From Uncertainty to Knowledge Growth Through
Individual Reflection” (Evers & Chitpin, 2003) followed by extensive dis-
cussions on how the teachers in the study formulated their tentative theories
based on the problems that they had identified. They also explored the dif-
ferent ways teachers went about (1) identifying the problems they wanted to
solve; (2) formulating and refining their tentative theories; and (3) eliminat-
ing errors based on feedback from cooperating teachers, students and their
own reflections.
Analysis Using the OKGF

Using the OKGF, pre-service teachers’ writing was analyzed for evidence
of how feedback from peers, associate teachers, the instructor/researcher,
and self-reflection had allowed them to modify their teaching strategies to
maximize students’ outcomes, as well as how engaging in knowledge growth
activities helped pre-service teachers improve their teaching. Furthermore,
the knowledge growth approach enabled them to construct practice through
a lived experience of a pedagogical approach that was new to them, for they
had often been told how they should teach children and what children need
to learn and know.
The analyses of all 28 pre-service students’ use of the OKGF were based
on two writing samples. The first sample was taken from a lesson plan
assignment created by pre-service teachers, based on a children’s book of
a chosen grade level to meet a specific component of the Department of
Education requirement for language arts. In addition to creating a lesson
plan, they needed to come up with three activities based on the lesson that
they had created. They then had to teach the lesson to the students in their
observation-practicum class in a kindergarten to Grade 6 setting. The sec-
ond sample was taken from pre-service teachers’ reflections, stemming from
feedback from the associate teacher and students, showing how they had
refined their tentative theories through the error elimination process to max-
imize students’ learning.
Pre-service teachers’ work samples were analyzed using Popper’s schema
that was elaborated in various ways, for example, by writing it as follows
(see Figure 5.2):
TTb EEb P2b
P1 TTb EEb P2b
TTn EEn P2n
Figure 5.2 Popper’s schema
In the written form in Figure 5.2, pre-service teachers proposed many the-
ories in their attempts to solve the problem (P1) of sequencing, for instance,
and each of their proposed solutions was critically examined to arrive at new
problem (i.e. P2b). When the new problem, (P2b) turned out to be merely
the old P1 in disguise, then one could say that the student’s theory only man-
aged to shift the problem a little (Popper, 1979, p. 288). However, the ques-
tion one should ask is how well the theory had solved the student’s problem,
P1. The cycle goes on until the student finds that the problem is adequately
solved and has added new knowledge to effective teaching approaches; it is
only then that one can say that one has entered Popper’s World 3.
Since pre-service teachers’ work samples were the main data source in this
study, a list of all the problems identified by them was made. The problems
were coded under Problem 1 to Problem n for each pre-service teacher. The
tentative theory (TT1) to overcome the identified problem (P1) was written
underneath the problem, followed by the feature of error elimination (EE1)
to test or revise the tentative theory (TT1). The new problem that arises out of
the previous frame ran through the knowledge growth schema P1  TT1 
EE1  P2 for each of the problems identified for each pre-service teacher.
A chart was created for each of the pre-service teachers consisting of
the following: pre-service teacher’s name (pseudonyms are used); Frame 1
consists of Problem 1 (P1); Tentative Theory 1 (TT1), Error Elimination 1
(EE1) and Problem 2 (P2). Frame 2 consists of Problem 2 (P2); Tentative
Theory 2 (TT2); Error Elimination 2 (EE2) and Problem 3 (P3) and so on
(see Figure 5.1 as an example).
FINDINGS
The following paragraphs present an analysis of the data from two pre-
service teachers. Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, illustrate how Emily and
Vanessa attempt to solve the problem of teaching sequencing to their kinder-
garten students using Popper’s schema elaborated in various ways. The data
Table 5.1 Evidence of Emily’s knowledge building
Popper Cycle 1 Popper Cycle 2 Popper Cycle 3 Popper Cycle 4 Popper Cycle 5
P1: How to P2: How P3: How P4: How to P5: How to
introduce to improve to teach get individual get all students
concept of students’ sequencing to student to to understand
sequencing to understanding some students? retell the story sequencing?
kindergarteners? of sequencing? sequentially?
TT1: This is TT2: This is TT3: This is TT4: This TT5: This
achieved by achieved by achieved by is achieved is achieved
reading the story having students asking these by asking by reading
If You Give a participate in students to the students another story
Mouse a Cookie the creation of retell the story to copy and Brown Bear,
and exploring a class story: If by looking complete the Brown Bear,
the meaning You Give a Kid at the events following What Do
of the word a Marker. and respective sentence from You See? to
“sequencing.” order. the board: the class and
“If I get a having the
cookie, I will students paste
want_____.” items related
to the story in
order.
EE1: Feedback EE2: Feedback EE3: Feedback EE4: Feedback EE5: Feedback
from students’ from from students from students’ from the
oral response cooperating indicates work indicates students
indicates teacher and that students that the above indicates
that they had students’ continued to strategy works that all of
difficulty with work indicates experience better for some the students
sequencing the that some difficulty with than for others. have a better
story. of them still sequencing understanding
have problems skill. of sequencing.
understanding
sequencing.
show that they have proposed different theories in their attempts to solve
the problem of sequencing, which gave rise to new and different problems.
Emily
Emily chose to introduce the concept of sequencing to her kindergarten stu-
dents. She believed that sequencing would be an appropriate and essential
concept for her students to learn because it builds students’ organizational
skills as well as helps them create a foundation for further instruction in
various reading elements. In her opinion, the development of sequencing
skills would serve as a “stepping stone,” or foundation, upon which other
reading skills could be built.
Table 5.2 Evidence of Vanessa’s knowledge building
Popper Cycle 1 Popper Cycle 2 Popper Cycle 3 Popper Cycle 4

P1: How to introduce P2: How to P3: How to P4: How to
the concept of improve students’ improve students’ teach students to
sequencing? understanding of understanding of find the missing
sequencing? sequencing using 1 number on a
to 10? number line?
TT1: This is achieved TT2: This is TT3: This is achieved TT4: This is
by reading the story achieved by using by having students achieved by
The Very Hungry flash cards to count objects found dividing students
Caterpillar to the teach students in the classroom. in groups of four
class and having days of the week with prompts
students make and counting from peers.
predictions that lead from 1 to 10.
them to noticing the
sequence of the story.
EE1: Feedback from EE2: Feedback EE3: Feedback EE4: Feedback
students’ verbal from students’ from students and from students
responses indicates response indicates cooperating teacher indicates that
that most of them did that they are able indicates that they some still have
not have the concept to order days of can count from 1 to difficulty with
of the days of the the week but still 10 with ease but can’t filling the
week and its order as have difficulty write the missing missing number.
well as the counting with 1 to 10. number to follow a
pattern. sequential order.
In creating her lesson, she prepared activities that would help her students
in understanding sequencing as simply a way of ordering events within a
storyline. Her goal was to help her students identify events in the story and
place the events in order according to the story. To achieve her goal, she
chose to read the book, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie by Laura Numeroff
to the class and discussed with the students the different events that took
place within the story.
Furthermore, she explored the meaning of the word “sequencing” to help
them understand how events occurred in a specific order (TT1). She then
asked them to look at the pictures to identify the order of events. Feedback
from this exercise indicated that a number of students seemed to have dif-
ficulty with the concept of sequencing the story (EE1) (Chitpin et al., 2008).
Emily’s tentative solution was to teach her students sequencing by elicit-
ing their participation in the creation of a class story (asking students to
name what they did sequentially). She asked the students to think of what
they would do if they had a marker. Each student would come up with an
answer, and he or she would create a book titled If You Give a Kid a Marker
(TT2). By asking students to come up with an answer and by having them
place the events in a specific order, Emily believed it would enhance students’
comprehension through the constructivist, hands-on approach.
In doing so, the above activity created some confusion among students.
The associate teacher then asked Emily, “Why does it really matter how the
events take place? They are making up the story.” The feedback from the
associate teacher prompted Emily to revise her tentative theory of teaching
students the value of sequencing with respect to storyline and plot and, thus
she generated another activity that would allow her students the hands-
on experience they needed in learning sequencing (EE2). She thought that
through this hands-on activity the students would recognize the importance
of ordering events.
Her follow-up activity was to ask her students to draw a picture of a
specific event related to the story. Students were each given a different event,
and after they drew their pictures to match the event, they formed a circle in
response to the events occurring within the story as it was read aloud by the
teacher. The students were then asked to retell the story by looking at the cir-
cular shape, the events, and their respective order. Once the students under-
stood the activity, and with some adjustment of the order, the rest of the class
was asked to retell the original story using the newly established sequence
of events. Feedback from students indicated that some of them continued to
experience difficulty with sequencing skills, as they were observed frequently
referring back to the book to look at the pictures (EE3).
Based on the feedback received, Emily revised her tentative theory to that
of asking her students to copy and complete the following sentence from the
board: “If I get a cookie, I will want___” (TT4). Furthermore, the students
had to draw a picture to match the word they had filled in. Emily hoped that
the activity would help her students understand the logical order of events,
such as being thirsty after eating a cookie. However, the work sample from
the students again suggested that this activity was effective for some, but not
for others (EE4). As a result, she revised her tentative theory to select the
book Brown Bear, Brown Bear, What Do You See?, by Bill Martin, that has
a clear plot structure to read with the children (TT5). She provided them
with cut-outs of the different events that took place within the story. The
students then pasted the items sequentially on a large sheet of paper so as
to provide clarification and practice with regard to sequencing. Feedback
from the above activity suggested that students had a better understanding
of sequencing as a result of reading the new book (EE5).
The Popper cycles have clearly allowed Emily to examine her own teach-
ing methods to discover weaknesses and strengths, as well as providing her
with a method through which to assess her students’ comprehension. In fact,
she stated, “This approach helps me definitely to get to know where my
students are and what they know or do not know.” Feedback from utilizing
the framework enables her to better restructure her lessons and activities in
meeting the needs of her students, while at the same time actively engaging
her students through participation and hands-on activities.
Vanessa
Vanessa, on the other hand, used the book The Very Hungry Caterpillar, by
Eric Carle, a book with familiar story steps to teach her students sequenc-
ing. On the surface, The Very Hungry Caterpillar is a story that is easy to
follow and therefore easy to retell because of the repetitive phrases (TT1).
One would assume that it would be easy for students to retell because the
concepts of days and numbers are sequenced; that is, Tuesday comes after
Monday and before Wednesday, and two comes after one and before three.
However, Vanessa’s Popperian cycles reveal that, until the students have
mastered their days of the week and number sense, they would still have
difficulty retelling the story in structural order, as they would with any clear
plot-structured books.
Vanessa wanted to find out how much the students already knew about
sequencing. She therefore asked her students to make predictions about
what day would come next and how much the caterpillar would eat because
both days and numbers are sequenced in the book (EE1). In implementing
this strategy—that is, through error elimination—she learned that her stu-
dents were not predicting accurately which day or amount of food would
come next in the story. She thus revised her problem (P2) to produce a ten-
tative theory (TT2) to include a hands-on activity—that of demonstrating
that numbers and days of the week come in a particular order in order for
her students to make the concept more obvious for them. She proceeded
in writing the name of each day on a piece of construction paper, put the
“Monday” card on the board, and asked her students what came next.
Through the successful oral responses that she received from her students,
she scrambled the days and had the students reorder them correctly. Using
the same strategy that she had used for teaching them days of the week,
she wrote a number from 1 to 10 (EE2) on separate pieces of construction
paper. However, feedback from student oral responses indicated that they
were having difficulty grasping the sequencing concept using numbers. She
refined her tentative theory (TT3) by dividing students into groups of four
and giving each group a set of number cards from 1 to 10, days of the week
cards, and food cards. Each student was to retell the story pictorially in
sequential order (TT4). When a student was unable to retell the story or
when the retelling lacked sequence and detail, the other members of the
group were asked to give prompts such as, “When did the story happen?
How many fruits were there? How did the story end?” She was particularly
interested in understanding the connection that the students were making
between Eric Carle’s story and the sequencing activity, in order for her to set
appropriate goals for her students, as well as informing her own teaching as
the following statement shows (Chitpin et al., 2006):
I walked around and observed the students working on this activity to

make sure that students were doing the activity correctly and to watch
what strategies they were using. I found out that they were able to match
the food cards with the number cards as well as ordering correctly the
days of the week. But they could not fill in the gaps to complete a num-
ber sequence. Students knew that 7 came after 6 but could not fill in
the gap between 6 and 8. This makes it slow and difficult for students
to complete the activity because they have to start with the smallest
number and work their way up to the largest number—they can’t go
back and fill in gaps. This brought me to set more realistic goals for my
students.
Vanessa found that the “fill in the gap activity” presented a challenge for
her students because they not only had to have good mastery of their number
sense but they also needed to be able to assimilate the concept of story struc-
ture in order to retell the story. She stated, “Initially I thought it will be easy
once I put 6 between two blanks, but this is not the case. They needed help.”
She refined her tentative theory to include guiding the student’s oral retelling
by having individual students write the entire story first and then conferred
with them using some simple guidelines, such as, begin with “ ‘Once upon a
time.’ What comes next? What was the caterpillar’s problem?” Through this
activity, Vanessa was able to diagnose her students’ ability for literal recall
(remembering facts, details, cause and effect relationships, and sequencing
of events). Her analysis of this activity revealed not only which elements her
students included or omitted or how well they sequenced but also where the
students’ retelling had been particularly weak.
DISCUSSION
Both Emily and Vanessa had identified the problem of teaching their students
sequencing as their initial problem. Through feedback from their stu-
dents they also learned to incorporate activities that engender higher levels
of student responses. In fact, student responses represent, arguably, one of
the most important forms of feedback for teachers. The findings reveal that
Emily and Vanessa used feedback from their students to eliminate errors
contained in their tentative theories and also to revise their theories so that
each subsequent theory is bolder and sharper in empirical content.
Emily and Vanessa listened intently to what their students had to say in
order to confront their assumptions and propose new theories that shaped
the emerging knowledge indicative of Popper’s World 3. Classroom prac-
tice provided them with a context in which they could test their tentative
theories for their capacities to solve the identified problems and used the
process of error elimination to modify and refine their tentative theories to
maximize her students’ success. In this way, the OKGF functions as a knowl-
edge growth framework to allow pre-service teachers to provide examples
of how their tentative theories fare against their pedagogical problems and
how their tentative theories are revisited to solve the problems through the
process of error elimination, thus allowing new problems to arise.
When the new problem, (P2b), turned out to be merely the old P1 in
disguise, as in Emily’s case, then one could say that Emily’s theory only man-
aged to shift the problem a little (Popper, 1979, p. 288). However, the ques-
tion one should ask was how well her theory had solved her problem, P1.
For Emily to progress from Point A to B, she needed a good tentative theory,
one that would not only take into consideration the different developmental
stages but also would make a difference to the problem that she was trying
to solve, that is, the newly emerging problems needed to be different from
the old ones as suggested in Vanessa’s example (Chitpin et al., 2006).
Since story telling is not an easy task for young children to grasp, it was
important for Emily to select books that have clear plot structure to make
their story lines easy to follow and therefore easy to retell. Furthermore,
it would have helped if Emily had selected books with elements such as
repetitive phrases of familiar sequences (use of days of the week, numbers,
letters, etc.). Conversation and general familiarity or popularity of the plot
or characters can also add to a story’s predictability and thus aid the children
in the retelling of the story.
Often, story retellings are used to measure children’s comprehension of
the story (Morrow, 1992). Through retelling, Emily and Vanessa wanted
to see how children were revealing their ability to make inferences as they
organized, integrated, and classified information that was implied but not
expressed in the story. Furthermore, Emily and Vanessa were also looking
for how children were relating the ideas in the story to their own experiences.
As well, holistic comprehension is revealed through children’s retelling, as
opposed to the more traditional, piece-meal methods of asking specific ques-
tions (Morrow, 1992). Through the analysis of a retelling, Emily and Vanessa
were diagnosing the children’s ability for literal recall, such as remember-
ing facts, details, cause-and-effect relationships, and sequencing of events.
Retellings also serve to reveal the children’s sense of story structure. For
instance, does a child’s retelling include statement of setting, theme, plot,
episodes, and resolution (Chitpin et al., 2008)?
The choice of a book can also lead to inherent challenges that can become
new problems to solve. In the caterpillar study, for example, one would
assume that it would be easy for students to retell the story because the
concepts of days and numbers are sequenced; that is, Tuesday comes after
Monday and before Wednesday, and two comes after one and before three.
However, Vanessa’s cycles reveal that, until the students have mastered their
days of the week and number sense, they would still have difficulty retelling
the story in structural order, as they would with any clear plot-structured
books (Chitpin et al., 2008).
Through the use of the OKGF, pre-service teachers were able to judge for
themselves as to whether such a framework was effective in helping them
meet their students’ needs in the language arts program. Furthermore, such
a framework enabled them to see how successful they had been in terms
of making progress towards the solution of the identified problems. It also
helped them to identify what their students did and did not understand. The
results of pre-service teachers’ understanding were reflected in their ability
to apply the concepts and skills taught appropriately in a variety of contexts.
In such an active role, pre-service teachers had the opportunity to refine the
tentative theories by asking questions and getting feedback from students,
associate teachers, and the instructor (Chitpin et al., 2006).
All of the pre-service teachers talked about modifying and refining their
teaching strategies (tentative theories), based on feedback received from
associate teachers after the lessons had taken place. These modifications or
changes were deliberate and were the product of some dissatisfaction with
what was used previously. In fact, pre-service teachers were saying, “That
did not work because the students did not understand the activity.”
Pre-service teacher comments reveal that they had continuously inter-
acted with their pedagogical experiments by evaluating the unfolding events
of the process; that is, they continued to evaluate their tentative theory
through error elimination in order to obtain feedback on their theory in
terms of their successes and the conformity with their earlier goals. They had
an image that served as a template against which they had judged the impact
of each tentative theory in light of the context in which the former tentative
theory was made, thus ensuring that each tentative theory they formulated
became stronger and bolder in empirical content.
In the traditional approach to teaching, students await the transmission
of knowledge. In other words, they wait to be filled with knowledge and
shaped by her teacher’s wishes whereas, with the Popper’s approach, stu-
dents are seen as dynamic organisms that develop and grow, as the role of
the teacher is to promote or facilitate that growth. In Vanessa and Emily’s
cases, students received critical feedback in their efforts to explain their
understanding of sequencing. Emily and Vanessa did not centre on what the
students wanted to know (Deweyian approach) but on what they already
knew (Popperian approach); not on how the students would like to act or
how the teacher would like them to act (transmission approach) but on how
they do act; not on the selves the students would like to be but on the selves
they are. For example, Emily asked her students to look at the pictures to
identify the order of events in order to obtain feedback from them as to what
they knew about sequencing. Both Vanessa and Emily presented the subject
matter sequencing by reading books to the class; they were able to secure
a critical reaction from them orally (“What is happening in the story?”) or
in writing in the form of completing the sentences. Both Vanessa and Emily
used oral discussions and written work to obtain critical feedback from their
students. In doing so, the students’ trial efforts revealed their present levels
of knowledge. Popper’s approach fulfills two functions, that of the student
and that of the teacher. For both, the procedure is one of uncovering and
eliminating errors. The teacher begins with the present (trial) knowledge of
the student using the (trial) strategy. The teacher then tries to criticize that
strategy in an attempt to discover its inadequacies or errors. This criticism
leads to the modification or refinement of the existing knowledge for the
teacher, who will, in turn, help the student to recognize that her trial efforts
are not as successful using that strategy. By comparing what the student
does with the strategy, it helps her to uncover her mistakes, which she tries
to eliminate in subsequent trials.
This strategy operates in contrast to constructivism, where proponents
believe that teachers should teach students using real problems which are
meaningful to the students. Furthermore, under this approach teachers are
to find out about their students’ present, past, and future experiences and
their interests and level of maturation. In addition, teachers should have a
broad understanding of the subject matter and be able to fashion a problem
that would both engage and promote their students’ learning or growth,
using the scientific method of experimentation. The latter is used by the
constructivists as a way of solving problems, a way of adapting, or coming
up with the best possible answers, the most correct solutions. However, in
this study, Vanessa and Emily went beyond the constructivist approach, as
they did not try to justify, prove, or establish an answer or a solution to their
problem of teaching sequencing. Instead, they tried to put their strategies to
the test to uncover the weaknesses.
LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The issue of teachers’ professional growth and development is complex. It

must be actively pursued and teachers must be their own sources of renewal
and continuance. A key feature of the OKGF lies in its ability to provide a
useable account of the conditions under which knowledge will grow, namely,
when knowledge is revised in the light of having failed fairly strict empirical
tests, subject to the constraint that the revisions are made in order to address
the relevant unsolved problem or problems. The framework also provides
an explanation for both the growth and failure of professional knowledge.
This will be of value when used as an explicit heuristic by educators in build-
ing their own professional knowledge (Chitpin & Evers, 2005).
Finally, in emphasizing important logical features of the growth of knowl-
edge, this chapter omitted the discussion of some equally important social
and dialogical factors. It is therefore worth remarking that hidden away in
the various processes associated with pre-service teachers in this study—
identifying problems, coming up with tentative theories, and engaging in
error elimination—was a host of other contributors, such as colleagues and
students, who helped provide a context for what was to be construed as a
problem, made suggestions for theory formulations, and offered advice on
what was to count as evidence of errors (Chitpin et al., 2005).
*******
This study shows how the OKGF provides pre-service teachers with a
better understanding of the effectiveness of their various teaching strate-
gies. These epistemic practices need not be complex or difficult to apply.
Rather, they require that teachers focus on problems at hand, make a con-
scious habit of thinking of possible solutions in terms of theories that have
implications for practice, and place an emphasis on testing these theo-
ries against the bluntness of social reality. Pre-service teachers’ responses
clearly demonstrated that they questioned and reflected upon what hap-
pened in the classroom, formulated tentative theories, and learned through
error elimination process. That is, each step in the lesson was assessed and
reflected upon.
The use of this framework appears to lead pre-service teachers to an
awareness of how their students construct meaning and gives both the
pre-service teachers and their students control and ownership of their own
learning. Emily and Vanessa’s examples illustrate how the OKGF scaffolds
meaningful assessment of teachers’ own growing skills and provides teachers
with increasingly astute insights, which leads to the blossoming of teaching
selves. This is consistent with the vision of teachers as autonomous learners
who need to build their own professional knowledge.
The OKGF is a robust framework, which is worth consideration and
exploration in teacher education programs. Despite individual differences,
all pre-service teachers were able to contribute to their own construction of
knowledge, in one way or another. Chapter 6 advocates the need for schools
to explore the counter-induction approach if we want to instill the value of
imagination and creativity, a critical stance towards ideas and the confidence
of taking risks in our students’ learning.
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6 Advancing Pedagogy Through
Counter-Inductivity
This chapter concerns itself with counter-induction in schools. As an educa-

tor who subscribes to Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism, I am of the
view that schools should be places where teachers can challenge common
assumptions, particularly as they relate to widely adopted teaching prac-
tices (Chitpin, 2006; Chitpin & Evers, 2005; Popper, 1979). No matter how
plausible a rule is, no matter how grounded in epistemology, that rule will
be violated at some time or other. For example, Campbell’s (1974) paper on
descriptive epistemology states that, in order to understand what someone
is saying to us, we must engage in some form of trial and error, which we do
rapidly and unconsciously. He further states that there is no direct transfer
of information to listeners, whether we are aware of it or not.
Such “violations” are not accidental events or the result of insufficient
knowledge or of inattention, all of which might have been avoided. These
violations frequently happen because some thinkers decide not to be bound
by certain “obvious” methodological rules or because they unwittingly break
them (Feyerabend, 2010). As such, the intent of this chapter is not to replace
one set of general rules by another set. Rather, it is an attempt to convince
practitioners that all methodologies, even the most “effective” ones, have
limitations. This chapter examines in concrete detail how the “counter-rule”
works. The counter-rule advises us to introduce and elaborate those hypoth-
eses which are inconsistent with well-established theories and/or facts. It
advises us to proceed counter-inductively. Furthermore, this chapter offers a
distinction between learning of information and knowledge building. I then
present Popper’s view on learning, followed by a discussion and illustration of
how the counter-rule urges us to develop hypotheses that are no longer con-
sistent with accepted and highly confirmed theories and well-established facts.
The counter-inductive procedures raise the following questions: Should
counter-induction be used in our schools for knowledge growth? What are
the arguments for and against using counter-induction in schools? Are there
circumstances favouring its use? Popper (1992) states that
we can see that life—even at the level of the unicellular organism—

brings something completely new into the world, something that did
80 Pedagogy Through Counter-Inductivity
not previously exist: problems and active attempts to solve them; assess-
ments, values; trial and error. . . . It may be supposed that . . . the most
active problem solvers, the seekers and the finders, the discoverers of
new worlds and new forms of life . . . undergo the greatest development.
(p. vii)
He further states that “the process of learning, of the growth of subjective

knowledge, is always fundamentally the same. It is imaginative criticism”
(Popper, 1979, p. 148). As theorists, my colleagues and I have used Pop-
per’s evolutionary epistemology to challenge assumptions in the conduct
of teaching, teacher education, education research, as well as method and
organizational decision-making courses (Chitpin, 2015; Chitpin & Evers,
2012; Chitpin & Jones, 2014; Chitpin & Simon, 2012; Simon et al., 2010).
As practitioners, we also draw on Popper’s insights in our teaching practices
(Adams & Burgess 1980; Chitpin, 2006; Chitpin & Evers, 2005; Swann,
2009; Swann & Burgess, 2005): that learning does not take place by the
direct transference of teachers’ subject matter knowledge, or knowledge
from primary data from the social or physical environment (Chitpin, 2011;
Swann, 2009). One of the problems that faces teacher education and the
process of teaching and learning relates to prevailing models of induction.
Popper’s work is still largely unknown by mainstream educationists, and
his work is often poorly understood. Furthermore, those who understand
his work are often reluctant to put Popper’s evolutionary epistemology into
practice because there are implications for the practice of education that is
different from their own (Swann & Burgess, 2005).
I share Popper’s view that if educators wish to transform their teach-
ing practices, they need to view teaching as knowledge building. The typi-
cal practice of education, which students learn by means of transference, is
intrinsically irrefutable (Popper, 1985). Popper, consistently argues, as do
many serious philosophers, that in the development of human capabilities
there is no transference of knowledge from outside the individuals, or from
other individuals or from their environment (Campbell, 1974; Popper, 1972;
Swann, 1999, 2005, 2007). However, the notion of involving the learners
in the process of creating knowledge is not a common practice in teacher
education programs. Even though new teachers are being introduced to the
theory of language or mathematics through action research and participa-
tion, these demonstrations of language or mathematics are rarely used for
meaningful purposes (Rich, 1991) or in meaningful ways. The neophyte
teacher then moves from the teacher education institution to the world of
the classroom and discovers the gap that exists between the theory in the
methodology of teaching and the reality of the practical world. The teacher
developer (e.g. new teacher induction), who works within the context of
traditional in-service education, accepts that knowledge exists outside of the
classroom and basically trains the teacher to use the knowledge that is devel-
oped elsewhere. However, if student learning is to be reformed, teachers
Pedagogy Through Counter-Inductivity 81
need to move beyond the knowledge acquisition stage in order to build
knowledge with their students.
Moreover, knowledge acquisition is a social process. It is hard to be the
only teacher to practice a certain method or approach. Improvement is not
just a matter of what individual teachers do. When teachers consult with their
colleagues on challenges they face in their teaching practice, they are refining
their tentative theories or solutions to change the way they teach or to find
ways to involve their students in their journey of learning. Thus, they are
building their knowledge of teaching collectively (Chitpin, 2006) and socially.
Returning to Campbell’s (1974) example that, in order to understand what
someone is saying to us, we must engage in some form of trial and error. For
the moment, we can see that this is in direct contradiction with the induction-
ist view that some basic elements of what is being said are transferred and
that the listener processes these elements so as to construct meaning.
This common inductionist view still prevails in schools, where teachers
are often asked to meet conditions which demand that new hypotheses agree
with the already accepted theories. I argue that this demand is unreasonable
because it preserves the older theory and not necessarily the better theory.
The next section offers a distinction between learning of information and
knowledge building.
LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE BUILDING
Bereiter (2002) draws a clear distinction between learning and knowledge

building (Popper, 1979) by defining learning as acquiring knowledge and
helping others to know. He and others point to the need for teachers to take
an active role in the construction and application of new knowledge and
skills (Bereiter, 2002; Chitpin, 2006; Chitpin & Evers, 2005, 2012). Hence
they claim that teachers need to move beyond the knowledge acquisition
stage (the “know how”) to create knowledge (the “know that”).
Typically, teaching is viewed as a “set of acts performed by people we call
teachers as they attempt to foster learning” (Eisner, 1985, p. 180). According
to this definition, when teachers engage in activities such as learning, asking
questions, leading discussions, or demonstrating ideas, they are teaching.
Eisner also describes the view adopted by John Dewey (1933), who felt that
the term “teaching” was similar to the term “selling.” That is, one could
not teach unless someone learned, just as one could not sell unless someone
bought. Teaching and learning were regarded as reciprocal concepts:
Thus, if a teacher attempts to teach but does not succeed in helping

students learn, then he or she may be said to have lectured, conducted a
discussion, demonstrated, explained, but not to have taught. To teach,
in this sense, is an act known by its effects.
(Dewey, 1933, p. 179)
The nature of teaching is changing, and, to use Darling-Hammond’s
(1995) words, “teaching is not talking and learning is not listening” any
more (p. 9). In other words, teaching is not about acquiring limited amounts
of knowledge, on the one hand, and transmitting them, as such, to the stu-
dents, on the other. In fact, teaching is seen as much more complex than
previously articulated. It requires not only a deeper knowledge of the
content and a wider repertoire of teaching strategies but also an intimate
knowledge of students so as to engage them in inquiry, discovery, and prac-
tical problem-solving with concentration on higher order thinking (Cole &
Knowles, 2000). In order to achieve higher order thinking, Harrington
(1994) argued, teachers must integrate their knowledge of subject matter,
students, and classrooms to make hundreds of instructional decisions daily.
Harrington goes on to state that, because of the complexity of the teaching
and learning process, knowledge of techniques and methods is not sufficient
to provide solutions to the dilemmas of teaching. Instead, teachers’ knowl-
edge of the subject matter, combined with a deep knowledge of students,
prior knowledge, their experiences and the way students learn, are required
(Cole & Knowles, 2000; Darling-Hammond, 1995).
In addition, teachers of the twenty-first century have the task of instructing
an extremely diverse student population that resists pat solutions (Kinsler &
Gamble, 2001). These demographic changes also increasingly make tradi-
tional whole class instruction less practical as a dominant mode of teaching
because the situation demands the flexible and skilled use of a variety of
instructional and organizational approaches (Darling-Hammond & Cobb,
1996). To perform their tasks, teachers of the twenty-first century need to be
proficient in their abilities to interpret diagnostic, student profile data from
varied sources, including disaggregated standardized test scores, Individual-
ized Educational Plans (IEPs), informal and “authentic” assessments, and to
construct academic plans that meet their students’ varied educational needs.
They must also be able to select from an increasingly wide range of organi-
zational techniques, instructional strategies, learning materials, and support
services as is appropriate to implement their varied individual, small, and
occasional whole class lessons, and to bring all these entities into an inte-
grated, cohesive whole (Kinsler & Gamble, 2001).
Even when all of these above conditions are met, there is still no guaran-
tee that a student has learned what his or her teacher has taught. This is due
to the fact that learning takes place in the context of experience and new
expectations, particularly when it comes to expectations that are not purely
an outcome of genetic inheritance or random mutation. Changes in expecta-
tion are accompanied by changes in what individuals are able to experience
and the potential responses that they are able to provide to situations; in
other words, what the individuals are able to do and are inclined to do when
changes in expectations occur.
I concur with Swann (2009) that “an ability to learn is a specific form of
adaptability, and the ability to adapt confers, potentially, an evolutionary
advantage” (p. 258). Although one could argue that learning is dependent
on maturation, it requires more than fruition of inborn characteristics. It
requires individuals or learning organisms to develop new expectations and
capabilities that would allow them to function more effectively in situa-
tions in which they find themselves. If one goes with this premise, one can
then argue that learning does not take place by means of instruction from
without the organism. What we learn from the environment is that some of
our expectations are mistaken or inadequate. The environment serves only
to challenge the expectations and, potentially, to eliminate them. Thus, new
expectations are formed when individuals discover the mismatches between
their expectations and experience (Swann & Burgess, 2005).
According to Popper (1979), learning occurs only when individuals
accept and seek out challenges from their environment and are able to
respond to them creatively, but it is not necessarily expected that they be
successful. Applying Popper’s counter-induction in a school context means
that, as learners and teachers engage in various activities in the name of
learning, learning is taking place, even though the teacher is imparting her
knowledge of the subject matter with her students. Instead, we argue that
students have learned only if the teacher’s instructions have challenged their
assumptions and have provoked them to engage in some sort of error elimi-
nation. For example, if a student believed that there is no black swan, and
the teacher played a video where she saw a black swan among the white
swans, she would have been engaged in some sort of error elimination.
With the so-called instruction, some of the students may learn some of the
time what the teacher intended them to learn, but most of the time it is a hit-
and-miss affair (Swann & Burgess, 2005). Assuming that educators wish to
transform their teaching practices to conform to this view of learning, it is
important that educators view their role as knowledge builders and provide
opportunities for their students to challenge the assumptions presented to
them from their environment or surroundings.
DEVELOPING HYPOTHESES
A teacher can only find weaknesses in a highly accepted and confirmed

theory by introducing other theories or views; that is, she must adopt a plu-
ralistic methodology. She must compare ideas with other ideas rather than
with what other teachers have experienced, and she must try to improve
rather than discard the views that have failed in the competition. When she
proceeds in this way, she will retain the theories that are bolder and stronger
and will elaborate and use them to measure the success of her teaching and
with other views of what constitutes quality or good or effective teaching.
She may discover that the theory she is using to teach her students sequenc-
ing is not as good as is generally assumed, and that it must be supplemented
or replaced entirely by another theory. Knowledge acquired this way is not a
series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view; rather,
it is a gradual approach to finding a “truth.”
Popper (1979) defines “truth” in terms of a theory that has best with-
stood criticism. It can be viewed as an ever-increasing ocean of mutually
incompatible alternatives, each contributing to our growth of knowledge
(Feyerabend, 2010, p. 14). In this sense, all players, teachers, students, and
parents are invited to participate in the learning and to contribute to the
knowledge base. Utilizing counter-induction, the task of the teacher is no
longer to “improve predictions” or “to follow a particular method of teach-
ing” or “to replicate a lesson delivered by another teacher.” Her attention
should be directed towards making her tentative theories more epistemically
progressive; that is, stronger and bolder so that they are able to solve more
problems.
Following Popper (1979), it can be argued that all living organisms that
engage in problem-solving always proceed by trial-and-error elimination:
. . . new reactions, new forms, new organs, new modes of behaviour,

new hypotheses, are tentatively put forward and controlled by error-
elimination. . . . Error-elimination may proceed either by the complete
elimination of unsuccessful forms (the killing-off of unsuccessful forms
by natural selection) or by the (tentative) evolution of controls which
modify or suppress unsuccessful organs, or forms of behaviour, or
hypotheses.
(Popper, 1979, p. 242)
The error elimination process can be summarized using Popper’s schema:

P1  TT  EE  P2 Where P represents a problem (e.g. a teaching prob-
lem), TT tentative theory is also known as a tentative solution applied to
the problem, and EE stands for error elimination, as depicted in the above
schema. Under Popper’s schema, there is no special defense with regards to
applying the counter-rule to established facts, since there is not one single
theory that agrees with all known facts. The question we need to pose is,
“Should counter-inductive theories be admitted into teaching and learn-
ing?” or, to put it another way, would a counter-inductive technique assist
in decreasing the discrepancies between theory and fact and, hence, reveal
the weaknesses in our theories or methodologies? If so, what can we do to
introduce counter-induction into our schools?
To answer this question, we must first acknowledge that induction still pre-
vails in our schools and, thus, observational reports (e.g. observing another
teacher teaching a lesson), experimental results (e.g. using manipulatives to
test a student’s understanding of a math concept), “factual’ statements” (e.g.
observing a student reading a text with ease) all contain theoretical assump-
tions or assert them through the manner in which they are used. We must
also recognize that one may learn how easily anyone may be deceived by
simple appearance or, should we say, by the impressions of one’s senses. For
example, when we travel along a street at night and when the moon follows
us, our steps appear to be equal to the shadow cast by the moon. If reason
does not intervene, it will obviously deceive our senses.
The above example shows that we start with a sensory impression, and
we consider a statement that is forcefully suggested by it. This suggestion is
so strong that it can lead us to accept entire systems of belief and rituals. It
is only when reason intervenes that we begin to examine the suggestion and
start considering other statements in its place.
The above example, when transposed into a teaching/learning context,
might look like this: a kindergarten teacher, after viewing the many free les-
son plans offered on the web, decides to take the suggestion offered on the
scholastic web site of how to teach the alphabet to kindergarten students by
using the book, There’s a Zoo in Room 22, by Judy Sierra (2000). The sug-
gested steps, along with the reviews from other teachers who used the lesson
plan, were so strong that it led the teacher to believe that if she followed
the steps outlined, she would be successful in teaching the alphabet to her
students. It was only when she followed the strategies in the lesson plan that
she began to see that there were other factors that she needed to consider,
such as the teaching context. Usually, the teachers are not even aware of
the assumptions that have or are shaping their beliefs (for more details, see
Chitpin, 2011). If teachers want to maximize their students’ learning, what-
ever the problem area or the subject matter, they must strive to find ways to
encourage themselves and their students to search for errors and limitations
in what they assume.
How can we possibly search for errors or examine something that we use
or do all the time? How can we analyze the way(s) we habitually express our
thoughts or observations so as to reveal their presuppositions? The answer
does lie within (Feyerabend, 2010). We need an external standard of criti-
cism; we need a set of alternative assumptions (“assumptions” is used to
mean theories, principles, etc.), and these assumptions can be quite general
in order to achieve the result. The first step in our criticism of “facts” is to
attempt to break the cycle of assumptional thinking. We must put forth a
new conceptual framework that, for example, can suspend or clash with the
most carefully established observational results. It is for these reasons that I
suggest the use of Popper’s counter-induction approach.
APPLYING POPPER’S COUNTER-INDUCTION
Using Popper’s counter-induction, we are urged to introduce hypotheses

that are inconsistent with well-established theories. It consists of discus-
sions in an attempt to criticize the theory or hypotheses and not to prove or
to make it probable. Popper further states that every step we take to protect
a theory from criticism, or to make it safe or “well-founded,” is a step away
from rationality. Instead, we should expose the theory to counterarguments
instead of protecting it so that it can exhibit its weak spots, which is pres-
ently not the case under the induction approach.
Knowledge building or growth occurs when we uncover new facts from
the theories. These new facts will either support the current theories or they
will force us to modify them by indicating precisely where the errors are. In
both cases, they will precipitate real progress and not merely arbitrary or
superficial change. The procedure to arrive at this change would consist of
refuting the accepted point of view with as many relevant facts as possible.
The exclusion of alternative views can be a seen as a measure of expediency,
which does not help, as it hinders progress by absorbing time and resources
that could be devoted to improvements. Counter-induction eliminates fruit-
less discussion and forces us to concentrate on the facts, which, after all, are
the only acceptable judges of a theory (Feyerabend, 2010; Popper, 1979).
A theory should not be changed unless there are pressing reasons to do so.
One of the pressing reasons for changing a theory occurs when there is a dis-
agreement with the facts. It is worth noting that discussion of incompatible
facts can lead to progress while discussion of incompatible hypotheses will
not. Thus, it is a sound procedure to increase the number of relevant facts
but not a sound procedure to increase the number of factually adequate, but
incompatible alternatives.
A theory which is unfalsifiable is not necessarily a bad theory, particularly
as it pertains to realism and idealism (Popper, 1985). One can argue that
realism is preferable to idealism, even though neither is falsifiable (Swann &
Burgess, 2005). Although the theories can be metaphysical and unfalsifi-
able, they can nevertheless be critically discussed. For example, there can
be a metaphysical debate about what happens when learning takes place, as
presented in this chapter.
In the case of a teacher who wants to solve her problem of teaching
sequencing to her kindergarten students, she first needs to identify the prob-
lem, which is not merely a problem derived out of curiosity. It is a theoreti-
cal result stemming from the fact that certain expectations are not met; for
instance, students having difficulty understanding the concept of sequenc-
ing. It is important to note here that the elements of the problem are not
given to the teacher. It cannot be discovered by just anyone who has taught
a class or who knows something about teaching and learning (Feyerabend,
2010). It is only when the expectation is not met that it becomes a problem.
Part of Popper’s doctrine can be summed up by stating that research begins
with a problem. The problem is the result of a conflict between an expecta-
tion and an observation, which is constituted by the expectation. This Pop-
perian doctrine differs from the doctrine of inductivism, where objective
facts enter a passive mind and leave their traces there (Feyerabend, 2010).
Having now formulated a problem, the teacher tries to solve it. Solving
a problem means trying out a theory that is relevant and falsifiable, but
not yet falsified. For example, the problem presented above concerns how
a teacher might teach sequencing to kindergarten students. A first solution
provided by a kindergarten teacher was to read the story If You Give a
Mouse a Cookie (Chitpin & Simon, 2006). Next comes the criticism of the
theory proposed by the teacher in an attempt to solve the problem. Success-
ful criticism removes the theory once and for all and creates a new problem
to explain why the theory was successful or why it failed (for a detailed
description, please see Chitpin & Simon, 2006).
In order for the kindergarten teacher to solve the problem of teaching
sequencing, she needs a new theory that reproduces the successful conse-
quences of the older theory, denies its mistakes, and makes additional pre-
dictions not made before. These are some of the conditions that a suitable
successor of a refuted theory must satisfy. She has adopted the conditions
and proceeded by conjecture and refutation from less general theories to
more general theories, thus adding to her knowledge growth (Chitpin, 2006).
In doing so, she discovered more and more facts, which were explained
by theories. There is no guarantee that she would be able to solve every
problem and replace every theory that has been refuted with a successor
theory that satisfies the formal conditions. It would depend on how many
theories she could come up with and it would depend on the circumstances
in which she found herself. So long as she uses the scheme, she would satisfy
the rules of critical rationalism and be able to build knowledge.
DISCUSSION
Schools are typically places where young minds are cultivated and challenged.
A teacher following a counter-induction approach, who wishes to help her
students learn something in particular that she, as an educator, has in mind,
may want to encourage her students to engage in some open-ended trial-and-
error elimination. The students would be provided with a safe place where
they are permitted and helped to identify mismatches between their current
expectations and experience and articulate some of the mismatches that they
have discovered; from there they create tentative theories and, then, test these
theories by subjecting them to critical scrutiny. In doing so, the teacher is foster-
ing a belief in the value of imagination and creativity, a critical stance towards
ideas and the confidence to take risks in one’s own learning and to learn from
one’s own mistakes, which is at the heart of the counter-induction approach.
The counter-induction approach described above can be applicable to
both prescribed school curriculum and open-ended learning. The difference
in these two situations is that, in the context of prescribed school curricu-
lum, the teacher would be less inclined to encourage her students to engage
in self-initiated trial-and-error elimination. There is also a chance that the
learners’ aspirations would be suspended or distorted in favour of pursuing
the teacher’s learning objectives or the school curricula. There needs to be
a balance between the teacher’s agenda and that of the learners’ and, if the
teacher’s agenda consistently overrides that of the students, the latter may
fail to develop their capability to be self-initiating, which is often the case
with the induction approach. When the learners are spending time meeting
the school or teacher’s objectives, this distracts them from focusing on, criti-
cizing and developing expectations which may have the greatest influence on
the way they interact with the world (Swann & Burgess, 2005).
When using the counter-induction approach, the teacher with a pre-
scribed school curriculum will operate on the assumption that there is
no transference of knowledge or ideas from her to her students. Learning
occurs when students are given the opportunity to engage in trial-and-error
elimination, and, thus, she would be structuring learning activities with this
in mind. Based on the philosophy of counter-induction, the main purpose of
education is to focus on the development of the individuals, where the lat-
ter can pursue their own learning aspirations while meeting the prescribed
curricula. Under this approach, students would also be initiated into the
practice of critical discussions while building knowledge. Furthermore, this
approach would conform to the arguments put forth by the educationists
who argue that prescribed curricula are necessary to maintain coherence and
stability within the social structures and that students need the basic skills to
function properly in our society.
One of the many benefits of adopting such a method is that while the
students are learning from the prescribed curricula, they are being given the
latitude to discover the discrepancy between expectations and experience,
propose solutions, and put their solutions to the test to find the weaknesses
contained in their proposed solutions, while working on the objectives of
the lesson. In this way, students are seen as contributors and evaluators of
their own learning. The teacher is also provided with the opportunity for
teacher-initiated trial-and-error elimination and some formative assessment
tied into such activity. Moreover, through this approach, teachers are also
presented with the opportunity to develop classroom dialogue and peer and
self-assessment of students’ work (Black et al., 2003).
In most schools, under the induction approach, such activity is rarely
present, and we see even less of the activity that is likely to be conducive
to the kind of learning that leads to further learning in the longer term,
both within and outside of the school (Swann & Burgess, 2005). The for-
mative assessment movement in Ontario, Canada, though valuable, does
not address the tyranny of the prescribed curriculum. Students are rarely
encouraged to adopt a trial-and-error approach in their own initiated learn-
ing, other than what their teachers want them to learn.
The limited opportunity for the students to engage in trial-and-error learn-
ing is due to the fact that, with the prescribed curriculum, what is learned
and how it is learned is controlled by the teacher, and thus the outcomes are
largely predictable, which is consistent with the induction approach. The
counter-induction approach, on the other hand, does not assume that what
is taught is actually learned by the student. Instead, it advocates for teachers
to adopt practices that are consistent with the idea that learning is a process
of trial-and-error elimination, and when teachers adopt such practices, their
students learn more.
As well, when teachers believe in the discoveries of error and expect their
students to discover errors and limitations instead of giving the teachers
“the right answer” when performing a required task, students and teachers
can learn more. This is due to the fact that students have the opportunity
to formulate refutable hypotheses, which can lead them to new discoveries,
thus building and adding to the pool of knowledge (Swann, 2003). Unfor-
tunately, our current school system does not foster this practice. Instead,
students are evaluated based on how well they have grasped the prescribed
curriculum under the inductive approach. In a system such as ours, it is easy
for a mismatch between the student and the curriculum to occur. The stu-
dent’s interests and her ability to do well are construed as failure on the part
of the student and, often, the teacher. Furthermore, when a system does not
encourage individuals to reveal their ignorance and incapacity, and when
criticism is applied to individuals rather than encouragement, we are stifling
individual creativity, thus causing improvement to cease.
*******
Teaching is a difficult and complex endeavor, and, assuming that educators
in schools wish to transform their teaching practices, they first need to view
their roles as helping their students construct and apply new knowledge and
skills through the process of trial and error (Popper, 1979). Teaching cannot
be reduced to a set of prescribed technical activities where students of the same
grade or age group are required to complete similar tasks. It requires teachers
to make decisions as to how similar age-group students can apply the concepts
in the prescribed curricula in different situations so as to construct knowledge.
It is more than teachers having a deep knowledge of subject matter, cur-
riculum, resources, and of their students individually or collectively that
would add to the pool of knowledge. In fact, teachers who have a good
knowledge of their subject matter often find it harder to teach the subject
well because they cannot understand why some of their students cannot
learn the materials or are not interested in the materials prescribed for them.
It appears that if we want our students to succeed and become autono-
mous, our school system would have to open the door to new thinking. We
need to create environments where learners are given the opportunity to
test their assumptions and/or hypotheses to find the weaknesses contained
within their theories. It is more than using grades to determine how well our
students are doing in schools. Schools should not be a place where students’
fear of failure mould their brain until they lose every ounce of imagination
and come to the conclusion that there is only one true method of teaching,
or whatever the myth of the day happens to be (Feyerabend, 2010).
Improving the nature of teaching and learning does not mean merely
focusing on what the teachers do. We need to look at the larger context in
which teaching and learning happens as well, such as in the school, district,
or province. We also need to look at the curriculum framework, the assess-
ment approaches, and the school culture, among others.
New approaches or ideas are generally met with resistance or hostility,
and we have to have excellent reasons to gain even a moderately fair hear-
ing. Even when good reasons are produced, these reasons are often disre-
garded or laughed at. But, we are seeing the results of using inductive models
in our schools. A group of researchers are pursuing the counter-induction
approach and are initiating detailed studies to explore the benefits and
drawbacks of using such methods (Chitpin & Evers, 2005, 2012; Swann,
2003; Swann & Burgess, 2005).
The position I have taken in this chapter represents a radical departure
from mainstream thinking in education. Some of my discussions with other
educationists have more often than not been thwarted by the position I have
taken. I have shown how induction limits and irrationalizes some of the rules
we regard as basic. I have also shown how counter-induction is supported
by argument and have described some of the circumstances, which may help
to further its usefulness. Chapter 7 discusses ways in which principals can
use counterarguments to overcome some of the “bias” stemming from their
decisions involving student achievement and assessment of teachers.
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7 The Objective Knowledge Growth
Framework
A Framework for Principals’ Emotional
Decision-Making
There is a growing body of evidence in behavioural and neuroscience which

points to the idea that emotion and cognition not only interact but con-
tain integrative operations necessary for adaptive functioning (Hansen &
Christensen, 2007; Shiv et al., 2005). In fact, recent investigations reveal
that emotions influence how one makes decisions (Bechara et al., 2000;
Loewenstein et al., 2001). Studies show that emotions can either serve to
increase an individual’s tolerance or to avoid risk in decision-making situ-
ations (Werner et al., 2009). In this context, findings from several studies
reveal that highly anxious individuals tend to judge the risk of a given situ-
ation as being greater than non-anxious individuals do, and that the for-
mer would most often choose safer options in tasks involving risks (Hockey
et al., 2000; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Maner et al., 2007; Mitte, 2007).
Using the somatic hypothesis marker (SMH), an influential conceptualiza-
tion of how emotions affect decision-making, Damasio (1996, 1999, 2003)
and colleagues (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 2000; Damasio
et al., 1991) have demonstrated how emotion and cognition interact when
making decisions.
The SMH suggests that signals from the body help to regulate decision-
making in complex and uncertain situations. For instance, when making a
decision, the somatic signal/marker, such as the heart rate, rises as an emo-
tional reaction to the response option. Thus, for each response option, a
somatic state is generated and stored in the memory. The SMH also suggests
that the somatic markers are represented and regulated in the emotional
circuitry of the brain, particularly in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. For
example, when a principal encounters a situation that is similar to the one
that he or she previously experienced, information regarding the possible
response options and their likely outcomes is reactivated. This information
associates itself with the somatic responses to the situation experienced and
assists the principal in rejecting the disadvantageous choices and opting for
choices that are more advantageous (Werner et al, 2009).
Despite the fact that emotions are traditionally viewed as irrational
occurrences, which need to be ignored or controlled (Lerner, 2008; Morse,
Edwardsen, & Gordon, 2008), that cloud judgment, and in which thinking
Objective Knowledge Growth Framework 93
or mindfulness or innovativeness could occur to distort reasoning, contem-
porary research points to the fact that rational and emotional processes go
hand in hand (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). That is, emotion is indispens-
able in rational decision-making (Barnes & Thagard, 1996). Thus, one can
claim that principals’ day-to-day decision-making is governed, at least in
part, by emotional factors (see Maia & McClelland, 2004; Sanfey & Cohen,
2004), which has implications for understanding a wide range of human
activities, especially when it comes to principals’ decision-making in school
contexts (Lakomski & Evers, 2010).
In light of this, principals need to take into account their emotions when
making decisions so that their “gut feelings,” experiences, and perceptions
can impact positively and legitimately on their decision-making processes,
particularly as their work becomes increasingly complex and demanding,
and as ideologically driven external interventions from various levels of
school governance intensify. These external interventions include factors
that increasingly focus on raising standards of student achievement for
educational, social, and economic purposes and include the assessment of
teacher, principal, and school performance through a range of mandated
accountability measures.
This chapter investigates the role of emotions in principals’ decision-
making when confronted with problems of practice. First, a discussion of
Simon’s rational decision-making and emotional decision-making models
is provided. Next, an argument is made for organizations and institutions,
including schools, to acknowledge that emotion and cognition interact with
one another and that rational decision-making models, based solely on
cognition, are not defensible, as evidenced by Damasio’s somatic marker
hypothesis (SMH). In other words, emotions influence the choices principals
make in their decision-making processes. Finally, a suggestion is made as to
how the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework, based on Popper’s criti-
cal rationalism, can assist principals in overcoming some of the confirmation
bias stemming from their emotional decision-making processes. This frame-
work can also lead them to a new and better theory of emotional decisions.
SIMON’S RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING MODEL
Herbert A. Simon, in 1960, was the first to introduce the now widely
accepted conceptualization of the rational decision-making process (For-
man & Selly, 2001), the aim of which was to provide a comprehensive and
structured approach to decision-making, whereby individuals may follow
certain steps so as to organize their thoughts. Simon’s categorization of the
decision-making process consists of three phases: Intelligence, Design, and
Choice (Forman & Selly, 2001).
It is in the first phrase, referred to as “Intelligence,” that the decision-maker
identifies his/her problem and/or opportunity. Studying the problem and/or
94 Objective Knowledge Growth Framework
opportunity comprehensively “can help guide further analysis towards [a]
resolution [for change]” (Golub, 1997, p. 10) and provide insight on “iden-
tifying its scope, its relationship to other problems . . . [and potential future]
impacts” (p. 10). For example, when a principal is faced with a problem of
practice, he or she first needs to identify the problem at hand by stating the
problem, perhaps in the form of a question. By identifying the problem, the
principal enters the second phase of the model called “Design,” where he
or she has a clearer understanding of the issue. It is within this phase that
the causes of the problem are discussed for their pertinence, relative to the
identification and development of alternate solutions. Alternative solutions
are identified as a group of reasonable responses or actions that can be
taken to resolve the identified problem (Golub, 1997). In the final phase of
Simon’s decision-making process, called “Choice,” the decision-maker seeks
to discover the “best fit” or a solution among alternatives in order to come
to a decision, which takes into consideration all the variables that he or she
will be most concerned with or affected by (Forman & Selly, 2001). Thus,
the decision-maker will be assessing, evaluating and ordering the various
choices or goals, taking into account the ones that meet most of his or her
needs (Thagard & Millgram, 1997).
To further illustrate this point, consider a newly appointed administra-
tor who is tasked with improving trust and relationships among staff and
students in a diverse school. He or she needs to create a learning community
and transform the various school cultures from places of isolation to sites
for collaboration so that teachers may work together interdependently and
learn from one another in order to maximize student success. Her goals
are to meet with the teachers individually during their planning time so
as to build rapport, relationships, and trust. She also wants to arrange for
grade-level teachers to have the same planning time so that they can plan,
create, and share lesson plans as well as pedagogical and assessment strate-
gies with each other, so that the school can function as a system of teaching
and learning communities and can become more successful in raising stu-
dent academic achievement. As a rational decision-maker, she would choose
complex plans that are most coherent with her currently held goals. In short,
she would base her decisions on principles of coherence that govern the rela-
tionships between actions and goals. She would make her decisions based
on the “best” plan that meets the identified goals (building relationships
and trust with her staff and maximizing students’ success by creating teach-
ing and learning communities), which is determined by deliberative coher-
ence. Given her limited resources (the number of planning periods set by the
school boards), she is faced with competing goals. Goals that hang together
would be more easily met, such as that teachers can cover for one another
while she is meeting with other individuals on the teaching staff. Indeed, her
needs and interests will determine the choices she makes in addressing the
competing goals. What happens when we insert her needs and interests—the
emotional aspects—into the equation?
Emotional and rational decision-making can, in fact, interact in different
ways to enhance the principal’s decision-making process. Studies show that
people make decisions in continuous terms with a flow of thinking, intuit-
ing, feeling, and acting rather than in discreet thoughts, intuitions, emotions,
and actions (Chia, 1994; Coget, 2004; Coget & Keller, 2010). Coget &
Keller (2010) describe how emergency room (ER) doctors make decisions
by shifting continuously between thinking, intuiting, and feeling, which they
call the “critical decision vortex model.” Furthermore, they argue that the
critical decision vortex model (rational, intuitive and emotions) can be use-
ful for managers, CEOs, or any employee working in high-reliability orga-
nizations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).
In light of contemporary research that points to the inadequacy of the
rational decision-making model, support for the revision of the rational
decision-making model to incorporate a theory of emotional decisions that
takes into account human thought and experience is warranted. Recent data
from behavioural science and neuroscience point out that cognition and
rational decision-making require the support of emotion. Furthermore, neu-
roscientific research points to evidence that some people become unable to
make decisions when the regions of their brain, associated with emotional
processing, have been damaged (Churchland, P. M., 2007; Churchland,
P. S., 2002; Churchland & Churchland, 1998; Clark, 1997, 2001; Damasio,
1996, 1999, 2003; Gazzaniga, 2005; Glannon, 2007; Quartz & Sejnowski,
2002; Tancredi, 2005).
EMOTIONS IN DECISION-MAKING: COGNITION

AND EMOTION
Emotions have traditionally been viewed as detrimental to decision-

making (Janis & Mann, 1977) for two main reasons: First, emotions are
viewed as primitive forms of intuitive decision-making, which can bias
judgment (Coget & Keller, 2010; Darwin, 1894). Second, emotions can
have a high intensity, which have the potential to interrupt other cognitive
processes, including decision-making (Frijda, 1986). High intensity emo-
tions are also known to blur decision-making, be it intuitive or rational
decision-making (for extensive reviews, see Coget et al., 2010; Forgas,
1995; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). However, according to recent stud-
ies, even though emotions can impede rational decision-making, they can
also enhance decision-making in various ways, as described by Coget and
Keller (see Coget et al., 2010).
Emotions can inform judgment by initiating intuitive decision-making
(Coget et al., 2010). In the case of the principal who was tasked with build-
ing trust and positive relationships among teachers in her school, she was at
first angered by the uncooperativeness of the teachers with the administra-
tive staff and amongst themselves. This anger prompted her to look at the
school organization, where she discovered that, previously, planning time
and teaching loads were largely assigned based on the seniority and popular-
ity of the teachers, which contributed greatly to their current uncooperative-
ness. Second, emotions can energize actions. The principal’s anger caused
her to work on the school timetable so that the same-grade-level teachers
would have the same planning time, thus enabling them to plan, share, cre-
ate, and dialogue or discuss the best learning and assessment strategies with
one another in order to maximize student success. Her initial anger was
gradually replaced by understanding and empathy for the teachers. From a
relationship-building perspective, it is important for both the teachers and
the principal to have humane rather than merely managerial interactions.
Finally, emotions influence school administrators’ ethical judgments when
allocating limited resources. More and more evidence points to the fact that
emotion is indeed a necessity in making important life decisions (Lakom-
ski & Evers, 2010). Ochsner and Phelps (2007) state that “emotion and
cognition [interact] and their integrative operation is necessary for adap-
tive functioning [of the individual]” (p. 317). For these researchers, break-
throughs in this area of research, through the development and study of new
theories, not only shed light on the process of decision-making but assist in
surfacing the significance of emotions and understanding and their intercon-
nectedness with decision-making processes.
The most pertinent contributions to the research of emotions and decision-
making lie within what Damasio (1996) calls the somatic marker hypothesis
(SMH). In re-examining the case of Phineas Gage, the victim of an 1848
mine explosion, where an iron rod went through his skull and brain and
left him with frontal lobe damage, Damasio (1996) found that Gage and
other patients with similar injuries recovered but retained severe deficiencies
in practical and social decision-making. Damasio (1996) thus concluded
that human brain regions for making decisions are strongly connected to
emotional centres. He further maintained that patients with frontal lobe
damage have faulty decision-making skills despite having all the informa-
tion required to make decisions. For example, Saver and Damasio (1991)
found that, although these patients have normal or better intelligence and
memory, they are nevertheless unable to implement choice in everyday life,
despite being given all the necessary information to do so, because they lack
the requisite somatic marker. In fact, Saver and Damasio (1991) found that
their subjects would take hours deciding where to dine, obsessing over a
restaurant’s seating plan, menu, and atmosphere and still could not make a
final decision as to where to go for dinner.
In addition, Damasio (1999) suggests in his hypothesis that “the delicate
mechanism of reasoning [in decision-making] is no longer affected, non-
consciously and on occasion even consciously, by signals hailing from the
neural machinery that underlies emotion” (p. 41). In other words, emotion
is not disconnected from one’s reasoning but is, in fact, essential in assisting
the decision-making process. The underlying emotional factors or somatic
(“body”) markers (Damasio, 1996) preside over the simple act of decision-
making; an intake of various responses or stimuli the body is exposed to.
We come into “possession” of somatic markers through the interactions of
everyday life and lived experiences; however, these markers are bounded by
our internal preference system and by external circumstances, such as ethical
rules and social regulations, which are not solely sufficient for making a sin-
gle correct decision (Damasio, 1996). Decision-makers are bounded by the
limits of individual preference and therefore cannot, one would argue, con-
sider all markers appropriately in order to optimize choice and change (Rei-
mann & Bechara, 2010), a point which Simon’s rational decision-making
model fails to take into consideration, and which the Objective Knowledge
Growth Framework (OKGF), described later in this chapter, advocates for,
since the latter recognizes that individual preference is “to evaluate several
pieces of data against a single hypothesis, rather than one datum against
several hypotheses” (Tweney et al., 1980, p. 119).
In one of the most telling experiments and most cited study in support of
the SMH is the Iowa Gambling Task (GT) (Bechara et al., 2000; Bechara &
Damasio, 2005; Damasio et al., 1991). Participants were asked to choose
decks of cards that they believed would maximize profits. The following was
the scenario:
Subjects must choose between decks of cards which yield high immedi-
ate gain but larger future loss, i.e. long term loss, and decks which yield
lower immediate gain but a smaller future loss, i.e. a long term gain.
The task consists of four decks of cards named A, B, C, and D. The
goal of the task is to maximize profit on a loan of play money. Subjects
are required to make a series of 100 card selections, although they are
not told ahead of time how many card selections they are required to
make, or from which deck. Subjects select one card at a time from any
deck they choose and are free to switch from one deck to another at
any time as often as they wish. However, the subject’s decision to select
from one deck versus another is largely influenced by various schedules
of immediate reward and future punishment. These schedules are pre-
programmed and known to the examiner, but not to the subject. The
reward/punishment schedules are set in such a way that two of the decks
of cards (A and B) yield high immediate gain but larger future loss, i.e.
long term loss (disadvantageous decks), and two of the decks (C and
D) yield lower immediate gain but a smaller future loss, i.e. a long term
gain (advantageous decks).
(Bechara, 2004, p. 31)
Subjects with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), the

“underbelly” of the frontal lobe right behind our eyebrows, did not avoid
choosing the “bad” decks. In fact, they preferred them compared with the
“normals.” This supports evidence that VMPFC subjects continued to make
decisions that were not in their best interests. Furthermore, they exhibited
the same behaviour patterns in their lives when it came to personal and
social matters where it was impossible for them to predict the future or
where they needed to make decisions based on hunches and guesses. To fur-
ther test VMPFC patients’ inability to “foresee the future,” Bechara (1994)
devised a psychophysiological measure to ascertain participants’ skin con-
ductance response (SCR) during the task. He found that “normals” began
to generate SCRs prior to choosing any cards when they were contemplating
which deck to choose from, with their SCRs becoming more pronounced
when selecting risky cards. In sharp contrast, no SCRs were generated by
the VMPFC participants before choosing any card. These findings provide
strong support for the SMH’s veracity. In effect, then, our decision-making
is guided by emotional signals that are generated in anticipation of future
events. Thus, Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) shows that feel-
ings mark response options in real or simulated decisions. In fact, the SMH
serves as an automatic biological device in helping individuals select options
that are more advantageous to them. Options that are not selected are omit-
ted in the decision-making process.
This supports the statement by Gray (1988), in his article A Perspec-
tive on Organization Theory, that “individuals always behave in terms of
what they believe to be their best interests” (p. 149). As principals’ decision-
making incidents increase due to the current context of reform—that is,
as their decision-making activity increases due to federal and state policy
changes—school districts typically charge schools with implementing these
initiatives locally (Marks & Nance, 2007, p. 6). Thus, drawing on this pre-
vious research, principals’ choices and actions, based on what they believe
to be in their best interests, would be the contributing factor as to what is
passed down in the decision generating process.
Gray (1988) further states that individuals create their own ‘organiza-
tions’ as part of an experience to consolidate their choices. For example,
principals under pressure to focus on raising standards of student achieve-
ment for social and economic purposes, as well as for assessing the perfor-
mance of teachers, will decide on what goals they want to work on. The
changes they make will depend on their beliefs and values, which may or
may not arise through “trusting their gut.”
Recently, findings from neuroscientific and behavioural studies reveal the
legitimacy of gut feelings (intuition) in rational decision-making processes
(Coget & Keller, 2010; Lakomski & Evers, 2010). Furthermore, it is these
gut-level insights that determine decisions. In fact, research reveals that,
when there is a disconnect between emotion and cognition, individuals are
frequently unable to make final decisions (Churchland, P.M., 2007; Church-
land, P.S., 2002; Churchland & Churchland, 1998; Clark, 1997, 2001;
Damasio, 1996, 1999, 2003; Gazzaniga, 2005; Glannon, 2007; Quartz &
Sejnowski, 2002; Tancredi, 2005).
Somatic markers serve as additional cues for individuals in the process
of making a decision; guiding them in the direction of making an advanta-
geous choice, taking into consideration all available details and informa-
tion at their disposal (Damasio, 2003). In light of research pointing to the
legitimacy of emotions in decision-making, this chapter considers the com-
bination of SMH with the OKGF, as put forward later in this chapter. The
juxtaposition of Damasio’s hypothesis with a rational critical framework
such as OKGF may help principals overcome confirmation biases stemming
from their decision-making processes, which can lead them to newer and
better theorization, where emotions are recognized as legitimately constitut-
ing part of the decision-making process.
Many of the incidents which we choose to act upon, after much consid-
eration, present difficult choices. Consider Sam, a high school teacher who
has taught for two decades in a large urban centre in Ontario, Canada.
Sam has always aspired to become a school administrator since joining the
teaching profession but had to put off applying for a leadership position
while she was raising her family of two daughters. When it was time for
her to apply for the leadership position, she was faced with heavy compe-
tition and was unsuccessful in her many attempts to secure a position in
her school district. She was, however, successful in her attempt to secure a
vice-principalship in a small town, north of the city where she was residing.
She must now decide whether or not to accept the leadership position in the
small town. Why is this so difficult a decision for her to make? After all, this
is her dream job! This difficulty is due to the fact that important career deci-
sions often involve many different, and sometimes conflicting, factors. Sam
is perhaps attracted by the new leadership position because, for her, this
represents a career advancement, which offers increased salary and recogni-
tion. However, Sam is also concerned about moving her family out of the
city, leaving behind friends and colleagues. Furthermore, her spouse may
have to leave his current job and face the possibility of not finding employ-
ment in the small town. Sam has to take into account many interconnected
and possibly ill-specified factors that are relevant to the choice that she will
make. Using the OKGF, described below, Sam can be encouraged to think
of several alternative hypotheses simultaneously to help her make a deci-
sion as to whether to accept the principalship or not, since the framework
takes into consideration both the subjective or psychological state of the
individuals as well as rational decision-making processes. Furthermore, the
OKGF supports Damasio’s (1996) somatic hypothesis in that, according
to him, “. . . somatic [or ‘body’] markers are a special instance of feelings
generated from secondary emotions. These emotions and feelings have con-
nected, by learning, to predict future outcomes of certain scenarios” (p. 174).
Thus, it is revealed through the SMH that an inherent interrelatedness
and dependency of emotions is required in one’s decision-making process
because the constructs and activity within one’s brain and mind determine
the choices made, since both rationality and emotion occur within this one
entity which we call the mind; rationality and emotion which the OKGF is
able to capture.
In a school environment, for example, principals who need to make
decisions on homework policy may base their decisions on past experi-
ences and incorporate their somatic and/or body marker into the decision-
making process through ‘hunches” or “gut feelings” instead of merely
following a decision-making framework or other model. It is in this way
that the OKGF can serve as a powerful tool in enabling principals to ask
more penetrating questions in making important educational decisions.
Regardless of background or the number of experiences, the OKGF pro-
vides participants with a tool to make decisions that respect the priorities
that define the problem.
THE OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE GROWTH FRAMEWORK
Given the fact that neuroscientific and behavioural data point to the legiti-
macy of our “gut feelings,” “hunches,” or “emotions” as part of rational
decision-making processes, the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework
(OKGF) can represent a powerful decision-making framework for princi-
pals to document their decision-making processes and how they cope with
and respond to high-stakes demands that require wise and astute decision-
making which can potentially affect diverse stakeholders. A key influence of
the OKGF is Popper’s (1972) twin concepts of critical rationalism and the
growth of objective knowledge. Before explaining how the OKGF can help
principals in their decision-making processes, a brief summary of Popper’s
philosophy is provided.
Sir Karl Popper

Sir Karl Popper was an Austrian–British philosopher of science. He was born
in 1902 in Vienna. During his career, he authored many books, including his
classic Logik der Forschung (1934). Popper (1966) claimed that criticism
“is the only way we have of detecting our mistakes, and of learning from
them in a systematic way” (p. 376). Criticism includes criticizing theories or
conjectures of our own and of others. It consists of deductive logical reason-
ing to remove inconsistencies from our theories and to modify or refine our
theories when they do not do what they are intended to do or when there
are contradictions. In fact, Popper (1979) rejected all attempts at justifica-
tion of theories with his falsificationist view of rationality. Popper argued
that human beings and their scientific knowledge are inherently fallible and
subject to error. Often times, emphasis is placed on justifying our decisions
rather than finding answers that are not always comfortable.
Confirmation Bias and Willful Blindness
We cannot deny that we all come with our own biases based on past experi-
ences, values, and beliefs. Therefore, we need to search and eliminate those
biases contained in our theories through critical discussions, experimenta-
tion, or systematic application of our theories in order to find out how to
cope with and respond to high-stakes demands and to augment how effec-
tive we are in resolving the demands placed upon us.
Confirmation bias, or “willful blindness,” a term used to describe avoid-
ance for a wrongful act by claiming lack of awareness of facts, is a product
of a rich mix of experience, knowledge, thinking, neurons, and neuroses,
which allows us the capacity for change. We can learn to see better, not just
because our brain changes but because we do. As all wisdom does, seeing
starts with simple questions, “What should I know that I don’t know?” or
“Just what am I missing here?” In other words, we need to actively search
for confirmation biases. Changing the course of the actions of a leader
can require surprisingly little; perhaps asking a simple question, such as
“Did I understand correctly?”, can turn the tide. The question is, how do
we educate individuals so that they will think for themselves, challenge
what they see, and be prepared to turn their assumptions upside down and
examine them? In particular, how do we get school leaders to resist the
influence of the situations in which they find themselves, in the context of
decision-making?
Applying the OKGF in Educational Settings

The answer to developing better solutions may lie in the use of the OKGF,
which allows principals to test their assumptions and theories through dis-
cussions and dialogues and to think without barriers. It is so much easier
to be blind to the consequences of one’s decisions when one does not have
to see the results. For example, when a school principal decides to change
the grade of a student on a report card due to a parental complaint, he or
she might not have all the requisite information to make such a decision.
However, he or she will also not have to see the results of his or her actions/
decisions. Furthermore, he or she will not have to bear the consequences of
the student’s success, or the lack thereof. In fact, one could argue that the
only person who has to bear the consequences is the student. As a further
example, many students prefer knowing the “right” answer instead of the
process of searching for it. Often, they would request of me, “Tell me, what
do I need to know to get a good grade/pass the course/get my degree?”
Many students have been brought up in an educational system where they
believe that they need to know and not to think, and where the pursuit of
knowledge is not being explored. They have been taught, in effect, an intel-
lectual form of obedience. This form of obedience carries on, uninterrupted,
into employment. What is critical is being able to leave the space in which
thinking or mindfulness or innovativeness could occur without fear, and for
which OKGF advocates.
UTILIZING THE OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE GROWTH

FRAMEWORK
The OKGF provides such a space in which thinking or mindfulness or inno-

vativeness can occur, as it emphasizes that the dynamic growth of knowl-
edge is stimulated by problems of practice, inconsistencies, and intellectual
conflicts. The framework, aiming at refutation, moves knowledge forward;
it makes users question established beliefs, mobilizing them to revise their
theories and formulate new and even daring hypotheses. Crucial to this
process is the users’ willingness to reflect and critically revise their hith-
erto accepted body of beliefs. This method must be identified with critique,
where the drive to discover weak points in theories is paramount and where
defensive arguments are themselves questioned.
This theoretical framework can be used to chart the thinking process of
the decision-makers because it enables them to overtly express their decision-
making/problem-solving process while analytically reflecting on it, testing it,
and reacting to feedback information. The role of logical argument, of deduc-
tive and cyclical logical reasoning, is an important element of the OKGF. From
that point, decision-makers are then able to effectively critique and attempt to
find the weak spots in their underlying theories or solutions. This structured
process involves following a schema, as depicted in Figure 7.1.
In Figure 7.1, P1 represents an initial problem identified by the principals,
TT1 is the first tentative theory that principals propose to address or solve the
problem, EE1 is the process known as error elimination, where the proposed
TT1 is tested against experience or the criticisms of others, and P2 is the new
problem that arises out of error elimination. The schema then iterates. These
iterations, involving reflection and justification, can form the basis of power-
ful professional learning. As an example, when teachers (Simon et al., 2010)

Figure 7.1 The Objective Knowledge Growth Framework

were interviewed in depth, and their teaching artifacts were analyzed in detail,
the OKGF schema emerged as a good fit for assisting their professional learn-
ing, regardless of their professional training, background, or prior experience.
That is, it was the structure of the problems they faced and the reflective and
justificatory practices they undertook that heightened their willingness to try
new decisions in arriving at solutions. The theory-building process inherent in
the OKGF helped to shape the trajectory of their learning. It is also a model
of professional learning based on experience that is sensitive to contexts,
human thoughts, exigencies, and experiences, as evidenced by the study con-
ducted with pre-service teachers in the area of assessment (see Chitpin et al.,
2008). The framework also provides a structure for principals to put their
solutions to the test and prompts them to report on the process when mak-
ing key decisions. As well, the OKGF systematically tracks the progression of
decision-making skills used by the principals; thus, each decision-making skill
employed becomes bolder and sharper in empirical content.
The OKGF’s structure guides self-reflection and prompts participants to
report, verbally or in writing, on the process, thoughts, and feelings they
experience when making key decisions. It also acknowledges the SMH, as
it gives individuals the autonomy to decide what to include and what to
leave out, because what is important to report for one individual might not
be important for another. The OKGF is cost efficient and easy to imple-
ment, as evidenced by Chitpin and Simon (2008). Given the imperative for
school principals to produce demonstrable school improvements for stu-
dent learning, it is important to have understandings about how principals
make decisions and how they solve problems. Bellamy, Fulmer, and Muth
(2007) suggest that the knowledge and theories upon which principals make
school improvement decisions are significant factors in the improvement of
their practice. Currently, little is known about (1) the theories, schemas, and
knowledge that principals operationalize through their decision-making;
(2) the process by which principals test and revise their theoretical under-
standings about the nature of educational problems; and (3) how principals
draw upon external resources (e.g. power, confidants) and respond to inter-
nal and external constraints when making decisions about school improve-
ment. The OKGF proposed would assist in providing robust descriptions of
what principals actually know about educational problems, how they draw
upon and revise theories of action for responding to problems, which theo-
ries are tenable in school improvement decisions, and which cognitive and
contextual resources are important in principals’ decision-making. As such,
the framework promises to provide valuable knowledge about how princi-
pals operationalize formal and informal theory in practice, and considerable
insight for those involved in principal preparation programs.
*******
In light of current findings, support for the revision of Simon’s (1960)
rational decision-making model to incorporate a theory of emotional
decision-making, such as the OKGF, that takes into account human thought
and experience, is warranted. As well, research evidence points to the fact
that cognition and rational decision-making require the support of emotion
(Churchland & Churchland, 1998; Churchland, P. M., 2007; Churchland,
P. S., 2002; Clark, 1997, 2001; Damasio, 1996,1999, 2003; Gazzaniga,
2005; Glannon, 2007; Quartz & Sejnowski, 2002; Tancredi, 2005). Dama-
sio’s somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) shows that feelings mark response
options and serve as an automatic device in helping individuals select options
that are more advantageous to them when making decisions.
The decision an individual makes is dependent on these contexts and is
also based on one’s emotions when confronted with any given situation.
Given the legitimacy of our “gut feelings” or “hunches” or “emotions”
in rational decision-making processes, the Objective Knowledge Growth
Framework (OKGF) can be a powerful decision-making framework for
principals to document their decision-making processes and how they cope
with and respond to high-stakes demands that require wise and astute
decision-making that can potentially affect diverse stakeholders (Popper,
1972).
The OKGF, based on Popper’s critical rationalism, agrees that one should
not be wedded to one mindset but be always traveling between perspec-
tives. The highly unconstrained travel between points of view requires
hard work and it can be risky, not just because it can take you from well-
established paths but because it provokes questions that one is not invited
to ask, and these uninvited questions can make people uncomfortable, not
the least being that they don’t easily lend themselves to prepared answers.
The framework also requires that we travel well outside of our immediate
knowledge and safety. It means putting our theories and assumptions to the
test and having the confidence and curiosity to ask questions that are not
always comfortable. It requires educational leaders or organizational leaders
to find out what the conditions are for willful blindness to flourish, and how
they can develop new habits that may assist them in avoiding situations/
circumstances of willful blindness or confirmation bias.
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8 Principals and the Professional
Learning Community
Learning to Mobilize Knowledge
In many ways, school administrators have already played an important

role in utilizing research knowledge to inform leadership practice. In this
study, we propose using the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework
(OKGF) in the development and maintenance of a web site called the Cana-
dian Principal Learning Network (CPLN) to assist principals in advancing
their knowledge and skills in the area of decision-making—knowledge that
is more responsive to a wider range of social, political, and professional
learning community economic priorities outside of the university than cur-
rently exists (Gibbons et al., 1994; Levin, 2011; Phipps & Shapson, 2009;
SSHRC, 2004, 2005a). Through the CPLN, knowledge is collectively gener-
ated; principals, researchers, and other involved stakeholders collaborate in
a non-hierarchical, interdisciplinary, applied partnership (Bickel & Hattrup,
1995; Bradley, 2002; Brew, 2003; Department for Education and Employ-
ment, 2000; Gravani, 2008) which echoes the Social Sciences and Humani-
ties Research Council’s (SSHRC) strategic plan of transforming itself into a
knowledge council where “humanities and social sciences knowledge can
make a difference, where it can inspire ideas and debate, where it can gal-
vanize individuals, communities, businesses and governments into action”
(SSHRC, 2005a, p. 23). As John and Prior (2003) write, “Here the centre
to periphery model of knowledge creation and dissemination is being chal-
lenged so that neither activity is seen as belonging to a separate domain of
experts as opposed to others” (p. 172). The project also seeks to expand this
network and to encourage the development of new ideas and relationships
so that knowledge produced through this partnership “cuts across borders
and disciplines and brings researchers together with people working outside
academia” (SSHRC, 2005a, p. 7).
As Wenger (1998) points out, “elements of discourse travel across bound-
aries and combine to form broader discourse as people co-ordinate their
enterprises, convince each other, reconcile their perspectives and form alli-
ances” (p. 128). Given that the focus of the study is to build and extend a
community of practice, as well as to mobilize research knowledge on princi-
pals’ decision-making, it became important to provide a forum such as the
CPLN to support and sustain principals and researchers in advancing their
knowledge and skills in the area of decision-making (SSHRC, 2005b).
Principals and the Learning Community 109
According to SSHRC (2005b), engagement with research users or benefi-
ciaries of research knowledge is central to the design of any applied research
projects. The CPLN is designed to act as an agent to change practice through
ongoing social contact, which is most likely to affect the behaviour of the
participants (Cooper et al., 2009; Watson et al., 2002). To be individually
and collectively adopted by the participants, the network would also have to
be feasible, worthwhile, meaningful, and productive. It was therefore deter-
mined that the CPLN would provide participating school principals and
their boards with access to (1) a network of peer support to help them make
decisions and resolve common problems; (2) an innovative model of reflec-
tive professional development in the form of the OKGF; (3) a database of
sound empirical studies, evidenced-based research, and practical literature
that would lead to an informed decision-making process; and (4) a jointly
produced web site to facilitate the above activities and to provide convenient
access to information.
It was anticipated that, through the CPLN, experienced participating
principals could also act as mentors to newly hired principals within their
respective boards. Furthermore, by putting researchers and research users in
close and continuing contact, the CPLN would offer long-term opportuni-
ties for collaboration among members in future projects. The first part of
this chapter presents the inception of the peer-to-peer network, the CPLN,
created to assist principals in making decisions and in solving common prob-
lems so that knowledge generated through the network can be mobilized
among the research users and researchers. The second part of the chapter
recounts the evolution of the CPLN web site as well as two workshops on
the use of the OKGF. In addition, it describes the challenges faced in creat-
ing a resource tailored to the specific needs of participating principals, as
well as how those challenges were collaboratively overcome. The third part
of the chapter describes how the OKGF based on the critical rationalism of
Karl Popper functions as a reflective framework and how principals engage
and interact in an online learning community (CPLN) using the OKGF to
inform their decision-making process. Since the OKGF was previously used
with educators and was originally developed in 2003 as a self-directed pro-
fessional development model with pre-service and in-service teachers and
principals, we wanted to use the framework as a group-directed professional
development model to document and interrogate the decision-making pro-
cesses of principals through the CPLN.
KNOWLEDGE MOBILIZATION: THE CPLN
Much research in leadership points to at least two barriers facing principals

with respect to their professional learning. The first relates to the working
condition of principals. Principals often work in fragmented and isolated
cultures (Ackerman & Maslin-Ostrowski, 2002; Mitgang & Maeroff, 2008;
Wagner & Kegan, 2006). Schools tend to be self-contained and complex
110 Principals and the Learning Community
microcosms with varied needs and pressing demands. Various stakeholders,
such as parents, students, teachers, community leaders, and school-board
administrators, have high expectations from the school principals in terms
of leadership, problem solvers, educators, and so forth. Faced with difficult
and delicate situations, principals rely on their beliefs systems, values, previ-
ous experiences, and knowledge to make critical decisions. Often, they are
too personally involved in the context to take an objective view of the situ-
ation (Bradshaw et al., 2002).
The second barrier has to do with the limited district support they receive
for their professional learning (Elmore, 2000; Fullan, 2008; McLaughlin &
Talbert, 2002; Tucker & Codding, 2002) which leaves little room for reflec-
tion, collaboration, or focusing on teaching and learning (Fahey, 2011).
Typically, schools also tend to offer unreflective settings for principals
(Lieberman & Miller, 2008; Stoll & Louis, 2007). On their own, principals
generally do not take time to consult relevant research to help them solve
practical problems that arise on a daily basis. Although they regularly meet
with their peers at board-level meetings, participate in workshops organized
by their associations, and sometimes attend research conferences, most of
these initiatives have prescribed or predetermined agendas, leaving little
room for sharing research-based and timely information that might be use-
ful for solving novel situations they may face at their schools.
Seeking funding from the Knowledge Network for Applied Education
Research (KNAER) to interrogate principals’ decision-making processes
came about during a recent research meeting. Given that the roles and
responsibilities of principals have radically changed over the last decade
with increasingly more responsibilities being placed on their shoulders, we
are of the view that how principals make decisions in their daily practices can
impact on student achievement and the assessment of teachers. Knowledge
generated through this interrogation can then be mobilized among research-
ers and research users such as principals, parents, and the general public,
which is the ultimate goal of this research project (Cooper et al., 2009).
Furthermore, we concur with Wenger’s (1998) and Lave’s (1993) views
that learning is social and emanates mainly from our experience in par-
ticipating in daily life. Building a community of practice (Wenger, 2007),
through the CPLN, where principals can engage by sharing and discuss-
ing their challenges or opportunities with one another, might be one way
to improve their work. As a matter of fact, the postings generated through
principals’ interactions with one another on the CPLN web site can be used
to capture their decision-making processes. The principals come from a
rural Eastern Canadian school district, some of whom are also graduate
students. We built this web site so that these principals may interact with
one another by posting their questions and sharing ideas and information
with each other. It could also be interesting to note the nature and type of
problems principals face and the factors that influence their decision-making
processes. Moreover, the web site can serve as a structure to link principals
and researchers and to facilitate dissemination of research between research-
ers and practitioners. In other words, these principals may serve as bridges
between research and practice, since they are full-time practitioners in the
field (Levin, 2011).
We mindfully assembled an international team of researchers with
administrative experience, curriculum knowledge and pedagogy, and whose
research interests lay in educational leadership, education administration,
change theory, educational policy, and professional learning. In addition,
principals who were current graduate students and new researchers also
joined our research team. The research supporting the CPLN was funded
by the KNAER in June 2011. Despite the fact that the study is ongoing, the
following narrative, based on the perspectives of participants within and
observers of the event, provides insights into three key issues:
(1) principals’ needs of group-directed reflection on decision-making

skills;
(2) interactivity and other web site characteristics required to sup-
port principals’ online community of practice; and
(3) electronic infrastructures and sustaining principals’ engagement
in the CPLN.
In the following paragraphs, a description of the experiences of research-

ers and principals in developing the CPLN web site and related OKGF
training activities is presented chronologically, as framed by the above three
issues.
DEVELOPING THE CPLN WEB SITE: NAVIGATING

UNCHARTERED TERRITORY
Our collective experiences as researchers and principals in developing the

CPLN web site did not follow a well-thought-out plan or logical procedures
or set goals typical of empirical research. Instead, it involved twists and
turns shaped by the new and relatively unconventional nature of interactive
online communities of practice.
Principals’ Needs Concerning Group-Directed Reflections

on Decision-Making s Skills
The OKGF was presented during the first workshop at the school board on
January 23, 2012, in which eleven principals participated. While the main
purpose was to present the OKGF, another key objective was to show the
participants how to apply it within a collaborative context. When preparing
for the workshop, the operational committee aimed at answering the ques-
tion, “What does it take to bring principals to engage in a group-directed
reflection using the OKGF?” Participants were invited to think of day-to-
day situations that required making decisions, specifically decisions that
were relatively new and demanding for them and which they felt could be
referred to their peers for advice. Examples were provided by participants
and, following this, OKGF-based discussion processes were employed to
explore and improve those situations and decisions.
Completed and blank OKGF templates were distributed to principals in
order to assist, remind, and structure group-directed reflections to follow in
the next few weeks, via the CPLN web site. Researchers would contribute to
the interactions and provide theoretical perspectives as needed, for instance,
to help prompt participants in their attempts to resolve their posted prob-
lems. For various reasons, some of which included participants’ lack of expe-
rience with discussion forums, the preliminary nature of the online forum
itself (this will be discussed in the next section), and the demanding nature
of their work, visits to the CPLN were numerous but actual postings to
the forum were scant. During the February 23 workshop, four participants
described their lack of understanding regarding how to apply group-directed
reflections and how to post their interactions on the CPLN. They were anx-
ious to know how many times a week they were expected to participate.
Consequently, it was agreed that they would post as often as possible, given
their busy schedules and other commitments, and identify routine problems
and responses that were critical to them and their work.
Interactivity and Site Characteristics Required to Support

the Community of Practice
The CPLN started out pretty simply with a discussion forum, a relatively
static networking tool, a resource documents section, and information
about the research team and the project. However, the CPLN web site went
through a few substantial iterations in order to accommodate and engage
the principals in group-directed reflections critical to their decision-making
skills. Essentially, the CPLN evolved from an informational tool to an inter-
active forum. In the CPLN’s initial stage, the forum was embedded in the
network tab located at the upper right-hand corner and was relatively dif-
ficult for users to locate.
Given that its purpose was to facilitate exchanges among members, the
various themes and activities that were posted on this page, in the end,
made it cumbersome and overwhelming. As mentioned above, the web site
recorded many visits from the participants, but no follow-up postings were
actually provided. This suggests interest but also confusion or difficulty
experienced by various members in navigating the various tabs and pro-
viding further input. This observation prompted the operational committee
members to meet, discuss the issue, and propose alternative solutions. They
aimed to answer the question, “What do principals need from the web site
to give it ‘added value’ compared to simply picking up the phone and calling
one another?” This discussion resulted in the following recommendations
for changes to the CPLN:
(1) Move the forum page to the front page of the web site.
(2) Focus the forum discussion on practical problems (topics) offered
by the principals.
(3) Provide categories for grouping problems or topics.
(4) Allow for sub-topics to be added to main discussion categories.
(5) Simplify follow-up discussion per problem or topic posted.
(6) Add a “Recent Topic Button.”
(7) Transform a full (or closed) discussion into a wiki with additional
references to resources such as case laws, documentation of best
practices, evidence-based papers, and so on. Discussions should
thus serve as references and resources for future similar topics
posted on the web site.
(8) Provide an online tutorial on how to post a topic and to follow
up on it, with screenshots of step-by-step processes.
(9) Use one topic posting from a principal as an example of how
to apply group-directed reflection and discussion based on the
OKGF.
The goal of these changes was to ensure that the various principals’
group-directed reflections be posted on the CPLN; that these reflections be
supplemented by input from research, policy, and theory; and that the result-
ing resolved problems be saved and accessible for future reference.
Although not initially anticipated, the move towards a hybrid CPLN—
that is, on combining informational and interactive components—became
a key feature of the knowledge mobilization study. It is akin to Facebook
in the sense that school administrators can use it to post questions or
concerns and then receive comments or feedback from other adminis-
trators. An example of a posting might be, “Hey, something interesting
just came across my desk and I’m not sure what to do. Here it is! Any
suggestions?”
The alterations to the web site were seen by the school principals as a
way to effectively connect to a network of researchers, peers, and docu-
mentation and thereby significantly contribute effectively to principals’
decision-making process. For this peer-to-peer network to be established
and maintained, it was crucial to produce a simple yet inexpensive, effi-
cient, meaningful, and stable web site. A search of the web, for examples,
of similar web sites revealed that, except for Facebook, which enables
social exchanges, no other web sites possessed the characteristics that met
the unique combination of needs voiced by the principals. The changes
to the CPLN were made in time for the next face-to-face meeting, held in
February 2012, at the participating school board, where they were pilot-
tested “live.”
Electronic Infrastructures and Sustaining Principals’
Engagement in the CPLN
The various features of the CPLN mentioned above were meant to engage
principals in an online community of practice and to sustain their group-
directed reflections around meaningful but demanding day-to-day decision-
making situations. The principal investigator and the web master were present
at the second meeting, and the discussion forums were then re-organized
into five categories (staff, students, parents, religion, extra-curricular) that
were identified by principals as pertinent to their needs. The principals were
shown how to navigate through these categories and attendant topics in
the newly revised web site as they electronically pursued the group-directed
reflection exercises offered at the on-site meeting. Two completed discus-
sions topics using the OKGF serve as examples.
The above examples show how participants (principals, researchers, stu-
dent assistant) interact to collectively resolve or find potential solutions to
the identified problems. Principals refer to OKGF terminology and to rel-
evant documentation in order to make informed decisions. Participants in
the first topic have arrived at closure, whereas the second problem remains
unresolved and in need for further reflections.
As the study evolved, we added an administrative area for the research
team to post the minutes of previously recorded meetings that took place
mostly via Skype. Furthermore, two areas were created for newsletters and
for sharing information on conferences, symposia, and lectures. Partici-
pants can also gain access to the lectures and the sessions of the symposium
or conferences by clicking on the links provided. All lectures and sessions
were recorded via webinars. The research team, in consultation with the
participants, believe that a section called “Closed Discussions” may need
to be developed as part of a knowledge base featuring resolved issues for
principals. In each of the “Closed Discussions” sections, the OKGF and the
discussions, as well as the solutions reached, are provided.
The web site also features an online tutorial on how to post a topic
and follow up on it; auto-subscriptions to categories in order to receive
e-mail notifications of new postings; topics deemed “closed” or completed,
archived to wikis for future access by principals with similar concerns;
access to supporting and relevant literature (empirical studies, evidence-
based research, official Ministry policies and memoranda, legal case stud-
ies, etc.); and network links to local, national, and international researchers,
experts, and colleagues in the field. Even though the project is still in its
infancy, with fifteen participants, currently they have found the site to be a
valuable tool, as the “on-line chats” can continue over the next few days/
weeks until a satisfactory solution is found for the problem raised. As well,
participants found that the interactions of the principal investigator have
been useful as she provides comments for them to think about regarding
the issues at hand and/or provides links to relevant articles or case law that
they may read or refer to.
Given the dispersed geographical area of the board, two principals vol-
unteered to train seven of their peers who could not attend the second
meeting, February 2012, in person. Training in the use of the web site has
also provided an opportunity for the administrators to meet face-to-face
and to reflect collectively on the decision-making process through the use
of the OKGF (discussed in the third part of this chapter). They found the
framework useful in providing them with a structure to dissect the feedback
received so as to more closely identify and examine the problems, tenta-
tive solutions, or options to resolving the problems The ongoing feedback
has also led to some rich dialogues, which have provided insights into how
school administrators make decisions. Despite this initial stage, adminis-
trators have commented on how the CPLN is engaging them in an online
community of practice, as well as sustaining their group-directed reflections
around their daily decision-making situations.
Along with such promising and exciting aspects of the web site comes
a variety of technical concerns and challenges that are currently being
addressed, such as the CPLN web site often being down so that principals
could not log in at a time convenient to them. This issue was due to the
fact that CPLN was hosted on a relatively small server that had limited
capacity and no automatic backups. Unfortunately, this shortcoming led to
frustration and the complete withdrawal of two of the original participat-
ing principals. There was also concern expressed of the web site not being
stable or robust enough, as the CPLN is currently not supported by reliable
host servers, such as those found in universities or governments. Another
key issue is making the CPLN user-friendly, uncluttered, and interactive,
with easy navigation both within and across its various components. Given
the lack of similar models, web site architects, rather than just technicians
or administrators, are needed at future planning phases. These consultants
must be familiar with the education context and, to a certain extent, must
also understand the needs of the principals. Features being discussed and
considered are guest bloggers, favourites, twitter options, podcasts, live
chats, and virtual conferencing. Discussions with researchers and principals
around promoting the CPLN web site and extending its access and use to
principals and vice principals of school boards throughout Canada are also
being explored. It was agreed that it would be wise to keep the momentum
going by extending the web site usage to other school boards in Ontario and
then exploring ways of expanding the network to reach out to school profes-
sional learning community boards in other provinces throughout Canada.
The OKGF was used to provide structure for participants’ group reflections
in the CPLN by helping them examine their decision-making process, devise
tentative theories, and eliminate certain theories or solutions in favour of
others in order to resolve identified problems.
THE OKGF FOR OPTIMIZING OUTCOMES
The Peer-to-Peer Network for School Principals (PPNSP) has been adapted
from a similar concept originally developed for business contexts. It draws
upon several theoretical influences. One is Wenger’s (1998) ideas about
shared learning and communities of practice. The PPNSP, however, extends
beyond these ideas by encouraging the development of new relationships
and networks. The most important influence regarding the development of
the PPNSP is the OKGF (Chitpin, 2010; Chitpin & Simon, 2009).
The OKGF builds upon Popper’s (1979, 2002) critical rationalism, which
emphasizes that the dynamic growth of knowledge is stimulated by prob-
lems of practice, inconsistencies, and intellectual conflicts. Crucial to this
process is the users’ willingness to reflect and critically revise a hitherto
accepted body of beliefs. This method encourages users to discover weak
points in their theories and to question their arguments. In the current con-
text, we focus on the theory’s process of systematic and explicit reflection,
rather than whether knowledge can be said to be objectively true.
Thus far, we have seen numerous depictions of the cyclical process of iden-
tifying an initial problem, proposing a tentative theory to address or resolve
the problem, to test tentative theories against experience or the criticisms
of others, and to arrive at a new problem identification process that arises
out of error elimination. The schema then iterates. The comprehensive yet
simple OKGF has repeatedly been shown to support professional learning
(Chitpin, 2011; Chitpin & Knowles, 2009; Chitpin & Simon, 2009, 2012;
Simon et al., 2010). For example, when the teachers in Simon et al.’s (2010)
study were interviewed in depth and their teaching artifacts were analyzed in
detail, the OKGF schema was recognized as a useful tool for assisting their
professional learning, regardless of their professional training, background,
or prior experience. Its focus is on helping people explicitly examine how
they make decisions; how they devise tentative theories and consider their
accuracy; how others influence the decision process and what that means;
and how and why they eliminate certain options in favour of others.
The OKGF is sensitive to experience, contexts, and exigencies (Simon
et al., 2010). Perhaps the best known attempt at incorporating all three—
experience, contexts, and exigencies—is the model of the reflective practi-
tioner developed by Schon (1983), who focused on broad procedures for
specifying the conditions under which reflecting on and in practice could
flourish. However, Schon’s work did not provide a structure to guide self-
reflection or prompt learners to report on their process or progress when
making key decisions.
The OKGF, on the other hand, systematically tracks the progression
of decision-making (challenges and opportunities) employed by the par-
ticipants. As a consequence, each strategy employed becomes bolder and
sharper in empirical content. Finally, the OKGF is cost effective and rela-
tively easy to implement—as demonstrated by a pilot study in an Eastern
Ontario Board (Chitpin & Knowles, 2009) as well as in an SSHRC-funded
study with pre-service teachers regarding assessment issues (Chitpin, 2010).
In that study, participants were essentially asked to document their decision-
making (using a template) as they attempted to resolve organizational
problems. When the OKGF is adopted within a natural school setting as a
reflective tool, it offers several advantages: participants are provided with a
structured form to record their decision-making process and their explana-
tions of actions taken when faced with opportunities or challenges. They
also have the freedom to choose the number of cycles they want to complete,
as long as these are reflective of their typical school day.
OPTIMIZING OUTCOMES
Every time a principal chooses to make a decision, such as deciding to give a

week’s detention to a student who has exhibited violent behaviour in class or
to suspend the student for a day from school, he or she is essentially predict-
ing how the future will proceed and also how this plan will affect the odds
for a favourable outcome. This is important for the principal to predict as
he or she connects both the subjective and the objectivity reality. The OKGF
does not go as far as Popper goes in asserting that a hypothesis is not scien-
tific unless it can be falsifiable, meaning that it can be tested in the real world
by means of a prediction. Instead, the OKGF suggests that principals need to
think carefully about the assumptions and beliefs they bring to the process
of resolving a problem, because making a decision invokes judgment, which
introduces the potential of bias, as the decision made may be based on per-
sonal, social, or political beliefs.
One of the strongest characteristics about the OKGF is that it forces the
principals to identify the problems they are facing. Principals then gather
information on the problem and formulate a solution to resolve the prob-
lem. Essentially, the principals demarcate their theory/solution by putting
it to the test, similar to the way scientists validate their hypotheses by con-
ducting an experiment. The stronger the theory/solution, the more effec-
tive it is in resolving the problem. Let us take a posting from the CPLN
to illustrate this point. Let us call the principal John. He is a downtown
high school principal. His school has an ongoing problem with Muslim
students using their faith to get out of class and avoid serving detentions.
His post read:
The other day I found a student outside the school building when he
had told his teacher that he had to go to the washroom. He said that he
left the school to pray. (No I do not know where he went to pray, but
we are a downtown school.) A couple of weeks ago, we had a formal
request from the Muslim Student Association for all Muslim students
to leave afternoon class every day before the bell to pray. We also have
students refusing to attend lunch hour detentions because of prayer. We
no longer give Friday detentions.
We have brought in our MLO (multicultural liaison officer) who has
consulted an imam who has said that the students do not have to pray
at the times they think they need to. But here is my question. Is there
anything in the Education Act that supports us in our efforts to keep stu-
dents from leaving class to pray? We are not talking about Grant Days
or Religious holidays, just being in class during the day. Every individual
in society has beliefs and biases stemming from his or her experiences,
values and knowledge and even perhaps from given political or profes-
sional agendas.
However, the OKGF acknowledges John’s prior knowledge and beliefs

and how these might affect the way he makes his decisions faced with new
information or evidence. In fact, it provides a good description of how prin-
cipals react to changes in their daily work, as evidenced from the example
given above. John strives to be less subjective and more rational when he
consulted an imam to get feedback from his hypothesis that the students
were avoiding detentions and attending classes by using faith as an excuse.
Using the OKGF framework, he handles the problem by breaking down
the inputs/feedback received, such as, first, “checking with your Equity and
Inclusion lead and with leaders of that faith to determine what is deemed
time for prayer and requirements for how often” (posting from CPLN). Also
of note is looking into the proposed solution—that of, second, providing a
space for prayers and speaking with the school district’s legal expert about
the situation and, third, exercising the indirect power of the principal to deal
with this issue by referring to sections 264 and 265 of the Education Act
and Regulation 298. The feedback gathered can, with time and experience,
constitute a working knowledge for the principals.
Given the amount of feedback received, John must consider all of the
information. In other words, he is updating his decision-making process
any time he is presented with new information. The OKGF thus encourages
him to be disciplined about how he weighs new information. If the ideas
presented by his peers are worthwhile, he ought to be willing to test them
and eliminate the errors that are contained in the hypotheses or theories.
Through using the OKGF, principals notice when they become too person-
ally or professionally invested in a problem. It is when they are willing to
test the ideas/theories gathered through their interactions with others on
the CPLN web site that they begin to avoid problems and, also, learn from
their mistakes.
In the current context, the CPLN acts as an online learning community
that enables both novice and seasoned principals to be involved and engaged
in professional learning (Bradshaw et al., 2002; Claudet, 2001). Since
many schools remain isolated and unreflective places where they struggle
with collaborative practice (Bryk et al., 2010; Lieberman & Miller, 2008;
McLaughlin & Talbert, 2002; Stoll & Louis, 2007), the CPLN serves as a
centre of inquiry and as a bridge for researchers and research users. The
CPLN is also viewed as a social process where researchers and research users
engage and interact with each other on issues of interest which are pertinent
to them, along with plausible strategies and theories they are contemplating
in order to resolve issues they are currently facing. Moreover, the CPLN
enables principals to easily access the views of colleagues and researchers
alike on issues raised.
Researchers can also bridge the gap between theory and practice by
exchanging ideas, reviewing points, and discussing theories or cases with
principals who have varying experiences, school sizes and locations. This
form of online learning community is about actively engaging the principals
beyond the traditional forums of attending workshops and seminars, which
are mainly geared towards academic audiences. As such, the CPLN mobi-
lizes principals to become research users.
Our participants represent moderate to high users of this technology, due
to the business of their daily routines, which also leaves them little time to
access the web site. Nevertheless, they access the web site whenever possible
and use the structure provided when they are confronted with complex,
unfamiliar, non-routine, or quality-based issues in order to obtain feed-
back or information from other principals or researchers. By posting their
concerns or issues, these principals engage in learning. Middlecamp (2005)
states:
If students do not engage, they are unlikely to learn. And if [we] do not
engage, [we] are unlikely to engage our students. Furthermore, if we do
not engage, [we]miss out on opportunities to learn ourselves. Thus, the
engagement of all involved in the teaching and learning processes would
seem to be worthy and mutually beneficial goal.
(Middlecamp, 2005, p. 17)
In fact, a considerable amount of literature points to a correlation between

professional learning communities and gains in student learning. (Bryk et
al., 2010; Donaldson, 2008; Guskey, 2000; Leithwood et al., 2004; Lieber-
man & Miller, 2008; Louis & Kruse, 1995; McLaughlin & Talbert, 2002;
Newmann & Wehlage, 1995; Peterson, 2002; Schmoker, 2006; Stoll &
Louis, 2007). Moreover, such literature supports the claim that a profes-
sional learning community, such as the CPLN, can be powerful in improving
teaching and learning and maintains the notion that school principals have
a critical role to play in this process (DuFour et al., 2005; Fullan, 2008;
Wagner, 2004; Wagner & Kegan, 2006).
The CPLN web site, along with the OKGF, is a step forward in providing
principals with a structure and a venue to be reflective and collaborative.
The web site alone would not have been sufficient for principals to network,
as an online community needs to be grown and not built. As well, building
a collaborative, reflective online learning community is not an easy feat, as
most schools are far from being communities (Lieberman & Miller, 2008;
Louis & Kruse, 1995; Schmoker, 2006; Wagner, 2004; Wagner & Kegan,
2006) and struggle with any degree of collaborative practice (Bryk et al.,
2010; Lieberman & Miller, 2008; McLaughlin & Talbert, 2002; Stoll &
Louis, 2007). Principals need a place to reflect, discuss, experiment, practice,
and learn, and, for this group of principals, that place is the CPLN.
IMPLICATIONS
The CPLN was created as a resource for collaboration among principals

and (international researchers in differing fields of endeavour. Interactions
resulting from social linkages which develop between researchers and users
(principals) Amara et al. 2004; Cooper et al., 2009; Levin, 2011) assist the
latter in advancing their skills in the area of decision-making. As suggested in
other studies, school districts need to apply research knowledge in a greater
and more consistent manner than ever before (Amara et al., 2004: Cooper
et al., 2009). There is also a need for more innovative and creative ways of
connecting research to practice in school districts. For example, in this study,
many of the participants are graduate students who are also full-time school
administrators. Knowledge generated through this study can thus be applied
more consistently and systematically (Levin, 2011; Cooper & Levin, 2010)
to their specific situations.
Research literature also suggests that principals should continue to learn
about leading in order to improve their practice and, also, to make sense of
the changing roles they experience (Fahey, 2011). In order for professional
learning to continue to occur, a mechanism to maintain rigour as the group
learns is warranted, as illustrated by this project. The use of the OKGF and
the CPLN web site enables principals to go deeper into the various prob-
lems or issues they face. Furthermore, this study suggests that, for princi-
pals’ learning to continue, there needs to be ongoing support and structure
(Fahey, 2011). Moreover, the problems faced by principals need to be con-
nected to the actual dilemmas. In other words, the concerns expressed need
to be related to the challenges they face in their daily work. It is not about
studying principals’ work but about the real work of a principal (Fahey,
2011). This project also suggests that similar structures need to be explored
and put into place for principals and researchers to collaborate and learn so
as to improve theory and practice; that is, structures that can be quickly and
easily implemented so as to strengthen the connections between research,
policy, and practice (Cooper & Levin, 2010).
The reflections and collaboration captured in this study can also pro-
vide a model for preparing other principals for the learning that takes place
within the environment of a professional learning community and online
professional learning community using the OKGF. A recent national study
on leadership training suggests that powerful leadership does not just take
place during preparation programs but that principals need to continue to
learn as they lead in their respective schools (Mitgang & Maeroff, 2008).
It is hoped that the sharing of the challenges faced and the learning that
occurred through participating in the CPLN have been effective and efficient
in producing reflective, proficient administrators capable of addressing not
only the challenges posed in their schools but also, as numerous researchers
note (Fry et al., 2006; Levine, 2005; Mitgang & Maeroff, 2008), of surviv-
ing the job themselves.
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9 Making Just Tenure and Promotion
Decisions Using the Objective
Knowledge Growth Framework
Tim is Assistant Professor at “Capital University.” His recent bid for tenure
and promotion has been denied by John, the Dean of the Faculty. How did
John come to this decision? Is this justified and fair?
In recent years there has been a blossoming of interest in the topic of how
people make decisions, based on the available information. A large number
of papers and many books and articles have been written on good decision-
making, which suggests ways to counter our irrationality and biases to
improve our decisions. This is particularly true with regard to decisions that
have lifelong consequences. This chapter offers a framework to guide such
decisions that impact on individuals’ lives, as is the case with professors’
tenure and promotion.
One would assume that all professors should get tenure because they
have proven that they have the intellect, skill, fortitude, initiative, and self-
awareness to survive in a seriously demanding doctoral program at a research
university (Perlmutter, 2008). Gravestock (2011) states that, even though
tenure and promotion criteria are clearly defined and articulated in collec-
tive agreements, including how professors’ dossiers are to be evaluated, the
reality is that not all professors are offered tenure for a variety of reasons.
For example, a professor’s tenure is based on evidence of his or her contri-
butions to teaching, research, and service. While the means of assessment
for tenure vary from institution to institution, there are, however, many
common elements, such as “competence” in teaching, measured through
data from student evaluations, and “excellence” in research, in terms of the
number of peer-reviewed publications and service provided to the commu-
nity, based on the professor’s academic expertise.
For the purpose of this chapter, I will use student evaluations to illustrate
how the information contained in these evaluations is used to make career
and life decisions for professors. Because this is such an important decision,
we can benefit from utilizing a mechanism such as the Objective Knowledge
Growth Framework (OKGF). As noted in previous chapters, the OKGF is a
critical rational framework for checking data generated from student evalu-
ations to minimizing errors when making decisions that not only have life
Tenure and Promotion Decisions 125
consequences for the individuals but also for institutions, as many cases end
up in appeals that tie up limited resources.
Most of the information we acquire is either through processing what we
read or hear. So much information is transmitted daily that, more often than
not, we simply accept it unless there is some obvious reason not to do so,
such as in the case where the information received is inconsistent with some
of our beliefs (Popper, 1979; Swann, 2009). We may even use this informa-
tion, student evaluations, without much thought or consideration, to make
decisions relating to tenure and promotion.
This chapter takes the position that beliefs acquired through informa-
tion, such as student evaluations, are not necessarily always justified but
serve merely as propositional information. As well, because of an underlying
assumption that feedback provided to professors by students is one of the
more reliable measures of teaching effectiveness, we frequently fail to take
into account the sensitive nature of the teaching context.
This chapter also draws on Popper’s epistemology to provide solutions
to counter decision-makers’ biases, particularly as it pertains to institutional
improvement that could potentially have major impacts, both for the institu-
tion and for the individual. The chapter begins with a discussion on weak-
nesses in human decision-making, followed by Professor Tim’s (pseudonym)
tenure case. I then provide a critical-rationalist account of how leaders might
use some of Popper’s key insights, depicted by the OKGF, to counteract the
tendency to accept others’ opinions and arguments at face value, using an
example of a Dean’s potentially negative assessment of a faculty member’s
tenure and promotion application. I will conclude by illustrating how such a
process framework as the OKGF can be used to encourage leaders to explore
a variety of options that assist them in arriving at the best possible choice.
OKGF: SPOTLIGHT SHIFTING IN DECISION-MAKING
Hume (2013), in Section X of “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understand-

ing,” states that people take various factors into consideration when assess-
ing the truth or otherwise of what people tell them. He further says that we
take into account the character of the person involved. If the individual in
question has a dubious character, this casts more doubt on the veracity of the
statement, and, thus, we might not necessarily accept the statement. Further-
more, we must also consider whether the person has an interest in what he
is doing and the manner in which he says it. If he is hesitant or comes across
as being too assertive, this may also raise some suspicion. Hume’s (2013)
observations are still as relevant today as when they were first made, though
we should not think of his observations as an exhaustive list of possible
overriding factors that people use when listening to others speak (Diller,
2009) and when using information presented to them (Perlmutter, 2008).
126 Tenure and Promotion Decisions
Although, Hume (2013) and Diller (2009) are referring to assertions made
by people, and how these assertions are processed, the decisions made using
these assertions may have great impact and consequence.
Kahneman (2011), a psychologist and Nobel Prize winner in economics
for his research on the way people make decisions, says that people are quick
to jump to conclusions because, often, we focus on the information that is
right in front of us while failing to consider the information that is offstage.
He calls this tendency, “what you see is all there is” (p. 121). Heath and
Heath (2013) refer to this tendency as the “spotlight” effect. Spotlights are
used in theaters to direct our attention to the intended objects, scenes, or
actors. What is inside the spotlight is crisply illuminated.
Tim’s situation can be viewed as an example of the spotlight effect. We
learn with colleagues that Tim is not an effective teacher and that students
do not hold him in high esteem. His research is satisfactory, and he rarely
participates in community service. We take the available information and
start drawing our conclusions from it. What we forget is that a spotlight
only focuses on a spot, and everything around it becomes obscured, as
noted above. Furthermore, we forget to ask a number of obvious ques-
tions. For instance, instead of not supporting his tenure, why not change
his teaching assignment to better match his strengths? As well, perhaps
Tim can be matched with a mentor who would help him set more ambi-
tious goals.
Moreover, if and when John (pseudonym), the Dean of the Faculty of
Education at Capital University, digs deeper, he might find that some col-
leagues appreciate Tim’s straightforward ways. He might also find that his
take on Tim, based on his teaching evaluations and his participation in fac-
ulty meetings, is not completely accurate. It is only when he starts shifting
the spotlight that he sees the situation differently, and, if he wants to make
a good and fair decision about Tim’s tenure, he needs to do the spotlight
shifting, as it is easy to develop an opinion based solely on the information
before us.
Why do we have a hard time making good decisions, particularly in recent
years, with so many fascinating books and articles that have addressed this
question? Bias and irrationality are some of the main causes of our dif-
ficulty, as evidenced by Tim’s tenure scenario. At times, we are also given
the advice to “trust our gut” when making important decisions. Yet, often
our gut can’t make up its mind. But if we can’t trust our gut, then who
or what can we trust? Many leaders put their faith in careful analysis, as
evidenced by research carried out by Lovallo and Sibony (2010) on ways
decisions are made and their subsequent outcomes in terms of revenues,
profits, and market shares. They found that organizations that use a
decision process model led to better analysis because it helps organi-
zations to identify their confirmation bias. Confirmation bias exists in
organizations, our personal lives—in short, everywhere (Chitpin, 2010;
Chitpin & Simon, 2012).
CONFIRMATION BIAS AND SPOTLIGHT SHIFTING
Confirmation bias occurs when we mirror our existing values and beliefs
and, in the process, cause new and divergent opinions to vanish altogether. If
we begin to shift the spotlight from side to side, Tim’s teaching scores begin
to look very different. We could not possibly hope to make a good decision
about Tim’s teaching without doing this spotlight shifting. Yet, it was easy
for anyone to develop an opinion without doing it. Often, we have a ten-
dency to interpret the data before us in a fashion that not only is compatible
with our existing theories and beliefs but also is similar to the values and
beliefs of the members we seek feedback from. For instance, Tim was viewed
by the administrators and colleagues from the Faculty Teaching Personnel
Committee (FTPC) as an ineffective teacher, not highly regarded by students,
and spending too much time criticizing the administration. Furthermore,
because John sought like-minded colleagues’ opinions and suggestions, he
was thus further reinforcing his convictions and the confirmation bias. The
reference about seeking like-minded colleagues is made with respect to the
assumption that John is following up with the recommendation presented
to him by the FTPC.
Research shows that people tend to select information that supports their
existing attitudes, beliefs, and actions (Chitpin, 2010; Lovallo & Sibony,
2010). On the surface, this practice looks very scientific. After all, we are
collecting data. However, Lovallo and Sibony (2010) state that confirmation
bias “is probably the single biggest problem in business, because even the
most sophisticated people get it wrong. People go out and they are collect-
ing the data, and they don’t realize they are cooking the books” (p. 5). The
danger with confirmation bias is that, if we want something to be true, we
will spotlight the data that support it to draw conclusions from those spot-
lighted scenes and congratulate ourselves for making a reasoned decision.
In order for John to make a good and fair decision about Tim, he needs to
first remember to shift the light because the spotlight will rarely illuminate
everything he needs in order to make a good decision. For instance, he has
to be cognizant of the class size, the mode of delivery, and the number of
students who participated in the evaluation process, even though these fac-
tors might contradict his prior views and those of his committee members.
Switching perspective is something that John needs to do if he is to fol-
low the OKGF (Chitpin, 2010; Chitpin & Evers, 2012). It is not that John
lacks data or information. It is difficult because he feels conflicted with the
short-term pressures of making a decision based on the data before him,
which has obscured the long-term need to get to the truth of Tim’s teaching
evaluations. By following the OKGF, John would determine Tim’s teaching
effectiveness by carefully considering other factors that may account for
Tim’s poor teaching evaluations. As well, John would dodge the confirma-
tion bias by seeking advice from colleagues who are not serving on the Fac-
ulty Teaching Personnel Committee and colleagues who have worked more
closely with Tim. From these converging assessments, John could perhaps
have a better assessment of Tim’s teaching.
TIM’S TENURE: A FICTITIOUS SCENARIO
Gravestock and Gregor-Greenleaf (2008) surveyed 44 universities across

Canada and discovered that professors’ tenure time range averaged three
to seven years. Previous professional experience is also taken into consid-
eration at the time of appointment. Generally, the time for a professor to
be granted tenure from his or her first probationary appointment is five
to six years. Furthermore, a professor’s tenure and promotion is generally
based on teaching, research, and community service to the institution. The
authors found that criteria for research contributions are more stringent and
more thoroughly articulated. However, recently revised policies on teaching
include clearer statements of expectations. Professors are expected to pro-
vide evidence for their contributions in each of the three categories to the
Committee of Faculty Teaching Personnel.
While the means of assessment for professor’s tenure vary from insti-
tution to institution, there are, however, many common elements, such as
“competence” in teaching and “excellence” in research, which are measured
using, for example, data from student evaluations from all courses taught,
samples of teaching materials, teaching dossiers, peer-reviewed research
publications, research grants, conference proceedings, participation in insti-
tutional committees and governance processes, and community service rel-
evant to academic expertise.
John, Dean of the Faculty of Education at Capital University, is agoniz-
ing about whether to support the Faculty Teaching Personnel Committee’s
recommendation to deny Tim promotion and tenure. Tim is an Assistant
Professor of Education Leadership in the Faculty of Education in a bilingual
university in central Canada. Prior to his appointment at the university, he
was a high school math and philosophy teacher, for over a decade, in one
of the largest boards in Eastern Canada. He has a disciplinary background
in mathematics and philosophy, and research and teaching interests in the
areas of educational administration and leadership, philosophy of educa-
tion, and research methodology.
Since Tim’s appointment to the faculty six years ago, he has consistently
received low teaching scores on his course evaluations, which is one of the
common elements considered in tenure and promotion decisions (Grave-
stock et al., 2008). He writes a maximum of two articles per year. At the
same time, Tim is not without his talents. He is intelligent and speaks both
official languages, English and French. He currently teaches in both pro-
grams, face-to-face, hybrid and online. He also has the ability to quickly
and effectively resolve technical problems, such as issues with Adobe con-
nections and video conferencing, and has a thorough knowledge of systems
management (Blackboard Vista and Blackboard Learn). He rarely partici-
pates in faculty or committee meetings and can often be seen in the corridor
criticizing the administration.
As one reads about Tim, opinions form quickly. We may feel we already
know Tim well enough to offer advice as to what John should do. Perhaps
we may advise John not to support Tim’s tenure, or maybe we would suggest
giving Tim a chance to improve his teaching and scholarship. Chances are
that we might feel it is easy to provide an opinion. However, if we aspire to
make better decisions, then we ought to learn how biases work and how to
fight them using a process framework derived from Popper’s critical ratio-
nalism. My discussion to advocate such a framework in making educational
decisions is indebted to Popper but does not represent a straightforward
discussion of his work.
POPPER’S CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Popper’s critical rationalism is a species of rationalism and, thus, is opposed

to all forms of irrationalism. Popper (1966a) focuses on the following com-
ponents: objectified knowledge, descriptive and argumentative language,
theoretical and practical problems; the search for error and specific limi-
tation (Chitpin, 2010; Chitpin & Evers, 2012; Chitpin & Simon, 2012;
Swann, 2009). Popper (1966a) also seeks “to solve as many problems as
possible by an appeal to reason, i.e. to clear thought and experience, rather
than by an appeal to emotions and passions” (p. 224). He presents his ratio-
nalism by means of the formula: “I may be wrong and you may be right,
and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (p. 225). This attitude of
reasonableness, as Popper calls it, may seem simplistic, but it is robust and
encapsulates a many-faceted position. At the heart of Popper’s formula is
the readiness to accept and not dismiss or ignore contrary opinions or evade
criticisms directed at our own views. One of the most distinctive features of
critical rationalism is the moral commitment to adopt the attitude of reason-
ableness, which is not easy to apply in our daily living (Popper, 1966a). It
is almost a struggle not to dismiss, in some shape or form, the inconvenient
truths and irritating arguments/information that are brought to our atten-
tion, thus suggesting that our opinions or plans are not as perfect as we
would like them to be (Diller, 2009).
According to Popper (1983), there are two ways in which a person can
respond to a piece of information. She can either critically examine the infor-
mation presented, which is time-consuming, and, also, only a small amount
of what she hears or reads can be subjected to this sort of scrutiny, or she
can accept it at face value, which is the most common way of dealing with
information unless there is some reason for not accepting such a piece of
information. It should be pointed out that critical rationalists do not criti-
cize a claim by attacking its reasons rather than the claim itself. Instead they
would advise those involved in argumentation to criticize the claim by show-
ing that it has false consequences. This is because falsity is re-transmitted in
a valid argument, which would mean that the claim itself is false.
From a critical rationalist’s perspective, the origins of a theory are irrel-
evant to its truth; it is the consequences of a standpoint that are far more
important in assessing its value (Chitpin & White, 2012; Diller, 2009). In
other words, if the reasons provided in a claim are bad but the logic is cor-
rect, one is not bound to reject the claim. The reverse is also true: Where the
reasons are good but the logic faulty, one is not bound to reject the claim.
Just because one particular set of reasons for a claim has been shown to be
false does not mean that it is irrational to accept that claim. There may be
other considerations that show the claim is rational to believe, and, thus,
one carries on believing it.
The critical rationalists, on the other hand, do not believe that it is ratio-
nal to hold unjustified beliefs. Instead, they use explanation to show how an
initial stock of beliefs are acquired and continue to be added to throughout,
as evidenced by Tim’s case (which will be taken up later in the chapter).
PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSITIONAL OR ACQUIRED

INFORMATION
Popper’s (1974) replacement of traditional problems of epistemology by

new ones is similar to his replacement of a traditional problem of politi-
cal theory with a new question; for instance, from “Who should rule?” to
“How can we organize our political institutions so that bad or incompetent
rulers cannot do too much damage?” (p. 25).
For Popper (1974), the traditional problems of epistemology of “How do
you know? What is the source of your assertions?”(p. 25) are taken to mean,
‘What are the best sources of our knowledge—the most reliable ones, those
which will not lead us into error, and those to which we can and must turn,
in case of doubt, as the last court of appeal?” (p. 25). The problem with the
traditional political question is that it invites authoritarian answers (Diller,
2008). Popper criticized the idea of having an ultimate source of political
power, as well as showing that the traditional approach to political theory
contains many flaws and that there are infallible, more, or even highly reli-
able sources of knowledge (Diller, 2008; Popper, 1974). Popper further adds
that we do not just accept information because it comes from a reliable
source. Rather, knowing that it comes from a reliable source means that, as
it stands, we have no reason to doubt that the information is incorrect, but
it is still acceptable to ask for the source of information (Diller, 2008).
Consider, for example, the teaching scores on Tim’s Teaching Evaluation
Report. The information on Tim’s teaching seems to be legitimate, as it
comes from a respected and authoritative source. Popper cautions against
such an approach. Knowing the source of information does not necessarily
legitimize nor justify that information, nor does it render it reliable. Know-
ing that Tim’s teaching scores come from the Teaching Evaluation Report
give no grounds for rejecting that information at the present time.
However, I may reject that information later if I learn, for example, that
only half of the students completed the evaluation, which will impact the
mean of all responses. Furthermore, averages do not always give useful data.
Imagine the following scenario. In an extreme case where fourteen students
out of twenty choose “Excellent”—“Excellent” being a score of 5 and “Very
Poor” a score of 1—the resulting average or mean would be 3.8. The six
dissatisfied students severely affect the average. By computing the median,
a score of 5 is achieved.
Thus, the average gives us one datum or story and the median gives us
another datum or story. Although the average is better than other statistical
measures, the average may not reflect much of a consensus response. In fact,
it is also possible that the fourteen students who evaluated Tim gave him a
score of 1 and only six gave him a score of 5. There is also the possibility
that students who have no concerns with Tim’s teaching did not feel a need
to complete an evaluation and, thus, he ended up with a low teaching score.
We reject information that comes from an unreliable source, but we do not
accept information purely on the basis that it comes from a reliable source.
Rather, knowing that the information comes from a reliable source means
that we can accept the correctness of that piece of information for the time
being. This is why asking for the source of the information is acceptable.
Popper further adds that the question “How do you know?” is a valid ques-
tion to ask, particularly with newly propounded theories. Popper (1974)
replies to the question ”How do you know?” as follows:
I do not know: my assertion was merely a guess. Never mind the source,
or the sources, from which it may spring—there are many possible
sources, and I may not be aware of half of them; and origins or pedigrees
have in any case little bearing upon truth. But if you are interested in the
problem which I tried to solve by my tentative assertion, you may help
me by criticizing it as severely as you can; and if you can design some
experimental test which you think might refute my assertion, I shall
gladly, and to the best of my powers, help you to refute it.
(p. 27)
Popper’s response makes sense if uttered by someone who has to make

a decision on Tim’s promotion. Popper believes that just because the infor-
mation came from some sort of legitimate or valid source does not mean
that the claim is correct. Popper is correct in rejecting such an approach.
Like Popper, we believe that, rather than asserting the source of informa-
tion as conferring validity or justification on that assertion, we should con-
sider whether that information constitutes a reasonable reason to reject the
assertion in question. Just knowing Tim’s teaching scores come from the
University Course Evaluation neither legitimizes nor justifies that informa-
tion, nor does it render it reliable (Diller, 2008).
In addition, we need to establish factors that account for a decrease in
the number of false beliefs that we acquire through the Teaching Evaluation
Report (Diller, 2008). Once we begin to think of ways to reject informa-
tion that is not correct or accurate, we also run into problems of failing to
believe true statements, read or written. I thus propose a critical rationalist
framework, called the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework (OKGF) to
improve the ways in which we assess information when making decisions.
Many educationists do not know Popper’s work; rather, Popper is known
for his contributions to the philosophy of science (Popper, 1972) and his
political theory (Popper, 1966a, 1966b). In the next section, I will first
describe the process of the OKGF framework and then how it can be used
by for leaders or decision-makers in dealing with propositional information
when making promotional decisions.
THE OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE GROWTH FRAMEWORK:

A PROCESS DECISION-MAKING MODEL
The OKGF is based on Karl Popper’s (1979, 2002) critical rationalism. It

emphasizes that the dynamic growth of knowledge can be stimulated by
problems relating to practice, such as inconsistencies and intellectual con-
flicts. According to Popper, accepted theories (information, procedures, and
policies) can only be disproven and must be replaced by newer, more accept-
able theories. Thus, we are actively encouraged to seek information that
contradicts formerly accepted theories. The OKGF, therefore, aims to refute
erroneous theories in order to move knowledge forward by making users
question established beliefs and mobilizing them to revise their theories in
order to formulate new hypotheses. Crucial to this process is the users’ will-
ingness to reflect upon and revise hitherto accepted but unworkable educa-
tional processes (information, policies, and practices). This method strives
to replace weak theories in their decision-making practices with a processed
framework (Chitpin, 2010, 2013a; Chitpin & Jones, 2015).
The OKGF consists of three steps. The first step consists of identifying an
intial problem (P1). Second is the attempted solution or “theory.” A tenta-
tive theory is proposed in order to resolve the problem (TTn). Third is the
attempted falsification of the theory by “testing” through “critical discus-
sion.” In other words, the theory is subjected to “error elimination” (EE1)
and, finally, there is the generation of new knowledge, which creates “new
problems” and “new facts” (P2), which will then require an explanation.
These steps may occur sequentially or concurrently. Sometimes, however,
one may need to “double back” on something one has learned. For example,
in the course of gathering information to test a tentative solution or theory,
one might discover a new option that one had not considered before. At
other times, one would not require all the steps. For example, a long-awaited
promotion or budget increase from the board probably would not require
much consideration before one accepts the offer.
Although, a tentative theory or solution can only be adopted one at a time
in response to its specific problem, there are many possible solutions/theories
to a problem, as well as a variety of ways to solve a particular problem. Each
tentative theory is tested by putting it into practice and assessing the results.
The tentative theory may be better or worse than the other tentative thories.
“Better” or “worse” in this context are judged based on whether the the-
ory has solved the problem and the additional consequences ensue (Swann,
2009). If the theory is inadequate in resolving the problem, error elimina-
tion (EEn) is employed in order to either refine the problem identification
or refine the tentative theory. The schema then iterates until a satisfactory
solution is found (Pn). This is called an “OKGF sequence,” similar to “Pop-
per’s schema” (Chitpin, 2010). If each OKGF sequence generates new facts,
it produces new knowledge; the original problem also becomes richer in that
it has more questions to resolve but, at the same time, it brings us closer to
the truth of the inquiry, i.e. to the core of the problem to reach a better “deci-
sion.” The new facts arising from the sequence must also be explained and, in
so doing, we increase our knowledge of the problem as we explain or account
for these new discoveries in our decision-making. The OKGF has an addi-
tional advantage in that any discovery made or any new fact revealed is now
the subject of further investigation within the theory under discussion. We
must also explain or account for these new facts that are uncovered through
the OKGF analysis. The sequence is summarized as follows:
P(1) Problem

TT(1)  Tentative Theory or Solution

EE(1)  Error Elimination
↓
P(2)  New Facts and New Problems
Problem 2 (P2) is different from Problem 1 (P1) because of the result of

the new situation arising from the tentative theory (TT1) and the error elimi-
nation (EE1), which consists of applying the tentative theory to solve the
identified problem (P1). New facts are produced, thus increasing our knowl-
edge of the situation under investigation. In this context, “knowledge” is
used to mean all kinds of expectations, some of which are conscious—others
are unconscious. Still others are inborn or acquired through learning. It can
also be used to mean implicit and/or explicit assumptions and theoretical
constructs (true or false). Knowledge is often understood in education to
mean “justified belief” (Chitpin, 2010; Swann, 2009). However, Popper says
that we cannot justify our beliefs because we do not know if they are true
and also because when these beliefs enter into the public domain, they exist
independently of us.
“Theory” in this chapter refers to explicit statements of all kinds, includ-
ing general and singular statements, as well as implicit assumptions and
unstated expectations (ideas). To make a theory testable, it is necessary to
combine it with statements of one or more specific initial conditions—the
circumstances under which the theory is to be tested—to form a positive
prediction. A prediction has the same structure as an explanation, except
that the theory and specific initial conditions are assumed to be known and
what remains to be discovered are the logical consequences, which have not
yet been observed (Popper, 1979, p. 352). For example, when John uses a
theory (using the Standard Deviation [SD] of the faculty) to compare Tim’s
mean score with that of the faculty, he needs to specify the condition(s)
under which the theory will be tested to achieve an anticipated result (e.g.
during Fall Semester or Summer Session or with the professors teaching the
same courses or class size). The theory is then subjected to criticism; that
is, checking to ascertain whether or not the prediction has been fulfilled (in
this case, checking to ensure that most of the teaching scores fall close to the
“average,” with relatively few scores falling to one extreme or the other, i.e.
a normal bell curve).
PROBLEMATIZING PREDICTION
According to Popper, the prediction must be sufficiently precise in order for

counter evidence to emerge. If it is not sufficiently precise, the process is mere
soothsaying (Chitpin, 2010; Swann, 2009). The prediction needs also to be
bold in the sense that it is not overly consistent with prior expectation(s).
The best predictions are those that are specific, inconsistent (with some prior
expectations), and can be fulfilled. The bolder the prediction, the more chal-
lenging to our expectations and, thus, the more significant the contribution to
our knowledge of the situation, which can lead to making a better decision.
A situation needs to be created to refute the prediction. For example,
John predicted that, at the end of each term, he would be provided with the
mean score of all the professors in the faculty. Even when he was provided
with the SD as he predicted, it does not prove that the theory is true, for
many reasons, such as the bell curve is not normally distributed due to
the scores of professors falling from one extreme to the other, or due to the
size of the class and the number of students who submitted an evaluation,
or because, in general, people tend not to use the outlier scores on a scale,
or because student evaluations tend to be positively skewed (as are marks
given by professors). In fact, the prediction may be fulfilled for reasons unre-
lated to the proposed theory and the stated initial condition(s). John did
not obtain the “true” or “real” answer from Tim’s teaching scores or from
the members of his committee of teaching personnel about Tim’s teaching,
only. There are other factors that are in play. The prediction in this case (SD
would give John an answer) is not fulfilled and thus indicates that there was
an error or errors. However, the nature of the error is not clear, as we are not
sure whether the theory is in error or whether the conditions of the experi-
ment have been badly set up and/or poorly conducted (how the evaluations
were administered and the number of participants). Based on the available
information, we are required to make a decision or render a judgment, and
our judgment or decision may be incorrect. Furthermore, we can adopt only
one trial solution at a time to solve our identified problem, not to mention
that there are many possible trial solutions to a problem and various ways in
which we can respond to the identified problem. Even though we can adopt
a number of solutions, we need to be aware that one or some are more suc-
cessful than others (Chitpin, 2013b; Chitpin & Simon, 2012).
P(1) Problem = How can John use Tim’s teaching evaluation to make a
decision about his teaching effectiveness?

TT(1) Tentative = to compare Tim’s mean score with that of the whole
Theory or Solution faculty, i.e. to look at the standard deviation (SD) to
help him find the story behind the data.

EE(1) Error = The distribution of professors’ teaching scores are not
Elimination normally distributed.

P(2) New Facts = How does John use this information to make a decision
and New Problems about Tim’s tenure?
By utilizing this schema, we may adopt one trial solution at a time, as we

strive to resolve the identified problem.
SITUATIONAL LOGIC AND THE PHYSICAL

AND SOCIAL WORLD
This situational logic assumes the existence of both the physical and the
social world. The latter includes social institutions and people. Popper
(1992) went on to suggest that “we might construct a theory of intended and
unintended institutional consequences of purposive action” (p. 80). Purpo-
sive action means not only what individuals do when they act for themselves
but also when they act as agents of institutions. It is important to note that
“institutions do not act; rather, only individuals act, within or on behalf of
institutions” (p. 80). Thus, individuals can develop theories of both intended
and unintended consequences of action. John seeks to assess Tim’s teaching
scores in relation to the rest of the faculty and use that data to determine
whether or not he deserves tenure. This is the intended consequence of his
action plan. However, while assessing Tim’s teaching score using the faculty
mean and standard deviation, John may realize that the SD is not an effec-
tive means of assessing Tim’s teaching scores. This would be an unintended
consequence of his action plan.
Since John did not achieve his intended consequence through the teaching
evaluation data to make a tenure decision for Tim, he must eliminate the
errors contained within his data that prevent him from reaching a proper
conclusion and making a fair decision with respect to Tim’s teaching (EE1).
Using the OKGF, John recognizes that the SD is not an accurate means
of assessing Tim’s teaching score because the bilingual faculty’s teaching
scores are bimodally distributed, with English-speaking faculty possessing
lower teaching scores than French-speaking faculty (P2). John can eliminate
this error by comparing Tim’s teaching scores with that of other English-
speaking members of the faculty who have taught Tim’s course (TT2), thus
focusing on the information that is offstage.
DISCUSSION
When we want something to be true, we gather information that supports

our desires, beliefs or values. However, confirmation bias does not just affect
what information we seek, it even affects what we notice in the first place.
Many of our assumptions of facts have no major consequences, and, in
other cases, our ignorance or confirmation bias can be an impediment to our
success. For example, John and members of the Faculty Teaching Personnel
Committee believe that they can make a sound decision (X) by using Tim’s
teaching scores (Y) or by using Y as the most effective way of achieving X.
For the sake of argument, let’s pretend that John was able to reach a decision
on Tim’s tenure, based on his teaching scores (Y). He thinks he has achieved
X by doing Y, but there may be one or more factors that may have come
into play, such as not wanting to set a precedent. If this is the case, then
assuming that placing credence in Tim’s teaching scores is wrong, John did
not solve the problem. Although his decision is not life threatening, it has
grave implications for Tim’s professional and personal lives. Even though
confirmation bias or spotlighting may appear to be inconsequential, Swann
(2003) suggests that there is still much to gain from trying “to (a) avoid solu-
tions to practical problems that embody erroneous assumptions about the
effectiveness of the solution, unintended consequences, and the existence of
better alternative solutions, and (b) advance our knowledge” (p. 262). These
actions become even more important when the decisions we make have seri-
ous implications for people’s and organizations’ futures.
Organizations or management intervene with the intention of achieving
specific goals. There are situations where managers or leaders solve problems
without the help of explicit theory. In fact, that is what happens almost all
the time; explicit theory is rarely used. However, there are instances where
this would be to the organization’s detriment because the organizations and
individuals would be adversely affected by the decisions made. The unin-
tended consequences resulting in John’s and the FTPC’s decisions may also
be harmful and farther reaching (Chitpin, 2010; Popper, 1961, sect. 20).
There is no doubt that some decisions we make have less harmful conse-
quences and solve more problems. However, John needs to problematize the
situation by saying why he needs to deny Tim tenure (a practical problem)
or ask why Tim is experiencing difficulty with his teaching (a theoretical
problem). Indeed, there is more than one way in which a mismatch between
expectation and outcome can be turned into a problem. However, the task
of formulating problems is neither straightforward nor value-free (Chitpin,
2010; Chitpin & Evers, 2012, Swann, 2003, 2009). This is because of one’s
values and preferences or beliefs. Our decisions are always affected by who
we are as individuals, our personal and cultural experiences, beliefs, values
and position in the organization or society, and all of these factors influence
our decision as to how we view Tim’s teaching. This is not a sound reason
for assuming a relativistic position with regards to how we make our deci-
sions, because some decisions we make are better than others (Diller, 2008;
Popper, 1979).
If leaders are concerned with improving their outcomes, they need to find
ways of putting their hypotheses to the test, bearing in mind the tendency to
see evidence that supports our decisions, especially if we seek confirmation
bias or seek like-minded people to confirm our views. But, if we are truly
committed to genuinely improving our decision-making practices, Heath
and Heath (2013) suggest that we use a process decision-making framework
to help us navigate this muddy terrain. For example, John can solve his
problem as to whether to grant Tim tenure by shifting the spotlight from
Tim’s teaching scores to asking the question, “What would have to be true
for me to be right in my decision?”
My intention is not to convince decision-makers to replace one decision-
making model with another. Rather, my intention is to convince decision-
makers or readers that all decision-making models, even the most robust
ones, have their limitations. The best way to demonstrate the limits of any
theory is to use the OKGF process. In fact, a well-conducted case study
can be effective in casting doubt on existing assumptions and biases. This
process framework needs to be learned through stages, and it takes time to
master such an approach. The acceptance of this process decision-making
framework might also show that an accepted point of view, which shares
its confirming instances, cannot be eliminated by factual reasoning. They do
not show that such an alternative is acceptable; and even less do they show
that it should be used.
*******
In order to be consistent in our decision-making ability, we require a process
such as the OKGF. The value of the OKGF process is that it reliably focuses
our attention on things we would otherwise miss, such as options we may
have overlooked, information we may have resisted, and preparations we
may have neglected.
The framework aims to support decision-makers in identifying the chal-
lenges they face, encourages them to act on their tentative theories, and to
be attentive to the outcomes. John’s challenge was to make a tenure deci-
sion based on Tim’s teaching scores. Using the OKGF would require John
to (1) have a deeper understanding of the problem by shifting the spotlight
to the teaching scores; (2) seek multiple perspectives for reaching a solution,
including but not limited to consultation with colleagues who have worked
with Tim directly; (3) test his options (solutions/theories) by seeking infor-
mation that challenges his beliefs and biases so as not to overlook a viable
solution; and (4) ensure that Tim sees that the decision made is fair and just.
The OKGF systematically tracks the progression of decision-making (chal-
lenges and opportunities) employed by the participants. Thus, each strategy
employed becomes bolder and sharper in empirical content. Finally, the
OKGF is a process that gives the decision-makers the assurance in knowing
that they have made the best decision they could and, thus, giving them the
confidence to be bolder. It is also a process that is cost effective and relatively
easy to implement—as illustrated by Tim’s case. When the OKGF is adopted
within a natural school setting as a process, it offers several advantages:
participants are provided with a process that inspires confidence, knowing
that they have made the best decision they could and stops the cycle of ago-
nizing by asking, “What I am missing?” It is a process that is far from being
a constraint, which gives the decision-makers the comfort to be bolder, and
bolder in the right direction. It allows them to be decisive. Their decisions
may never be perfect, but they can be better, bolder and wiser.
REFERENCES
Chitpin, S. (2013a). Can mentoring and reflection cause change in teaching practice?
A professional development journey of a Canadian teacher educator. Professional
Development in Education, 37(2), 225–240.
Chitpin, S. (2013b). Should Popper¹s view of rationality be used for promoting
teacher knowledge? Educational Philosophy and Theory, 45(8), 833–844.
Chitpin, S. & Evers, C. W. (2012). Using Popper’s philosophy of science to build pre-
http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ije.v4i4.2757
Chitpin, S., & Jones, K. (2015). Leadership in a performative context: A framework
for decision making. Educational Philosophy and Theory (Special Issue: New
frontiers in educational leadership theory), 47(4), 387–401.
rationalism. Teacher Education & Practice, 25(2), 302–319.
Chitpin, S., & White, R. E. (2012). Self-directed professional development for educa-
tional leaders: Using the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework. The Scholar-
Practitioner-Quarterly, 6(4), 329–349.
Diller, A. (2009). Designing androids. Philosophy Now, 42, 28–31.
Diller, A. (2008). Testimony from a Popperian perspective. Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, 38(4), 419–456.
Gravestock, P. (2011). Does teaching matter? The role of teaching evaluation in
tenure policies at selected Canadian Universities. PhD Thesis. Ontario Institute
for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto.
Gravestock, P., & Gregor-Greenleaf, E. (2008). Student course evaluations: Research,
models and trends. Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario, Toronto.
Heath, C., & Heath, D. (2013). Decisive: How to make better choices in life and
work. New York: Random House.
Hume, D. (2013). An inquiry concerning human understanding. Retrieved February
17, 2014, from http://ebooks. adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92e/
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking fast and slow. Toronto, Canada: Doubleday.
Lovallo, D., & Sibony, O. (2010). The case for behavioural strategy. McKinsey
Quarterly, 2, 30–45.
Perlmutter, D. D. (2008, July 18). Your first real taste of academic culture. The
Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com/article/Your-
First-Real-Taste-of/45876/
Popper, K. (2002). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge.
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Popper, K. (1992). In search of a better world: Lectures and essays from thirty years.
London: Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1983). Realism and the aim of science. London & New York:
Routledge.
Popper, K. (1979). Objective knowledge. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Popper, K. (1974). Replies to my critics. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of
Karl Popper, Book II (pp. 961–1197). La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing.
Popper, K. R. (1972). On the theory of the objective mind. In Objective knowledge:
An evolutionary approach (pp. 153–90). London, England: Oxford University
Press.
Popper, K. R. (1966a). The open society and its enemies: The spell of Plato (Vol. 1,
Popper, K. R. (1966b). The open society and its enemies: The high tide of Prophecy:
Hegel, Marx, and the aftermath (Vol. 2, 5th ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Popper, K. R. (1961). The poverty of historicism (2nd ed.). London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Swann, J. (2009). Learning: An evolutionary analysis. Educational Philosophy
and Theory, 41(3), 469–581. Swann, J. (2003). How science can contribute to
the improvement of educational practice. Oxford Review of Education, 29(2),
53–268.
Index
action(s) 42, 64, 94, 98, 101, 103, 117, confirmation bias 16, 17, 26, 93, 99,
127, 135–6; consequence(s) of 40, 101, 104, 126–7, 136, 137
42, 43, 135–7; purposive 40, 135 Confucius 11
action research 4, 80 conjectures and refutations 7, 33, 38,
Adler, Alfred 2 51, 53, 87
administrator(s) 14, 47, 94, 99, 108, constructivist approach 23, 34, 64, 76
109–10, 111, 113, 114, 115, counter-induction 79, 83, 84–6, 87,
120, 121, 127, 128–9 88, 90
assessment 82, 88, 90, 93, 98, 103, critical approach 17, 18, 25, 29, 33–4,
110, 117, 124, 128, 130, 135–6 43, 50, 52, 55, 64, 87
assumption(s) 5, 9, 18, 39, 41, 42, 43, critical fallibilist epistemology 2, 19,
44, 47, 64–5, 73, 74, 79, 80, 35, 50, 51, 64, 80, 100, 125,
83–5, 88, 89, 101, 104, 117, 125, 130
127, 133–4, 137; See also beliefs critical rationalism 19–20, 29, 79, 87,
attitude(s) 5, 6, 16, 127, 129 93, 99, 100, 104, 109, 116, 124,
authenticity 21, 82 125, 129–30, 132
critical thinking skills 2, 4, 5, 12, 14,
Bachelor of Education 1, 53, 66 16–17, 21, 42, 48, 61, 64, 102
beliefs 4, 11, 18, 22, 34, 35–6, 37, 39, criticism 5, 12, 19–20, 21, 29, 33,
54, 64, 85, 87, 98, 101, 102, 34–5, 37, 39, 44, 51, 65, 68, 76,
110, 116, 117, 118, 125, 127, 80, 84–7, 88, 89, 100, 102, 116,
130, 131, 132, 133–4, 136, 137, 127, 129–30, 134
138; See also assumptions curriculum 4, 10, 16, 47, 63, 87, 88,
Bereiter, Carl 5, 81 89–90; and assessment course
best fit 94 46, 53–4; developers 29, 111
Carle, Eric 72 decision(s) 92–3, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101,

Canada 1, 2, 5, 88, 99, 115, 128 103, 104, 109, 110, 111–12,
Canadian Principal Learning Network 117, 124, 125–7, 129, 132, 133,
108, 109, 111, 112–14, 115, 137, 138
118–21 decision-making 93, 94, 99, 100, 101,
children 2, 5, 37, 42–3, 63, 67, 74 102, 103, 108, 109, 110, 112,
classroom(s) 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, 36, 42–3, 113–17, 118, 120, 124–7, 132,
47, 50, 54, 55, 57–60, 66–7, 77, 133–7, 138; emotional 93, 98,
80, 82 99, 103–4; rational 93, 98, 99,
cognition 92, 93, 98 103–4
community of practice 108, 109, 110, deductive arguments 5, 12, 19, 35, 100
111, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, design 93, 94
120 Dewey, John 47, 48, 81
142 Index
Eccles, John 2, 65 information 18, 36, 79, 81, 101, 109,
education 3, 4, 12, 13, 23, 43, 63, 65, 110, 112, 118, 119, 124–5, 126,
80, 88, 90, 93, 115; act 118; 127, 129, 130–2, 135, 136, 138
in-service 4, 14, 48, 49, 66, 80, instructional strategies 3, 25, 47, 58–9,
109; pre-service 3, 14, 16, 24–5, 64, 69, 77, 82, 83, 88; methods 3,
46, 48, 49, 50–5, 57–8, 60–1, 64–5, 80, 82, 84, 89, 90; style 5;
63, 64, 66–8, 73–4, 77, 80, 103, techniques 3, 82, 84
109–10, 117 intelligence 93, 101
educator(s) 1, 2, 5, 12–14, 29, 34, interpretation 13, 21, 22, 53
42, 48, 63, 64, 76, 80, 83, 87,
88, 89, 90, 109–10; See also journal writing 46–7, 49, 50, 51, 53,
teacher(s) 54, 55, 57, 60–1
Eisner, Elliot 81 judgment 40, 43, 47, 117, 135
emotion(s) 6, 92–3, 99–100, 104, 129 justification 35, 36, 37, 100, 102
environment 9, 18, 80, 83, 89; for
learning 4, 88; teaching 12, 85 knowledge 3–7, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21,
epistemology 79–80, 84 27–8, 33, 34, 36, 39, 41, 58,
error(s) 4, 6–8, 19, 29, 35, 39–40, 60–1, 65, 75, 76, 79, 101, 102,
43, 60, 64, 76, 85, 86, 89, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 113,
100, 124–5, 135; detection 4, 114, 118, 120, 129, 130, 133;
7, 43, 58, 86, 129, 130, 133; building 5, 9, 21, 22, 24–5, 26,
elimination 8–9, 12, 13, 19, 20, 29, 34, 35, 59, 66, 79, 80–4,
21, 22, 24, 28, 29, 33–4, 35, 86–8, 132, 134; generation 5,
37, 38, 50, 52, 54, 57, 60, 65–8, 12, 14, 17, 18–19, 23, 38, 43,
72–7, 83, 84, 85, 87–9, 102, 116, 65, 68, 77, 80, 89, 108, 109,
118, 132, 133, 135, 136; trial 110, 120, 132, 133; growth 14,
and 79, 81, 84, 87–9, 102, 135 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29, 33,
evidence 16, 17, 20, 22, 25, 28, 35, 39, 34, 37, 39, 46, 49–51, 53, 54,
40, 51, 52, 54, 67, 92, 103–4, 55, 57, 60–1, 63, 64–5, 67, 73,
124, 128, 134, 137 75–6, 79–80, 84, 86, 87, 102,
expectations 82–3, 86, 87–8, 128, 134 116, 132, 133; objective 10, 11,
experience(s) 47, 48, 55, 60, 65, 66, 67, 87, 100, 116, 129; scientific 5,
74, 76, 82, 83, 87, 88, 93, 98, 19, 100; subject matter 82, 83,
100, 101, 102–4, 110, 112, 116, 89; subjective 10, 23, 66, 80,
118, 119, 128, 129, 137 100
experiment(s) 38, 40, 43, 44, 75, 84, Knowledge Network for Applied
101, 117, 120, 135 Education Research 110, 111
falsification 19–20, 21–2, 26, 35, 38, language 4; Arts 67, 74

40, 43, 65, 86, 100, 117, 130, learner(s) 3, 5, 13, 16, 61, 63, 80, 83,
132 87–8, 103, 120–1
foundationalist(s) 34 learning 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 34, 39, 40, 47,
51, 61, 63, 64, 66, 76–7, 79–84,
history 17, 19, 21 86, 87, 88–9, 110, 119, 120,
hypothesis 7–8, 11, 17, 22, 23, 26, 28, 133; materials 3, 34, 35, 36, 43,
29, 34, 35, 38, 42, 43, 66, 79, 89, 128; style 23, 25, 82
81, 83, 85–6, 89, 99, 102, 117, literacy and numeracy skills 5, 21, 39,
118, 132, 137 42, 69, 72; secretariat 5
logic 19, 40, 102, 130
imagination 37, 77, 87, 89 Lord Boyle 2
Individualized Educational Plans 82
inductionist approach 2, 12–13, 21, 34, Marxism 2
37, 38, 43, 59, 80, 81, 84, 85–6, methodology of teaching 4, 79, 83
87–8, 89, 90 Ministry of Education 10, 13
Index 143
Numeroff, Laura 70 proposition(s) 22, 24
psychology 2, 11
Objective Knowledge Growth pupil(s) 3, 67; See also student(s)
Framework 17, 46, 52, 54, 55,
57, 60–1, 63, 64–6, 67–8, 73, rational 6, 98, 99–100, 118, 129;
74, 76–7, 93, 99–100, 101–4, decision-making 93, 99, 100,
108, 109, 111–19, 120, 124, 103–4, 127
125, 127, 132–3, 136, 137–8 reality 4, 6, 10, 86, 117
Ontario 1, 2, 5, 53–4, 88, 99, 115, reason 6, 129
116–17; College of Teachers 1; reflection(s) 17, 21, 22, 46–52, 53, 54,
curriculum 10 55, 57–8, 60–1, 63, 64, 67, 77,
102, 103, 111–16, 120, 132
Peer-to-Peer Network for School refutation 19, 22, 35, 38, 39, 43, 51,
Principals 116 54, 64, 66, 67, 86–7, 89, 102,
Pedagogic Institute 2, 80 132, 134
policy 12, 47, 100, 113, 120, 128, 132 research 80, 86, 90, 98, 99, 103–4,
policymakers 2, 13, 29, 47 108, 109, 110–11, 113, 114,
Popper, Sir Karl 1–2, 3, 6–8, 10–14, 119, 120, 124, 126, 127, 128
19–20, 21–2, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41,
46, 80, 83, 100, 117, 129–31, schema(s) 6, 8, 14, 17, 18, 21–3, 24,
133–4 26, 46, 50–1, 54, 63, 65, 68, 84,
Popper sequence 38, 50–1, 53, 54, 57, 102, 116, 133, 135
59–61, 63, 68, 71–2, 84, 133 school(s) 2, 3, 12, 14, 17, 29, 42, 43,
Popperian approach 5, 17, 18, 23, 25, 63, 77, 79, 81, 83, 84, 87,
28, 29, 33–4, 37, 40, 43, 49–51, 88, 89–90, 93, 100, 109–10,
55, 64–5, 68, 75, 85, 86, 100, 118–19, 121, 138; district(s)
104, 125, 129, 132 5, 89, 109, 110, 111, 113,
practicum 1, 46, 54, 67 115, 117, 120; governance 93;
prediction(s) 26, 39, 43, 72, 84, 87, system(s) 4, 89, 93, 101
117, 134–5 scientific method 1, 2, 38, 76;
principal(s) 92–3, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, knowledge 5, 35, 65; progress
102, 103, 104, 108, 109–15, 8, 48
117–20 sequencing 26, 28, 68–76, 83, 86
problem(s) 6, 8–9, 11, 19, 21, 22–4, Sierra, Judy 85
28, 38, 41, 44, 50–3, 54, 55, Simon, Herbert 93, 94
58, 60–1, 65, 68, 72, 74–6, 84, skill(s) 3, 13, 16, 36–7, 49, 75, 77, 81,
86, 93–4, 100, 102, 103, 109, 88, 103, 108, 120, 124
110, 112–17, 118, 120, 127, Social Sciences and Humanities
128–9, 130, 132–3, 135, 137, Research Council of Canada
138; identification 5, 13, 18, 22, 108, 117
38, 42, 51, 52–4, 55, 58, 59, 60, solution(s) 13, 18–19, 21, 22–3, 41–2,
63, 67, 68–9, 73–4, 94, 102–3, 64, 76, 81, 82, 84, 86–7, 88,
116, 117, 132, 133; practical 5, 94, 101, 102, 103, 110, 112,
41, 42, 59, 94, 129, 132; solving 114–15, 117, 118, 125, 133,
8–9, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23–24, 135, 138
25–8, 34, 40, 42, 46, 51, 52, 54, somatic marker hypothesis 92, 93,
60–1, 63, 64, 67, 68–9, 74, 76, 99–100, 103–4
82, 84, 86, 87, 94, 102, 109–10, standardized test scores 82
113, 115–17, 132–3, 135, 136–7 student(s) 2, 4, 5–7, 12, 16–17, 21,
professional growth and development 22, 24–5, 26, 28, 39, 40, 42,
9, 18, 24, 29, 46, 53, 57, 61, 63, 43, 47, 50, 54, 55, 63, 64–5,
64, 65–6, 76, 102–3, 109, 116 66–72, 74–6, 77, 81–7, 88–9,
professor(s) 124, 125, 128, 134 101, 109–10, 114, 117, 118,
proof 7, 76 119, 120, 125, 126–7, 134;
144 Index
achievement 5, 18, 29, 41–2, 126, 127, 132; strategies 2, 5, 9,
57, 58–9, 73, 80–1, 85, 88, 90, 13, 16, 18, 40, 57–9, 64–5, 67,
93, 98, 110; diverse population 71–2, 75–6, 82, 85; techniques
2, 82, 94, 117; evaluation(s) 3, 46, 68, 71
124–5, 126, 127, 128, 131, tenure 124–6, 128–9, 135–8
134–6; success 29, 41, 43, 61, theory 4, 6–7, 9, 11–12, 13, 16–17,
71, 73, 87–8, 94, 101; See also 19–20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29,
pupil(s); learner(s) 33, 35, 38, 39–40, 42, 43, 44,
support services 3, 82 53, 54, 58, 59, 64–5, 68, 73–6,
79, 80–1, 83–7, 89, 99, 100,
Tarski, Alfred 20 101, 102–4, 112, 113, 116–19,
teacher(s) 1–7, 8–9, 12–14, 16–17, 120, 127, 130, 131, 132–5,
18, 21, 22–3, 24, 26, 29, 34, 137, 138; of teaching/learning
35, 39, 41, 42–3, 46–7, 49, 4, 18–19, 21, 33, 60–1, 63–4,
50, 54, 59, 60–1, 63–7, 71, 70–3, 77, 80–1, 83, 84–5, 86,
75–7, 79–5, 86–9, 94, 98, 99, 87–8, 89, 119; tentative 22,
102–3, 109–10, 116, 126, 128; 24–5, 28, 33, 38, 39, 50, 51–4,
knowledge 2, 3, 6, 10, 16, 20–1, 57, 58, 59–61, 64–8, 73–7, 84,
22–3, 29, 61, 63, 64, 80, 81; 87, 115, 116, 132–3, 135, 138
oversupply 1; primary 2, 48 transmission model of education 16, 75
teacher education 1–5, 29, 77, 80; truth 6–8, 19, 20, 22, 35, 38, 43, 84,
competence 3, 47; See also 125, 129, 130, 132, 133–5, 136;
teacher training; education and certainty 7, 9
teacher training 1, 3, 4, 80, 102–3, 116;
See also teacher education value(s) 42, 77, 87, 98, 101, 110, 127,
teaching 2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 18, 36, 40, 130, 136, 137
41, 43, 47–8, 54, 57–9, 61, 63, verisimilitude 19, 20
67, 72, 75, 80, 124, 125, 127, voice 3, 5, 11
128–9, 130–1, 135, 136–8;
practice 18–19, 21, 22, 25, 34, Wenger, Etienne 116
42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, Worlds of experience 2, 8–13, 21, 24,
57, 61, 63, 64–5, 67, 73, 77, 79, 40, 46, 49–50, 53, 60, 68, 73,
80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 89, 93, 120, 135

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Popper’s Approach to Education

Challenging the theory of induction in teacher education, this book

Stephanie Chitpin is Associate Professor of Leadership, Evaluation, Curriculum

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com

5 Virtue Ethics and Moral 13 Methods in the Philosophy

6 Durkheim and Modern 14 Life, Work and Learning

29 Social Reconstruction Learning 38 Popper’s Approach to Education

1 Why a Popperian Approach to Teacher Education:

2 A Popperian Approach to Building Teachers’ Knowledge 16

3 Why Popper’s View of Rationality Should Be Considered

4 Guiding Pre-Service Teachers’ Reflections: A Popperian

5 Capturing Pre-Service Teachers’ Knowledge Growth:

6 Advancing Pedagogy Through Counter-Inductivity 79

7 The Objective Knowledge Growth Framework: A Framework

8 Principals and the Professional Learning Community:

9 Making Just Tenure and Promotion Decisions Using

2.1 Schematic representation of the Objective Knowledge

2.1 Evidence of Emily’s knowledge building 27

The first teacher education program in Ontario, Canada, was established in

. . . my first teacher, Emma Goldberger, who taught me the three R’s.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE CREATION

The nature of teaching is changing and, to use Darling-Hammond’s (1995)

[I]f we expect the discovery of error . . . to incur a penalty, we are likely

Instead, teachers should encourage students to find errors in their beliefs

Every criticism is an attempt to show that a given statement is inconsis-

Teachers can use valid deductive arguments to encourage students to

Bereiter (2002) draws a clear distinction between learning and knowledge

. . . rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments

What is truth? Popper (1992) defines truth as “A theory or a statement

1. Every unambiguously formulated statement is either true or false; and

Knowledge can grow, and . . . science can progress—just because we

According to Popper, all knowledge grows through a process of conjec-

Here, P1 is a problem from where the individual starts, which could be a

UNDERSTANDING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING

The activity of understanding is the same as that found in all problem-

POPPER’S THREE “WORLDS”

According to Popper (1979), individuals engage with their surroundings on

Knowledge in the objective sense is totally independent of anybody’s

In light of what Popper avers, it seems appropriate to view World 3 as

IMPLICATIONS: POPPER’S OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

According to Popper, the aim of education is to nurture students’ abilities,

“Critical thinking” is a term that appears frequently in educational reform

Fullan (2006) argues that schools need to focus on knowledge production

POPPER’S CRITICAL RATIONALISM: THREE CORE CONCEPTS

Popper’s (1966) philosophy of “critical rationalism” can be understood, in

Intuitively speaking, a theory T, has less verisimilitude than a theory

TT1 Tentative Theory

Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of the Objective Knowledge Growth Framework

A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies

In addition, Chitpin and Evers’ (2012) study with pre-service teachers,

We look at the list of assessment principles from the Growing Success

Through critical discussions, they questioned the validity and reliability

Even though students are given specific criteria as to how to evaluate

POPPER’S CRITICAL APPROACH AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Despite Popper’s influence on the philosophy and practice of science, the

My short answer is that a problem consists of all the conditions or

There are different ways of solving a problem within a given constraint.

P1 TTb EEb P2b

TTn EEn P2n

Figure 2.2 The Popperian schema

Table 2.1 Evidence of Emily’s knowledge building

Popper Cycle 1 Popper Cycle 2 Popper Cycle 3 Popper Cycle 4

The goal of teacher education is not to indoctrinate or train teachers to