Well Control Guide - Chevron Energy Technology Company 2006

Drilling Well Control Guide
Copyright 2005 Chevron Energy Technology Company

All rights reserved under International and
Pan-American Copyright Conventions.
This manual may not be reproduced in whole or part without

prior written permission of copyright owner.
This manual and information, data and know-how relating thereto are provided and accepted
on an “as is” basis without any warranties, express or implied, for the exclusive use of the
party accepting this manual from Chevron Energy Technology Company (“CETC”). CETC
and its affiliates of any degree and their agents and employees (hereinafter “Indemnitees”)
will not be liable for any damages, including indirect, special, incidental, consequential,
exemplary or punitive damages or expenses (including lost profits or savings) resulting from
a party using this manual and information, data and know-how relating thereto. A party
using this manual and information, data and know-how relating thereto assumes the sole and
complete responsibility for the use thereof and shall defend, indemnify and save harmless
Indemnitees from and against any and all loss, damage, injury and liability for injury to or
death of any person or for loss of or damage to property or for loss or damage resulting from
its use, directly or indirectly, of this manual and information, data and know-how relating
thereto. Such indemnity shall apply whether or not one or more of the Indemnitees was or is
claimed to be passively, concurrently, or actively negligent, and whether liability without
fault or negligence per se is imposed or sought to be imposed on one or more of the
Indemnitees.
October 2005 i
“Well In Control Of Our Wells”
Chevron Global Well Control Team
January 2006
To: CVX Drilling & Completion Community
From: CVX Global Well Control Team
Subject: CVX Well Control Philosophy
Chevron’s Global Well Control Team is the designated custodian of the corporation’s philosophy
on well control. This philosophy is reflected in the corporate well control guides (for Drilling and
Workover / Completion operations), and reinforced in the corporation’s in-house well control
training.
Corporate Governance
There are by design no specific corporate policies governing Chevron’s well control operational
practices. However, there are some relevant general corporate HES documents and initiatives,
including the following:
¾ Policy 530: Health, Environment, & Safety

• Safe & Incident-Free Operations
• Pollution Prevention
• Emergency Management
¾ 4+1 Strategic Intents

• Operational Excellence (see Fig. 1 below)
• Cost Reduction (reduced NPT by kick avoidance or competent kick handling)
• Organizational Capability (development of a competent, versatile workforce)
Page 1 of 9
Well Control Philosophy
Different geographical areas and geological settings can present widely varying well control
challenges. Therefore, Chevron deems it impractical to develop well control policy for
universal application throughout the corporation’s geographically and operationally diverse work
sites. Instead, Chevron has opted for a flexible approach to global well control by employing
corporate guidelines. These guidelines, based on a number of credible industry and in-house
sources, are reflected in the corporation’s well control guides and reinforced in the training
delivered by the Global Well Control Team.
Well Control Goals

Chevron’s recommended well control practices are primarily based on principles involving
overbalance and containment within intact wellbores. The CVX operational well control goals,
established to protect people and the environment, are as follows (listed in decreasing priority):
¾ Maintain primary control of the well at all times during well operations, with sufficient
hydrostatic overbalance to control formation pressure.
¾ Efficiently utilize secondary well control options whenever primary control of the well is
lost, thereby minimizing the influx volume. By emphasizing the need for the earliest
practical detection of a kick, followed by rapid well shut in, the probability of successfully
controlling a kick utilizing standard, appropriate procedures is enhanced.
¾ Restore primary control of the well, utilizing an appropriate kill technique (Driller’s Method,
Wait & Weight Method, bullheading, etc.), selected to enhance safety and operational
performance objectives (in that order of priority).
Deviation From The Corporate Guidelines

Chevron’s corporate guidelines are not binding policy. An SBU may legitimately deviate from
these guidelines to suit a specific local operating environment.
Changes To The Corporate Guidelines

A Management of Change (MOC) process exists for considering any substantive change
proposals to the corporation’s well control guidelines. By design, this process provides for a
rigorous test of any proposed changes, to avoid indiscriminate changes that could ultimately
impact the corporation’s global well control operations.
The change proposal MOC process is as follows:

1) A formal change request is originated by an SBU Drilling Manager (or by the Global Well
Control Team itself).
2) The proposed change is studied by the Global Well Control Team and a recommendation
developed.
3) The Global Well Control Team furnishes the global D&C leadership with an outline of the
issues and a recommendation on the proposal.
4) The global D&C leadership decides the matter.
5) If the proposed change is supported by the global D&C leadership, the Global Well Control
Team incorporates this change into the corporation’s well control guidelines and its in-house
training.
Page 2 of 9
The pages that follow highlight key components of Chevron’s overall well control philosophy,
grouped by guidances and recommended practices. They are intended to reinforce the guidance
found in the corporation’s various well control manuals.
CVX Well Control Philosophy
Guidances
1. API Endorsement: The company shall meet or exceed API (American Petroleum Institute)
recommendations and specifications pertaining to well control.
2. Surface Containment: Wells are to be designed and equipped with surface equipment rated
to contain MASP (Maximum Anticipated Surface Pressure), using some defined “worst case”
gas column calculation. No uniform corporate practice exists for this “worst case” design
(gas displacement of 2/3 of a well’s mud fluid column is often used, but not exclusively so).
3. Primary Objective: The primary objective of well control is to reestablish hydrostatic

overbalance to formation pressure; avoidance of stuck pipe is a secondary concern.
4. Underground Blowouts: Underground blowouts (UGBOs), though undesirable, are

preferable to surface blowouts.
5. Supervisory Notification: The company’s rig site representative (DSM or WSM) should
notify the appropriate offsite (i.e. shore based) drilling management prior to commencing a
well kill operation.
6. Well Control CD: Chevron’s workforce is provided a Well Control CD published by the
CVX Global Well Control Team. The CD contains various well control software, including
kill worksheets for the Wait & Weight and Driller’s methods. A kill worksheet should be
prepared using this CD, prior to starting any kill circulation. This ensures Pcmax (maximum
expected casing pressure), maximum pit gain, barite requirement, and mud/gas separator
limit calculations are available for the well kill.
7. Safety Factors: Safety factors used during kill operations should be based on the subsurface
pressure limit - typically the shoe, expressed as MISICP (Maximum Initial Shut In Casing
Pressure). In general, use of a small amount of additional surface pressure to establish a
safety factor is preferred over the use of extra fluid density. Efforts should be made to avoid
the effects of unintended accumulation of safety factors (applied pressure, mud weight, or
both).
8. Conventional Drilling: Drilling with overbalance is normal operational practice.

Underbalanced drilling (UBD), managed pressure drilling (MPD), closed hole circulating
drilling (CHCD), etc., are specialized well operations that require authorization by the
Drilling Manager.
Page 3 of 9
9. Material Stocks: There are no specific corporate requirements for minimum stocks of
barite, cement, base oil, drill water, etc., to be kept on hand during drilling operations.
10. Competencies: Personnel are expected to maintain competency with three “constant bottom
hole pressure” well control methods: Wait & Weight and Driller’s methods when circulation
is employed, and Volumetric Control when circulation isn’t.
11. Unacceptable Techniques: The Concurrent Method and the Lo-Choke Method should not
be used. Also, any well control method not designed to handle gas kicks should not be used
(such as the Barrel In/Barrel Out Method).
12. Contractor Certification: Chevron requires documentation from drilling contractors of

appropriate well control certification for all contractor rig personnel at and above Driller
level. IADC WellCAP and IWCF are considered acceptable international certification
standards for contractor personnel (local regulations permitting).
13. BOPE Preferences: Preferred well control equipment configurations (BOP stack and
manifolds) are identified in the Chevron well control manuals, including recommended
location of complete shut-off rams (shear/blind), variable bore rams, drilling spools, etc.
14. Surface “Weak Point”: The surface system “weak point” using a surface BOP stack is the
mud/gas separator (MGS). For a subsea BOP stack, the “weak point” is the slip joint and/or
MGS.
15. Subsurface “Weak Point”: Wells are to be designed with the casing shoe as the subsurface
“weak point” (versus the casing itself).
16. Pre-Recorded Data: Routine measurement of slow circulating rates on bottom-founded rigs
(using surface BOP stacks) is not required. However, determination of the SIDPP (shut-in
drill pipe pressure) by bumping of the float is required.
17. Kick Type: All kicks should be handled as gas kicks, regardless of the expected nature of
the influx.
18. Tertiary Kill: Tertiary kill operations (dynamic kills, plugs in flowing wells, well capping,
hot tapping, work in explosive atmospheres, etc.), are not within the normal scope of job
competencies of field-based Chevron personnel. All drilling operations should have in place
a contingency plan for obtaining emergency well control services from a specialist, well
intervention contractor. Chevron personnel should only be expected to work in support
functions on tertiary well control operations.
19. Dynamic Kill: CVX advocates the “divert and desert” diverting philosophy, whereby all
personnel abandon the rig upon divert (to protect personnel).
20. Bridging Document: A bridging document between the operator and drilling contractor is
recommended to clarify in advance all well control related roles and responsibilities of each
party during an event (e.g. define who is authorized to function the choke, address any
diverter related issues, resolve any disputes over well control practices, etc.).
Page 4 of 9
21. Documentation: Accurately code and document well control events in the “operations”
section of the DISWin drilling database (for potential future training use as a case study).
22. Pressure Management: At all times while shut-in on a kick without circulation, the well
bore pressure should be managed to avoid weak point break down (using Volumetric
Control). This is particularly important at time of intial shut-in, prior to establishing kill
circulation.
Recommended Practices
1) Drilling Spool: A drilling spool should be used for circulating through the choke during
well control operations on a surface stack. It is not recommended to circulate through the
integral ports on a surface BOP stack.
2) Drill Pipe Float: Use a drill pipe float at all times during drilling operations (non-ported
preference).
3) Master Ram: The lowermost pipe rams in a BOP stack are considered “master rams”, and
should be of a fixed ram type for the largest diameter drill pipe in use (not a variable bore
ram, if operationally feasible). Wellhead outlets below this “master ram” should not be used
for routine well control or drilling operations.
4) Shut-In: The hard shut-in technique is recommended (typically closing the annular
preventer). Remote chokes and/or choke lines should be left in the closed position when not
in use.
5) Pipe Hangoff: Pipe hangoff is recommended for subsea well killing operations (as part of
the shut-in procedure).
6) Riserless Drilling: Drill shallow hole riserless on floating operations. No diverting

operations should be permitted after the BOP stack has been installed.
7) Off-Bottom Kills: Wells should be killed on bottom. Off-bottom well kills are not
recommended (though some off-bottom operations to cope with or reduce wellbore pressures
may be necessary).
8) Ram Stripping: Ram-to-ram stripping is not recommended using a Chevron drilling BOP
stack. Only the annular preventer should be used for this purpose.
9) OEM Parts: Use OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) or OEM-authorized parts on all
safety critical equipment, including the BOP stack and choke manifold.
10) Energized Seal Rings: Only wellbore energized seal rings should be used on pressure-
critical equipment (e.g. type RX, BX, AX, etc., but not R type).
Page 5 of 9
11) Seal Ring Reuse: Seal rings should not be reused (an exception being for subsea
applications, where the LMRP gasket is typically reused after disconnects for weather, for
example).
12) Pressure Limits: Operational and test pressures should not exceed 100% of BOP, manifold,
or wellhead rated working pressures, nor 80% of rated (new) casing burst pressures.
13) Safe Working Pressure: No personnel should be permitted to work near or with any
equipment exposed to pressures that exceed rated working pressure or maximum tested
pressure, whichever is less. Emergency planning/procedures should ensure that evacuation is
ordered and could realistically be completed prior to maximum pressure thresholds being
reached.
14) “Worst Case” Flow Containment: All completed wells (including producers and injectors)
should be permanently equipped with appropriate mechanisms to prevent possible flow from
the well in the event of failure/destruction of the wellhead and/or surface equipment (e.g.
SCSSV, weighted packer fluids, tested liner cement/packer, etc.).
15) Choke Operation: The default preference is for the Chevron Drill Site Manager (Drilling
Representative) not to operate the choke, but instead to manage the overall well kill process.
16) DST Testing: DST testing should be commenced during daylight hours, to facilitate leak
detection.
17) Jackup Diverterless Drilling: Diverterless drilling from a jack-up rig offshore is permitted
only with proper authorization (Drilling Manager recommendation, with next-higher level
functional approval authority).
18) Kick Tolerance: There are no Kick Tolerance minimums specified by the corporation,
however, it is expected that wells will be designed on the basis of local kick tolerance
criteria. Routine calculation and awareness of kick tolerance during well operations is
recommended (including routine use of the Global Well Control Team’s kick tolerance
spreadsheet found on the Well Control CD).
19) Shear/Blind Rams: Shear/blind rams are recommended for both surface and subsea stack
operations.
20) Barrier Philosophy: The minimum number and types of barriers to well flow, prior to BOP
or tree removal for drilling or workover operations, should be specified by the SBU/Profit
Center as appropriate for local operations. As a minimum, it is recommended that all wells
with cemented casing should have either tested surface equipment installed (i.e. a tree or
BOP with capability to shut in during all operations, including running casing, wireline
operations, running a completion, etc.), or sufficient barriers to assure containment of all
penetrated permeable formations. Generally, 3 barriers are recommended for well
operations.
21) Kill Rates: Pumping rates between 2 and 5 barrels/minute are recommended for routine kill
operations (to minimize ECD and allow for good choke manipulation).
Page 6 of 9
22) Pipe Rotation: Reciprocation of pipe through an annular under moderate pressure is an
acceptable practice, but rotation in a closed annular is discouraged (based on feedback from
the manufacturers and industry field experience). No specific pressure limit is stipulated, as
too many variables impact this figure (it is often less than 1,000 psi).
23) Accumulator Tests: BOP tests should include routine accumulator tests or drills to confirm
that usable fluid volume, preventer closing times, and system recharge time all meet API
recommendations (in the absence of more stringent government regulation).
24) MISICP: Calculate MISICP (Maximum Initial Shut-In Casing Pressure) based on LOT/FIT
(leak off test/formation integrity test) data, and use this value for initial planning of kill
operations. Use of MAASP (Maximum Allowable Annular Surface Pressure) during kill
operations is strongly discouraged.
25) Flow Containment: As a minimum, each well should be equipped with at least one surface
device capable of closing off all well bore fluid columns whenever any fluid is returned from
a well (via pumping, u-tubing, or well flow), or when any materials are inserted into or
removed from a well (e.g. tubing, wireline, sucker rods, etc.).
26) Kick Indicators: Use of indicators of potential pore pressure increase (lagged and real
time), including drilling breaks/reverse breaks, cuttings quantity/size/shape, etc., is strongly
encouraged.
27) BOP Test Frequency: BOPE should be tested at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks (less
when required by regulation). Testing of reconnected or repaired equipment is required prior
to recommencing operations.
28) Trip Monitoring: Effective use should be made of mud/trip monitoring equipment, with use
of appropriate alarms. Hole fill records (trip sheets) should be maintained during all trips in
or out of a well. In the event of a significant hole fill discrepancy while POOH, the well
should be flow checked and, if not flowing, the bit returned to bottom to permit a bottoms-up
circulation.
29) Flow Avoidance: Maintain emphasis on sound well control and flow monitoring practices,
particularly when cementing, using spacers or slugs, or whenever the fluid density in the hole
is being altered.
30) Drills: Pit and trip drills should be conducted at least weekly with each crew during drilling
operations (more frequently if proficiency has not been established). Choke drills (practice
circulating around a closed-in well bore prior to drilling out a casing shoe) are recommended,
particularly with deep wells, offshore operations, or on operations with new/unfamiliar
contractor personnel/equipment.
31) Riser Margin: Riser margin should generally not be used on subsea operations.
32) Well Bore Integrity Check: Confirm well bore pressure integrity (intact or non-intact)
early in a well control operation (in an intact wellbore, a pressure change on the casing side
should be reflected equally on the drill pipe side, after allowing for lag time).
Page 7 of 9
33) Ballooning: At the first instance of suspected ballooning, treat the incident as a kick. Use
an appropriate assessment technique to rule out a kick (the 1st circulation of the Driller’s
method to circulate bottoms up, or a mud bleed/pressure response fingerprint in a known
ballooning area). For ballooning to be a possibility, mud losses must have preceded the
suspected ballooning event.
34) Density Rounding Rules: When calculating equivalent mud weights, round up for kill mud
calculations, but round down for LOT/FIT (leak off test/formation integrity test) calculations.
35) Flow Checks: The duration of a flow check should be that time necessary to confirm the
flowing status of a well. This may be only a few seconds (if the well is clearly flowing with
pumps off), or it could be as long as 30 minutes (particularly on floating rigs or when
ballooning exists), depending on the well.
36) Shallow Gas Hazard Mitigations: Utilize all available information sources (seismic, offset
well data, etc.) when planning to mitigate potential offshore shallow gas hazards.
37) Slow Circulating Rates: It is not recommended that SCRs (circulating pressures at selected
kill rates) on surface BOP stacks be routinely recorded.
38) Shut-In Drill Pipe Pressure: SIDPP measurement should routinely be recorded following a
kick, by bumping the float.
39) Choke Line Friction: Choke line friction for subsea BOP stacks should be routinely
recorded (open hole CLF measurement technique preferred).
40) Choke/Kill Line Content: For floating operations, choke and kill lines should be routinely
flushed, but left filled with current drilling mud weight during drilling operations.
41) Tripping With Losses: Persistent fluid losses reduce the reliability of primary well control.
Therefore, it is recommended that local management establish some limit for losses while
tripping out of the hole, based on local operating experience (for example, < 20 bbl/hour). If
losses exceed the established limit, a formal risk assessment should be conducted before
tripping proceeds.
Page 8 of 9
OE CVX Operational Excellence Tenets
1
10 Always operate within
design or environmental 2
Always involve the right limits
people in decisions that Always operate in a
affect procedures and safe and controlled
equipment environment
9 3
Always follow written Always ensure safety
procedures for high risks devices are in place and
or unusual situations OE Tenets functioning
Promote
8 IFO 4
Always address Always follow safe
abnormal work practices and
conditions procedures
7 5
Always comply with all 6 Always meet or
applicable rules and exceed customer’s
regulations Always maintain requirement
integrity of dedicated
systems
OE Tenets Support Incident-Free Operations

Fig. 1
Page 9 of 9
CONTENTS
Well Control Philosophy 1
SECTION 1: Fundamentals of Well Control 1-1

1.1 Categories of Well Control 1-1
1.2 Understanding Fluids and Pressures 1-2
1.3 Relationship of Volume to Pressure 1-7
1.4 Capacity, Volume, and Displacement 1-9
1.5 Bottomhole Pressure 1-10
1.6 The U-Tube Concept 1-11
1.7 Circulating Pump Pressure 1-13
1.8 Formation Pressure 1-16
1.9 Equivalent Mud Weight 1-21
1.10 Formation Fracture Pressure 1-22
1.11 Surface Pressure Limitations (MAASP and MISCIP) 1-27
1.12 Rig Equipment and Instrumentation 1-27
1.13 Mud-Gas Separator 1-32
SECTION 2: Causes of Kicks 2-1

2.1 Introduction 2-1
2.2 Low Density Drilling Fluid 2-2
2.3 Abnormal Formation Pressure 2-5
2.4 Swabbing 2-8
2.5 Not Keeping the Hole Full on Trips 2-11
2.6 Lost Circulation 2-12
2.7 Other Causes of Kicks 2-13
SECTION 3: Kick Detection 3-1

3.1 Positive Kick Indicators 3-1
3.2 Indicators of Possible Kick or Increasing Formation Pressure 3-3
SECTION 4: Shut-In Procedure 4-1

4.2 Hard and Soft Shut-Ins 4-2
4.3 Hard Shut-In Procedure while Drilling with a Surface BOP Stack 4-2
4.4 Hard Shut-In Procedure while Tripping with a Surface BOP Stack 4-3
4.5 Shut-In Procedure while Drilling with a Subsea BOP Stack 4-3
4.6 Shut-In Procedure while Tripping with a Subsea BOP Stack 4-4
4.7 Shut-In While Wireline Logging (all rig types) 4-5
4.8 Shut-In While Running Casing 4-6
4.9 Shut-In While Out of the Hole (all rig types) 4-6
4.10 Hang-Off Guidelines (floating rigs) 4-6
October 2005 ii
Contents
SECTION 5: Planning and Operations 5-1

5.1 Well Planning 5-1
5.2 Crew Responsibilities 5-2
5.3 Well Control Related Drills 5-5
5.4 Slow Circulating Pressure (SCRs) 5-11
5.5 Use of the Mud System 5-12
5.6 Drilling Guidelines and Procedures 5-16
5-7 Implementing the Well Plan 5-26
SECTION 6: Well Control Methods and Procedures 6-1

6.2 Driller’s Method 6-2
6.3 Wait & Weight Method (Engineer’s Method) 6-21
6.4 Procedures for Deviated Wells 6-37
6.5 Volumetric Method 6-39
6.6 Lubricate & Bleed 6-52
6.7 Bullheading 6-53
6.8 Pipe Off Bottom – Stripping to Bottom 6-56
6.9 Problems and Complications while Killing 6-71
SECTION 7: Well Control Equipment 7-1

7.1 Ram Blowout Preventers 7-1
7.2 Annular Preventers 7-31
7.3 Diverters 7-49
7.4 BOP Stack Arrangements Surface Installation 7-67
7.5 Choke Manifolds 7-80
7.6 Auxiliary BOP Equipment 7-87
7.7 Test and Inspection 7-100
7.8 Gaskets and Seals 7-119
7.9 Closing Units – Surface Installations 7-128
SECTION 8: Subsea Well Control 8-1

8.2 Reduced Fracture Gradients – Formation Strength 8-1
8.3 Shut-In Procedures 8-5
8.4 Subsea Choke and Kill Lines 8-8
8.5 Disconnecting from the Well 8-16
8.6 Subsea BOP Equipment 8-19
8.7 High Pressure Lines and Manifolds 8-25
8.8 Diverter System 8-30
8.9 Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) 8-32
8.10 Subsea BOP Control Systems 8-37
8.11 Trouble Shooting Subsea Control Systems 8-65
8.12 Other Control Systems 8-69
October 2005 iii

CONTENTS
8.13 Definitions of Subsea Terms 8-76
SECTION 9: Diverting Shallow Gas 9-1

9.2 Causes of Shallow Gas Kicks 9-2
9.3 Diverting vs. Shutting-In 9-4
9.4 Shallow Gas 9-5
9.5 Diverting Operations 9-15
9.6 Flow After Cementing 9-20
9.7 Surface Diverter Systems and Equipment 9-21
9.8 Mud Gas Separator (MGS) 9-32
9.9 Pressure Testing the Diverter System 9-33
9.10 Diverting Procedure 9-33
9.11 Diverter Equipment Considerations 9-35
9.12 Guidelines for Training of Crews 9-36
SECTION 10: Horizontal Well Control 10-1

10.2 Productivity of Horizontal Wells 10-3
10.3 Types of Kicks and Kick Components 10-5
10.4 Recognizing & Evaluating Kicks 10-6
10.5 Kick Scenarios for Horizontal Wells 10-7
10.6 Methods of Well Control for Horizontal Wells 10-11
10.7 Kick Prevention Considerations 10-13
10.8 Kick Sheets for Deviated / Horizontal Wells 10-14
10.9 Effect of Well Profile on Casing Pressures and Pit Gain 10-20
10.10 Stripping in Horizontal Wells 10-22
SECTION 11: Deepwater Well Control 11-1

11.1 Kick Prevention and Detection 11-1
11.2 Circulating to Kill Wells 11-3
11.3 Gas in Marine Riser 11-7
11.4 Shallow Water Flows 11-8
11.5 Hydrates 11-9
11.6 DP Emergency Disconnect 11-15
11.7 Riser Margin 11-21
SECTION 12: HPHT Well Control 12-1

12.1 Well Planning and Design 12-1
12.2 Communication 12-4
12.3 HPHT Well Control Equipment 12-5
12.4 HPHT Drilling Techniques 12-16
12.5 Specialized HPHT Kick Monitoring and Procedures 12-27
12.6 Transition Zone Procedures 12-36
iv October 2005
Contents
12.7 HPHT Zone Procedures 12-44

12.8 HPHT Well Control Events 12-47
12.9 HPHT Coring Procedures 12-49
12.10 Supercharging or Ballooning 12-50
SECTION 13: Slimhole Well Control 13-1

13.2 Slim-Hole Well Control Circulating 13-2
13.3 Implementing Slim-Hole Well Control 13-6
13.4 Kick Detection 13-9
13.5 Kick Prevention 13-11
13.6 Slim-Hole Pre-Kick Information 13-16
13.7 Standard Slim-Hole Well Kill Procedures 13-20
13.8 Special Well Kill Procedures 13-25
SECTION 14: H2S and SO2 Considerations 14-1

14.2 H2S in Drilling Operations 14-1
14.3 H2S Equipment, Corrosion and Fluid Treatment 14-7
14.4 Planning H2S Operations 14-11
October 2005 v
Section 1 - Fundamentals of Well Control
1. Fundamentals of Well Control
1.1 Categories of Well Control
Conventionally, well control practices can be conveniently subdivided into three main
categories:
• Primary Well Control

• Secondary Well Control
• Tertiary Well Control
Primary Well Control
This is the name given to the process which maintains a hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore
greater than the pressure of the fluids in the formation being drilled, but less than formation
fracture pressure. If hydrostatic pressure decreases and becomes less than formation pressure
(primary well control is lost) then fluids may enter the wellbore from an exposed formation.
If the hydrostatic pressure of the fluid in the wellbore exceeds the fracture pressure of the
formation then the height of the fluid column in the well could be reduced. Such a reduction
in fluid column height may, in an extreme case, lead to loss of primary well control over
another exposed formation’s pressure.
While an overbalance, or slight excess of hydrostatic pressure over formation pressure is

typically desired, the basic practice of maintaining primary well control involves keeping a
well filled with a density of drilling fluid that will be heavy enough to balance, but not break
down the combinations of formation that may be exposed at any particular time.
Secondary Well Control
If primary well control is inadequate, fluid contained in an exposed, permeable formation

may flow into the well. Once in the well, this formation fluid, of whatever type, is called an
“influx”. Once the process of flow from a formation into the well begins, hydrostatic pressure
will decrease even further. If uncontrolled, this process can lead to flow from a well that may
be uncontrollable (a blowout). The process is stopped by using a “Blowout Preventer” (BOP)
to increase pressure above that of hydrostatic pressure alone, thus preventing the intake of
additional formation fluids into the well. This use of a mechanical device to make up for
inadequate hydrostatic pressure is referred to as “secondary” well control.
Early recognition of the failure of primary well control and the rapid use of BOPs for shut-in
of the well is the key to effective secondary well control. By taking action quickly, the
October 2005 1-1

amount of formation fluid that enters the wellbore is minimized and a blowout can be
averted.
Tertiary Well Control
Tertiary well control describes the third line of defense where the formation cannot be
controlled by primary (hydrostatic) or secondary well control (equipment). An example of
this would be where flow from a well can be controlled by rapid pumping of a dense fluid in
an attempt to use fluid friction pressures to dynamically stop an influx and kill a flowing
well.
Tertiary well control is used only in the event that secondary well control fails due to hole
conditions or equipment failure. Tertiary well control basically involves emergency
procedures intended to mitigate hazards to personnel and the environment, generally at the
expense of the total loss of the well.
Listed below are further examples of tertiary well control:
• A well is killed by use of a relief well and a “dynamic kill” technique

• An Underground Blowout is controlled by rapid pumping of heavy mud
• Barite or gunk plugs are used to stop fluid influx
• Water is pumped to destabilize an exposed formation causing a flowing well to “bridge
over” as the wellbore collapses
Procedures in this manual relate to primary and secondary well control only. Should these
fail, the advice of blowout control experts regarding possible application of tertiary control
techniques may be appropriate.
1.2 Understanding Fluids and Pressure
Understanding pressure and pressure relationships is important in understanding well control.
Pressure is defined as the force per unit area exposed to the force:
Force
Pressure = Area
This formula can be re-arranged to calculate the force from a given pressure and a unit area:
Force = Pressure x Area
1-2 October 2005

Pressure is commonly expressed as the pounds of force applied against a one square inch
area, i.e. pounds per square inch (psi). Therefore, when a gas is placed in a pressure tight
container, it exerts a pressure on all sides of the container. If the gas pressure equals 100 psi,
then it exerts a force of 100 pounds (lbs) on each square inch of the container.
Liquids create a pressure called “hydrostatic pressure” due to their weight. If a liquid is
placed in an open topped can, gravity pulls the liquid down against the bottom of the can.
The total weight of the liquid, divided by the area of the can bottom that supports this weight,
is the hydrostatic pressure at the bottom of this liquid. Since liquids are fluid, this same
hydrostatic pressure is exerted against the side of the can. It is therefore practical to calculate
the force acting against the side of the can by determining the weight of a column of fluid at
the same depth.
Fluid Pressure
A fluid is any substance that is not solid and can flow. Liquids like water and oil are fluids.
Gas is also a fluid. Under certain conditions, salt, steel and rock can become fluid, and in
fact, almost any solid can become fluid under extreme pressure and temperature. In well
control, fluids such as gas, oil, water, completion fluids, brines, and mud are encountered.
The hydrostatic pressure a fluid exerts is caused by a combination of the depth and the
density of the fluid. In the oilfield, density of a fluid is commonly referred to as a fluid’s
“weight” and is often expressed in pounds per gallon (ppg).
The hydrostatic pressure developed by a fluid is relative to the “true vertical” depth. Since
each additional foot of a particular fluid column’s depth increases the weight of the fluid
column by a certain amount (related to its density), it is possible to quantify the hydrostatic
pressure resulting from each foot of depth. This quantity is expressed as “psi per foot” (psi/ft)
and represents the pressure difference that exists between any two points in the static fluid
column that are 1 foot apart in depth.
This psi/ft value is termed the fluid’s “pressure gradient”. Knowing the pressure gradient
makes it easy to calculate the relative pressure at different points in a static fluid column. The
difference in pressure between two points is equal to the pressure gradient (change per foot)
multiplied by the true vertical difference in depth of the two points.
To illustrate the method used to determine this useful psi/ft value, consider the following
diagram of a 1 cubic foot container of liquid.
October 2005 1-3

Figure 1.2.1 Pressure exerted by 1 foot of a liquid
The conversion factor 0.052 psi/ft per lb/gal is derived as follows:
A cubic foot contains 7.48 US gallons.

Therefore, one cubic foot of a fluid weighing 1 ppg would weigh 7.48 lbs.
The pressure exerted on the bottom of this 1 ft. deep container containing this fluid is:
Weight (force) = 7.48 lbs = 7.48 lbs/ft²

Area 1 ft²
But if we divide the base of the cube into 144 one inch squares, the weight acting on
each square inch is:
7.48 lbs = 0.052 lbs/in2 or 0.052 psi

144 in²
Since this is the amount of pressure caused by the weight of a 1 foot deep column of
this 1 ppg fluid, 0.052 can be thought of as the gradient of a 1 ppg fluid.
If we want to know the gradient of a heavier, real fluid (such as drilling mud), we
simply multiply 0.052 (the 1 ppg gradient) by the actual density (ppg) of the fluid.
Example:
1-4 October 2005

The pressure gradient of a 10 ppg fluid is 10 times the gradient of a 1 ppg fluid.
Thus:
10 x 0.052 psi/ft = 0.52 psi/ft
This number, 0.052, is often thought of and used like a conversion factor to relate a
fluid’s density in ppg to its gradient in psi/ft:
10 ppg x 0.052 psi/ft/ppg = 0.52 psi/ft
The same factor can be used to relate a known gradient to a fluid density that would
provide the equivalent pressure:
Example:
The pressure at a water depth of 100 ft is measured to be 43.3 psi. What is the water’s
density (ppg)?
Gradient = pressure = 43.3 psi = 0.433 psi/ft

depth 100 ft
0.433 psi/ft = 8.33 ppg (gradient of fresh water)

0.052 psi/ft/ppg
Hydrostatic Pressure
As stated above, hydrostatic pressure (HP) is the pressure developed by a static column of
fluid at a given true vertical depth (TVD) in a well. This pressure can be calculated at any
true vertical depth, provided the density of the fluid in the well is known.
The simple equation below determines the pressure exerted by a fluid at any true vertical
depth, by multiplying the pressure gradient by the true vertical height of the column in feet:
Hydrostatic Pressure = Pressure Gradient (psi/ft) X True Vertical Depth (ft)
Figure 1.2.2 Hydrostatic Pressure in Various Shaped Holes
October 2005 1-5

Note: The true vertical height or depth of the fluid column is of importance in the equation;
“measured” length, its volume or the shape of the fluid column is irrelevant.
Figure 1.2.3 Measured Depth (MD) versus True Vertical Depth (TVD)
Example:
With a 500 ft TVD column of fresh water, what is the hydrostatic pressure?
HP = 0.433 psi/ft x 500 ft = 216.5 psi
Example:
What is the hydrostatic pressure of a 6,750 ft (MD), 6,130 ft (TVD) well? The well is
full of a 9.2 ppg fluid.
Gradient = 9.2 ppg x 0.052 = 0.478 psi/ft

HP = 0.478 psi/ft x 6,130 ft
= 2,930 psi
Example:
A 12,764 ft TVD well is filled with a 15 ppg fluid. What is the BHP?
HP = 15 ppg x 0.052 x 12,764 ft

= 9,956 psi
1-6 October 2005

In similar fashion it is easy to calculate the hydrostatic pressure with two or more fluids in a
well, provided the depths (TVD) of the fluid interfaces and fluid densities are known.
To do this, the HP for each fluid section is calculated, and the sum of the individual
calculations yields the HP at bottom.
Example:
A 10,500 ft TVD well has two fluids in the well, a 15 ppg fluid from TD to 7,125 ft,
and an 8.33 ppg fluid to surface. What is the HP at the bottom of the well?
HP of 15 ppg fluid = 15 ppg x 0.052 x (10,500 – 7,125) ft

= 15 ppg x 0.052 x 3,375 ft
= 2,633 psi
HP of 8.33 ppg fluid = 8.33 ppg x 0.052 x 7,125 ft
= 3,086 psi
Total HP = 2,633 psi + 3,086 psi
= 5,719 psi
For wells containing gas, similar calculations can be performed. But since gas is much more
compressible than liquids, the gas density (and thus, gradient) depends on the nature of the
gas as well as the pressure and temperature of the gas. While tables may be used for
circumstances involving large volumes of gas under known conditions, basic well control
theory often uses a gradient of 0.1 psi/ft as a simplifying assumption; pressure calculations
involving a column of gas in a well can then be made similar to the examples above.
1.3 Relationship of Volume to Pressure
All fluids under pressure will change in volume to some extent as the pressure changes. As
pressure increases, the volume of the fluid will decrease, i.e. the fluid will compress. As
pressure decreases, the volume will increase, i.e. the fluid will expand. To a lesser extent, the
volume of a fluid is related to its temperature.
In general, the volume of a fluid will increase with an increase in temperature, and decrease
with a decrease in temperature.
Liquids
Fluids will compress or expand differently depending on their compressibility. Liquids have
a low compressibility compared to gas.
The relative compressibility of liquids and gases is an important factor in well control.
Liquids of concern in well control include mud, saltwater, oil, and combinations of these
liquids. Since the compressibility of these liquids is low, little change in volume due to
October 2005 1-7

pressure or temperature changes should be expected as these liquids are circulated from the
wellbore.
Gases
Gases are very compressible and are subject to large changes in volume as they migrate to
surface or are circulated from the wellbore. The expansion of a gas bubble while circulating
out a kick may cause the casing pressure (i.e. choke pressure) to rise and the pit level to
significantly increase.
The volume of a gas bubble will roughly double each time the depth (and therefore the
hydrostatic pressure) is halved in an open well.
The idealized relationship between the volume and pressure of a gas is described by Boyle’s
Law:
Boyle’s Gas Law: P x V = Constant
or more commonly: P1 x V1 = P2 x V2 or: P1V1 = P2V2
If V is the volume of gas (bbl), and P is the pressure (psi), then (disregarding temperature)
the relationship of V to P for a gas can be expressed as shown in the following example:
Example:
Calculate the volume of gas you will have downstream of the choke when you circulate out a
1 bbl gas kick from a reservoir that has a formation pressure of 3000 psi.
Solution: Using Boyle’s Law P1V1 = P2V2
Where: P1 = pressure of gas at depth 1 = 3000 psi

V1 = volume of gas at depth 1 = 1 bbl
P2 = pressure of gas at depth 2 (surface) =14.7 psi
V2 = volume of gas at depth 2 (surface) = ? bbl
3000 psi x 1 bbl = 14.7 psi x V2
3000 = 14.7 x V2
3000 = V2
14.7
204 = V2
Therefore the gas kick expands from 1 bbl to 204 bbls as it is circulated from the well and the
bubble pressure decreases from 3000 psi to atmospheric pressure.
1-8 October 2005

1.4 Capacity, Volume and Displacement
During drilling well control operations, frequent calculations of capacity and displacement
must be made. A brief review of the methods of doing this is provided below.
The Capacity Factor is defined as the volume that can be held per foot of container. The
container may be any number of things including a mud pit, an open hole, the inside of a
tubing string, or an annulus.
Capacity factors change as the dimensions of the container change. The internal capacity
factor is used to calculate internal drill string volumes and the annular capacity factor is used
to calculate annular volumes. The formulas for calculating these capacity factors are given
below:
Internal Capacity Factor
ID 2
CF =
1029
where CF = Capacity Factor (bbl/ft)

ID = Internal pipe diameter (inches)
Annular Capacity Factor
ID 2 - OD 2
CF =
1029
where CF = Capacity Factor

ID = Diameter of hole or inside diameter of larger pipe (inches)
OD = Outside diameter of smaller pipe (inches)
Capacity is the volume of fluid held within a specific container. Internal and annular
capacities are parameters that are often needed in a well control situation. Fluid capacity is
determined by multiplying the height (or length) of the container by its capacity factor.
Displacement is the volume of fluid pushed away or displaced by something such as a pipe
being run in, or a different fluid pumped through, a particular portion of a fluid-filled well.
Calculations for displacement volumes can be done using the capacity factor formulae, but
substituting pipe dimensions for hole dimensions in order to calculate steel rather than liquid
volumes.
The volume of mud in the hole is always equal to the capacity of the entire hole, minus the
displacement of the pipe in the hole (assuming the pipe and annulus are full). The annular
October 2005 1-9

capacity between work string components and the casing or hole can be calculated by
subtracting both the capacity and displacement of the work string components from the
capacity of the hole.
1.5 Bottomhole Pressure
Bottomhole pressure in the well is equal to the sum of all pressures acting at total depth.
When the hole is full and the fluid column is stable, then bottomhole pressure is the same as
the fluid hydrostatic.
We use the term Surface Pressure (SP) to describe the pressure that is exerted at the top of a
column of fluid or gas. Under static conditions, this surface pressure (or force) is exerted
against all points in the wellbore, and is ordinarily indicated at the surface by pressure gauges
which are installed on either the drill pipe (drill pipe pressure, DPP) or at the top of the
casing x drill pipe annulus (casing pressure, CP).
Under Static Conditions, the pressure at any point in the well can be determined if we know
the hydrostatic and surface pressures. We call this pressure Bottomhole Pressure, and it can
be calculated as follows.
Bottomhole Pressure (BHP) = HP + SP
Example:
Calculate the bottomhole pressure exerted on a

5000' TVD well that is full of 10 ppg mud
and has a shut-in surface pressure of 300 psi.
BHP = HP + SP
BHP = 0.052(10)(5000') + 300
BHP = 2900 psi
The pressure acting on the perforations at 5000'

in this well is 2900 psi.
Figure 1.5.1
1-10 October 2005

1.6 The U-Tube Concept
When two fluid columns are connected only at their bases, it is often possible to use the
behavior of one of the columns to determine something about what is happening in the other
one. The arrangement of two, connected columns is typically described as a “u-tube” and is
often depicted in sketches in the shape of a “U” (as in Figure 1.6.1).
Whenever a string of drill pipe or tubing is in a well and fluids are free to pass between this
string and the annulus around the string, the system can be considered a u-tube. Given this
arrangement, changes in hydrostatic and surface pressures in one fluid column (leg) can be
used to determine conditions at various points of the other leg.
To understand why the u-tube is useful, it is important to keep a basic principle in mind:
fluids will always flow from an area of higher pressure toward an adjacent area of lower
pressure. They do this because they can; that’s what it means to be “fluid”.
While this may seem obvious, the implication of this is sometimes overlooked: if a fluid is
not flowing, there is therefore no difference in pressure between the area the fluid is in and an
adjacent area to which it could flow.
To state this a different way, if a u-tube situation exists, and it can be determined that fluids
in the system are not flowing, it can then be concluded that the pressure at the point where
the u-tubes are connected must be exactly equal.
Relating this concept to a well with drill pipe and annulus columns connected at bottom
(through, for example, the bit nozzles), the following relationship must exist whenever a well
is static:
HPDP + SPDP = BHP = HPA + SPA
Where: HPDP = hydrostatic pressure at bottom of drill pipe

SPDP = surface pressure at top of drill pipe
BHP = bottomhole pressure
HPA = hydrostatic pressure at bottom of annulus
SPA = surface pressure at top annulus
Consider an example of this relationship when a kick is taken with the bit on bottom. The
well kicked because the formation pressure was greater than the hydrostatic pressure
generated by the mud in the well. When the well is shut-in, the well stops flowing; that
means the pressure in the bottom of the wellbore must now equal formation pressure (for the
same reasons stated earlier – unless some type of barrier stops it, fluid flow will always
continue until no pressure differential exists between adjacent areas).
October 2005 1-11

Since the well did flow as the kick occurred, mud hydrostatic pressure alone at bottom must
have been less than the formation pressure. Assuming for the moment that there is no barrier
(float) in the drill pipe, the amount of pressure underbalance should now be indicated by the
surface pressure shown on the drill pipe gauge (since this gauge shows surface pressure
acting on top of a full column of clean, original mud).
The fluid in the annulus is no longer composed of drilling mud alone; it also includes lighter
weight formation fluid which reduces the total hydrostatic pressure in the annulus. Thus, the
annulus side is now more hydrostatically underbalanced than the drill pipe side. The resulting
shut-in casing pressure is therefore higher than the shut-in drill pipe pressure.
This results in a u-tube situation shown in Figure 1.6.1.
Figure 1.6.1 U-Tube Concept - Bottomhole Pressure
Using Figure 1.6.1 as an example, a 10,000 ft well with 10 ppg mud has penetrated an over
pressured sand with a reservoir pressure of 5,740 psi and taken a 30 bbl kick. Since the
hydrostatic head of the 10 ppg mud is only 5,200 psi (10,000' x 10 ppg x 0.052 = 5,200 psi),
the drill pipe is under balanced by 540 psi, which is reflected on the shut-in drill pipe gauge
and at the top of the drill pipe side of the u-tube.
1-12 October 2005

The hydrostatic pressure on the annulus side is equal to the sum of the hydrostatic pressure of
the mud in the annulus and the hydrostatic pressure of the gas in the annulus. Since 30
barrels of annular mud has been displaced by the lighter weight gas, there is less total
hydrostatic pressure in the annulus than in the drill pipe. The hydrostatic pressure generated
by 30 barrels of mud is 140 psi more than the hydrostatic pressure generated by 30 barrels of
gas in this wellbore configuration. Therefore, the shut-in casing pressure and the pressure at
the top of the annulus side of the u-tube is 140 psi higher than the value indicated on the drill
pipe gauge.
While this example shows pressures at various points in a well in which we know exact fluid
contents and locations, the real value of the u-tube comes in situations in which we use
known fluids and pressures on one side or the other to determine or control pressures at a
different location (typically bottomhole). In particular, the Driller’s Method for controlling
kicks relies heavily on these basic u-tube concepts.
1.7 Circulating Pump Pressure
Friction is resistance to movement of the fluids being pumped. The amount of pressure
needed to overcome this resistance is dependent upon a number of factors:
• Hole depth (length of flow path)

• Hole size
• Hole condition (e.g. balling, packing off, etc)
• Drill string geometry (internal and external)
• Circulation rate (fluid speed)
• Pipe rotation
• Fluid density
• Fluid rheology (flow properties)
• Quantity and type of drilled cuttings or influx in the annulus (affects density and
rheology)
• Any applied back pressure at surface
Frictional Pressure Losses While Circulating
The pressure provided by the fluid pump must overcome the sum of all of the individual
pressure losses in the circulating system. When circulating normally without any surface
pressure on the annulus, all the pressure produced by the pump is expended in this process,
overcoming friction losses between the fluid and whatever it is in contact with. Losses in
specific parts of the u-tube that are important include:
• Pressure loss in surface lines (lines from the fluid pump to the top of the drill string)
• Pressure loss in tubing or pipe
October 2005 1-13

• Pressure loss across jet nozzles or downhole motors or tools

• Pressure loss in annulus
Note: Pressure losses are independent of hydrostatic pressures and any imposed, additional
surface pressures.
The pressure at any point in a circulating system is always increased by any pressure losses
that exist “downstream” of that point (which can be estimated by hydraulics calculations).
Pressure losses in the annulus act as a “back pressure” on any exposed formations upstream
of the pressure loss; bottomhole pressure while circulating therefore exceeds static BHP by
the total Annulus Pressure Loss (APL) that exists.
The total pressure at the bottom of the annulus increases when the pump is started, and
decreases whenever circulation stops. It is common to describe this BHP increase caused by
APL while circulating, by comparing it to the effect of a hypothetical mud that would
provide the same BHP with the pump off. This hypothetical mud weight is referred to as the
Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD). Calculation of ECD is illustrated in the example
below.
Circulating bottomhole pressure = Static bottomhole + Annulus

pressure pressure losses
Figure 1.7.1
The total pressure at bottom can be calculated and converted to an equivalent static mud
weight (ECD) which would exert the same pressure.
1-14 October 2005

ECD = Pmuda + APL

0.052 x TVD
or:
ECD = CMW + APL

0.052 x TVD
Where: ECD = Equivalent Circulating Density

APL = Annulus Pressure Loss
Pmuda = Hydrostatic Mud Pressure in Annulus
CMW = Current Mud Weight
Using values from Figure 1.7.1:
ECD = 5200 psi + 250 psi

0.052 x 10,000 ft
ECD = 10.4 ppg
While system circulating pressures losses (which equal pump pressures) can be estimated
with hydraulics calculations, they are also routinely measured by pumping at reduced
circulation rates and recording pressures observed. However determined, pressure losses will
change with changes in fluid density or circulation rate.
Pressure loss (PL) change with mud density change is estimated as follows:
PLnew = PLold x New MW

Old MW
Example:
A circulating pump pressure is 3000 psi while pumping at 100 spm, using a mud
weight of 10 ppg. If the mud weight in the system is changed to 12 ppg, what is the
new circulating pressure?
Using the formula above, the new circulating pump pressure can be calculated:
PLnew = 3000 psi x 12 ppg

10 ppg
PLnew = 3600 psi

Pressure loss (PL) change with changed circulation rate is estimated as follows:
PLnew = PLold x (New pump speed)2

(Old pump speed)2
October 2005 1-15

Example:
Given: A circulating pump pressure is 3000 psi while pumping at 100 spm. The pump speed
is increased to 120 spm. To estimate the new circulating pump pressure:
PLnew = 3000 psi x (120 spm)2

(100 spm)2
PLnew = 4320 psi
Note: Changing either pump speed or mud weight will similarly affect localized pressure
losses such as annular pressure loss.
1.8 Formation Pressure
Most rocks underground contain fluids like water, oil, and gas, which are contained in tiny
openings called pores. In a rock with pores, the measurement of the ratio of the pore volume
to volume of the rock material is termed ‘porosity’. The connection between the pores is the
flow path for any fluids and is extremely important, e.g. rocks with many large pores, which
are not interconnected, will not have any flow potential to a hole drilled into the formation,
i.e. the fluids would be locked in place.
The interconnection of pores makes the rock permeable and the measurement of this factor is
called ‘permeability’.
Formation pressure is the pressure of the fluids contained in the pores of a formation rock,
and is classified into three categories, Normal, Abnormal and Subnormal.
Formation pressure or pore pressure is said to be normal when it is caused solely by the
hydrostatic head of the sub-surface water contained in the formations and there is pore to
pore pressure communication with the atmosphere.
Dividing this pressure by the true vertical depth gives an average pressure gradient of the
formation fluid, most commonly between 0.433 psi/ft and 0.465 psi/ft.
Normal Formation Pressure
Normal formation pressure is equal to the hydrostatic pressure of water extending from the
surface to the sub-surface formation. Thus, the normal formation pressure gradient in any
area will be equal to the hydrostatic pressure gradient of the water occupying the pore spaces
of the sub-surface formations in that area.
1-16 October 2005

The concentration of dissolved solids (salts) and gases in the formation water affect the
magnitude of the hydrostatic pressure gradient. Increasing the dissolved solids (higher salt
concentration), increases the formation pressure gradient, while an increase in the level of
gases in solution will decrease the pressure gradient.
For example, formation water with a salinity of 80,000 ppm sodium chloride (common salt)
at a temperature of 25°C has a pressure gradient of 0.465 psi/ft, and is called brine. Fresh
water (zero salinity) has a pressure gradient of 0.433 psi/ft.
Temperature also has an effect as hydrostatic pressure gradients will decrease at higher
temperatures due to fluid expansion.
In formations deposited in an offshore environment, formation water density may vary from
slightly saline (0.44 psi/ft) to saturated saline (0.515 psi/ft). Salinity varies with depth and
formation type. Therefore, the average value of normal formation pressure gradient may not
be valid for all depths. For instance, it is possible that local normal pressure gradients as high
as 0.515 psi/ft. may exist in formations adjacent to salt formations where the formation water
is completely salt-saturated.
The following table gives examples of the magnitude of the normal formation pressure
gradient for various areas. However, in the absence of accurate data, 0.465 psi/ft is often
taken to be the normal pressure gradient.
Table 1.8.1 Normal Formation Pressure Gradients
Formation Water Pressure Gradient Example Area

Psi/ft (SG)
Fresh Water 0.433 1.00 Rocky Mountains
& Mid continent, USA
Brackish Water 0.438 1.01
Salt Water 0.442 1.02 Most sedimentary basins
worldwide
Salt Water 0.452 1.04 North Sea,
South China Sea
Salt Water 0.465 1.07 Gulf of Mexico, USA
Salt Water 0.478 1.10 Some areas of Gulf of
Mexico
Abnormal Formation Pressure
Where pressure in a formation is greater than that caused by a column of native brine, the
pressure is considered “abnormal”. Note that this condition is very common and, indeed,
characterizes many of the best oil or gas reservoirs.
Common causes of abnormal pressures include:
October 2005 1-17

• Under-compaction in massive shale beds
When first deposited, shale has a high porosity. More than 50% of the total volume of
un-compacted clay-mud may consist of the water in which silt particles were
deposited. During normal compaction, a gradual reduction in porosity accompanied
by a loss of formation water occurs as the thickness and weight of the overlying
sediments increases. Compaction reduces the pore space in shale; as compaction
continues, water is squeezed out. It is, of course, necessary that the essentially
incompressible water is able to exit the shale in order for further compaction to occur.
If the balance between the rate of compaction and fluid expulsion is disrupted such
that fluid removal is impeded, fluid pressures within the shale will increase. The
inability of shale to expel water at a sufficient rate results in much higher porosity
(less compaction) than expected for the depth of burial in that area. Fluid within such
abnormally porous shales tend to support a portion of the rock overburden weight,
thus causing them to be abnormally pressured.
• Salt Beds
Continuous salt depositions over large areas can cause abnormal pressures. Salt is
totally impermeable to fluids and behaves plastically. It deforms and flows by re-
crystallization. Its properties of pressure transmission are more like fluids than solids,
thereby exerting pressures equal to the overburden load in all directions. The fluids in
the underlying formations cannot escape as there is no communication to the surface
and thus the formations become over pressured.
• Mineralization
The alterations of sediments and their constituent minerals can result in variations of
the total volume of the minerals present. An increase in the volume of these solids
will result in an increased fluid pressure. An example of this occurs when anhydrite is
laid down. If it later takes on water during crystallization, then its structure changes to
become gypsum, with a volume increase of around 35%. This volume increase can
result in pressure being applied to adjacent formations.
• Tectonic Causes
This is a compacting force that is applied horizontally in sub-surface formations. In

normal pressure environments water is expelled from clays as they are being
compacted with increasing overburden pressures. If, however, an additional
horizontal compacting force squeezes the clay laterally and if fluids are not able to
escape at a rate equal to the reduction in pore volume, the result will be an increase in
pore pressure; See Figure 1.8.1
1-18 October 2005

Figure 1.8.1
• Faulting
Faults may cause abnormally high pressures. Formation blocks sometimes contain
sealed-in pressures that may be normal for the depth of burial. But if such a block is
uplifted to a shallower depth, this previously “normal” formation pressure may be
“abnormal” at the new depth.
Formation slippage may also bring a permeable formation laterally against an

impermeable formation, thereby preventing the flow of fluids. Non-sealing faults or
permeability within a formation layer may allow highly pressured fluids to move
from a deeper permeable formation to this newly sealed, shallower formation. If this
fault seals, then the permeable formation may be overpressured.
October 2005 1-19

Figure 1.8.2 Trap Resulting from Faulting
• Diapirism
Salt diapirism is the process in which upward intrusion of salt forms a salt dome.
This up thrust disturbs the normal layering of sediments and over pressure can occur
due to the folding and faulting of the intruded formations. Resulting hydrocarbon
traps are illustrated in Figure 1.8.3.
Figure 1.8.3 Salt Diaparism
1-20 October 2005

• Reservoir Vertical Height
Abnormal pressure can also occur in normally compacted rocks as the result of depth
and structure changes with a reservoir. As shown in the figure below, at 3,000 ft. the
formation pressure at the gas-water contact is normal and equal to 0.465 psi/ft x 3000
ft= 1,395 psi. However, at the top of the structure (2000ft), the formation pressure is
therefore approximately equal to 1,295 psi. The mud weight required at 2,000 ft to
balance this formation is 1,295/(0.052 x 2,000’) = 12.5 ppg. This formation is
therefore abnormally pressured.
2,000ft.
3,000 ft.
GAS
WATER
Figure 1.8.4
The pressure at 3,000 ft (1,395 psi), less a 1,000 ft. gas column (1,000’ x .1 psi/ft), equals
1,295 psi.
Subnormal Pressure
Subnormal pressures occur in formations where the pressure gradient is less than ‘normal’.
These pressures are found mainly in mountainous areas, or in producing formations with
limited aquifer support where sufficient fluids have been extracted to reduce the formation
pressure. Well
1.9 Equivalent Mud Weight
The most convenient method of describing downhole pressures and formation strength is in
terms of an Equivalent Mud Weight (EMW) using units of pounds per gallon (ppg).
EMW is used as an expression of the downhole pressure in relation to the density (ppg) of a
hypothetical, static mud column.
EMW can be used to quantify formation pressure, the pressure applied by a column of mud, a
pressure limit at some depth in a well, or the pressure at some depth caused by a combination
of hydrostatic pressure, surface pressure and friction pressures.
October 2005 1-21

By dividing a value of pressure (psi) at some depth by the true vertical depth to that point (in
feet, generally measured from the drill floor elevation or RKB), an equivalent pressure
gradient can be determined. This gradient, divided by the conversion factor 0.052, yields an
EMW in pounds per gallon.
1.10 Formation Fracture Pressure
The ability to utilize primary and secondary well control techniques depends heavily on the
ability of the exposed wellbore to sustain applied pressures without fracturing or breaking
down. The strength of a formation derives partly from the nature of the rock, but more
significantly from the stresses caused by its confinement by adjacent or overlying formations.
In almost all cases, the ability of a formation to withstand the hydrostatic and dynamic
pressure loads placed on it during drilling will be limited, often severely. Knowing the limits
of the strength of exposed formations is critical when planning for successful drilling and/or
well control operations.
While initial well planning may be done using estimated or indirectly measured formation
strength, drilling operations usually require an actual measurement of formation strength,
generally referred to as a “Leak Off Test” (LOT).
Leak Off Test (LOT)
Leak Off Tests are used to measure the “fracture strength” of a formation. The test is
performed by applying incremental pressures from the surface to the closed wellbore/casing
system until it can be seen that either a) fluid is being injected into an impermeable
formation, or b) injection rate into an unconsolidated or permeable formation noticeably
increases. The pressure at which this occurs is called the Leak Off Test Pressure and is
typically used as the field measurement of formation strength at the casing shoe.
Since most Leak Off Tests are stopped before actual fracture of the formation occurs,
ultimate formation strength and fracture propagation information are generally not obtained.
A typical LOT procedure includes the following general steps:
• Before starting, check gauges for accuracy. Determine applicable upper pressure
limit that should not be exceeded (e.g. 80% casing burst rating).
• Be sure the casing has been pressure tested before LOT operations commence. Be
sure adequate open hole below the cemented casing shoe is exposed (typically about
15 ft).
• Circulate and condition the mud and check for uniform mud density in and out.
1-22 October 2005

• With bit above casing shoe, close BOP.

• With the well closed in, pump a continuous small volume at a constant rate into the
well, typically at ¼ or ½ bbl per minute. Monitor the pressure build up and
accurately record the volume of mud pumped. Plot pressure versus the volume of
mud pumped.
• Watch for deviation from linearity on the pump pressure / volume pumped plot.
Consider pumping one or two additional volume increments beyond the first point
of non-linearity observed to confirm trend, but stop pumping immediately if
pressure stops building while pumping.
• Bleed off the pressure and establish the amount of mud, if any, lost to the formation
during the test.
While there may be significant variation in procedural details and interpretation of Leak Off
Tests, the most common definition of Leak Off Pressure is the pressure at which the linear
relationship ends between volume pumped and resulting pressure increases. An example
illustrating this definition is shown in Figure 1.10.1 below.
October 2005 1-23

Figure 1.10.1 Idealized LOT Plots
Unconsolidated or high permeability formations can make procedures and interpretation of

LOT data more complex. In such cases, pump pressure can be seen to immediately decrease
1-24 October 2005

once the pump stops. It may then be necessary to pump in incremental fluid volumes, then
wait a fixed time interval with the pump stopped before recording and plotting a pressure
value. In this way it is often possible to distinguish between effects of permeability and
formation displacement (true leak off). An idealized graph showing the results of this type of
LOT is shown in Figure 1.10.2.
Figure 1.10.2 Comparison of LOT Plots
Formation Integrity Test (FIT)
Many wells are designed with information considered relatively reliable. For example,
development wells drilled in proximity to previous, comparable wells often benefit from
reliable offset information regarding formation characteristics. In such cases, a pressure test
may be performed simply to confirm expected formation and cement integrity. Although still
commonly called a Leak Off Test, this test is more accurately referred to as a “Formation
Integrity Test” (FIT). For an FIT, wellbore pressures are intentionally limited to avoid
potential damage to a formation that could result from an overly aggressive LOT.
A general procedure for an FIT may include:
• Before starting, gauges should be checked for accuracy.

• Be sure the casing has been pressure tested before well LOT operations commence.
Be sure adequate open hole below the cemented casing shoe is exposed (typically
about 15 ft).
• Circulate and condition the mud, check for uniform mud density in and out.
• With bit above casing shoe, close BOP.
• With the well closed in, pump a continuous small volume at a constant rate into the
well, typically at ¼ or ½ bbl per minute. Monitor the pressure build up, recording and
October 2005 1-25

Drilling and Testing Well Control
plotting pressure versus the volume of mud pumped. Stop pumping if “leak off
pressure” is observed, or when pressure reaches a value corresponding to the required
formation strength defined in the well plan.
• Monitor this pressure to ensure that there is no leak off (perhaps allowing for initial
pressure drop when pumping is stopped). Then bleed off the pressure and establish
the amount of mud, if any, lost to the formation during the test.
An example illustrating an FIT is shown in Figure 1.10.3 below.
Figure 1.10.3 Sample Formation Integrity Test Plot
1-26 October 2005

1.11 Surface Pressure Limitations (MAASP and MISICP)
Given estimated or measured strengths of formations and tubulars, there are several terms
that represent surface pressures above which the wellbore may not remain intact. Generally
these are limits to casing pressure (as opposed to drill pipe pressure) and relate to specific
worst case situations.
Maximum Allowable Annular Surface Pressure (MAASP) is a calculated value of casing

pressure that, if exceeded, is likely to result in fluid losses (formation fracture) or casing
burst. Except when the well is old and it is suspected there is casing corrosion or wear,
formation strength at the exposed casing shoe is almost always the limiting factor.
The leak-off test (or FIT) will provide the data used to determine the maximum casing
pressure that could be applied at surface without exceeding known strength of formations at
the casing shoe. Since shoe pressure is the sum of mud hydrostatic pressure and casing
pressure, this value will change as mud weights change.
Within Chevron, this formation strength related value is referred to as Maximum Initial Shut-
In Casing Pressure (MISICP). As the name implies, it is valid only at initial shut-in on a kick
when the pumps are off (well is static) and the well is full of current weight mud.
MISICP is calculated as follows:
MISICP (psi) = [LOT EMW(ppg) – Current MW(ppg)] x 0.052 x Shoe TVD(ft)
Since this value is a special case of MAASP, it can also be referred to as “static MAASP”.
Within Chevron the term MICISP is preferred because it properly restricts use of the term to
an initial, static condition.
At later times, or when pumps are running, continuing hydrostatic and friction pressure
changes in the annulus make calculation of comparable “dynamic MAASP” values
unreliable. Chevron does not recommend routine calculation of such a value, recommending
instead proper well planning and use of reliable, standard kill methods.
1.12 Rig Equipment and Instrumentation
Good and reliable instrumentation is vital for drilling and well control operations. For well
control, more accurate instrumentation is needed than for normal drilling operations.
October 2005 1-27

The instrumentation is required to:
A) Detect changes such as drilling breaks, increase in flow, increase in pit level, increase
in gas levels, increase in torque and drag, H2S presence, etc.
B) Assist in controlling critical operations such as well kill operations using a choke.
C) Monitor critical parameters such as pressure during closed in periods and trip tank
level during tripping and stripping operations
Pressure Gauges
Each rig is normally equipped with gauges to read the pressures on the standpipe and the
wellhead. Generally, these oil-filled gauges are reliable, but not very accurate and therefore
not ideal for well control operations.
The gauges required for well-control must be of the same pressure rating as the well control
equipment on the rig. They must also be very accurate and able to read low pressures as well
as high pressures.
Accurate gauges should ideally be located at the driller’s console as well as at the choke
panel.
Fluid Measurement
The driller’s console has a pit volume totalizer (PVT) gauge which displays the volume of
fluid in the pits. It has a second gauge which shows changes, or deviation of the active
system volume, both gains and losses. This gauge is equipped with an alarm, which can be
set for a certain amount of loss and gain. This alarm is used by the driller during drilling
operations and is commonly set at +/- 5 bbls.
A flowmeter, which is normally installed in the mud return flow line, measures a percentage
of the flow through the flow line. The flowmeter gauge is located on the driller’s console and
is also equipped with an alarm which can be set to indicate return flow changes of, for
example, +/- 10 %.
A typical flowmeter system setup is shown below. Note that flowmeters of this type indicate
trends, not accurate values of actual fluid volumes.
1-28 October 2005

REMOTE
INDICATOR
Figure 1.12.1 Typical Flowmeter System
The high and low settings for the pit level alarm and flow line alarm must be checked and set
to appropriate values. It is particularly important that the driller have a reliable means of
maintaining PVT reliability during connections. Some routine method should be in place to
ensure that drillers, during connections, do not re-zero the gauge indicating pit level
deviation (in response to alarm activation caused by drainback of surface lines when pumps
are turned off). Since bottomhole pressure is reduced by loss of ECD during connections,
comparing accurate measurements of total pit volumes before and after a connection is an
important early kick detection practice.
Trip Tank
As each stand of pipe is pulled out of the well the hole has to be filled with mud equal to the
volume of steel removed. This is referred to as pulling dry. A trip sheet is used to record the
volume of mud pumped into the well. If the well is swabbing the volume to fill the well will
be less than the steel displacement, a primary indicator of a kick. While running pipe into the
well, mud will be displaced. The volume displaced should also be equal to the steel
displacement. It is important that the rig can measure these volumes accurately. There are
October 2005 1-29

occasions, such as when there is a float in the drill string, or the bit has plugged off, or when
pulling wet, when the fixed end displacement of the pipe being tripped will have to be
accounted for.
A trip tank is used to monitor these volumes. There are many types of trip tanks but they
should all have the ability to monitor volumes accurately. A drawing of one common system
is shown below.
Trip tanks usually have a capacity of 10 to 50 barrels. They must be relatively tall and narrow
in order that the fluid level changes significantly as small volumes flow in or are pumped out.
This permits relatively accurate measurement of gain or loss of fluids from the wellbore.
It is particularly useful to have the ability to continuously fill the hole from and
simultaneously take returns to the trip tank. This reduces the likelihood of hydrostatic
pressure reductions in the well due to the driller’s attention to other matters. Changes in the
trip tank fluid volume can be compared with calculated, theoretical pipe displacements to see
if the hole is taking or returning equal amounts of mud.
The trip tank can also be lined up to take returns from the well when it is desired to monitor
the well for small fluid gains or losses (as during flow checks).
All trip tanks require careful maintenance. They must be kept clean to avoid build up of
solids. Valves and pumps should be checked for leaks and ease of operation. Floats and
instrumentation should be checked and calibrated at regular intervals.
Figure 1.12.2 Continuous Recirculating Trip Tank
1-30 October 2005

A separate tank may be used to accurately measure even smaller volumes of fluid. This may
be useful during stripping operations. A strip tank with a capacity of only 3 to 4 bbls is
shown in the drawing below. In this system, after measuring returns bled into the strip tank,
the tank contents can be emptied into the trip tank, where the total volume of fluid bled from
the well (cumulative volume), can be measured.
Note: It is important to anticipate the possibility of gas in fluids bled to the stripping
or trip tanks, since the flow will likely not be via the mud-gas separator.
Figure 1.12.3 Stripping Tank Configuration
Gas Measurement
Gases circulated from the well in the drilling fluid are usually detected by a gas trap such as
the one shown in Figure 1.12.4 below. A vacuum hose draws a mixture of air and gas from
the gas trap to a gas detector. An agitator is usually built into the gas trap to increase
sensitivity by increasing the proportion of gas coming out of the mud near the detector.
October 2005 1-31

Since the actual chemical nature of gases potentially encountered may not be reliably known,
the gas detector & recorder is usually scaled in terms of arbitrary gas units, which vary for
different devices. In practice, significance is placed only on relative changes (trends) in the
gas concentrations detected; “high” or “low” gas levels relate to changes from baseline
readings which may be affected by mud properties and instrument calibration as well as by
presence of formation gases in the mud.
In some cases, additional information about formation fluids being brought to surface with
returning mud can be obtained by using a gas chromatograph to determine the composition of
the gases removed from the mud.
Figure 1.12.4 Typical Drilling Fluid Gas Detection System
1.13 Mud-Gas Separator
To prepare for the possibility of significant volumes of gas being returned to the surface with
the mud stream, some provision must be made for separating this gas from the mud and
safely handling it.
The mud-gas separator performs this role and is situated downstream of the choke manifold.
The gas separated by this device is generally vented a safe distance from the rig (land rigs) or
through the vent line in the derrick. Two basic types of mud-gas separators are in common
use.
1-32 October 2005

The most common type is the atmospheric mud-gas separator, sometimes referred to as a
“gas buster” or “poor-boy” separator. In another type of mud-gas separator, the pressurized
chamber is designed such that it can be operated at moderate back pressure, generally much
less than 100 psig, with some designs are operated at gas vent line pressure which is
atmospheric, plus the vent line friction drop.
All separators with a liquid level control may be referred to as pressurized mud-gas
separators. Both the atmospheric and the pressurized mud-gas separators have advantages
and disadvantages. Some requirements are common to both types of mud-gas separators. A
by-pass line to the flare stack must be provided in case of malfunction or in the event the
capacity of the mud-gas separator is exceeded.
Precautions must also be taken to prevent erosion at the point the drilling fluid impinges on
the wall of the vessel. Provisions must be made for easy cleanout of the vessels and lines in
the event of plugging. Use of the rig’s mud-gas separator is not recommended for well
testing operations.
The mud-gas separator or poor boy, should be lined up at all times when a kick is being
displaced. The separator is used to remove large gas bubbles from the mud and to deal with a
flow of gas once the influx is at surface.
There will be a limit to the volume of gas that each separator can safely process. When this
limit is exceeded, there exists the possibility that gas will blow through into the shaker header
box.
An estimate can be made of the maximum gas flow rate that the separator can handle.
Limiting factors include the back pressure at the outlet to the vent line in relation to the
hydrostatic head of fluid at the mud outlet of the separator. When the back pressure due to
the gas flow is equal to, or greater than, the hydrostatic head available at the mud outlet, the
gas will blow through to the shaker header tank.
The Chevron Well Control CD contains a worksheet that simplifies calculations necessary to
confirm adequate mud-gas separator capacity.
In order to minimize the possibility of a gas blow-through, the vent line should be as straight
as possible and have a large ID. The mud outlet should be configured to develop a suitable
hydrostatic head (minimum recommended head is 10 feet).
The back pressure due to the flow of gas should be monitored with a pressure gauge. Some
warning of the possibility of a gas blow-through will be given when the registered pressure
approaches the hydrostatic head of the fluid in the discharge line. For sizing calculations it
should be noted that the minimum hydrostatic head may be provided by influx fluids (e.g.
oil) rather than drilling mud.
October 2005 1-33

If the safe operating limit of the separator is approached, the circulating rate may need to be
reduced or the flow switched to the overboard line or the burn pit.
Figure 1.13.1 Mud-Gas Separator Operating at Maximum Capacity
1-34 October 2005

Section 2 – Causes of Kicks
2. Causes of Kicks
2.1 Introduction
Definition of Kick
A kick is defined as an undesirable flow of formation fluid into the wellbore. It occurs
because the pressure exerted by the column of drilling fluid is not great enough to overcome
the pressure exerted by the fluids in a permeable formation.
The vast majority of kicks happen unintentionally, for example, by drilling into abnormally
pressured formations or by failing to keep the hole full while tripping. Kicks can happen at
any stage during rig operations; to avoid them, constant vigilance is required by the drilling
team. Figure 2.1.1 shows historically (for the industry as a whole), when kicks are most
likely to happen during rig operations.
Drilling
Tripping Out
Tripping In
Casing
Circulation
Testing
Other
Figure 2.1.1 Frequency of Kick by Operation at Time of Kick
October 2005 2-1

Obviously, there are times when it is desirable to have an intentional flow of formation
fluids, e.g. when the well is put on production or during drill stem testing. However, an
unintentional kick during completion, workover, or drilling operations threatens control of
the well if prompt action is not taken.
Definition of Influx
An influx is a quantity of formation fluid that has entered the wellbore. An influx may or
may not be sufficient to cause hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore to fall below formation
pressure. But an influx is an indication that the pressure of an exposed, porous, permeable
formation must have exceeded adjacent wellbore pressure at some time. If not promptly
recognized, an influx (particularly a gas influx) may result in further reductions of
hydrostatic pressure which can lead to loss of control of a well.
Wells kick because the reservoir pressure of an exposed permeable formation is higher than
the wellbore pressure at that depth. There are many situations which can produce this
underbalanced condition. Among the most likely and recurring are:
• Low density drilling fluid.

• Abnormal formation pressure.
• Swabbing.
• Not keeping the hole full on trips.
• Lost circulation.
These causes will be examined in detail in this section with emphasis placed upon what can
be done early to avoid this situation.
2.2 Low Density Drilling Fluid
Density of the drilling fluid is normally monitored and adjusted to provide the hydrostatic
pressure necessary to balance or slightly exceed the formation pressure. Accidental dilution
of the drilling fluid with makeup water in the surface pits, or the addition of drilled-up, low
density formation fluids into the mud column, are possible sources of a density reduction that
could initiate a kick. Diligence on the mud pits is the best way to ensure that the required
fluid density is maintained in the fluids pumped downhole.
Most wells are drilled with sufficient overbalance so that a slight reduction in the density of
the mud returns will not be sufficient to cause a kick. However, any reduction in mud weight
during circulation must be investigated and corrective action taken. A major distinction
should be drawn between density reductions caused by gas cutting and those caused by oil or
salt water cutting.
2-2 October 2005

Gas Cutting: The presence of large volumes of gas in the returns can cause a drop in the
average density and hydrostatic pressure of the drilling fluid. However, the appearance of gas
cut mud at the surface usually causes unnecessary concern, and often results in over-
weighting of the mud. The reduction of bottomhole pressure due to gas cutting at the surface
is illustrated in the following table.
Table 2.2.1 Pressure Reduction Due to Gas Cutting (psi)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10.0 PPG Cut to 18.0 PPG Cut to 18.0 PPG Cut to
Depth 5.0 PPG 16.2 PPG 9.0 PPG
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1000 51 31 60
5000 72 41 82
10000 86 48 95
20000 97 51 105
Notice that the total reduction in hydrostatic pressure at 20,000 feet is only about 100 psi
even though mud density is cut by 50 percent at the surface. This is because gas is very
compressible and a very small volume of gas that has an insignificant effect on mud density
downhole will approximately double in size each time the hydrostatic pressure is halved.
Near the surface, this small volume of gas would have expanded many times, resulting in a
substantial reduction of surface density.
It is interesting to note that most gas cutting occurs with an overbalanced condition
downhole. For example, if a formation containing gas is drilled, the gas in the pore space of
the formation is circulated up the hole along with the cuttings. The hydrostatic pressure
acting on the gas contained within a drilled cutting is greatly reduced as it moves up the
annulus, allowing the gas to expand and enter the mud column. The mud will be gas cut at
the surface, even though an overbalanced condition exists downhole. If the amount of
"drilled gas" is large enough, it is possible that a well could be flowing at the surface as the
gas breaks out and still be overbalanced downhole. However, a flowing well is always treated
as a positive indication that the well has kicked, and the well should be shut-in immediately
when this occurs.
In a balanced or slightly overbalanced condition, gas originating from drilled cuttings could
reduce the bottomhole pressure sufficiently to initiate a kick. Gradual increases in pit level
would be observed at first, but as the influx of gas caused by the underbalanced condition
arrives at the surface, rapid expansion and pit level increase will occur. The well should be
shut-in and the proper kill procedure initiated. When gas cut mud causes a hydrostatic
pressure reduction large enough to initiate a kick, the density of the mud being pumped
downhole will usually not have to be increased to kill the well. This can be verified by
shutting-in the well and confirming that the shut-in drill pipe pressure is zero.
Oil or Salt Water Cutting: Oil and/or saltwater can also invade the wellbore from drilled
cuttings or swabbing, reduce the average mud column density, and cause a drop in mud
October 2005 2-3

hydrostatic pressure large enough to initiate a kick. However, since these liquids are much
heavier than gas, the effect on average density for the same downhole volumes is not as
great. Also, since liquids are only slightly compressible, little or no expansion will occur
when circulating them out. However, a given mud weight reduction measured at the surface
due to oil and/or saltwater invasions will cause a much greater decrease in the bottomhole
pressure than a similar mud which is cut by gas. This is because the density reduction is
uniform throughout the entire mud column when it is cut by a liquid.
Settling of Mud Weighting Materials or Drilled Cuttings
The settling of desirable solids in a mud can cause a reduction in the mud density. A similar
effect can be caused when drilled cuttings settle to the bottom of the hole. Both mechanisms
may significantly reduce the hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore.
The settling of mud weighting materials in a well is referred to as “barite sag”. Although
more prevalent in highly deviated or extended reach wells, barite sag can happen in vertical
wells during periods of non-circulation. The current thinking is that barite sag can never be
totally eliminated and that, in the field, the problem needs to be managed by a combination of
good mud design and operational practices such as maintaining pipe rotation and avoiding
low annular velocities.
In addition, barite recovered by the mud centrifuge can also settle or be lost in the mud pits if
not sufficiently agitated.
Loss of ECD Effect
When the pumps are shut down to make a connection while drilling, the dynamic bottomhole
pressure (based on ECD) reduces to the value of static bottomhole pressure. This is because
of the loss of annular frictional pressure. It is normal practice to keep pumps running during
upward pipe movement prior to making a connection to minimize any swabbing effect. If the
mud weight is insufficient to balance formation pressure, the loss of ECD can allow
formation fluids to enter the wellbore. The resulting influx is generally referred to as
“connection gas”.
In theory, drilling mud weight for normal, overbalanced drilling operations should be
sufficient to avoid connection gas. Observation of the occurrence of connection gas is
therefore a good indication that static mud overbalance has been lost and mud weight may
need to be increased. While connection gas influx volumes are unlikely to cause a significant
reduction in bottomhole pressure, it is sometimes prudent to limit the number of potential
“packets” of connection gas in a well at any one time; cumulatively, the loss of hydrostatic
pressure can be significant in marginal situations.
Cement Density
Kicks that occur while cementing are often the result of a reduction in the hydrostatic
pressure of the fluid column in the wellbore. In addition to being cut by improper mixing,
2-4 October 2005

cement density can be cut by formation water or gas contaminating the slurry. Different
events can lead to a reduction of the hydrostatic pressure below the formation pressure.
• A spacer or flush is normally pumped ahead of the cement. If it is not of adequate

density, the well may begin to flow.
• If the density of the cement is too high, lost circulation can result, leading to a loss of
hydrostatic pressure.
• There have been instances where the casing float equipment has failed allowing the
drilling fluid to U-tube up the casing, leaving insufficient hydrostatic pressure in the
annulus.
• Cement design must also be considered, with particular attention given to setting
manner (right angle set), percentage of free water, and water loss.
As cement transitions from a slurry to a solid state, there is a period of time during which
hydrostatic pressure of the slurry column reduces to a fresh water gradient. This happens
because the cement solids become self-supporting before the cement structure becomes
relatively impermeable. The associated reduction in hydrostatic pressure during this
transition can lead to an influx which can prevent the cement from forming a reliable seal,
and can also reduce annulus hydrostatic pressure. Good slurry design (e.g. right angle set,
zero free water) and proper field mixing can help avoid this potential problem.
The well should be closely monitored during all phases of the cementing operation. The
BOPs should not be nippled down until you are sure that the well will not flow after cement
has had time to properly set.
2.3 Abnormal Formation Pressure
Formation pressure is due to the action of gravity on the liquids and solids contained in the
earth's crust. If the pressure is due to a full column of saltwater with average salinity for the
area, the pressure is defined as normal. If the pressure is partly due to the weight of the
overburden and is therefore greater, the pressure is known as abnormal. Pressures below
normal, due to depleted zones or less than a full fluid column to the surface are called
subnormally pressured.
In the simplest case (usually at relatively shallow depth), the formation pressure is due to the
hydrostatic pressure of formation fluids above the depth of interest. Saltwater is the most
common formation fluid and averages about 8.95 ppg or 0.465 psi/ft along the U.S. Gulf
Coast. Therefore, 0.465 psi/ft is considered the normal formation pressure gradient for the
Gulf Coast. Normally pressured formations are often drilled with about 9.5 to 10.0 ppg mud
in the hole.
October 2005 2-5

For the formation pressure to be normal, fluids within the pore spaces must be interconnected
to the surface. Sometimes a seal or barrier interrupts the connection. In this case, the fluids
below the barrier must also support part of the rocks or overburden. Since rock is heavier
than the fluids, the formation pressure can exceed the normal hydrostatic pressure. During
normal sedimentation, the water surrounding the shale is squeezed out because of the
addition of overburden pressure. The available pore space, or porosity, will decrease and the
density per unit volume will increase with depth. However, if a permeability barrier or rapid
deposition prevents the water from escaping, the fluids within the pore space will support
part of the overburden load, which results in above normal pressure. This is depicted in
Figure 2.3.1 below.
Less Dense Shale

Borehole
Denser Shale
Wellbore
Normal Sand
Denser Shale
Less Dense Shale

Over-Pressured Sand Formation (due to free water)
Denser Shale
Figure 2.3.1 Abnormally Pressured Sand Formation
Another common cause of abnormal pressure is faulting. As can be seen in Figure 2.3.2, a
formation originally deposited under normal pressure conditions is uplifted 2,000 ft. The
pressure within the uplifted section is trapped in the formation. The pressure in the formation
is now abnormal for that depth. There may be no rig floor warning prior to drilling into an
abnormal pressure zone of this nature.
2-6 October 2005

8,000 ft
10,000 ft
4650 psi
4650 psi
Figure 2.3.2 Abnormal Pressure Due to Faulting
Abnormal pressure can also occur as the result of depth and structure changes within a
reservoir. As shown in Figure 2.3.3, at 3,000 ft, the formation pressure at the gas-water
contact is normal and equal to 0.465 psi/ft x 3000 ft = 1,395 psi. However, at the top of the
structure (2000 ft), the formation is overpressured and approximately equal to 1,295 psi.
Note: The pressure at 3,000 ft (1,395 psi), less a 1,000 ft. gas column (1,000 ft x .1 psi/ft),
equals 1,295 psi. The mud weight required at 2,000 ft to balance this formation is
1,295 ÷ (0.052 x 2,000’) = 12.5 ppg.
2,000 ft
3,000 ft
GAS
WATER
Figure 2.3.3 Abnormal Pressure due to Folding
Prior to drilling a particular well, all information regarding abnormally pressured zones
should be gathered and on hand for the Drilling Engineer. Seismic data can often be helpful.
Logs on nearby wells, along with the drilling reports of these wells, should be studied. If the
well is a rank wildcat in a new area, no knowledge of pressures to be encountered may exist.
In these cases, pressure determination from techniques such as plotting the "dc" exponent
while drilling, and pore pressure calculations from electric logs run in the well are invaluable.
October 2005 2-7

Other warning signs are available while drilling, and are discussed in Section 3, Kick
Detection.
Usually, abnormally pressured formations give enough warning that proper steps can be
taken. Changes in drilling parameters or mud properties often indicate the approach toward
or entry into abnormal or high-pressure zones. Once these zones are detected, it's often
possible to drill toward, or even into them a reasonable distance while raising the mud weight
sufficiently to control formation fluid entry. However, when pressure due to mud weight
approaches the fracture gradient of the weakest exposed formation, it is good practice to set
casing. Failure to do this has been the cause of many underground blowouts and lost or
junked holes.
If permeable, abnormal pressure zones are drilled with mud weights insufficient to balance
the formation pressure, a kick situation develops. This occurs when the pressure in the
formation drilled exceeds the hydrostatic head exerted by the mud column. A pressure
imbalance results and fluids from the formation enter into the wellbore.
2.4 Swabbing
Swabbing is a condition that arises when pipe is pulled from the well and produces a
temporary bottomhole pressure reduction. In many cases, the bottomhole pressure reduction
may be large enough to cause the well to go underbalanced and allow formation fluids to
enter the wellbore. By strict definition, every time the well is swabbed-in, it means that a
kick has been taken. While the swab may not necessarily cause the well to flow or cause a
noticeable pit gain increase, formation fluids produced into the annulus will almost certainly
lower the hydrostatic pressure of the mud column. Usually, the volume of fluid swabbed-in
to the well is an insignificant amount and creates no well control problems (e.g., a small
amount of connection gas). At other times, however, immediate action will need to be taken
to prevent a further reduction in hydrostatic pressure which could cause the well to flow on
its own.
2-8 October 2005

Figure 2.4.1 Swabbing Action
It can be very difficult at times to recognize swabbing. The most reliable method of detection
is proper hole filling. If a length of drill pipe composed of five barrels of metal volume is
pulled from the well and the hole fill-up is only four barrels, a barrel of gas, oil, or saltwater
has probably been swabbed into the wellbore. If swabbing is indicated (even if there's no
flow), the pipe should be immediately run back to bottom, the mud circulated out, and the
mud weighted up and conditioned before making the trip.
A short trip is often made to determine the combined effects of bottomhole pressure
reductions that are caused by a loss of equivalent circulating density and swabbing. When
drilling under or near balanced conditions, a short trip is particularly important since it
quickly indicates a need to raise mud density or slow pulling speeds. Expansion of swabbed
gas or flow from the formation later during the trip can be much more difficult to overcome,
possibly requiring stripping back to bottom to kill the well.
Many downhole conditions tend to increase the likelihood that a well will be swabbed-in
when pipe is pulled. Several of these are discussed below.
Mud density vs Formation pressure: If mud hydrostatic pressure is just equal to formation
pressure, the well will be static until the drill string is moved upward. To prevent this, an
overbalance designed to exceed any probable swab pressure reductions is generally used
prior to tripping out of the hole. This overbalance margin or “trip margin”, unless added just
prior to tripping, may not be reliable protection from swabbing, as its value may be based on
predicted (rather than measured) pore pressure for formations exposed since the previous
trip.
October 2005 2-9

Balled-Up Bottomhole Assembly: The drill string becomes a more efficient piston (swab)
when drill collars, stabilizers, and other bottomhole assembly components are balled-up. This
causes a greater bottomhole pressure reduction that can swab more fluids into the wellbore. If
the well is almost at balance, only a few vertical feet of fluid swabbed-in can cause the well
to flow on its own.
Pulling Pipe Too Fast: The piston action is also enhanced when pipe is pulled too fast. The
Drill Site Manager should be sure that the pipe is pulled slowly off bottom for a reasonable
distance. However, the hole should be watched closely at all times to be sure it is taking the
correct amount of mud. The maximum pulling speed can be determined for a given set of
mud properties using software commonly provided by mud loggers.
Poor Mud Properties: Swabbing problems are compounded by poor mud properties, such as
high viscosity and gels. Mud in this condition tends to cling to the drill pipe as it moves up or
down the hole, causing swabbing coming out and surging (pressure spikes) going in.
Heaving or Swelling Formations: Swabbing can result if the formations exposed either
heave or swell, effectively reducing the diameter of the hole and clearance around the bit or
stabilizers. In these formations, even a clean bit acts like a balled bit or stabilizer.
Large OD Tools: Drill stem testing tools, fishing tools, core barrels, or large drill collars in
small holes enhance swabbing by creating a piston action when the pipe is pulled too fast.
Extra care should be taken whenever pulling equipment with close tolerances out of the hole.
Good practices to prevent or minimize swabbing are aimed at keeping the mud in good
condition, pulling pipe at a reasonable speed, and using some type of effective lubricant mud
additive to reduce balling. Additives such as blown asphalt, gilsonite, and detergent are
effective in many cases. Good hydraulics will often help clean a balled-up bit or bottomhole
assembly.
One effective technique to eliminate swabbing involves circulating while pulling out of the
hole. With top drives, this is not particularly difficult, but greatly complicates trip sheet
records and calculations. When using this technique it is important to review procedures to
ensure that pumping and pulling operations are coordinated in a way that ensures positive,
forward circulation in “worst case” conditions; this generally requires pumping at a rate that
replaces closed end displacement volumes of the string being pulled to ensure swabbing
doesn’t occur even if balled up bits or BHA components are present.
In spite of any efforts to minimize swabbing, every trip out of a new section of hole is,
essentially, an experiment. It is important to monitor the well at all times for indications that
desired overbalance, or primary well control, has been lost.
2-10 October 2005

2.5 Not Keeping the Hole Full on Trips
Blowouts that occur on trips are usually the result of either swabbing or not keeping the hole
full of mud. Substantial progress has been made in blowout prevention, but constant
vigilance must be maintained. As drill pipe and drill collars are pulled from the hole during
tripping operations, fluid needs to added to the well in order to prevent the fluid level in the
hole from dropping. In order to maintain mud hydrostatic pressure, a volume of mud equal to
the volume of steel removed must be pumped into the annulus; a fill volume less than that of
the volume of steel removed indicates hole fill from another source (e.g. the formation).
A continuously circulating trip tank is recommended for keeping the hole filled while
permitting accurate measurement of fluid volumes taken by the well as a given length of pipe
is removed. It is the responsibility of the Drill Site Manager to see that the rig crews are
thoroughly schooled in the necessity of keeping the hole full and maintaining records of
actual fluid volumes used or returned during trips.
Figure 2.5.1 Continuous Circulating Trip Tank
In addition to trip tanks, mud logging units and pit volume monitoring (PVT) systems can be
used to monitor overall fluid levels in various mud system tanks. While not as sensitive (due
to larger tank cross sections), these monitoring systems serve as a useful backup for keeping
track of major trends and become more important when utilizing procedures such as pumping
out of open hole or backreaming during trips.
October 2005 2-11

Flow line monitors (flow indicating devices) can be useful while drilling or tripping. In
particular, they can provide immediate notification of “no-flow” corresponding to the onset
of lost circulation (which can result in the hole not being full).
2.6 Lost Circulation
An important cause of well kicks is the loss of whole mud to natural and/or induced fractures
and to depleted reservoirs. Such losses can occur suddenly and result in a drop in fluid level
in the annulus, thereby underbalancing a different, exposed, permeable zone.
Some of the more common causes of lost circulation include:
Excessive Mud Weight: Mud weight is increased (either intentionally or due to cuttings
loading) to the point that the fracture pressure of the weakest exposed formation is exceeded,
circulation may be suddenly lost, and the fluid level in the hole can drop quickly and
dramatically.
If returns cease, loss of hydrostatic pressure can be minimized by immediately pumping

measured volumes of water into the hole. Measuring the volumes will enable the Drill Site
Manager to calculate the correct weight of mud that the formation will support without
fracturing. Upon gaining returns, verify that the well is not flowing on its own.
Going into the Hole Too Fast: Loss of circulation can also result from rapidly lowering the
drill pipe and bottomhole assembly (drill collars, reamers, and bit). This is called “surging”
and is similar to swabbing, but in reverse; the piston action forces the drilling fluid into the
weakest formation. This problem is compounded if the string has a float in it and the pipe is
large compared to the hole. Particular care is required when running pipe into a hole in which
formation pressure and fracture pressures are relatively close.
2-12 October 2005

Figure 2.6.1 Pressure Surges
Pressure Due to Annular Circulating Friction: Another item to be considered when there is
not much difference between formation pressure and fracture pressures is the pressure added
by circulating friction. This can be quite large, particularly in holes with small annular
clearances. It is sometimes necessary to reduce the pumping rate to lower the circulating
pressure. The problem can become acute when trying to break circulation with high gel fluids
or when using high viscosity fluids.
Sloughing or Balled-Up Tools: Partial plugging of the annulus by sloughing shale can
restrict the flow of fluids in the annulus. This imposes a backpressure on the formations
below and can quickly cause a breakdown if pumping continues. Annular plugging is most
common around the larger drill string components such as stabilizers, so efforts to reduce
balling will also diminish the chances of this type of lost circulation.
2.7 Other Causes of Kicks
Drill Stem Testing (DST)
Drill Stem Testing is used to measure directly the production potential of a formation, to
capture samples of the fluids from the zone tested, and to obtain pressure and temperature
data.
A DST is performed by setting a retrievable packer/tester on drill pipe just above the
formation to be tested. The packer is set to seal off the annulus and the tester tool is opened
to allow flow from the open zone. The tester is then closed, the packer unseated, and the drill
string is pulled out of the hole with the captured fluid sample.
October 2005 2-13

Instruments in the tool record the pressures and temperature. Down hole chokes can be
incorporated in the test string to limit surface pressures and flow rates to the capabilities of
the surface equipment to handle or dispose of the produced fluid.
During the course of the test, the bore hole or casing below the packer, and at least a portion
of the drill pipe or tubing, is filled with formation fluid. At the conclusion of the test, this
fluid must be removed by proper well control techniques to return the well to a safe
condition.
Drilling Into an Adjacent Well
Drilling into an adjacent well is a potential problem, particularly offshore where a large
number of directional wells are drilled from the same platform.
If the drilling well penetrates the production string of a previously completed well, the
formation fluid from the completed well can enter the wellbore of the drilling well, causing a
kick. If this occurs at a shallow depth, it is an extremely dangerous situation and could easily
result in an uncontrolled blowout.
Excessive Drilling Rate through a Gas Sand/Limestone
When drilling a gas bearing formation, the mud weight will be gas cut due to the gas
breaking out of the pore space of the cuttings near the surface. The severity of the influx will
depend on the penetration rate and porosity of the formation drilled, and is independent of
mud weight.
While this gas cutting is not usually sufficient to cause loss of overbalancing hydrostatic
pressure, degassing may be necessary to ensure that good mud is being pumped back into the
hole to prevent the percentage of gas from increasing with each circulation, which could
eventually result in greater and greater bottom hole hydrostatic pressure reductions.
Control drilling of a gas containing formation (limiting penetration rate) can help limit gas
cutting of mud.
Coring
Extra care should be taken when tripping with a core barrel. The formation that has been cut
is far more likely to swab at this time because we are often coring formations known (or
hoped) to be both hydrocarbon bearing and permeable. To avoid contaminating the core with
mud, coring (and related tripping) is sometimes done with reduced trip margins. Reduced
fluid paths and small annular clearances (particularly in extended core holes) further add to
the potential for swabbing while pulling out of the hole.
2-14 October 2005

Extended reach / Horizontal drilling
In horizontal wells, the reservoir is exposed to a far greater extent than with vertical wells. In
fact, the swab effects can be 30% greater than normal. Although there is no loss of
hydrostatic pressure providing the influx is in the horizontal component of the well,
subsequent circulation of the influx into the vertical section could lead to a serious loss of
hydrostatic pressure and a potentially difficult kick situation.
Differentially stuck pipe
Excess overbalance against an exposed, permeable formation can result in differentially stuck
pipe. The pipe, or usually the drill collars, become forced against the side of the open hole.
This is made worse by rapid build up of filter cake which prevents equalization of pressure
between the wellbore and the formation.
If the string cannot be removed by pulling, rotating or jarring, then chemical pills can be
spotted around the drill collars to dissolve the filter cake. But another technique sometimes
used, is to reduce the mud weight to stop the losses and equalize (or even slightly
underbalance) pressure against the formation. This method should be used with extreme
caution since, if the sticking zone is underbalanced (or a separate, higher pressure zone
becomes underbalanced), a kick may be inadvertently initiated.
October 2005 2-15

Section 3 - Kick Detection
3. Kick Detection
Introduction
Alertness in recognizing warning signs of a kick is of the utmost importance in well control.
Careful observance and correct reaction to these signs will help keep the well under control.
Warning signs fall into two major categories: signs that indicate that a kick may be occurring
or is becoming more likely, and signs that serve as positive indicators of a kick in progress.
3.1 Positive Kick Indicators
Positive Kick Indicators While Drilling
Flow into the wellbore while drilling causes three changes to occur in the mud circulating
system:
• The mud return flow rate exceeds the pumping rate into the well
• Increase of active mud system volume (pit gain)
• Return flow continues with the pumps off
Since a rig’s fluid system is a closed system, an increase in returns detected by a flow
monitoring system (returning flow exceeding pumping rate) will also eventually result in a
gain in pit level. Detecting a change in pit level is generally accomplished visually or by use
of any of several pit level measuring instruments (e.g. PVT system). But in any event, a
change in pit level will lag behind the increase in return flow rate; it takes time for the
increased flow to accumulate sufficiently to be observed as a pit level change.
PVT’s include a recording instrument mounted at the driller’s console. Many operations also
utilize an independent monitoring system maintained and monitored by mud loggers. These
devices permit constant monitoring of the pit level by the driller, both while tripping and
drilling.
Good communication between crew members is essential on the rig. To minimize false
alarms and permit proper evaluation of pit level trends, a driller should make sure the crew
notifies him and the mud logger before anything is done that could change the level in the
pits (i.e. starting/stopping mud cleaners, transferring mud, adding weighting materials, etc).
Whenever the pumps are stopped (during connections, in response to a possible kick
indicator, as an immediate response to observing flow increase or pit gain, or for any other
October 2005 3-1

reason), the pressure at the bottom of the wellbore decreases due to loss of the ECD effect.
Any flow that continues after the pumps have stopped is a positive indicator of either influx
in the well (perhaps due to previously undetected swabbing) or underbalance of formation
pressure at bottom. In either case, when such flow is observed, immediate action to stop the
flow from the well is required.
Since a well is more likely to flow with the pumps off (without ECD effect), stopping the
pumps to check for flow is an effective means to detect possible underbalance while drilling.
For this reason, it is generally considered reasonable to perform at least a quick “flow check”
as part of the kick detection process while drilling. A well that will not flow after turning the
pumps off may be a good indication that something other than a kick is responsible for
whatever triggered the flow check, and the well may not require being shut-in.
The size or severity of a kick depends on the volume of foreign fluid allowed to enter the
wellbore, which depends on the degree of underbalance, the formation permeability, and the
length of time it takes the drilling crew to detect that the well is kicking and utilize BOP
equipment to stop the flow. Smaller influx volumes decrease the likelihood of damage to the
well and minimize casing pressures during kill operations, both of which lead to safer, more
cost efficient well control operations.
Positive Kick Indicators While Tripping
It is recommended that a trip tank system providing continuous hole fill up be used when
tripping both out of and into the hole. Using such a system, it should be possible to compare
fluid volumes pumped into or returned from a well with steel volumes pulled out or run in
(typically calculated after each 5 stands of drill pipe and more frequently for large drill
collars). This information should be recorded on a trip record (trip sheet).
Using cumulative figures, if less fluid volume than calculated is needed to fill the hole while
tripping out, or more returns than calculated are observed while tripping in, a flow check
should be performed.
• If the flow check is positive, the well should be immediately shut in. Stripping may
then be needed to move the string back to near the bottom of the well.
• If the flow check is negative, the drill string should be run back to bottom to permit
circulating out any influx and/or adjusting mud weight or tripping practice.
Note that the flow check itself is not really the kick indicator; the string needs to be moved
back to near the bottom of the well regardless of the outcome of the flow check. The flow
check is simply used to determine how to get the string to bottom – by stripping or by
running into the open well. The real indicator in this case is the trip record. It is the Drill Site
Manager’s responsibility to ensure that proper trip records are made and used properly to
identify kicks while tripping.
3-2 October 2005

3.2 Indicators of Possible Kick or Increasing Formation Pressure
It is often useful to compare the current trip sheet with the record from the previous trip. This
makes it possible to assess trends in a given hole section.
The various signs that have been identified as warning indicators of a possible kick or
increasing formation pressures are not consistent in all situations. The signs may have to be
used collectively, as a single indicator may not accurately provide sufficient warning of
getting into an unbalanced situation. Even though the reliability of signs may change between
wells, it is important to consider possible well control implications whenever such
indications are observed, before attempting to confirm (or assuming) the cause of the
indication is non-critical. Many well control incidents involve early warning signs that were
noted, but were explained away as relating to non-critical operational errors (such as
unanticipated mud transfer in the pits or flow caused by u-tubing).
Indications of a possible kick or increasing formation pressure include:
• Increase or decrease in drilling rate of penetration

• Increased drag and torque
• Decrease in shale density
• Increase in cutting size and shape
• Mud property changes
• Increase in trip, connection and/or background gas
• Increase in the temperature of the returning drilling mud
• Decrease in d-Exponent
Change in Rate of Penetration
When drilling ahead and using consistent drilling parameters, as the bit wears, a normal trend
of decreasing penetration rate (ROP) should occur.
If the differential pressure between the hydrostatic pressure of the drilling fluid and
formation pore pressure decreases, an increase in the drilling rate occurs as the chip hold
down effect is reduced.
A gradual, but consistent increase in penetration rate is often a fairly good indicator that a
transition zone may have been penetrated. As drilling continues during this transition into
zones of higher pressure, consideration of possible changes in desired overbalance of mud
hydrostatic to formation pressure may need to be made.
A rapid change in rate of penetration is known as a “drilling break”. This may be either an
increase or a decrease in penetration and simply reflects some sudden change in downhole
October 2005 3-3

conditions which could coincide with changes in formation type, permeability, fluid content,
or pressure.
If the bit penetrates a formation that is significantly underbalanced due to insufficient mud
hydrostatic pressure, penetration rate may increase dramatically as cuttings are no longer
held against the bottom by hydrostatic differential pressure, but are literally blasted off the
bottom of the hole by formation pressure that exceeds wellbore pressure. This is the classic
explanation for drilling breaks relating to the start of a well kick.
There are, however, other reasons for penetration rate increases. For example, when crossing
a fault into a formation for which the bit is more suitable, the ROP can increase. Similar
changes can occur as rock type changes between sedimentary layers or even as a result of
permeability changes affecting chip hold down. These same changes can just as easily result
in a sudden decrease in ROP.
What is significant in each of these cases is that the new formation could have higher pore
pressure, increased permeability, or a connection (via unsealed faults) to productive zones
that are underbalanced by current mud hydrostatic pressure; a drilling break is simply an
indication that the potential for flow from the hole may have changed.
Increased Drag and Torque
Increased drag and rotary torque are often noted when drilling into overpressured shale
formations due to the inability of the underbalancing mud column to hold back physical
encroachment of the formation into the wellbore. A shale formation, even if hydrostatically
underbalanced, can rarely flow due to the low permeability of shale. It is the possibility that
the bit will exit the shale and penetrate an underlying, high permeability zone (like an
embedded sandstone that may be equally overpressured, but through which fluids can flow
readily) that makes it important to note torque and drag indications of increasing pressure in
the shale section.
Drag and rotating torque are indirect indicators of overpressure; increases often may indicate
that a transition zone is being drilled. But they are also indicators of hole instability (either
chemical or resulting from borehole stress relationships) and other mechanical problems
(cuttings beds, loss of bit gauge, etc.) that are unrelated to the potential for a well to kick.
Up drag and down drag as well as average torque figures should be recorded periodically,
(often during each connection).
Decrease in Shale Density
The density of shale normally increases with depth, but stops increasing and may, in fact,
decrease as abnormal pressures develop within large shale sections. When drilled, the density
of the cuttings can be measured at surface and plotted against depth.
3-4 October 2005

A normal trend line can often be established and deviations, particularly decreases, can
indicate changes in pore pressure. These measurements can sometimes be correlated to
specific formation pressure changes that may otherwise not be apparent until adjacent, more
permeable zones are penetrated. Mud loggers will typically monitor this trend.
Increase in Cutting Size and Shape
In transition zones or in abnormally pressured shales, pieces of the rock wall of the wellbore
may break off and fall into the hole because of hydrostatic underbalance (pore pressure
greater than mud hydrostatic pressure). These pieces will often be larger and more angular
than cuttings, as they are not destroyed by the action of the bit. Water wetting of the shale
may further aggravate this sloughing into the hole. As these larger particles are more difficult
to flush out of the well, some may fall toward the bottom, particularly during connections or
trips (pumps off), thereby resulting in more hole fill, torque or drag. And since these
“cuttings” are not, in fact, cut by the bit, they add to the total volume of cuttings coming over
the shakers, often dramatically increasing the observable cuttings load without a proportional
increase in penetration rate.
Actual cuttings from shale sections that are overbalanced by mud hydrostatic pressure tend to
be rounded and are generally flat, while cuttings from an underbalanced shale are often long
and splintery with angular edges. The underbalance causes the hole cuttings to have a greater
tendency to come off bottom and reduces the likelihood that they will be reground prior to
being flushed up the hole.
Changes in cuttings shape and cuttings load over the shakers need to be monitored at surface.
Mud Property Changes
Water cut mud or a chloride increase after bottoms up circulation clearly indicates that
formation fluid has entered the wellbore (since the water or salt must have come from
somewhere). It could have been caused by swabbing or it could indicate a well flow is
underway. Small chloride or calcium increases could be indicative of tight (low permeability)
zones that are hydrostatically underbalanced.
In some muds, the viscosity will increase when salt water enters the wellbore and mixes with
the mud. This is called flocculation because the small particles of mud solids, which are
normally dispersed, form little “groups” called flocs. These flocs cause viscosity and gel
increases.
In other muds you might see a viscosity decrease caused by water cutting (weight decrease).
This is true when operating with low pH salt saturated water base muds.
In oil muds, water contamination acts as a “solid” and causes viscosity increases.
Gas cut mud would be fluffy and would have higher viscosities (and lower mud weight).
October 2005 3-5

Note: It is important to understand that the trend change is more important than the actual
value or magnitude of the change.
Increase in Trip, Connection and/or Background Gas
Returning mud must be monitored for contamination by formation fluids. This is done by
constantly recording the flow line mud density and accurately monitoring gas levels in the
returned mud.
Gas cut mud does not in itself indicate that the well is flowing (gas may be entrained in the
cuttings). However, it must be treated as an early warning of a possible kick. Therefore pit
levels (which would indicate significant loss of mud and hence, hydrostatic pressure in the
hole) should be closely monitored if significant levels of gas are detected in the mud.
An essential part of interpreting the level of gas in the mud is the understanding of the
conditions under which the gas entered the mud in the first place.
Gas can enter the mud for one or more of the following reasons:
• Drilling a formation that contains gas, even with a suitable hydrostatic overbalance.
• Temporary reduction in hydrostatic pressure caused by swabbing as pipe is removed

from the hole.
• Pore pressure in a formation being greater than the hydrostatic pressure of the static
mud column.
Gas due to one or a combination of the above, can be classified as one of the following:
Drilled Gas
When porous formations containing gas are drilled, a certain quantity of the gas contained in
the cuttings will enter the mud.
Gas that enters the mud from the cuttings, unless it dissolves in the mud and is kept at a
pressure higher than its bubble point, will expand as it is circulated up the hole, causing gas
cutting at the flow line. Gas cutting due to this mechanism will occur even if mud hydrostatic
pressure overbalances the formation. Raising the mud weight will not prevent it.
It should be noted that drilled gas should correspond to the volume of cuttings from the
porous formation. The quantity of gas noted should therefore also correspond to changes in
rate of penetration through the gas bearing formation. Excessive gas readings can be
controlled by limiting penetration rate (control drilling).
3-6 October 2005

Background Gas
After a formation containing gas has been drilled, gas may continue to weep or be flushed
into the open wellbore. This situation is most common after drilling a low permeability
formation (e.g. shale) with formation pressures nearly balanced or slightly underbalanced by
wellbore pressure (as when drilling a transition zone).
A relatively stable gas reading not associated with either penetration rate or bottoms up
circulations is generally referred to as background gas. While frequently posing no
significant risk to primary well control, changes in background gas can be helpful in
recognizing increasing hydrostatic underbalance while drilling transition zones, and should
not be ignored. Awareness of background gas trends can also be helpful in assessing the
magnitude or significance of other gas readings.
Connection Gas
Connection gas is measured at surface as a distinct increase above background gas levels as
bottoms up occurs after a connection.
Connection gas is caused by the temporary reduction in effective total pressure of the mud
column during a connection. This is due to pump shut down (i.e. loss of ECD) and, possibly,
the swabbing action as the string is lifted off bottom for the connection.
In most cases, connection gas indicates a condition of near balance between pore pressure
and mud hydrostatic pressure. When an increasing trend of connection gas is identified,
consideration should be given to weighting up the mud before continuing drilling operations
and particularly before any tripping operations.
Trip Gas
Trip gas is any gas that enters the mud while tripping the pipe with the hole appearing static.
It is gas observed when circulating bottoms up after a round trip.
If the static mud column is sufficient to balance the formation pressure, the trip gas will have
had to have been caused by swabbing.
Significant trip gas may indicate that a near balance situation exists in the hole (possibly
inadequate trip margin), or that tripping practices may be causing swabbing (i.e. inconsistent
hole fill, pulling too fast, poor mud condition prior to trip, etc.).
Gas Due to Inadequate Mud Density (kick gas or influx)
Drilling of a gas bearing permeable formation that is underbalanced in spite of ECD, will
cause an immediate flow increase followed by a pit gain (or a reduction in a continuing fluid
loss trend).
October 2005 3-7

The surface indication of an underbalanced formation depends on the degree of

underbalance, as well as the formation permeability. But unlike the other causes of gas in the
mud that are mentioned above, failure to detect and immediately correct the underbalanced
condition will cause a worsening of the gas inflow which can ultimately lead to exceeding
well design limits (kick tolerance) and resulting loss of well control.
Increase in the Temperature of the Returning Mud
The formation temperature will normally increase as depth and formation pressures increase.
But by observing temperature trends in the returning mud, temperature increases can be used
to identify abnormally increasing pressures, particularly while drilling transition zones. The
circulating rate, elapsed time since tripping, hole geometry, use of mud chemicals and
surface temperature conditions will also influence flow line temperature trends and must be
accounted for when evaluating mud temperature changes. The cooling effect of mud flowing
through a long marine riser can also make the interpretation of flow line temperature changes
rather difficult.
Figure 3.2.1 shows example plots of temperature increase while penetrating an abnormally
pressured formation.
3-8 October 2005

Figure 3.2.1 Flow line Temperature Data
October 2005 3-9

Decrease in d-Exponent
A calculated value called the d-Exponent is often plotted by well loggers in real time. This
calculation was introduced in the mid sixties to define a normalized penetration rate in
relation to certain drilling parameters.
The d-Exponent may be corrected and normalized for mud weight changes and/ or ECD
(equivalent circulating density) by the following:
A plot of dc-Exponent versus depth in shale sections has been used with moderate success in
predicting abnormal pressure.
Trends of dc-Exponent normally increase with depth, but in transition zones, its value
decreases to lower than expected values.
Mud logging companies apply further variations/models which are designed to normalize for
other parameters (such as bit wear and rock strength), with varying degrees of success.
3-10 October 2005

Figure 3.2.2 An illustration of a dc-Exponent plot
October 2005 3-11

Section 4- Shut-In Procedures
4. Shut-In Procedures
4.1 Introduction
Minimize the Size of the Influx
The Chevron shut-in procedure is designed with this overriding purpose in mind: To
minimize the size of the influx. Early recognition of a kick and rapid shut-in is essential for
effective well control. By taking action quickly, the amount of formation fluid that enters the
wellbore and the amount of drilling fluid expelled from the annulus are minimized. Smaller
kicks yield lower initial shut-in casing pressure and lower maximum casing pressures while
circulating out the kick, as shown in Figure 4.1.1. This translates to lower casing shoe
pressures at all points during the circulation and reduces the chance of formation breakdown
and an underground blowout.
Note: The larger the influx, the higher the casing pressures; so, minimize the size of the
influx.
Figure 4.1.1
October 2005 4-1

Section 4 – Shut-In Procedures
4.2 Hard and Soft Shut-Ins
API RP 59 defines a “Soft Shut-in” as one in which a choke is used to stop well flow after
annulus flow is stopped by use of a BOP. This type of shut-in fails to minimize the size of an
influx as effectively as a “Hard Shut-in” (closing off flow using any BOP element). Chevron
recommends that a Soft Shut-in not be used in drilling operations. Instead, a Hard Shut-in
procedure is recommended.
The shut-in procedure should be agreed to by Chevron and the drilling contractor, and posted
on the rig floor before drilling begins.
Note: At all times it should be remembered that if the well is flowing, or if it is unclear
whether or not a pit gain is from the well, the driller should shut the well in immediately,
before informing supervisors.
The Hard Shut-in requires three major steps, sometimes referred to within Chevron as “The 3
S’s”, which are described below.
Note: For each of the following situations, it is recommended that before initiating shut-in
procedures, the driller should sound the drill floor alarm to alert the crew to the
presence of a suspected kick. Following each shut-in, additional steps may be
specified for obtaining Shut-in Drill Pipe Pressure (measure SIDPP by bumping
float), noting pit gain, and measuring and recording Shut-in Casing Pressure (SICP).
4.3 Hard Shut-In Procedure while Drilling with a Surface BOP Stack
To shut-in a well while drilling with a surface BOP stack:
Step one: Space out
• Stop rotating, pick the drill string up off bottom, and space out to ensure no tool
joint is located in the BOP element selected for initial closure. If kelly is in use,
be sure lower kelly valve is positioned above rig floor.
Step two: Shut down
• Shut off pumps and observe well.
4-2 October 2005

Step three: Shut-in well
• If flow is suspected or confirmed, close selected BOP element first, then open the
HCR against a fully closed choke manifold valve or a positively sealing, closed
choke.
• Confirm that the well is shut-in and flow has been stopped (use trip tank).
• Inform Supervisors.
Note: Either the uppermost pipe ram or annular preventer can be used with a surface stack.
4.4 Hard Shut-In Procedure while Tripping with a Surface BOP Stack
To shut-in a well while tripping with a surface BOP stack:
Step one: Stab Valve
• Install a fully opened safety valve in the drill string. Make-up and close same.
Step two: Space Out
• Space out to ensure no tool joint is located in the BOP element selected for initial
closure. If kelly is in use, be sure lower kelly valve is positioned above rig floor.
• Close selected BOP element first, then open the HCR against a fully closed choke
manifold valve or a positively sealing, closed choke.
• Confirm that the well is shut-in and flow has been stopped (use trip tank)
• Prepare to strip back to bottom.
Note: Either the uppermost pipe ram or annular preventer can be used with a surface stack
4.5 Shut-In Procedure while Drilling with a Subsea BOP Stack
To shut-in a well while drilling with a Subsea BOP stack:
Step one: Space out
joint is located in the upper annular BOP. When pre-calculating space out, be
October 2005 4-3

above sure lower kelly valve (or lowest string safety valve) is positioned to
remain rig floor after drill string is hung off.
Step two: Shut down
• If flow is suspected or confirmed, close upper annular BOP element first, then
open the upper choke line valve (Spring Assist Closure Valve on choke line at
BOP stack) against a fully closed choke manifold valve or a positively sealing,
closed choke.
• Inform supervisors.
4.6 Shut-In Procedure while Tripping with a Subsea BOP Stack
To shut-in a well while tripping with a Subsea BOP stack:
Step one: Stab Valve
• Install a fully opened safety valve in the drill string. Make-up and close same.
Step two: Space Out
• Space out to ensure no tool joint is located in the upper annular BOP. When pre-
calculating space out, be sure lower kelly valve (or lowest string safety valve) is
positioned to remain above rig floor after drill string is hungoff.
• Close upper annular BOP element first, then open the upper choke line valve
(Spring Assist Closure Valve on the choke line at BOP stack) against a fully
closed manifold valve or a positively sealing, closed choke.
• Prepare to strip back to bottom.
4-4 October 2005

4.7 Shut-In while Wireline Logging (all rig types)
To shut-in a well while wireline logging through open BOP (no lubricator):
Step one: Stop logging
• Instruct wireline operator to stop wireline movement.
Step two: Shut-in well
• Close annular BOP element around the wireline. Increase closing pressure if
necessary to affect a seal.
• Open the HCR (or Spring Assist Closure Valve) against a fully closed choke
• Inform Supervisors
Note: If flow continues through closed annular BOP, consider cutting the wireline
with a cable cutter and letting it fall, then closing blind rams to effect shut-in. Shear
rams should be considered as a last resort for cutting the wireline and used only if
the annular(s) fail to secure the well and the wireline can’t be cut and dropped clear
of the BOP.
To shut-in a well while wireline logging with lubricator:
Step one: Stop logging
• Instruct wireline operator to stop wireline movement.
Step two: Shut-in well
• Energize appropriate seals around the wireline. Increase closing pressure if

necessary to effect a seal.
• Confirm that the well is shut-in and flow has been stopped. Be prepared to use
secondary closure method (close wireline BOP) as appropriate.
• Inform Supervisors
October 2005 4-5

4.8 Shut-In while Running Casing
A plan should be made to permit shutting the well in during any phase of drilling operations.
Particular combinations of pipes/tools/casing may require careful thought in order to be sure
necessary equipment and procedures are in place to maintain control of the well.
Particular care should be given to ensuring BOPs are available to close in the well should
flow occur while casing is being run (or pulled). This may require changing rams for surface
stack operations prior to running casing or, for subsea operations, setting regulated operating
pressure limits that prevent casing collapse in the event the annular must be closed.
As an additional complication for shutting-in on a casing string, control of flow up the casing
(caused by casing or shoe failure) may be problematic due to difficulty of installing
crossovers and valves at the rig floor (and possibly a limited ability to shear casing with a
subsea BOP). Where special equipment exists, such as a casing stinger mounted on a top
drive, rig specific shut-in sequences should be developed to use available equipment most
effectively.
In all cases, specific shut-in plans should be in place to ensure shut-in equipment needed is
available and personnel are trained in appropriate related procedures.
4.9 Shut-In while Out of the Hole (all rig types)
To shut-in a well while out of the hole:
Step one:
• Close blind rams or shear/blind rams.

4.10 Hang-Off Guidelines (floating rigs)
Reasons for Hanging Off after Shut-in
There are several reasons to consider hanging off the drill string on pipe rams after shutting-
in a well and/or during well control operations. It is recommended that the decision of
4-6 October 2005

whether or not to hangoff be made in advance of any well control incident as part of general
well control preparedness and training. The following are some key issues relevant to such a
decision:
Preventing motion of the drill string through closed BOP elements permits use of rams
A floating rig may generally be considered to be in constant vertical motion with respect
to the seabed (and the BOP which is located at seabed). Some sort of drill string
compensation device is used to keep the drill string from moving up and down off the
bottom of the hole while drilling, but such devices are usually locked or ineffective at
accurately compensating for heave while the drill string is held suspended off bottom. The
use of any BOP element other than an annular preventer (which is designed to tolerate
some string motion) is dependent on stopping the movement of the pipe relative to the
seabed. This is accomplished by use of the motion compensating equipment to land at
least a portion of the string weight on a closed pipe ram in the BOP.
Permitting disconnect from BOP during well control operations
A unique complication of floating drilling involves the occasional need to be able to

disconnect the rig from the well. In emergencies, such disconnect may require shearing
the drill string, which can generally be done only if no tool joint is located in the
Shear/Blind ram. If, during well control operations, the drill string should become stuck
with a tool joint in this unfortunate position, it may not be possible to disconnect while
keeping the well closed in.
By hanging off immediately after initial shut-in, the possibility of losing control of the
well in this event is minimized.
Limiting potential collection of trapped “stack gas”
The large ID of most subsea BOPs (18 ¾” or larger), along with the relatively large
distance between upper annular elements and pipe rams (due to presence of a second
annular element and a marine riser connector) results in the potential for collection of a
much larger volume of gas between the annular element and the uppermost choke line
outlet. By hanging off at shut-in (when gas is likely well below the BOP) and using the
choke outlet just below the hangoff pipe ram, this gas volume can be minimized, thus
eliminating much of the risk associated with removal of this trapped gas after the kill.
For all these reasons, some floating drilling contractors and many experienced subsea drilling
specialists strongly recommend immediate hang-off as part of their recommended shut-in
procedures. In such cases, it is important to have a “bridging document” in place before
drilling begins if Chevron drilling management wishes to retain the option of “working” the
drill string after shut-in.
October 2005 4-7

Example Hangoff procedure
The recommended procedure for shutting-in and hanging off:
Step one: Space out
joint is located in the upper annular BOP. When pre-calculating space out, be
sure lower kelly valve (or lowest string safety valve) is positioned to remain
above rig floor after drill string is hung off.
Step two: Shut down
• If flow is suspected or confirmed, close upper annular element first, then open the
upper choke line valve (Spring assist Closure Valve on BOP stack) against a fully
closed choke manifold valve or a positively sealing, closed choke.
• Inform supervisors.
Step four: Confirm space out for closure of hangoff rams
• Using motion compensator, raise string slowly through annular preventer until
indicated weight, compensator position, or an increase in control system annular
readback pressure indicates a tool joint has been pulled up against the upper
annular element. Use observed drill string position to determine or confirm proper
position of drill string to permit closure of hangoff rams (generally done with tool
joint ~ 5 feet above ram when closing preventer).
• Close hangoff ram and lock same.
• Open choke line outlet below hangoff ram.
Step five: Hangoff on ram
• Lower drill string using compensator until desired load is suspended on hangoff
ram. Weight on VBRs should be limited if tool joint rests on fingers instead of the
ram block itself. Adjust motion compensator to mid-stroke suspending at least air
weight of string above hangoff rams (more if limiting load on VBRs).
4-8 October 2005

Step six: Bleed off trapped pressure
• Be sure to close all choke/kill outlets below hangoff ram, then use upper choke
line to bleed off any pressure remaining trapped between annular and hangoff
ram. Observe volume of fluid bled off: only a small volume (relative to stack and
choke line capacity) will flow out unless gas is present, in which case gas
expansion could cause much larger bleed off volumes. If gas is indicated or
suspected, consider using “removal of trapped stack gas” procedure prior to
opening annular element. Otherwise, open annular and close upper choke line
valve prior to re-opening choke/kill outlet below hangoff ram and continuing well
control operations.
October 2005 4-9

Section 5 – Planning and Operations
5. Planning and Operations
5.1 Well Planning
Casing Seat Selection
Successful well control starts with good well planning. Anticipation of formation
characteristics to be encountered while drilling, particularly formation pore pressure and
formation strength, are keys to effective well planning.
Successful primary and secondary well control requires selection of casing setting depths that
will permit maintenance of hydrostatic overbalance in all reasonably foreseeable
circumstances. The choice of setting depths for all casing strings is a fundamental part of the
well planning process:
• A casing string set too high may leave weak zones exposed in the subsequent
open hole section, which are unable to support the mud weights needed to drill
to the next casing point
• A hole section extended too deep may result in a well likely to suffer
formation breakdown if even a minimal kick occurs
Initial selection of the setting depths is made with reference to the anticipated lithological
column, formation pressure and fracture gradient profiles. While drilling, information
obtained that corroborates or corrects earlier assumptions and estimates should be used to
revise the well plan.
While overall well objectives are important (such as the need to deliver a final production
casing string set at the required depth), the impact of changes to a well plan on the ability to
control wellbore pressures should be considered using a realistic range of formation
uncertainties.
Formation Pressure Prediction before Drilling
In well planning, the formation pore pressure data have the greatest utility if they are
available as early as possible. Several early decisions are made at this phase, which are
directly influenced by the pore pressure profile for the well to be drilled.
The casing and mud programs depend on the magnitude and degree of certainty of the
expected pore pressure, as well as the well head and BOP equipment design. In some cases
the pressure, profile can ultimately influence the rig selection.
October 2005 5-1

Section 5 – Planning and Preparation
There are usually two sources of well pressure data for the well being planned:
geophysical/geological data and offset well data. The preferable source would be offset well
data, but in instances where there are no offset wells or it is considered that the offset wells
are too far away to be relevant then seismic analysis would have to be used to predict the pore
pressure.
Seismic data is used in the exploration phase to map and identify potential reservoir traps
and to estimate formation tops in the lithological column. It can also be used to give a
quantitative estimate of the formation pressure.
Seismic data is particularly important offshore, where it is used to determine the possible
presence of shallow gas bearing sands. In this case, a high resolution seismic survey is
performed which usually investigates formations down to a depth of some 3500 ft below
the seabed.
5.2 Crew Responsibilities
General
Well Control operations are improved by having good operational plans in place. Plans
should include the allocation of individual responsibilities and contingency procedures to
cope with foreseeable, potentially serious problems.
Rig specific well control operational plans should be prepared prior to spudding a well.
Specific operational agreements to clarify varying drilling contractor and Chevron practices
should be captured in the form of a Bridging Document.
Preparation of the crew to apply procedures specified should be confirmed by use of related
well control drills.
Responsibilities
The Well Control operations plan must allocate the responsibilities of all those concerned in
the operation. Circumstances at the rig site may dictate that these responsibilities be modified
in the event of an incident covered by the contingency plan. The following, however, can be
used as guidelines for the allocation of responsibilities for Well Control operations:
• The Chevron Drill Site Manager (DSM)

- Ensures that all the crews are properly trained
- Organizes a pre-kill meeting for all those involved in the well
control operation
- Provides specific well control procedures, using the well
5-2 October 2005

control guidelines
- Implements and supervises these procedures
- Should be present on the drill floor at the start of the kill
operation. Either the Toolpusher or the Chevron Drill Site
Manager should be present at all times on the drill floor
during the kill operation
- Should maintain communication with the Operations base if
possible
- Should assign the responsibility of keeping a diary of events
Note: The Drill Site Manager’s right to assume complete control of the work
required to regain control of the well should be documented in the
Bridging Document
• The Chevron Drilling Engineer (if present)

- Will provide technical back-up to the Drill Site Manager
- Should keep a diary of events
• The Senior Drilling Contractor Representative

- Has the overall responsibility for all actions taken on the rig
as described in the bridging document .
- Has the responsibility for supervising the drilling contractor
staff that are not directly involved in the well control
operation
• The Toolpusher
- Has responsibility for the execution of the well control
operation
- Has the responsibility for ensuring that the driller and the drill
crew are correctly deployed during the well control operation
- Must be present at the drill floor during the start of the kill
operation. Either the Toolpusher or the Chevron Drill Site
Manager should be present at all times on the rig floor during
the operation
- Has the responsibility for briefing the off duty drill crew prior
to starting a new shift
• The Driller
- Has the responsibility for the initial detection of the kick and
closing in the well
October 2005 5-3

- Has the responsibility for supervising the drill crew during the
well control operation
- Has the responsibility for control of rig pumps and, at the
option of the Drill Site Manager, working the drill string
during kill operations
- Has the responsibility to monitor well and BOP equipment
during kill operations and be ready to operate rig as needed to
respond to changing situations (e.g. close alternative BOP
element or hangoff string)
- Should keep a log of well parameters and events
• The Mud Engineer
- Has continuous responsibility for monitoring the mud system

and the conditioning of the mud
- It is advisable to have a second Mud Engineer on the rig when
drilling through the reservoir or when anticipating higher
formation pressures.
• The Cementing Engineer

- Ensures that the cement unit is ready for operation at any time
- Operates the cement unit at the discretion of the Drill Site
Manager
• The Subsea Engineer (where appropriate)

- Should be available for consultation at all times during the
well control operation
- Has the responsibility for checking all the BOP equipment
during the operation
• The Mud Logging Engineers

- Have the responsibility for continuously monitoring the
circulating system and the mud density during the well
control operation
Communication
It is good practice to have a Well Control meeting with all personnel involved prior to
drilling into a reservoir or when anticipating higher formation pressures. It may be helpful to
clarify priorities (i.e. focus on relative priorities regarding kick detection and drilling
5-4 October 2005

efficiency), discuss kick tolerance, alarm settings, coordination with mud loggers and mud
engineers, applicable shut-in procedures, and other items relevant to the ability to avoid,
respond to, or control potential kicks.
One of the Drill Site Manager’s responsibilities is to organize a pre-kill meeting after the
well has been shut-in. The purpose of this meeting is to ensure that all those involved in the
supervision and execution of the well control operation are briefed with the details of the
plan that will be used to kill the well. Any amendments to the execution plan can be made at
that meeting.
Experience has shown that even the most well known well control procedures can go badly
wrong if communication before and during the operation is not properly organized.
The objectives of advance communication planning are:
• To ensure that all information relevant to a well control operation can be efficiently
communicated to the Drill Site Manager
• To ensure that all those involved in the operation are aware of the line and method of
communication that they should use
• To ensure that communication equipment on the rig is adequate, and is available
during the well control operation in the most effective manner possible
Note: There is no time for a pre-kill meeting when there is Shallow Gas. Training and
discussions about Shallow Gas Procedures must be performed prior to spudding
the well. All personnel involved must know their duties when shallow gas is
encountered.
5.3 Well Control Related Drills
Shutting in the well quickly to minimize the size of the influx is a very important procedure
in successful well control. Drilling crews can only become proficient in performing this
method correctly through training and practice. The Chevron Drill Site Manager should
ensure that the Toolpusher administers training in kick detection and shut-in procedures until
proficiency is demonstrated. The training must be done frequently enough so that shutting in
the well becomes almost automatic whenever a kick is detected.
The Drill Site Manager can judge the crew's level of shut-in proficiency through the use of
pit drills and trip drills that are coordinated with the Toolpusher. Proper drills and training
can prevent a panic situation and provide the necessary experience if a kick should occur.
The following information describes how to conduct drills and provides a basis for crew
evaluation.
October 2005 5-5

BOP Drills
The purpose of BOP Drills is to familiarize the drill crews with techniques that will be
implemented in the event of a kick.
The most important influence on wellbore pressures after a kick is taken is the volume of the
influx. The smaller the influx, the less severe will be the pressures during the well kill
operation. Therefore, it is most important that the drill crew react quickly to any sign that an
influx may have occurred and promptly execute the prescribed control procedure. Drills
should be designed to reduce the time that the crew takes to implement these procedures.
The relevant Drills should be carried out as often as is necessary, and as hole conditions
permit, until the Drill Site Manager and the Toolpusher are satisfied that every member of the
drill crew is familiar with the entire operation.
Every effort must be made to ensure that the drill is carried out in the most realistic manner
possible. Where practical, there should be no difference between the drill and actual control
procedures.
Once satisfactory standards have been achieved, the drills should be held at least twice
weekly per crew. If standards fall unacceptably, the Drill Site Manager should specify that
the Drills are conducted more frequently.
The following drills should be practiced where applicable and reported on the IADC Drilling
Report:
Drilling (pit drill)

Tripping (trip drill)
Diverter
Accumulator
Choke Drill
Kick While Drilling (Pit Drill)
The purpose of this drill is to familiarize the crew with the control procedure that will be
implemented in the event of a kick while drilling. For training, it may be conducted in cased
hole. However, if a subsequent drill is conducted when the drill string is in open hole, the
well should not be shut-in.
When the pipe is on bottom, the following procedure can be used as a guideline for the drill:
(1) Without prior notice, the Toolpusher gradually increases the apparent pit level
by manually raising the float. As an effective alternative, the Toolpusher may
choose to manually manipulate the flow sensor where possible.
(2) The Driller is expected to detect the pit gain and take the following steps:
5-6 October 2005

(a) Sound the alarm

(b) Pick up the kelly (or top drive) to pre-determined space out position for
shut-in with the kelly cock (or lowest safety valve) above the rotary table.
(c) Shut down the pumps (and rotary).
(d) Check the well for flow.
(e) Demonstrate readiness/ability to affect shut-in using correct BOP element.
(f) Report to the Drill Site Manager.
(g) Record the time required for the crew to react and conduct the drill on the
IADC drilling report.
(3) Members of the drilling crew should proceed with their assigned duties and
report back to the rig floor upon completion.
Note: Drill Site Manager should monitor actual behaviors to assess competence.
Kick While Tripping (Trip Drill)
The purpose of this drill is to familiarize the crew with the control procedure that will be
implemented in the event of a kick that occurs while tripping pipe. Like the pit drill, the trip
drill is useful for both teaching and testing purposes.
Note: This Drill should only be conducted when the BHA is inside the last casing string.
The trip drill is supervised by the Toolpusher with the concurrence of the Drill Site Manager.
Frequency of Trip Drills: When a new rig is picked up, trip drills should be conducted
during each trip (both while pulling out and going into the hole) while the bit is up in the
casing. When the crew becomes proficient, trip drills should be conducted at least twice
weekly per crew if conditions allow.
Trip Drill Procedure
1. The Toolpusher simulates the kick by raising a float in the trip tank, and makes
note of the time. The Drill Site Manager should assist in observing the crew and
recording completion times. If this is not practical, the drill may be initiated by
simply announcing “Well Flowing” to the driller.
2. The Driller must respond by sounding the alarm and having his crew install a
fully open safety valve on whatever pipe is in the hole.
3. The crew should make up and close the full opening safety valve, and prepare to
shut-in the well using the approved Chevron Shut-in Procedure While Tripping.
This may include spacing out the drill pipe.
October 2005 5-7

4. After the safety valve is installed and the Driller is ready to close the preventers,
the Drill Site Manager should advise the Driller that the exercise is only a drill
and that it is not necessary to close the preventers. The time elapsed since the start
of the drill should be noted when the Driller is prepared to shut the well in.
5. Members of the drilling crew should proceed with their assigned duties and report
back to the rig floor upon completion. Crew performance should be assessed in
comparison to lists documenting individual crew responsibilities.
Diverter Drill
If shallow gas is encountered and the well kicks, blowout conditions may develop very
quickly. It is therefore important that the crew initiate selected procedures as soon as possible
in the event of a shallow gas kick.
Diverter drills should therefore be carried out to minimize the reaction time of the crews. A
further objective of the drill is to check that all diverter equipment is functioning correctly.
A diverter drill should be carried out prior to drilling with returns to the rig.
Drills should be designed in line with the specific procedure that will be used in the event of
a shallow gas kick.
The Toolpusher must ensure that the drill crew (and marine staff, if offshore), are correctly
deployed during the drill and that each individual understands his responsibilities.
The time recorded in the log should be the time elapsed from initiation of the drill until the
rig crew (and marine staff) is ready to initiate the diverting and related procedures.
Note: For offshore operations, steps relating to rig evacuation and/or moving off
location should be included in the drill.
Accumulator Drill
Accumulator drills are designed to verify that the accumulator/closing system is in good
working order and that it is properly sized for the particular blowout preventer stack in use.
Accumulator performance must be proven with an accumulator drill when the blowout
preventers are first installed (which verifies proper sizing), and thereafter in conjunction with
the periodic BOP pressure tests that check for hydraulic leaks.
Results of the accumulator drill, including closing times of the rams and annular preventer, as
well as initial and final accumulator pressures, are to be reported on the “Blowout Preventer
Test and Equipment Checklist." A copy of this form is given as Figure 5.3.1 below. A
notation should also be made on the tour report that an accumulator drill was conducted.
5-8 October 2005

Accumulator drills must be conducted when the drill pipe is up in the casing, not in open
hole. Drill pipe must be positioned in the BOP stack for the pipe rams to close on.
The Drill Site Manager and Toolpusher should witness all accumulator drills, but the
Toolpusher is responsible for the actual supervision of the drill. It is recommended that for
subsequent drills, alternate control stations be used to function the BOP.
Surface BOP Accumulator Drill Procedure
1. With system charged up, turn off all accumulator pressurizing pumps.
2. Record the initial accumulator, manifold, and annular pressures.
3. Close all of the preventers (except the shear or blind rams). Substitute the reopening
of a pipe ram to simulate blind ram closure. Open the HCR valve.
4 Measure and record the closing times for each preventer with a stopwatch.
5. Record the final accumulator, manifold, and annular pressures.
6. To pass the accumulator test, each BOP must have closed in less than 30 seconds.
Additionally, at the end of the test there must be at least:
a. 1,500 psi accumulator pressure remaining in a 3,000 psi accumulator.

b. 1,385 psi accumulator pressure remaining in a 2,000 psi accumulator.
c. 1,285 psi accumulator pressure remaining in a 1,500 psi accumulator.
Note: a) Equipment that does not meet these requirements either has insufficient
capacity, insufficient precharge, or needs repair.
b) Closing time for annular preventers 20" or larger should not exceed 45
seconds.
7. Observe the remaining pressure for at least 5 minutes to detect any possible ram
piston seal leaks.
8. Turn the accumulator pump(s) back on. Record time required for system to re-
charge to system pressure (to automatic shut-off). Compare re-charge time with
previous test and investigate any discrepancies.
9. Re-open the BOPs.
October 2005 5-9

Choke Drill
The objective of this drill is to give drill crews the most realistic type of well control training,
and a feel for the equipment and procedures that they would use to kill a well.
This drill should be carried out prior to drilling out the intermediate and production casing
shoes. It should never be carried out when open hole sections are exposed. The following
procedure is recommended:
(1) Run in hole and tag the top of cement.
(2) Pull back one stand and install the kelly (or install top drive).
(3) Break circulation and measure at least one slow circulating rate pressure.
(Consider circulating bottoms up prior to this if the annulus may contain
contaminated mud).
(4) Carry out standard Pit Drill, including actual shut-in of well.
(5) Pump slowly into the shut-in well to obtain a low pressure on the casing gauge
(typically 200 psi).
In coordination with choke operator, bring the pump up to kill speed holding
this casing pressure constant (or at values intended to compensate for choke line
friction).
(6) Manipulate choke to obtain experience in making specific adjustments to
circulating drill pipe pressure. For example, use choke to increase/decrease
circulating DPP by 100 psi. Use the drill to help identify, train and confirm
competence of potential choke & pump operator teams.
It is important that the choke operator develops a feel for the lag time between manipulation
of the choke and its subsequent effect on the drill pipe pressure. The lag time should be
recorded, so that it can be used for reference should a kick be taken in the next hole section.
Other Drills
For operations anticipating the need for special well control operations, it is recommended to
establish drills customized to prepare rig personnel for specific related duties. Examples of
operations for which rig-specific well control drills may be appropriate include:
• Stripping in/out with or without gas migration

• Emergency disconnect (mooring or dynamic positioning system failure)
• Well servicing (kick detection and shut-in)
• Drilling into potential massive lost circulation zone
• Drilling in zones with H2S potential
• Shut-in while running multiple string completion
• Tripping with core barrel, casing, or using various float devices or downhole tools
5-10 October 2005

5.4 Slow Circulating Rates (SCRs)
There are many reasons why a kick should be displaced from the hole at a rate that is
considerably slower than that used during normal drilling. These include:
• To minimize the pressure exerted on the open hole (due to annulus friction)
• To allow weighting of mud to keep up with pumping requirements
• To permit adequate degassing of the returned mud
• To reduce the need for fast choke adjustments
• To reduce the pressure exerted on well control equipment
All of these factors must be considered when selecting the rate at which to displace a kick.
However, the absolute upper limit for the displacement rate may be restricted by the pressure
rating of the surface equipment and in particular the setting of pump pressure relief valves.
The pumping rate may also need to be limited to avoid exceeding the gas handling capacity
of the mud gas separator.
In order to estimate the circulating pressures needed during the displacement of a kick, it is a
common industry practice to measure the friction pressure in the circulating system at
various reduced rates. These measured reduced circulating rate pressures (referred to as
SCRs) are sometimes used to estimate the drillpipe circulating pressure necessary to maintain
“constant” bottomhole pressure during kill operations.
There are, however, problems with this practice.

• Pre-recorded SCRs may not reflect current pressures due to changes in mud weight,
flow characteristics or pump efficiencies
• SCRs may be out of date due to lengthening of the hole
• SCRs may not be available for pump or pump speed intended for use during a kill
• SCRs may be impacted by unknown conditions downhole (such as plugged nozzle or
change in status of bypass port in BHA)
Chevron therefore recommends that circulating pressures necessary for control of bottomhole
pressure should be determined as needed. These pressures can be obtained by using the
recommended method for bringing pumps up to speed (BPUTS). As SCRs are not needed for
this, and have a significant tendency to mislead or distract from proper interpretation of
pump startup pressures, Chevron does not recommend routine measurement and recording of
these values.
There are other, practical reasons to routinely estimate or note pump pressures. By
comparing pressures resulting from use of one pump, then a second one, differences in pump
performance (i.e. efficiency) may be readily noted. A single pressure measurement taken
while using each pump at the same theoretical output rate makes it possible to readily
identify efficiency differences that could, hopefully, be investigated or resolved before they
impact routine or emergency procedures (such as bumping a plug or displacing kill fluid).
October 2005 5-11

To use the Wait & Weight kill method, it is necessary to have a reliable means of
determining system friction pressures for the kill rate used. As substitution of kill weight
fluid takes place, estimated changes in friction pressures can be used to develop a pressure
control schedule that keeps bottomhole pressure constant while fluid contents change.
To properly determine an SCR value to use for creating a Wait & Weight displacement
schedule, the following procedure is recommended:
1. Starting with the well shut-in and any trapped pressure bled off, bump the float in
order to obtain SIDPP.
2. After ensuring any excess pressure trapped during Step 1 has been bled off, bring
pump up to desired kill rate while holding casing pressure constant (for subsea
operations, adjust for choke line friction or use the static kill line for this purpose).
3. After allowing sufficient time for the system pressures to stabilize following the last
pump or choke adjustment, note the actual circulating drill pipe pressure; record and
use this value as Initial Circulating Pressure (ICP).
4. Stop the pump, again holding casing pressure constant, and shut-in the well.
5. Since:
SCR + SIDPP = ICP
Then:
ICP - SIDPP = SCR
Therefore, subtract the SIDPP from the measured ICP; the difference between these
pressures is the actual SCR for the given pump rate. This SCR value can then be used
to calculate Final Circulating Pressure (FCP) for the Wait & Weight Method
displacement schedule.
5.5 Use of the Mud System
General
Proper management of the mud pit system can impact the ability of a crew to promptly detect
a kick.
The following guidelines should be considered when managing pit arrangements:
Guidelines for use of Mud System while Drilling
• Keep the active mud system surface area as small as is practical to assist kick
5-12 October 2005

detection. Any reserve mud stocks in the tanks should be positively isolated from the
active system. Ensure that the gates on troughs are sealing properly.
• Adequate reserve stocks of mud should be available, the volume and weight of which
will be determined by the nature of the next hole section.
• Ensure all pit level systems and tank isolating valves are working correctly before
drilling into possible gas-bearing zones.
• Keep all mud treatments and pit transfers to the absolute minimum at critical sections
of the well. Ensure that the Driller and the Mud Logging Engineer are aware in
advance of any changes to the system, including starting or stopping of mud cleaning
equipment.
• Pit Crew personnel should be trained and kept aware of their role in early kick
detection. Mud engineering and mud logging personnel should also be included in
briefings to ensure their roles in kick detection are also clear.
Pit Management during Kill Operations
The major factors that will determine the most satisfactory pit arrangement while displacing
a kick include the following:
• The technique that will be used to displace the kick
• The usable surface pit volume in relation to the hole volume
• The method of weighting up the mud
• Handling, storage, or disposal of produced fluids displaced to the surface
• Potential magnitude of pit gain caused by influx expansion during displacement
• Mud treatment required prior to re-use of contaminated returns
• The nature and toxicity of the influx fluid
• Pit level monitoring equipment capabilities
The most satisfactory arrangement of the pits for kill operations may vary depending on kill
method selected and rig limitations. Pit limitations and mixing capabilities may affect the
timing of mud weight up for various methods:
The Wait & Weight Method:
– In a typical situation it is impractical to weight up a complete hole volume
prior to displacement of the kick. It will therefore be necessary that some mud
is weighted while the kick is displaced from the hole. The volume that is
weighted prior to displacement of the kick will depend, for a given hole
capacity, on the rate at which barite can be added into the system in relation to
the desired rate of displacement.
October 2005 5-13

– In the unusual situation when there is adequate surface volume (and well
behavior permits), a complete hole volume of kill mud can be prepared before
displacement of the kick.
The Driller’s Method:
– In this case the mud is weighted either while the kick is displaced with
original weight mud (in a separate pit), or after the first circulation is
completed, depending on the availability of barite and tank space. Weight up
during the first circulation requires the ability to utilize the active system
completely independent of the pits in which kill mud is being prepared; if this
ability is lacking, weight up should be done only after the influx is circulated
out.
Volume Increase due to Barite Addition
The volume of a given amount of mud will increase as barite is added to it. This may be
significant when a large mud weight increase is required in a large volume of mud. It may be
useful to anticipate this volume change when planning to weight up kill mud.
The mud volume will generally increase by approximately 2/3 of a barrel for each 1000 lbs
of barite added to the mud system.
Example: Adding 50000 lbs of barite to 600 bbls of mud will cause the volume to
increase to approximately:
50,000 lbs = 34 bbls increase

1,000
600 bbls + 34 bbls = 634 bbls approximate final weighted mud volume
Dealing with Gas at Surface

Gas at Surface
It is important that suitable equipment is available on the rig to deal with the influx once it is
displaced to surface.
Returns should be piped through the mud gas separator and then on to the degasser for
further removal of entrained gas.
The degasser is designed to remove the small bubbles of residual gas left in the mud after the
mud has been processed through the mud gas separator. The degasser should be lined up at
all times during the well control operation.
It is important that the degasser is working properly and as such it should be tested regularly.
While drilling with gas cut returns, the degasser can be checked as follows:
5-14 October 2005

(1) Measure actual (gas cut) mud weight at the shaker header box using a non
pressurized mud balance.
(2) Measure actual mud weight at the degasser outlet using a non pressurized mud
balance.
If the actual mud weight at the outlet of the degasser is greater than the actual
mud weight at the inlet, then the degasser is working.
(3) Compare the mud weight measured using a non pressurized mud balance at the
degasser outlet with the shaker header box using a pressurized mud balance. If
the degasser has removed all the gas from the mud, these weights should be
equal.
If these weights are less than the active system mud weight, it may be necessary
to provide further treatment to remove possible liquid influx and/or weight up
the mud before pumping it back into the well.
It is important to have a second method of dealing with severely gas cut returns that exceed
the capacity of the mud gas separator or contain toxic fluids. Offshore, this will generally be
a line from the manifold just downstream of the choke, leading overboard or to a flare.
Onshore, a similar line should lead to a flare or burn pit.
It should be easy to switch the returns from the mud gas separator to the flare line. It may be
necessary to use the flare line during a well control operation in the following situations:
• The gas flow rate is too high for the mud gas separator
• Hydrates are forming in the gas vent line from the mud gas separator
• The gas is found to contain H2S
• The mud system is overloaded (pits are full or it is desired to discharge or isolate
contaminated returns)
Lines that are required to handle high velocity gas should be as straight as possible to
minimize erosion and must be properly anchored.
5.6 Drilling Guidelines and Procedures
Tripping Guidelines
Considerable preparation is required before the trip is commenced. The following are among
the most important actions that should be carried out prior to tripping:
October 2005 5-15

• Circulate & Condition the hole / mud
The mud should be conditioned to ensure that tripping will not cause excessive
swab/surge pressures.
Any entrained gas or cuttings should be circulated out.
The mud being pumped and returning from the well should be the same density. It
should be sufficiently heavy to ensure an adequate overbalance will exist at all times
during the trip.
• Determine the maximum pipe speed
Swab/surge pressures should be calculated at various tripping speeds using the

appropriate formulae.
The maximum upward pipe speed should be selected bearing in mind the estimated
overbalance or trip margin.
• Line up the Trip Tank
A trip tank should be available on every rig and should include a mechanically
operated indicator of the trip tank level, visible from the Driller’s position. Spare
parts for the hole fill pump should be kept at the rig site to ensure reliability. If
possible, the trip tank level should also be monitored from the Mud Logger’s cabin.
5-16 October 2005

FROM
MIXING PUMPS
Figure 5.6.1 Typical Trip Tank Hook-up on a Floating Rig
In order to obtain maximum benefit from a trip tank, a trip sheet should be used to
record the mud volumes required to keep the hole full, on every trip out of, or in to,
the hole.
October 2005 5-17

The following is a sample of a recommended trip sheet:
Trip Sheet
WELL # RIG: DATE AND TIME: SHEET #
REASON FOR TRIP: DRILLER:
HOLE DEPTH: INITIAL BIT DEPTH:
DISPLACEMENT OF inch : bbl/ft : bbl/stand
Trip on: Singles Doubles Stands # OF STANDS TO CASING SHOE:
# OF STANDS FOR TOP OF BHA TO BE 1 STAND BELOW B.O.P.:
Measured Hole
Trip Tank Calculated Fill/Disp Discrepancy Remarks
STAND STAND Fill/Disp
Volume
increment accum increment accum increment accum
# Increment (bbl)
(bbl) (bbl) (bbl) (bbl) (bbl) (bbl)
Start
Single Single
Double Double (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) - (3) (2) - (4)
Stands Stands
Figure 5.6.2
5-18 October 2005

This trip sheet should be used if the contractor cannot provide a similar sheet. The
basic requirement for a trip sheet is that a clear method is provided for comparing
calculated (theoretical) pipe displacements with actual hole fill volumes. The
cumulative discrepancy between the two values should also be recorded.
The trip sheet for the last trip out of the hole should be available for comparison
(looking for trends).
• Provide the Driller with the necessary information
The Driller should be told the reason for the trip.

He should be told of any indicators of increasing pore pressure or near balance that
were identified during drilling before, or since, he came on shift.
He should be fully aware of the procedures to be adopted in the event of a kick while
tripping.
He should be aware of any tight spots in the open hole.
• Drill floor preparation
Crossovers should be available on the rig floor to allow a full opening drill pipe safety
valve to be made up to each connection size in use in the string.
A drill pipe safety valve (full opening safety valve) should be available on the rig
floor. It should be kept in the open position.
An inside BOP (check valve) such as a Gray valve, should be available on the rig
floor. This valve should be used in the event that stripping into the hole is required.
The rig crew should be completely familiar with, and practiced in, their
responsibilities in the event of a kick.
Tripping Procedure
Having completed the preparations as outlined in the previous section, the trip out of the hole
can be started. The following general procedure is proposed as a guideline:
(1) Flow check the well with the pumps off, to ensure that the well is stable with the ECD
(equivalent circulating density) effect removed.
(2) Pump a slug. This enables the pipe to be pulled dry and the hole to be accurately
monitored during a trip. It is important to accurately displace the slug to the pipe (i.e.
account for surface line volume).
October 2005 5-19

Be prepared to account for the fluid volume “u-tubed” out of the well while a slug is
settling. The total amount of fluid that should come out of the well as the slug falls
can be calculated as follows:
Volume Gain (bbl) = [ Slug Volume (bbl) x Slug Wt (ppg) ] - Slug Volume (bbl)
Mud Wt (ppg)
(3) For the first 5 – 10 stands off bottom, monitor hole fill volumes stand by stand to
check for swabbing (indicated by less than calculated hole fill). By not installing a
pipe wiper, hole behavior can be closely monitored visually through the rotary table.
Volumes delivered from the trip tank to fill the hole, stand by stand, should be
recorded on the trip sheet and compared to the steel volume of pipe removed.
(4) After confirming proper hole fill trends, continuously use the recirculating trip tank to
keep the hole full, monitoring fluid volumes. Using the trip sheet, record hole fill at
least every 5 stands, noting any unexpected changes in hole fill trends.
(5) Conduct a flow check when the bit has been pulled into the casing shoe.
(6) Conduct a flow check prior to pulling the BHA into the BOP stack. Be aware that the
required hole fill volume per stand of heavy weight or drill collars removed from the
hole may be much greater than for drill pipe.
If unsure of the overbalance, consideration should be given to conducting a short round trip.
Once back on bottom, the overbalance can be assessed from the level of the trip gas at
bottoms up.
If the hole does not take the correct amount of fluid at any stage in the trip, a flow check
should be carried out.
If the flow check indicates no flow and the cause of the discrepancy cannot be accounted for
at surface, the string should be returned to bottom while paying particular attention to
displacement volumes (shut-in if excess returns are noted). After circulating bottoms up, it
may be necessary to increase the mud weight before restarting the trip out of the hole.
If the flow check is positive (well is flowing), the well should be shut-in according to the
recommended procedure. Subsequent action will be dependent upon the conditions at the rig
site.
Special Procedure for Oil Base Muds
When oil base mud is in use, gaseous fluids have a tendency to go into solution with the mud
at high temperature and pressure. Experience has shown that once an influx has gone into
solution, it will not break out of solution until the bubble point is reached, typically at 1000 –
1500 psi (this will depend on the fluids involved). The possible consequence of this is that a
small influx that was undetected at depth may suddenly break out of solution close to the
5-20 October 2005

surface. This may cause a dangerous liberation of gas at surface, as well as significant
reduction in hydrostatic pressure in the well.
Consideration should also be given to the possibility of thermal expansion of the mud at high
temperatures. This can cause a reduction in effective mud weight and hence in the overall
hydrostatic head.
It is therefore recommended that tripping procedures are modified to take account of this
potential problem when oil base mud is in use and in particular for the following situations:
- When drilling or coring in a potential pay zone:

- When drilling toward an expected increase in pore pressure
- When significant levels of gas in the mud are detected
In these circumstances the following procedure is recommended prior to pulling out of the
hole:
(1) Flow check the well.

(2) Circulate bottoms up.
(3) Complete a check trip to the shoe monitoring hole volumes.
(4) Flow check at the shoe, and run back to bottom.
(5) Pump 2/3 to 3/4 of strokes required to circulate from bit to the BOP. Close in
the BOP and complete bottoms-up circulation through the choke line (on an
open choke), watching for any pit gain (shut-in if noted).
(6) If gas or formation fluids are observed, increase the mud weight and perform
another check trip. If not, trip out of hole using similar tripping speeds, noting
trip tank levels as usual.
This procedure can be relaxed if, after several trips under the same conditions, the well
remains stable.
The following procedure is recommended in these circumstances after a round trip:
(1) When back on bottom prior to any further drilling or coring, pump 2/3 to 3/4
of strokes required to circulate from bit to the BOP. Close in the BOP and
complete bottoms-up circulation through the choke line (on an open choke),
watching for any pit gain (shut-in if noted).
(2) If gas or formation fluids are observed, consider increasing mud weight prior
to drilling or coring deeper.
October 2005 5-21

Crew Handover
The new crew coming onto tour should be thoroughly briefed on everything that transpired
during their absence. The handover notes should include information about what has been
accomplished, where the job stands at that point, any problems or complications that
occurred, as well as normal parameters (such as well depth, new BHA, pump rates and
pressures, string weight, torque and drag, gains/losses, fluid properties etc.) that were
experienced during the preceding shift. Changes should be recorded on the pre-recorded data
sheet. The new crew should be advised about what has happened, what is being monitored,
and what is anticipated.
For a continuous, smooth operation, a staggered crew change policy, especially at

supervisory level, can be beneficial.
Pre-Recorded Data Sheet
The Pre-recorded Data Sheet (2 page subsea version is printed on the following pages)
provides a method to organize wellbore and system details that will be needed in the event of
any well control incident. Included in PC spreadsheet form on the Chevron well control CD,
this is a critical well control document that should be kept as current and as accurate as
possible as drilling proceeds or changes occur. The Drill Site Manager will need this
information to properly apply any of several potentially needed well control procedures.
The information on the Pre-recorded Data Sheet is used to calculate pumping volumes and
strokes and is therefore applicable to the management of most well killing operations. A
sheet must be filled out when a kick is taken so that the information it contains will be readily
available. The CD provides specialized data sheet versions appropriate for either surface or
subsea BOP stacks.
Note: It is strongly recommended that the Pre-recorded Data Sheet be filled-out as

completely as possible at all times while drilling.
The Pre-recorded Data Sheet should be kept as current and as accurate as possible so that
time won’t be wasted looking up routine capacity numbers after a kick has been taken. The
Data Sheet has been designed so that nearly all of the sections can be completed prior to a
kick. These sections include:
Sections that may be completely filled out in advance and remain unchanged if a well kicks:
• Well Data Section

• Pump Data Section
• Casing Data Section
• Wellhead or Casing Pressure Limitation Section
• Liner Casing Data Section
5-22 October 2005

• Drill string Data Section

• Maximum Initial SICP Section
However, some of the Sections on the Pre-recorded Data Sheet cannot be fully completed
until after the well has kicked.
Sections needing update prior to use for well control operations:
Hole Data Section: Measured Depth and True Vertical Depth figures should be
updated after the well is shut in.
Internal Capacities: Using the spreadsheet, drill pipe length (ft) and volume
calculations will be updated after depth figures are input.
Annulus Capacities: Using the spreadsheet, annulus length (ft) and volume
calculations will be updated after depth figures are input.
If the Pre-recorded Data Sheet is completed manually, the only blanks remaining on the sheet
will be those which require the length of the hole at the time of the kick. If a kick is taken,
the Drill Site Manager simply needs to determine the length of drill pipe in the hole, and the
remaining capacities (hole, internal, and annulus) can be easily calculated.
October 2005 5-23

Figure 5.6.3
5-24 October 2005

Figure 5.6.4
October 2005 5-25

5.7 Implementing the Well Plan
While wells may be planned with the best available information, actual conditions
experienced while drilling may require adjustment or reconsideration of casing setting
depths, mud densities, and safety factors that were used in the initial design of the well.
Monitoring key parameters during the drilling process is essential in order to avoid exposing
the operation to situations for which the original well plan may be inadequate.
Pore Pressure Evaluation While Drilling
Information about actual formation pressures obtained while drilling can be used to refine the
selection of appropriate mud weight. While ensuring adequate primary well control, the mud
density may be adjusted to help maximize penetration rate and minimize the hazards of lost
circulation and drill string differential sticking. Close monitoring of drilling parameters and
formation properties can provide good information about actual pore pressures that can serve
as the basis for such adjustments.
Abnormally pressured zones may exhibit several of the following properties when compared
to normally pressured zones at the same depths:
• Higher porosities
• Higher temperatures
• Lower formation water salinity
• Lower shale densities
• Lower shale resistivities
• Higher interval sonic velocities
• Hydrocarbon saturations may be different (i.e. higher saturation)
Any measurable parameter which reflects the changes in these properties may be used as a
means of evaluating formation pressures. The parameters listed above are commonly used to
evaluate formation pressures while drilling, however, they also vary with differing
lithologies. Lithological variations should always be taken into account when interpreting
changes in drilling and mud parameters.
In addition to being used as possible indicators of a kick, measurement of some of these

parameters can be used to quantitatively estimate formation pressure. This information can
be used to review and/or modify the pore pressure predictions used for the initial design of
the well. As an example, consider shale density.
The bulk density of normally compacted shales increases with depth. Overpressured shales
are generally undercompacted and thus have higher porosities and lower bulk densities than
5-26 October 2005

would be expected. If shale bulk density is plotted against depth as drilling progresses, then a
normal compaction trendline can be established. A decrease in shale bulk density away from
the normal compaction trendline may then indicate the presence of an overpressured zone. A
schematic shale bulk density plot is shown in Figure 5.7.1
The magnitude of abnormal pressures can be calculated from shale bulk density plots using
methods similar to those used for d-exponent plots.
Figure 5.7.1 Schematic Shale Bulk Density/Depth Plot
Alternatively, empirical curves, relating observed bulk density deviation from the normal
trend to formation pressure gradient, can be used. However, such curves are area dependent,
so can only be used if the appropriate area curve is available.
Measurement While Drilling (MWD) tools provide nearly continuous downhole data while
drilling is in progress. The use of MWD devices to transmit electric log data (LWD) permits
formation pressure evaluation using the same principles as wireline logging. The advantage
of MWD/LWD data is that actual downhole drilling parameters (weight-on-bit, torque) are
measured and the formation log data is obtained during the drilling process, very shortly after
October 2005 5-27

the formation has been drilled. Thus, evaluation of formation pressures can occur as drilling
progresses. “Real time” correlation with offset data may also be achieved.
To permit effective use of information collected during drilling, mud logging services may
include a Pressure Evaluation Geologist or Engineer to provide on site pressure evaluation
service. It is this individual’s responsibility to closely monitor all the available formation
pressure indicators and to communicate this information to the Company supervisory
personnel at the rig site. He should also make formation pressure estimates based on all
available pressure indicators (and discussions with Company personnel), and be able to
support these estimates with sound reasoning.
Of course, it is also possible to obtain direct measurement of pore pressures using wireline
logs. In particular the RFT tool provides a direct measurement of formation pressures as a
primary function. But many other logging tools available on either wireline or run as part of
MWD/LWD/PWD assemblies can be used to refine pore pressure estimates and/or
measurements.
Measurement of Actual Formation Strength
A true leak off test (LOT) can be used to determine the fracture strength of a formation. This
information may either confirm the adequacy of the original well plan, or indicate conditions
requiring changes to the well design or operational practices.
Like a formation integrity test (FIT), a LOT is performed by applying incremental pressures
from the surface to the closed wellbore/casing system. But in this case, pumping is continued
until it can be seen that fluid is being injected into the formation (or until pressures reach the
limits to which the casing was tested).
A typical LOT procedure is as follows:
• Before starting, gauges should be checked for accuracy. The upper pressure limit
should be determined.
• The casing should be pressure tested before well operations commence.
• Circulate and condition the mud and check mud density in and out.
• Close BOPs.
• With the well closed in, the pump is used to pump a continuous small volume at a
constant rate into the well, typically at ¼ or ½ bbl per minute. Monitor the pressure
build up and accurately record the volume of mud pumped. Plot pressure versus
volume of mud pumped.
• Stop the pump when any appreciable deviation from linearity is noticed between
pump pressure and volume pumped.
5-28 October 2005

• Bleed off the pressure and establish the amount of mud, if any, lost to the
formation.
In unconsolidated or highly permeable formations, fluid can be lost at low pressures, well
before actual rock deformation or fracture occurs. In these cases, adjustments for fluid lost
due to formation permeability need to be made in order to determine actual formation
strength limits.
The figures below show typical plots for unconsolidated (permeable) and consolidated
(impermeable) formations, respectively.
Unconsolidated or
Permeable Formations
Consolidated or
Impermeable Formations
Figure 5.7.2
October 2005 5-29

Leak off test results are most commonly expressed in terms of an equivalent mud weight,
calculated as follows:
Leak-off pressure + Mud Weight = Leak-off test EMW

0.052 x casing shoe TVD
Kick Tolerance
Given the fact the formation pressures and strengths may not precisely match data used for
the initial design of the well, it is useful to have some field method available to review basic
design limits using pore pressure, LOT, and actual casing setting depth data collected during
the drilling process. One tool that is useful for this purpose is “kick tolerance”. Kick
tolerance used in field operations involves calculations similar to those used during casing
setting depth planning, but provides an opportunity to evaluate the effect of changes in well
geometry, mud density, and formation strength for whatever conditions of formation pore
pressure actually exist.
Kick Tolerance (KT) is a valuable drilling engineering tool that has historically been used
improperly or not completely utilized. Proper understanding and application of KT becomes
helpful when dealing with marginal development projects, exploration programs, and
deepwater drilling.
While the concepts and results underlying kick tolerance calculations are fairly basic, there
are several different approaches commonly used to interpret or interrelate the variables
involved, which leads to much confusion within the industry on how KT can be used.
In order to realize the maximum advantage of Kick Tolerance, it is critical to define terms
carefully and have a consistent interpretation and methodology for its use.
Kick Tolerance Definition
Chevron has chosen to define Kick tolerance as follows:
Kick Tolerance is the maximum gas kick volume (bbls) for a

given Kick Intensity (ppg), at a specific depth, that can be
successfully shut-in and circulated out of a well without
exceeding MISICP.
This is the definition of kick tolerance used on the Chevron well control CD, which contains
a PC spreadsheet tool that can be used to perform kick tolerance calculations for both well
engineering and pre-kick drilling operations purposes. While key definitions are consistent,
implications of kick tolerance can vary for these separate phases of a drilling operation. For
this manual, discussion is limited to kick tolerance as it relates to pre-kick drilling operations.
5-30 October 2005

Definition of Kick intensity
A key term when discussing kick tolerance is “Kick Intensity” (KI). For pre-kick operations,
Chevron defines kick intensity as the amount of under balance (in PPG) between the current
mud weight (CMW) and the predicted formation pressure (FP) plus a defined amount of
“pore pressure uncertainty” (in PPG).
The amount of pore pressure uncertainty could be based either on the quality of information
available during the well design process or in terms of the type of project. A sample of such a
definition based on type of project is as follows:
Table 5.7.1
Pore Pressure Uncertainty in ppg Application
Up to 0.5 ppg Development projects
Between 0.5 ppg and 1.0 ppg Appraisal projects
Greater than 1.0 ppg Exploration projects
Using whatever uncertainty is deemed appropriate for a particular application, the KI

corresponding to a “worst case” formation pressure (for which the well should be designed)
can be determined. With all values expressed in terms of equivalent mud weights (ppg):
KI = (predicted pore pressure + pore pressure uncertainty) – current mud weight
This value of KI can then be used to calculate the gas volume that, if taken as an influx from
a formation containing this worst case pressure, would cause weak point pressure to equal
measured, actual casing shoe limits (obtained during the LOT).
In this way, the theoretical limits that were used for the initial well design process can be
compared with limits calculated using actual conditions of shoe depth, mud weight and
casing shoe strength. Kick tolerance values can thus be used to highlight plan features that
may need to be revised (i.e. recommended minimum mud weights or current hole section
projected depth), or operational practices than may need attention (i.e. crew training
regarding practices to limit influx).
October 2005 5-31

When to Calculate Kick Tolerance
KT should be routinely updated during drilling operations. Factors that will affect kick
tolerance include:
Changes in mud weight

Changes in estimated formation strength
Changes in location of “weak point” (i.e. after new casing has been set)
Changes in hole depth
Using the Chevron PC spreadsheet, values of kick tolerance can be estimated for the variety
of hole depths expected for the current hole section. By displaying kick tolerance values for
this range of depths, it is easy to see the effect of increasing hole depth; this aspect of kick
tolerance is widely underestimated unless a tool such as this spreadsheet is used.
The PC spreadsheet program also provides a simple way to see the impact of various
alternative mud weights. While Chevron does not prescribe specific limits to operational
practices based on kick tolerance values, the Drill Site Manager is responsible for
recognizing existing limits to wellbore integrity; kick tolerance provides a relatively
convenient way to keep these limits appropriately in mind.
The following is an example of the graph generated by the Chevron kick tolerance
spreadsheet for a well with the following parameters:
Current depth = 10,000 ft.

Current mud weight = 10.0 ppg mud.
Casing seat depth = 5,000 ft.
LOT = 13.5 ppg EMW
Predicted pore pressure = 9.7 ppg
Pore Pressure uncertainty = 1.0 ppg
KI (with 10.0 ppg mud) = (9.7 + 1.0) – 10.0 = 0.7 ppg
Target hole section depth = 15,000 ft.
ACF (open hole x BHA) = 0.0292 bpf
ACF (open hole x DP) = 0.0459 bpf
5-32 October 2005

KICK TOLERANCE vs DEPTH
10,000
---X---Vol Weak Point Limited, ---O--- Vol TD Limited
11,000
T r u e V e r tic a l D e p th (ft)
12,000
13,000
14,000
15,000 10, 0.7

10.2, 0.5 10.4, 0.3 10.6, 0.1
16,000
25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0
Maximum Kick Volume (Bbls)
M W = 10 ( PPG) , KI = 0 .7 ( PPG) M W = 10 .2 ( PPG) , KI = 0 .5 ( PPG) M W = 10 .4 ( PPG) , KI = 0 .3 ( PPG) M W = 10 .6 ( PPG) , KI = 0 .1 ( PPG)
Figure 5.7.3
The graph indicates a kick tolerance at 10,000 ft. of approx. 43 bbls with a KI of 0.7 ppg,
with a 10 ppg mud. This means that it should be possible to shut-in and circulate out a 43 bbl
dry gas kick from a formation requiring a 0.7 ppg mud weight increase. Such a result might
well indicate that the current well plan provides adequate pressure control capability for
anticipated conditions and rig operational limits.
Note that if drilling continues to 15,000 ft without any other relevant changes, the kick
tolerance decreases to 25 bbls with the same KI of 0.7 ppg. This may be closer to operational
limits for kick detection on the rig and more operational care may be called for.
More likely, however, is the situation in which pore pressure is expected to increase
sometime during this hole section. In that case, a new kick tolerance graph should be
generated. An increase in pore pressure while drilling this section would likely result in a
reduced kick tolerance, perhaps to a level that makes it unlikely a crew would be able to
reliably detect the kick and shut-in the well fast enough. In that case, reconsideration of the
October 2005 5-33

well plan (e.g. casing seat depths), operational practices (e.g. PVT alarm set points), or
drilling mud weights might be appropriately considered.
Factors Affecting Kick Tolerance
KT calculated for pre-kick drilling operations decreases with:

• Decreasing weak point integrity (typically LOT of casing shoe)
• Increasing open hole TVD
• Smaller annular capacities (kick lengthens)
• Increasing kick intensity (formation pressure) or decreasing mud weight
5-34 October 2005

Section 6 - Well Control Methods and Procedures
6. Well Control Methods and Procedures
6.1 Introduction
The objective of the various kill methods is to circulate out any invading fluid (liquid or gas)
and circulate a satisfactory weight of kill mud into the well, without allowing further influx
into the hole. Ideally this should be done with the minimum of damage to the well.
If this can be done, then once the kill mud has been fully circulated around the well, it is
possible to open up the well and resume normal operations. Generally, a kill mud which just
provides hydrostatic balance for formation pressure is circulated.
This allows approximately constant bottom hole pressure slightly greater than formation
pressure to be maintained as the kill circulation proceeds.
After the well is dead, it can be opened up again and the mud weight may be further
increased to provide a safety or trip margin.
Constant Bottom-Hole Pressure Kill Methods
There are three “constant bottom-hole pressure” kill methods in common use today:
• Driller’s Method
• Wait & Weight Method (also known as the Engineer’s Method)
• Concurrent Method
These three techniques are very similar in principle, and differ primarily in respect to when
kill mud is pumped down.
In the Driller’s Method, the kill method is split into two circulations. During the first, the
kick fluid is circulated without changing the mud weight; once the influx is out, the mud is
weighted up and pumped around the well on the second circulation.
The Wait & Weight Method achieves both of these operations simultaneously. Kill mud is
prepared before starting the kill, and the kick fluid is circulated out while this mud is
circulated into the well.
In the Concurrent Method, the kill mud is introduced in stages while circulating. While
benefiting from advantages of both the other methods, it is difficult to use in practice due to
the significantly more complex calculations and record keeping required and is therefore not
recommended by Chevron.
October 2005 6-1

For both the Driller’s and Wait & Weight methods, Chevron has developed specialized
worksheets to facilitate calculations and field application of these methods. These worksheets
are available in both hard copy and electronic (PC) versions. Field personnel are encouraged
to use these tools, particularly when complex well geometry or critical pressure limitations
exist.
6.2 Driller’s Method
The Driller’s Method of well control requires two separate circulations of the well. The first
circulation is required to remove the influx from the annulus using the mud density in the
hole at the time of the kick. After the pumps are started, the drill pipe pressure is held
constant by choke manipulation to maintain bottomhole pressure equal to, or slightly greater
than, formation pressure. If the kick contains gas, it will expand in the annulus under
controlled conditions as it nears the surface. Therefore, an increase in casing pressure and pit
volume should be expected. Drill pipe pressure and pump rate must be held constant. At any
time during or immediately after this first circulation, the well can be shut-in and the drill
pipe pressure will read the same as it did originally (accounting for any pressure safety factor
that may be trapped on the well).
After the kick fluid has cleared the choke, the well can be shut-in. At this time, shut-in drill
pipe and casing pressures will be the same, assuming that all of the influx has been removed
and mud hydrostatic is the same inside the drill pipe and the annulus. The original shut-in
drill pipe pressure is converted to an equivalent density at the bit, and the mud density is
increased accordingly.
During the second circulation, bottomhole pressure is held constant by first maintaining
casing pressure equal to the shut-in value while filling the drill pipe with the kill mud. When
the drill pipe is filled, as determined by the number of strokes pumped, the drill pipe pressure
is recorded and control shifts to maintaining a constant drill pipe pressure while the annulus
is filled with heavy mud. When the kill mud reaches the surface, the pressure on the choke
should be minimal. The pumps can be stopped while holding casing pressure constant and
the well checked for flow.
Any time a well under pressure is circulated, the start-up and shut-down procedures are
critical and should be done with exceptional care. Whenever the pump speed is increased or
decreased (including start-up and shut-down), the casing pressure must be held constant at
the value it had immediately before the pump speed change was initiated. This ensures that
bottomhole pressure remains constant. This procedure is valid because casing pressure
should be the same whether the well is closed-in or being pumped. However, the drill pipe
pressure must vary depending upon the circulating pressure loss in the system, which is a
function of the pump speed. The casing pressure cannot be held constant for very long
though, due to the changing height of the influx caused by the irregular annulus and gas
expansion.
6-2 October 2005

Description of the Driller’s Method
Step 1 - The Kick Is Detected - Shut The Well In
As always, it is extremely important to shut-in the well as quickly as possible in order to

minimize the size of the influx. The best way to achieve this is by using the "Three S" Shut-
in Procedure While Drilling or the "Three S" Shut-in Procedure While Tripping.
Shut-In Procedure While Drilling
(1) SPACE OUT: Pick up off bottom to pre-determined space out position
(ensuring all safety valves are located above drill floor). Tool
joint should be located clear of BOP used for initial shut-in
(2) SHUT DOWN: Stop the mud pumps. Confirm well is flowing.
(3) SHUT-IN: Close the uppermost applicable BOP. Confirm that the well is
shut-in and flow has stopped.
Shut-In Procedure While Tripping
(1) STAB VALVE: Install the fully opened safety valve in the drill string. Close the
safety valve.
(2) SPACE OUT: Position the drill string so that the tool joints are clear of the
preventers.
(3) SHUT-IN: Close the annular preventer or uppermost pipe ram preventer.
Confirm that the well is shut-in and flow has stopped.
It should be emphasized that in nearly all well kicks, the Driller will be responsible for
closing the preventers and shutting the well in. The Driller must have the experience and the
initiative to do this by himself if he is working alone. It is the responsibility of the Chevron
Drill Site Manager to make sure that the Driller knows the proper shut-in procedure. The
Driller will have plenty of time after the well is shut-in to retrieve crews from the mud pits
and notify the Toolpusher. The Driller must not delay when shutting the well in.
Step 2a - Allow The Well To Stabilize, Record Pressures And Volume Gained
After the well is shut-in, it may take a few minutes for the shut-in pressures to stabilize. If the
pipe is reciprocated through the annular preventer during the kill, it may be advisable to
reduce the annular closing pressure to lessen element wear. The crew should ensure that the
bag does not leak at the reduced pressure!
October 2005 6-3

If the choke manifold is lined-up properly, it should be possible to open the choke line valve
at the preventer stack and read the shut-in casing pressure at the choke manifold. If no drill
pipe float is installed, read and record the shut-in drill pipe pressure as well. Finally, examine
the pit volume charts to determine the volume gained during the kick and verify this number
with the Derrickman and, if available, the mud loggers.
Step 2b - Bumping The Drill Pipe Float
If a drill pipe float is installed (per routine Chevron practice), the pressure gauge on the drill
pipe will probably read near zero. In order to get an accurate value for the shut-in drill pipe
pressure, the float will have to be "bumped" open by slowly pumping down the drill pipe.
The correct procedure for bumping the float is given below.
Float Bumping Procedure
(1) Make sure the well is shut-in and that the shut-in casing pressure is recorded.
(2) Slowly pump down the drill pipe at a constant pump speed while monitoring both
the casing and drill pipe pressure.
(3) The drill pipe pressure will increase as pumping is begun. Watch carefully for a
"lull" in the drill pipe pressure (a hesitation in the rate of increase), which will
occur as the float is pumped off its seat. Record the drill pipe pressure when the
lull is first seen.
(4) To verify that the float has been pumped open, continue pumping down the drill
pipe very slowly at a constant pump speed until an increase in the casing pressure
is observed. This should occur very soon after the lull is detected on the drill pipe
gauge.
(5) Shut down the pump as soon as you see the casing pressure begin to increase
and record the shut-in drill pipe pressure as the pressure at which the lull was
first seen, in Step 3 above (not the final drill pipe pressure after the pumps are
stopped).
(6) Check the shut-in casing pressure again. Any excess pressure may be bled-off in
small increments until equal casing pressure readings are observed after two
consecutive bleed-offs.
The float bumping procedure, as described above, can be difficult at times, particularly if the
rig has mechanically driven mud pumps. In that case, it may help to clutch the pumps in short
bursts to slowly build up pressure on the drill pipe. It’s more likely that a drill pipe "lull"
won't occur before the casing pressure starts to increase when using this procedure. To
determine the shut-in drill pipe pressure in these instances, subtract the increase in shut-in
casing pressure from the final value of shut-in drill pipe pressure after the pumps have been
stopped. The equation for this calculation is given below. Use this value as the official shut-
in drill pipe pressure (SIDPP).
6-4 October 2005

If excess pressure is trapped on the

drill pipe when bumping the float…
Shut-in Shut-in drill pipe Increase in shut-in

Drill pipe = pressure after - casing pressure while
Pressure bumping float bumping float
Step 3 - Perform The Kick Control Calculations
Calculations should be performed using the Driller's Method Worksheet before the influx is
displaced from the well on the first circulation. Several critical items will be determined
including:
• Bottomhole reservoir pressure.

• Mud weight necessary to balance the kick.
• Maximum surface casing pressure during the first circulation.
• Maximum excess mud volume gained during the first circulation.
An example problem illustrating the use of the Driller's Method Worksheet is provided later
in this Section.
One thing that must be kept in mind while performing calculations is that the formation
fluids in the annulus, especially gas, may migrate up the hole and cause an increase in the
shut-in casing pressure over time. If the shut-in casing pressure starts increasing substantially
(i.e., to the point of risking shoe breakdown or exceeding the wellhead or casing pressure
limitation), you may have to bleed-off some of this excess pressure through the choke. It is
better to bleed the pressure off in small increments rather than one large slug. Any excess
pressure that appears on the annulus due to the migrating gas bubble may be bled-off in small
increments until equal readings are observed after two consecutive bleed-offs.
There is more likelihood of pipe sticking if formation fluids are kept longer in the annulus
and it's important to proceed as quickly as possible.
Step 4 - Establish Circulation
After the kick control calculations have been performed, use the information recorded on the
Driller's Method Worksheet to circulate the influx from the well. Before breaking
circulation, be sure to check the following items.
1. Be sure that every member of the crew knows exactly what his duties are before the
kill operation begins. (See Section in this manual on Crew Responsibilities for more
details.)
October 2005 6-5

2. Eliminate all sources of ignition in the immediate vicinity of the rig and vent lines.
See that the vent lines on the mud-gas separator and mud degasser are secured
properly and, if possible, are downwind from the rig.
3. Make sure your circulating system (including manifolds and pits) are lined-up
correctly.
4. Zero the stroke counter and make a note of the time.
When establishing circulation in a well closed in under pressure, back pressure on the well
can be difficult to control. This procedure is critical since additional influx will result if too
little back pressure is held, or the formation can breakdown if too much back pressure is held.
The procedure requires simultaneous manipulation of the choke and the pump speed. While
the pumps are being brought up to speed, the choke is opened in such a way that casing
pressure is maintained constant at its shut-in value just prior to beginning pumping. As the
pump speed is increased up to the desired kill rate, drill pipe pressure will increase but casing
pressure must be held constant. Successful manipulation of the choke while establishing
circulation in this manner will maintain constant bottomhole pressure.
A predetermined pump rate must be held constant throughout the killing of the well. If the
pump rate is allowed to vary without adjusting the drill pipe pressure, constant bottomhole
pressure will not be maintained. If the pump rate is increased, additional frictional pressure
will be reflected in the drill pipe pressure. If the choke is adjusted to bring the drill pipe
pressure down to the value predetermined using a constant rate, then the bottom hole
pressure is reduced, possibly allowing additional influx. Conversely, if the pump rate is
reduced, the reduction in frictional pressure will be noted and if the choke is adjusted to
increase the drill pipe pressure, it may create sufficient overpressure at the casing shoe to
cause a breakdown. Therefore, any change in pump rate should be made known to the choke
operator and the pump must be returned to the original rate.
Step 5 - Circulate Out The Influx Holding Drill Pipe Pressure Constant
After the pumps are operating at the desired kill rate and pressures have stabilized (after lag
time), the drill pipe pressure should be observed and recorded. Hold the observed drill pipe
pressure constant for the entire first circulation by manipulating the choke as the contaminant
is circulated from the well. (Note: While the drill pipe circulating pressure should be equal to
SIDPP + SCR pressure at the kill rate, the observed drill pipe pressure should be used
whether or not SCR pressure is known, assuming pumps are started correctly.)
As the gas and contaminated mud are circulated to the surface, the gas will begin to expand,
increasing both the casing pressure and pit volume. A pure gas contaminant will increase the
casing pressure to the value shown at "R" on the worksheet (see Figure 6.5), but will be less
if the contaminant includes water and/or oil. This is probably the most critical stage of the
killing operation, where panicking could very easily turn a good job into a disaster.
6-6 October 2005

It can sometimes be difficult to bleed the gas off fast enough to keep the drill pipe pressure
within limits, but excessive pressure could cause formation breakdown. If the gas cannot be
released fast enough from the annulus to prevent an increase in drill pipe pressure, the pumps
may have to be slowed or even stopped until the excess pressure can be bled down through
the choke. For this reason it is a good idea to take several slow pump rates, including one at
the slowest pump rate possible, so that the new drill pipe pressure can be determined at the
reduced pumping rate. If the pumps must be stopped while bleeding down the casing
pressure, attempt to hold the drill pipe pressure at or above the original shut-in pressure while
bleeding. If the drill pipe pressure drops below this value, another kick may be taken. The
pumps should be returned to the original rate as soon as possible. This method is not ideal,
but is necessary when the surface facilities cannot safely handle the high flow rates.
Step 6 - Shut Down The Pumps - Weight Up The Mud Pits
After the contaminant has been circulated out of the well, the pumps can be shut down and
the well shut-in. When shutting down the pumps, the choke should be closed gradually as
the pump speed is reduced. The choke should be closed in a way that holds the casing
pressure constant as the pumps are slowed down. As the pump speed decreases, the drill pipe
pressure will decrease but casing pressure must be held constant at its value just prior to
slowing down. This procedure insures that constant bottomhole pressure is maintained during
the shutdown. When the well is shut-in after the first circulation, the shut-in casing pressure
and the shut-in drill pipe pressure should be equal. A casing pressure higher than the drill
pipe pressure indicates that there is still some contaminant in the annulus or that another kick
was taken during the first circulation. Such a situation will warrant an additional circulation
of the well with existing mud before kill weight fluid is mixed and pumped. (Note: After
shutdown, the SICP and the SIDP should be equal to the initial shut-in drill pipe pressure that
was observed when the well was first shut-in, accounting for any pressure safety factor that
may have been trapped on the well).
If the shut-in casing pressure is equal to the shut-in drill pipe pressure at the completion of
the first circulation, weight-up the mud in the pits. The first step is to reduce the mud volume
in the active pits to make room for weighting material. The mud mixing facilities and pit
volumes on a particular rig will dictate to some extent just how the mud should be handled.
The ideal situation is to maintain a reasonably low-volume active system so that the mud
circulated out of the hole can be weighted up without having to stop circulating. It may be
desirable to weight up enough mud to displace the entire hole before the killing operation is
started. Many variables will enter into this decision and every situation is different. It is
important to remember that the mud weight can be raised while the well is being circulated.
Step 7 - Re-Establish Circulation And Circulate Kill Mud
After the mud has been properly weighted-up, the second circulation should be started. First,
establish the desired pump rate by holding the shut-in casing pressure constant while
bringing the pump up to the kill rate (as described in Step 4). Make sure to hold this pump
rate constant throughout the killing of the well.
October 2005 6-7

As the kill mud goes down the drill pipe, adjust the choke so that the casing pressure remains
constant at the shut-in value it had before the start of the second circulation. Hold the casing
pressure constant until the kill mud reaches the bit (as determined by the drill pipe capacity in
strokes).
When the kill mud reaches the bit, the pressure on the drill pipe should be observed and
recorded on the Driller's Method Worksheet. Adjust the choke to hold this drill pipe pressure
constant throughout the remainder of the kill operation. Continue circulation until the hole is
full of kill mud. The approximate strokes and volume required are indicated on the
Prerecorded Well Data Sheet. The casing pressure should drop to zero as the light weight
mud is displaced from the annulus.
Step 8 - Shut Down And Check For Flow
After the entire hole volume has been displaced with kill mud, the pumps can be shut down
and the well shut-in. When shutting down the pumps, the choke should be closed (holding
casing pressure constant) gradually as the pump speed is reduced. As the pump speed
decreases, the drill pipe pressure will slowly decrease to zero (Note: The casing pressure may
already be reading zero before the pumps are shut down. This is normal and may be
expected.) After the well is shut-in, the casing and drill pipe pressures should be zero
(accounting for any pressure safety factor that may have been trapped on the well). Confirm
that the well is dead by cracking open the choke; the well should not flow. If the well is dead,
the BOPs can be opened. Keep in mind that a small volume of gas may be trapped between
the preventer and the choke line. Exercise caution on the rig floor when opening the
preventers.
Step 9 - Circulate And Condition The Mud
After the BOPs are opened, circulate the mud and condition it to the desired properties.
Usually the yield point is too high. Therefore, running or pulling pipe can cause excessive
pressure on the formation or swabbing, and either could lead to another kick.
To prepare for a trip after conditioning the mud, raise the mud weight to provide a suitable
"trip margin” as determined by swab/surge calculations (calculation services generally
available from mud loggers).
6-8 October 2005

Figure 6.2.1 Driller’s Method
October 2005 6-9

Water or Oil Influx
Figure 6.2
Figure 6.2.2
October 2005 6-10

Figure 6.2.3
October 2005 6-11

Using the Driller’s Method Worksheet
The Chevron Driller's Method Worksheet is a step-by-step instruction sheet to help the Drill
Site Manager calculate the critical well control parameters that are necessary to successfully
kill a well using the Driller's Method. Use of the printed worksheet is demonstrated below
with an example problem. The use of the electronic version of this both speeds up and
greatly simplifies the calculations.
Sample Problem - A well is being drilled, and the following data are known prior
to a kick:
2-duplex pumps - 16-in. stroke, 3-in. rod, 96% vol. eff., 6-1/4-in. liner.
Casing size - 10-3/4 in, set at 4000 ft.
Hole size - 9-7/8 in.
Casing pressure limitation - 2864 psi (burst)
Shoe Test: 720 psi with 10 lb/gal mud
Drill pipe size - 5 in., 19.5 lb/ft (20.7 lb/ft w/tool joints).
Remaining collapse resistance of drill pipe - 3885 psi
Drill collar size - 7 in. OD x 2-13/16 in. ID x 450 ft long.
Mud weight - 10 lb/gal.
Active surface mud system - 450 bbls, before kick; 200 bbls at start of kill
operation.
Actual Slow Pump Rate Pressure (generally unknown until start of kill):
590 PSI @ 30 Strokes/min
While drilling at 9000' TVD, the well kicked and the BOPs were closed. The following data
was observed:
Initial drill pipe pressure = 470 psi.

Initial casing pressure = 600 psi.
Pit volume gain = 15 bbl.
The following pages describe a step-by-step procedure for determining the well control
parameters which are necessary to kill the well in the example problem using the Driller's
Method.
Driller’s Method Worksheet
Step 1 – Pre-Recorded Information
Prior to the kick (and at all times), your pre-recorded data sheet should be completely filled-
out except for the measured depth and the length of drill pipe in the hole. Enter these items
and calculate the internal drill string capacity and the system totals. Transfer SCR data (if
known) from the Pre-recorded Data Sheet to line "A" of the Driller's Method Worksheet.
6-12 October 2005

Step 2 - Information To Be Recorded When Well Kicks
Many items of information need to be gathered when a well kicks, including:
Old Mud Weight Pit Volume Increase

Initial Shut-in Drill Pipe Pressure True Vertical Depth of Hole
Initial Shut-in Casing Pressure Measured Depth of Hole
Slow pump rates
This information should be recorded in lines "B" through "F" on the Driller's Method
Worksheet.
Step 3 - Determining Pressures For The First Circulation
One advantage of the Driller's Method is that it is not necessary to calculate any circulating
drill pipe pressures before the first circulation can begin. However, while circulating, it is
very important to record and maintain a constant drill pipe pressure once it is established.
Space is provided on the Driller's Method Worksheet to record the initial circulating drill
pipe pressure which is observed after the pumps are operating at the selected kill rate. (The
kill rate should be between 2-5 barrels per minute for most cases.) Space is also provided to
record the kill rate (in strokes per minute) before the circulation begins. Remember to keep
the kill rate constant for the entire circulation and to maintain constant drill pipe pressure by
making choke adjustments until the influx is circulated out.
Note: For added peace of mind during the kill operation, some people have been
trained to estimate the initial circulating drill pipe pressure (ICP) by adding a
known slow pump rate pressure (SCR) at the desired circulating rate to the
initial shut-in drill pipe pressure. In this example, with 30 SPM as the kill
rate, the initial circulating pressure should be approximately 590 + 470 =
1060 psi.
To perform this calculation it has traditionally considered desirable to pre-
record SCR values at likely kill rates. But since the actual value that is
observed on the drill pipe pressure gauge when circulation is established is
the value that should be held constant for the entire circulation (not the
estimated value), this calculation can lead to confusion when changed hole,
mud, or nozzle conditions have impacted the actual SCR value since it was
last recorded. In part to avoid such possible confusion, Chevron recommends
against routine pre-recording of SCRs, emphasizing instead the proper pump
start sequence as the best way to obtain the correct ICP.
Step 4 - Determining Mud Weight To Balance The Kick
Use the following equation to calculate the mud weight increase needed to balance the kick.
October 2005 6-13

Initial Shut-in Drillpipe Pressure

Increase in Mud Weight = ------------------------------------------------
0.052 X True Vertical Depth
470
= --------------------- = 1.0043
0.052 X 9000
= 1.0 lb/gal
Rounding-Up Rule: The increase in mud weight should be calculated to the hundredths
place. If the number in the hundredths place is greater than zero, then round the number in
the tenths place up one full tenth. In this example, the number in the hundredths place is
zero, so the number in the tenths place is not rounded-off.
Record a 1.0 lb/gal increase on line "G" of the Driller's Method Worksheet. Adding the mud
weight increase "G" to the old mud weight "B" yields the new mud weight required to
balance the kick.
New Mud Weight To Balance The Kick = Old Mud Weight + Increase In Mud Weight
= 10.0 + 1.0
= 11.0 lb/gal
Enter the new mud weight in part "H" of the worksheet.
Step 5 - Total Volume To Weight-Up
There are several reasons why the volume of mud in the surface pits should be reduced after
the first circulation, but before weighting-up. Some of these reasons include:
• It takes less time to weight-up less volume.

• It requires less barite to weight-up less volume.
• It may overflow the pits if barite is added without reducing first.
Whatever the reasons, decide on an appropriate pit volume and add it to the total system
volume (from your Pre-recorded Data Sheet) to determine the total volume to weight-up. In
our example, we decided on 200 bbls of active pit volume with 779 bbls of system volume
for a total volume of 979 bbls to weight-up. Record this value on part "I" of the Worksheet.
6-14 October 2005

Step 6 - Barite Required To Weight-Up
Use the following formula to determine the amount of barite needed to increase mud weight
to the required kill weight. Record the value at "J".
15.0 X Increase in Mud Weight

Barite Required = Total Volume to Weight-up x ----------------------------------------------
35.0 - New Mud Weight
15.0 x 1.0
= 979 x -------------------
35.0 - 11.0
= 612 sacks
Step 7 - Determining Pressures For The Second Circulation
Remember, when using the conventional Driller's Method, circulating pressures aren't
calculated, but are self-determined. This means that the pressures observed on the gauges are
the pressures that are held constant while circulating. The values recorded on the Driller's
Method Worksheet for the casing and drill pipe pressures should be observed values.
On the Driller's Method Worksheet, record the casing pressure as observed immediately
before the start of the second circulation. It should not be much higher than the originally
observed shut-in drill pipe pressure. If it is, another kick could be in the hole and it may be
necessary to circulate the well as before, using the first circulation techniques in order to
clear the well of the additional influx. Otherwise, begin the second circulation by holding the
observed casing pressure constant while establishing circulation and until the kill mud
reaches the bit. Record the drill string internal capacity (in strokes) on the Worksheet to
determine when kill mud will reach the bit.
Note: For added peace of mind during the kill operation, it's also possible to make an
estimation of the circulating drill pipe pressure decrease that should occur as
the drill pipe is displaced with kill weight mud. This would be exactly the same
pressure schedule that would be used if the Wait & Weight Method had been
chosen. In fact, it is possible to simply substitute the Wait & Weight Method for
the second circulation of the Driller’s method. In practice, it is often useful to
continue to use the Driller’s method as described, but use the Wait & Weight
pressure schedule as further evidence that the kill is proceeding correctly.
As soon as the kill mud reaches the bit, attention should turn to the drill pipe gauge. The
observed drill pipe pressure at this point should be recorded on the Worksheet and held
October 2005 6-15

constant for the remainder of the kill. The worksheet provides a guide to calculating a
theoretical value for this “final circulating pressure” which can be helpful in confirming that
kill operations are progressing properly. To use this when no pre-recorded SCR is available,
the SCR pressure for this equation can be determined as follows: SCR = ICP – SIDPP.
Step 8 - Determining PcMax And Volume Gain
If the kick is gas, then the maximum casing pressure will occur when the gas first reaches the
surface. This value must be calculated before its arrival to determine if the wellhead and
casing can withstand the pressure. The mathematics of this calculation are provided on lines
“K” through “R” on page 2 of the Driller’s Method Worksheet.
To make things easier and more reliable, Pc Max calculations are automatically performed
when using the CD to complete the Driller’s Method Worksheet, with the final value of
PcMax shown on line “R”.
The maximum pit volume gained while properly circulating out a gas kick is also calculated
automatically and indicated on worksheet line “T”. Line “U” shows the volume gained while
circulating, which may be useful for ensuring adequate space in the pits before commencing
circulation.
Generally speaking, the casing pressure is significant only if it should exceed the pressure
rating of the casing, wellhead or BOPs. It is seldom possible to accurately calculate whether
oil, gas, or water has entered the hole, but with rare exceptions gas is always present. The
methods used to calculate PcMax and corresponding maximum pit volumes will indicate the
maximum possible values caused by a pure gas influx. Water or oil will decrease the casing
pressure and volume gain somewhat from those values shown on the worksheet.
Maximum casing pressures and pit gains should be expected to occur simultaneously when
the top of the gas bubble (worst case scenario) reaches the choke manifold. To estimate the
time at which this may occur, the last line of the Driller’s Method Worksheet is used to show
“bottoms up” strokes for the top of the bubble. Practical adjustments to this value should be
made as field experience indicates gas is usually experienced at surface after pumping only
one half to two thirds calculated bottoms up strokes.
The following pages provide a completed example of a Pre-Recorded Data Sheet and
Driller’s Method Worksheet using information provided in the example above.
6-16 October 2005

PRERECORDED WELL DATA

Surface BOP Stack
WELL NAME: Section 6 Example RIG: 1234
HOLE DATA Note: Angle only used in Kick Tolerance Calculation FIELD: Chevron Manual
Size MD (feet) TVD (feet) Angle (°)
9.8750 9,000 9,000
PUMP DATA
Select
Liners (in.) Stroke(in.) Rod(in. ) % Eff. bbl./stk For Kill
Pump #1 6.25 16 3 96.05 0.1720 X
Pump #2 6.25 16 3 96.05 0.1720
CASING (LAST SET) DATA

(in. OD) (in. Avg ID) Shoe @
MD (feet) TVD (feet) Angle (°)
Last Casing 10-3/4 9.8500 4,000 4,000
WELLHEAD OR CASING PRESSURE LIMITATION

100% BOP 100% Wellhead 80% Csg
The lessor of: Rating (psi) Rating (psi) Burst (psi) Limitation = 2,864 psi.
10,000 10,000 2,864
DRILL STRING DATA

O. D. Wt/Ft * ID (in) bbl/ft Length (ft)
Drill Pipe 1 5.000 20.70 4.2760 0.01776 8,550
DC 1 7.000 120.00 2.8125 0.00768 450
* (not req'd) Measured depth = 9,000
ACTIVE PIT VOLUME

Volume 450 bbl
MAX INITIAL SICP TO FRACTURE FORMATION AT SHOE

(Shoe Test - Present Mud Wt.) x 0.052 x Shoe TVD
13.46 PPG EMW - 10.00 PPG x 0.052 x 4,000 ft = 720 psi.
Figure 6.2.4 Sample Pre-Recorded Well Data sheet
October 2005 6-17

INTERNAL CAPACITIES
BOP Drill Pipe 1 8,550 ft x 0.01776 bbl/ft = 151.9 bbl
Drill Collar 1 450 ft x 0.00768 bbl/ft = 3.5 bbl
MD 9,000 ft Total = 155.3 bbl = 903 Strokes
ANNULAR CAPACITIES
DP1 x Csg. 4,000 ft x 0.0700 bbl/ft = 279.9 bbl

DP1 x Hole 4,550 ft x 0.0704 bbl/ft = 320.5 bbl
DC1 x Csg ft x bbl/ft = bbl
DC1 x Hole 450 ft x 0.0471 bbl/ft = 21.2 bbl
MD 9,000 ft
Total Annulus = 621.6 bbl = 3,614 Strokes
SYSTEM CAPACITY SUMMARY
Total Internal Capacity = 155.3 bbl = 903 Strokes
Total Annulus = 621.6 bbl = 3,614 Strokes
System Volume (Internal + Annulus) = 776.9 bbl = 4,517 Strokes
Volume from Bit to Shoe = 341.7 bbl = 1,987 Strokes
DP1
DP2
HWDP
DC1
DC2
Figure 6.2.4 Sample Pre-Recorded Well Data Sheet (Cont.)
6-18 October 2005

DRILLER'S METHOD WORKSHEET

Surface BOP Stack
PRERECORDED INFORMATION
Select SPM psi bbl/stk bbl/min
A. Slow Circ Rate Data For Kill
( Use SCR Pressure through Riser for Subsea ) 20 250 0.1720 3.4
X 30 590 0.1720 5.2
(Pump #1 Selected) 40 1,025 0.1720 6.9
INFORMATION RECORDED WHEN WELL KICKS Time of Kick: dd/mmm/yy Hr:Min . 09-Feb-79 6:0
B. Old Mud Weight B 10.00 PPG

C. Initial Shut-In Drill Pipe Pressure (SIDPP) C 470 psi
D. Initial Shut-In Casing Pressure (SICP) D 600 psi
E. Initial Pit Volume Increase E 15.0 bbl
F. True Vertical Depth of Hole F 9,000 ft (TVD)
MD of Hole (for Capacity Calculations ONLY) 9,000 ft (MD)
FIRST CIRCULATION TO CLEAR WELL OF INFLUX
Bring Pumps up to Speed While Holding Casing Pressure Constant 30 SPM

{Account for Choke Line Friction if Subsea}
Read and Record Initial Circulating Pressure on Drill Pipe

[Should Approximately = Slow Circ Rate Pressure + SIDPP] A+C= 1,060 psi
Maintain Constant DP Pressure Until Influx is Circulated Out. Then Shut Down
Pumps While Holding Casing Pressure Constant. {Remember CLF for Subsea}. If Drill
Pipe and Casing Shut-In Pressures are not Equal, Continue to Circulate Out Influx.
G. Increase in Mud Weight required to Balance Kick

Initial SIDPP C
G = = G 1.1 PPG
(0.052) (TVD) (0.052) (F)
H. New Mud Weight H=B+G= H 11.10 PPG
I. Total Volume to Weight up I = Active Pit Vol + System Vol = I 1,227 bbl
J. Barite Required
(15.0) (G)
J=Ix = J 840 sacks
(35.2 - H)
SECOND CIRCULATION TO BALANCE WELL
Bring Pumps up to Speed While Holding

Casing Pressure Constant. {Account for ? SIDP (C) Casing Pressure 470 psi
CLF if Subsea} Maintain Constant Casing
Pressure Until New Mud Reaches the Bit. Drill String Internal Capacity 903 strokes
Read and Record Drill Pipe Pressure KWM (H)

When New Mud Reaches the Bit ? SCR (A) x = Final Circulating Pressure 655 psi
Maintain Constant Drill Pipe Pressure Old MW (B)
Until the System is Displaced. System Volume 4,517 strokes
Figure 6.2.5 Driller’s Method Worksheet
October 2005 6-19

RESERVOIR PRESSURE (Pr)

K. Pr =(0.052) (New MW) (TVD) K = (0.052) (H) (F) = K 5,195 psi
HEIGHT OF GAS BUBBLE AROUND DRILL PIPE

L. Annulus Capacity Factor (DP x Casing) Right Below Wellhead L 0.0700 bbl/ft
(Asssumes DP1 below Wellhead)
M. Height = Initial Pit Vol Increase E M 214 ft

M= =
Annulus Capacity Factor L
MAXIMUM CASING PRESSURE (Pcmax) WHEN GAS GETS TO SURFACE

N. ΠGrad = Difference in mud weight gradient and influx gradient
(Use 0.1 psi/ft, 0.328 psi/m, for influx gradient if unknown)
(MW) (0.052) - Influx Grad N = (B) (0.052) - Influx Grad = N 0.42 psi/ft
O. Pcmax, Part 1 = SIDPP ¸ 2 O=C ÷ 2 = (Surface) O 235 psi
P. TZ= Compressibility and Temperature Effects (fig 11P.5)

or Tz = 4.03-(0.38 x In(Pr)) P = 4.03-(0.38 x In(K)) = P 0.7789
Q. Pcmax, Part2 (figure 11P.1)

2
or Pcmax, Part 2 = Pcmax Part 1 + (Pr) (Ht) (Π grad) (TZ)
Q 648 psi
Q = O2 + (K)(M)(N)(P) =
R. Maximum Casing Pressure,
Pcmax = (Pcmax, Part 1) + (Pcmax, Part 2) R=O+Q= R 883 psi
S. Does Pcmax Exceed the Wellhead or Casing Pressure Limitation?
YES NO X
VOLUME GAIN WHILE CIRCULATING OUT GAS BUBBLE

T. Volume of Gas at Surface (from Fig. 11P.4 or Formula below)
T 69 bbl
(Pit Increase) (Pr) (TZ) (E) (K) (P)
Vg, Volume of gas at surface, bbl = = =
Pcmax R
U. Volume Gain While Circulating Out Gas Kick U=T-E= U 54 bbl
VOLUME AND STROKES TO MAXIMUM CASING PRESSURE

V. Maximum casing Pressure and Excess Volume Occur When the Pumped Volume Equals
Total Annulus Capacity - Volume of Gas at Surface bbl strokes
Annulus Cap {prerecorded} - T = 553 3,214
Figure 6.2.5 Driller’s Method Worksheet (Cont.)
6-20 October 2005

6.3 Wait & Weight Method (Engineer’s Method)
The Wait & Weight Method of well control, formerly referred to as the Engineer’s Method,
requires only one complete circulation. The kill mud is circulated at the same time the influx
is removed from the annulus. After the well has been shut-in and the pressures and pit
volume increase have been recorded, the mud density in the pits is increased and a drill pipe
pressure schedule is created. A schedule must be prepared in order that drill pipe pressure can
be properly adjusted downward as kill mud fills the drill pipe.
Once the kill mud reaches the bit, the drill pipe pressure should be held constant until it
reaches the surface. Bottomhole pressure will be equal to, or slightly greater than formation
pressure throughout the procedure as long as pump rate is maintained at the same rate.
If the kick contains gas, it will expand in the annulus under controlled conditions as it nears
the surface. Therefore, an increase in casing pressure and pit volume should be expected.
However, the drill pipe pressure and pump rate must be held constant.
As with the Driller’s Method, any time a well under pressure is circulated, the start-up and
shut-down procedures are critical and should be done with exceptional care. The following
advice on this topic warrants repeating. Whenever the pump speed is increased or decreased
(including start-up and shut-down), the casing pressure must be held constant at the value it
had immediately before the pump speed changed in order to keep bottomhole pressure
constant. This procedure is valid because casing pressure will virtually be the same whether
the well is closed-in or being pumped. However, the drill pipe pressure will vary depending
upon the circulating pressure loss in the system, which is a function of the pump speed. The
casing pressure cannot be held constant for very long due to the changing height of the influx
caused by the irregular annulus and gas expansion.
Description of the Wait & Weight Method
Step 1 - The Kick Is Detected - Shut The Well In
As always, it is extremely important to get the well shut-in as quickly as possible in order to
minimize the size of the influx. The best way to achieve this is by using the "Three S" Shut -
in Procedure While Drilling or the "Three S" Shut-in Procedure While Tripping, shown
below.
October 2005 6-21

(1) SPACE OUT: Shut down rotary and pick up to pre-determined space
out position (ensuring all safety valves are located above
drill floor). Tool joint should be located clear of BOP
used for intial shut-in
(2) SHUT DOWN: Stop the mud pumps. Confirm well is flowing.
(3) SHUT-IN: Close the uppermost applicable BOP. Confirm that the
well is shut-in and flow has stopped.
Shut-In Procedure While Tripping
(1) STAB VALVE: Install the fully opened safety valve in the drill string.
Close the safety valve.
(2) SPACE OUT: Position the drill string so that the tool joints are clear of
the preventers.
(3) SHUT-IN: Close the annular preventer or uppermost pipe ram

preventer. Confirm that the well is shut-in and flow has
stopped.
It should be stressed that in nearly all well kicks, the Driller will be responsible for actually
closing the preventers and confirming shut-in of the well. It is the duty of the Chevron Drill
Site Manager to make sure the Driller can execute the proper shut-in procedure. The Driller
must have the initiative and experience to do this alone if required. There will be plenty of
time after the well is shut-in to retrieve crews from the mud pits and notify the Toolpusher.
The Driller must not delay when shutting the well in.
Step 2a - Allow The Well To Stabilize, Record Pressures And Volume Gained
After the well is shut-in, it may take a few minutes for the shut-in pressures to stabilize. If the
pipe is reciprocated through the annular preventer during the kill, use this time to reduce the
annular closing pressure to reduce element wear. Make sure the bag does not leak at the
reduced pressure!
With your choke manifold lined-up properly, open the choke line valve at the preventer stack
and read the shut-in casing pressure at the choke manifold. If no drill pipe float is installed,
read and record the shut-in drill pipe pressure as well. Finally, examine the pit volume charts
6-22 October 2005

to determine the volume gained during the kick and verify this with the Derrickman and, if
available, mud loggers.
Step 2b - Bumping The Drill Pipe Float
If a drill pipe float is installed (per routine Chevron practice), the pressure gauge on the drill
pipe will probably read near zero. In order to get an accurate value for the shut-in drill pipe
pressure, "bump" the float open by slowly pumping down the drill pipe at a constant rate.
The correct procedure for bumping the float is given below.
Float Bumping Procedure
(1) Make sure the well is shut-in and that the shut-in casing pressure is recorded.
(2) Slowly pump down the drill pipe at a constant rate while monitoring both the
casing and drill pipe pressure.
(3) The drill pipe pressure will increase as pumping is begun. Watch carefully for a
"lull" in the drill pipe pressure (a hesitation in the rate of increase), which will
occur as the float is pumped off its seat (when the pressure above and below the
float have equalized). Record the drill pipe pressure when the lull is first seen.
(4) To verify that the float has been pumped open, continue pumping down the drill
pipe slowly and at a constant rate until an increase in the casing pressure is
observed. This should occur very soon after the lull is detected on the drill pipe
gauge.
(5) Shut down the pump as soon as you see the casing pressure begin to increase
and record the shut-in drill pipe pressure as the pressure at which the lull was first
seen, in Step 3 above (not the final drill pipe pressure after the pumps are stopped).
(6) Check the shut-in casing pressure again. Any excess pressure may be bled-off in
small increments until equal casing pressure readings are observed after two
consecutive bleed-offs.
The float bumping procedure, as described above, can be difficult at times, particularly if the
rig has mechanically driven mud pumps. In that case, it may help to clutch the pumps in short
bursts to slowly build up pressure on the drill pipe. It's more likely that a drill pipe "lull"
won't take place before the casing pressure starts to increase when using this procedure. To
determine the shut-in drill pipe pressure in these instances, subtract the increase in shut-in
casing pressure from the final value of shut-in drill pipe pressure after the pumps have been
stopped. The equation for this calculation is given below. Use this value as the official shut-
in drill pipe pressure (SIDPP).
October 2005 6-23

If excess pressure is trapped on the

drill pipe when bumping the float…
Shut-in Shut-in drill pipe Increase in shut-in

Drill pipe = pressure after - casing pressure while
Pressure bumping float bumping float
Step 3 - Perform The Kick Control Calculations
Calculations should be performed using the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet before the
kill mud is circulated into the well. Several critical items will be determined including:
• Drill pipe pressure schedule

• Bottomhole reservoir pressure
• Mud weight necessary to balance the kick
• Maximum surface casing pressure during the kill circulation
• Maximum excess mud volume gained during the kill circulation
To prepare a drill pipe pressure schedule, it will be necessary to determine the system friction
pressures when circulating at the chosen kill rate. Since this pressure is not always reliably
known, the following steps can be used to obtain this “SCR” value:
1. Starting with the well shut-in and any trapped pressure bled off, bump the float as
described above in order to obtain SIDPP.
2. After ensuring any excess pressure trapped during Step 1 has been bled off, bring
pump up to desired kill rate while holding casing pressure constant (for subsea
operations, adjust for choke line friction or use the static kill line for this purpose).
3. After allowing sufficient time for the system pressures to stabilize following the last
pump or choke adjustment, note the actual circulating drill pipe pressure; record and
use this value as Initial Circulating Pressure (ICP).
4. Stop the pump, again holding casing pressure constant, and shut-in the well.
5. Since:
SCR + SIDPP = ICP
Then:
ICP - SIDPP = SCR
Therefore, subtract the SIDPP from the measured ICP; the difference between these
pressures is the actual SCR for the given pump rate. This SCR value can then be used
to calculate Final Circulating Pressure (FCP) for the Wait & Weight Method
displacement schedule.
6-24 October 2005

An example problem illustrating the use of the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet is
provided later in this section (see Figure 6.3.1).
One thing to keep in mind while performing your calculations is that the formation fluids in
the annulus, especially gas, may migrate up the hole and cause an increase in the shut-in
casing pressure. If the shut-in casing pressure starts increasing substantially to the point of
risking an underground blowout or exceeding the wellhead or casing pressure limitation,
bleed-off some of the excess pressure through the choke. It is better to bleed the pressure off
in small increments rather than one large slug. Any excess pressure which appears on the
annulus due to the migrating gas bubble may be bled-off in small increments until equal
readings are observed after two consecutive bleed-offs.
Step 4 - Raise The Mud Weight In The Pits
As soon as the required mud weight has been calculated, raising the mud weight in the pits
should begin. The first step is to reduce the mud volume in the active pits to make room for
weighting material. The amount of barite required to increase the mud weight is determined
in Part "J" of the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet. If barite required exceeds barite on
hand, either further reduce the volume in the active system or proceed with the Driller’s
Method. The mud mixing facilities and pit volumes on a particular rig will dictate to some
extent just how the mud should be handled. The ideal situation is to maintain a reasonably
low-volume active system so that the mud circulated out of the hole can be weighted up
without having to stop circulating. It may be desirable to weight up enough mud to displace
the entire hole before the killing operation is started. Many variables will enter into this
decision, so each situation must be handled on its own merits. The important thing is that the
mud weight can be raised while the well is being circulated.
Meanwhile, formation fluids in the annulus, especially gas, will migrate, causing an increase
in casing pressures. Also, the longer formation fluids are in the annulus, the more likely pipe
sticking becomes. Therefore, it is important to proceed as quickly as possible.
Step 5 - Establish Circulation
After the kick control calculations have been performed and the mud has been weighted up
properly, the well should be circulated through the choke using the information recorded on
the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet. Before breaking circulation, be sure to check the
following items.
(1) Ensure that all members of the crew know exactly what their duties are before
the kill operation begins (See section on "Crew Responsibilities" for more
detail).
(2) Eliminate all sources of ignition in the immediate vicinity of the rig and vent
lines. See that the vent lines on the mud-gas separator and mud degasser are
secured properly and, if possible, are downwind from the rig.
October 2005 6-25

(3) Make sure the circulating system (including manifolds and pits) are lined-up
correctly.
(4) Zero the stroke counter and make a note of the time.
When establishing circulation in a well closed in under pressure, back pressure on the well is
very difficult to control. The procedure is critical, since additional influx will result if too
little back pressure is held, and the formation can break down if too much back pressure is
held.
The procedure requires simultaneous manipulation of the choke and the pump speed. While
the pumps are being brought up to speed, the choke is opened in such a way that casing
pressure is maintained constant at its shut-in value just prior to the start of pumping. As the
pump speed is increased up to the desired kill rate, drill pipe pressure will increase, but
casing pressure must be held constant. Successful manipulation of the choke while
establishing circulation in this manner will maintain constant bottomhole pressure.
The chosen pump rate must be held constant throughout the killing of the well. If the pump
rate is allowed to vary without adjusting the choke size, constant bottomhole pressure will
not be maintained. If the pump rate is increased, additional friction pressure will cause the
drill pipe pressure to increase. If the choke is adjusted to lower the drill pipe pressure to its
assumed correct value, then the bottomhole pressure is reduced, possibly allowing another
influx. Conversely, if the pump rate is reduced, the reduction in friction pressure will be
noted and the choke adjusted to increase the drill pipe pressure, possibly creating sufficient
overpressure at the casing shoe to cause a breakdown. Therefore, any change in pump rate
should be made known to the choke operator and the pump should be returned to the original
rate.
Step 6 - Follow The Drill Pipe Pressure Schedule While Pumping Kill Mud
After circulation has been established and the pumps are operating at the desired kill rate, the
previously observed initial circulating pressure should again be seen on the drill pipe
pressure gauge. As the kill mud goes down the drillpipe, gradually adjust the choke so that
the drill pipe pressure closely tracks the drill pipe pressure schedule calculated earlier. From
a practical standpoint, once the proper choke opening has been established for the given
pump rate, only minor (if any) choke manipulations should be required to stay on schedule.
At this point in the kill procedure, constant bottom-hole pressure is being maintained by
following the drill pipe pressure schedule and by making slight choke adjustments. Do not
change the pump rate to accomplish this. Also, do not make choke adjustments in order to
keep the casing pressure constant while the drill pipe is being displaced with kill mud. When
an influx rises above the drill collars and around the drill pipe, the influx column height is
reduced as a result of the larger annular capacity around the drill pipe as compared to around
the drill collars. This reduction increases the hydrostatic head in the annulus. Therefore, as
constant bottomhole pressure is being maintained by following the drill pipe profile, it's
possible to see a drop in casing pressure as the influx height shortens.
6-26 October 2005

When the kill weight mud gets to the bottom of the drill string, the pressure on the drill pipe
should be the final circulating pressure, as recorded at "L" on the worksheet.
Step 7 - Hold The Drill Pipe Pressure Constant For The Remainder Of The Kill
When kill mud starts to be circulated up the annulus, the choke must be manipulated so that
drill pipe pressure is maintained constant at the final circulating pressure.
As the gas and contaminated mud are circulated to the surface, the gas will begin to expand,
increasing both the casing pressure and pit volume. A pure gas contaminant will increase the
casing pressure to the value shown at "W" on the worksheet. It will be less if the kick also
includes water and/or oil. Probably the most critical stage of the killing operation takes place
at this time, and panicking can very easily turn a good job into a disaster.
It can sometimes be difficult to bleed the gas off fast enough to keep the drill pipe pressure
within limits, but excessive pressure could cause formation breakdown. If the gas cannot be
released fast enough from the annulus to prevent an increase in drill pipe pressure, the pumps
may have to be slowed or even stopped until the casing pressure is bled down. If this must be
done, use the choke to hold casing pressure constant as the pump speed is changed.
Alternatively, the pumps may be stopped while holding casing pressure constant, then
restarted as before (again holding casing pressure constant) until the new kill rate is obtained;
hold this new indicated circulating drillpipe pressure constant as you continue to circulate.
This process becomes more complicated if the need for slowing the pumps occurs while
displacing the drill string with kill weight mud using a pressure schedule. Due to the
complexities that may be involved (magnified by string/hole geometry issues), it is
recommended that, whenever accurate downhole pressure control is necessary and the Wait
& Weight methods is being used, a pump speed providing 2-3 bbls/minute output should be
used until the drill string is filled with kill weight mud; after that point the pump speed may
be increased in the same manner (holding casing pressure constant while changing speed) for
greater efficiency where circumstances permit.
Continue circulation until the entire system is full of the kill weight mud. The approximate
strokes required are indicated on the prerecorded data sheet.
Step 8 - Shut Down And Check For Flow
After the entire hole volume has been displaced with kill mud, the pumps can be shut down
and the well shut-in. When shutting down the pumps, the choke should be closed gradually
as the pump speed is reduced (holding casing pressure constant). Note: The casing pressure
may already be zero before the pumps are shut down. This is normal and may be expected.
As the pump speed decreases, the drill pipe pressure will slowly decrease to zero. After the
well is shut-in, both the casing and drill pipe pressures should be zero (accounting for any
trapped pressure safety factor). Confirm that the well is dead by cracking open the choke; the
well should not flow. If the well is dead, the BOPs can be opened. Keep in mind that a small
October 2005 6-27

volume of gas may be trapped between the annular preventer and the choke line. Exercise
caution on the rig floor when opening the preventers.
Step 9 - Circulate And Condition The Mud
After the BOPs are opened, the mud should be circulated and conditioned to the desired
properties. Usually, the yield point is too high. Thus, running or pulling pipe can cause
excessive pressure on the formation or swabbing, and either could lead to another kick.
After the mud has been conditioned and the yield point reduced, if a trip is made, it may be
necessary to raise the mud weight slightly to provide a suitable "trip margin". This can be
determined with swab/surge calculations (calculation service is generally available from mud
loggers).
Using the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet
The Wait & Weight Method Worksheet is a step-by-step instruction sheet to help the Drill
Site Manager calculate the critical well control parameters that are necessary to successfully
kill a well using the Wait & Weight Method. Use of the Worksheet is demonstrated here
through the use of an example problem described below:
Example Problem - A well is being drilled and the following data are known prior to a kick:
2-duplex pumps - 16-in. stroke, 3-in. rod, 96% vol. eff., 6-1/4-in. liner.
Casing size - 10-3/4 in., set at 4,000 ft. Hole size - 9-7/8 in.
Casing pressure limitation - 2,864 psi (burst)
Shoe Test - 720 psi with 10 lb/gal. mud
Drill pipe size - 5 in., 19.5 lb/ft. (20.7 lb/ft. w/tool joints).
Remaining collapse resistance of drill pipe - 4,109 psi
Drill collar size - 7 in. OD x 2-13/16 in. ID x 450 ft. long.
Mud weight - 10 lb./gal.
Active surface mud system - 450 bbl. before kick; 200 bbl. at start of kill.
Actual Slow Pump Rate Pressure (generally unknown until start of kill):
590 PSI @ 30 Strokes/min
While drilling at 9,000 ft. TVD, the well kicked and the BOPs were closed.
The following data was observed.
Initial drill pipe pressure = 470 psi.

Initial casing pressure = 600 psi.
Pit volume gain = 15 bbl.
Following is a step-by-step procedure for determining the well control parameters which are
necessary to kill the example well using the Wait & Weight Method.
6-28 October 2005

Wait & Weight Method Worksheet
Step 1 – Pre-Recorded Information
Prior to the kick (and at all times), a Pre-recorded Data Sheet should be completely filled out
except for the measured depth and the length of drill pipe in the hole. After entering these
items, the internal drill string capacity and the system volume totals should be calculated.
These values may be sufficiently accurate for evaluating initial well kill options.
Step 2 - Information To Be Recorded When Well Kicks
Many items of information need to be gathered when a well kicks. These include:
Old Mud Weight Pit Volume Increase

Initial Shut-in Drill Pipe Pressure True Vertical Depth Of Hole
Initial Shut-in Casing Pressure Measured Depth Of Hole
This information should be recorded in lines "B" through "F" on the Wait & Weight Method
Worksheet.
Step 3 - Determining Mud Weight To Balance The Kick
Using the equation below, calculate the increase in mud weight necessary to balance the kick.
Initial Shut-in Drill pipe Pressure

Increase in Mud Weight = ---------------------------------------------------
0.052 X True Vertical Depth
470
= ------------------------ = 1.0043
0.052 X 9000
Therefore,
Increase in Mud Weight = 1.0 lb./gal
Rounding-Up Rule: The increase in mud weight should be calculated to the hundredths
place. If the number in the hundredths place is greater than zero, then round up the number in
the tenths place one full tenth. In this example, the number in the hundredths place is zero, so
the number in the tenths place is not rounded up.
Record a 1.0 lb/gal increase on line "G" of the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet. Adding
the mud weight increase "G" to the old mud weight "B" yields the new mud weight required
to balance the kick.
October 2005 6-29

New Mud Weight To Balance The Kick = Old Mud Weight + Increase In Mud
Weight
= 10.0 + 1.0
= 11.0 lb/gal
Enter the new mud weight in part "H" of the worksheet.
The mud weight determined by this procedure will provide a hydrostatic pressure equal to the
BHP and sufficient to kill the well, but perhaps not high enough for making a trip. Weighting
up a mud increases its yield point, causing increased pressure on the formation during
circulation (the equivalent circulating density). As extra mud weight and a higher yield point
could fracture the formation, it is best to adjust the yield point and add a trip margin after the
well is killed.
Step 4 - Total Volume To Weight-Up
As discussed in the Driller's Method, there are several reasons why the volume of mud in
surface pits should be reduced before weighting up. Again, some of these reasons are:
(1) It takes less time to weight up less volume.

(2) It requires less barite to weight up less volume.
(3) While circulating the influx out, the pits may overflow.
Whatever the reason, decide on the volume to use and add it to the system volume from the
Prerecorded Data Sheet to determine the total volume to weight up. In our example, we again
used 200 bbl. to arrive at a total volume to weight up of 979 bbl. Record this value at "I" on
the worksheet.
Step 5 - Barite Required To Weight-Up
Again, the same formula used to determine barite requirements for the Driller's Method will
be used to calculate the volume required for the Wait & Weight Method. The equation is
shown below:
15.0 x Increase in Mud Weight

Barite Required =Total Volume to Weight Up x -----------------------------------------------
35.0 - New Mud Weight
6-30 October 2005

Step 6 - Determining Initial Circulating Pressure
The initial drill pipe circulating pressure (ICP) can be determined by proceeding as follows:
a) Use the choke to hold the casing pressure constant (600 psi in this example) until
the pump is at the desired speed (30 SPM in this example)
b) When pressures stabilize, read the drill pipe pressure at that time; this value is the
initial circulating pressure (ICP). If this procedure were done in this example, the
observed ICP would be 1060 psi.
Record this value at "K."
Step 7 - Determining Final Circulating Pressure
To determine Slow Pump Rate Pressure (SCR) is available, subtract the SIDPP from the
Initial Circulating Pressure (ICP) noted in Step 6 above:
ICP from Step 6 1060 psi

SIDPP - 470 psi
Actual SCR 590 psi
The final circulating pressure is the pressure the drill pipe gauge should read when kill mud
reaches the bit (SCR pressure after mud density has been increased). The final circulating
pressure can be estimated by the formula:
New Mud Weight

Final Circulating Pressure = Slow Pump Rate Pressure X ------------------------------
Old Mud Weight
11
= 590 X ----- = 649 psi
10
Step 8 - Drill Pipe Pressure Schedule
Successful well killing with the Wait & Weight Method requires that the drill pipe pressure
decrease from a higher value (the Initial Circulating Pressure) to a lower value (the Final
Circulating Pressure) as kill mud is pumped down the drill string. It is very important that the
drill pipe pressure be reduced smoothly in small increments as the drill pipe is filled with kill
mud. The drill pipe pressure should not be reduced all at once when the kill mud reaches the
bit.
In order to accomplish a smooth transition from Initial Circulating Pressure to the Final
Circulating Pressure, create a drill pipe pressure schedule which displays the correct
October 2005 6-31

circulating drill pipe pressure at 50 or 100 stroke increments as kill mud is pumped down the
drill string. The Drill Site Manager can track the drill pipe pressure and the pump strokes and
make small choke adjustments so that the observed drill pipe pressures are equal to the
calculated values displayed on the schedule at all points during the circulation. It is important
to realize that this drill pipe pressure drop should require minimal choke adjustments since
the hydrostatic pressure in the drill pipe will be increasing automatically as the kill mud is
pumped down.
The first step in creating the drill pipe pressure schedule is to transfer the internal, annulus
and system capacity values from the Prerecorded Data Sheet to lines "M" and "N" on the
Wait & Weight Method Worksheet.
Next, record the calculated Initial Circulating Pressure, "K", on the top/right side of the
schedule table and record zero strokes on the left-side.
Next, record the calculated Final Circulating Pressure, "L", on the bottom line of the schedule
table (on the right) opposite the total internal stroke capacity (on the left).
We now need to fill-in the lines between the Initial Circulating Pressure and the Final
Circulating Pressure on the Drill pipe Pressure Schedule table. The drill pipe pressure drop
per stroke can be calculated with the following formula:
Initial Circulating Pressure - Final Circulating Pressure

Drill pipe Pressure Drop = ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(per stroke) Total Internal Stroke Capacity
1060 - 649
= -----------------
905
= 0.45 psi/stroke
This equation will normally yield a fraction of a psi reduction per pump stroke, which is too
small to accurately measure on the rig. Therefore, we arbitrarily choose a stroke increment of
100 strokes, which becomes our point of reference as kill mud is pumped down the drill pipe.
Instead of reducing the drill pipe pressure 0.45 psi per stroke, we reduce it 45 psi per 100
strokes (which is essentially the same thing).
We can then subtract this pressure decline (45 psi per 100 strokes) from the initial circulating
pressure, repeating this reduction for each subsequent increment, until the final circulating
6-32 October 2005

pressure at the total internal capacity is reached. The schedule is completed by adding stroke
increments on the left side and subtracting pressure increments from the right side.
Step 9 - Determining Pc Max And Volume Gain
If the kick is gas, then the maximum casing pressure will occur when the gas first reaches the
surface. This value must be calculated before its arrival to determine if the wellhead and
casing can withstand the pressure. The mathematics of this calculation are provided on lines
“P” through “W” on page 2 of the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet.
To make things easier and more reliable, Pc Max calculations are automatically performed
when using the CD to complete the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet, with the final value
of PcMax shown on line “W”. This value should be used to help decide whether or not to
circulate out the kick.
The maximum pit volume gained while properly circulating out a gas kick is also calculated
automatically and indicated on worksheet line “X”. Line “Y” shows the volume gained
while circulating which may be useful for ensuring adequate space in the pits before
commencing circulation.
The volume gained due to barite addition is simplified by the equation shown in part “Z”. It
is approximated by dividing the barite required to weight up “J” by 15 sacks of barite per bbl
of additional volume increase. Record this figure on line “Z”. The total volume gain while
circulating out a gas kick is calculated by adding line “Y” to line “Z”. Record this value.
Generally speaking, the casing pressure is significant only if it should exceed the pressure
rating of the casing, wellhead or BOPs. It is seldom possible to accurately calculate whether
oil, gas, or water has entered the hole, but with rare exceptions gas is always present. The
methods used to calculate PcMax and corresponding maximum pit volumes will indicate the
maximum possible values caused by a pure gas influx. Water or oil will decrease the casing
pressure and volume gain somewhat from those values shown on the worksheet.
Maximum casing pressures and pit gains should be expected to occur simultaneously when
the top of the gas bubble (worst case scenario) reaches the choke manifold. To estimate the
time at which this may occur, the last line of the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet is used
to show “bottoms up” strokes for the top of the bubble. Practical adjustments to this value
should be made as field experience indicates gas is usually experienced at surface after
pumping only one half to two thirds calculated bottoms up strokes.
The following pages provide a completed example of the Wait & Weight Method Worksheet.
October 2005 6-33

WAIT & WEIGHT METHOD WORKSHEET

Straight Hole - Surface BOP Stack
( Use SCR Press through Riser for Subsea ) 20 250 0.1720 3.4
X 30 590 0.1720 5.2
(Pump #1 Selected) 40 1,025 0.1720 6.9
INFORMATION RECORDED WHEN WELL KICKS Time of Kick: dd/mmm/yy Hr:Min . 09-Feb-79 6:0
B. Old Mud Weight B 10.00 PPG
C. Initial Shut-In Drill Pipe Pressure (SIDPP) C 470 psi
E. Initial Pit Volume Increase E 15.0 bbl
MUD WEIGHT TO BALANCE KICK

Initial SIDPP C
G= = = G 1.1 PPG
(0.052) (TVD) (0.052) (F)
H. New Mud Weight H=B+G= H 11.10 PPG
J. Barite Required (15.0) (G)

J=Ix = J 840 sacks
(35.2 - H)
INITIAL CIRCULATING PRESSURE

K. Slow Circ Rate Pressure + SIDPP K =A+C= K 1,060 psi
FINAL CIRCULATING PRESSURE

H
L. Slow Circ Rate Pressure X (New Mud Wt / Old Mud Wt) L=Ax = L 655 psi
B
DRILL PIPE PRESSURE PROFILE
M. Total Internal Capacity (from Prerecorded Well Data) M 155.3 bbl 903 stks
N. Total Annulus Capacity (from Prerecorded Well Data) N 621.6 bbl 3,614 stks
O. System Volume (from Prerecorded Well Data) O 776.9 bbl 4,517 stks
Init Circ Press (K) - Final Circ Press (L)

Press Decline = X Stroke Increment =
Internal Stroke Capacity (M) 44.9 psi/Inc
Stroke Increment = 100 Stks
Drill Pipe Press
Strokes (ID Compensated) Average
0 1,060 1,060 = Initial Circ Press (psi) (K)
100 1,016 1,015
200 973 970
300 929 925
400 886 881
500 842 836
600 798 791
700 755 746
800 711 701
900 658 656
Total Internal
Capacity (M) = 903 619 655 = Final Circ Press (psi) (L)
Figure 6.3.1 Wait & Weight Method Worksheet
6-34 October 2005

RESERVOIR PRESSURE (Pr)

P. Pr = 0.052 x New MW x TVD P = (0.052) (H) (F) = P 5,195 psi
MAXIMUM CASING PRESSURE (Pcmax) WHEN GAS GETS TO SURFACE

Q. Drill String Capacity from Prerecorded Data Q 155 bbl
R. Annulus Capacity Factor DP x Casing Right Below Wellhead R 0.0700 bbl/ft

(Asssumes DP1 below Wellhead)
S. Temperature and Compression Effects. (from fig. 11P.5 or formula below)
S = TZ = 4.03 - (0.38 x In(P)) = S 0.78
T. Difference between New MW and Influx Gradients,

(use .1 psi/ft, 0.328 psi/m, for Influx Grad if unknown)
T = (0.052) (H) - Influx Grad T 0.477 psi/ft
U. Pcmax, Part 1 (from Fig. 11P.2 or from Formula Below)

(0.052) (G) (Q) (Surface) U 63 psi
U = =
(2) (R)
V. Pcmax, Part 2 (from Fig 11P.3 or from Formula Below)
(P) (E) (S) (T) V 647 psi

V = U2 + =
R
W. Maximum Casing Pressure,
PCmax=PCmax, Part 1 + PCmax, Part 2 W=U+V= W 710 psi
Does Pcmax Exceed the Wellhead or Casing Pressure Limitation?

YES NO X
VOLUME GAIN WHILE CIRCULATING OUT GAS BUBBLE

X. Volume of Gas at Surface
(E) (P) (S)
Vol Gas At Surface (bbls) = = X 85 bbl
W
Y. Vol Gain While Circulating Out Gas Kick Y=X-E= Y 70 bbl
J
Z. Vol Gain due to Barite Addition Z = = Z 56 bbl
15 Sks / bbl
Total Vol Gain While Circulating Out Gas Kick Y+Z= 126 bbl
VOLUME AND STROKES TO MAXIMUM CASING PRESSURE

Maximum casing Pressure and Excess Volume Occur When the Pumped Volume Equals
bbl strokes
Total Annulus Capacity - Vol of Gas at Surface N-X= 536 3,117
Figure 6.3.1 Wait & Weight Method Worksheet (cont.)
October 2005 6-35

Figure 6.3.2
6-36 October 2005

Figure 6.3.3 Wait & Weight Method Procedure
6.4 Procedures for Deviated Wells
Kick behavior can be significantly different in highly deviated wells. Swabbing can be more
of a problem as the BHA is dragged up the low side of the hole. Gas kicks may migrate faster
as the influx channels up the high side of the hole. Drill pipe pressure schedules may need to
be significantly different for deviated wells because hydrostatic pressure changes depend on
true vertical depths, whereas hole volumes depend on measured depths. See Figure 6.4.1.
October 2005 6-37

Figure 6.4.1
Kick Detection
The equivalent circulating density is relatively higher when drilling high angle wells. Fluid
volumes during connections and while tripping should be monitored closely since loss of this
higher ECD makes it more likely a kick will only be noticed when pumps are off.
Kick Detection and Precautions to take while Tripping
a) Mud loggers should calculate maximum tripping speed to avoid swabbing.
b) Check mud rheology is within specifications prior to tripping; high mud rheology
can lead to swabbing.
c) When tripping out of a high angle section, there are two options:
1. Line up to trip tank and pull out, monitoring hole fill in trip tank
Advantages: Accurate record of hole fill.
Disadvantages: Pulling out of hole with pumps off there is no annular pressure loss
(APL) to act as a safety margin.
6-38 October 2005

2. Pump out of hole to last casing shoe, back reaming and circulating.
Advantages: While circulating, annular pressure loss will be acting on formation

and should prevent swabbing.
Disadvantages: If an influx is swabbed in, it would be very hard if not impossible to

detect.
Kill Procedures
When preparing to displace the drill string to kill weight mud, pressure schedules should be
corrected for hole deviation. The Chevron Well Control CD contains a kill sheet program
that greatly simplifies the preparation of pressure schedules appropriate for high deviation
wells. Use of a non-compensated, “straight line” pressure schedule can result in bottomhole
pressure climbing above intended pressures while displacing kill mud to the bit.
In some cases of deviated wellbores, it may be desirable to take advantage of the relative ease
of use of the conventional Driller’s Method procedure that involves displacing kill mud to the
it while maintaining constant casing pressure.
6.5 Volumetric Method
In controlling a threatened blowout, special problems may arise that interfere with routine
methods of well control. One of these problems is not being able to circulate an influx out of
the wellbore. In order to kill a well by proper use of a constant bottomhole pressure
circulating method, it is necessary to circulate the well from below the depth of entry of the
influx.
This may be at least temporarily impossible due to several things, such as inoperative pumps,
plugged bit or drill pipe, drill pipe above the influx (as in a kick taken while tripping), or
when pipe is out of the hole completely. When one of these problems occurs, the well cannot
be circulated with kill mud until corrective measures have been taken and the ability to
circulate out the influx is regained. In the case of a plugged bit, it would be necessary to
perforate the drill pipe; or if the drill pipe was off bottom, it would be necessary to strip back
to bottom.
Changes in SICP (after sufficient time for stabilization) will dictate the method of controlling
the well. If the casing pressure does not increase above the original stabilized shut-in
pressure, a salt water or oil kick is indicated. Since there is less density differential between
liquids (salt water or oil) and mud than between gas and mud, the liquids will migrate much
slower than gas. Thus, the shut-in casing pressure will remain relatively constant for a
reasonable length of time, and the only consideration is to leave the well shut in until it can
be killed. If, however, the casing pressure increases above the original SICP, a gas kick is
indicated. The expansion characteristics of gas, coupled with the density difference between
October 2005 6-39

gas and mud that causes the gas to migrate, dictate the use of the Volumetric Control Method
to control bottomhole pressure.
Successful use of the Volumetric Method requires a thorough understanding of three basic
principles. The first is Boyle's Law, which states that the pressure of a gas is directly related
to its volume. The second is hydrostatic pressure, and the third involves the relationship of
fluid volume and height as determined by annular capacities.
Basic Volumetric Control Principles
First Basic Principle - Boyle's Law: Boyle's Law states that the pressure of a gas is directly
related to its volume. If a volume of gas is compressed, the pressure in the gas will increase.
Conversely, if a gas is allowed to expand, the pressure in the gas will decrease. Stated
mathematically, Boyle's Law is written as:
Boyle's Law P1V1 = P2V2
where: P1 = Pressure in gas at condition 1

V1 = Volume of gas at condition 1
P2 = Pressure in gas at condition 2
V2 = Volume of gas at condition 2
This equation is a simplification of the real gas law equation, PV=ZnRT. Though it neglects
the effect of temperature and gas compressibility, it provides a reasonable basis for
understanding of this emergency control method.
Relating this phenomenon to well control, as a gas kick migrates up without being allowed to
expand, the pressure of the gas bubble will remain constant. Or, if the gas bubble is allowed
to expand as it migrates, then the pressure in the gas bubble will decrease.
Migration of the gas bubble to the surface without expansion will usually result in disastrous
consequences. This is because the pressure in the bubble as it enters at the bottom of the
wellbore is equal to the formation pressure. Owing to the nature of gas bubbles, they tend to
rise in a fluid which has a greater density than their own. If a gas bubble rises without
expansion, it will have the same pressure at the surface as it had on bottom and will “bring”
bottomhole formation pressure to the surface! The consequences can be disastrous, possibly
resulting in ruptured casing or an underground blowout.
On the other hand, if we allow the volume of gas to increase as the bubble rises in the
annulus, then according to Boyle's Law, the pressure in the gas bubble will decrease. This is
precisely the action taken when using Volumetric Control. We allow the gas bubble to
expand; we can measure the gas expansion by measuring the amount of mud bled off through
the choke.
6-40 October 2005

Second Basic Principle - Hydrostatic Pressure: Pressure at the bottom of a column of static
mud equals the hydrostatic pressure of the mud plus the pressure applied to the top of the
column.
Pressure at bottom of mud column = Hydrostatic Pressure + Surface Pressure
Although not “surface pressure”, the pressure in a gas bubble migrating up a well will
similarly act on the mud column below it, increasing the pressure at the bottom of the mud
column (e.g. at the bottom of the hole) by the pressure in the gas bubble. We could state this
as:
Bottomhole Pressure = Hydrostatic Pressure below bubble + gas bubble Pressure
When the gas bubble migrates up one foot in the well, there will be one additional foot of
mud below the gas bubble. The additional foot of mud below the gas bubble increases the
hydrostatic pressure of the mud below the gas bubble. If the bubble pressure remains
constant while moving upward by this foot, the bottomhole pressure will increase by the
hydrostatic pressure provided by this “new” foot of mud below the bubble.
If we bleed mud from the annulus in order to provide room for the gas bubble to expand, we
naturally reduce the volume of mud in the annulus and, therefore, the hydrostatic pressure as
well. When the mud is bled from the annulus, it is very important that it is done in a way that
holds the casing pressure (surface pressure) constant. From the above equation, it's clear that
if we bleed mud from the annulus while holding the casing pressure constant, then the
bottomhole pressure will decrease.
Therefore, in Volumetric Control, there are two ways to influence the bottomhole pressure:
1. Do nothing. The gas bubble will rise, and bottomhole pressure will go up along
with surface pressure.
2. Bleed mud from the annulus. Assuming we do this while holding surface
pressure constant, bottomhole pressure will go down by the amount of
hydrostatic pressure lost as mud is bled off.
We must be very careful to lose only calculated amounts of hydrostatic pressure when
bleeding mud from the annulus. If the surface pressure is allowed to bleed off, or if the
hydrostatic pressure is lowered too much, an underbalanced condition may result and
additional gas may enter the well. We want to bleed off just enough to keep surface pressure
constant until loss of wellbore hydrostatic pressure equals the amount of overpressure we
allowed to build up in the well prior to bleeding. In order to accomplish this, we need to
equate the desired loss in hydrostatic pressure with the volume of mud bled off at the surface.
The casing pressure can be allowed to increase by this lost pressure in order to keep
bottomhole pressure from changing. It is for this reason that we measure the amount of mud
bled off from the annulus and equate that volume to a reduction in hydrostatic pressure.
October 2005 6-41

Third Basic Principle - Volume and Height: These factors are required in order to calculate
the reduction in hydrostatic pressure which occurs each time mud is bled from the annulus.
The drop in hydrostatic pressure occurring as a result of each mud volume bled must be
known.
Annulus capacity factors can be calculated with the following formula:
Annulus Capacity Factor
OD2 -ID2
ACF = ------------------
1029.4
Where: ACF = Annulus Capacity Factor (bbl/ft)
OD = Outside Diameter of Annular Space(in)
ID = Inside Diameter of Annular Space (in)
Description of the Volumetric Control Method
The Volumetric Control Method is not a kill method, but instead is a method of controlling
the bottomhole pressure until provisions can be made to circulate or bullhead kill mud into
the well.
The purpose of Volumetric Control is to permit controlled expansion of the gas bubble as it
migrates up the hole. We allow the gas bubble to expand by holding casing pressure constant
while bleeding off mud at the surface. Casing pressure is held constant only while the mud is
being bled off; at other times it is allowed to increase naturally. Each barrel of mud that we
bleed off at the surface changes the wellbore environment as follows:
Each barrel of mud that we bleed from the annulus causes......
...... the well to accommodate a gas bubble expanding by one barrel.

...... the hydrostatic pressure of the mud in the annulus to decrease.
...... the bottomhole pressure to decrease by a calculated amount.
Volumetric Control is accomplished in a series of steps that causes the bottomhole pressure
to rise and fall in succession. We wait while the gas bubble rises and the casing pressure and
bottomhole pressure go up. Then we keep casing pressure from increasing further by
bleeding mud from the annulus and the bottomhole pressure goes down. We again close in
the well and wait while the gas bubble rises, and then we hold this new, higher casing
pressure constant by bleeding mud. In this way, bottomhole pressure is held within a range of
values that is high enough to prevent another influx and low enough to prevent an
underground blowout. This cycle is repeated until either the casing pressure quits building
6-42 October 2005

(i.e. the gas quits migrating) or the last of the gas has reached surface (in the event the gas is
strung out in the wellbore).
Step 1 - Calculations
There are three calculations which need to be performed before a Volumetric Control
procedure can be executed. These are:
1. Safety Factor
2. Pressure Increment
3. Mud Increment
The Safety Factor (SF) is an increase in the bottomhole pressure which is allowed to occur
naturally as gas migrates up the annulus with the well shut in. It is important that we allow
the bottomhole pressure to increase to a value which is sufficiently above the formation
pressure to ensure that we don't go underbalanced while performing the later steps. An
appropriate value for the safety factor is in the range of 50 to 200 psi in most cases.
Depending on the value selected, depth, angle, hole size, and fluid in the well, it may take
from minutes to several hours for the gas bubble to rise sufficiently to increase the casing
pressure by this amount.
If the initial SICP is close to MISICP, it may be advisable to select a small safety factor. Any
increase in the bottomhole pressure will be reflected as an equal increase in the shoe pressure
as well. If the shoe is close to its fracture pressure, then the safety factor will have to be
appropriately reduced. If you calculate that a 200 psi safety factor will break the shoe down,
then a 100 psi safety factor might be more suitable.
The pressure increment (PI) is the amount of pressure to be used as a working pressure
range while performing the Volumetric Control Method. It is both the amount of surface
pressure increase to be tolerated per step, as well as the amount of the reduction in
hydrostatic pressure that occurs during each step in which a given volume of mud is bled
from the annulus. The Drill Site Manager should generally select a pressure increment about
equal to the value of the Safety Factor (rounded to the nearest 10 psi).
As an example, let us assume a Safety Factor of 100 psi has been selected; then the
recommended Pressure Increment should also be 100 psi.
October 2005 6-43

The mud increment (MI) is the volume of mud which must be bled from the annulus in
order to reduce the annular hydrostatic pressure by the amount of the Pressure Increment
determined above. The Mud Increment can be calculated with the equation given below. It is
very important that some means be available to measure the small volumes of mud that are
bled from the annulus.
Mud Increment
PI x ACF
Mud Increment = --------------------
MW x 0.052
where:
PI = Pressure Increment (psi)
ACF = Annulus Capacity Factor (bbl/ft)
MW = Mud Weight (ppg)
As an example, if a Pressure Increment of 100 psi is selected, and the annulus capacity factor
is 0.0704 bbl/ft with a mud weight of 11.3 ppg, then the proper Mud Increment is 12 bbl.
Step 2 - Allow Casing Pressure To Increase To Establish Safety Factor Plus Pressure
Increment
After the calculations are completed, the next step in Volumetric Control is to wait for the
gas bubble to migrate up the hole and cause an increase in the shut-in casing pressure. This
would actually be occurring as calculations were being made. At the start, the casing
pressure is allowed to increase by an amount equal to the Safety Factor plus the amount equal
to the Pressure Increment. Since no mud has been bled off from the annulus, the hydrostatic
pressure of the mud in the well has not changed since the well was first shut in.
At this point therefore, the bottomhole pressure has also increased by the amount of the
Safety Factor (100 psi) plus Pressure Increment (100 psi), and the well should be safely, but
not excessively overbalanced (200 psi total overbalance).
Step 3 - Hold Casing Pressure Constant Until The Mud Increment Is Bleed Off
Given the 200 psi overbalance caused by the pressure increases in Step 2, the casing pressure
can be kept from rising further by bleeding mud from the well. This can be done until the
first Mud Increment has been bled from the well. The manner in which the mud is bled off
from the annulus is very important; it must be bled in such a way that the casing pressure
remains constant throughout the entire bleeding. This is done to ensure that the bottomhole
pressure is reduced only by a loss in the mud hydrostatic pressure, and not by an additional
loss in surface pressure. In practice, multiple small choke openings and closures may be
required during a bleed step so as to maintain surface pressure “constant” during bleeds.
6-44 October 2005

During the bleeding process, the hydrostatic pressure is reduced by the Pressure Increment
while the surface pressure is held the same, so the bottomhole pressure is also reduced by the
Pressure Increment (100 psi).
While Bleeding Mud From The Annulus
Bottomhole Pressure = Hydrostatic Pressure + Surface Pressure
(Goes Down) (Goes Down) (Stays the Same)
Each time mud is bled from the annulus, the gas bubble expands to fill the volume vacated by
the mud. As the gas bubble expands, the pressure in the bubble decreases according to
Boyle's Law.
NOTE: It is not possible to make gas expand. If surface pressure is not maintained constant
(i.e. it is allowed to drop by bleeding too much at one time), the volume bled off may be
partially replaced by additional influx entering the well from the formation. This defeats the
purpose of the method and can lead to a more severe well control situation.
Step 4 - Wait For The Casing Pressure To Increase As The Gas Bubble Migrates
Each “mud increment” volume of mud bled from the annulus reduces the bottomhole
pressure by the amount of the Pressure Increment. By the end of the bleed step, this decreases
the overbalance back to a value equal to the Safety Factor. We then simply wait for the gas
bubble to migrate up the annulus, causing both surface pressure and bottomhole pressure to
increase (just as when the safety factor was initially applied). We wait for the gas bubble to
rise until the surface casing pressure has increased by an amount equal to the Pressure
Increment. At this point, bottomhole pressure has also increased by the amount of the
Pressure Increment, and the well is again overbalanced by the Safety Factor plus Pressure
Increment (200 psi total).
Step 5 - Hold Casing Pressure Constant By Bleeding Mud From The Annulus
Once maximum overbalance returns to the well, the casing pressure can again be held
constant by bleeding mud from the annulus. As with the first bleed step, this has to stop when
the Mud Increment has been bled from the well. This reduces the bottomhole pressure by the
amount of the Pressure Increment, because a like amount of mud hydrostatic pressure has
been bled from the well. This has also permitted the gas bubble to expand by the volume of
the Mud Increment.
October 2005 6-45

Step 6 - Alternate Holding Casing Pressure Constant and Letting Gas Bubble Rise
The remainder of the Volumetric Control procedure is simply a succession of repeating steps
4 & 5 above, holding casing pressure constant and then letting it rise, holding casing pressure
constant and then letting it rise, holding casing pressure constant and then letting it rise, until
the gas has finally migrated all the way to the surface. Each time the casing pressure is held
constant and mud is bled, the bottomhole pressure falls and each time the casing pressure is
allowed to rise as the bubble migrates without expansion, the bottomhole pressure rises.
During each bleed step, the gas bubble expands and lowers the pressure in the bubble. By the
time the gas reaches the surface, it has expanded to many times its original volume, so its
pressure is greatly reduced.
Volumetric Control Method Example
"JJ" Flash, the Chevron Drill Site Manager, was glad he had been to Well Control School
last week on his days off because he now needed to use what he had learned. Kicks were
common while drilling through "The Trend," but this one had just turned ugly. Just moments
after he started pumping using the Driller’s Method, something fully plugged him off at the
bit. He noticed one of the roustabouts searching for a glove out by the pipe racks, and knew
he would have to use Volumetric Control. After getting the well closed in again, JJ gathered
up the following information and jotted it down in his tally book:
Hole Size: 8-1/2”

Drill Pipe: 5" X.H. MISICP: 994 psi
Mud Weight: 14.7 ppg Shoe Test:16.5 ppg EMW
Ann. Cap. Factor: 0.0459 bbl/ft SICP: 500 psi
TD:14,400' MD/TVD SIDP: 350 psi
Casing Shoe: 12,220' MD/TVD Pit Gain: 24 bbl
JJ knew that, to employ Volumetric Control, he had to determine a safety factor, pressure
increment, and mud increment. But he also knew he had to check the shoe pressure first.
Under shut-in conditions, he realized that the SICP was about 500 psi below MISICP. With
this margin, he felt OK with a safety factor of 100 psi and about an equal pressure increment
(100 psi) to use as a working range. So he decided to limit the overbalance to a maximum of
200 psi.
JJ noticed that after shut-in pressures initially stabilized, it only took about 20 minutes for
the casing pressure to rise 200 psi, from the initial shut-in value of 500 psi to 700 psi. JJ
decided that this was the maximum overbalance he was going to permit. So he started
holding casing pressure constant by cracking open the choke while asking the crew to
measure the volume bled off.
JJ next got out his calculator and began to calculate the mud increment that would
correspond to his 100 psi pressure increment.
6-46 October 2005

PI x ACF 100 x 0.0459

Mud Increment = -------------------- = ------------------- = 6.0 bbls
MW x 0.052 14.7 x 0.052
He then knew that for every 6.0 bbls of mud that was bled from the annulus, the hydrostatic
pressure would be reduced by 100 psi. With these calculations completed, he was ready to
proceed.
To help them measure small volumes, JJ had the rig crew arrange to take returns from the
poor boy mud/gas separator to a single, relatively small active system tank. He told the
Derrickman to get a good, accurate starting volume reading on the tank and to let him know
as soon as the volume increased by 6.0 bbls. JJ knew he might be working with the choke for
a long time, so he got a Roughneck to bring a chair up to the rig floor next to the manual
choke he was going to use to bleed off small casing pressure increases. Then he sat and
concentrated on holding the casing pressure constant.
As the pressure tried to creep up above 700 psi, JJ cracked the choke and bled-off the first
little bit of mud from the annulus; the drop on the casing pressure gauge was imperceptible.
He bled a little more mud and the casing pressure gauge dropped back to 700 psi. JJ closed
the choke. He continued to prevent the casing pressure from rising much above 700 psi by
bleeding mud in small increments. About two hours later, the derrickman finally called him
to report that he’d collected 6.0 bbls in the active.
At this point, JJ knew that he had lowered the bottomhole pressure by 100 psi as he had bled
the 6.0 bbls from the annulus, so he closed the choke and waited while the gas bubble
migrated further up the hole. In a few minutes, the casing pressure gauge rose 100 psi to 800
psi (700 psi + 100 psi = 800 psi).
Now that he had his full 200 psi maximum overbalance back on the well, it was time to hold
the casing pressure constant again. He kept the casing pressure from rising much above 800
psi until he had bled another 6.0 barrels of mud from the annulus. It took a long time to
accumulate this second, 6.0 bbls of mud, but not as long as the first 6.0 barrels.
For the next 5 1/2 hours, JJ alternately let the casing pressure rise, then held it constant until
the mud tank level went up by 6.0 bbls. Starting with the 8th time he was holding casing
pressure constant (at 1400 psi), JJ started getting gas along with mud through the choke.
After checking to be sure the measuring tank was catching the mud and gas was venting
safely, he continued the bleeding and build up steps until the casing pressure reached 1700
psi and eventually stayed constant without need to continue to bleed off.
After checking to make sure the pipe rams weren't leaking and that pressures remained
steady, JJ felt fine, since everything was in order. Just then the perforating truck pulled up to
the location to shoot some holes in the drill collars. He was relieved that he wasn’t going to
need to Lube and Bleed, but would instead be able to use the Driller’s Method to circulate
that gas kick out within the hour.
October 2005 6-47

BHP vs. Time

11800
11750
11700
11650
Bottom hole Pressure (psi)
11600
11550
11500
11450
Pressure increases while shut-in
11400
11350 Pressure decreases while bleeding off

11300
11250
11200
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (minutes)
Figure 6.5.1 Volumetric Control Example Pressures
A plot of JJ's Volumetric Control procedure is shown above. Each time he held the casing
pressure constant, the bottomhole pressure decreased, and each time he let the casing
pressure rise the bottomhole pressure increased. The gas bubble volume increased by 6.0 bbls
each time he held casing pressure constant by bleeding mud, and it rose from its initial
volume of 24 bbls to 88 bbls when pressures finally stabilized (24 bbl kick + 64 bbls bled =
88 bbls).
Other Volumetric Considerations
Annulus Capacity Factor: The annulus capacity factor that is used to determine the mud
increment, should, in theory, be the ACF for the location of the gas bubble at the end of the
bleed stage. Note that the annulus capacity factor may change as the gas bubble migrates up
the hole, particularly if a tapered drill string is in use or a drilling liner is installed in the well.
If the bubble migrates into a smaller annular space, then less mud needs to be bled from the
annulus to produce the same hydrostatic pressure reduction. Use of an erroneously large
annulus capacity factor leads to underbalance and use of an erroneously small capacity factor
leads to overbalance.
6-48 October 2005

To avoid such errors, it may be possible to estimate the location of the influx at the end of
each bleed cycle and use the then current ACF for calculations. To do this, it may be possible
to estimate the rate of gas bubble migration with the formula below:
Rate of Gas Bubble Rise
∆ SICP
ROR = -------------------------
MW x 0.052 x ∆T
where:
ROR = Rate of Rise (ft/min)
∆ SICP = Change in Shut-in Casing Pressure (psi)
MW = Mud Weight (ppg)
∆T = Time from end of last bleed to start of next bleed (min.)
If an accurate time log is kept of the Volumetric Control procedure, then the rate of rise can
be estimated each time the casing pressure is allowed to rise. Remember, however, that the
gas bubble will continue to rise when the casing pressure is being held constant.
This calculation, while accurate in terms of well control theory, often significantly
underestimates the rate of gas migration in actual wells. For this reason, it is generally
recommended to simply use the Drill pipe x Casing ACF just below the BOP for the entire
Volumetric control operation (or just Casing capacity factor if there is no pipe at all below
the BOP).
This simplification generally results in a minor overbalance occurring as an influx migrates

from open hole into the annular space below the BOP, but avoids the underbalance that can
occur if the rate of gas migration (and hence, influx location) is inaccurately determined. In
wellbores with unusual geometry (in which annulus capacity factors increase significantly at
depths in which gas expansion is also significant), it may be necessary to select safety factors
sufficiently large to overcome any potential underbalance when using this simplification.
Use of Volumetric Method with Subsea BOPs: The potentially significant loss of
hydrostatic pressure that occurs as gas replaces mud in the choke line requires consideration
when using Volumetric control. It would be desirable to use the choke line capacity factor
rather than the Drill pipe x Casing ACF from the time gas enters the choke line. If this isn’t
done, the well may become significantly underbalanced; if done too soon, the well may be
excessively overbalanced. When a static kill line is available, it is possible to detect the entry
of gas into the choke line by observing that the choke and kill line gauges will begin to
diverge (choke line gauge will climb and stay higher) once this occurs. At that point,
Volumetric control can continue by using the choke line capacity factor to recalculate the
mud increment (which will generally be much smaller). The SICP increase from this point on
may become dramatic, particularly in long choke lines (deep water).
October 2005 6-49

Directional Wells: In deviated wells, bubble migration rates may be higher and the bubble
may string out more. Unless the shallow portions of the well are significantly deviated (as in
slant-hole drilling), it is not recommended to adjust the mud increment to compensate for the
reduced TVD of the bubble in the deviated section: By simply using the ACF for the vertical
section (even when the influx is presumably still in deviated hole), hydrostatic changes
(reduction) caused by the bubble moving from the deviated to the vertical hole section can be
automatically accounted for (i.e. any mud bleeds with gas in the deviated hole section will
produce some added overbalance if a vertical wellbore is assumed, and this pressure
overbalance will help to offset the hydrostatic reduction that occurs when the bubble
transitions from the deviated to the vertical hole section).
Similarity to Driller's Method: In essence, the Volumetric Control procedure is identical to

the first circulation of the Driller's Method, except that no pumps are used. With volumetric
control, the influx is allowed to migrate out of the hole rather than being circulated out of the
hole. Once the influx has reached surface, the well should be in essentially the same state that
it would have been if the first circulation of Driller's Method had been stopped when gas first
reached the choke. Worst-case estimates of pressure at this time (end of Volumetric Method)
should be equal to PcMax as calculated for the Driller’s Method.
On the figure below, note the shape of the casing pressure curve while using the Volumetric
Method (values here correspond to JJ’s example above). This curve essentially matches the
theoretical worst case surface casing pressure curve we could generate if using the Driller’s
Method, though the time frame is extended since gas in this example moves slower while
migrating than it would if we were circulating it up with a pump.
Notice as well the dramatic shortening of successive bleed steps: though nothing happens
very fast at the beginning, things happen progressively faster as the influx approaches the
surface.
6-50 October 2005

Shut-In Casing Pressure vs. Time
1800
1600
1400
Shut-In Casing Pressure (psi)
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (minutes)
Figure 6.5.2 Volumetric Control Example Pressures
Casing Pressure Continues to Rise With Gas at the Surface: This may occur if the gas
bubble is strung-out (which is quite likely). Since gas contributes very little to the hydrostatic
pressure of the fluids in the well, it can usually be bled from the well without causing much
of a pressure reduction at the bottom of the hole. Therefore, if gas reaches the surface and the
casing pressure continues to rise, the Drill Site Manager should continue using the
Volumetric Method, bleeding mud or gas through the choke, measuring the volume of de-
gassed mud bled off as usual. This can be continued until shut-in surface pressures no longer
rise.
End of Volumetric Method: Used correctly, Volumetric control can continue until SICP is
stable. At this time, gas has likely accumulated below the BOP. It is important to not bleed
off this gas except by use of another appropriate method designed to keep BHP constant. In
many cases, the Driller’s method can be used when pumping mud below the bubble is
possible. In other cases where pumping is not an option, it may be necessary to use the
Lubricate and Bleed Method to properly remove the gas and/or reduce surface pressures
without allowing the well to go underbalanced and take additional influx.
With no float in drill string: In cases where either no float or a ported float is being used in
the drill string, it is sometimes possible to control BHP by simply using the drill string as an
extension of the drill pipe pressure gauge. If the string is full of gas-free fluid, it is a simple
matter to hold drill pipe pressure constant by bleeding off excess annular pressure through
the choke. This will accomplish the goal of the Volumetric Method (allows gas to expand
October 2005 6-51

appropriately while migrating to surface). But it should be relied on only when it is certain
that the drill pipe fluid is gas free, and the drill pipe is in communication with the bottomhole
formation (no plugging).
Since it would only be used when unable to pump (otherwise use of the Driller’s Method is
recommended), it is generally not possible to pump fresh fluid into the drill pipe prior to
using this technique. Care is recommended when making assumptions that drill string fluid is
gas free when a well is shut-in after a kick, as many wells have blown out through the drill
string when no float was used. Chevron recommends routine use of a float, with application
of the conventional Volumetric Method for the infrequent situation where circulating at or
near the bottom of the hole is not possible.
6.6 Lubricate & Bleed
Sometimes during major well control situations, there comes a time when gas is at surface
and it is not possible to circulate (as could easily be the case after using the Volumetric
Control procedure). This is the point in time that the surface pressure is the highest due to
decreased hydrostatic in the well. When this occurs, the best way to remove the gas is by
circulating through the drill string, so long as the bottom of the drill string is below the gas.
When such circulation is not possible, the well may have to be “lubricated and bled”. The
theory involved in lubricating and bleeding is the same as that for Volumetric Control but in
reverse. Surface pressure is replaced with hydrostatic pressure by pumping mud into the well
on top of the gas. The gas and mud are allowed to change places in the hole and a certain
amount of the surface pressure is then bled off.
In some cases it may be considered impossible to remove all trapped gas, or the mud
currently in the hole may be too light to balance formation pressure. In these cases it is
sometimes desirable to lubricate extra heavy mud into the hole, thereby reducing the need for
surface pressure.
The lubricate and bleed procedure is listed in the following steps:
Step 1 - Calculate
Calculate the hydrostatic pressure that will be exerted by 1 barrel of whatever mud will be
pumped into the well.
Step 2 - Lubricate
Slowly pump a given volume of mud into the well. The amount chosen will depend on many
different well conditions and may change throughout the procedure. The rise in surface
pressure can be estimated by applying Boyle's law of P1 x V1 = P2 x V2 and realizing that
for every barrel of mud pumped into the well the bubble size decreases by 1 barrel.
6-52 October 2005

Step 3 - Wait
Allow the gas to migrate back to the surface. This step could take quite some time and is
dependent on a number of factors such as mud weight and viscosity.
Step 4 - Bleed
Bleed gas from the well until the surface pressure is reduced by an amount equal to the
hydrostatic pressure of the mud pumped in. It is very important to bleed only gas. If at any
time during the procedure mud reaches the surface and is bled from the well, the well should
be shut in and the gas allowed to migrate through (“swap out” with) the mud that has been
injected.
Step 5 - Repeat Previous Steps
Repeat steps 2 through 4 until all of the gas has been bled off or a desired surface pressure
has been reached.
Surface pressure will, of course, increase during lubrication (pumping in). The amount of this
increase will depend on the volume of gas being compressed in the well; a relatively small
pressure increase would indicate a relatively large gas volume. The Chevron Well Control
CD contains a PC program that uses this relationship to estimate the volume of gas remaining
in the well (assuming an intact U-tube). This volume can then be used to determine a value of
MAASP appropriate for that well condition (e.g. known volume of gas in wellbore above
casing shoe of known strength).
As mud hydrostatic pressure in the well increases during each lubrication step, the value of
MAASP decreases. Since gas volume also decreases each time gas is bled off, a point may be
reached when lubrication may need to be stopped in order to avoid exceeding MAASP.
While some gas may remain in the well at this point, Lubricate and Bleed procedures may
not be able to be used further.
Because of this, the well may or may not be “dead” at the end of this process. And, even if
surface pressure is reduced to 0 psi by lubricating a heavy mud, primary well control may
still require running into the hole in order to displace the wellbore fluids to a single, kill
density mud. Care must be taken while running pipe into the hole to ensure drill string
displacement of a heavy mud “slug” at the top of the annulus does not cause the well to
become hydrostatically underbalanced once again.
6.7 Bullheading
Bullheading is a technique that may be used in certain circumstances during drilling

operations to pump an influx back into the formation. The well fluids are pumped back into
the reservoir, generally by displacing the casing using a sufficient quantity of kill fluid. This
type of kill method works when there are no obstructions in the annulus and injection into the
October 2005 6-53

formation can be achieved without exceeding any pressure limitations (such as MAASP), or
where formation breakdown is considered preferable to alternative outcomes.
Note: This technique may or may not result in fracturing the formation.
When to Bullhead
During drilling operations, bullheading may be considered in the following situations:
• When a very large influx has been taken.
• When displacement of the influx by conventional methods may cause excessive

surface pressures (i.e. exceeding MASP which might risk casing burst near the
wellhead).
• When displacement of the influx by conventional methods would result in an

excessive volume of gas at surface conditions (i.e. a volume that may exceed mud-
gas separator throughput limitation).
• If the influx in suspected to contain an unacceptable level of H2S.
• When a kick is taken with the pipe off bottom and it is not considered feasible to
strip back to bottom.
• When an influx is taken with no pipe in the hole.
• To reduce surface pressures prior to implementing further well control operations.
Note: The decision to bullhead during drilling operations must be made promptly after shut-
in (ideally considered as a contingency during planning). If there is a delay before the
decision is made to use this technique, then gas may migrate upwards and decrease the
chance of being forced back into the formation that produced it. Pumping with this method
(pressuring the wellbore) can result in formation fracture at the shoe or other weak point in
the system.
The Important Factors
Bullheading during drilling operations should only be considered when standard well control
techniques are considered inappropriate. During such situations, it is rare that accurate
information is available regarding exact exposed formation injectivity or fracture
characteristics. In most cases therefore, the likelihood of successfully bullheading an influx
will not be known until it is attempted.
However, the major factors that will determine the feasibility of bullheading include the
following:
6-54 October 2005

• The characteristics of the openhole.

Note: Low reservoir permeability may require that the fracture pressure be
exceeded.
• The rated pressure of the well control equipment and the casing (making allowance
for wear and deterioration).
• Drill pipe and casing pressure limits should be known and not exceeded.
Note: In some cases, it may be possible to apply pressure to the outside of the
innermost casing to help stay below burst limits during the bullheading operation.
• The type of influx and the relative permeability of the formation.
Note: Gas migration, should it occur, may present a serious problem as downward
fluid velocity may have to exceed migration rates in order to displace the influx into
the formation. Viscosifiers added to the kill fluid may or may not help limit
migration.
• The position of the influx in the hole.
• The quality of the filter cake at the permeable formation.
• The consequences of fracturing a section of the openhole.
• The consequences of displacement of large volumes of drilling fluids into potentially
productive formations exposed.
Procedure
In general bullheading procedures can only be drawn up bearing in mind the particular
circumstances at the rig site. For example, there may be situations in which it is considered
necessary to bullhead away an influx containing H2S, even if this is expected to cause a
fracture downhole. In another situation with shallow casing set, it may be considered totally
unacceptable to cause a fracture in the open hole (risk of broaching may be more serious than
risk caused by high pressures or undesirable fluids at surface).
For situations in which bullheading is considered potentially applicable (expected H2S, short
open hole exposure, low migration probability, etc), it may be useful to anticipate and
prepare for possible use of bullheading before exposing a potential kick zone. When used
promptly in the proper situation, bullheading can be an effective means of enhancing safety
and reducing costs. In other situations it is often considered only as a last resort when
conventional control methods have failed.
A procedure for bullheading should be drawn up along the following lines:
(1) With the well closed-in, calculate surface pressures that would be expected to
cause formation fracture during bullheading.
October 2005 6-55

(2) Prepare a chart using strokes versus pumping pressure if mud heavier than
original mud weight is to be used (as when attempting to reduce surface
pressure).
(3) If gas is already present at the surface, use Lubricate and Bleed procedures to
eliminate the gas before commencing bullheading.
(4) Bring the pumps up to speed to overcome the well pressure and slowly pump
the kill fluid down the annulus. Monitor pump pressure during the operation.
Note: Be careful not to exceed any maximum pressures (MASP or MISICP unless
formation breakdown is considered tolerable).
(5) Attempt to pump fast enough to exceed the rate at which gas may be
migrating.
(6) As the produced fluids are forced back into the formation, the added
hydrostatic pressure should lower the pumping pressure. Record all pressure
values on the chart.
(7) Stop the pump (unless an over displacement has been approved) and shut-in
the well and monitor the situation.
Note: If pressure is observed, then the gas may have migrated up-hole faster than the
fluid was being pumped down, or the fluid density in the hole is not sufficient to kill
the well.
6.8 Pipe Off Bottom - Stripping to Bottom
One of the most serious well control problems faced by a Drill Site Manager is being off
bottom or out of the hole with a kick in the wellbore. Kicks taken with the pipe off bottom
(or out of the hole) create a serious complication to conventional well control techniques.
When a kick occurs on a trip, or with pipe out of the hole, there are several options available
to deal with the kick. Some of these options include:
• Kill the well off bottom (generally not a recommended practice)

• Use Volumetric Control if you have a migrating gas kick in the well
• Strip the drill pipe back to bottom
• Strip using Volumetric Control if you have a migrating gas kick in
the well
• Snub the drill pipe back in the well
This section will discuss the stripping and snubbing options available to field personnel in
these well control situations.
6-56 October 2005

Stripping and snubbing are specialized operations used to trip tubulars into or out of a
pressurized wellbore through the blowout preventers. Normally, the objective of these
operations is to return the pipe to bottom where the well can be conventionally circulated to
remove the influx.
Stripping can be defined as tripping pipe through the blowout preventers when the drill
string weight is greater than the net upward force created from wellbore pressures.
Snubbing is defined as forcing pipe through the blowout preventers when the drill string
weight is not sufficient to overcome the net upward force created by wellbore pressures. As
snubbing requires specialized equipment not routinely available on a drilling rig, it will not
be detailed here. More information about snubbing operations is available in the Chevron
Workover Well Control manual.
To adequately understand stripping, familiarity with the pressures and forces involved in
these operations is a must. In this section we will discuss the following concepts associated
with stripping:
• Initial shut-in considerations

• Effects of stripping/snubbing pipe into the well
• Influx penetration
• BHP control procedures
• Practical considerations
Understanding these concepts is vital to the success of stripping operations.
Initial Shut-In Considerations
Unlike kicks taken with the pipe on bottom, kicks taken while tripping usually result in shut-
in drill pipe pressures and shut-in casing pressures that are the same or nearly the same (as
shown in the figure below). This can make kill weight fluid density determination difficult.
However, in most cases (i.e., if a proper flow check was done prior to the trip out), the fluid
density in the well will be sufficient to control the well. Kick type determination can also be
somewhat difficult, but a change in the shut-in surface pressures is, in most cases, an
indication of influx migration and a gas kick. Kick type determination is vital in the decision
making process since it will, along with other factors, dictate whether or not Volumetric
Control will be used during the stripping operation.
October 2005 6-57

200 psi
200 psi
Figure 6.8.1
Another critical consideration is how far the drill string is off bottom. If you are only a few
stands off bottom, conventional circulating techniques may be sufficient to kill the well.
However, if you are a few thousand feet off bottom, you may have to strip the drill pipe to
bottom to effectively remove the influx and kill the well. The condition of the annular
preventer element should be taken into account when making the decision whether or not to
strip thousands of feet of pipe into a well.
Just like all other well control operations, rig crews should be aware of their individual
responsibilities during stripping. A safety meeting prior to initiating the operation is
recommended to outline and stress each individual's duties during the operation.
Stripping drill pipe into the wellbore requires the use of an inside blowout preventer of some
type and a workable annular closing pressure regulator valve. The inside blowout preventer is
designed to prevent flow up the drill pipe during stripping operations and still enable forward
circulation of the well once the drill pipe has been stripped to the desired depth.
There are two stripping techniques, Annular and Ram combination stripping. Annular
stripping is considered a relatively simple technique. It involves less risk than ram
combination stripping for the following reasons:
During annular stripping the only item of well control equipment that is subject to high levels
of stress is the annular element.
The control system is not highly stressed during the operation (as is the case during ram
combination stripping).
6-58 October 2005

The annular element can be changed out on a surface stack when pipe is in the hole by
inserting a split element.
The upper annular preventer, on a floating rig, is the only stack component that is subject to
wear and this can be changed without pulling the complete BOP stack.
Ram combination stripping is possible on all types of rig but involves significantly more risk.
Chevron does not recommend Ram combination stripping with a rig BOP (though this may
be considered if using a specialized snubbing BOP stack).
The surface pressure is the overriding factor which determines whether or not it will be
possible to implement annular stripping. However, it is also necessary to consider that the
operating life of an annular element is severely reduced by increased wellbore pressure.
Field tests carried out on Hydril and Shaffer 5K Annulars, show good performance at 800 psi
wellbore pressure, but at 1500 psi and above the performance was severely reduced and
unpredictable.
If surface pressures indicate that annular stripping is not possible, attempts should be made to
reduce the pressures in order to enable annular stripping to be used. The most appropriate
technique will depend on the position of the influx in the hole. The options are:
• to circulate out the influx (applicable only when influx is above the circulation
depth)
• to bullhead
• if the influx is at the BOP, to remove the influx from the well using the Lubricate
& Bleed method.
The annular regulator valve allows you to reduce the annular operating pressure to a point
that will allow the drill pipe to be stripped more easily through the annular and into the
wellbore and will help ensure that the annular is not subjected to excessive pressures as the
tool joint is stripped through the element. It is very helpful to have a surge dampener in the
closing line (see figure 6.15). This may not be necessary on a surface stack if the pressure
regulator can respond fast enough to maintain a constant closing pressure as a tool joint is
stripped through the annular.
October 2005 6-59

Figure 6.8.2
When stripping pipe into the wellbore, there are special considerations that should be taken
into account. Two of these are the effects of lowering pipe into a closed-in well and the
effects of influx elongation as the drill string penetrates the bubble.
As pipe is lowered into a closed-in well, pressures increase similarly to what you would
observe when pumping into a closed-in well. In other words, as pipe is lowered into the well,
it traps pressure in the well, increasing bottomhole, casing, and wellbore pressures. Initially,
a certain amount of trapped pressure is desirable in order to prevent further influx from
entering the well while stripping or snubbing. Therefore, pipe is stripped into the well
without relieving this trapped pressure in order to establish a safety factor for the operation.
As in certain other well control procedures, some trapped pressure is desirable, but excessive
trapped pressure can result in severe fluid loss or fracturing of formations. Consequently,
when choosing the safety factor for a stripping job, check the MISICP (maximum initial
shut-in casing pressure).
Once the desired safety factor is established, fluid must be bled off at the surface to
compensate for the additional pipe being stripped into the well. There are two ways to do
this: one is the volume accounting method, and the other is the constant surface pressure
method.
6-60 October 2005

Volume Accounting
For the volume accounting method, the volume of fluid needed to bleed from the well must
be determined as pipe is run, and this volume has to be measured accurately. The volume can
be determined by using the following equation:
2
Volume = OD
1029
Where: Volume = Pipe volume added (bbls/ft)

OD = Pipe outer diameter (in.)
Another way to determine the volume is to simply add the pipe capacity factor (bbl/ft) to the
pipe displacement factor (bbl/ft).
Example:
Calculate the bleed off requirement (bbls) for stripping 5 stands
(93'/stand) of 5" drill pipe.
2
Volume = OD
1029
2
Volume = (5)
1029
Volume = 0.02430 bbls/ft
So for 5 STDS: Volume = (0.02430 bbls/ft)(5 STDS)(93'/stand)
Volume = 11.3 bbls
We must bleed off 11.3 bbls of fluid.
Constant Surface Pressure
Instead of accounting for string volume, the second method involves maintaining constant
surface pressure by bleeding fluid through the choke as pipe is run in. Usually this “constant
surface pressure” method is easier to accomplish than volume accounting for the following
reasons:
• pressure responses are almost immediate while volume measurements require more
time before over or underbleeding trends can be identified
October 2005 6-61

• when controlling pressures, it isn't necessary to rig up a device to accurately measure

very small fluid volumes coming out of the choke line in order to bleed the proper
amount of fluid as pipe is stripped in.
• errors or trend changes are easier to detect; since the overall objective is to maintain
constant wellbore pressure, it makes sense to measure it directly, rather than monitor
and interpret volume changes that affect pressure
Influx Penetration
When the drill string penetrates the influx, the height of the influx increases. As the height of
the influx increases, the hydrostatic pressure decreases and the casing pressure must increase.
An increase in casing pressure will have to be accounted for at the surface, and choke
adjustments should be made correspondingly when stripping pipe into the well. Obviously,
the increase will be much more significant if the influx is gas, due to its lower density.
6-62 October 2005

135 psi 173 psi
Hole Size: 8.5”

Drill pipe: 5” 19.5#/ft
TVD: 10,000’
MW: 9.0 ppg
PGI: 0.3 psi/ft
Pit Gain: 30 bbl
OIL INFLUX
OIL INFLUX
Figure 6.8.3
When the volume accounting method is used, influx penetration isn't as much of a concern
since the casing pressure will rise on its own, automatically, when the kick fluid is
penetrated.
October 2005 6-63

If the constant surface pressure method is used, the influx penetration will have to be
accounted for by increasing the casing pressure. The amount casing pressure will have to
increase can be determined by using the following equation:
∆CP = ∆H (PGF - PGI)
Where: ∆CP = Increase in casing pressure (psi)

∆H = Change in influx length (ft.)
PGF = Pressure gradient of drilling fluid (psi/ft)
PGI = Pressure gradient of influx (psi/ft)
LK = Length of Kick influx
Given the information in the figure above, calculate the increase

in casing pressure required when penetrating the 30 bbl oil kick.
Solution: Using Equation: ∆CP = ∆H(PGF - PGI)
First we must determine the change in the length of the kick.
Initially LK = 30 bbl/(0.0702 bbl/ft) = 427'
Then when
Penetrated LK = 30 bbl/(0.0459 bbls/ft)= 653'
So:
∆CP = (653'-427')[(0.052 X 9) - 0.30]
∆CP = 38 psi
An estimation of the point in time when the drill string will penetrate the influx is
straightforward for kicks that don’t migrate (i.e., oil and saltwater kicks). Simply determine
the length of pipe that needs to be stripped into the well to penetrate the kick. For example, if
the pipe was 1,000' off bottom in our example problem, the influx would be penetrated after
running 1,000' - 427' = 573' of drill pipe.
As a practical matter, the safety factor can be made greater than the casing pressure
increase necessary to control BHP when the pipe penetrates the influx (provided, of
course, that the safety factor does not exceed the maximum shut-in casing pressure the
well can stand). If this approach is taken, then the well will still be overbalanced after
penetration. Determining the time when influx penetration actually occurs will not be
necessary.
6-64 October 2005

For a gas kick migrating in the well, it is not possible to rely on just the surface pressure or
just the volume bled. It is necessary to both accurately measure the volume of fluid bled and
maintain a constant surface pressure. Volumetric Control techniques have to be used at the
same time that the volume of pipe being stripped in the well is being accounted for.
Combining stripping or snubbing with Volumetric Control will be discussed next.
Stripping Procedures
The previous example problem dealt with stripping operations with an oil kick in the well
(the situation with a saltwater kick would be similar). However, when conducting stripping
operations with a migrating gas kick in the well, there are additional considerations that need
to be taken into account. These considerations mainly deal with gas migration and its effect
on both wellbore pressures and the stripping operation itself. They highlight the importance
of kick type determination at the outset of stripping operations.
As previously discussed in this manual, gas migration (in a closed in well) can cause trapped
pressure in the wellbore. If this trapped pressure is not properly relieved, then excessive fluid
loss or lost circulation problems can occur. Therefore, when conducting stripping operations
with a gas kick in the wellbore, fluid must be bled off to compensate for both the additional
pipe being run in the well and the effects of gas migration. We refer to this procedure as
Stripping with Volumetric Control.
When stripping pipe into the well using Volumetric Control, preliminary calculations must
be made. Not only must an applicable safety factor be chosen, but a pressure increment and
the corresponding fluid increment(s) also have to be determined. Ordinarily, two fluid
increments must be determined: one for the capacity of the hole (when the drill pipe is above
the bubble), and another for the annulus capacity around the drill pipe (when the drill string
penetrates the bubble).
As stated previously, when the drill string penetrates the bubble, the height of the bubble
increases and surface pressure adjustments must be made to compensate for the loss in
hydrostatic pressure. Additionally, when using Volumetric Control during stripping
operations, bubble penetration is also the point at which a new ACF for calculating the fluid
increment must change. Understanding and compensating for gas migration effects are
critical to the success of stripping operations.
Estimating the point in time when the drill string will penetrate the influx is not as straight
forward with gas kicks. In order to determine when the drill string will penetrate the gas
bubble, two calculations must be made. First, an estimation of the bubble migration rate can
be made from the observed rise in shut-in casing pressure. The equation below can be used to
determine the rate of migration:
October 2005 6-65

∆SICP
ROR =
FD X 0.052 X ∆T
Where: ROR = Migration rate (ft/hr)

∆SICP = Change in SICP (psi)
FD = Fluid density (ppg)
∆T = Time interval of casing pressure change (hrs)
Given the following information, calculate 300 psi

the gas migration rate:
300 psi
FD: 9 ppg
TVD: 10,000'
Drill pipe Depth: 2000'
ISICP: 300 psi
Pit Gain: 30 bbl
PG of the Influx: 0.1 psi/ft 2,000
Hole and Casing ID: 8.5" ft
Drill pipe: 5" 19.5#
While you are doing calculations,

surface pressures increase from
300 psi to 600 psi in 15 minutes.
Solution:
ROR = ∆SICP
FD X 0.052 X ∆T
First ∆SICP = 600 psi - 300 psi = 300 psi,
Then ∆T = 15 min/(60 min/hr) = 0.25hrs
So ROR = 300
9 X 0.052 X 0.25
ROR = 2564'/hr
The gas migration rate is 2564'/hr.
6-66 October 2005

The second calculation involves an estimate of the stripping speed. This approximate number
is also expressed in ft/hr, and can be measured during the initial stages of the stripping
operation. These two rates, along with the estimated distance from the bubble to the bit, can
be used to estimate the point in time when the drill string will penetrate the bubble. The time
can be estimated by using the equation:
DBubble - DBit
T = ----------------
MR + TS
Where: T = Time estimate to bubble penetration (hrs)

DBubble = Depth of the bubble (ft)
DBit = Depth of the bit (ft)
MR = Migration rate or ROR (ft/hr)
TS = Tripping Speed (ft/hr)
Keep in mind that this is an estimate and may not be accurate. When the bubble penetration
time is calculated in this manner, it's assumed that the bubble is all together and that its initial
location is known. If a kick is swabbed while tripping out of the hole, it's very possible that
kick fluid is strung out from just below the bottom of the bit to the bottom of the well. Under
these conditions, the time to bubble penetration calculation can be meaningless. Other
factors, such as a varied stripping speed, bubble expansion, and changing bubble density, are
also not accounted for with this technique.
Practically speaking, it's probably better to account for bubble penetration from the start so
that it doesn't matter when the bubble is penetrated or how strung out the bubble is. More will
be said about this later in the section.
Procedure for Stripping Without Volumetric Control
Once the well is shut-in, the following procedure can be used to strip the drill string back into
the well to the desired depth. This procedure does not include simultaneous volumetric
control bleeds and is therefore mainly designed for kicks that do not migrate (i.e., oil and
saltwater kicks), or when the string is relatively close to bottom.
1. Calculations
• Bit depth vs. kick depth - determine the number of stands or time to penetrate
the influx.
• Pressure increase due to influx penetration
• Net upward force vs. downward force - this can be done by simply slacking off.
If a “pipe light” condition exists, the pipe will have to be snubbed into the well.
October 2005 6-67

• Determine an appropriate safety factor - Add in the pressure increase due to

influx penetration if you are using the constant surface pressure method.
• Calculate the theoretical bleed volume (bbls) per stand of pipe to be stripped.
2. Stab and make up the inside BOP (or equivalent) on top of the safety valve. Once made
up open safety valve and ensure IBOP (or equivalent) is not leaking. If a non-ported drill
pipe float is installed in the string and is holding, you have the option of not installing the
IBOP and removing the safety valve. The drill pipe float will then be relied upon to
maintain pressure control in the drill pipe.
3. Regulate annular closing pressure to permit stripping. (Note: A small leak while stripping
is desirable, but make sure the annular is not leaking in the static state).
4. Strip pipe into the well until you establish the desired safety factor.
5. Continue by stripping to the desired depth while bleeding off the calculated fluid volume
(bbls.) per stand, or by maintaining constant casing pressure by bleeding fluid. (If volume
accounting is used, be aware that casing pressure will increase due to bubble penetration
by the amount calculated in Step 1.)
Procedure for Stripping With Volumetric Control
The following procedure simultaneously utilizes Stripping and Volumetric Control

techniques. It is designed to strip pipe back into the well while compensating for the effects
of gas migration. Hence, the stripping procedure is basically designed for gas kicks where the
additional trapped pressure from bubble migration could create severe fluid loss or lost
circulation problems.
1. Calculations
• Check the net upward force vs. downward force - if “pipe light," snub the pipe
into the well.
• Calculate the theoretical bleed volume (bbls) per stand of pipe to be stripped.
• Determine an appropriate Safety Factor (psi).
• Choose an applicable pressure increment (psi) and corresponding fluid

increments (bbls.).
• Bit depth and kick depth - determine the number of stands, or time to penetrate
the bubble based on migration rate and trip speed.
• Calculate the increase in casing pressure required when penetrating the bubble.
6-68 October 2005

2. Stab and make up inside BOP (or equivalent) on top of the safety valve. Once made-up,
open safety valve and ensure IBOP (or equivalent) is not leaking. If a non-ported drill pipe
float is installed in the string and is holding, you have the option of not installing the
IBOP and removing the safety valve. The drill pipe float will then be relied upon to
maintain pressure control in the drill pipe.
3. Regulate annular closing pressure to permit stripping. (Note: a small leak while stripping
is desirable, but make sure the annular is not leaking in the static state.)
4. Strip pipe into the well (or allow the gas to migrate) until you establish the desired safety
factor.
5. Continue stripping pipe into the well, bleeding off fluid to maintain constant casing
pressure. Record the volume of fluid bled for each stand of pipe stripped. The following
table should be filled out to keep track of the fluid bled from the well.
Table 6.8.1 Stripping Table
Stands Casing Volume Total Vol. Total Vol.

Difference
Stripped Pressure Bled Bled Stripped
6. When the “difference” (additional fluid bled above theoretical pipe displacement volume)
is equal to the calculated fluid increment volume: increase casing pressure (by stripping
additional pipe without bleeding fluid) by an amount equal to the predetermined pressure
increment (psi).
October 2005 6-69

7. Once the additional pressure increment has been established, repeat Steps 5 and 6 until
you penetrate the bubble.
8. Upon penetrating the bubble:
• Allow casing pressure to increase by the predetermined amount
• Adjust step 6 to compensate for the new fluid increment.
Note: It may be more practical to act as if you will penetrate the bubble immediately by
adding the casing pressure increase into your safety factor and using the fluid increment
calculated with the Drill pipe x Casing annulus capacity factor from the start. This is
discussed in the next subsection.
9. Repeat Steps 5 and 6 until the drill string is stripped to the desired depth.
Practical Stripping Considerations
Stripping to bottom without Volumetric Control is not a complex procedure. All that is
required is that bottomhole pressure be controlled while pipe is run in the well through the
shut-in BOP. This can be done in one of two ways: fluid is bled from the well that 1) equals
the volume stripped through the BOP, or 2) keeps the casing pressure constant.
Maintaining constant casing pressure is probably easier to do and easier to get started with,
while bleeding equivalent volumes does a better job of taking care of influx penetration.
However it's done, the process is not difficult for someone familiar with well control
concepts.
On the other hand, stripping to bottom with Volumetric Control is a complex procedure, and
is often made more complex by the way it's taught. Trying to keep track of the stripping
operation, the Volumetric Control procedure, bubble penetration, changing fluid increments,
and all the other little details involved can become an enormous task. In addition, the time to
bubble penetration calculation that accounts for some of these complications is not a very
accurate model of what is happening in the well.
A more practical way to strip with a migrating gas kick is to eliminate the need for the time
to bubble penetration calculation altogether. This is done in two ways. First, add the pressure
increase due to bubble penetration into the safety factor from the beginning so that when the
hydrostatic pressure in the well decreases as the influx is penetrated, the safety factor will
ensure that no further kick is taken. Second, calculate the fluid increment using the capacity
factor around the drill pipe. The same fluid increment is used throughout the entire stripping
procedure. Since this fluid increment will be smaller than the one that would be calculated
when the influx is below the drill pipe, the wellbore will be going slightly more overbalanced
until the influx is penetrated.
6-70 October 2005

As the string is stripped into the hole, it may be necessary to fill the pipe, as the float and/or
inside BOP should prevent it filling from the bottom. Be careful not to allow fluid volumes
used to fill the pipe to confuse measurements of fluids in the annulus (that is, fluids being
recorded on the stripping table).
One more practical matter needs to be mentioned. When stripping with Volumetric Control,
the Drill Site Manager maintains constant surface pressure until the amount of fluid bled
from the well exceeds, by the fluid increment, the amount of closed end pipe displacement
stripped into the well. Since the bubble expands the most in the upper part of the well and
expands little deep in the well, the drill pipe may make it to bottom before the first fluid
increment is reached (unless the kick is discovered with the bit far off bottom or the kick is in
the upper part of the well before stripping begins).
As soon as the kick is discovered and the well is shut in, you should start stripping back to
bottom while holding casing pressure constant. While you are stripping in, you can calculate
the pressure increase due to penetrating the influx and add this to the safety factor you chose
initially. Even with a gas kick, it's often possible to get to bottom before having to worry
about going underbalanced due to the expansion of the bubble.
Before tripping pipe on a well where swabbing in a gas kick could be a problem, it would be
wise to keep some way of accurately measuring fluid volumes bled through the choke
hooked up at all times. This will save time trying to rig it up after a kick has been taken.
Keep in mind that fluids returned may contain significant amounts of gas; it is therefore
recommended to arrange to take returns from the choke via the mud/gas separator whenever
possible.
6.9 Problems and Complications while Killing
Problems and complications can arise at any stage of well kill operations. The crews should
be vigilant and note any discrepancy in the kill plan. Typical problems are identified below.
Plugged Nozzle
A plugged nozzle in the bit is indicated by a sudden, unexpected increase in drill pipe
pressure with little or no change in the choke pressure.
The choke operator may be tempted to open the choke in an attempt to reduce the drill pipe
pressure to the original circulating pressure. This action would result in a drop in choke
pressure and a corresponding drop in bottomhole pressure.
Therefore, should a plugged bit nozzle be suspected, the pump should be stopped, the well
shut-in, correct shut-in pressures established, and the pump restarted holding casing pressure
constant to establish the increased circulating pressure that will maintain a suitable
bottomhole pressure. Note that an alert choke operator might accomplish the same thing by
simply holding choke pressure constant momentarily while the standpipe circulating pressure
October 2005 6-71

stabilizes at a new, higher value; this higher value would then be used as the target standpipe
pressure in place of the value noted prior to the nozzle plugging.
If the bit becomes totally plugged, there may be an abrupt and continuous increase in drill
pipe pressure, with a drop in choke pressure. In this event, if increased drill pipe pressure
does not clear the problem, the string may need to be perforated as close as possible to the bit
in order to re-establish circulation.
Figure 6.9.1
Hole pack off around the drill string can create pressure responses very similar to those
caused by a plugged nozzle. Casing pressure that fluctuates can be an indication that pack off
rather than nozzle plugging is actually occurring. An increase in mud losses would also
indicate pack off rather than nozzle plugging. When pack off is suspected, reciprocating the
drill string may help clear the problem.
Plugged Choke
A plugged choke is indicated by a sudden, unexpected increase in choke pressure

accompanied by an equal increase in drill pipe pressure (after a lag time). Some plugging of
the choke is to be expected if the annulus is loaded with cuttings.
6-72 October 2005

The first course of action is to open the choke in an attempt to both clear the restriction in the
choke and to avoid overpressuring the well. If this action is not successful, the pump should
be stopped immediately and the well shut-in. After switching to an alternate choke, the
excess pressure in the well should be bled off via the choke and circulation restarted in the
usual manner.
One of the reasons for displacing a kick at slow circulation rates is to avoid overpressuring
the well if cuttings or formation solids suddenly plug the choke. In this respect, circulation
rates should be minimized in critical conditions.
Figure 6.9.2
Choke Washout
A choke is unlikely to suddenly cut out. In this respect, there will usually not be any dramatic
indication that this problem is occurring.
As a choke wears it may become necessary to gradually close it in to maintain desired

circulating pressure. If the operator finds that he has to gradually close in the choke to
maintain circulating pressure, but the casing pressure has not increased is spite of this
closure, either the choke is washing out or partial lost circulation is occurring downhole. If
October 2005 6-73

pit levels are constant or are increasing appropriately for casing pressure increases, a worn
out choke should be suspected.
There may be a time during a stage of the operation when it is no longer possible to maintain
a suitable circulating pressure even with the choke indicated to be fully closed. At, or
preferably before this stage, the flow should be switched to another choke and repairs made
to the worn choke.
Figure 6.9.3
Pump Failure
The most obvious indicator of failure at the fluid end is likely to be erratic standpipe pressure
together with irregular rotary hose movement. This may be preceded by an unexplained drop
in circulating pressure.
If pump failure is suspected, the pump should be stopped and the well shut-in. The
displacement should be continued with the second rig pump, or if necessary, the cement
pump. As slow circulating rate pressures for these pumps are not reliably known, it is
6-74 October 2005

important to use proper technique to bring the alternate pump up to speed (i.e. holding casing
pressure constant).
Fig 6.9.4
String Washout
A washout in the drill string may be indicated by an unexpected drop in standpipe pressure,
while the choke pressure remains unchanged. Since this pressure drop is relatively slow (the
washout is not instantaneous, but usually worsens with time), the choke may have been
slowly closed and casing pressure may have increased in order to keep circulating drill pipe
pressure on schedule. Since desired drill pipe pressure may have been successfully
maintained, the only indication of something having gone wrong may be by observing that
the increase in casing pressure is out of proportion to gain in mud pit levels – a sometimes
difficult call to make in the field, particularly where partial mud losses might be expected.
Uncorrected, a drill string washout can ultimately result in excess bottom hole pressure, an
inability to circulate kill fluids to the bit (they exit the string prematurely through the hole),
and possibly a parted drill string (complicating further kill operations). The recommended
procedure in the event of a drill string washout is to stop the pump and shut the well in and
check for trapped pressure. If the shut-down is done properly (by, for a surface BOP, holding
October 2005 6-75

casing pressure constant until pumps are off), trapped casing pressure would provide good
evidence confirming the washout.
Every effort must be made to ensure that the washout is not enlarged by extended circulation
and drill string manipulation. The most critical situation would be in the event of a washout
close to the surface. Should this occur, it may not be possible to displace the influx from the
hole effectively, unless the influx is above the washout. If the influx is below the washout
(indicated by early return of heavy mud to surface), Volumetric control or bullheading may
be appropriate to control downhole pressures and reduce surface pressures sufficiently to
permit pulling out of the hole to repair the washout, then running back to bottom to finish the
kill with uniform kill weight mud.
If the washout is identified as being near the bottom of the well (evidenced by lack of early
returns of kill mud, or possible use of frayed soft line to locate the hole), it may be possible
to displace the kick from the well effectively by continuing the kill operation. In this case,
there will of course be the risk of parting the drill string with continued circulation. The rate
of washout per bbl displaced will be reduced if slower circulation rates are used.
If continued circulation is attempted, it will be necessary to establish a new, corrected

circulating pressure (or schedule) as the pump is restarted. It is advisable to periodically re-
establish the circulating pressure if the circulation is continued for prolonged periods through
a washout.
Stuck Pipe
The complication of stuck pipe during a well control operation can cause serious problems.
Unfortunately, the likelihood of the pipe becoming stuck during a well control operation is
increased if the pipe is close to bottom where it is easiest to properly kill a well. While
preventing sticking is important, it is more important to regain primary, hydrostatic control of
the well. Practices intended to avoid sticking should only be applied after assuring they do
not jeopardize control of well pressures.
Where it is considered safe to do so, the company representative may wish to move the drill
string during well control operations. When practical, it is recommended that the string
should be reciprocated. It is particularly important to avoid rotating the pipe unless
continuous reciprocation is also maintained. Several incidents have occurred in which
rotation only, even for just a few minutes, resulted in pipe being completely severed by steel
components that support rubber annular BOP elements.
Due to likely increases in wellbore pressures during a well control operation, a likely cause
of stuck pipe is differential sticking. However, mechanical sticking may result if the hole
sloughs and packs-off as a result of contact with the influx fluids.
If the pipe is differentially stuck, continue the operation because it is most likely that
circulation can still be carried out in order to kill the well. Efforts to free the pipe can be
made once the well has been killed.
6-76 October 2005

Surface Pressure Approaches the Dynamic MAASP
Using information from a Leak Off Test, it is possible to calculate a value for surface
pressure which, when added to hydrostatic pressure plus annular or choke line friction losses
above the casing shoe, would result in shoe pressure equal to shoe fracture pressure.
At initial shut-in, assuming the kick is in open hole below the shoe and there is no flow (no
friction loss), this calculated pressure is called MISICP, maximum initial shut-in casing
pressure (a Chevron term). Calculations for a surface pressure limitation at subsequent times
while circulating out a kick, commonly referred to as MAASP (Maximum Allowable
Annular Surface Pressure) are much more uncertain since the exact hydrostatic pressure
above the shoe and exact annular friction loss values may be unknown, as they are affected
by the presence of the influx. Attempts to calculate such a limit applicable while circulating
(sometimes called dynamic MAASP) are generally unreliable. It is therefore recommended
that once a kill operation is started, no operational decisions (such as to open the choke or
change pump rate) should be made based on these calculated values (if they are even made).
Even if a reliable value for dynamic MAASP were available, there is usually little to be
gained by knowledge of that value. Should annulus pressure reach such a limit while a well is
being properly controlled (i.e. a constant bottom hole pressure method is being applied
correctly), it is generally prudent to continue with the method, even if doing so risks annulus
pressure increases that could result in lost circulation or even an underground blowout; the
alternative of opening the choke to prevent annulus pressure from increasing may result in
taking additional influx which could ultimately lead to very high surface pressures or even a
surface blowout.
Bearing in mind that the highest pressures at the casing shoe (often considered the weakest
part of the open hole) generally occur when the top of an influx reaches that point, annular
pressure increases that occur while using a constant bottomhole pressure method after that
time are unlikely to cause lost circulation.
Hydrates
Natural gas hydrates have the appearance of hard snow and consist of chemical compounds
of light hydrocarbons and liquid water. They are formed at temperatures above the normal
freezing point of water under certain conditions of temperature and pressure. This formation
process is accelerated when there are high gas velocities, pressure pulsations or other
agitations, such as downstream of a choke and at elbows, which cause the mixing of
hydrocarbon components.
During well control operations, gas hydrates may cause the following serious problems:
• Plugging of subsea choke/kill lines, preventing opening and closing of subsea BOPs,
sealing off wellbore annuli, or immobilizing the drill string. There have been recorded
incidences of such occurrences with subsea stacks in water depths of 1150 ft and
deeper.
October 2005 6-77

• Plugging of surface lines at, and downstream of the choke or a restriction. This is
particularly hazardous when high gas flow rates are experienced through low pressure
equipment (such as the poor boy separator and gas vent line). The formation of
hydrate plugs under these conditions can rapidly overpressure low pressure well
control equipment.
The major factors which determine the potential for hydrate formation are gas composition,
liquid content, pressure and temperature. The formation of hydrates can be predicted using
the figure below. It should be noted that the conditions for hydrate formation can easily be
created at a subsea stack or when operating in a cold environment.
Figure 6.9.5 Temperature at which Gas Hydrates will Freeze (Katz)
6-78 October 2005

Hydrates can be affected by one or a combination of the following:
• Injecting inhibiting agents such as glycol into the gas flow; this has the effect of
lowering the temperature at which hydrates would be expected to form.
• Injecting Methanol; this has the effect of dissolving existing hydrate formations
• Heating the fluid/gas mixture above the temperature at which hydrates will form or
remain stable; this can help prevent or break up existing hydrates.
• Reducing the pressure; this can also help prevent or break up existing hydrates.
In any case, it is often quite difficult to get rid of hydrates once they have formed,
particularly in closed spaces (like a choke line) in which the hydrates block delivery of
methanol and/or heated fluid.
It is important that adequate attention be given to the potential for hydrate formation. Subsea
water temperatures and pressures should be considered, along with local air temperature
issues and cooling effects of expanding gas in surface lines downstream of the choke.
When a high potential for complication due to hydrates exists, precautions such as being
prepared to inject glycol into the fluid stream should be considered. For example, it may be
helpful to inject glycol into high pressure lines upstream of the choke or, via the kill line, into
a subsea choke line while circulating out a fluid containing gas and water.
October 2005 6-79

Section 7 – Well Control Equipment
7. Well Control Equipment
Introduction
The BOP stack and ancillary equipment are safety-critical, and the last line of defense against
loss of control of the well. It is therefore imperative that the company’s onsite
representatives (Drill Site Managers) thoroughly familiarize themselves with the specific
equipment they have on location, including such things as:
1) Rated working pressures for all pumping and BOPE
2) Piping/pit/manifold arrangements and possible flow routings
3) Closing unit sizing, layout and control systems
4) contactor maintenance and testing practices
Chevron recommends only OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) parts be used to service
safety-critical equipment, such as the BOPs and wellheads.
Chevron subscribes to the API’s Recommended Practices for well control, and in particular,
RP-53 (latest edition) pertaining to field use of BOP equipment (operation and maintenance).
7.1 Ram Blowout Preventers
Ram type preventers consist of two hydraulically actuated, horizontally opposed rams which
are designed to either seal off an openhole or an annulus containing a pipe of a specific
diameter. At least one ram preventer should be fitted with rams to suit each size of pipe in the
hole. Variable bore pipe rams are also available for most ram preventers. The working
pressure of ram type preventers should at least be equal to the maximum anticipated surface
pressure, plus a margin for pumping into the hole.
There are different types of ram preventer, as outlined below:
RAM BLOWOUT PREVENTERS - CAMERON U BOP
The Cameron Type “U” preventer is a wellbore pressure assisted ram preventer suitable for
surface or subsea installations. Since the tail end of the operating rod is enclosed within the
preventer, it is not possible to determine the position of the rams through exterior
observation. All Type “U” preventers manufactured since 1979 are equipped for H2S service.
The outstanding feature of the Type “U” preventer is its ability to “pump open” the bonnet
doors. After removing four bonnet bolts, applied closing pressure will open the bonnets for
easy top-load ram changing. The Cameron Type “U” preventer is shown below.
October 2005 7-1

Figure 7.1.1 Cameron Type U Blowout Preventer
The Cameron U BOP is the most widely used ram-type BOP for land, platform and subsea
applications worldwide, and offers the widest range of sizes of any ram-type BOP. Like all
other Cameron preventers, the rams in the U BOP are pressure-energized. Wellbore pressure
acts on the rams to increase the sealing force and maintain the seal in case of hydraulic
pressure loss. Seal integrity is actually improved by increased well bore pressure. Other
features of the U BOP include:
• Hydraulic stud tensioning available on larger sizes to ensure that stud loading is
consistently accurate and even.
• Bonnet seal carrier is available to eliminate the need for high makeup torque on
bonnet studs and nuts.
• Hydraulically operated locking mechanisms, Wedgelocks, lock the ram hydraulically
and hold the rams mechanically closed even when actuating pressure is released. The
operating system can be interlocked using sequence caps to ensure that the
Wedgelock is retracted before pressure is applied to open the BOP.
7-2 October 2005

Figure 7.1.2 Cameron U - Type BOP
Pipe Rams
Cameron pipe rams are available for use in Cameron ram-type BOPs to centralize and seal
around all specific sizes of tubing, drill pipe, drill collar or casing.
• Cameron pipe rams are self-feeding and incorporate a large reservoir of packer rubber
to ensure a long-lasting seal under all conditions.
• Ram packers lock into place and are not dislodged by well flow
• All Cameron pipe rams are suitable for H2S service per NACE MR-01-75.
• CAMRAM™ top seals are standard for all Cameron pipe rams (except U BOPs larger
than 13-5/8”).
• CAMRAM 350™ packers and top seals are available for high temperature service
and for service in which concentrations of H2S are expected
October 2005 7-3

Figure 7.1.3 Pipe Rams
Variable Bore Rams
Variable bore pipe rams are designed to pack-off around a range of sizes. For example, one
set will provide backup for two different pipe rams, e.g. 3 ½” and 5”, or 5” and 7”. Some
variable bore rams have a limited hang-off capacity, which is dependent on tool joint size
and ram range. If the tool joint outside diameter (O.D.) is less than the maximum capability
of the variable ram, the tool joint can be forced through the ram packer by surface pressure.
TM TM
Cameron offers the following range of variable bore ram [VBR and VBR-II ] sizes to
suit units U, UL and UM.
Table 7.1.1
BOP Pipe Size

bore Range
11 “ 2 ⅞” to 5 ”
11 “ 3 ½ ” to 5 ½ ”
13 ⅝ ” 4 ½ ” to 7 ”
13 ⅝ “ 2 ⅞ ” to 5 ”
16 ¾ ” 3 ½” to 7 ”
16 ¾ “ 2 ⅞” to 5 ”
18 ¾ “ 3 ½ ” to 7 ⅝ ”
18 ¾ “ 2 ⅞ ” to 5 ”
7-4 October 2005

Additional sizes may be available from various manufacturers.
One set of Cameron variable bore rams (VBRs) seals on several sizes of pipe or hexagonal
kelly, eliminating the need for a set of pipe rams for each pipe size.
Features include:
• A VBR packer contains steel reinforcing inserts which rotate inward when the rams
are closed; the steel provides support for the rubber which seals against the pipe.
• All VBRs are suitable for H2S service per NACE MR-01-75.
• CAMRAM™ top seals are standard for all Cameron VBRs.
TOP SEAL
Figure 7.1.4 VBRs
Shearing Blind Rams
Shear/Blind Rams are designed to cut the drill pipe and then act as blind rams to contain well
bore pressure. The pipe stub is accommodated by a recess. The pipe should be stationary and
in tension, if practical, before shearing. Care should be taken to ensure a tool joint is not
opposite the rams. It may be necessary to increase manifold pressure above 1500 psi to shear.
Pipe size and grade may be limiting factors to the shear process, even at maximum manifold
pressures. Some models of Shear/Blind rams are unsuitable for sour service.
October 2005 7-5

Cameron Shearing Blind Rams (SBRs)
Cameron shearing blind rams (SBRs) shear the pipe in the hole, and then bend the lower
section of sheared pipe to allow the rams to close and seal. SBRs may also be used to close
on open hole for normal drilling/completion/workover operations. Features include:
• Large frontal area on the blade face seal reduces pressure on the rubber and increases
service life.
• Cameron SBRs can cut pipe numerous times without damage to the cutting edge.
• The single-piece body incorporates an integrated cutting edge.

• CAMRAM™ top seals are standard for all Cameron SBRs.
• H2S SBRs are available for critical service applications and include a blade material
of hardened high alloy suitable for H2S service.
DVS (double V shear) rams are shearing blind rams which are similar to SBRs, with the
following features:
• DVS rams fold the lower portion of the tubular over after shearing, so that the lower
blade can seal against the blade packer
• DVS rams include the largest blade width available to fit within existing ram bores.
7-6 October 2005

SIDE PACKER
SIDE PACKER
SIDE PACKER
Figure 7.1.5 - Cameron Shear Rams
Shaffer Type 72 Shear Rams
Shaffer Type 72 Shear Rams shear pipe and seal the well bore in one operation. They also
function as blind or CSO (complete shut-off) rams for normal operations.
The hydraulic closing pressure required to shear commonly used drill pipe is below 1,500 psi
for BOP’s with 14'’ pistons. These pistons are standard in all BOP’s rated at 10,000 psi
working pressure and higher. On lower pressure preventers, optional 14" pistons can be
supplied for shearing, instead of the standard 10" pistons.
When shearing, the lower blade passes below the sharp lower edge of the upper ram block
and shears the pipe. The lower section of cut pipe is accommodated in the space between the
lower blade and the upper holder. The upper section of cut pipe is accommodated in the
recess in the top of the lower ram block.
October 2005 7-7

Closing motion of the ram continues until the ram block ends meet. Continued closing of the
holders squeezes the semicircular seals upward into sealing contact with the seat in the BOP
body, and energizes the horizontal seal. The closing motion of the upper holder pushes the
horizontal seal forward and downward on top of the lower blade, resulting in a tight sealing
contact. The horizontal seal has a moulded-in support plate which holds it in place when the
rams are open.
Lower Block
SHEAR RAMS OPEN
SHEAR RAMS CLOSING
SHEAR RAMS CLOSED
Figure 7.1.6 Shaffer Type 72 Shear Rams
7-8 October 2005

Hang-off Rams
Pipe rams with enhanced load-bearing capabilities (usually rated to 600,000 lbs) are typically
employed for floating operations. This may involve hardening of the load bearing area,
which may render the ram unsuitable for sour service.
Offset Rams
Offset rams and dual offset rams are available for dual completions. Special equipment is
required to pressure test offset and dual offset rams. Orientation of both pipe strings should
be taken into consideration.
General Comments:
The majority of ram type preventers in use are manufactured by Cameron (types U and T),
NL Shaffer (types LWS and SL) and Hydril (types V and X). Most models share common
features:
• Self-Feeding Action of Ram Packer Elastomer.
The front elements of ram seals have steel plates bonded to the rubber elastomer. The steel
plates are designed to contain and extrude the rubber elastomer, thereby affecting a seal. If
the rams are used for stripping pipe, the front face of the ram seal will wear. The self-feeding
action will ensure worn rubber is replaced.
• Ram Locking Devices
Hydraulically operated ram preventers are provided with locking-screw stem extensions and
large diameter hand wheels similar to the operating screws of manually closed preventers.
The main purpose of the locking screws is to manually lock the ram in the closed position
after they are closed hydraulically. In an emergency, the screws can be used to close the rams
if the hydraulic system fails. If the locking screws are used to close the rams, the closing unit
selector valve should be in the closed position. This will eliminate the possibility of hydraulic
oil being trapped on the opening side of the actuating pistons.
An optional hydraulic lock mechanism (Cameron Wedgelock, Shaffer Ultralock and Poslock,
and Hydril’s Multiposition Lock) can be used in place of locking screws to lock the ram in
the closed position.
October 2005 7-9

Figure 7.1.7 Blowout Preventer Wedgelock Assembly
RAM LOCKS
Ram type preventers should be equipped with extension hand wheels or hydraulic locks. The
main purpose of the locking system is to manually lock the rams in the closed position after
they are closed hydraulically.
Spare Parts
As per API, the following recommended minimum blowout preventer spare parts approved
for the service intended should be available at each rig:
a. Plastic packing for BOP secondary seals.

b. A complete set of drill pipe rams and ram rubbers for each size of drill pipe being used.
c. A complete set of bonnet or door seals for each size and type of ram preventers being
used.
d. Ring gaskets to fit flange connections, and
e. Appropriate spare parts for annular preventers, when used.
Chevron recommends only OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) spares be utilized on
the BOP stack.
Secondary Piston Rod Seal
All ram type preventers with a rated working pressure of 5,000 psi, or higher, should be
equipped with a secondary piston rod seal in case the primary rod seal fails. The secondary
seal is plastic which is stored inside a container until it is activated.
7-10 October 2005

SECONDARY SEAL
PROTECTOR CAP
Figure 7.1.8 Secondary Seal
The secondary seal is activated by screwing down on the piston, which forces plastic through
the check valve and into the space between the two swab cup seals. Further piston
displacement causes pressure to build up between the swab cups, forcing them to flare out
and provide a seal. When the pressure exerted by the plastic packing reaches the proper
valve, additional displacement of the piston will overcome the spring tension in the relief
valve and plastic packing will begin to extrude from it.
The secondary seal should be activated only if the primary connecting-rod seal leaks during
an emergency operation. The secondary seal is designed for static conditions and movement
of the connecting rod causes rapid seal and rod wear.
U II Blowout Preventer
The Cameron U II BOP takes all of the features of the U BOP and adapts them for subsea use
in the 18-3/4” 10,000 and 15,000 psi WP sizes. Like all other Cameron preventers, the rams
in the U II BOP are wellbore pressure energized. Wellbore pressure acts on the rams to
increase the sealing force and maintain the seal in case of hydraulic pressure loss. Seal
integrity is actually improved by increased well bore pressure.
Other features of the U II BOP include:
• Internally ported hydraulic stud tensioning system ensures that stud loading is
consistently accurate and even.
October 2005 7-11

• Bonnet seal carrier is available to eliminate the need for high makeup torque on
bonnet studs and nuts.
• Hydraulically operated locking mechanisms, Wedgelocks, lock the ram hydraulically

and hold the rams mechanically closed even when actuating pressure is released. The
operating system can be interlocked using sequence caps to ensure that the
Wedgelock is retracted before pressure is applied to open the BOP
• A pressure balance chamber is used with the Wedgelocks to eliminate the possibility
of the Wedgelock becoming unlocked due to hydrostatic pressure.
Other features include hydraulically opening bonnets, forged body, and a wide selection of
rams to meet all applications.
Figure 7.1.9 Cameron 18-3/4" Double U II Blowout Preventer
Optional Equipment
Bonnet Seal Carriers for TL, U, UL and U II BOPs. The bonnet seal carrier is a bore-type
sealing assembly which replaces the face seal used as the previous bonnet seal. Sealing
capability is not dependent upon bonnet bolt torque. One seal is captured in a machined bore
in the BOP body while the other seal is captured in a machined bore in the intermediate
flange.
7-12 October 2005

The seal carrier was designed, developed

and performance-verified for use in newly
manufactured BOPs or as a replacement
seal assembly for BOPs where either the
BOP body or the intermediate flange
requires weld repair on the sealing
surfaces.
Figure 7.1.10 Seal Carrier
Large Bore Shear Bonnets
Cameron developed large bore shear bonnets to increase the available shearing force required
to shear high strength and high quality pipe. In order to achieve this, the large bore shear
bonnet design increased the available closing area by 35% or more. Cameron recommends
large bore shear bonnets when larger shearing forces are required. As an alternative to
purchasing new large bore shear bonnets, some old shear bonnets can be converted. This
process requires reworking and replacing several existing components.
Tandem Boosters for U BOPS
A BOP equipped with tandem boosters can deliver increased shearing force while not
increasing the wear and tear on the packers. Tandem boosters approximately double the force
available to shear pipe. Since the tail rod of the tandem booster has the same stroke as the
BOP operating piston, the standard shear locking mechanism can be installed on the outside
end of the booster.
Figure 7.1.11 Cameron UII BOP Hydraulic Control System
October 2005 7-13

SHAFFER SL RAM BLOWOUT PREVENTERS
The Shaffer “SL” is a subsea ram preventer which can be fitted with an automatic locking
provision called “Poslock”. “SL” preventers are trimmed for H2S service and special rams
are available that can be used to hang-off the drill pipe. The Shaffer hydraulic system is
routed through the door hinges and into the operating cylinder. Shaffer preventers (and all
hinged door preventers) should never be “pumped open” by applying closing pressure, as this
will almost surely damage the operating rod and the foot. The Shaffer “SL” preventer is
shown below.
Figure 7.1.12 Shaffer SL-Ram BOP
Shaffer Model SL ram blowout preventers may also be fitted with other styles of locking
devices, which will accommodate wear and various pipe sizes in the event of VBR use. The
PosLock system does not account for wear or varying pipe sizes for the locking device. It
does allow closure and sealing on various pipe sizes, but will only lock on the one particular
pipe size for which it has been adusted prior to use.
Special Features:
• Flat doors simplify ram changes. To change the rams, apply opening hydraulic
pressure to move the rams to the full open position. Remove the door cap screws and
7-14 October 2005

swing the door open. Remove the ram from the ram shaft and replace it. It is not
necessary to apply closing hydraulic pressure to move the rams inward to clear the
door.
• Door seals on most sizes have a hard backing moulded into the rubber. This fabric
and phenolic backing prevents extrusion and pinching at all pressures to assure long
seal life.
• Internal H2S trim is standard. All major components conform to API and NACE H2S
requirements.
• Maximum ram hardness is Rc22 to insure H2S compatibility of pipe and blind rams.
Shear rams have some harder components.
• Manual-lock and Poslock pistons can be interchanged on the same door by replacing
the ram shaft, piston assembly and cylinder head.
• Wear rings eliminate metal-to-metal contact between the piston and cylinder to
increase seal life and virtually eliminate cylinder bore wear.
• Lip type piston seals are long-wearing polyurethane with molybdenum disulfide
moulded in for lifetime lubrication.
• Lip-type ram shaft seals hold and separate the well bore pressure and the opening
hydraulic pressure. No known failures of this highly reliable high pressure seal have
occurred.
• Secondary ram shaft seals permit injection of plastic packing if the primary lip-type
seal ever fails. Fluid dripping from the weep hole in the door indicates that the
primary seal is leaking and the secondary seal should be energized.
• Rams are available which will support 600,000 pounds when a tool joint is lowered
onto the closed rams. These rams conform to H2S requirements.
• Shear/Blind rams cut drill pipe and seal in one operation. Most common weights and
grades of drill pipe are sheared with less than 1,500 psi hydraulic pressure.
• Poslock operators automatically lock the rams each time they are closed. This
eliminates the cost of a second hydraulic function to lock. It also simplifies
emergency operation because the rams are both closed and locked just by activating
the close function.
October 2005 7-15

SHAFFER SL MANUAL-LOCK SYSTEM
Manual-lock pistons move inward and close the rams when closing hydraulic pressure is
applied. If desired, the rams can be manually locked in the closed position by turning each
locking shaft to the right until it shoulders against the cylinder head. Should hydraulic
pressure fail, the rams can be manually closed and locked. They cannot be manually
reopened.
The manual locking shafts are visible from outside and provide a convenient ram position
indicator. Threads on the manual locking shaft are enclosed in the hydraulic fluid and are not
exposed to corrosion from mud and salt water or to freezing.
Rams are opened by first turning both locking shafts to their “unlocked” position, then
applying opening hydraulic pressure to the pistons, which move outward and pull the rams
out of the well bore.
SHAFFER MODEL SL HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Operation and Maintenance
Hydraulic power to operate a Model SL ram BOP can be furnished by any standard oil field
accumulator system.
Hydraulic passages drilled through the body eliminate the need for external manifold pipes
between the hinges. Each set of rams requires only one opening and one closing line. There
are two opening and two closing hydraulic ports, clearly marked, on the back side of the
BOP. The extra hydraulic ports facilitate connecting the control system to the preventer.
A 1,500 psi output hydraulic accumulator will close any Model SL ram BOP with rated
working pressure in the well bore, except for the 11" and 13 5/8” 15,000 psi BOPs, which
require 2,100 psi. However, these two will close against 10,000 psi well pressure with less
than 1,500 psi hydraulic pressure.
A 3,000 psi hydraulic pressure may be used, but this will accelerate wear of the piston seals
and the ram rubbers.
A 5,000 psi hydraulic pressure test is applied to all Model SL cylinders at the factory.
However, it is recommended that this pressure not be used in field application.
The hydraulic operating fluid should be hydraulic oil with a viscosity between 200 and 300
SSU at 100°F. If necessary, water-soluble oil (such as NL Rig Equipment K-90 and water)
can be used for environmental protection. Ethylene glycol must be added to the K-90 and
water solution for freeze protection if equipment is exposed to freezing temperatures.
7-16 October 2005

Note: Never use fuel oil of any kind as it causes the rubber goods to swell and deteriorate.
Some water-soluble fluids do not give adequate corrosion protection or lubrication and
should not be used.
SHAFFER MODEL SL POSLOCK SYSTEM
SL preventers equipped with Poslock pistons are automatically locked in the closed position
each time they are closed. The preventers will remain locked in the closed position even if
closing pressure is removed. Opening hydraulic pressure is required to reopen the pistons.
Figure 7.1.13 Fluid Circuit – SL RAM
The hydraulics required to operate the Poslock are provided through opening and closing
operating ports. Operation of the Poslock requires no additional hydraulic functions, such as
are required in some competitive ram locking systems. When closing hydraulic pressure is
applied, the complete piston assembly moves inward and pushes the rams into the well bore.
As the piston reaches the fully closed position, the locking segments slide toward the piston
O.D. over the locking shoulder as the locking cone is forced inward by the closing hydraulic
pressure.
The locking cone holds the locking segments in position and is prevented by a spring from
vibrating outward if the hydraulic closing pressure is removed. Actually, the locking cone is
a second piston inside the main piston. It is forced inward by closing hydraulic pressure and
outward by opening hydraulic pressure.
When opening hydraulic pressure is applied, the locking cone moves outward and the locking
segments slide toward the piston l.D. along the tapered locking shoulder. The piston is then
free to move outward and open the rams.
Note: Poslock pistons are adjusted in the factory and normally do not require adjustment in
the field except when changing between pipe rams and shear rams. The adjustment is
easy to check and easy to change.
October 2005 7-17

SHAFFER ULTRALOCK™ LOCKING SYSTEM
Figure 7.1.14 ULTRALOCK - Unique Position Locking System
UltraLock, the most versatile locking system available, provides a maintenance-free and
adjustment-free locking system that is compatible with any ram assembly that the blowout
preventers can accommodate. Once the UltraLock is installed, no further adjustments will be
needed when changing between Pipe Rams, Shear/ Blind or MULTI-RAM assemblies.
BOPs that are equipped with the UltraLock are automatically locked in the closed position
each time the BOPs are closed; no preset pressure ranges are needed. The BOPs will remain
locked in the closed position, even if closing pressure is lost or removed. Hydraulic opening
pressure is required to re-open the preventer, and this opening pressure is supplied by the
regular opening and closing ports of the preventer.
No additional hydraulic lines or functions are required for operations of the locks. Stack
frame modifications are not required because all operational components are in the hydraulic
operating cylinders.
Note: Existing BOP’s with PosLock Cylinders can be upgraded to the UltraLock.
7-18 October 2005

HYDRIL RAM PREVENTER
The Hydril ram preventer is designed for land applications and is available in a range of
working pressures from 3M to 15M psi. The Hydril ram preventer can be equipped with
automatic "Multi-position" locks, or manual locks, which can lock the preventer in the closed
position. The bonnet doors swing open on hinges to gain access to the cavity of the preventer
and to change the ram blocks. Hydril ram blocks are loaded from the top onto the operating
rod. The Hydril ram preventer is shown below.
Hydril Type “V” Preventer
Replaceable Cylinder Liner
Figure 7.1.15 HYDRIL 13-5/8” 15,000 psi Ram BOP Manual Lock
1. The Ram Body Casting has controlled and predictable structural hardness and strength
throughout the pressure vessel. Hydril pressure vessel material has equal strength along
all axes to provide reliable strength and resistance to sulphide stress cracking in
hydrogen sulphide service.
2. The Ram Assembly provides reliable seal off of the wellbore for security and safety.
The Ram accommodates a large volume of feedable rubber in the front packer and
upper seal for long service life.
October 2005 7-19

3. The Field Replaceable Seal Seat provides a smooth sealing surface for the ram upper
seal. The seal seat utilizes specially selected and performance effective materials for
maximum service life.
4. Hinged Bonnets swing completely clear of overhead restrictions (such as another BOP)
and provide easy access for rapid ram change to reduce downtime.
5. Load Hinges, separate from the fluid hinges are equipped with self-lubricated bearings
to support the full weight of the bonnet for quick and easy opening of the bonnet.
6 Fluid Hinges, separate from the load hinges, connect the control fluid passages between
the body and bonnets. This arrangement provides a reliable hydraulic seal and permits
full pressure testing and ram operation with the bonnets open. The fluid hinges and
bonnet hinges contain all the seals necessary for this function and may be removed
rapidly for simple, economical repair.
7. Replaceable Cylinder Liner has a corrosion and wear resistant bore for reliable piston
operation. The cylinder liner is easily field replaceable or repairable for reduced
maintenance cost and downtime.
8. Piston and Piston Rod Assembly are one piece for strength and reliability in closing and
opening the ram, which results in a secure operating assembly.
9. Choice of Ram Locks - Automatic Multiple Position Locking (MPL) or Manual

Locking is available on Ram BOPs.
10 Multiple-Position Locking (MPL) utilizes a hydraulically-actuated mechanical clutch

mechanism to automatically lock the rams in a seal off position.
11. Manual Locking utilizes a heavy-duty acme thread to manually lock the ram in a
sealed-off position or to manually close the ram if the hydraulic system is inoperative.
12. Fluid Connections and Hydraulic Passages are internal to the bonnets and body and
preclude damage during moving and handling operations.
13. Connector Ring Grooves are stainless steel lined for all connectors (top, bottom and
side outlets), for corrosion resistance of the sealing surface.
14. Sloped Ram Cavity is self-draining to eliminate build-up of sand and drilling fluid.
15 Bonnet Seal utilizes field proven material in an integrated seal design which combines
the seal and backup ring for reliability and long life.
16. Piston Rod Mud Seal is a rugged, field-proven, integrally designed lip seal and backup
ring retained in the bonnet by a stainless steel spiral lock ring.
7-20 October 2005

17. Secondary (Emergency) Piston Rod Packing provides an emergency piston rod seal for
use in the event of primary seal leakage at a time when repair cannot be immediately
affected.
18 A Weephole to atmosphere isolates wellbore pressure, indicates when seal is achieved
and possible leakage in the primary seal.
19. Piston Seals are of a lip-type design and are pressure-energized to provide a reliable
seal of the piston to form the operating chambers of the BOP.
20. Side Outlets for choke/kill lines are available on all models. Two outlets, one on each
side, may be placed below each ram. In single and double configurations, outlets may
be placed below the upper and lower ram, below the bottom ram only, or below the top
ram only, therefore providing great versatility in stack design.
21. Single and Double Configurations are available with a choice of American Petroleum
Institute (API) flanged, studded, or clamp hub connections. This allows for the most-
economical use of space for operation and service.
22. Bonnet Bolts are sized for easy torquing and arranged for reliable seal between bonnet
and body. This prevents excessive distortion during high pressure seal off.
23 Bonnet Bolt Retainers keep the bonnet bolts in the bonnet while servicing the BOP.
24 Guide Rods align ram with bonnet cavity, preventing damage to the ram, piston rod or
bonnets while retracting the rams.
25. Ram Seal Off is retained by wellbore pressures. Closing forces are not required to
retain an established ram seal off.
October 2005 7-21

Figure 7.1.16 Hydril 18¾” 15,000 psi Ram BOP Multiple Position Lock (MPL)
HYDRIL MPL AUTOMATIC RAM LOCKING
Figure 7.1.17 HYDRIL Multi-Position Lock (MPL)
7-22 October 2005

Hydril Ram Blowout Preventers are available with automatic Multiple-Position Ram
Locking. Multiple-Position Locking (MPL) allows the ram to seal off with optimum seal
squeeze at every closure. MPL automatically locks and maintains the ram closed with the
optimum rubber pressure required for seal off in the front packer and upper seal.
Front packer seal wear (on any ram BOP) requires a different ram locking position with each
closure to ensure an effective seal-off. Multiple-Position Locking is required to ensure
retention of that seal off position.
A mechanical lock is automatically set each time the ram is closed. Ram closure is
accomplished by applying hydraulic pressure to the closing chamber, which moves the ram
to a seal off position. The locking system maintains the ram mechanically locked while
closure is retained after releasing closing pressure. The ram is opened only by application of
opening pressure, which releases the locking system automatically and opens the ram,
simultaneously.
Note: MPL is available on all Hydril Ram Blowout Preventers.
How MPL works
This figure shows the ram maintained closed and sealed off by the MPL. Hydraulic closing
pressure has been released. The Hydril Ram Blowout Preventer with MPL automatically
maintains ram closure and seal off. MPL will maintain the required rubber pressure in the
front packer and upper seal to ensure a seal off of rated working pressure. MPL will maintain
the seal off without closing pressure and with the opening forces created by hanging the drill
string on the ram.
Locking and unlocking of the MPL are controlled by a unidirectional clutch mechanism and
a lock nut. The unidirectional clutch mechanism maintains the nut and ram in a locked
position until the clutch is disengaged by application of control system pressure to open the
ram.
Hydraulic opening pressure disengages the front and rear clutch plates to permit the lock nut
to rotate and the ram to open. As the ram and piston move to the open position, the lock nut
and front clutch plate rotate freely.
October 2005 7-23

Table 7.1.2 Ram Preventer Opening and Close Ratios
Closing Ratio
Closing ratio is defined as the cross sectional area of the operating piston divided by the cross
sectional area of the ram shaft. This ratio can be used to determine closing pressures
necessary to overcome wellbore pressures acting to force the ram open.
As an example, consider a ram with an 11” piston and a 4” ram shaft.
Area exposed to operating pressure = (11”/2)2 x π = 95.03in2

Area exposed to wellbore pressure = (4”/2)2 x π = 12.57 in2
Closing ratio = 95.03 / 12.57 = 7.56
Question: What minimum operating pressure would be required to close this ram
against 15,000psi maximum BOP working pressure?
Answer: Working pressure / Closing ratio = Minimum operating pressure

15,000 psi / 7.56 = 1984 psi
7-24 October 2005

15,000psi x 12.57 in2 =

188,550 lbs. Force 1984 psi x 95.03 in2 =
Piston
188,540 lbs. Force
pipe
Ram shaft
Ram block
Figure 7.1.18 Closing Ratio Example
In this case, a 3000 psi accumulator system providing minimum operation pressure of 1200
psi (pre-charge pressure + 200 psi) would clearly be inadequate. Selection of a ram BOP with
a closing ration of at least 10, or use of an accumulator system with greater than 1984 psi
minimum operating pressure would be recommended.
The closing ratio typically becomes more important as the difference increases between
operating system pressure and BOP rated working pressure.
October 2005 7-25

Table 7.1.3 Fluid required (for operating one set of ram preventers)
7-26 October 2005

Table 7.1.4
Blowout Preventer Variable - Bore Ram Hang off Capacities:
Make/Size/WP/Model Ram size Hang off capacity lbs Working Temp °F
Cameron BOP's
13 ⅝" - 10M psi WP U 5" x 2⅞" 3½" - 150,000 180

5" - 450,000
5½" x 3½" 3½" - 150,000 180
(5" + 5½") - 450,000
7" x 4½" 5" - 190,000 180
5½" - 240,000
6⅝" - 450,000
13 ⅝" - 15M psi WP U 5" x 3½" 3½" - 200,000 180
5" - 450,000
5½" x 3½" 3½" - 200,000 180
(5" + 5½") - 450,000
7" x 5" 5" - 250,000 180
5½" - 300,000
6⅝" - 450,000
13 ⅝" - 10M psi WP T/TL 5" x 2⅞" 3½" - 150,000 180
5" - 450,000
16¾" - 10M psi WP U 5" x 2⅞" 3½" - 294,000 180
5" - 450,000
18¾" - 10M psi WP U 7⅝ x 3½" 3½" - 200,000 180
(5" + 5½") - 350,000
6⅝" - 375,000
18¾" - 10M psi WP UII 5" x 2⅞" 3½" - 300,000 180
5" - 450,000
7⅝ x 3½" 3½" - 200,000 180
(5" + 5½") - 350,000
6⅝" - 375,000
18¾" - 15M psi WP UII 5" x 3½" 3½" - 140,000 180
5" - 450,000
7⅝ x 3½" 3½" - 140,000 180
(5" + 5½") - 350,000
6⅝" - 375,000
18¾" - 10M psi WP T/TL 7⅝ x 3½" 3½" - 60,000 180
5" - 225,000
5½" - 275,000
6⅝" - 350,000
18 ¾" - 15M psi WP T/TL 5" x 3½" 3½" - 140,000 180
5" - 450,000
5½" x 3½" 3½" - 140,000 180
(5" + 5½") - 450,000
6⅝" x 3½" 3½" - 140,000 180
(5" + 5½") - 350,000
6⅝" - 600,000
October 2005 7-27

Make/Size/Model Ram size Hang off capacity lbs Working Temp °F
Cameron Flex Packers
(13 ⅝"+18¾") - 10M psi WP U 5" x 3½" 3½" - 150,000 180

5" - 450,000
6⅝ x 5" 5" - 190,000 180
5½" - 240,000
6⅝" - 450,000
18 ¾"-(10M+15M) psi WP
T/TL 5" x 3½" 3½" - 250,000 180
5" - 450,000
6⅝ x 5" 5" - 250,000 180
5½" - 350,000
6⅝" - 450,000
18 ¾" - 15M psi WP T/TL 5" x 5½" (5" + 5½") - 450,000 180
6⅝ x 5" 5" - 250,000
5½" - 350,000
6⅝" - 450,000
W/SPECIAL RAM 6⅝ x 5" (5"+5½"+6⅝")- 600,000 180
Hydril BOP's
Hydril MPL
18¾" - 10,000 psi WP 3½" x 5½" 5½" size - 600,000 190

4½" x 7" 7" size - 600,000
18 ¾" - 15,000 psi WP 3½" x 5½" 5½" size - 600,000 190
5" x 7" 7" size - 600,000
4½" x 7" 7" size - 600,000
13 ⅝" - 10,000 psi WP 2⅞" x 5" 5" size - 600,000 190
3½" x 5½" 5½" size - 600,000
3½" x 6" 6" size - 600,000
5" x 7" 7" size - 600,000
13 ⅝" - 15,000 psi WP 3½" x 5" 5" size - 600,000 190
5" x 7" 7" size - 600,000
Hydril Quik-Loq
13 ⅝" - 15,000 psi WP 3½" x 5" 5" size - 600,000

5" x 7" 7" size - 600,000 190
Shaffer SL
13 ⅝" - 10,000 psi WP 5" x 6⅝" 5" + 5½" - 400,000 280
13 ⅝" - 15,000 psi WP 3½" x 5" 5" - 400,000 280

5" x 7" 5" - 400,000 280
5½" - 600,000
16¾" - 10,000 psi WP 3½" x 5" 5" - 600,000 280
7-28 October 2005

Make/Size/Model Ram size Hang off capacity lbs Working Temp °F
Shaffer BOP's
Shaffer SLX/NXT
18¾" - 10,000 psi WP 3½" x 5" 3½" - 200,000 280

5" - 600,000
5" x 6⅝ (5"+5½") - 400,000 280
6 ⅝" - 600,000
5" x 7" (5"+5½") - 300,000 280
6⅝" - 600,000
18 ¾" - 15,000 psi WP 3½" x 5" 3½" - 200,000 280

5" - 600,000
3½" x 5½" 3½" - 200,000 280
(5"+5½") - 600,000
5" x 7" (5"+5½") - 300,000 280
6⅝" - 600,000
Table 7.1.5 Blowout Preventers Casing Shear-Ram Capabilities
Shear
Size/WP/Model Shear ram/piston size casing size/weight Pressure Sealing
Cameron Type TL
c/w Super shear bonnets
18¾" - 15,000 psi Super Shear Rams 9⅝ - K55 47lbs/ft 980 psi No
13⅜" - P110 72lbs/ft 1350 psi No
Cameron Type U II Shearing Blind Rams 9⅝ - K55 47lbs/ft Yes

c/w Tandem Boosters 13⅜" - P110 72lbs/ft Yes
Hydril MPL
13⅝ - 10,000 psi 14¼" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 2800 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 2850 psi No
13⅝ - 15,000 psi 14¼" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 2800 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 2850 psi No
13⅝ - 15,000 psi 19" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 1550 psi No

7" - L80 29lbs/ft 1750 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 1500 psi No
7" - P110 32lbs/ft 1700 psi No
16¾" - 10,000 psi 14¼" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 2800 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 2650 psi No
October 2005 7-29

Shear
Size/WP/Model Shear ram/piston size casing size/weight Pressure Sealing
18¾" - 10,000 psi 14¼" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 2800 psi No

7" - N80 29lbs/ft 2650 psi No
18¾" - 15,000 psi 15½" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 2350 psi No
7" - L80 29lbs/ft 2650 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 2250 psi No
7" - P110 32lbs/ft 2550 psi No
7⅝" L80 29.7 lbs/ft 2650 psi No
19" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 1550 psi No
7" - L80 29lbs/ft 1750 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 1500 psi No
7" - P110 32lbs/ft 1700 psi No
7⅝" L80 29.7 lbs/ft 1750 psi No
9⅝"-N-80 47.2 lbs/ft 2250 psi No
22" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 1150 psi No
7" - L80 29lbs/ft 1300 psi No
18¾" - 15,000 psi 22” 7" - P110 32lbs/ft 1250 psi No
7⅝" L80 29.7 lbs/ft 1300 psi No
9⅝"-N-80 47.2 lbs/ft 1700 psi No
Hydril QUIK-LOQ
13⅝ - 15,000 psi 14¼" 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 2800 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 2650 psi No
14¼" Boosted 7" - L80 26lbs/ft 1550 psi No
7" - L80 29lbs/ft 1750 psi No
7" - N80 29lbs/ft 1500 psi No
7" - P110 32lbs/ft 1700 psi No
7⅝" L80 29.7 lbs/ft 1750 psi No
9⅝"-N-80 47.2 lbs/ft 2250 psi No
Shaffer SLX/NXT
18¾" - 15,000 psi WP 14" piston + 16 booster Cut all sizes of casing
up to 13⅜" P110-72lbs/ft 2425 psi No
7-30 October 2005

7.2 Annular Preventers
Annular preventers have a doughnut-shaped element with bonded steel internal reinforcing.
Extrusion of the element into the wellbore is effected by upwards movement of a
hydraulically actuated piston. The element is designed to seal around most shapes or size of
pipe and to close off on an open hole.
An important function of annular preventers is to facilitate the stripping of drill pipe into or
out of the hole, with pressure on the well. Undue wear on the element is avoided by the use
of a pilot-operated hydraulic regulator to control closing pressures.
The majority of annular preventers in use are manufactured by Hydril (types MSP, GK, GL,
and GX), Shaffer (Spherical) and Cameron (type D). These are illustrated below together
with a summary of the major operating features.
The most important aspects of the operation of annular preventers are:
• For maximum sealing element life, the hydraulic closing pressures should conform to
the manufacturer’s recommendations for pressure testing and operational use.
Excessive closing pressures combined with wellbore pressure sealing effects, cause
high internal stress in the element, reducing the life of the element. This information
should be available at the rigsite.
• Cavities should be flushed out and the element inspected at the end of each well.
Preventers should be stripped and inspected annually. Seals should be replaced and
all sealing surfaces inspected. Note: Cap seals should be replaced when changing
elements.
• Drilling tools, especially rock bits, should be run with caution through the BOPs to
minimize packing element damage. Elements of annular preventers sometimes will
not fully retract. Note: The type of packing element should be determined by the type
of well being drilled.
• Although most models and size of annular preventer are designed to close on an open
hole, it is not recommended to utilize this function except in an emergency, because
gross deformation of the elastomer causes cracking and accelerates wear.
• When stripping, the closing pressure should be reduced to allow a slight weeping of
mud past the element. Closing pressures higher than this will increase element wear.
The pipe should be moved slowly, particularly when tool joints are being lowered
through the element. The manufacturers also provide pressure recommendations for
stripping operations.
October 2005 7-31

• Rotation and reciprocation of the drill string through a closed annular can take place
as long as the appropriate measures are in place. Rotation of the drill string without
simultaneous reciprocation through a closed annular increases the risk of parting the
drill string. Cases have occurred in which the steel reinforcing fingers inside worn
packing elements have cut into the drill string, severing the pipe.
Note: Rotation in an annular preventer is not recommended, reciprocation is preferred if

pipe is to be moved.
Cameron Model “D” Annular Preventer
The Cameron Model “D” preventer uses two elastomer elements consisting of a donut and a
rubber packer. When closing pressure is applied, the contractor piston moves upwards
against the donut, which deforms inward onto the outside of the rubber packer. This action
displaces the rubber packer radially inward to produce the seal. The packer is internally steel
reinforced to help prevent excessive deformation under pressure. Since the Model “D”
preventer is not wellbore pressure assisted, closing pressure above 1,500 psi may be needed
in extreme circumstances to affect a seal. The normal operating pressure of the Model “D” is
1500 psi. Most sizes of the Model “D” preventer use less closing fluid than Hydril and
Shaffer preventers of equivalent size, and have a smaller over-all height. The Cameron “D”
Annular Preventer is shown in Figure 7.2.1
Figure 7.2.1 Cameron Model D Annular Blowout Preventer
In the unique design of the Cameron DL annular BOP, closing pressure forces the operating
piston and pusher plate upward to displace the solid elastomer donut and force the packer to
close inward. As the packer closes, steel reinforcing inserts rotate inward to form a
7-32 October 2005

continuous support ring of steel at the top and bottom of the packer. The inserts remain in
contact with each other whether the packer is open, closed on pipe or closed on open hole.
Other features of the DL BOP include:
• The Cameron DL BOP is shorter in height than comparable annular preventers. A

quick-release top with a one-piece split lock ring permits quick packer change out
with no loose parts involved. The design also provides visual indication of whether
the top is locked or unlocked.
• The DL BOP is designed to simplify field maintenance. Components subject to wear

are field-replaceable and the entire operating system may be removed in the field for
immediate change-out without removing the BOP from the stack.
• Twin seals separated by a vented chamber positively isolate the BOP operating
system from well bore pressure. High strength polymer bearing rings prevent metal-
to-metal contact and reduce wear between all moving parts of the operating systems.
• Packers for DL BOPs have the capacity to strip pipe as well as close and seal on
almost any size or shape object that will fit into the wellbore. These packers will also
close and seal on open hole. Some annular packers can also be split for installation
while pipe is in the hole. Popular sizes of the DL BOP are available with high-
performance CAMULAR™ annular packing subassemblies. See Figure 7.2.2
Figure 7.2.2 CAMERON 2000 psi WP Annular Blowout Preventer

Sealing Element
October 2005 7-33

HYDRIL GK ANNULAR
The Hydril “GK” preventer shown in Figure 7.2.3 is a highly wellbore pressure assisted
annular preventer which is designed for land applications. The 15M psi GK is not wellbore
pressure assisted. This preventer can close on open hole in an emergency, but damage to the
sealing element may result and element life will be reduced. In a closed position, element
wear can be determined through an access port located in the top of the preventer. The lifting
eyes, shown below, should be used to lift the annular preventer only - never the entire stack.
Figure 7.2.3 HYDRIL “GK” Annular
OPERATIONAL FEATURES
The Hydril GK Annular BOPs are particularly qualified to meet the industry’s need for
simple and reliable blowout protection. Over 40 years of operational experience provide the
simplest, field proven mechanism in the industry.
Only two moving parts (piston and packing unit) on the Hydril Annular BOP mean few areas
are subjected to wear. The BOP is thus a safer and more efficient mechanism requiring less
maintenance and downtime.
A long piston with a length to diameter ratio approaching one eliminates tendencies to cock
and bind during operations with off-center pipe or unevenly distributed accumulation of
sand, cuttings, or other debris. This design ensures the packing unit will always reopen to full
bore position.
7-34 October 2005

Back-to-Front feedable rubber on the Packing Unit enables the packing unit to close and seal
on virtually any shape in the drill string or completely shut off the open bore, while also
permitting stripping of tool joints under pressure. This feature permits confident closure of
the BOP at the initial indication of a “kick” without delaying to locate the tool joint.
The Conical Bowl Design of the Piston provides a simple and efficient method of closing the
packing unit. The piston serves as a sealing surface against the rubber packing unit; there is
no metal-to-metal wear and thus longer equipment life results.
Utilization of Maximum Packing Unit life is made possible with a piston indicator for
measuring piston stroke. This measurement indicates remaining packing unit life and ensures
valid testing.
A Field Replaceable Wear Plate in the BOP Head serves as an upper non-sealing wear
surface for the movement of the packing unit, making field repair fast and economical.
Flanged Steel Inserts in the Packing Unit reinforce the rubber and control rubber flow and
extrusion for safer operation and longer packing unit life.
Greater stripping capability is inherent in the design of the packing unit since testing (fatigue)
wear occurs on the outside and stripping wear occurs on the inside of the packing unit. Thus,
testing wear has virtually no affect on stripping capability and greater overall life of the
packing unit results. The resulting ability to strip the drill string to the bottom without first
changing the packing unit means a safer operation, lower operating costs, and longer service
life for the packing unit.
The packing unit is tested to full rated working pressure at the factory and the tests are
documented - before it reaches the well site - to ensure a safe, quality performance.
The packing unit is replaceable with pipe in the bore, which eliminates pulling the drill string
for replacement and reduces operating expenses, with more options for well control
techniques. Large PRESSURE ENERGIZED SEALS are used for dynamically sealing piston
chambers to provide safe operation, long seal life, and less maintenance.
Piston sealing surfaces protected by operating fluid lowers friction and protects against
galling and wear, to increase seal life and reduce maintenance time.
BOP CLOSURE SEQUENCE
All Hydril Annular Blowout Preventers employ the same time-tested design for sealing off
virtually anything in the BOP bore or the open hole. During normal wellbore operations, the
BOP is kept fully open by leaving the piston down. This position permits passage of tools,
casing, and other items up to the full bore size of the BOP as well as providing maximum
annulus flow of drilling fluids. The BOP is maintained in the open position by application of
October 2005 7-35

hydraulic pressure to the opening chamber. This ensures positive control of the piston during
drilling and reduces wear caused by vibration, as shown in Figures 7.2.4 A, B & C.
Figure 7.2.4 A Closure Sequence (Open)
The piston is raised by applying hydraulic pressure to the closing chamber. This raises the
piston, which in turn squeezes the steel reinforced packing unit inward to a sealing
engagement with the drill string. The closing pressure should be regulated with a separate
pressure regulator valve for the annular BOP. Guidelines for closing pressures are contained
in the applicable Operator’s Manual.
Figure 7.2.4 B Closure Sequence (Part Closed)
7-36 October 2005

The packing unit is kept in compression throughout the sealing area, thus assuring a tough,
durable seal off against virtually any drill string shape - kelly, tool joint, pipe, or tubing to
full rated working pressure. Application of opening chamber pressure returns the piston to
the full down position, allowing the packing unit to return to full open bore through the
natural resiliency of the rubber.
Figure 7.2.4 C Closure Sequence (Sealed Off)
Figure 7.2.5 BOP Closing Sequence
October 2005 7-37

Complete shut off (CSO) of the well bore is possible with all Hydril Annular BOPs. During
CSO the flanges of the steel inserts form a solid ring to confine the rubber and provide a safe
seal off of the rated working pressure of the BOP. This feature should be utilized only during
emergency well control situations, as it will reduce the life of the packing unit.
HYDRIL TYPE GL 5000 PSI ANNULAR BLOWOUT PREVENTER
The Hydril “GL” preventer is designed primarily for subsea use, but is also utilized in deeper
land operations. The unique feature of the “GL” preventer is its secondary closing chamber
which can be used to compensate for marine riser hydrostatic pressure effects in deep water.
The secondary chamber also allows additional closing force on the contractor piston. This
may be necessary in some instances since the preventer is only slightly wellbore pressure
assisted. The secondary chamber port should never be plugged; either connect the port to the
accumulator or leave it open. The “GL” preventer shown in Figure 7.2.6 has a latched head
for easier sealing element change.
Cutaway view of GL BOP shown in midstroke.

5000 or 10000 psi bottom connections are available
in hub, API flanged, or studded connection.
Figure 7.2.6 Cutaway section of HYDRIL Type GL BOP shown in Mid-stroke
Hydril GL Annular Blowout Preventers are designed and developed both for subsea and
surface operations. The GL family of BOPs represents the culmination of evolutionary
design and operator requirements. The proven packing unit provides full closure at maximum
working pressure on open hole or on virtually anything in the bore - casing, drill pipe, tool
joints, kelly, or tubing. Features of the GL make it particularly desirable for subsea and deep
well drilling. These drilling conditions demand long-life packing elements for drill pipe
stripping operations and frequent testing. The GL BOP offers the longest life packing unit for
annular blowout preventers available in the industry today - especially for the combination of
7-38 October 2005

BOP testing and stripping pipe into or out of a well under pressure. The latched head permits
quick, positive head removal for packing unit replacement or other maintenance with only
minimum time required.
Figure 7.2.7 HYDRIL ‘GL’ Opening and Closing sequence
The following outstanding features of the Hydril GL BOPs make these units particularly
qualified to meet the industry’s needs for simple and reliable blowout protection. The
Secondary Chamber, which is unique to the GL BOP, provides this unit with great flexibility
of control hookup and acts as a backup closing chamber to cut operating costs and increase
safety factors in critical situations. The chamber can be connected four ways to optimize
operations for different effects:
1. Minimize closing/opening fluid volumes.

2. Reduce closing pressure.
3. Automatically compensate (counter balance) for marine riser hydrostatic pressure
effects in deep water.
4. Operate as a secondary closing chamber.
Automatic Counter Balance can be achieved in subsea applications by selection of one of the
optional hookups of the secondary chamber. The Latched Head provides fast, positive access
to the packing unit and seals for minimum maintenance time. The latching mechanism
October 2005 7-39

releases the head with a few turns of the Jaw Operating Screws, while the entire mechanism
remains inside the blowout preventer. There are no loose parts to be lost downhole or
overboard.
The Opening Chamber Head protects the opening chamber and prevents inadvertent
contamination of the hydraulic system while the head is removed for packing unit
replacement.
Figure 7.2.8 Operating pressure for Hydril GL Preventer
The optimum closing pressure for the standard hookup is obtained using the following
formula:
Closing Pressure = Surface Closing Pressure + Adjustment Pressure (∆P)
(0.052 x Wm x Dw) - (0.45 x Dw)

Adjustment Pressure (∆P) = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––
p
7-40 October 2005

Where:
Wm = drilling fluid density in lb/gal

Dw = water depth in feet
0.052 = conversion factor
p = 2.13 = the ratio of closing chamber area to secondary
chamber area for GL 16¾ - 5000.
0.45 psi/ft = pressure gradient for sea-water using a specific gravity of sea
water = 1.04 and 0.433 psi/ft pressure gradient for fresh
water.
Only packing elements which are supplied by the manufacturer of the annular preventer
should be used. New or repaired units obtained from other service companies should not be
used since the preventer manufacturers cannot be held responsible for malfunction of their
equipment unless their elements are installed.
Table 7.2.1 ANNULAR PREVENTERS

Gallons of Fluid Required to Operate on Open Hole
October 2005 7-41

HYDRIL PACKING UNIT REPLACEMENT
The sealing element can be changed without removing the drill pipe. When it becomes
necessary to change the sealing element, the rams below the annular preventer should be
closed and locked. The top of the annular preventer is removed and the rubber sealing
element lifted out. This element is then cut between the metal ribs, the rubber is parted, and
then the old split rubber element is pulled from around the drill pipe. The new rubber sealing
element is cut (never sawed) between the metal ribs, as shown in Figure 7.2.10 and the new
element is installed in a method reversed from the removal sequence. All replacement
elements must be approved by the preventer manufacturer.
Note: Cameron sealing elements cannot be cut in this fashion and instances have been
documented where Shaffer elements in a subsea application have come out of the
Annular body after being split.
Figure 7.2.9 Changing packing elements with Pipe in the Hole
7-42 October 2005

CONTRACTOR PISTON
Figure 7.2.10 Contractor Piston
As the contractor piston is raised by hydraulic pressure as shown in Figure 7.2.10, the rubber
packing unit is squeezed inward to a sealing engagement with anything suspended in the
wellbore. Compression of the rubber throughout the sealing area assures a seal-off against
any shape.
October 2005 7-43

SHAFFER SPHERICAL BLOWOUT PREVENTERS
Shaffer Spherical blowout preventers are compact, annular type BOPs which reliably seal on
almost any shape or size - kellys, drill pipe, tool joints, drill collars, casing or wireline.
Sphericals also provide positive pressure control for stripping drill pipe into and out of the
hole. They are available in bolted cover, wedge cover and dual wedge cover models. There
are also special lightweight models for airlifting and Arctic models for low temperature
service.
Figure 7.2.11 SHAFFER Annular
Shaffer 18 ¾” Spherical Annular Preventer Packing Element
Shaffer Spherical Annular BOP performance depends on the type of element fitted. This
annular may only close and hold pressure up to full rated working pressure on objects of a
specific diameter.
Shaffer has two different types of element:
1. The Standard element (Part No 155295 10K Nitrile) with long fingers will not seal as
well against larger diameters. A Standard element will close on 5” drill pipe with 1500
psi operating pressure and seal up to its full rated working pressure of 10,000 psi.
However, this working pressure reduces to 2,000 psi at the recommended closing
pressure of 600 psi on a 12 ¾” test tool.
7-44 October 2005

2. The short fingered Casing element (Part No 157656) will not seal as well against
smaller diameters. A Casing element will close with 1,000 psi operating pressure and
seal to 9,000 psi on a 13 3/8” test mandrel. This falls to 5,000 psi with 1,500 psi
operating pressure on a 5” mandrel.
This information is clearly stated in Shaffer documentation, which also states that “Casing
element type 157656 does not comply with API RP 16 (will not close on open hole or seal up
to the full rated working pressure when closed on pipe diameters greater than 13 3/8” or
smaller than 8 ½”)”.
At the beginning of a rig contract it is important to check what type of element is fitted to the
annular. Failure to be aware of the BOPs limitations could have serious well control
consequences.
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Installation
A blowout preventer operating and control system is required to actuate the Spherical BOP.
Several systems are available and those commonly used on drilling rigs work well. The
recommended installation requires:
1. A control line to the closing (lower) port.

2. For stripping, an accumulator bottle in the closing line adjacent to the BOP. This bottle
should be pre-charged to 500 psi for surface installations and to 500 psi plus 45 psi per
100' of water depth for subsea installations.
3. A control line to the opening (upper) port.
4. A hydraulic regulator to allow adjustment of operating pressure to meet any given
situation.
The hydraulic operating fluid should be hydraulic oil with a viscosity between 200 and 300
SSU at 100°F. If necessary, a water-soluble oil such as Koomey K-90 and water can be used
for environmental protection. If equipment is exposed to freezing temperatures, ethylene
glycol must be added to the K-90 and water solution for freeze protection.
Note: Some water-soluble systems will corrode the metals used in BOPs. If water-soluble
oil is used, the user should ensure that it provides adequate lubrication and
corrosion protection.
October 2005 7-45

Figure 7.2.12 Installation Hook-up for Single and Dual spherical BOP
7-46 October 2005

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Operating Requirements
Sphericals have relatively simple operating requirements compared to other annulars. When
closing on stationary pipe, 1,500 psi operating pressure is sufficient in most applications.
Recommended closing pressures for specific applications are given in Table 7.2.2.
Closing action begins when hydraulic fluid is pumped into the closing chamber of the
Spherical BOP below the piston. As the piston rises, it pushes the element up, and the
element’s spherical shape causes it to close in at the top as it moves upward. The element
seals around the drill string as the piston continues to rise. Steel segments in the element
move into the well bore to support the rubber as it contains the well pressure below.
Table 7.2.2 Shaffer Spherical Closing Pressures on Casing
When there is no pipe in the preventer, continued upward movement of the piston forces the
element to seal across the open bore. At complete shutoff, the steel segments provide ample
support for the top portion of the rubber. This prevents the rubber from flowing or extruding
excessively when confining high well pressure.
Stripping Operations
Stripping operations are undoubtedly the most severe application for any preventer because
of the wear the sealing element is exposed to as the drill string is moved through the
preventer under pressure. To prolong sealing element life, it is important to use proper
operating procedures when stripping. The recommended procedures are:
1. Close the preventer with 1,500 psi closing pressure.

2. Just prior to commencing stripping operations, reduce closing pressure to a value
sufficient to allow a slight leak.
3. If conditions allow, stripping should be done with a slight leak to provide lubrication
and prevent excessive temperature buildup in the element. As the sealing element
October 2005 7-47

wears, the closing pressure will need to be incrementally increased to prevent excessive
leakage.
• Most annular preventers are designed to use wellbore pressure to assist in

maintaining closure. In some circumstances and depending on the preventer size,
the well pressure alone can keep the annular closed without any closing hydraulic
pressure being applied. However, an annular preventer should never be operated
without closing pressure being applied. The packing unit may suddenly open with
any reduction or surge in well pressure.
• Annular preventers will allow for stripping pipe because they have the ability to
maintain a seal while passing tool joints and have a better abrasion resistance than
pipe ram preventers. Special attention should be given to the annular preventer
during the stripping operations. Although the accumulator pressure regulator will
maintain constant closing pressure, the response of most regulators is slow. Tool
joints may have to be moved through the preventer slowly so that the regulator has
enough time to react, in order to avoid damage and excess wear to the packing
element.
Hydril Sealing Elements
All preventer manufacturers provide sealing elements of different composition that are
designed for use in specific wellbore environments. Table 7.2.3 provides Hydril’s packing
unit selection and Table 7.2.4 lists Shaffer’s sealing elements.
Table 7.2.3 Packing Unit Selection (from Hydril)
Table 7.2.4 Shaffer Sealing Elements

Packing Type Colour Code Letter Code Recommended Usage
Natural Rubber Red 1 or 2 Low temperature operations in

water based muds.
Buna (Nitrile) Blue 5 or 6 Oil and water based muds.

H2S in oil based muds.
Neoprene Black 3 or 4 H2S with water based muds.
7-48 October 2005

7.3 Diverters
Introduction
A diverter system can provide a degree of protection prior to setting the casing string upon
which the BOP stack and choke manifold will be installed. The system is designed to pack
off around the Kelly, drill string, or casing and direct flow to a safe location. Valves in the
system direct the well flow when the diverter is actuated. A diverter is not designed to shut-in
or stop flow, but rather permits routing of the flow to a safe distance away from the rig.
Figure 7.3.1 Diverter Systems – Surface Installations
Diverter Installation and Equipment Requirements
The diverter system is typically installed on the drive pipe or conductor casing. It consists of
a low pressure diverter or an annular preventer of sufficient internal bore to pass the bit and
tools required for subsequent drilling. Vent line(s) of adequate size (reference API RP 64) are
attached to outlets below the diverter and extended to a location sufficiently distant from the
well to permit safe venting and proper disposal of fluid flow from the well.
Conventional annular blow out preventers or rotating heads are commonly used as diverters:
however, various sizes of special low pressure “diverters” are available. The rated working
October 2005 7-49

pressure of the diverter and vent line(s) is not of prime importance; rather they are sized to
permit diversion of well fluids while minimizing wellbore back pressure. Chevron
recommends vent lines of 10” for land & offshore and 12” diameter for floaters.
TOP VIEW SIDE VIEW
Figure 7.3.2 Surface Diverter for Floating Operations
Diverter system reliability is often limited by metal erosion caused by high flow rates of
formation fluids/solids. As far as the geometry of the system is concerned, large diameter,
straight vent line systems will help minimize fluid velocity and turbulence at the surface.
When turns have to be made, fittings designed to reduce erosion at high flow rates should be
used.
7-50 October 2005

Combination Stack
Since the decision to divert or shut-in is based upon the formation integrity at the conductor
shoe, and this is not known for sure until the shoe has been drilled out, it may difficult to
know beforehand whether to nipple up a diverter or a BOP stack after cementing conductor
casing. To get around this problem, combination diverter/BOP stacks have been nippled up
on conductor casing, and the decision to shut in or divert made only after the conductor shoe
has been tested. Per API: a competent shoe must be set and the LOT performed prior to use
of a BOP stack to shut-in a well. A schematic of an example combination stack arrangement
is shown below.
Figure 7.3.3 Combination Stack
In some offshore operations, the annular preventer and diverter spool are placed close to
mean sea level while the drilling unit's work deck and flow lines are a considerable distance
above. In such instances, consideration can be given to having the divert lines exit from the
spool at or just above sea level (see below).
October 2005 7-51

Diverter Spool
For surface applications, the diverter spool must be of a pressure rating equal to or greater
than that of the annular preventer, with two 10" minimum ID side outlets and with 10"
minimum vent line size. If the spool has only one outlet, then it must be a minimum of 10" in
diameter and must tee into two 10" overboard vent lines. Of course, two 10" diameter outlets
would be preferable. For onshore operations, the spool should have at least one outlet with a
6" minimum ID, local regulations and policy permitting. The spool should be inspected to
assure its integrity prior to installation. All bolts must be installed and new ring gaskets used
to minimize the possibility of leaks.
Diverter Valves
The diverter valves should be installed immediately adjacent to the diverter spool. This is a
precaution against a failure between the spool and the valve, where washing due to
turbulence can be a problem. These valves should be full opening, with a minimum ID of 10"
(unless local regulations mandate a larger bore size). The design of the diverter vent line
assembly (spool outlets, valves, and vent lines) should promote a uniform internal diameter,
as ID changes accelerate erosion. Diverter valves are not intended to be exposed to shut-in
wellbore pressure in diverting service, but conceivably they could be subjected to such
pressure due to sudden vent line plugging. The hydraulic gate valve has been field proven
with BOP systems over many years, and is recommended over the hydraulic ball valve for
use with the diverter system.
Hydraulic instead of pneumatic valve operation is recommended for the following reasons:
1) Hydraulic operators develop a greater closing force with a smaller operating chamber
compared to a pneumatic operator in the same service.
2) Hydraulic control lines are less likely to be damaged than pneumatic tubing because
they are heavy duty, high pressure steel lines.
3) Hydraulic fluid is consistent with the control station fluid.
4) Hydraulic systems are less likely to have freezing problems.
5) Hydraulic system leaks are easier to find.
6) Hydraulic valves can still function if the rig air supply is depleted or turned off.
In a study of diverting situations, it was found that the single most common cause of failure
in the diverter system was the malfunction of the divert valves. As a result, the selection of a
hydraulic gate valve is preferable whenever possible. Again, all valves should be routinely
function tested to ensure they are not seized up. The diverter and valves should be function
tested once every 24 hours.
Certain operations require a booster pump to be installed on the drive pipe close to the water
level to reduce lost return problems. If this pump is being used, it must have a remote valve
7-52 October 2005

installed adjacent to the drive pipe with a pressure rating consistent with the system. Its
operations must be tied into the diverter panel such that it will be closed automatically when
the diverter is closed.
Diverter Vent Lines
The diverter vent lines or overboard lines should have the same pressure integrity as the rest
of the system for the same reason as the divert valves. If a line plugs, it must be able to
withstand pressure for the time it takes to open the opposite line. The lines should extend at
least beyond the edge of any decking below the lines. As previously mentioned, the lines
must be installed as straight as possible since changes in flow direction can cause significant
erosional problems at the area of change.
If at all possible, hard piping from the divert valves to the overboard lines should be used. In
the case where hard piping is not possible, flexible hoses typically are used to connect the
overboard lines with the divert valves. These flexible lines must be of a pressure rating
consistent with the system, be as short as possible, be as straight as possible, and have
integral end couplings for connecting. Collapsible hoses with hose clamps or dresser sleeves
are not acceptable. The hoses and overboard lines must be securely anchored to
accommodate the severe forces to which they will be subjected.
Diverter Control Stations
The component most often lacking in consistency and definition is the control station that
will be used to execute the divert function. Simplicity and reliability of a diverter system
demands the control station be readily accessible and simple in operation, leaving no room
for error. The system should operate as a remote station to the main accumulator system.
Figure 7.3.4 Diverter Control Station
October 2005 7-53

A typical diverter control station would consist of two levers in a panel that are labelled as to
their function. One lever should be used to divert the flow overboard. When this handle is
moved to “Divert”, the four way valve on the main accumulator for the annular preventer
will shift to the close position, closing the annular preventer. Simultaneously, the four way
valves on the main accumulator for both port and starboard divert valves will shift to the
open position, opening both overboard lines.
If at this time the need arises to close the upwind overboard line, the second lever on the
control station should be used. This lever, when moved to “port”, will shift the starboard four
way valve on the main accumulator to the close position and shift the port four way valve to
the open position, if closed, opening the port divert valve. No combination of these handles
should allow the well to be shut in. A diverter control station rigged-up this way is shown in
the last picture.
Two separate diverter control stations are required; one on the rig floor, and the other station
at a safe and remote distance from the rig floor. The diverter control stations will be air
operated, supplied by the rig’s continuous air supply. As a safety precaution, the control
stations should contain an air reserve bottle with adequate volume to function each operation
two times, independent of rig air, in the event the rig air supply is disrupted for any reason.
The major advantages of a separate diverter control system are:
a. It has the sole function of controlling the divert operation.

b. It will be a permanent fixture of the rig.
c. The chance of human error in diverting a well is eliminated.
d. By using the main accumulator system, the stored energy of the system is utilized.
e. The control lines from the unit to the component are high pressure steel lines that are
permanently installed on the rig.
Integral Vent Valve Diverters
Diverters with integral vent valves were introduced in the 1980's and have been field proven
in gas flow diverts. The key advantage of integral vent valves is the elimination of the
diverter valve (a weak link in the traditional diverter system described earlier), and thereby
the need to rely on sequencing functions to execute a divert. A schematic of a typical integral
venting diverter unit is shown in Figure 7.3.5.
7-54 October 2005

Figure 7.3.5 Integral Vent Diverter
Hydril's FS and FSP Diverter Systems are annular type diverters with integral vent lines and
valves. The FSP can be used as a diverter in the upper hole and then after cementing
conductor pipe it can be used as a blowout preventer. The integral vent valve design of these
units ensures that as the packing unit closes the vent simultaneously opens. These units have
a full seal off range, including on open hole. A schematic of an FSP unit is shown in Figure
7.3.6.
The Hydril FSP and FS diverters are normally teamed with Hydril's DS-12-500 Flow
Selector. The Flow Selector provides the capability to switch from one vent line to another
without the possibility of complete shut off in the process. It provides a massive target made
of hardened steel that causes the flow to be diverted down one of two branches of the vent
line system. A schematic showing the DS-12-500 Flow Selector is shown in Figure 7.3.7.
October 2005 7-55

Figure 7.3.6 Hydril FSP Diverter
7-56 October 2005

Figure 7.3.7 Flow Selector
Hydril also offers an SXV/MSP diverter arrangement. The SXV/MSP combines an MSP bag
type annular preventer with an SXV Diverter Spool containing integral vent valves. The SXV
spool can either be attached to the MSP annular diverter or separated by a spacer spool. The
SXV/MSP combination can be used either for surface diverting or for subsea diverting from
a bottom founded offshore drilling rig. The SXV/MSP assembly is available in 21-1/4", 29-
1/2", and 30" sizes. A schematic showing alternative SXV/MSP diverter arrangements is
shown in Figure 7.3.8.
October 2005 7-57

Figure 7.3.8 Hydril SXV/MSP system for surface (left) and subsea diverting
Fixed Housing Diverters
The following two diverter systems have fixed outer housings that mount to the rotary table
beams underneath the rig floor. The vent lines are attached to this outer housing. The diverter
itself can be run through the rotary table and locked into the outer housing. The packing
element is inserted into the diverter and J's in place. This insert packer can close on a range
of pipe sizes but not on open hole. The insert packer has to be pulled when pulling the BHA
through the diverter. This means the diverter is incapable of being closed while the BHA is
being pulled. Newer model insert packers are split into more than one concentric piece that
allow the inner packing element to be removed in order to pull the BHA, leaving the outer
piece of the packing element which can seal on the collars.
ABB Vetco Gray
ABB Vetco Gray markets their line of KFDJ diverter units for non-floating surface diverting
operations. This equipment has been marketed by a succession of companies over the years.
Originally developed and marketed by Regan Forge and Engineering Company, the product
was later acquired by Hughes Tool Co. and marketed by Hughes Offshore. A name change
followed once again with the creation of the Baker-Hughes organization, and eventually
ABB Vetco Gray acquired the technology.
7-58 October 2005

Figure 7.3.9 Vetco Gray KFDJ Fixed Diverter
The KFDJ is a 500 psi or 2000 psi working pressure diverter system, with a 27-1/2" bore in
conjunction with a 37-1/2" rotary table installation and a 36-1/2" bore in conjunction with a
49-1/2" rotary table installation. The unit is designed to run through the rotary table to
minimize nipple up time. It seats into a diverter support housing permanently mounted under
the rotary table and hydraulically locks in place. The support housing provides fixed outlets
for flowline, fill-up line, and vent lines, eliminating the need to disconnect and reconnect
these lines. A range of insert packers is utilized to provide pack-off over a full range of pipe
sizes, but open hole closure is not possible. The inserts are deployed with a "J" type running
tool. A schematic of the KFDJ diverter is shown in Figure 7.3.9.
A spacer spool and an over-shot packer are used to install the KFDJ diverter onto casing
(either structural or conductor). The overshot packer uses hydraulically inflatable seals to
pack off on the casing, and is available in a single or dual packer assembly. It can also be
October 2005 7-59

energized manually by torquing large socket head set screws in the bottom retaining flange.
The overshot assembly is equipped with wash out ports above the packer to clean out debris
trapped in the annular area between the casing and the ID of the overshot packer housing.
Figure 7.3.10 KFDJ Diverter System Overshot Package
The Vetco Gray EC-6 Coupling is used to connect the diverter assembly to the spacer spool
and overshot packer. The EC-6 is a stab type coupling utilizing a large lip seal. After the
coupling is stabbed, a course ACME thread nut on the EC-6 pin is made up to the EC-6 box
external thread. The diverter, spacer spool, and overshot packer assembly are deployed in one
piece with a handling tool, without the need to connect or disconnect the flow line, fill-up
line, and vent lines. A schematic of the overshot packer is given above.
The KFDJ Model J is an enhanced version of the KFDJ diverter unit, featuring fewer
hydraulic connections and a "J" lock between the diverter and the support housing. A
7-60 October 2005

mechanical latch secures the diverter in the housing and the latch handle provides a visual
confirmation of lock engagement. A schematic of the KFDJ Model J diverter is shown in
Figure 7.3.11
Figure 7.1.11 - KFDJ Model J Diverter
The KFDJ Model J diverter only requires three hydraulic functions to install and operate the
system. These functions are: energize and vent the diverter package; energize the flowline
seals; and, energize the overshot packer connecting the diverter to the casing. A schematic of
these hydraulic functions is given in the following figure. Usually the hydraulics of the KFDJ
October 2005 7-61

are piped into the control panel in such a way that operating one divert lever will control all
three of these hydraulic functions.
Figure 7.3.12 KFDJ Hydraulic Function Arrangement
Dril-Quip, Inc.
Dril-Quip markets a fixed diverter system for use with 37-1/2" and 49-1/2" rotary tables. The
Dril-Quip diverter has a working pressure of 2,000 psi. It utilizes a permanent housing
attached under the rotary table, eliminating the need for mechanical connection of the flow
line and fill-up line. The diverter assembly, spacer spool, and overshot packer are run
through the rotary table using a "J" type handling tool. The handling tool is selectively
equipped to permit running and retrieving either the insert packers individually or the entire
diverter assembly. Complete installation and lockdown of the diverter assembly is
accomplished with spring loaded snap rings, without the need for hydraulics. Self-energizing
seals, sealing on hard-faced surfaces, are used to isolate the diverter outlets. These seals do
not require hydraulic pressure to seal.
The diverter incorporates several sizes of packer inserts to effect a packoff across a full range
of pipe sizes. The diverter itself only requires two hydraulic functions to install and operate:
energizing and venting the diverter packer; and, energizing the overshot packer connecting
the diverter to the casing. The overshot packer is energized through the external hydraulic
port to 200 psi above the expected operating pressure. Naturally, other hydraulic functions
7-62 October 2005

are needed to control the diverter valves. Testing of the diverter is accomplished using a test
tool attached to the handling tool.
Figure 7.3.13 Dril-Quip Diverter System
The diverter, spacer spool, and overshot packer are connected to each other using stab type
couplings. After engagement, air wrenches are used to drive the captive screws against a split
lock ring. The coupling can be tested through the external port. A schematic of the Dril-Quip
diverter is shown in Figure 7.3.13.
Shaffer Fixed Housing Diverter
Shaffer markets a combination diverter/BOP system in 21-1/4", 2000 psi, and 30 ", 1000 psi
models. This fixed diverter integrates the Shaffer Spherical annular with a vent outlet spool
piece. The assembly fits into a housing permanently mounted under the rig floor. The unit
can close on open hole or a wide range of tubular sizes. A schematic of the Shaffer
diverter/BOP is shown in Figure 7.3.14.
October 2005 7-63

Figure 7.3.14 Shaffer Diverter/BOP
Diverter-Casing Connector
While the welded starting head is the most common means of connecting the diverter to the
casing, there have been several products introduced that speed up the process. One such
product, discussed above in the section on fixed housing insert packer type diverters, uses an
overshot packer with hydraulically activated seals below a diverter housing that is fixed to
the rotary beams. These connecters are only required to form a seal since the diverter itself is
secured to the rotary beams.
7-64 October 2005

Figure 7.3.15 Vetco Gray VG-Loc
Other products are designed to seal and hold the diverter in place. These "quick connect"
type connectors can be used in conjunction with annular style diverters. One such product is
the Vetco Gray VG Loc. This connector provides fast reliable connection of the diverter onto
plain end pipe, without the need for welding or extensive preparation. Mechanically set slips
engage the casing wall while seals effect a packoff. A schematic of the Vetco Gray VG-Loc
is shown in Figure 7.3.15.
Pressure Testing the Diverter System
Diverter systems are required to be pressure tested and function tested on a regular
basis. The required tests are described below.
Upon initial Nipple-Up:
Pressure test the diverter bag, diverter valves, and vent lines (if possible) to 200 psi.
This test may be conducted with a test plug, or in conjunction with the conductor pipe
pressure test before drilling out the shoe. For diverters nippled up on drive or
structural pipe, the 200 psi test pressure may not be possible, so a lower test pressure
will need to be used. Record the test on a test chart and make a written notation of the
test in the tour/morning report.
Function test all equipment and circulate through the overboard lines to ensure they
are free from obstruction. Make a record of the test in the tour/morning report.
October 2005 7-65

Note: Verify that each diverter valve is functioning both fully opened and fully closed. This
should be done visually.
While drilling ahead:
Function test all equipment (open and close) at least once every 24 hours. Make a
written notation of the test in the tour/morning report.
The diverter bag, spool, diverter valves, and vent lines (if possible) should be pressure
tested weekly. This test will require a test plug. Record the test on a test chart and
make a written notation of the test in the tour/morning report.
7-66 October 2005

7.4 BOP Stack Arrangements for Surface Installations
API Classification Nomenclature
Chevron has adopted the API classification system to describe BOP stack arrangements.
While a summary of API designation practices is included below, additional equipment
details may be found in API RP 53.
Chevron has historically used a non-API stack designation system that provides a convenient
way to specify and describe certain common recommended stack configurations. This
“Class” designation helps to ensure appropriate selection of BOP and choke manifold
components in relation to defined classes of wells and Chevron’s operational philosophies.
To permit continued use of this useful Chevron practice, the material presented in this section
includes descriptions of Chevron class 1 through Class 5 wells and equipment, but uses
current API classification nomenclature to define stack arrangements.
Stack Component Codes
The recommended component codes for designation of BOP stack arrangements are as
follows:
A = annular type blowout preventer (may be lower pressure rated than rams)
G = rotating head (may be lower pressure rated than annular)
R = single ram preventer (integral unit) with one set of rams, either blank or for pipe, as
operator prefers
Rd = double ram preventer (integral unit) with two sets of rams, positioned in accordance
with operator’s choice
Rt = triple ram preventer with three sets of rams, positioned in accordance with operator’s
choice
S = drilling spool with side outlet connections for choke and kill lines
K = 1000 psi rated working pressure
Components are listed reading upward from the uppermost piece of permanent wellhead
equipment, or from the bottom of the BOP stack. A BOP stack may be fully identified by a
very simple designation, such as:
5K – 13 5/8 – SRRA
This BOP stack would have a rated working pressure of 5000 psi (this is the ram and spool
rating; annular may have lower rating),would have a throughbore of 13 5/8 inches, and would
October 2005 7-67

consist of: drilling spool, ram, ram, and annular. Note that this API designation does not
indicate whether a ram is a pipe ram, variable bore ram, blind ram or shear/blind ram.
Equipment Requirements and Pressure Ratings
Some wells require little BOP equipment, while others need elaborate hookups. The specific
BOP stack arrangement to be used for each area should be approved by the Drilling Manager
in charge of the operation. The following BOP examples are meant to serve as guidelines, but
by no means represent all acceptable BOP arrangements.
When configuring BOP systems, primary consideration is given to safety standards,

environmental protection, and company investments. The specifications outlined are
recommended minimums, and are not intended to prevent the use of new equipment and
procedures. Approval for changes in BOP arrangement must come from the Drilling
Manager in charge of the operation.
In most cases, BOPs should be hydraulically operated, and assembled with flanged or
clamped connectors. Manually operated BOPs and screwed connections are acceptable in
certain situations. The type of BOP needed will depend on the conditions and approved
operating practices for the particular job or area.
Factors that should be considered when determining the BOP’s required working pressure
rating include:
• Internal working pressure of the casing

• Maximum anticipated surface pressure if the well kicks
• Depth of exposed oil and gas zones
• Availability of BOPs with the required pressure rating
• Maximum potential formation pressure and fluid density
• Pressure rating of the wellhead equipment
In general, the rated working pressure ratings of the wellhead and casing should be adjusted
based upon the age and mechanical condition of these components. The pressure rating of
BOPs and associated well control equipment has to be equal to or greater than the adjusted
pressure rating of the last casing string and wellhead. In all situations, the rated working
pressure of all components must be adequate to contain the maximum anticipated surface
pressure (MASP). BOP equipment designed for one class of well may also be used on all
lower classes of wells.
Classifications of Wells
Wells are classified by pressure ratings needed to assure secondary well control capability for
safe operations in worst-case situations. Formation pressures should be estimated using all
available, relevant information, including seismic interpretation, production records,
reservoir testing, and field experience (including offset data). Wells may need to be
7-68 October 2005

reclassified due to changing field conditions (e.g. following introduction of secondary

recovery techniques in mature fields).
Given worst case estimated formation pressures, the required BOP pressure rating must be
higher than the calculated MASP. In general, MASP is calculated as the difference between
the highest potential formation pressure and the hydrostatic pressure of a full column of gas
of lowest expected specific gravity. Different “worst case” scenarios may be used where
downhole weak points (e.g. zone below last casing shoe) are known to reliably limit potential
surface pressures.
For Chevron operations, wells are classified as follows:
Class I Wells:
A Class I designation is given to all rod replacement workover operations when
production tubing is not removed from the well. Wells in this classification will
usually use a Class I blowout preventer stack without a choke manifold.
Class II Wells:
A Class II designation is given to all drilling or workover operations in which:
• The maximum anticipated surface pressure is less than 2,000 psi.

• Production tubing is removed from the well.
• Operations are conducted in settled oil fields incapable of flowing to
the surface and where no gas zones are expected.
Wells in this classification should use the appropriate Class II-A or II-B blowout
preventer stack for workovers. In all cases, a Class II choke manifold should be
installed.
Class III Wells:

A Class III designation is given to all drilling and workover operations that have a
maximum anticipated surface pressure between 2,000-5,000 psi, or when gas zones
are expected. Wells in this classification should use a Class III blowout preventer
stack and a Class III choke manifold.
Class IV Wells:
A Class IV designation is given to all drilling and workover operations with a
maximum anticipated surface between 5,000 and 10,000 psi. In addition, all wells
located in an urban or offshore location or where lethal concentrations of H2S are
present will be designated as Class IV (or higher). Wells in this classification should
use a Class IV blowout preventer stack and a Class IV choke manifold.
Class V Wells:
A Class V designation is given to all drilling and workover operations that have a
maximum anticipated surface pressure greater than 10,000 psi. A Class V
October 2005 7-69

designation is also given to any Class IV well with tapered drill strings and without
variable bore rams, or where dual tubing strings are run simultaneously. A Class IV
choke manifold should be utilized on wells of this type.
General Blowout Preventer Stack Specifications
The following general specifications apply to all classes of blowout preventer stacks:
• The minimum pressure rating of all pressure control equipment (BOP, valves,
etc.) must be equal to or greater than the maximum anticipated surface pressure.
Any deviation from this requirement should have prior approval of regulatory
agencies and the Drilling Manager.
• The through-bore size of the preventer stack must be large enough for casing or
liner hangers, packers, plugs, or any other large diameter downhole tools to be
run in the well.
• Drilling spools with side outlets are preferred on all preventer stacks if a
significant amount of time will be spent circulating fluids in the well. However,
preventer side outlets may sometimes be used instead of a drilling spool if there
are space limitations. The diameter of all preventer side outlets must be at least
as large as the choke manifold lines.
• All ram preventers must be equipped with locking devices. Either extension hand
wheels or hydraulic locks are to be used.
• Adequate wires and turnbuckles are required to stabilize the preventer stack.
They should be horizontal, or lead upward from the stack or to deadmen outside
the substructure. Guying downward to the substructure could buckle the pipe if
the rig were to settle.
• New API metal rings are to be used each time a flange is assembled or a
connection is broken. Flange grooves should be well cleaned and dry. API RX or
BX rings are required. Use of API R rings is not permitted.
• All preventer packing elements and gaskets are visually inspected at the time of
installation and rejected if they aren't satisfactory (even if they withstand a
pressure test at the time).
• In operating side valves, the inside valves are considered master valves and
would normally never be opened or closed when there is pressure unless the
outside valve is closed.
• Preventer assemblies will be dismantled periodically between wells to inspect for
internal erosion or corrosion and to check flange bolts. Preventers should not be
flanged together for several months without being broken down for inspection.
New flange bolts are to be used each time a flange is assembled on all Class IV
and V type stacks. Check with the Superintendent in charge of the operation for
other classes of stacks.
• All flange bolts should be checked periodically and tightened or replaced as
required.
• All testing shall be done with clear fluid (water or base oil).
• All preventers and valves should be tested separately whenever possible.
7-70 October 2005

• If desired, pressure control equipment may be tested to its nominal working

pressure. This can be done by seating a proper test plug in the bowl of the casing
head spool before applying the test. The maximum hang down load for a given
test pressure should be checked with the wellhead manufacturer.
• Blowout preventer control manifolds must be clearly labeled to indicate which
preventers are operated by the respective control valves. Opening and closing
positions for the control valves should be marked.
• Remote control stations are to be installed at a safe, accessible location,
preferably near an escape route.
• Blind ram controls should be equipped with a safety device or shield to prevent
accidental closure. The safety shield will not prevent blind ram closure from a
remote station.
• Never leave a preventer control in a “blocked” position while operations are in
progress.
• At least one spare set of pipe ram blocks and seals for each size tubing or drill
pipe, as well as spare bonnet seals, must be on the rig.
• When oversized preventers are used, a wear bushing or ring should be placed
between the bottom preventer and the casing head. The inside diameter of the
wear ring and the flow nipple must be of sufficient size to permit passage of
casing/liner hangers, packers, plugs or any other large diameter downhole tools
that might be used.
• It's good practice to have the choke manifold at a location outside the rig
substructure if possible. This reduces clutter underneath the rig and improves
safety.
Class I Blowout Preventer Stack
The Class I preventer “stack” is designed for sucker rod jobs only. It may be composed
of a manually operated ram preventer installed in place of a Christmas tree. If the
maximum anticipated surface pressure is less than 2,000 psi, screwed tubing connections
may be used. A typical Class I blowout preventer arrangement is shown below.
Tubing
or
Casing Head
Figure 7.4.1 Class I BOP
October 2005 7-71

Class II-A Blowout Preventer Stack
The Class II-A preventer stack is designed for wells in which the MASP is less than
2,000 psi and gas is not expected. The Class II-A blowout preventer stack is composed
of a single blind ram preventer and a single hydraulically operated annular preventer
(e.g. 2K - 9 - RA). In an alternate configuration, a single pipe ram preventer may be
substituted for the annular preventer (e.g. 2K – 9 - RR). Pipe and blind rams may be
either hydraulically or manually operated.
r This stack is installed directly onto the wellhead without the use of a drilling spool.
e Choke and kill lines are installed directly onto the wellhead side outlets that must have a
minimum internal diameter of 2". As the maximum anticipated surface pressure of this
stack is less than 2,000 psi, screwed connections may be used. All components must be
of steel construction.
The Class II-A stack can be made suitable for certain operations where a new section of
hole is to be drilled (or re-drilled) by attaching the choke and kill lines to the pipe ram
preventer side outlets rather than to the wellhead outlets (to avoid damage to wellhead
outlets and valves during extended circulating).
A typical Class II-A BOP stack configuration is shown in Figure 7.4.2.
Figure 7.4.2 Class II-A BOP stack configurations (e.g. 2K – 9 – RR or RA)
7-72 October 2005

Class II-B Blowout Preventer Stack
The Class II-B preventer stack is also designed for wells where the MASP is up to 2,000
psi and no gas is expected, but when more extensive sidetracking or deepening
operations are expected. The stack is composed of a single blind ram preventer, then a
drilling spool, with a single hydraulically operated annular preventer on top (e.g. 2K – 9
– RSA). In an alternate configuration, a single pipe ram preventer may be substituted for
the annular preventer (e.g. 2K - 9 - RSR). Pipe and blind rams may be either
hydraulically or manually operated.
The choke and kill lines are installed onto the drilling spool and must have a minimum
internal diameter of 2". An emergency kill line may be connected to the wellhead valve.
As the maximum anticipated surface pressure is less than 2,000 psi, screwed connections
may be used. All components must be of steel construction. An example of this stack is
Figure 7.4.3 Class II-B BOP stack configurations (e.g. 2K – 9 – RSR or

RSA)
October 2005 7-73

Class III Blowout Preventer Stack
The Class III preventer stack is designed for wells that have a MASP between 2,000 and
5,000 psi. A Class III stack is also used for lower pressured wells where gas is expected.
If the drill string is tapered, either variable bore rams can be used in the Class III stack,
or a higher class stack can be used instead. The stack is composed of a single pipe ram
preventer, then a drilling spool, a blind ram preventer, and a hydraulically operated
annular preventer on top. A typical Class III stack would be a 5K – 13 5/8 – RSRA, as
shown in figure 7.4.4.
The choke and kill lines are installed onto the drilling spool, and must have a minimum
internal diameter of 2". All side outlets on the preventers or drilling spool must be
flanged, studded, or clamped. An emergency kill line may be installed on the wellhead.
A double ram preventer should only be used when space limitations make it necessary to
remove the drilling spool. In these instances, the choke manifold should be connected to
the flanged outlet between the preventer rams only (in other words, not the bottom side
outlet). In this hookup, the pipe rams are considered master rams only, and cannot be
used to routinely circulate out a kick.
Figure 7.4.4 Class III BOP stack configuration (e.g. 5K – 13 5/8 – RSRA)
7-74 October 2005

Class IV Blowout Preventer Stack
The Class IV preventer stack is designed for wells in which MASP is from 5,000 psi to
10,000 psi. If the drill string is tapered, either variable bore rams can be used in the
Class IV stack, or a Class V stack can be used instead. The stack is composed of a single
lower pipe ram preventer on the bottom, a drilling spool, an upper pipe ram preventer, a
blind ram preventer, and then a hydraulically operated annular preventer on top. This
arrangement (e.g. 10K – 13 5/8 – RSRRA) is shown in figure 7.4.5.
The choke and kill lines are installed onto the drilling spool, and have a minimum
internal diameter of 3". All side outlets on the preventers or drilling spool must be
flanged, studded, or clamped. An emergency kill line may be installed on the wellhead.
A double ram preventer may be used for the blind rams and upper pipe rams. If this
stack is used in conjunction with a tapered drill string, a set of variable bore pipe rams
should be installed in the upper pipe ram preventer, and rams appropriate for the largest
pipe used should be installed in the lower pipe ram preventer.
Figure 7.4.5 Class IV BOP stack configuration (e.g. 10K – 13 5/8 – RSRRA or
RSRRAG)
October 2005 7-75

Class V Blowout Preventer Stack
The Class V preventer stack is designed for well operations where the MASP is greater
than 10,000 psi or when a tapered string is to be used without variable bore rams. It is
composed of a single lower pipe ram preventer on the bottom, then a drilling spool, a
middle pipe ram preventer, an upper pipe ram preventer, a blind ram preventer, and a
single hydraulically operated annular preventer on top. The choke and kill lines are
installed onto the drilling spool, and must have a minimum internal diameter of 3". All
side outlets on the preventers or drilling spool must be flanged, studded, or clamped. An
emergency kill line may be installed on the wellhead. Double ram preventers can be
used to reduce the height of the stack, but a drilling spool should be used in all instances.
When this stack is used in conjunction with a tapered drill string, small pipe rams are to
be installed in the upper pipe ram preventer, and large pipe rams should be installed in
the middle and lower pipe ram preventers. Variable bore pipe rams may be installed in
lieu of the small pipe rams in the upper ram preventer.
Figure 7.4.6 Class V BOP stack configuration (e.g. 15K – 13 5/8 –RSRRdA)
7-76 October 2005

Alternative Stack Arrangements and Equipment Usage
As an alternative to the above-mentioned BOP stack arrangements, it may be advantageous

from an economic point of view to install the blind ram preventers in the bottom position to
allow for changing of pipe rams blocks when different sizes of pipe are used. This
arrangement should be approved by the Drilling Superintendent in charge of the operation
prior to its installation.
Also, for many operations (especially critical operations or where lethal levels of H2S may
be encountered), it is beneficial from a safety and environmental point of view to replace the
blind rams with shear/blind rams. This allows for the well to be completely shut off if control
is lost.
It should be noted that if shear/blind rams are utilized, they may require much higher
operating pressures to effectively shear the pipe and close in the well. It is generally
necessary to utilize hydraulic boosters on the shear/blind ram to provide shearing capability
for commonly used grades of drill pipe. It is recommended that the ram manufacturer be
consulted to determine what pressure/booster to use for shearing of various pipe sizes and
grades.
The accumulator system should provide a sufficient amount of hydraulic fluid stored under
the appropriate pressure for the shear/blind rams, and provisions should be made for applying
the unusually high hydraulic operating pressures that may be necessary to assure shearing
capability. Crews should be trained in regard to the potential need to use bypass systems to
apply necessary shearing force.
Test Plugs and Test Joints
Several test plugs are available for testing the BOP stack. The test tool arrangement should
provide for testing the bottom blowout preventer flange. Test plugs generally fall into two
types, hanger type and cup type.
The hanger type test plug has a steel body with outer dimensions to fit the hanger recess of
corresponding casing heads. An O-ring pressure seal is provided between the tester and the
hanger recess. The tester is available in various sizes depending on wellhead type and size
and is equipped with tool joint connections. These plugs should be constructed with an upper
bevel and/or bevelled groove to facilitate the use of locking screws. The O-ring groove, if
used, should be machined to permit a pressure seal from above or below the plug. Other
types of seals should also be capable of holding pressure from above or below the plug.
Weep holes may be drilled in the pin end of the test joint or may be installed in the test plug.
These testers can be provided with a plug to test blind rams with the drill string removed. The
tester can be retrieved with the drill string.
The cup type test plug consists of a mandrel threaded with a box on top and a pin on the
bottom for a tool joint connection. A cup type pressure element holds pressure from above.
October 2005 7-77

Unless the cup type tester is suspended in the wellhead via a modified test plug/cup tester
assembly, bear in mind that the test joint(s) are exposed and the full tensile load generated by
the test pressure. Some models contain a back pressure valve to by-pass fluid when going in
the hole. Also, a set of snap plugs (usually four), can be provided integral to the mandrel so
that the snap plugs can be broken off by dropping a bar inside the pipe, thereby allowing the
annulus to be connected with the inside of the drill pipe to permit pulling the tool without
swabbing the hole.
The test joint should be made of pipe of sufficient weight and grade to safely withstand
tensile yield, collapse, or internal pressures that will be placed on it during testing operations.
Refer to API RP 7G (Recommended Practice for Drill Stem Design and Operating Limits)
for tabulated data listed by drill pipe size, grade, weight, and class (condition of pipe). The
test joint, or a box and pin sub on top of a standard joint of drill pipe, should have a tapped or
welded connection below the box end connection equipped with a valve, gauge, and fittings
having a working pressure at least equal to the rated working pressure of the BOP stack.
Weep holes may be drilled in the pin end of the test joint or may be installed in the test plug.
Casing rams can be tested by inserting a special casing ram test sub between the test joint and
the test plug, so that the sub can be placed across the casing rams to be tested. A casing ram
test sub can be made by welding tool joint connections on the ends of a short length of casing
of desired diameter. If the casing ram test sub is not manufactured commercially, it is
important that the sub be properly designed for test loads, welding be properly checked, and
the sub be carefully maintained to ensure integrity.
Figure 7.4.7 Figure 7.4.8
7-78 October 2005

Figure 7.4.9 Cup Type Test Plugs
October 2005 7-79

7.5 Choke Manifolds
To pump into, or take returns from a shut-in well, the BOP side outlets/drilling spools are
connected to an arrangement of valves, fittings and lines generally called the “choke
manifold”. This manifold provides various flow routes that permit the fluids to be contained
or bled from the BOP as needed. When, as is common for subsea operations, the same
manifold is used to direct pumped fluids into the well via “kill” lines, the manifold is referred
to as the “choke and kill manifold”.
General Choke Manifold Specifications
The following general specifications apply to all classes of choke manifolds.
• All choke manifold components that may be exposed to well pressure must have
a working pressure rating equal to or greater than that of the preventer stack in
use.
• Components should comply with applicable API specifications to accommodate
anticipated pressure, temperature, and corrosiveness of the formation fluids and
drilling fluids potentially encountered (e.g. H2S).
• Choke manifolds should be placed in a readily accessible location, preferably
outside the rig substructure when possible.
• Choke lines should be run in a straight line with a minimum of turns. Turns, if
required, should be targeted.
• Choke lines should be securely staked or anchored to reduce vibrations or
potential whipping while circulating. This includes lines downstream of the
choke (e.g. straight through “blooey” lines).
• Blooey lines must have internal diameters at least equal to the choke line and
should vent well fluids clear of the rig.
• All valves must be of full-opening gate valve construction. Low torque ball
valves should not be installed.
• Alternate flow and flare routes downstream of the choke line should be provided
so that eroded, plugged, or malfunctioning parts can be isolated for repair
without interrupting flow control.
• Buffer tanks are sometimes installed downstream of the choke assemblies in
order to manifold the bleed lines together. When buffer tanks are installed,
provision should be made to isolate a failure or malfunction without interrupting
flow control.
• Consideration should be given to the low temperature properties of the materials
used in installations to be exposed to unusually low temperatures. All
components of the choke manifold system should be protected from freezing by
heating, draining, or filling with the appropriate fluid.
October 2005 7-80

• New metal rings are to be used each time a flange is assembled. Flange grooves
are to be well cleaned and dry. API RX or BX rings are required. Use of API R
rings is not permitted.
• Testing, inspection and general maintenance of choke manifold components
should be carried out on the same schedule as employed for the BOP stack in
use.
Class I Choke Manifold
None required
Class II Choke Manifold
The Class II choke manifold is suitable for Class II well operations. A Class II choke
manifold is shown in Figure 7.5.1. Specific design features of the Class II choke
manifold are:
• The manifold is attached to the tubing/casing head or ram preventer side outlets
when a Class II-A preventer stack is used. This hookup is only recommended for
Class II workover operations.
• The manifold is attached to a drilling spool when a Class II-B preventer stack is
in use.
• The minimum internal diameter is 2" (nominal) for outlets, flanges, valves and
lines.
• Includes two steel gate valves in the choke line at the wellhead/drilling spool
outlet. The inside choke line valve may be remotely controlled (HCR).
• Includes one manually adjustable choke which is installed on the side of the
manifold cross. Steel isolation gate valves are installed between the choke and
the cross, and downstream of the choke.
• Includes one bleed line installed on the side of the manifold cross which is
isolated by a steel gate valve.
• Includes a suitable pressure gauge which can display the casing pressure within
view of the choke operator.
• Screwed connections may be used in lieu of flanges or clamps.
NC
NC
Adjustable Choke
2”
2” NC
NC NO NO
2” 2” 2”
Drilling Optional 2” NO Normally Open
NC
Spool HCR NC Normally Closed
Figure 7.5.1 Class II Choke Manifold
October 2005 7-81

Class III Choke Manifold
The Class III choke manifold is suitable for Class III well operations. The Standard
Class III choke manifold is shown in Figure 7.5.2. Specific design features of the Class
III manifold are:
• The manifold is attached to a drilling spool or the ram preventer side outlet (i.e.
attached to the side outlet below the top ram of a double ram that may be used
without a drilling spool due to space limitations)
• The minimum internal diameter is 2" (nominal) for outlets, flanges, valves and
lines.
• Includes two steel gate valves in the choke line at the drilling spool outlet. The
inside choke line valve may be remotely controlled (HCR).
• Includes two manually adjustable chokes which are installed on both sides of the
manifold cross. Steel isolation gate valves are installed between both chokes and
the cross, and also downstream of both chokes.
• Includes a blooey line which runs straight through the cross and is isolated by a
steel gate valve.
• Includes a suitable valve isolated pressure gauge which can display the casing
pressure within view of the choke operator.
• Returns through the choke manifold must be diverted through a mud/gas
separator, and then be routed to either the active mud pits or the reserve pit
through a buffer tank or manifold arrangement.
• If the choke manifold is remote from the wellhead, a third master valve should
be installed immediately upstream of the manifold cross.
NC
NC
Adjustable Choke
2”
2” NO 2” NO
NC NO NC
2”
2” 2” 2”
Drilling Optional
HCR 2” NC
Spool NC
Adjustable Choke
2”
NC
NO Normally Open
NC Normally Closed
Figure 7.5.2 Class III Choke Manifold
7-82 October 2005

Class IV Choke Manifold
The Class IV choke manifold is suitable for Class IV and Class V well operations. A
standard Class IV choke manifold is shown in Figure 7.5.3. Specific features of the
Class IV manifold include:
• The manifold is attached to a drilling spool.

• The minimum internal diameter is 3" (nominal) for the choke line, choke line
valves, manifold cross, and blooey line. The minimum internal diameter is 2"
(nominal) for the chokes and for all other valves installed within the manifold.
• Includes two 3" steel gate valves in the choke line located at the drilling spool
outlet. The inside choke line valve is remotely controlled (HCR).
• Includes one manually adjustable choke and one hydraulically operated choke
which are installed on either side of the manifold cross. Two, 2" steel isolation
gate valves are installed between both chokes and the manifold cross.
• Includes one 3" blooey line running straight through the cross, which is isolated
by two, 3" steel gate valves.
• Includes a valve isolated pressure gauge that can display the casing pressure
within view of the choke operator.
• Returns through the choke manifold must be diverted into a mud/gas separator
and then be routed to either the active mud pits or the reserve pit through a buffer
tank or manifold arrangement.
• If the choke manifold is remote from the wellhead, a third master valve should
be installed immediately upstream of the manifold cross.
NC NC
Remote Adjustable Choke
2”
2” NO
2” NO NO
NC NO NC NC
3”
3” 3” 3” 3”
Drilling HCR
2” NC
Spool
2” NC NC
Adjustable Choke
NC 2”
NO Normally Open
NC Normally Closed
Figure 7.5.3 Class IV Choke Manifold
October 2005 7-83

Chokes
The primary function of a choke is to create a back pressure on the well, which will increase
bottomhole pressure sufficiently to control formation flow while an influx is circulated out.
Chokes may be either positive or non-positive sealing. Chokes used for well control must be
adjustable (as opposed to a fixed choke which may be used for production/testing). They are
available in a variety of sizes and pressure ranges. Adjustable chokes can be either manual or
hydraulically operated from a remote control console.
Hydraulic chokes are easily adjusted and permit accurate remote regulation of choke
pressure. An important feature of most hydraulic remote chokes is that the choke itself can be
placed in the choke manifold, but is controlled remotely from a panel that also displays the
casing and drill string pressures.
When multiple chokes are present, the manifold should permit isolation and repair of one
choke while another is active. Spare parts for the chokes should also be available at the rig
site.
Kill Lines
For surface BOP installations, the kill line is an emergency line used for high pressure
pumping into a closed-in well. This may be necessary when there is no pipe in the hole, or if
the drill string becomes plugged and bullheading into the annulus is required.
Since injection pressures would have to exceed shut-in pressures, kill lines must be designed
and rated for at least as high a working pressure as the preventer stack.
When wellbore pressures permit, pumping into a kill line from lower working pressure rated
rig pumps may be useful. The primary kill line is therefore usually connected to the rig
standpipe or circulating manifold, and is often the first choice for pumping into the well
annulus. But to prevent possible overpressure of the standpipe manifold and pump system, a
high pressure check valve restricting flow from the BOP stack must be present and kept in
good working condition.
In many cases, a remote kill line may be installed that branches off from the primary kill line
and runs to the cementing unit (in offshore installations) or to a safe location distant from the
rig (in land installations).
Kill Line Specifications
The same guidelines which govern the installation of choke manifolds also apply to kill line
installations. The more important recommendations include:
• All lines, valves, check valves, and flow fittings should have a working pressure
rating and be tested following installation to a pressure equal to or greater than the
7-84 October 2005

rated working pressure of the BOP stack in use (except for lower pressure rated
items attached to, for example, the rig standpipe and which are properly protected
by a high pressure check valve).
• Flanged, welded or clamped connections should be used for fittings or valves with
a rated working pressure above 2,000 psi.
• Components should be of sufficient diameter to permit reasonable pumping rates
without excessive friction. The minimum recommended size is 2 inches inside
diameter.
• Components which may be exposed to drilling fluids or formation fluids should
comply with relevant API Specifications, with particular consideration given to
pressure, temperature, and corrosion resistance requirements.
• Double full-opening valves between the BOP stack outlet and the kill lines are
required for installations with a rated working pressure of 5,000 psi or higher.
Generally, at least the inside valve should remain normally closed except when in
use.
• All components of the kill line system should be protected from freezing by
heating, draining, or filling with the correct fluid.
• Consideration should be given to the low temperature properties of the materials
used in installations to be exposed to unusually low temperatures.
• The kill line should not be used as a fill-up line. Routine use of the kill line could
result in erosion of the line and valves, reducing their usefulness in an emergency.
Chevron recommends two minimum kill line arrangements: Type “A” and Type “B." The
Type “A” kill line is suitable for installation on Class II wells, and the Type “B” kill line is
designed for Class III, IV and V wells. Kill lines are an integral piece of well control
equipment and must be installed, inspected, tested, and maintained in the same manner as
other pieces of well control equipment.
Type A Kill Line - Class II Wells
The Type “A” kill line shown in Figure 7.5.4 is suitable for installation on all Class II wells.
Specific design features of the Type “A” kill line include:
• May be connected to the wellhead or the lower ram preventer side outlet. Do not
connect to the drilling spool above the blind ram on the Class II-B preventer stack or
to the BOP side outlet on the Class II-A preventer stack if the outlet is above the blind
rams.
• Includes a minimum of one, 2" (nominal) gate valve and a 2" check valve installed at
the wellhead.
• Screwed connections may be used in lieu of flanges or clamps.
October 2005 7-85

Type B Kill Line - Class III, IV and V Wells
The Type B kill line described below in Figure 7.5.5 is the minimum recommended hookup
for installation on all Class III, Class IV and Class V wells. Specific design features of the
Type B kill line include:
• The preferred kill line connection to the well is at the drilling spool. However, a
preventer side outlet may be used when space restrictions exclude the use of a drilling
spool. In all cases, the kill line must be installed below the blind rams so the well can
be pumped into without pipe in the hole.
• The arrangement includes two, 2" (nominal) gate valves installed at the drilling spool
and an upstream fluid cross. The outside valve may be hydraulically remote
controlled.
• Two pump-in lines should be attached to the fluid cross. The primary kill line is
routed to the rig standpipe or circulating manifold where it can be manifolded to the
rig pumps. The remote kill line must be run a safe distance away from the rig or to the
rig cementing unit. The remote kill line should have a loose end connection (properly
covered for protection from debris) for rigging-up to a high pressure pumping unit.
• Both the primary kill line and the remote kill line must include a 2" check valve that
is in working condition, while circulating. If a check valve is crippled for testing
purposes, the flapper or ball must be reinstalled and tested before operations resume.
• The primary kill line must include a pressure gauge that can display the pump-in
pressure on the rig floor.
• Any lines that are installed at the wellhead are designated as “emergency kill lines”
and should only be used if the primary and remote kill lines are inoperable.
NC
Wellhead
To Rig Pumps or Lower
2” 2” Ram
Check
Valve
Figure 7.5.4 Type "A" Kill Line
NO NC
To Rig Pumps Drilling

2” 2” Spool
Check
Valves
To Remote Kill Line
Figure 7.5.5 Type "B" Kill Line
7-86 October 2005

7.6 Auxiliary BOP Equipment
Inside Blowout Preventers
An inside blowout preventer is a non-return or check valve that permits pumping into the
drill string, but prevents upward flow through the valve. Examples of inside BOPs are drill
pipe float valves, drop-in dart valves, Gray valves, and Omsco valves. Note that some top
drives may be equipped with valves labeled “IBOP” that do not fit this definition (i.e. they
are not back-pressure type valves).
Drill pipe float valves are recommended by default for all Chevron drilling operations. In
general, the non-ported version of these floats is preferred.
Figure 7.6.1 shows an inside BOP intended to permit stripping into a well. It can be stabbed
and made up on the drill string, but only at very low flow rates; this valve should not be the
valve used for shut-in while tripping.
VALVE
RELEASE ROD
Figure 7.6.1 Inside BOP
October 2005 7-87

Full Opening Safety Valve (FOSV)
Full Opening Safety Valves are ball valves designed for high pressure service. They are
termed “Full Opening” because the ball is bored so that the flow path through the valve has a
smooth ID when it is open. Most of these valves are designed not to hold pressure from both
directions. One of the most important components of the valve is the wrench, or key, which
is used to operate the valve.
These valves should be located on the rig floor in an open position, to allow the valve to be
installed in the drill string if the well begins to flow while tripping pipe. After the valve has
been stabbed and made up, it can then be closed to shut the well in. Thus, the wrench or key
is vital for the valve to be effective and must be readily accessible at any time. A Full
Opening Safety Valve is shown in Figure 7.6.2.
Safe operation requires that full-opening safety valves fit each size of tubing, drill pipe, and
drill collar in use and be available on the rig floor ready to make up. Consequently, if the
well begins to flow during trips or when making connections, the correct size can be stabbed
and made up. It is good practice to install a valve as a precaution when the pipe is left in the
slips during rig repair or similar down times. Care should be taken that all valves have the
proper threads and will go through the BOPs and casing, so that they can be stripped into the
hole below a back-pressure valve (inside BOP).
Figure 7.6.2 FSOV
7-88 October 2005

Ball Valves
The principal component of a ball valve is a ball with a hole bored through the center. When
aligned with the flow path, it allows for fluid to pass with little or no restriction. When
closed, the flow path is completely blocked and flow is stopped. Ball valves are ordinarily
not utilized in well control operations (with the exception of Full Opening Safety Valves) for
the following reasons:
• Ball valves are difficult to operate in medium to high pressure situations.

• Although metal-to-metal seals are preferred, they utilize a resilient seal ring.
• Ball valves have a history of seizing when not used frequently and maintained properly.
• They cannot be back-seated to repair stem packing.
Gate Valves
Gate Valves are designed to perform a seal and hold pressure by means of a gate operating
within the body of the valve. A gate valve is the preferred type of valve for use in well
control and production hookups. There are several different designs of gate valves, but at the
present time there are no clear preferences for one design or model over another. While a
specific manufacturer or model will be utilized almost exclusively in some areas, all of the
models available from the various manufacturers meet the design and testing criteria set
forward by API Standard 6A.
Note: It is very important to understand and be able to differentiate between various design
features. This section will discuss the major design features in use today.
Split Gate and Floating Gate Valves
The Split Gate design utilizes a gate mechanism that is actually two separate plates. As the
valve is closed, a wedge or expander forces the gates against the seats. Since both gates come
into contact with a metal seal on each side of the body of the valve, it is capable of holding
pressure from either side equally as well. Other advantages to this design are: a) the design
does not rely on pressure to effect an initial seal, and b) it gives better overall sealing
characteristics for both high and low pressure applications. An example of a split gate design
is Vetco-Gray’s Model D Graygate Valve shown in Figure 7.6.3.
October 2005 7-89

Figure 7.6.3
The Floating Gate design is a solid one piece gate that floats laterally within the body of the
valve and performs a seal when the gate contacts one of two seals that are located on each
side of the body. This design is “pressure assisted” and relies on a differential pressure across
the valve to affect a seal. This design has proven to be very effective and is utilized by
several manufacturers. An example of a floating gate valve is Cameron’s Type J Gate Valve
7-90 October 2005

Figure 7.6.4
It is extremely important to understand how each of the above designs operate and to know
which design to use. On a split gate valve, once the valve closes, a better seal is obtained
when the valve handle is turned hard. A better seal results when the gate is driven tighter or
farther down between the seals. However, on a floating gate design, the valve must be closed
all the way. Then, the valve must be backed off a certain amount (1/4 to 1/2 turn). This
allows the gate to float and is necessary to complete a seal. If a floating gate valve was closed
and the handle was turned as hard as possible, it would force the gate into the bottom of the
valve body and not allow it to move or float.
Rising Stem and Non-Rising Stem Valves
A Rising Stem valve is designed so that the stem is fixed to the gate. As the handle is turned,
the stem and gate move simultaneously. This gives an indication of the actual position the
valve is in (i.e., either opened or closed). One problem with a rising stem gate valve is that if
the stem is out, there's no sure indication that the valve is opened. Some valve models use a
October 2005 7-91

“reversed gate” design whereby the opening through the gate is located on the top portion of
the valve instead of the bottom. Thus, when the stem is out, the valve is actually closed.
Again, it's important to know and understand the type of valve you are operating and the
design features utilized. An example of a Rising Stem Valve is shown in Figure 7.6.5.
Figure 7.6.5 Rising Stem Valve
7-92 October 2005

A Non-Rising Stem valve is designed so that as the handle and stem are turned, the gate
rides up and down on the stem. This does not allow the stem to move vertically. Therefore,
the position of the valve is not indicated by the stem, as shown in Figure 7.6.4.
One feature of many valves currently being manufactured is called “back-seating." Should
the valve start to leak through the stem packing, the back-seating feature allows for the stem
to be seated against a seal in the handle. The stem packing located above this seal can be
removed and replaced, and then the valve is ready to be put back in to its “normal” operating
mode.
HCR Valves
HCR Valves are essentially gate valves which have been fitted with a hydraulic actuator to
operate the valve remotely. The term HCR stands for High Closing Ratio and is derived from
the design of the hydraulics of the closing pistons. A HCR receives its power fluid from the
accumulator unit and is operated from the BOP panel(s). These valves can also be equipped
with a fail safe assembly that will automatically close the valve should power fluid (or
opening pressure) be lost. The typical operating pressure is 1,500 psi. HCR valves are usually
designed with a rising stem design and there's no allowance for back-seating. A typical HCR
valve is shown in Figure 7.6.6
October 2005 7-93

Figure 7.6.6 HCR Valve
Plug Valves
Plug Valves are very versatile and have a number of applications for workovers. Plug valves
are often referred to as Lo-Torc valves because they are easy to operate, quick opening
valves that are relatively simple to maintain and repair. They are not usually utilized in choke
and kill manifolds as they can be difficult to open in the higher pressure ranges. The valves
are utilized on many cementing and stimulation manifolds and pump systems. A Plug Valve
is shown in Figure 7.6.7
7-94 October 2005

Figure 7.6.7 Plug Valve
Check Valves
Check valves are installed in kill line hookups to prevent flow back to the pump. It is
particularly important to have check valves installed between the well and any temporary
high pressure lines (such as Chiksans leading from a high pressure kill pump). In the event of
line failure, these check valves can prevent uncontrolled, high pressure flow from the well or
whipping of parted lines. To perform this function, it is generally not essential that these
valves hold pressure securely; they are thus often not tested for pressure holding (i.e. body
test only) in field service.
Figure 7.6.8 shows a typical check valve. The operating principal of a check valve is simple.
Fluid can be pumped through the valve (left to right in the figure shown), while preventing
fluid from flowing out of the well. Pressure from the pump moves the valve off its seat and
October 2005 7-95

allows the fluid to pass through the valve. When pumping stops, the valve is forced back onto
its seat by a spring. Ordinarily, the newer valves use a metal-to-metal seal between the valve
and its seat.
Figure 7.6.8 Check Valve
Back Pressure Valves
A Back Pressure Valve (BPV), or tubing plug, is usually a one-way check valve that is
installed in a specially machined profile in the tubing hanger or plug bushing. The BPV is
designed to prevent the flow of fluids and gases through the hanger, but still allows the
pumping of fluid into the tubing string. They are installed in the well to remove the
production tree and allow the initial nipple up of the BOP stack, to install the tree while
nippling down the BOP stack, and while heavy lifts are being made over the wellhead.
The BPV can be installed or removed with either the tree or BOP stack nippled up on the
tubing head. They can also be installed with or without pressure on the tubing. Installation of
the BPV through the tree, with pressure on the well, requires the use of a lubricator.
Wellhead manufacturers have various designs for Back Pressure Valves depending on the
7-96 October 2005

size and make of the hanger and wellhead. The installation and removal of Back Pressure
Valves should only be performed by specific personnel trained by wellhead manufacturers.
Figure 7.6.9 shows one model of a Back Pressure Valve. Figure 7.6.10 shows a standard
lubricator used in the installation and removal of some BPVs when pressure is on the well.
Figure 7.6.9 Backpressure Valve Figure 7.6.10 Lubricator
Valve Removal Plugs

The Valve Removal Plug (VR Plug) is a threaded one-way check valve that can be installed
through an outlet valve on a casing head, casing spool, or tubing spool into a female thread in
the outlet. This isolates the valve from any pressure and allows for removal of the outlet
valve for its repair or replacement.
October 2005 7-97

Once the valve has been repaired or replaced, it can be reinstalled and the VR Plug is
removed. Note: VR Plugs are intended for short-term use, and should not be considered as a
long-term replacement for wellhead valves.
Most wellheads installed on new wells have threads machined into the outlets to allow for
installation of a VR Plug. However, many of the older wellheads are not setup for use of a
VR Plug. Figures 7.6.11 and 7.6.12 illustrate a VR Plug and Lubricator.
Figure 7.6.11 VR Plug
Figure 7.6.12 VR Plug Lubricator
7-98 October 2005

Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valves
Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valves, (SCSSV) are installed in the tubing string
below the surface (or mudline in offshore applications) and are designed to shut the well in
should a catastrophic event occur at the surface that might cause the wellhead to be severely
damaged or lost. The valve is controlled by a small diameter steel control line that is run
down the outside of the tubing from the surface to the valve. If the wellhead were to become
damaged badly enough to rupture the control line, a loss of pressure from the line would
cause the valve to close and seal the tubing off.
Basically, there are two designs for these valves: tubing retrievable and wireline retrievable.
The wireline retrievable valves allow for the major components of the valve (other than the
body) to be pulled from the well and serviced or replaced. The tubing retrievable model
requires the tubing string to be pulled from the well in order to gain access to the valve.
These valves are “flapper type” and can be locked open using wireline tools in order to
facilitate access to the tubing string below the valve for additional wireline operations.
October 2005 7-99

7.7 Testing and Inspection
Blowout prevention equipment is emergency equipment and must be maintained in proper

working condition at all times. The Drill Site Manager is the responsible person to ensure
that Chevron is provided with equipment that performs to our specifications by being an
active participant in the daily maintenance and weekly testing of blowout prevention
equipment. Several maintenance items which the Drill Site Manager should check on a daily
basis are listed below:
1. Examine the fluid level in the accumulator and make sure it's at the proper level, and
that the proper pressures are indicated on the accumulator, manifold, and annular
pressure gauges.
2. Verify that the control lines are run to avoid damage from trucks or tools.
3. Confirm that the preventer controls are either in their proper opened or closed
position (not blocked), and that leaks are not evident.
4. Ensure the preventer stack is well guyed so that vibrations are minimized while
drilling.
Several other maintenance points are provided below:
1. Avoid circulating green cement through the preventer stack or choke manifold
whenever possible. Always flush thoroughly with water any piece of blowout
prevention equipment that has come in contact with green cement.
2. Make sure that the rig is centered over the well to reduce drill string and blowout
prevention equipment contact and abrasion.
3. Do not routinely use the kill line as a fill-up line during trips.
4. Install the ram preventers so that the ram bonnets are aligned directly above casing
head valves in order to protect them from falling objects.
Testing of Blowout Prevention Equipment (BOPE)
The object of BOPE testing is to eliminate all leaks and to determine that the equipment will
perform under well control conditions. Generally, BOPE pressure tests should be conducted
in accordance with the following guidelines.
1. All tests are to be performed using clear water. Adding a small amount of commercially
available dye to the water will assist in detection of small leaks.
October 2005 7-100

2. The initial “low pressure” test of each piece of blowout prevention equipment must be
conducted at a pressure between 200 and 300 psi.
3. The subsequent “high pressure” test is conducted at the rated working pressure of the
equipment for all:
a. Ram-type preventers
b. Choke manifolds and valves
c. Kill lines and valves, including the check valve
d. Upper and lower kelly cocks, top drives, inside BOPs, and safety valves
4. The “high pressure” test of the bag-type annular preventer should be conducted at 70%
of its rated working pressure.
Note: In some drilling operations, the pressures to be used for low and high
pressure testing of preventers and casing may be different from those given
above, due to governmental regulations, operational issues, or approved local
practices. An example is when a high pressure BOP provided with a
contracted rig is used on a low pressure well.
5. If a BOP does not pass the low pressure test, do not test to the high pressure and then
drop back down to the low pressure.
6. Subsea BOPs should be stump tested at the surface with water, in the manner described
above, before installation on the seafloor.
7. Surface and subsea BOPE must be pressure tested as follows:
a. When installed
b. Before drilling out each string of casing
c. Before working inside new casing strings where cement is not drilled out
d. Following the disconnection or repair of any wellbore pressure seal in the
wellhead/BOP stack assembly or choke manifold (limited to the affected
components only)
e. BOPE are typically tested in Chevron’s operations at least once every 14 days,
but in any event must not exceed at least once every 21 days (30 days for
BOPE rated at less than 5K working pressure), subject to local regulation.
October 2005 7-101

Note: The bi-weekly pressure test is not required for blind and shear-blind rams,
subject to local regulation. Test these rams only when installed, when a
pressure seal is broken, or after setting a new string of casing. However, blind
and shear-blind rams must be actuated at least once every seven days, unless
operational issues prevent such.
8. All valves located downstream of the valve being tested must be placed in the open
position.
9. Variable bore pipe rams should be tested with all sizes of pipe in use, excluding drill
collars and bottomhole tools.
10. All pressure tests must be held for a minimum duration of five minutes, with no
observable pressure decline.
11. A record of all pressure tests must be made on a pressure recording chart.
12. The results of all pressure tests, actuations, and inspections must be recorded in the tour
report.
Testing Procedure for 5,000 psi WP BOPE and greater
One of many possible testing procedures for a 5000 psi BOP is given below. The test
procedure can be easily amended and made applicable for other types of preventer stacks as
well. As BOPE hook-ups differ among rigs, the most efficient testing procedure will usually
have to be determined by the particular rig.
Important: The steps in the following procedure are meant to be performed in

numerical sequence. The instructions assume that at the beginning of
each step, the equipment is arranged the same as in the end of the
previous step. Therefore, if the procedure is not followed in sequence,
erroneous test results may be obtained.
Step 1: Function and flow testing.
Before applying test pressure to the preventers, perform the following:
a. Close and open all preventers. Do not close pipe rams or annular on open hole. Note:
Do not close the Blind or Shear Blind Rams on pipe.
b. Pump through the kill line, flow line, mud-gas separator, and choke lines with water
to make sure that none are plugged.
7-102 October 2005

Step 2: Fill the stack with water.
Drain the mud from the BOP stack and fill it with clear water (or base oil, if an oil base mud
is being used on the well).
Step 3: Casing test (if required)
If a casing test is to be made, perform the following (refer to Figure 7.7.1):
a. Connect the pressure source to the kill line and open kill line valves #3 and #4.
b. Temporarily cripple the kill line check valve.
c. Open all valves and chokes on the choke manifold.

d. Close the inner casing head valve #2 and outer choke line valve #6. This test may be
repeated with valve #2 open and valve #1 closed in order to test valve #1.
e. Close the blind rams.

f. Pump into the well through the kill line monitoring and recording the test pressure at
the test pump. For all casing strings other than drive pipe or structural casing, conduct
the test to 70% of the minimum internal yield (burst) of the casing.
Annular
Choke
Blind Rams Line
Upper Pipe Rams
Kill Line Choke Manifold
Lower Pipe Rams
Wellhead
Figure 7.7.1
Step 4: Blind rams (if required).
October 2005 7-103

If a blind ram test is to be made, perform the following:
a. Land the test plug in the casing head and remove the running tool from the wellbore.
b. Connect the pressure source to the kill line and open kill line valves #3 and #4 .
c. Temporarily cripple the kill line check valve.
d. Open all valves and chokes on the choke manifold.
e. Open valves #1 and #2 on the casing head and close the outermost choke line valve
#6. (See Figure 7.7.2)
f. Close the blind rams.
g. Pump into the well through the kill line. Monitor and record the test pressure at the
test pump. Conduct the low pressure test first at a pressure of 200-300 psi. Conduct
the high pressure test second at the rated working pressure of the stack.
13
14
Figure 7.7.2
7-104 October 2005

Note: This test will also evaluate the outer choke line valve and thereby eliminate the
need for Step 10 below.
Very Important: Monitor valves 1 and 2 for leaks and/or well flow throughout the tests.
Step 5: Annular Preventer.
Test the annular preventer as follows:
a. Land the test plug and test joint in the casing head.
b. Connect the pressure source to the test joint at the rig floor.
c. Close the outermost kill line valve #3 and open all other kill line valves (the kill line
check valve should be crippled).
d. First, open all choke line and choke manifold valves. Then close the outermost choke
manifold valves #12, #13, #14, and #15. (See Figure 7.7.3)
Note: On many manifolds, valves downstream of choke (e.g. #13 & #14) may be rated
for working pressure less than that of the BOP, choke manifold, or annular
preventer. Actual test sequences must be developed so as to not exceed working
pressure ratings of any item exposed to test pressure.
e. Verify that the casing head valves #1 and #2 are open.
f. Close the annular preventer and pump into the well through the test joint. Conduct the
low pressure test first at a pressure of 200-300 psi. Conduct the high pressure test next
at a pressure equal to 70% of the rated working pressure of the bag-type annular
preventer. Verify the accuracy of the gauge installed downstream of choke manifold
valve #11 by observing the test pressure.
October 2005 7-105

13
14
Figure 7.7.3
Step 6: Upper pipe rams, outer kill line valve, and choke manifold.
Without changing the choke manifold or testing arrangement, open the annular and
immediately test the upper pipe rams as follows.
a. Close choke manifold valve #11. (See Figure 7.7.4)
b. Close the upper pipe rams and pump into the well through the test joint. Conduct the
at the rated working pressure of the stack. Confirm that choke manifold valve #11 is
not leaking by observing a zero pressure indication on the downstream gauge.
7-106 October 2005

13
14
Figure 7.7.4
Step 7: Positive sealing chokes.
If the chokes are designed to be positive sealing, test them as described below. Otherwise,
recognize that you may not obtain a credible pressure test of the choke.
a. Open outermost choke manifold valves #11, #13 and #14.
b. Close positive sealing chokes. (See Figure 7.7.5)
October 2005 7-107

c. Close the upper pipe rams and pump into the well through the test joint. Conduct the
at the rated working pressure of the stack.
13
9
7 11
15
3 4 5 6
8 12
10
1 2
14
Figure 7.7.5 – Positive Sealing Chokes
Step 8: Choke manifold continued.
Continue testing the choke manifold valves by performing the following:
a. Open outermost choke manifold valves #11, #13, and #14.
b. Open chokes.
7-108 October 2005

c. Close choke manifold valves #9 and #10. (See Figure 7.7.6)
d. Close the upper pipe rams and pump into the well through the test joint. Conduct the
at the rated working pressure of the stack.
13
15
14
Figure 7.7.6 – Choke Manifold
October 2005 7-109

Step 9 Choke Manifold continued:
Continue testing the choke manifold valves by performing the following:
a. Open choke manifold valves #9 and #10.
b. Close choke manifold valves #7 and #8. (See Figure 7.7.7)
low pressure test first at a pressure of 200-300 psi. Conduct the high pressure test
second at the rated working pressure of the stack.
13
14
Figure 7.7.7 – Choke Manifold
7-110 October 2005

Step 10: Outer choke line valve
Test the outer choke line valve by performing the following:
a. Open choke manifold valves #7 and #8.
b. Close outer choke line valve #6. (See Figure 7.7.8)
c. Close the upper pipe rams and pump into the well through the test joint. Conduct the low
pressure test first at a pressure of 200-300 psi. Conduct the high pressure test second at
the rated working pressure of the stack.
13
14
Figure 7.7.8
October 2005 7-111

____________________________________________________________________________
Note: This test may be omitted if a blind ram test was performed previously as in Step 4
above.
____________________________________________________________________________
Step 11: Inner choke and kill line valves
Test the inner choke and kill line valves by performing the following:
a. Open outer choke line valves #6.
b. Close inner choke line valve #5.
c. Open outer kill line valve #3.
d. Close inner kill line valve #4. (See Figure 7.7.9)
13
Figure 7.7.9
7-112 October 2005

Step 12: Kill line check valve:
Test the kill line check valve by performing the following:
a. Install the inner working mechanism of the kill line check valve.
b. Open kill line valves #3 and #4.
Note: This test may be combined with Step 10 above if a blind ram test was not
previously performed.
Step 13: Lower Pipe Rams
Test the lower pipe rams by performing the following:
a. Open the upper pipe rams. (See Figure 7.7.10)

Open casing head side outlet valves.
b. Close the lower pipe rams and pump into the well through the test joint. Conduct the
October 2005 7-113

13
14
Figure 7.7.10
Step 14: Kelly, kelly cocks, Top Drive, rotary hose, standpipe, safety valve, inside
BOP
Using an appropriate test sub on the bottom of the kelly/top drive, test equipment up to the
uppermost kelly valve/IBOP in a fashion similar to the stack tests (i.e. conduct a low pressure
test first, at t pressure of 200 – 300 psi, followed by a high pressure test to the rated working
pressure of the stack). Install the safety valves and inside BOPs and test in a similar fashion.
Surface circulating equipment (mud standpipe, etc.) should be tested to its rated working
pressure, which is often less than stack test pressure.
7-114 October 2005

Step 15: Casing head valves
This test can be performed using a cup tester attached on the bottom of a test plug which has
the o-ring removed. The test plug and test cup need to have an opening ported through the
body, back through the drill pipe, such that if a leak occurs, the fluid will exit the top of the
drill pipe. This is to prevent the casing from being accidentally pressured due to the leak.
Also, both valves may be tested on the casing head individually to their working pressure,
using a VR type test plug.
Hang-Off Limitations while Testing
Many times, a portion of the bottomhole assembly will be hung-off below the test plug while
conducting a BOP test. This is done for a variety of reasons, including:
a. Leaves pipe in the hole to circulate through in case the well kicks.
b. Shortens the trip time by not having to pull completely out of the hole.
It must be remembered however, that hanging-off weight below the test plug reduces the
maximum allowable BOP test pressure. Charts are available from all wellhead manufacturers
which list the maximum allowable hang load for a given BOP test pressure.
Note: These charts should be consulted before hanging-off and testing BOPs.
Blowout Preventer Hydraulic Tests
The following items should be checked each time a preventer is to be hydraulically tested:
a. Verify wellhead type and rated working pressure.

b. Check for wellhead bowl protector.
c. Verify preventer type and rated working pressure.
d. Verify drilling spool, spacer spool, and valve types and rated working pressures.
e. Verify ram placement in preventers and pipe ram size.
f. Verify drill pipe connection size and type in use.
g. Open casing valve during test, unless pressure on the casing or hole is intended.
h. Test pressure should not exceed the manufacturer’s rated working pressure for the body
or the seals of the assembly being tested.
i. Test pressure should not exceed the values for tensile yield, collapse, and internal
pressure tabulated for the appropriate drill pipe as listed in API RP 7G: Recommended
Practice for Drill Stem Design and Operating Limits.
j. Verify the type and pressure rating of the preventer tester to be used.
October 2005 7-115

Notes:
1. Initial test pressure for the BOP stack, manifold, valves, etc., should be the lesser of
the rated working pressure of the BOP stack, wellhead, or upper part of the casing
string.
2. Optional test – a rated working pressure test on the top flange of the annular
preventer. A companion flange will be required.
3. Always provide for a safe leak path whenever conducting BOP tests, in the event of a
test plug/cup type tester seal failure (to avoid overpressuring the well).
Table 7.7.1
Test Pressure Recommendations Preventer Equipment Tested
Blowout preventer stack rated working pressure 1. Entire BOP stack.

(or as specified in the notes below). 2. All choke manifold components upstream
of the chokes.
3. All kelly valves, drill pipe, and tubing
safety valves.
4. Drilling spools, intermediate casing
heads, and side outlet valves.
Rated operating pressure of preventers or 3000 psi, 1. Closing unit valves and manifold.
whichever is less. 2. All operating lines.
Casing test pressure (70% of casing burst) 1. Any blind rams below the drilling spool.
2. Primary casing head and side outlet
valves.
3. Casing string.
Fifty percent (50%) of rated working pressure of 1. Choke manifold components downstream
components. of chokes.
200 -300 psi 1. All ram type preventers.

2. Annular preventer.
3. Hydraulically operated choke line valve.
An initial pressure test should be conducted on all preventer installations prior to drilling out
the casing shoe. Conduct each component pressure test for at least 5 minutes. Monitor
7-116 October 2005

secondary seal ports and operating lines on each preventer while testing to detect internal seal
leaks.
Subsequent pressure tests of BOP equipment should be carried out after setting a casing
string, prior to entering a known pressure transition zone, and after any BOP stack or choke
manifold component change, but no less than once every 21 days (30 days for less than 5K
equipment), subject to local regulation. Equipment should generally be tested to at least 70%
of the minimum internal yield pressure of the upper part of the casing string: this pressure
should, in all cases, be equal to or greater than the maximum anticipated surface pressure.
An exception is the annular preventer which may be tested to 70% of its rated working
pressure, to minimize pack-off element wear or damage. After a preventer stack or choke
manifold component change, carry out a hydraulic test as above.
Note: Precautions should be taken not to expose the casing to test pressures in excess of its
rated strength. A means should be provided to prevent a pressure build up on the
casing in the event the seals on the test tool leak.
Drilling Spools
While choke and kill lines are often connected to side outlets of the BOP, in situations which
may require extensive circulation of potentially abrasive material through these outlets, it
may be preferable that these lines be connected to a drilling spool installed above at least one
preventer capable of closing on pipe. Utilization of the BOP stack side outlets reduces the
number of stack connections by eliminating the drilling spool and shortens the overall height
of the BOP. The reasons for using a drilling spool are to localize possible erosion in the less
expensive spool and to allow additional space between rams to facilitate stripping operations.
Chevron does not recommend ram to ram stripping with a BOP stack, and strongly
recommends use of a drilling spool (the exception being subsea operations).
Figure 7.7.11 – Typical Drilling Spool
October 2005 7-117

Drilling spools for BOPs should meet the following minimum specifications:
a. Have side outlets no smaller than 2 inches inside diameter and be flanged, studded, or
clamped for API Class 2M, 3M, and 5M. API Class 10M and 15M installations should
have a minimum of two side outlets, one 2 inches and one 3 inches inside diameter.
b. Have a vertical bore inside diameter at least equal to the maximum bore of the
uppermost casinghead as specified in API Spec 6A: Specification for Wellhead
Equipment.
c. Have a working pressure equal to the rated working pressure of the attached BOP.
d. For drilling operations, wellhead outlets should not be employed for choke and kill
lines. Such outlets may be employed for auxiliary or back-up connections to be used
only if a failure of the primary circulating system is experienced.
Periodic Function Testing
Blowout Preventer Operating Test
A preventer operating test should be performed at least once each week. The test should be
conducted as follows, while tripping the drill string with the bit just inside casing:
a. Install drill pipe safety valve.

b. Operate the choke line valves.
c. Operate adjustable chokes. Caution: Certain chokes can be damaged if fully closed.
d. Position blowout preventer equipment to check choke manifold. Open adjustable
chokes and pump through each choke manifold line to ensure that it is not plugged. If
the choke manifold contains brine, diesel, or other fluid to prevent freeze-up in cold
weather, some other method should be devised to ensure manifold, lines, and assembly
are not plugged.
e. Close each preventer until all pipe rams in the stack have been operated. Caution: Do
not close pipe rams on open hole. If Blind Rams or Shear Blind Rams are in the
stack, operate these rams at another time with no pipe in the hole.
f. Return all valves and preventers to their original position and continue normal
operations. Record test results.
7-118 October 2005

7.8 Gaskets and Seals
API Spec 6A “Specification for Wellhead Equipment” requires that flanges integral with
drilling-through equipment be marked as follows:
Manufacturer’s name or mark, API monogram (when authorized by API), flange or hub size,
pressure rating, ring joint type and number, minimum vertical bore, model and serial number
and date of manufacture, and clamp number where applicable.
Specifications covering API hub and clamp connection components are contained in Section
2, API Spec 6A: Specification for Wellhead Equipment. A hub and clamp connection consists
of two hubs pulled together against a metal seal ring by a two or three piece clamp with two
to four bolts and nuts. The hub and clamp connection requires fewer bolts for makeup as
compared to the flange connection. Depending on the manufacturer, metal seal rings may be
of the API RX, API BX, or non-API type. Hub and clamp connections may be API or of a
proprietary design (manufacturer’s literature should be consulted for identification,
specification, dimensional data, and recommended makeup torque).
Figure 7.8.1 Metal Seal Rings and Groove
API Type 'R' Ring Joint Gasket
The type ‘R’ ring joint gasket is not energized by internal pressure. Sealing takes place along
small bands of contact between the grooves and the gasket, on both the OD and ID of the
gasket. The gasket may be either octagonal or oval in cross section. The type ‘R’ design does
October 2005 7-119

not allow face-to-face contact between the hubs or flanges, so external loads are transmitted
through the sealing surfaces of the ring. Vibration and external loads may cause the small
bands of contact between the ring and the ring grooves to deform plastically, creating a leak
path unless the flange bolting is periodically tightened. Standard procedure with type ‘R’
joints is to tighten the flange bolting weekly; however, Chevron does not recommend the use
of the ‘R’ ring joint gasket for BOP stacks or other safety-critical equipment (such as
Christmas trees).
ENERGIZED
Figure 7.8.2 Type 'R' Ring Joint Gasket
API Type 'RX' Pressure-Energized Ring Joint Gasket
The ‘RX’ pressure-energized ring joint gasket sealing takes place along small bands of
contact between the grooves and the OD of the gasket. The “X” stands for well bore
energized. The gasket is made slightly larger in diameter than the grooves, and is
compressed slightly to achieve initial sealing as the joint is tightened. The ‘RX’ design does
not allow face-to-face contact between the hubs or flanges. However, the gasket has large
load-bearing surfaces on the inside diameter, to transmit external loads without plastic
deformation of the sealing surfaces of the gasket. It is recommended that a new gasket be
used each time the joint is made up.
7-120 October 2005

ENERGIZED
Figure 7.8.3 API Type 'RX' Pressure-Energized Ring Joint Gasket
API Type 'BX' Pressure-Energized Ring Joint Gasket
Sealing takes place along small bands of contact between the grooves and the OD of the
gasket. The “X” stands for well bore energized. The gasket is made slightly larger in
diameter than the grooves, and is compressed slightly to achieve initial sealing as the joint is
tightened. Although the intent of the ‘BX’ design was face-to-face contact between the hubs
and flanges, the groove and gasket tolerances which are adopted are such that, if the ring
dimension is on the high side of the tolerance range and the groove dimension is on the low
side of the tolerance range, face-to-face contact may be very difficult to achieve. Without
face-to-face contact, vibration and external loads can cause plastic deformation of the ring,
eventually resulting in leaks. Both flanged and clamp hub ‘BX’ joints are equally prone to
this difficulty. The ‘BX’ gasket frequently is manufactured with axial holes to ensure
pressure balance, since both the ID and the OD of the gasket may contact the grooves.
In practice, the face-to-face contact between hubs or flanges is seldom achieved.
October 2005 7-121

ENERGIZED
Figure 7.8.4 API Type 'BX' Pressure-Energized Ring Joint Gasket
Type 'AX' and 'VX' Pressure-Energized Ring Joint Gasket
The ‘AX’ pressure-energized ring joint gasket was developed by Cameron Iron Works. The
‘VX’ ring was developed by Vetco. Both ring gaskets are well bore energized.
gasket. The gasket is made slightly larger in diameter than the grooves, and is compressed
slightly to achieve initial sealing as the joint is tightened. The ID of the gasket is smooth and
is almost flush with the hub bore. Sealing occurs at a diameter which is only slightly greater
than the diameter of the hub bore, so the axial pressure load on the connector is held to an
absolute minimum. The belt at the center of the gasket keeps it from buckling or cocking as
the joint is being made up. The OD of the gasket is grooved. This allows the use of
retractable pins or dogs to positively retain the gasket in the base of the wellhead or riser
connector when the hubs are separated. The gasket design allows face-to-face contact
between the hubs to be achieved with minimal clamping force. External loads are transmitted
entirely through the hub faces and cannot damage the gasket.
7-122 October 2005

ENERGIZED
Figure 7.8.5 ‘CIW’ Type ‘CX’ Pressure-Energized Ring Joint Gasket
The ‘CX’ pressure-energized ring joint gasket was developed by Cameron Iron Works.
gasket. The gasket is made slightly larger in diameter than the grooves, and is compressed
slightly to achieve initial sealing as the joint is tightened. The gasket is patterned after the
‘AX’ and ‘VX’ gasket, but is recessed, rather than being flush with the well bore, for
protection against keyseating. The gasket seals on approximately the same diameter as do the
‘RX’ and ‘BX’ gaskets. The belt at the center of the gasket keeps it from buckling or cocking
as the joint is being made up. Since the ‘CX’ gasket is protected from keyseating, it is
suitable for use through the BOP and riser system, except at the base of the wellhead and
riser connectors. The gasket design allows face-to-face contact between the clamp hubs or
flanges to be achieved with minimal clamping force. External loads are transmitted entirely
through the hub faces and cannot damage the gasket.
October 2005 7-123

Figure 7.8.6 Application of Type 'AX', 'VX' and 'CX' Pressure-Energized Ring
Joint Gaskets
The ‘AX’, ‘VX’ and ‘CX’ face-to-face pressure-energized ring gaskets allow face-to-face
contact between the hubs to be achieved with minimal clamping force. The ‘AX’ and ‘VX’
gasket is used at the base of the wellhead and riser connector when the hubs are separated.
The ‘AX’/’VX’ design ensures that axial pressure loading on the connector is held to an
absolute minimum. The ‘AX’ gasket also is suitable for side outlets on the BOP stack, since
these outlets are not subject to keyseating.
The ‘CX’ gasket is recessed for protection against keyseating. The ‘CX’ gasket is suitable for
use throughout the BOP and riser system, except at the base of the wellhead and riser
connector.
Bolting
Flange, stud, bolt, and nut specifications for normal service are summarized below:
Table 7.8.1
Flange Type Stud Bolts Nuts
Grade Spec Grade Spec
6B B7 ASTM A-193 1 ASTM A-194

6BX B7 ASTM A-193 2H ASTM A-194
7-124 October 2005

Pipe Flanges and Hubs
The following tabular data detail sizes in use on BOPs.
Table 7.8.2
Rated Working Flange or Hub Minimum Ring-Joint Ring-Joint

Pressure, psi Size, in. Vertical Bore, in. Gaskets Gaskets
RX BX
500 (0.5 K) 29 ½ 29 ½ - -
2,000 (2 K) 16 16 ¾ 65 -
20 21 ¼ * 73 -
26 ¾ 26 ¾ - -
3,000 (3 M) 6 7 1/16 45 -
8 9 49 -
10 11 53 -
12 13 5/8 57 -
20 20 ¾ 74 -
26 ¾ 26 ¾ - -
5,000 (5 K) 6 7 1/16 46 -
10 11 54 -
13 5/8 13 5/8 - 160
16 ¾ 16 ¾ - 162**
18 ¾ 18 ¾ - 163
21 ¼ 21 ¼ - 165
10,000 (10 K) 7 1/16 7 1/16 - 156
9 9 - 157
11 11 - 158
13 5/8 13 5/8 - 159
16 ¾ 16 ¾ - 162
18 ¾ 18 ¾ - 164
21 ¼ 21 ¼ - 166
15,000 (15 K) 7 1/16 7 1/16 - 156
9 9 - 157
11 11 - 158
13 5/8 13 5/8 - 159
20,000 (20 K) 7 1/16 7 1/16 - 156
Notes: * Replaces 20¼” subsequent to January 1974.
** Replaces BX-161 subsequent to adoption of 5000 psi rated working pressure

(10,000 psi test pressure) flange in lieu of 5000 psi rated working pressure
(7500 psi test pressure) flange in June 1969.
Elastomer Components for BOP Stacks
Unlike many high pressure devices that rely exclusively on metal-to-metal seals, BOP ram
and annular elements depend heavily on elastomers for their ability to seal and hold
October 2005 7-125

pressures. Various specialized materials have been developed by major BOP manufacturers
to permit reliable service under field conditions that may involve:
• mechanical stresses (caused by high pressures and sealing element or pipe movements)
• varying chemical environments (oil-based vs. water-based muds, possible presence of
corrosive gases such as H2S or CO2)
• varying temperature conditions (from freezing conditions to > 300 degrees F.)
Note that each of these factors can, during actual kill operations, vary significantly from
conditions that existed when the BOP was last tested. It is therefore important that worst case
conditions be anticipated prior to drilling, and elastomers suitable for those worst case
conditions be properly selected and used in the BOP.
Labeling of Elastomer Components
API RP 53 states that each resilient, non-wellbore, non-metallic component, such as

elastomer seals used in BOP actuating systems, should be marked or tagged using a
codification system developed by the equipment manufacturer. The markings should include
information regarding the durometer hardness, generic type of compound (see table below),
date of manufacture (month/year), lot/serial number, manufacturer’s part number, and the
operating temperature range of the component.
Table 7.8.3 Elastomer Compound Marking Code
Common Name Chemical Name ASTM Code D1418

Butyl Isobtylene-isoprene IIR
Kel-F Epichlorohydrin CO
Epichlorohydrin-ethylene oxide ECO
Chloro fluoro elastomer CFM
Hypalon Chlorosulfonated polyethylene CSM
EPR Ethylene-propylene copolymer EPM
EPT Ethylene-propylene terpolymer EPDM
Viton Fluorocarbon FKM
Natural Polyisoprene NR
Isoprene
Natural or Synthetic Polyisoprene IR
Nitrile Butadiene-acrylonitrile NBR
Acrylic Polyacrylic ACM
Diene Polybutadiene BR
Neoprene Polychloroprene CR
Vistanex Polyisobutylene IM
Thiokol Polysulfide
Most manufacturers have their own elastomer research section for the development of the
seal components for their BOPs. They also have particular trade names for these products.
7-126 October 2005

In the field, the presence of hydrogen sulphide (H2S), carbon dioxide (CO2), zinc bromide
(ZnBr) brines, various synthetic base oils, and other factors can adversely affect particular
elastomers. Since development of elastomers to cope with difficult field conditions is
ongoing, it is recommended that the BOP manufacturer be consulted prior to starting
operations in which difficult or novel environmental, hole, or mud conditions might be
encountered.
High sustained temperatures generally shorten service life of elastomers. In the event flow
line temperatures (sustained temperatures) in excess of 200°F (93°C) are anticipated, special
elastomers designed for high temperature service will be required.
All elastomers deteriorate over time, whether in service or even under the best of storage
conditions. Proper maintenance procedures and recordkeeping is necessary to ensure reliable
performance of BOP equipment. Improper storage conditions (high heat, humidity, exposure
to sunlight or ozone (near electrical equipment), improper support, etc.) significantly reduce
the useful shelf life of elastomers. Spare BOP seals and packing units should therefore be
stored in accordance with the original equipment manufacturer’s recommendations.
October 2005 7-127

7.9 Closing Units – Surface Installations
Basic Operating Principle and Components
A Closing Unit or Accumulator System simply accumulates (or stores) hydraulic fluid under
pressure for use in functioning blowout preventers in a matter of seconds. The hydraulic fluid
is piped to the opening and closing ports of the BOP stack (including the HCR valve) via
steel and coflex hoses. The BOPs can then be functioned from the accumulator unit or from a
remote control panel. For surface stacks, hydraulic fluid returning from the BOP stack is sent
back to the accumulator reservoir so that the entire system is a “closed loop". The
accumulator consists of four basic components: the Accumulator Bottles, the Pumping
System, the Manifold System, and the Reservoir. Each is discussed in detail below.
Figure 7.9.1 Surface BOP Control System
October 2005 7-128

Accumulator Bottles
Accumulator bottles are available in various sizes and some of the designs vary, but the basic
principles are the same. Three of the more common sizes and designs are as follows:
Cylindrical Bottle with Flexible Bladder
A cylindrical bottle with a flexible bladder is the most common accumulator bottle in the
industry. The bottle is a long cylindrical shape and contains a flexible rubber bladder. The
bladder is attached via a screwed connection to the top of the bottle, which allows for the
bladder to be filled with nitrogen. The amount of nitrogen used varies depending on the size
of the bottle. The corresponding bottle pressure is called the precharge pressure, which is
recorded after the bladder has been filled. The amount of precharge pressure will vary
slightly depending on the operating pressure of the accumulator system.
As the accumulator pumps fill the bottle with hydraulic fluid (via a valve in the bottom of the
bottle), the flexible bladder “collapses” and compresses the nitrogen. When the pressure in
the bottle reaches the operating pressure for the system, the pumps stop and the hydraulic
fluid is stored under pressure.
Systems are available in various sizes, but bottles with a shell volume of 11 and 35 gallons
are the most common. For an 11 gallon bottle, the bladder itself is about 1 gallon. Thus, 10
gallons are available for nitrogen.
Cylindrical Bottle with Buoyant Float
Another design is a cylindrical bottle similar to that described above which, instead of
containing a bladder, contains a buoyant float. This design also has nitrogen pumped into the
top of the bottle to the precharge pressure. Again, the accumulator pumps fill the bottle with
hydraulic fluid and the buoyant float rises and compresses the nitrogen above the float. When
the pressure in the bottle reaches the operating pressure for the system, the pumps stop and
the hydraulic fluid is stored under pressure. Systems are available in various sizes.
Spherical Bottle with Buoyant Float
The third type of design is a ball that contains a float. However, in this design the float does
not separate the nitrogen from the hydraulic fluid, which is a major drawback. The float rides
on the fluid level in the ball and closes the poppet valve in the bottom of the ball before all of
the hydraulic fluid flows out. This type of bottle has an 80 gallon capacity. The design is not
utilized in many operations other than on some small workover rigs, or as a backup supply
for the “conventional” cylindrical type bottles.
October 2005 7-129

Pumping System
The pumping system supplies hydraulic fluid to the accumulator bottles. It usually consists of
two different types of pumps: a set of air driven pumps and a set of electric triplex pumps.
Each set of pumps operates independently of the other and is intended to be a backup for the
other if electric or air power is lost to the unit. Both sets of pumps are manifolded into a
common piping system that supplies the accumulator bottles. Figures 7.9.2 and 7.9.3 show
examples of each type of pump.
Figure 7.9.2
7-130 October 2005

Figure 7.9.3 Electric Triplex Pump
Manifold System
The manifold system directs the flow of fluid to the various BOP components and also
regulates the pressure of the fluid delivered to the BOPs. The manifold system contains two
regulators: one for the ram type BOPs and valves, and the second for the annular preventer.
For example, in a 3,000 psi operating pressure accumulator system, the manifold regulator
will take fluid from the accumulator bottles at up to 3,000 psi and regulate it down to 1,500
psi for the ram type BOPs and HCR valves. The accumulator will also take fluid from the
accumulator bottles and regulate it down to the desired annular operating pressure. In most
setups, the annular pressure can be adjusted at the accumulator or at the remote station. The
pressure of the accumulator bottles, the ram type BOPs, and the annular can be read from
gauges displayed on the manifold. Typical settings for these gauges on a 3000 psi system are:
3,000 psi for the accumulator, 1,500 psi for the manifold, and 800-1,500 psi for the annular.
The manifold system also takes the hydraulic fluid returning from the BOP and sends it to the
reservoir tank. The manifold system is highlighted in red and orange in the generic control
system diagram in Figure 7.9.1 above.
October 2005 7-131

Reservoir
The reservoir is the storage vessel for hydraulic fluid that is not under pressure. The reservoir
feeds the pumps and, for surface stack systems, takes the return fluid from the BOP stack.
The reservoir is shown in blue in Figure 7.9.1 above.
Accumulator Remote Panels
Remote control panels can be used to function the BOPE from strategic positions at the
wellsite. They are referred to as remotes because they are located a considerable distance
from the accumulator. Typical strategic positions where remotes are often located include:
near the Driller's position, in the Toolpusher's office, or near an escape route. Some
governmental agencies have specified safe distances for the positioning of these remotes.
API recommends utilization of at least one remote control panel in addition to the main
hydraulic control manifold.
There are basically three types of remote operating systems utilized in the industry today:
Air: Not recommended for distances in excess of 150 ft. or

in freezing temperatures.
Electro-Pneumatic: Not recommended for freezing temperatures
Electro-Hydraulic: Acceptable for freezing temperatures
General Accumulator Requirements
The capacity of the accumulator system and pumps must be sufficient for the BOP stack in
use. The system must hold pressure without leaks or excessive pumping, and should maintain
enough pressure capacity reserve to close the preventers with the recharging pumps turned
off. These pumps are designed to charge the accumulator within a reasonable time period and
maintain this charge during preventer operations.
Chevron’s design base for surface accumulator capacity is governed by MMS regulation,
which states that all blowout preventer systems shall be equipped with:
1. An accumulator system which shall provide sufficient capacity to supply 1.5 times the
volume of fluid necessary to close and hold closed all BOP equipment units with a
minimum pressure of 200 psi above the precharge pressure without assistance from a
charging system.
2. A backup to the primary accumulator-charging system, which shall be automatic,

supplied by a power source independent from the power source to the primary
7-132 October 2005

accumulator-charging system, and possess sufficient capability to close all BOP

components and hold them closed.
Since it is physically impossible to close the BOP equipment 1.5 times, the MMS
regulation stated above is equivalent to the following Chevron recommendations:
• For a 5,000 psi accumulator with 1,500 psi precharge, there must be one times
the volume to close all BOP equipment (without the pumps in service) and have
a minimum remaining pressure of 1,610 psi.
• For a 3,000 psi accumulator with 1,000 psi precharge, one times the volume to
close all BOP equipment (without the pumps in service) is required and a
minimum remaining pressure of 1,500 psi.
• For a 2,000 psi accumulator with 1,000 psi precharge, there should be one times
the volume to close all BOP equipment (without the pumps in service) and a
• For a 1,500 psi accumulator with 750 psi precharge, you must have one times the
volume to close all BOP equipment (without the pumps in service), with a
The above stated MMS regulation is equivalent to sizing a 3,000 psi accumulator with
enough capacity to close the annular and all ram preventers one time, with the pumps
out of service, while maintaining a minimum remaining operating pressure of 1,500 psi.
This equivalence is shown later in this section.
A base using a 50% safety factor is recommended by Chevron because it provides

complete replenishment of fluid in the closing lines at the time preventers are activated.
The safety factor also allows for loss of fluid capacity due to “interflow” in the four-
way valves and possible loss through the packings of the preventer units. A less
demanding base is not recommended, but may be used with 2,000 psi or lower working
pressure stacks, provided prior management approval has been obtained. Requirements
vary with the size of preventers and are principally controlled by annular preventer
requirements.
Opening/closing volume tables provide the necessary information to calculate individual

requirements as to accumulator size needed. Hydraulically operated choke and kill line
valves require added fluid capacity. It must be remembered that only one-half to two-
thirds of the accumulator bottle is liquid filled when fully charged, depending on the
unit.
Chevron's recommendation on the accumulator pump system follows API recommended

practices. With the accumulator bottles removed from service (isolated), each pump
system should be capable of closing the annular preventer on tubing, opening the HCR
valve, and obtaining a minimum pressure of 200 psi above precharge pressure within 2
minutes.
October 2005 7-133

Furthermore, two or three independent sources of power should be available on each

closing unit. The three commonly used sources are:
1. Air Pumps
2. Electric Pumps
3. Nitrogen backup systems
As mentioned earlier, these systems operate independently of each other. Nitrogen

backup systems are pressurized bottles of nitrogen used in cold weather areas (and areas
where required by law), to serve as an emergency backup to the primary electric pump
system.
These sizing recommendations are checked by performing an accumulator drill. The

accumulator drill is a routine test of the accumulator that is performed in conjunction
with each BOPE pressure tests.
Sizing Conventional BOP Accumulator Systems
As defined above, the requirement for sizing an accumulator system is based on two primary
items: capacity (i.e., hydraulic fluid volume) and pressure. To be able to adequately size a
system, an understanding of the mechanics behind the accumulator bottles where the fluid is
stored under pressure is needed.
Accumulator Bottle Nitrogen and Fluid Volumes at Varying

Pressures
1,000 1,200 1,500 3,000
N2
3.33
N2 gals
N2 6.67
N2 8.33 gals
10.0 gals
gals Fluid
6.67
Fluid gals
3.33
1.67 gals
Figure 7.9.4 Accumulator Bottle Operating Principle
7-134 October 2005

The basic operating principle of an accumulator bottle is based upon the bottle being
precharged with nitrogen to a certain pressure, and then hydraulic fluid is pumped into
the bottle. The pressure in the bottle increases as the nitrogen is compressed and the
volume of hydraulic fluid increases. Further explanation of how this process works is
best illustrated by the following example.
Example: Determine how much usable fluid is in an 11 gallon bladder-type

accumulator bottle that has been precharged with nitrogen to 1,000 psi. The
accumulator operating system is 3,000 psi.
This example will require the use of Boyle’s Law. Consider the bottle on the left in
Figure 7.9.4. The bladder has been precharged to 1,000 psi. We know that the
pressure of the nitrogen is 1,000 psi and the volume is 10 gallons (the bottle is
actually 11 gallons, but the bladder takes up 1 gallon). Thus, using Boyle’s Law we
can make the following calculation:
P1V1 = (1,000 psi) (10 gallons) = 10,000
As the bottle is charged to its full operating pressure of 3,000 psi, calculate the
volume of gas using Boyle’s Law and determine the amount of hydraulic fluid by
subtracting the volume of the gas from 10 gallons (the total volume in the bottle).
The calculation is as follows:
P1V1 = P2V2 = 10,000 (from previous calculation)
P2 = 3,000 psi
V2 = P1V1 = 10,000 = 3.33 gallons of nitrogen

P2 3,000
Thus, at 3,000 psi the nitrogen volume is 3.33 gallons, and the hydraulic fluid
volume is:
10 gallons - 3.33 gallons = 6.67 gallons of hydraulic fluid
This is shown in the bottle on the right hand side of Figure 7.9.4.
The example asked for the usable volume of hydraulic fluid in the bottle. By the
MMS definition, usable fluid is all fluid available from the bottle that is greater than
200 psi over the precharge pressure. So in our example, the 1,000 psi precharge
results in the usable fluid being all fluid that is stored at 1,200 psi or greater. Using
Boyle’s Law and calculations similar to that worked above, we can calculate the
volume of fluid in the bottles when the pressure is 1,200 psi to be 1.67 gallons.
Calculations are shown below:
October 2005 7-135

P1V1 = P2V2 = 10,000 (from previous calculation)
P2 = 1,200 psi
V2 = P1V1 = 10,000 = 8.33 gallons of nitrogen

P2 1,200
10 gallons - 8.33 gallons = 1.67 gallons of hydraulic fluid
Thus, the amount of usable fluid is the amount of fluid in the bottle when it is fully
charged less that when it is at 200 psi over precharge, or
6.67 gallons - 1.67 gallons = 5 gallons.
Similar calculations can be made for any size accumulator bottle and precharge, using
the same logic.
Now that the usable fluid in a bottle has been determined, an accumulator system can be
sized to match the BOP stack in use, per the following example:
Example: Size an accumulator for the following BOP stack and associated
equipment to meet MMS regulations
Solution:
Step 1 Determine the volume of hydraulic fluid required to close all
BOPs and open the HCR valve.
Gallons
Blowout Preventer Equipment to Close
Hydril “GK” Annular BOP (7-1/16", 5,000 psi W.P.) 3.86
Three Shaffer Ram BOPs (7-1/16", 5,000 psi W.P.)

(3 x 1.19 gallons each) 3.57
One McEvoy “AC” HCR valve (Volume to open) 0.46
Total gallons for full function of all preventers 7.89
The total system accumulator capacity should meet or exceed the following requirements:
7-136 October 2005

Total Gallons to Close 7.89

50% Safety Factor 3.95
Total Gallons of Usable Fluid Required 11.84
Step 2 Determine the number of accumulator bottles needed to give the amount of
fluid determined in Step 1.
11.84 gallons : 5 gallon usable fluid/bottle = 2.36 or 3 bottles

Thus, three 11 gallon accumulator bottles precharged to 1,000 psi are
needed for a properly sized 3,000 psi system.
The following equation can be used to determine the volume requirement for any
operating pressure system with any precharge pressure.
Equation 7.9.1
VR
V3 = ___________
P3 P3
____ - ____
P2 P1
P1 V1
Where:
V2
P1 = Maximum pressure of accumulator when V3
P2
completely charged. VR
P2 = Minimum operating pressure of accumulator.

P3
P3 = Nitrogen precharge pressure.
V3 = Total accumulator volume (nitrogen and hydraulic fluid).
VR = Total usable hydraulic fluid required, including safety factor.
Therefore, for the same 3,000 psi system with 1,000 psi precharge pressure used:
October 2005 7-137

VR 11.84
—————— ————————
P3 P 1, 000 1, 000
V3 = − 3 = − = 23 . 67 gallons
P2 P1 1, 200 3 , 000
The MMS rule discussed at the beginning of this section stated that the accumulator
must be able to close the BOP stack and have a 50% reserve, with at least 200 psi
over the precharge. This is somewhat difficult to check during an accumulator test in
the field as it is hard to function a BOP one-half of the way. Consequently,
Chevron’s recommendation for sizing an accumulator is phrased somewhat
differently, but is mathematically the same as the MMS requirement. Chevron’s
recommended sizing criteria is for a 3,000 psi system with 1,000 psi precharge to be
capable of functioning all BOP elements one time, with the pumps out of service,
and have a remaining pressure on the accumulator of at least 1,500 psi.
To check that this statement is equal to the MMS requirement, we can use Equation
7.9.1. In Chevron’s definition, the minimum nitrogen pressure (V2) is 1,500 psi and
the volume required (VR) is only 7.89 gallons. Substituting into the equation, the
following is the result:
VR 7.89
—————— ———————
P3 P3 1,000 1,000
V3 = − = − = 23 .67 gallons
P2 P1 1,500 3,000
7-138 October 2005

Figure 7.9.6 Typical Surface BOP Control System (T-Series)
Typical Surface BOP Control System (see Figure 7.9.6)
1. Accumulators – Pre-charge per label.

Warning! Use Nitrogen only – Do Not use Oxygen! Check every 30 days.
2. Accumulator Bank Isolation Valve - Manually operated, normally open.
3. Accumulator Bank Bleed Valve - Normally closed.
4. Accumulator Relief Valve - Set at 3,300 psi.
October 2005 7-139

5. Air Filter - Automatic Drain. Clean every 30 days.
6. Air Lubricator - Fill with SAE 10 lubricating oil, set for 6 drops per minute. Check oil
level weekly.
7. Air Pressure - Gauge - 0 to 300 psi.
8. Hydro-pneumatic Pressure Switch - Automatically stops air operated pumps when

pressure reaches 2900 psi, and starts pumps when pressure drops approximately 400 psi.
9. Air Supply Valves - Normally open. Close when servicing air operated pumps.
10. Suction Valve, Air Operated Pumps - Normally open. Close when servicing pumps.
11. Suction Strainer, Air Operated Pumps - clean every 30 days.
12. Air Operated Pump.
13. Discharge Check Valve, Air Operated Pump.
14. Duplex or Triplex Pump - Fill crankcase with SAE 20 oil for 40F to 115F ambient
temperature range. Check oil level monthly.
15. Chain guard - Fill with SAE 40 oil for operation above 20F ambient temperature. Check
oil level weekly.
16. Explosion-Proof Electric Motor.
17. Electric Pressure Switch - Automatically stops pumps when accumulator pressure
reaches 3,000 psi, and starts the pumps when pressure drops to 2,700 psi.
7-140 October 2005

18. Electric Motor Starter - Keep starter switch in “Auto” position except when servicing.
TURN OFF power at main panel when servicing.
19. Suction Valve, Triplex or Duplex pump - Normally open. Close when servicing pump.
20. Suction Strainer, Triplex or Duplex pump - Clean every 30 days.
21. Discharge Check Valve, Duplex or Triplex Pump.
22. High Pressure Strainer - Clean weekly.
23. Shut-Off Valve - Normally closed - Connection for separate operating fluid pump.
24. Manifold Regulator - Regulates operating pressure to ram preventers and gate valves.
Manually adjustable from 0 to 1,500, the manifold (or regulator) provides for by-pass
for pressures up to 3,000 psi.
25. Manifold Regulator Internal Override Valve - Normally in low-pressure (handle left)
position. For operating pressures above l,500 psi (ram preventers and gate valves),
move to high pressure position (handle right).
26. 5,000 psi W.P. Sub-Plate Mounted Four-way Control Valve - Direct the flow of
operating fluid pressure to the preventers and gate valves. NEVER leave in the center
(block) position.
27. Manifold Bleeder Valve.
28. Accumulator Pressure Gauge - 0 to 6,000 psi.
29. Manifold Pressure Gauge - 0 to 10,000 psi.
30. Annular Regulator - Provides independent regulation of the annular operating pressure.
Adjustable from 0 to 1,500 psi. TR Regulator can provide regulation up to 3,000 psi for
Cameron Type D annulars and contains a manual override to prevent loss of operating
pressure should remote control pilot pressure be lost.
October 2005 7-141

31. Annular Pressure Gauge - 0 to 3,000 psi. (0-6,000 psi - for Cameron D Annulars)
32. Annular Pressure Transmitter - Hydraulic input, 3-15 psi air output.
33. Accumulator Pressure Transmitter - 0 to 6,000 psi hydraulic input, 3-15 psi air output.
34. Manifold Pressure Transmitter - 0 to 10,000 psi hydraulic input, 3-15 psi air output.
(Transmitter converts hydraulic pressure to air pressure and sends a calibrated signal to
corresponding air receiver gauges on the Driller’s air operated remote control panel.)
35. Air Junction Box - Used for connecting the air cable from the air operated remote
control panels.
36. Reservoir - Stores operating fluid at atmospheric pressure. Fill to within 8 inches from
top.
37. Clean out man-way (T-Series units).
38. Sight glass, fluid level (T-Series units).

Option- Available on units with 5,000 psi working pressure manifold valves and piping.
39. By-pass Valve - Hydro-pneumatic pressure switch.
40. Normal Pressure Isolation Valve - Normally open. Close for pressure above 3,000 psi.
This feature can be used for shearing.
41. Manifold Protector Relief Valve - Set at 5,500 psi.
7-142 October 2005

Section 8 – Subsea Well Control
8. Subsea Well Control
8.1 Introduction
Floating drilling operations from semi submersibles and drill ships present special problems
in well control. Complications occur due to weather conditions, water depth, geology, and
the design and operation of the Subsea BOP stack and control system.
The Chevron Subsea CD includes an introductory presentation designed to familiarize

personnel with common subsea BOP system components. The materials that follow presume
a general familiarity with subsea equipment configurations and operations that utilize BOPs
installed on the seabed, with marine riser and choke and kill lines providing fluid paths to the
rig.
The industry often classifies subsea operations by water depth, as follows:
• Conventional: < 1,000 ft. water depth

• Deepwater: 1,000 – 3,000 ft. water depth
• Ultra-deepwater: > 3,000 ft. water depth
This classification system is based on a variety of considerations, including increasing

technical complexity and upgraded equipment requirements with increasing water depth.
From a well control standpoint, this classification system is useful because of water depth
implications on fracture strength, choke line friction, and BOP control systems.
The IADC’s “Deepwater Well Control Guidelines” is a useful, basic reference document for
subsea well control. It was developed through an industry effort, and is available online at
www.iadc.org.
8.2 Reduced Fracture Gradients – Formation Strength
In order to plan to drill a well safely it is necessary to have some knowledge of the fracture
pressures of the formation to be encountered. The volume of influx into the wellbore that can
be successfully contained depends on the fracture pressure of the exposed formations.
If wellbore pressures were to exceed this fracture pressure, the formation would break down,
resulting in loss of whole mud, loss of hydrostatic pressure against all exposed formations,
and potential loss of primary well control (hydrostatic overbalance). Fracture pressures are
related to the weight, above the zone of interest, of the formation matrix (rock) and the fluids
October 2005 8-1

(water/oil/gas) occupying the pore space within the matrix. These two factors combine to
produce what is known as the overburden pressure.
Since the density of a typical, thick sedimentary sequence is about 19.2 ppg, then a typical
sedimentary overburden gradient is:
0.052 x 19.2 = 1.0 psi/ft
Rock can fracture only when the internal stresses exceed the confining stresses acting on it. If
we assume that minimum confining stress is caused by the weight of the overburden (though
this is not always true), then the formation might be expected to be able to contain, without
fracturing, an additional 1 psi wellbore pressure for every foot drilled.
When working offshore, however, the “overburden weight” or “confining stress” is just the
weight of hydrostatic pressure of seawater down to the mud line (.445 psi/ft). If water depth
is ½ the total vertical depth of a well, then confining stress would increase by .445 psi/ft for
the first half of depth and by 1.0 psi/ft for the lower half. This would give an average
overburden gradient of .723 psi/ft, resulting in maximum potential equivalent mud weight of
14 ppg (vs 19.2 ppg for the equivalent land well).
Figure 8.2.1 Effect of Water Depth on Overburden Gradient
8-2 October 2005

The figures above illustrate this situation. Note that the effect of water depth on formation
strength diminishes as the proportion of the well below the mud line increases.
In essence, therefore, increasing water depth has the effect of reducing formation strength
(measured in equivalent PPG). Since mud weight needed to balance formation pressure may
be similar to that needed for on shore wells, the margin between necessary and maximum
permissible mud weights decreases as water depth increases. This often results in the need
for more casing strings offshore, particularly at shallow penetration depths where this
average overburden reduction effect is greatest.
Another consequence of the effect of water depth on fracture gradient relates to a greater
susceptibility to shallow gas or water flow problems in deepwater operations. More
information on these issues and related practices can be found in the section of this manual
that deals with shallow gas (Section 9).
Riser Margin
Standard operating procedures (and in many areas, government regulation) have required a
mud weight in excess of formation pressure equivalent mud weight in order to balance
formation pressure in the event of a disconnect or loss of the marine riser.
The increase in mud weight designed to compensate for the loss of hydrostatic pressure of
the mud column from the wellhead back to the rig when the riser is disconnected is known as
the riser margin.
The riser margin can be calculated as follows:
Reduction in BHP (psi) =
[Riser Length (ft) x Mud Gradient (psi/ft)] – [Water Depth (ft) x Sea Water Gradient
(psi/ft)]
Riser Margin (ppg) = Reduction in BHP (psi) ÷ 0.052 = (ppg)

Depth of well below seabed (ft)
In deepwater drilling, where the difference between formation and fracture pressures is very
small, the well cannot handle any extra pressure without losses occurring. For this reason,
riser margin can rarely be used in deepwater operations, and enhanced well monitoring and
training in well control becomes essential.
Sub-Salt Considerations
Drilling of sub-salt formations with saturated salt mud systems has caused some problems
with salt crystal build up on BOP components, particularly valve gates and seats. Proper
October 2005 8-3

maintenance (greasing) programs of the valves must be adhered to.
However, on wells that will drill through large sections of sub-salt, this standard procedure
may not be sufficient. Consideration should be given to completely service all valves prior to
use on a well that will utilize a salt saturated mud system and will involve drilling large
sections of sub-salt. Additionally, extra diligence for choke manifold valve maintenance is
warranted.
Hydrate Considerations
Hydrates have formed and caused severe problems while killing gas influx kicks. In a well
control situation, the kick fluid leaves the formation at a high temperature; with an extended
shut-in period it can cool to seabed temperature. With high enough hydrostatic pressure at the
mud line, hydrates could form in the BOP and choke / kill lines.
Hydrates are created by the reaction of natural gas with water and occur under certain
pressure and temperature conditions. They form substances that consist of ± 10%
hydrocarbon and ± 90% water, and that range in texture from a "jelly-like" mush to a solid
"ice-like" substance.
The danger of hydrates comes from several basic physical properties, the plugging nature of
the hydrate phase itself, its tendency to adhere to metal surfaces, and the large gas content of
the hydrate phase which, upon melting, can release up to 170 scf of gas per cubic foot of
hydrate. Furthermore, hydrate formation can cause the breakdown of a mud system by fresh
water extraction from the mud to form the hydrate structure.
Hydrate formation in drilling fluids is a relatively new experience offshore. Temperature,

pressure and gas composition determines the conditions for hydrate formation. Solidification
of the hydrate occurs as the temperature decreases and/or pressure increases with the proper
amount of gas and water present. In a drilling situation hydrates can form at temperatures
well above the freezing temperature of water, due to the pressure exerted by the hydrostatic
head. That statement should not be construed to mean that hydrates are only a concern in
deep water. Hydrates are a serious concern any time that cold temperatures meet high
pressure. The common condition in all hydrate formation experienced offshore has been
extended shut-in periods. The well control operations should start as soon as possible after
recording the shutin pressure parameters.
The significant effects of the hydrate formation in drilling operations are:

• Plugging of choke and kill lines
• Formation of a plug at or below the BOP, preventing monitoring of pressures below
the BOP
• Formation of a plug around the drill string in the riser, BOP or casing
• Formation of a plug in the ram cavity of a closed BOP- preventing it from fully
8-4 October 2005

opening.
In order to prevent hydrate formation during a kick situation, mineral oil base fluid can be
spotted across the BOP and in the choke / kill lines. In the event of a gas kick when a water
based mud system is being used, be prepared to spot a glycol / salt pill in the BOP, and
choke / kill lines.
Deep water and/or cold water locations, which will explore for gas, should take into
consideration the prediction and prevention of hydrates during the planning phase.
Prediction evaluations must take into account:
• Hydrostatic head plus maximum anticipated shut-in pressures at the coldest point in
the system (i.e., mud line)
• Final maximum anticipated mud weight
• Mud line temperature
Some items that may be impacted in the well plan due to possible hydrates, are:
• BOP modifications to allow inhibitor injection at the BOPs
• Inhibitor type, volume and concentration
• Drilling fluid type to be used through the prospective zone of interest
• Choke manifold modifications to allow inhibitor injection at the choke.
Prevention is always the best method. Remedial actions are always time-consuming, costly
and could possibly risk the safety of the rig and/or personnel.
8.3 Shut-In Procedures
When a kick is detected, the well should be closed-in on the uppermost annular preventer.
After shut-in, drill string reciprocation through the annular preventer can sometimes be
accomplished, but is complicated by possible rig motions and motion compensator
limitations. In many cases, pipe movement is not recommended, as significant wear may
occur on the sealing element, especially if a tool joint is reciprocated through the element.
To avoid this, the drill string may be hung-off on a pipe ram as soon as possible. Hanging off
can also help reduce the size of the trapped gas bubble that may be left in the BOP stack
between the sealing BOP element and the choke line outlet used to circulate the well. To
minimize the risk of annular wear and the size of the trapped bubble, the following is
generally recommended:
October 2005 8-5

a. The well should be shut-in on the uppermost annular preventer, with immediate
consideration given to hanging off the drill pipe on the pipe rams. To promote safe
handling of a kick, pipe movement may have to be sacrificed in order to minimize the
size of the trapped bubble and avoid annular element wear. It is acceptable to fully
hangoff on variable bore rams only if a tool joint will rest on ram blocks, not on the
fingers (which depends on the size and type of ram and the diameter of the drill pipe).
b. When circulating out the influx, returns should be taken through the choke or kill line
outlet directly beneath the closed pipe rams. Once the influx is circulated from the
wellbore, remove the trapped gas from the BOP stack and fill the riser with kill
weight mud. The diverter controls and overboard line should be manned before the
well is opened. When circulation begins up the riser, any residual gas bubble will then
be diverted overboard through the diverter lines as necessary.
c. Significant quantities of gas may be trapped in the BOP stack for one of the following
reasons:
i) Drill string is not hung off on the pipe rams.

ii) Well is not closed in until gas reaches the BOP stack.
iii) Pipe rams leak while killing the well with the annular also closed.
iv) Choke or kill outlet used for circulation is not immediately below closed rams.
Procedures must be used to control the potential expansion of a trapped gas bubble in
the BOP before the well is opened up, particularly when the above circumstances
exist.
NOTE: The significance of gas trapped in the BOP stack is dependent upon water depth
and mud weight. Two barrels of trapped gas in 150' of water with 10 ppg mud could
expand to just over 10 barrels at the surface. The same two barrels in 1000' of
water with 15 ppg mud could expand to over 100 barrels. Replacement of liquid in
the marine riser by large volumes of gas can result in riser collapse.
The three advantages of hanging-off versus reciprocating through the annular preventer are:
a. Minimizes wear on the annular
b. Minimizes the amount of trapped gas in the stack after the kick has been
circulated out.
c. Facilitates a quick disconnect if the need should arise.
8-6 October 2005

The annular preventer on the LMRP (upper annular) is used as the initial closing element,
absorbing whatever damage is done, until the drill pipe is supported on the ram-type
preventers. Keeping reciprocation brief through the annular preventer should minimize the
damage (the annular preventer on the stack, i.e. lower annular, is still available for well
control). The Chevron Drill Site Manager should ensure that, at all times, the Driller knows
the relative positions of tool joints in relation to the annular and ram-type preventers.
The Recommended Procedure for Shutting-in and Hanging-Off:
a. Sound Alarm.
b. Pick up to a pre-determined position off bottom that positions the tool joint clear
of the annular preventer (and with lower kelly cock above the rig floor) and stop
the pumps.
c. Close upper annular preventer. Regulate closing pressure so pipe moves freely.
d. Open the uppermost BOP side outlet valves and monitor the SICP.
e. Space drill pipe to insure no tool joint will interfere with closing the designated
hangoff pipe rams. This might require pulling the tool joint up into the closed
annular to positively locate the tool joint relative to the rams (note readback
pressure, weight indicator and compensator position to confirm tool joint
position), then moving the string based on the known distance between annular
and hangoff rams.
f. Close pipe rams with normal operating pressure (typically 1500 psi).
g. Close ram locking device if not automatic.
h. Plan to be sure that after hangoff, the lowest safety valve or kelly cock will
remain accessible with heaving conditions and that the bit will be near, but at least
several feet off bottom (usually 10-15’ or sufficient to avoid pack off by cuttings
and hole debris). Lower drill pipe slowly until it is supported on closed pipe rams
(using motion compensator to prevent rig heave from lifting string off rams after
hangoff).
i. Using the choke, bleed well pressure from between annular and ram preventers
via a BOP side outlet above the ram. Close choke and confirm pressure remains at
0 psi to verify that rams are holding. Open annular preventer while considering
possibility of release of gas from below annular, and take appropriate precautions
(such as possibly closing diverter element).
October 2005 8-7

j. Adjust the compensator to mid-stroke and support the string weight (air weight)
above the hangoff rams plus a nominal overpull (10 - 20 thousand lbs.)
k. Close the upper BOP side outlet valve, open the choke outlet that is just below the
hang-off rams, read and record the SICP.
l. Bump the float, read and record the SIDP pressure.
NOTE: The Driller must have record of proper tool joint spacing and be aware of
possible tidal or vessel draft changes. In order to keep tool joint and/or a safety
valve or kelly cock at a workable height above the rig floor, while still keeping
tool joints clear of the annular sealing element after shut-in, a pup joint may be
required in the drill string between rotary and stack while drilling ahead. A “kick
control joint” is not recommended because of the time required to break-out the
kelly or top drive to attach the joint.
The recommended procedure for shutting-in and reciprocating is similar to the procedure
for hanging-off except for the following:
1. After closing in the well, reduce the closing pressure on the annular to a point where
the pipe moves freely, but does not allow the annular to leak.
2. Ensure that no tool joints are working through the annular.
3. Have the string positioned so that the lower kelly cock or safety valve does not pass
below the rotary table.
4. Use the choke outlet as close to the annular as possible to minimize the size of any
bubble potentially trapped in the stack below the annular BOP.
8.4 Subsea Choke and Kill Lines
Water in Choke Line vs. Mud in Choke Line
Either gelled fresh water, fluids including anti-freeze, base oil, or weighted drilling mud may
be kept in the choke and kill lines. Unless special circumstances exist (which require related
special procedures), Chevron recommends keeping drilling mud in the choke and kill lines
during drilling operations. While periodic pumping through the lines may be necessary to
prevent settling of barite, this can be done as part of the routine procedure to obtain choke
line friction measurements.
It is recommended that before commencing any well control operations, the operator’s
representative should check with the drilling crew to confirm the contents of the choke and
8-8 October 2005

kill lines. Circulating out any fluid other than current mud may be required prior to
commencing the kill operation.
Hydrostatic Pressure Loss as Gas Enters the Choke Line
When circulating out a gas kick at a slow circulating rate from the well, two pressure changes
occur when gas enters the choke line:
1. Hydrostatic pressure in the choke line will be reduced as gas displaces mud
2. Choke Line Friction (CLF) will be reduced as gas replaces mud
In response to these changes, the choke operator will need to close the choke in order to
maintain a constant bottom-hole pressure (thereby substituting choke pressure for lost
hydrostatic or friction pressures). When the gas is in turn displaced by the drilling mud
behind it, the choke operator will need to open the choke to keep the bottom-hole pressure
constant. And when kill mud reaches the choke line, hydrostatic pressure and CLF will again
increase and, with the choke fully open, bottom-hole pressure will eventually become
overbalanced by the amount of CLF corrected for kill weight mud.
The magnitude of these pressure changes, particularly the hydrostatic change, can be
significant, especially in deep water. The maximum potential hydrostatic change can be
calculated as follows:
Max. choke line HP change = (mud gradient – influx gradient) x choke line length
Given:
choke line length = 3000 ft.
current mud weight = 12 ppg
est. gas gradient = 1 psi/ft
Then:
Max. choke line HP change = (12 ppg x .052 – 1 psi/ft) x 3000 ft.
= (.624 psi/ft – 1 psi/ft) x 3000 ft.
= 1575 psi
In this case, for bottomhole pressure to remain constant while the gas is being circulated out
through the choke, choke pressure could increase by 1575 psi. A choke operator aware of this
possible pressure change is less likely to overreact or make procedural judgment errors than
if they did not know this “correct” choke pressure increase might occur.
By comparison, the effect of reduced friction loss with gas instead of mud in the choke line
(#2 above) is relatively small. If CLF at kill rate while circulating 12 ppg mud through this
same choke line is, say, 275 psi, the most it can decrease is 275 psi – much less than the
potential hydrostatic change calculated above.
October 2005 8-9

In any case, choke operators need to be prepared for these changes when using constant
bottomhole pressure kill methods on rigs with long choke lines. These changes occur in
addition to the frictional changes that result from gas versus mud passing through the choke
itself – a change that occurs irrespective of choke line length.
Choke Line Friction
When drilling with a subsea stack, the choke is usually a great distance from the BOP stack,
depending on the water depth. Any friction occurring in the annular section of the well bore
will be reflected in the bottomhole and shoe pressures. Thus, it becomes important in well
control to take into consideration the additional friction generated while circulating through
the choke line. If ignored, the friction pressure could become sufficiently large to fracture the
formation at the casing shoe or deeper downhole.
Two methods are discussed below to determine the amount of choke line friction that occurs
while drilling with a subsea stack.
Measuring Choke Line Friction in Cased Hole
1. Record the standpipe pressure while circulating through the riser at one or
more desired reduced pump rates. These conventional “SCR” pressures are
recorded on the chart below as “Psys Riser”.
Note: The maximum pump rate used should not exceed the highest pump rate that can be
tolerated when the kick reaches the choke line.
2. Close the annular preventer on the LMRP and open the choke line valves at
the BOP and all appropriate valves and chokes on the surface manifold (as if
killing the well).
3. With the adjustable choke wide open, circulate through the choke manifold at
the same rate(s) used in Step #1. If applicable, circulate out all non-drilling
fluids in choke line before recording pressures.
4. Record the standpipe pressures while taking mud returns up the choke line at
each pump rate. These measurements of system pressure including choke line
friction are recorded as “Psys Choke Line”
5. Determine the amount of choke line friction for each pump rate by noting the
difference between Psys Riser and Psys Choke Line.
6. Calculate the change in Choke Line Friction (∆ CLF) by noting the

incremental increase in choke line friction above the value for the previous
line.
8-10 October 2005

A completed example is shown below.
CHOKE LINE FRICTION EXAMPLE CALCULATION
PSYS CHOKE CHOKE LINE

SPM BPM PSYS RISER LINE FRICTION ∆ CLF
20 1.8 300 psi 350 psi 50 psi 50 psi
30 2.7 500 psi 600 psi 100 psi 50 psi
50 4.5 1,200 psi 1,450 psi 250 psi 150 psi
Figure 8.4.1
Measuring Choke Line Friction in an Open Hole
In an open hole, the method previously discussed is not recommended, as it exposes the open
hole section to the full amount of choke line friction while circulating through the choke, as
well as allowing cuttings within the chokeline which then need to be circulated out from the
top with clean mud. Therefore, when measuring choke line friction with open hole exposed,
the following method is recommended:
1) Connect the rig pumps to the choke manifold and close off circulation to the drill
string. Open choke line valves at the BOP to permit pumping down the choke line
into the wellbore. If applicable, displace non-drilling fluids in the choke line with the
drilling fluid being used.
2) Pump down the choke line at the predetermined reduced circulating rate(s) while
taking returns through the riser. Circulating pressure noted for each pump rate should
be read directly from the Casing Pressure gauge on the choke control panel. Since the
friction pressure while circulating at reduced rates through the riser is negligible, the
circulating pressures observed will be the actual values for choke line friction at the
corresponding pump rates.
While Chevron does not recommend taking routine SCR measurements, it is important to
keep choke and kill lines free from gelled or settling mud solids. Therefore it is a good
practice to flush these lines once per tour, during which process the choke line friction values
may be efficiently notes.
Since the length of the choke line does not vary as the well deepens, choke line friction
values carefully measured at one time should remain valid until mud properties change.
October 2005 8-11

Compensating for Choke Line Friction When Circulating
As discussed previously in this section, adjustments may be required for choke line friction
in order to avoid applying additional pressure on exposed formations. Such adjustments are
necessary if CLF is greater than the safety factor selected for the kill operation. Listed below
is an example of the steps that can be taken to compensate for choke line friction.
Using the same values that were provided earlier, the following steps illustrate one
recommended procedure for compensating for choke line friction. For this example,
assume that the well can be killed at 50 spm. The initial SICP is 600 psi and initial SIDPP
is 500 psi.
PSYS CHOKE CHOKE LINE

SPM BPM PSYS RISER LINE FRICTION ∆ CLF
20 1.8 300 psi 350 psi 50 psi 50 psi
30 2.7 500 psi 600 psi 100 psi 50 psi
50 4.5 1,200 psi 1,450 psi 250 psi 150 psi
1. Hold casing pressure at 600 psi while bringing the pump rate up to 20 spm. The drill
pipe pressure should increase to 850 psi.
2. To compensate for the addition of 50 psi of choke line friction, open the choke
slightly and reduce the casing pressure to 550 psi . The drill pipe pressure should then
also drop by 50 psi to 800 psi.
3. Hold the casing pressure at 550 psi while increasing the pump rate to 30 spm. The
drill pipe pressure should increase to 1,050 psi.
4. To compensate for the addition of another 50 psi of choke line friction (∆ CLF=
50psi), open the choke slightly and reduce the casing pressure to 500 psi. Drill pipe
pressure should again also drop by 50 psi to 1,000 psi.
5. Hold casing pressure at 500 psi while increasing the pump rate to 50 spm. Drill pipe
pressure should increase to 1,850 psi.
6. To compensate for the addition of another 150 psi of choke line friction (∆ CLF=
150psi), open the choke slightly and reduce the casing pressure to 350 psi. Drill pipe
pressure should also drop by 150 psi to 1700 psi.
7. At this point the pumps are up to speed. The drill pipe pressure can be monitored the
same as for a surface BOP application.
8-12 October 2005

By "backing out" the choke line friction in this way, drill pipe pressure is now 1,700 psi,
which is the same as the initial SIDPP + the slow pump rate circulating pressure through the
riser (500 + 1200 = 1700). Thus, when calculating the initial and final circulating pressures
for the Wait & Weight Method drill pipe pressure schedule, use the circulating pressure
through the riser, and not the circulating pressure through the choke line.
Choke line friction must also be accounted for whenever the pumps are slowed down or
stopped completely during a kill operation. Using the same sample friction pressure values,
the following two examples illustrate procedures that can be used when stopping the pumps
using different kill methods:
To stop the pumps during the 1st circulation of the Driller’s Method, while circulating at 50
spm (while pumping original weight mud) with 700 psi circulating casing pressure and 1,700
psi circulating drill pipe pressure:
1. Increase the casing pressure to 850 psi by adjusting the choke. The drill pipe pressure
should increase to 1,850 psi.
2. Reduce pump speed from 50 spm to 30 spm while holding casing pressure constant at
850 psi. Drill pipe pressure should decrease to 1000 psi.
3. Increase casing pressure to 900 psi by adjusting the choke. The drill pipe pressure
should increase to 1050 psi.
4. Reduce the pump rate to 20 spm while holding the casing pressure constant at 900
psi. Drill pipe pressure should decrease to 800 psi.
6. Stop the pumps while holding the casing pressure constant at 950 psi. The drill pipe
pressure should be 500 psi after the pump is stopped (equal to original SIDPP).
When kill weight mud is circulated, all friction pressure values will increase due to higher
density fluid being pumped at a constant rate. While adjustments to friction pressure loss
values can be made using the ratio of new mud weight divided by old mud weight,
calculations can get somewhat complex, as illustrated below
Using the same sample friction pressure values, the following procedure should be used to
stop the pumps if Kill Weight Mud has been circulated just past the bit:
Using the same circulation rate of 50 spm, assume 600 psi circulating casing pressure and
1300 psi circulating drill pipe pressure (final circulating pressure after replacing 12 ppg
original weight mud with 13 ppg kill weight mud):
October 2005 8-13

1. Increase the casing pressure to 750 psi by adjusting the choke. The drill pipe pressure
should increase to 1,450 psi.
2. Reduce pump speed from 50 spm to 30 spm while holding casing pressure constant at
750 psi. Drill pipe pressure should decrease to about 540 psi.
should increase to about 590 psi.
4. Reduce the pump rate to 20 spm while holding the casing pressure constant at 800
psi. Drill pipe pressure should decrease to 325 psi.
6. Stop the pumps while holding the casing pressure constant at 850 psi. The drill pipe
pressure should be 0 psi after the pump is stopped since kill weight mud is at the bit.
Since this procedure requires calculations to adjust friction pressure for changed mud weight,
this shut-down procedure is prone to error. For this reason, a simpler, alternative procedure
involving use of the kill line (see the next section below) is preferred when applicable.
When kill weight mud is circulated back to the surface, choke line friction will increase due
to higher density fluid being circulated through the choke. In some situations, the increase in
choke line friction can be significant and may become critical (e.g. deep water with a long
choke line, a large increase in kill mud density, or kill weight mud density close to the leak
off test EMW). In these situations, it may become necessary to open a second choke, or
utilize a second flow path from the BOP (e.g. take flow up choke and kill lines
simultaneously) in order to reduce the drill pipe pressure to its proper value. If this cannot be
done, or the drill pipe pressure is still too high, the simplest alternative would be to finish
circulating using a slower pump rate (after adjusting circulating drill pipe pressures
appropriately).
Monitoring Static Kill Line Pressure
On some rigs, choke and kill lines can be monitored independently at surface, and, if suitable
outlets are available on the BOP stack, the pressure inside the BOP can be monitored through
the kill line. As long as we keep a valve closed on the kill line downstream from the pressure
gauge (hence the reference to “static” kill line), there will be no circulation through the kill
line, and thus no friction in the line to contend with.
If static kill line pressure is held constant for the time it takes to bring the pumps up to speed
or to slow them down, the pressure inside the BOP will remain constant, and bottomhole
pressure (BHP) will also be relatively constant. Since choke line friction occurs downstream
8-14 October 2005

of the BOP, the effect of choke line friction is eliminated as long as SICP continues to exceed
the value of choke line friction.
Note: This method of starting and stopping pumps is much easier, and requires no
calculations (or even measurement of choke line friction). In order to permit use of
this method, Chevron recommends always having a separate static kill line pressure
gauge available with readout visible to the choke operator.
The advantages to this method are:
1) The pump does not have to be started or stopped stages, which eliminates the
possibility of error while compensating for choke line friction
2) Accurate, pre-recorded values of choke line friction are less critical
3) It is much simpler to understand and avoid complications that can occur during kill
operations (such as plugging the choke line, or experiencing choke line hydrostatic
changes as influx replaces mud, etc.)
4) If the choke and kill lines contain water instead of mud, this method would eliminate
the need for displacing the choke line with mud prior to circulating out the kick
(though Chevron still recommends keeping choke and kill lines filled with mud
currently in use).
Note: If the kill line is being used to monitor casing pressure, be alert to the possibility of
gas entering the kill line. Pumping very slowly down the kill line while circulating
an influx out can eliminate this potential problem, but introduces complexity.
Consideration should be given to closing the kill line valves on the BOP stack
before the gas reaches the BOP stack if benefits of using the static kill line are not
critical (as when killing a small kick with good wellbore strength).
One of the most critical points in a subsea well killing procedure occurs when gas enters the
choke line. At this point, the hydrostatic pressure in the choke line begins to drop due to
replacement of a higher density fluid (drilling mud) with a lower density influx (gas). At this
time, the choke opening will have to be reduced in order to increase the surface pressure in
order to maintain a constant bottomhole pressure. A similar situation occurs when mud
begins to enter the choke line and displaces gas, except that this time hydrostatic pressure in
the choke line begins to increase and the choke will have to be opened to reduce surface
pressure in order to maintain a constant bottomhole pressure.
Since the capacity (bbl/ft.) of the choke line is much smaller than the annulus capacity of the
well, the rate of change in hydrostatic pressure when the gas enters or leaves the choke line is
much greater for a given pump rate than similar hydrostatic changes that occur while
circulating a kick up the casing annulus.
October 2005 8-15

Choke adjustments necessary to compensate for these hydrostatic changes may be easier if
the pumps rate is very slow. The Drill Site Manager will need to make a judgement call to
select pump rates that will facilitate controlling a kick without unnecessarily compromising
other safety or practical objectives. It is generally recommended to select a single,
appropriate rate slow enough to permit control during all phases of the kill operation, and to
maintain that rate for the entire circulation unless conditions dictate a change of plan.
Another consequence of gas replacing mud in a long choke line is that PcMax at the surface
will be higher than PcMax calculated for surface stack operations. The computerized kill
sheets provided for Chevron’s subsea operations adjust PcMax calculations for long subsea
choke lines.
8.5 Disconnecting from the Well
Subsea stacks are designed to allow a floating drilling vessel to disconnect from the well
while the well remains shut-in. Weather, an out of control well, or other situations could
require disconnecting. Listed below are the recommended procedures for disconnecting in
non-emergency and emergency situations.
It must be remembered that for operations in which Riser Margin is not being maintained,
any well containing mud density greater than sea water density will require shut-in with the
subsea BOP in order to maintain constant wellbore pressures. While disconnecting or
reconnecting, it is important to recognize that the well is not dead whenever the riser is
disconnected.
Non-Emergency Disconnect:
Sequences for non-emergency disconnect (as would be done when pulling the LMRP to
repair an annular preventer element damaged during kill operations) will vary by rig and
contractor. In general, however, the following sequence is typical:
1. Circulate bottoms up and pull into casing a distance greater than RKB to wellhead.
2. Calculate space out to land hang-off tool in the wellhead.
3. Make up hang-off tool in the string and run it into the hole (making sure that the bit is
still inside the casing).
4. Land hang-off tool inside the wellhead with the compensator stroked open. Position
compensator in mid-stroke and adjust the compensator to support the pipe weight
above the rams.
5. Close the appropriate pipe rams and locks.
8-16 October 2005

6. Back off the right-hand release sub on the hangoff tool.
7. Pick up drill pipe above the BOP stack. Confirm well is static before proceeding.
Close the shear/blind rams. Close the wedge locks if ram is a Cameron ram.
8. Displace the riser with sea water and adjust riser tensioning. Dump the subsea
accumulator bottles, if applicable. Deballast part or all of the air buoyancy tanks on
the riser, if applicable.
9. Pull the remainder of the drill pipe out of the riser. Disconnect the LMRP and pull the
riser.
Emergency Disconnect:
Situations that might require an emergency disconnect include: the loss of well control, a
sudden change in weather, loss of dynamic station-keeping ability, or waiting too long to do
a "non-emergency" disconnect. In these situations, the following procedure is typical:
1. Pick up and space out to hangoff on the designated hang-off ram.
2. Close hang-off ram with 1,500 psi closing pressure.
3. With compensator open, lower string onto hang-off ram. Adjust compensator until
near midstroke while supporting string weight above rams, plus overpull of 10,000
lbs (time permitting).
4. Close lower pipe rams for a backup.
5. Shear drill pipe with full operating pressure (3,000 psi). Close Cameron Wedge locks
if applicable.
6) Check the riser tensioning then disconnect the LMRP and pull the riser. Consider
moving rig to stay clear of shallower water while keeping LMRP well away from the
BOP stack.
Note: Studies conducted by Chevron and ram manufacturers indicate that complete shear
of some grades of drill pipe will not be obtained using 1,500 psi closing pressure.
High strength, large diameter or heavy weight drill pipe may require up to 3,000
psi closing pressure for a complete shear. Also, note that high strength drill pipe
that has been sheared can explode, long after shearing. A sheared stub should be
handled carefully and removed from the rig as soon as possible.
October 2005 8-17

Re-entering the Well after Disconnecting
While disconnected from the well, gas may "seep" into the wellbore since all overbalance
may have been lost while the well was shut-in without marine riser in place. This gas, if
present, may then migrate and collect just below the BOP stack. When reentering the well,
care must be taken to remove potentially trapped gas from under the BOP stack. The
following procedure is typical:
1. After reconnecting the LMRP, displace choke and kill lines to drilling mud weight
while the well remains isolated. Then open the lower pipe rams and BOP side outlet
valves as necessary to identify potential trapped gas in the BOP. Bleed off using rig
specific procedure for handling trapped stack gas.
2. Displace the riser with mud.
3. After clearing the well of any trapped gas, open the shear/blind rams.
4. Screw into the hang-off tool. If the pipe was sheared, dress-off the top of the drill pipe
stub and latch with an overshot.
5. After supporting the weight of the string, open the hang-off rams and confirm the
well is stable.
6. Consider circulating and conditioning mud, then pull the hang-off tool (or overshot, if
pipe was sheared) out of the hole and remove from string.
7. Trip to bottom, circulate and condition mud as required.
Note: If S-135 drill pipe has been sheared, "shattered" pieces of the drill pipe may be on top
of the shear rams. Pick up these pieces with a magnet prior to opening the shear
rams.
Emergency Disconnect from Dynamically Positioned Vessels
Special emergency disconnect procedures are required for floating drilling operations from
dynamically positioned (DP) vessels since, in the event of a power loss or positioning system
failure, the ability to remain directly over the BOP may be lost.
Since DP operations are rarely conducted in shallow water, the procedures relevant to these
situations are included in the section of this manual relating specifically to deepwater drilling
operations.
8-18 October 2005

8.6 Subsea BOP Equipment
Much of the BOP equipment found on floating drilling rigs duplicates that which is used for
surface locations. With some modifications, ‘surface-style’ annular preventers, pipe rams,
and hydraulic valves are incorporated onto a four posted guide frame that permits them to be
utilized at the sea floor. As with surface operations, pressurized hydraulic fluid operates this
equipment. Both a choke and kill line are available for well control, with circulating
pressures being regulated via a surface mounted adjustable choke and manifold assembly.
Differences include a pilot operated or multiplex (electro-hydraulic) control system, the

number and types of preventers (complete with remote locking mechanisms), the need for
hydraulic connectors and motion compensation, and even the physical location of the stack.
The purpose of positioning the BOPs on the sea floor is to eliminate the need for high
pressure containment equipment that can tolerate vessel motion and to provide pressure
containment for a well even if the drilling vessel must leave location.
In this section, the subsea BOP equipment and control systems will be divided into the
following five major components (as shown in Figure 8.6.1):
1) BOP Stack
2) Choke & Kill Lines & Manifold
3) Marine Riser and Diverter Assembly
4) LMRP (Lower Marine Riser Package)
5) Control System
BOP Stack
As depicted in Figure 8.6.2, the BOP Stack consists of a hydraulic wellhead connector, ram
type preventers, choke and kill line valves, and pod receiving blocks/lower female
receptacles. An annular preventer may or may not be included on the BOP proper. Notice
the absence of drilling spools between preventers, a design intended to minimize the overall
height, thereby increasing the assembly’s stiffness and reducing the bending moment
transferred to the wellhead.
Historically, the subsea stack has consisted of 4 rams and possibly an annular (alternately
the annular is on the LMRP). However, today’s new generation rigs and the increasingly
difficult drilling conditions have changed the thinking on a “typical” BOP configuration.
Many new generation rigs are now equipped with 6 ram stacks with annulars both on the
stack and on the LMRP. A detailed well program should help the planning engineers to
determine the BOP configuration required for specific operations. Additionally, extensive
thought must be given to the configuration of rams within the ram bodies (i.e., where to put
the shears, VBRs, etc. and why).
October 2005 8-19

Figure 8.6.1
8-20 October 2005

Figure 8.6.2 BOP Stack
Subsea BOP stacks are similar in component arrangement to surface installations, with the
following differences:
a. Choke and kill lines are normally connected to ram preventer body outlets.
b. Spools may be used to space preventers for shearing tubulars, hanging off drill pipe,
or stripping operations.
c. Choke and kill lines are manifolded for dual purpose usage.
d. Shear/Blind rams are normally used in place of blind rams.
e. Ram preventers are usually equipped with an integral or remotely operated locking
system
f. More accumulator volume is required and some of the accumulator bottles may be
mounted on the BOP stack (subsea).
Stack Component Codes
The recommended component codes adopted for designation of subsea BOP stack
arrangements use the same nomenclature as surface installations, with the addition of
remotely operated connectors:
October 2005 8-21

CH = remotely operated connector used to attach wellhead and preventers to each other.
Connector should have a minimum working pressure rating equal to the BOP
stack working pressure rating.
CL = low pressure remotely operated connector used to attach the marine riser/ lower
marine riser package to the BOP stack.
Ram and Outlet Placement
The specific ram block size placement is often dictated by the BOP configuration and outlet
location. A suitable hang-off ram position has to be identified, since having the ability to
shear pipe and disconnect the LMRP from the BOP Proper is necessary. Hanging off during a
well control situation will simplify emergency disconnects, prevent rig heave from wearing
away at the closing element and minimize gas accumulation under a closed preventer.
In some cases, there is not enough distance between the shear/blind ram and the upper pipe
ram (which is the next ram below the shear/blind ram) to fit a tool joint. If that is the case, the
capability to shear pipe is lost when the upper pipe ram is used for hangoff; this may
therefore not be a prudent ram to use for hangoff. Using the middle pipe ram for hang-off
often allows for shearing operations while still saving the bottom pipe ram to serve as a
master valve for isolating the wellbore.
Choke and kill valve outlet placement becomes a function of the procedures planned and an
assessment of what contingencies are to be given priority. Consideration is given to where
valve failures can be tolerated and how placement affects a corresponding back-up plan, what
the likelihood is of a disconnect during a well control procedure, and how it will be possible
to regain primary control over the well after returning from a disconnect. Most scenarios can
be handled by having at least one outlet below and one outlet above the hang-off ram. If a
third outlet is present, it should be below the hang-off ram as well. If fortunate to have a
fourth outlet, position it above the hang-off ram.
A consequence of certain outlet placements is a lack of consistent BOP pressure testing on

every outlet. For example, a weekly pressure test of shear/blind rams requires backing off a
test plug, which can be undesirable. If test pressure leaks by the ‘backed off’ tool, it can go
against the formation, since the subsea wellhead has no casing valve that can be opened.
Also, any damage to the test tool while running, setting, or retrieving could precipitate a
fishing job. If the shear/blind rams are only pressure tested before drilling out casing strings,
any valves on outlets directly under these rams will experience the same infrequent test
intervals (and only tested to casing pressure). Ensure this is thoroughly addressed in the
Application to Drill.
Spring Assist BOP Side Outlet (Failsafe) Valves
All choke and kill valves on a subsea stack are hydraulically actuated gate valves, containing
seats, gates, stems, etc., similar to their surface counterparts. They vary from surface stack
8-22 October 2005

“HCR” valves, however, in that they contain a spring to assist gate closure (under most
operating conditions). Hydraulic pressure applied to the open port forces the valve stem
down, compressing the spring. When this pressure is removed, the spring assists in closing
the gate. The term “failsafe” valves is more recognizable, but recent tests with mud and
simulated deep water production conditions have shown the spring does not always close the
valve, especially if a plug in the opening port occurs. Manufacturers now stress the term
‘spring assist.’ Two subcategories exist for spring assist valves, ‘line pressure closure’ and
‘system closure’. Both styles permit bi-directional sealing.
Line Pressure Closure
Line pressure closure valves do not require an external source of hydraulic fluid to close the
valve. For Cameron ‘AF’ type actuators, the valve closes by spring action plus line pressure
from the bore of the valve acting on the balancing stem (see Figure 8.6.3). The balanced
stem design prevents fluid displacement in the valve body during valve opening and closing,
and prevents the valve from opening when line pressure is less than the hydrostatic pressure.
Shaffer’s ‘HB Long Sea Chest’ model varies slightly, where line pressure assists spring
closing through a pressure-balancing tail rod that is 1/4" smaller than the valve’s stem. Also,
hydrostatic pressure effects on valve closure are negated through a ‘sea chest’ system. Oil
fills the spring side of the actuator piston, which is ported to the sea chest. As the gate valve
opens, oil is displaced to the sea chest via a bypass system. Hydrostatic pressure is
transmitted to the oil remaining in the spring side of the actuator piston, as well as the tail
rod diameter. This overcomes the hydrostatic forces trying to keep the valve open. Other
‘line pressure closure’ valves include ‘McEvoy EU’ and ‘EDU’ nomenclatures.
October 2005 8-23

Figure 8.6.3 System Closure
8-24 October 2005

System closure valves have a hydraulic control fluid supply plumbed to both open and close
ports. However, if a hydraulic pressure failure occurs, the actuator spring should ensure the
valve closes. Some actuators have an exposed tailrod that the hydrostatic pressure can act on,
enhancing the force of the hydrostatic pressure already acting on the close side hydraulic
fluid. This serves to counteract the hydrostatic force imparted by the column of fluid acting
on the open side hydraulic fluid, which tends to open the valve. Shaffer’s ‘HB Short Chest’ is
another example of a system closure valve.
Subsea valves can also have a pressure assist bottle tied into the closing chamber
(accumulator style bottles, pre-charged for water depth). When the valve opens, fluid from
the closing chamber charges the bottle, storing it to assist with the next closure.
It is required to always have two valves on each choke/kill outlet, providing redundancy. The
actuators require only 1500 psi to operate, but are rated to 3000 psi, should the higher
operating pressure be required. Commonly, these valves are mounted directly on the ram
preventer outlets, eliminating spools and keeping the height of the stack minimized.
8.7 High Pressure Lines and Manifolds
Choke and Kill Lines
Choke & Kill lines are high pressure lines which originate at the subsea BOP and convey
fluid under pressure to a surface mounted choke manifold. Unlike kill lines for surface stacks
subsea kill lines contain no back pressure valves; both choke and kill lines can be used to
either take flow from or deliver fluid to the subsea stack. Comments relevant to choke lines
therefore apply equally to kill lines.
October 2005 8-25

Figure 8.7.1 Example Riser Mounted Kill and Choke Lines for Subsea BOP
Installations
Choke and kill lines for subsea BOPs are installed opposite one another, permanently
attached to the exterior of the marine riser. As the riser is installed, choke and kill pin and
box connectors are stabbed and made up simultaneously with the riser. Choke and kill lines
are normally 3 inches in nominal diameter, or larger.
Installation Guidelines
Some of the more important considerations concerning subsea choke and kill lines are:
1) Connector pressure sealing elements should be inspected, changed as required, and

tested before being placed into service. Periodic pressure testing is recommended
during installation. Pressure ratings of all lines and sealing components should equal
or exceed the rated working pressure of the ram preventers.
2) Selection of choke and kill line connectors must take into consideration the ease of
connect/disconnect operations and the dependability of sealing elements for those
8-26 October 2005

emergency situations where it is necessary to unlatch the riser from the BOP stack
and then latch/reconnect again prior to resuming normal operations.
3) Each choke and kill line should have two full opening valves adjacent to the
preventers. These valves are hydraulically operated and at least one on each line
should be spring assisted for closure. Periodic pumping through the valves is
necessary since they are normally closed and may become plugged if not occasionally
flushed.
4) Locations of the choke and kill line openings on the BOP stack depends on the
particular configuration of the BOP stack and the operator’s preferred flexibility for
well control operations. Sharp turns in the piping arrangement should be targeted
where practical.
5) Flexible connections required for choke and kill lines both at the top and bottom of
the marine riser, should have a pressure rating equaling or exceeding the rated
working pressure of the ram preventers.
6) Selection of the top connection should include consideration of criteria such as

relative movement between vessel and riser, the environment, type and temperature
of fluids handled, pressure integrity, service life, ease of connect/disconnect
operations and replacement costs.
7) Bottom flexible connections (circumventing the flex joint) have the same
requirements as the top connection but are even more critical due to their relative
inaccessibility and the environmental conditions under which they must operate. For
deeper water operations, particular considerations should be given to internal–
external pressure integrity and reliability.
October 2005 8-27

Figure 8.7.2 Example types of flex connection on Top of marine riser for
choke/kill lines
Figure 8.7.3 Example Types of Flex Connectors at Bottom of Marine Riser for
C/K Lines
8-28 October 2005

Choke Manifold
A floating vessel’s choke manifold is often more elaborate than its surface counterpart (as
depicted in Figure 8.7.4). Often there will be two remote hydraulically operated chokes and at
least one manual choke. Depending on the choke placements, various flow path
combinations can be available, should either a washout or plug occur during well control
operations. Both the choke and kill lines terminate at this manifold, where fluids can be
circulated through either one. The mud pumps can be routed to the choke manifold, and most
rigs have provisions to tie in the cement unit as well. Also, depending on kill line outlet
placement on the BOP, pressure at the stack can be monitored via the kill line during well
control operations, reducing the need for ‘choke line friction’ determinations. The remaining
manifold components, including gate valves, pressure gauges and choke actuators, are the
same as those found on surface operations.
Note: Grease insert sealing failures on choke manifold valves have occurred. It has been
recommended all ‘high pressure’ grease inserts be replaced with certified
‘high pressure’ plugs prior to testing and system maintenance.
Figure 8.7.4 Choke Manifold for Sub Sea Drilling
October 2005 8-29

8.8 Diverter System
At the top of the marine riser system, a diverter system is generally connected between the
rig floor and the telescopic joint (slip joint) and secured to the rig substructure.
The diverter system vent lines are usually large diameter (12” or larger) and are designed to
divert wellbore fluids away from the rig floor with minimum back pressure on the wellbore.
They are usually directed to the opposite extremities of the vessel. Any valves in the diverter
vent lines must be full-opening and either automatic or selectively controlled or sequenced,
so that flow from the well bore cannot be closed in.
The diverter and valves should be actuated when installed and at appropriate times during
operations to determine the system will function properly.
Figure 8.8.1 Typical Diverter System Installed on a Floating Rig
8-30 October 2005

Slip Joint (Telescopic Joint)
The slip joint (telescopic joint) serves as a connection between the marine riser and the
drilling vessel, compensating principally for heave of the vessel. It consists of two main
sections, the outer barrel (lower member) and the inner barrel (upper member).
The outer barrel (lower member), connected to the riser pipe and remaining fixed with
respect to the seabed, is attached to the riser tensioning system and also provides connections
for the choke and kill lines. A pneumatically or hydraulically actuated resilient packing
element contained in the upper portion of the outer barrel provides a seal around the outside
diameter of the inner barrel to prevent fluid loss from the riser during movement of the inner
barrel. This is considered the “weak link” in the pressure containing ability of the riser
system, particularly when gas is being diverted.
The inner barrel (upper member), which reciprocates within the outer barrel, is connected to
and moves with the drilling vessel and has an internal diameter compatible with other
components of the marine riser system. The top portion of the inner barrel has either a
drilling fluid return line or diverter system attached, and is connected to the under side of the
rig substructure.
Marine Riser Tensioning System
The marine riser tensioning system provides positive tension on the marine riser (the lower
portion of the slip joint) to support its weight while permitting compensation for vessel
movement.
Tensioning at the top of the riser is one of the most important aspects of the riser system, as it
is desirable to maintain the riser profile as nearly straight as practical to reduce wear and
stresses due to bending. As tension is increased, axial stress in the riser also increases.
Therefore, an optimum tension exists for a specific set of operating conditions (water depth,
current, riser weight, drilling fluid density, vessel offset, etc.).
Periodic examination of riser tensioning system units should be made while in service, since
the system can cycle approximately 6000 times per day. As dropping the riser can cause loss
of primary well control (mud hydrostatic pressure), inspections needed to maintain reliability
of the system are critical. Particular care should be taken to establish a wireline and
replacement program based on ton cycle life for the particular rig installation. Users should
consult the equipment manufacturer for general maintenance procedures and specification
recommendations.
Riser Buoyancy
For deeper waters, it may be impractical from an operating viewpoint to install sufficient
units capable of providing adequate tensioning. In these cases, some types of riser buoyancy
October 2005 8-31

may be the solution (flotation jackets, buoyancy tanks, etc.). Buoyancy reduces the top
tensioning requirements but loses some of its effectiveness as a result of the increased riser
diameter exposing a greater cross sectional area to wave forces and ocean currents. Selection
of the optimum method and/or material for obtaining buoyancy requires careful consideration
of a number of factors, including water absorption, pressure integrity, maintenance
requirements, abuse resistance, and manufacturer’s quality control. Several of these factors
are time and water-depth dependent. As water depth increases, these factors become more
critical. A part of any analysis for an optimum system should include consideration of the
consequences of buoyancy failure during operations.
Marine Riser Inspection and Maintenance
As marine joints are removed from service, each joint and connector should be cleaned,
surfaces visually inspected for wear and damage, damaged packing or seals replaced, and
surface re-lubricated as required. Buoyancy material and/or systems, if installed, should also
receive close inspection. Prior to running a riser, thorough inspection of all components may
also be warranted, particularly if the riser has been idle for some time or previous inspection
procedures are unknown. For those operations where environmental forces are severe and/or
tensioning requirements are high, consideration should be given to maintaining records of
individual riser joint placement in the riser string and periodic testing (non-destructive) of the
connector and critical weld areas to reduce failures. Refer to API RP 2K: Recommended
Practice for Care and Use of Marine Riser Drilling Systems for specific information.
8.9 Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP)
The LMRP consists of a riser connector, annular preventer(s), a flex joint/ball joint assembly,
choke/kill line stabs (or mini collet connectors) and pod receiving blocks/upper female
receptacles for the control pods. An isolation valve for the choke and kill lines may also be
included on the LMRP. The LMRP provides the means to disconnect from the BOP should
weather, an emergency abandonment, or a well control situation dictate such action. It can be
pulled to surface with the marine riser, leaving the well shut in on the BOP. The riser
connector is similar to, or of the same design as the wellhead connector, which is discussed in
the previous section.
8-32 October 2005

Figure 8.9.1 LMRP Components
Annular Preventer
At least one annular preventer will be located on the LMRP. Other than the size, its design is
often the same as that used on surface stacks. One prudent addition often found is a ‘surge
bottle’, which is a pre-charged accumulator style bottle tied into the close chamber of the
annular. The bottle acts as a buffer for tool joints that are stripped through, allowing the
pressured closing fluid to be momentarily stored rather than dumped. This is required
because the pressure regulator on the subsea pod cannot respond quickly enough to the
fluctuations caused by the passing tool joint. The surge bottle should be pre-charged to 500 to
700 psi plus hydrostatic adjustment (approx .445 psi/ft).
Hydraulic Wellhead Connectors
The hydraulic wellhead connector attaches the BOPs to the wellhead and is designed to
latch and unlatch on to specific wellhead profiles. It is designed to withstand the bending
stresses and separating forces imposed by currents, wave and vessel movement, and
wellbore pressures. The connector will have a pressure rating that matches the ram
preventers.
Two basic types are available, the multiple piston type (Vetco H-4) and the annular piston
type (Cameron HC & Dril-Quip DX). Due to the large surface area, the annular type has a
higher preload at lower hydraulic pressures. The angle of locking dogs, or fingers, with
regard to engagement of the wellhead profile also has a significant influence on preload.
October 2005 8-33

Some operating features of the two most common manufacturer’s models are listed below.
(Note that a second riser connector attaches the LMRP to the BOP proper).
Vetco H-4 Connector
The Vetco H-4 Connector includes both a primary and secondary locking system. Half the
pistons are ported to the ‘primary’ lock chamber, with the rest ported to the ‘secondary’
lock chamber. This set up is identical for the unlocking system, making a total of four ports.
The locking systems are normally plumbed together externally by Vetco or the drilling
contractor, routing fluid to all locking chambers simultaneously. The unlock systems are
always separate, providing a backup system, should the primary unlock fail. The pistons are
designed so that a given operating pressure results in a larger unlocking force being
generated in comparison to locking force.
With the introduction of the Vetco Gray MS-700 wellhead system, Vetco Gray offers two
metal-to-metal wellhead to H-4 connector seal options - the standard VX gasket and a
secondary VT-1 gasket. All MS-700 subsea wellhead housings, manufactured for H-4
connectors, have a dual-taper VX / VT gasket profile with two independent sealing
surfaces. The secondary VT sealing surface is used when impact, corrosion, or washout has
damaged the primary VX sealing surface in the wellhead. The VT-1 gasket lands and seals
in the secondary taper in the wellhead bore. VT-1 gasket design provides 15,000 psi sealing
integrity. They can be installed into existing H-4 connectors and are retained by the seal
ring retainer screws in the same manner as the standard VX gasket.
Consideration should be given to using only non-resilient seal rings for testing and during
operations. When resilient seals are used, point loading occurs (due to test pressure and
weight) on the connector/profile at the resilient seal. This causes the shape of the resilient
seal to change, resulting in a permanent deformation to the surface of the ring groove.
Consequently, resilient seals are generally considered a “last option” when pressure
integrity can not be achieved with metal-to-metal seals.
Figure 8.9.2 Vetco H-4 Connector
8-34 October 2005

Figure 8.9.3 H-4 High-Angle Release Connector
Note: All H-4 greasing operations should be performed with the connector removed from
the test stump. Otherwise, a hydraulic grease lock may develop
Cameron Collet Connectors
Two basic styles of Cameron connectors are available for wellheads, the Model 70 and the
Model HC. Both designs attach the connector to the wellhead by a series of pivoted locking
segments shaped like tapered fingers (forming a ‘clamp’ segment) rather than dogs. These
segments create a funnel to guide the connector to its final landing position.
Both styles of Cameron connectors normally use an ‘AX’ ring gasket to mate with the
wellhead. Model 70 — The clamp segment is engaged by a series of hydraulic pistons (see
Figure 8.9.4). A common plumbing arrangement has all 9 pistons dedicated to lock: six
pistons to primary unlock, and three pistons to secondary unlock. Unlike Vetco’s ‘fluid
band’, all pistons are individually hosed. Each piston is designed to provide an unlocking
force that is 80% greater than the locking force. One other feature is that the ring gasket can
October 2005 8-35

be hydraulically locked in place while running or retrieving the BOP stack. Manual
override is standard.
Figure 8.9.4
Figure 8.9.5
8-36 October 2005

8.10 Subsea BOP Control Systems
Every component in a blowout preventer assembly is operated hydraulically by moving a

piston up and down or back and forth. Thus the function of a BOP control system is to direct
hydraulic fluid to the appropriate side of the operating piston and to provide the means for
fluid on the other side of the piston to be expelled.
On land, jack-up or platform drilling operations the control of the BOP is easily achieved in a
conventional manner by coupling each BOP function directly to a source of hydraulic power
situated at a safe location away from the wellhead. Operation of a particular BOP function is
then accomplished by directing hydraulic power from the control unit back and forth along
two large bore lines to the appropriate operating piston.
This system uses the minimum number of controlling valves to direct the hydraulic fluid to
the required function. It also enables the returning fluid to be returned to the control unit for
further use.
For subsea drilling operations, it is necessary to control larger, more complex BOP
assemblies which are remotely located on the sea-bed. In this instance, direct control cannot
be applied since the resulting control lines connecting the BOPs to the surface would be
prohibitively large to handle. Reaction times would also be unacceptable due to the longer
distances to the BOP functions and the consequent pressure drop.
In order to overcome these problems indirect operating systems have been developed. There
are two types - hydraulic and multiplex electro-hydraulic, of which the piloted hydraulic
system is by far the most common. Piloted hydraulic systems are typically limited to use in
water depths below approximately 3,000 ft.
Piloted Hydraulic System
In a piloted hydraulic system, the size of the control umbilical (pod hose) is reduced by using
only one, relatively large diameter hydraulic power supply line. This line is surrounded by
multiple, small diameter, hydraulic lines that transmit hydraulic signals down to “pilot”
valves (generally referred to as SPMs). The pilot valves then direct the hydraulic power fluid
to the appropriate BOP function.
The pilot valves are located in control pods on the BOP stack. In order to provide a complete
back-up of the subsea equipment there are two control pods – usually referred to as the ‘blue
and the yellow pods’.
,
No attempt is made to recover the hydraulic power fluid once it has been used to operate a
function, since this would increase the number of lines required in the umbilical. Instead the
fluid is vented subsea from the control pod.
October 2005 8-37

Multiplex Electro-Hydraulic System
In greater water depths, problems with umbilical handling and reaction times become
significant. In order to overcome them, the hydraulic lines controlling the pilot valves can be
replaced by separate electrical cables which operate solenoid valves in the subsea pods.
These valves then send a hydraulic signal to the relevant pilot valve which in turn is actuated
and directs power fluid to its associated BOP function.
The time division multiplexing system provides simultaneous execution of commands and
results in a relatively compact electrical umbilical. This typically consists of four power
conductors, five conductors for signal transmission and additional back-up and
instrumentation lines. With the armored sheath the umbilical has a resulting diameter of some
1.5 inches with a weight of about 3 lb/ft in air.
An electro-hydraulic system should have a central control point which interfaces various
signals electronically and sends one set of signals electrically to the subsea solenoid valves,
which direct the flow of power fluid to operate the preventer function. In this system, a
flowmeter should be used to provide an indication of the proper flow of hydraulic fluid and
proper operation of the blowout preventer.
Piloted Hydraulic System Overview
Fluid used to operate the functions on the BOP stack is delivered from the hydraulic power
unit on command from the central hydraulic control manifold. This contains the valves which
direct pilot pressure to the pilot valves in the subsea control pods and which are operated
either manually or by solenoid actuated air operators.
In this way the manifold can be controlled remotely via the actuators from the master electric
panel (usually located on the rig floor) or from an electric mini-panel (located in a safe area).
The system may include several remote mini-panels if desired. An electric power pack with
battery back-up provides an independent supply to the panels via the central control
manifold.
The pilot fluid is sent to the subsea control pods through individual, small diameter hoses
bundled around the larger diameter hose which delivers the power fluid. In order to provide
complete redundancy for the subsea portion of the control system there are two independent
hydraulic hose bundles and two independent control pods.
The hydraulic hose bundles (or umbilicals) are stored on two hose reels, each of which is
equipped with a special manual control manifold so that certain stack functions can be
operated while the stack is being run. Hydraulic jumper hose bundles connect the central
hydraulic control manifold to the two hose reels. Each umbilical is run over a special sheave
and terminates in its control pod.
8-38 October 2005

For repair purposes each pod along with its umbilical can be retrieved and run independently
of the BOP stack. In order to do this, the pod and umbilical hose are run on a wireline which
is usually motion compensated. In some designs of control system, the umbilical is run
attached to the riser in order to give it more support and reduce fatigue at hose connections.
The pod is still attached to a wireline for retrieval purposes. This design has the advantage of
not having to handle the umbilicals whenever the pod is pulled but has the disadvantage of
requiring more subsea remote hydraulic connections. Guidance of the pod is provided by the
guidewires and guideframe, as shown in Figure 8.10.1.
Figure 8.10.2 is a block diagram of the hydraulic flow system for a stack function. The
hydraulic fluid is prepared and stored under pressure in the accumulators. Some
accumulators (usually two) are dedicated to storing fluid for use in the pilot line network and
the remaining accumulators contain the fluid that is used to power the various BOP
functions.
Figure 8.10.1
October 2005 8-39

Figure 8.10.2 Subsea Control System (Block Diagram)
The power fluid is routed to the subsea control pod selected by the pod selector valve which
is located in the central hydraulic control manifold. The line to the non-selected pod is
vented. When power fluid reaches the pod, it is combined with fluid stored at the same
pressure in subsea accumulators, located on the BOP stack. The pressure of the combined
8-40 October 2005

fluid is then reduced, to that required to operate the stack function, by a subsea regulator
situated in the control pod. Adjustment of this regulator is performed from the surface via
dedicated pilot and read-back lines in the hose bundle.
Pilot fluid is always directed to both pods at the same time. When the pilot fluid for a
particular function reaches each pod, it lifts the spindle of its associated SPM (sub plate
mounted) pilot valve. In the pod to which power fluid has been sent, this will allow the
power fluid to pass through the SPM valve and be routed to the stack function via a shuttle
valve.
Operating Sequence
The following is a general summary of this operating sequence. Each piece of equipment on
the BOP stack has a corresponding pilot control valve on the central hydraulic control
manifold which actuates the appropriate SPM valve. The control valve is a four-way, three
position valve and can be functioned manually or by an air operator.
When a function button on either the mini panel or Driller’s panel is pushed, an electrical
signal is sent to the associated solenoid valve on the Central Hydraulic Manifold.
The solenoid valve moves to allow rig pressure air to pass through it and actuate its
corresponding pilot control valve (manipulator valve located on the accumulator unit).
When the pilot control valve is actuated, hydraulic fluid is allowed to flow from the pilot
accumulators (where it is stored at 3,000 psi) and down the appropriate pilot lines in both of
the umbilical hose bundles.
The pilot line terminates in the subsea pod at the SPM valve. When activated by the pilot
pressure, this valve lifts to allow hydraulic power fluid (at its regulated pressure) to flow to
its associated BOP function.
The position of the pod selector valve on the Central Hydraulic Manifold determines to
which of the two subsea control pods the hydraulic power fluid is directed. This fluid is
stored in the accumulators at 3,000 psi and is sent to the subsea pod through a 1” hose in the
center of the umbilical bundle.
When the power fluid reaches the pod it goes through a regulator which reduces its pressure
to 1,500 psi. This regulator can be adjusted from surface via another pilot control circuit.
Power fluid, at its regulated pressure, passes through the activated SPM valve on the selected
pod to the BOP function, via a shuttle valve.
Hydraulic fluid from the opposite side of the BOP function returns through its shuttle valve
to an SPM valve in one the subsea pods, from where it is vented to the sea.
October 2005 8-41

Close Function
In Figure 8.10.3, one of the BOP rams is being closed using the drillers master control panel.
Pushing the ‘close’ button on this panel actuates the solenoid valves on the hydraulic
manifold, thus allowing air pressure to move the pilot control valve to the ‘close’ position.
The solenoid valve on the right in the diagram vents the other side of the air cylinder.
With the pilot control valve in the ‘close’ position, pilot fluid at 3000 psi is sent down the
umbilical to the “RAM CLOSE” SPM valve in the subsea control pods. The pressure lifts the
spindle in this valve so that it seals against the upper seat, thus blocking the vent.
At the same time, power fluid at its regulated pressure is allowed past the bottom of the
spindle and into the valve block in the male and female sections of the control pod. From the
bottom of the female section, the power fluid then travels through the shuttle valve to the
‘close’ side of the BOP ram cylinder. Simultaneous reciprocal action in the “RAM OPEN”
SPM valve vents the hydraulic fluid from the opening chamber of the same ram BOP.
8-42 October 2005

Figure 8.10.3 Operating Sequence – Close Function
Block Function
The block function is used to vent a pilot control valve. By doing this individually on each
valve, a leak in the control system or the preventers can be located and isolated. By centering
October 2005 8-43

and venting all the valves when the accumulator unit is first being pressurized, unintentional
and inadvertent operation of the various other positions and functions can be eliminated.
Figure 8.10.4 Operating Sequence – Block
Referring to Figure 8.10.4, when the ‘block’ button is pressed, both the solenoid valves are
actuated in such a way as to apply pressure to both sides of the air operator. This causes the
pilot control valve to be centered, which then allows both the pilot ‘open’ and ‘close’ lines to
8-44 October 2005

be vented. The springs in both the SPM valves then push the spindles down so that they seal
against the bottom seats and block the flow of any power fluid through the valves. At the
same time this also vents both sides of the BOP ram operating cylinders.
Open Function
This sequence is the parallel opposite of the ‘close’ function. As shown in Figure 8.10.5,
when the ‘open’ button is pressed, the solenoid valves on the hydraulic control manifold are
actuated and allow air pressure to move the operator on the pilot control valve to the ‘open’
position. The solenoid valve on the left in the diagram vents the ‘close’ side of the operating
piston.
Figure 8.10.5 Operating Sequence – Open Function
October 2005 8-45

The pilot fluid can then flow down to the subsea control pod, where it lifts the spindle in the
“RAM OPEN” SPM valve, thus blocking the vent and allowing power fluid to flow through
the valve. From the pod, the power fluid travels through the ‘open’ shuttle valve to the ‘open’
sides of the BOP ram operating cylinders.
Simultaneous reciprocal action in the “RAM CLOSE” SPM valve allows the fluid from the
‘close’ side of the operating cylinders to be vented.
Central Control Point
A subsea closing unit control system should have a central control point. For a hydraulic
system, this should be a manifold capable of controlling all the hydraulic functions on the
BOP stack. The hydraulic control system should consist of a power section to send hydraulic
fluid to subsea equipment, and a pilot section to transmit signals through pilot lines. When a
manipulator valve on the closing unit control manifold is operated, a pilot signal is sent
subsea to an SPM control valve, which when opened directs power fluid to the blowout
preventer.
Pressure regulators on the surface control manifold send pilot signals to the subsea regulators
to control the pressure of the power fluid at the preventers. The surface control system should
also include a flowmeter which, by a measure of the volume of fluid going to a particular
function, will indicate if that function is operating properly. The hydraulic manifold should
be located in a safe but readily accessible area.
Control Fluid Circuit
In addition to the control fluid circuits used to operate stack functions such as ram or annular
preventers, the control system must also perform other functions such as control of subsea
regulators, provide readback pressures, latch/unlatch the subsea control pods, and charge the
subsea accumulators.
Figure 8.10.6 shows a typical control fluid circuit. The hydraulic fluid is mixed, pressurized
and stored in accumulator bottles by the hydraulic power unit. A pilot operated accumulator
isolator valve is provided to allow the pumps to charge the subsea accumulators. When
control fluid is used, it passes through a totalizing flowmeter in the hydraulic control
manifold, and then through the pod selector valve, which directs it to the chosen subsea pod.
After passing through the jumper hose and the subsea hose bundle to the chosen control pod,
the fluid supplies the stack mounted accumulator bottles (shuttle valves allow the bottles to
be charged from, and supply fluid to, either pod). The high pressure power fluid is then
routed to adjustable (via pilot lines) subsea pressure regulators. These reduce the fluid’s
pressure to that required to operate the particular BOP function desired. The fluid is then
routed to the SPM valves in the selected pod, which are controlled by the pilot control valves
8-46 October 2005

on the hydraulic control manifold. When activated by pilot line hydraulic pressure, these
SPM valves direct power fluid to the appropriate function.
Figure 8.10.6 Subsea Control System – Hydraulic Schematic
October 2005 8-47

Pilot Fluid Circuit
The pilot valves in the subsea pods are controlled from the surface by means of control
valves located in the hydraulic control manifold. These control valves can be operated either
manually from the control manifold itself or remotely from an electrical panel via pneumatic
solenoid valves.
Any BOP stack function such as a failsafe valve, which requires pressure only to open or
close, is called a 2-position function. There is an ‘operate’ position and a ‘vent’ position. The
latter position is used to release pressure from the operating side of the pilot valve.
Figure 8.10.7 shows a typical 2-position function pilot circuit. The control valve, a ¼“, four-
way manipulator valve, can be controlled from a remote panel via the two solenoid valves,
which can place the valve either in the ‘open’ or ‘vent’ positions. A pressure switch
connected to the discharge line of the control valve is activated when a pilot signal is present
and lights up the appropriate lamp on the control panel.
In the ‘open’ position the pilot signal is transmitted to the subsea control pods, where it
operates its associated pilot valve, which then allows the power fluid to flow through the
selected pod to the BOP function. A BOP stack function requiring pressure to both open and
close is called a 3-position function. The hydraulic pilot fluid circuit for a 3-position function
is shown in Figure 8.10.7. It requires the use of three solenoid valves, the ‘block’ solenoid
valve being used in conjunction with two shuttle valves in order to center the control valve.
A pressure switch is connected to each discharge line of the control valve and will transmit a
signal to the appropriate control panel lamp whenever a pilot signal is present. The operation
of the 3-position pilot circuit is as described above. The main components of the control
system and some of the other operating sequences are now described in more detail.
8-48 October 2005

Hydraulic Manifold
Figure 8.10.7 Pilot Fluid Circuit (Two-Position Function)
October 2005 8-49

Hydraulic Pilot Supply
Figure 8.10.8 Pilot Fluid Circuit (Three-Position Function)
8-50 October 2005

Regulator Control
Since the power fluid arrives at the subsea control pod at 3000 psi, and the BOP functions
have a maximum normal operating pressure of 1500 psi, regulators are needed in the pods -
one is provided for the annular preventers and one for the ram preventers. Figure 8.10.9
shows how the subsea regulator is controlled from the surface. A 1/2" air operated pilot
regulator in the control manifold transmits pilot pressure to the subsea regulator in order to
adjust its setting.
The air operator can be manipulated either manually using an air regulator on the control
manifold, or remotely from another control panel. When operated from a remote panel, a
solenoid valve is used to increase the air pressure by allowing rig air to flow into a 1 gallon
receiver connected to the air pilot line. The receiver acts as a surge protector for the pilot
regulator. Decreasing the air pressure is achieved by using a solenoid valve to vent the line to
atmosphere.
Pressure Readback
In order to ensure that the subsea regulator has set the desired operating pressure, the
manifold incorporates a readback system. The output of each subsea regulator is connected
through a 1/8" hose in the umbilical back to a pressure gauge in the control manifold.
Pressure transducers transmit the readback pressures to remote panels. A shuttle valve, also
in the manifold unit, connects the lines from both umbilicals and isolates the active and
inactive pods.
All the electrical components are housed in separate explosion proof housings on the control
manifold unit. One housing contains the solenoid valves and another contains the
transducers and pressure switches. The pressure switches are typically set to be activated ‘on’
when pressure in the pilot line to the ram or failsafe SPM reaches 1000 psi and to switch ‘off’
when the pressure falls to below 700 psi.
October 2005 8-51

Figure 8.10.9 Subsea Regulator Control Circuit
Control Panels
These panels permit the operation of the manifold unit from remote locations. Usually two
remote panels are used - a master one on the drill floor, and a mini-panel in a relatively safe
location such as a rig office. Other mini-panels can be integrated into the system if desired.
The drillers’ master panel is normally explosion proofed or air-purged, since it is located in a
hazardous area. It contains a set of graphically arranged push-button/indicating lights for
operation and status indication of each stack function. The regulator pressures are controlled
8-52 October 2005

by increase/decrease push-buttons, and there are gauges for monitoring pilot and readback
values. A digital readout of the flowmeter located on the control manifold is also provided.
Many types of drillers’ panel also include controls for the operation of the rig diverter
system, which is controlled in a similar way to a surface BOP system. The mini-panel is
usually not required to be explosion proof. It operates in the same way as the master panel,
but does not include the pressure gauges. Both panels include ‘lamp test’ facilities to check
for burnt out lamps. They also contain alarms for low hydraulic fluid level, low accumulator
pressure, low rig air pressure, and an alarm to indicate that the emergency battery pack is in
use.
The remote panels contain all the electrical switches needed to operate the solenoid valves on
the hydraulic control manifold, which in turn control the air operators of the pilot control
valves. Lights on the panels (red, amber, green) indicate the position of the 3-way valve
(open, block, close), and there is a memory system so that when a function is in block with
the amber light on, the last previously energized pilot signal will also be indicated by
continued illumination of the red or green light. Depending on exact sequences and reasons
for selection of the ‘block’ position, this memory function may or may not accurately reflect
actual position of a particular BOP element since
• A BOP with both opening and closing chambers vented (e.g. in block position) could
change position in response to mechanical loads or differential hydrostatic pressures
acting on ram cross sectional areas (depending on nature of ram locking device), and
• The failure that prompted the use of ‘block’ may have prevented full or proper
function of the BOP element prior to selection of block position
For these reasons, use of the block function, and subsequent evaluation of BOP position
should be limited to situations in which it is necessary to maintain temporary control of a
system experiencing a hydraulic leak.
Figures 8.10.10, 8.10.11, and 8.10.12 show in more detail the operation of a BOP function
from a remote panel. Although the lights on the panels show the position of the BOP
functions, the control buttons are not active until a ‘push and hold’ button is depressed in
order to allow the supply of electrical power to the panel. The sequence of events that occur
is as follows:
Close
1. The ‘press and hold’ button is held in to activate the panel.

2. The ‘close’ button is pressed.
3. Current flows to the ‘close‘ solenoid valve, which lifts to supply air to the 3-
position air operator.
October 2005 8-53

4. The air operated piston moves the pilot control valve to the ‘close’ position, and
pilot pressure is sent to the subsea control pod.
5. Successful pressurization of the pilot line to the control pod actuates a pressure
switch on the control manifold.
6. Current flows through an electronic card which illuminates the lamp of the ‘close’
button, indicating that the function is now closed.
7. The ‘press and hold’ button is released; the ‘close’ lamp remains illuminated.
Figure 8.10.10 Remote Operation – Close Function
Open
1. The ‘press and hold’ button is held in to activate the panel.

2. The ‘open’ button is pressed.
3. Current flows to the ‘open‘ solenoid valve, which lifts to supply air to the 3-position
air operator.
8-54 October 2005

4. The air operated piston moves the pilot control valve to the ‘open’ position, and
pilot pressure is sent to the subsea control pod.
5. Successful pressurization of the pilot line to the control pod actuates a pressure
switch on the control manifold.
6. Current flows through an electronic card which illuminates the lamp of the 'open’
button and extinguishes the ‘close’ lamp, indicating that the function is now open.
7. The ‘press and hold’ button is released; the ‘open’ lamp remains illuminated.
Figure 8.10.11 Remote Operation – Open Function
Block
1) The ‘press and hold’ button is held in to activate the panel.

2) The ‘block’ button is pressed.
3) Current flows to both the ‘close‘ and ‘open’ solenoid valves, which lift to supply air
to both sides of the 3-position air operator piston.
October 2005 8-55

4) The air operated piston moves to a central position, which places the pilot control
valve in the middle ‘block’ position so that no pilot pressure is sent down either the
‘close’ or ‘open’ pilot line.
5) Since no pilot line is pressurized, neither pressure switch is activated.
6) The electronic card senses that no pressure switch has been operated and illuminates
the ‘block’ lamp.
7) The ‘press and hold’ button is released; the ‘block’ lamp remains illuminated.
The ‘block’ position can be used to assist with the location of a hydraulic leak in the system
by systematically isolating the various BOP stack functions. It is also used to depressurize
the pilot lines when attaching junction boxes to the umbilical hose reels.
Note: The illumination of a push button lamp only indicates that a pilot pressure signal has
been generated, and not that a function has been successfully operated subsea.
Indications of a successful subsea function movement are –
a. The flowmeter shows that the correct amount of power fluid has been used.
b. There are fluctuations in manifold and readback pressure readings.
c. There is a noticeable drop in accumulator pressure.
Figure 8.10.12 Remote Operation – Block Function
8-56 October 2005

The BOP functions can be controlled from any panel at any time during normal operations. If
one panel or a cable to a panel is damaged, destroyed or malfunctions, it will not interfere
with the operation of the system from any other panel.
An emergency battery pack supplies the electric panels with power for a period of up to 24
hours (depending on use) in case of failure of the rig supply. The power pack typically
consists of ten 12 volt lead-acid batteries. A battery charger is also included to maintain the
batteries in a fully charged condition, ready for immediate use. Electrical cable connects the
remote panels and the battery pack to the junction boxes on the hydraulic control manifold.
Hose Reels
The hose bundle, as shown in Figure 8.10.13, is mounted on a heavy duty reel for storage
and handling is are connected to the hydraulic control manifold by jumper hoses. The reel is
driven by a reversible air motor and includes a disc brake system to stop the reel in forward
or reverse rotation.
Once the BOP has been landed and latched on to the wellhead, the control points on the side
of the reel are shut down and isolated to prevent interference with the full control system.
The regulators on the reel which control the manifold and annular pressures must also be
isolated in case they dump pressure when the jumper hose RBQ plate is attached as shown in
Figure 8.10.14.
When the subsea control pod is run or retrieved, the junction box for the jumper hose is
disconnected from the hose reel. However in order to keep selected functions ‘live’ during
running or retrieval operations, five or six control stations are mounted on the side of the reel.
These live functions include at least the riser and stack connectors, two pipe rams and the
pod latch. Figure 8.10.15 is a schematic of the hydraulic system through which the power
fluid flows to the controlled functions during reel rotation.
With the supply pressure isolated, the 3-position, 4-way valves are used to vent any pressure
that may remain trapped in a pilot line holding an SPM valve open. This is necessary, as the
reel is fitted with a different type of valve than the control manifold manipulator valves.
These valves look similar but do not vent when placed in the ‘block’ position, see Figure
8.10.12.
Hose Bundles and Hose Reels
A hydraulic hose bundle may consist of up to 64 pilot hoses which have an inside diameter of
1/8”, 3/16”, or both, and a power fluid hose which is usually 1” inside diameter. The pilot
hoses, as previously described, carry signals to the SPM control valves on the BOP stack,
while the power fluid is supplied through the one inch hose or rigid line to the pod and
accumulator bottles on the BOP stack.
October 2005 8-57

The working pressure rating of the hose bundle should exceed the working pressure rating of
the control system. For an electro-hydraulic system, electrical cables are run subsea to the
solenoid valves. The hydraulic power supply line may be integrated into an electrical cable
bundle or run separately.
The hose reels should be equipped so that some functions are operable while running or
pulling the BOP stack or lower marine riser package (LMRP). Recommended functions to be
operable at these times are the stack connector, riser connector, one set of pipe rams, pod
latches, and, if applicable, ram locks.
Figure 8.10.13
Figure 8.10.14
8-58 October 2005

Figure 8.10.15 Hose Reel Control Manifold
Subsea Control Pods
The subsea control pods contain the equipment that provides the actual fluid transfer from the
hose bundle to the subsea stack. A typical pod assembly, as shown in Figure 8.10.16,
consists of three sections:
October 2005 8-59

• a retrievable valve block

• an upper female receptacle block permanently attached to the lower marine riser
package
• a lower female receptacle permanently attached to the BOP stack
Figure 8.10.16 Subsea Control Pod
8-60 October 2005

Control fluid enters the pod at the junction box and is routed either directly to an SPM valve
or to one of the two regulators (one for the BOP rams and one for the annular preventers),
from where it is sent to the appropriate SPM. When a SPM pilot valve is actuated, it allows
the control fluid to pass through it to one of the exit ports on the lower part of the male stab
and into the upper female receptacle attached to the lower marine riser package.
For those functions which are part of the lower marine riser package, the fluid is then routed
out of the upper female receptacle and directed via a shuttle valve to the function’s operating
piston. For those functions which are part of the main BOP stack, the fluid is routed through
the upper female receptacle and into the lower female receptacle, from where it goes via a
shuttle valve to the appropriate operating piston.
Not all the functions on the BOP stack are controlled through pod mounted pilot valves. Low
volume functions such as ball joint pressure are actuated directly from surface through 1/4"
lines. These are generally referred to as straight through functions.
The integrity of each fluid route between the different sections is achieved by using a
compression seal that is installed in the retrievable valve block section of the pod.
Compression between the three sections is achieved by hydraulically locking the pod into the
lower receptacle (which is spring mounted on the BOP stack in order to facilitate easier
engagement).
Locking is accomplished by hydraulically extending two dogs that locate under the bottom of
the upper female receptacle. A helical groove on the outside of the lower skirt of the pod
ensures correct alignment of the fluid ports. To retrieve the pod independently of the lower
marine riser package, the locking pressure is bled off and the dogs are retracted mechanically
when an overpull is taken on the retrieving wire.
A more recent design utilizes the same concept but consists of a cube shaped retrievable
valve block which latches over two tapered blocks mounted on a base plate permanently
attached to the lower marine riser package. A single tapered block mounted on a spring base
is permanently attached to the BOP stack. The packer seals on the retrievable valve block are
pressure balanced in a breakaway condition, so that there is no tendency for it to be blown
out of the pocket if the pod has to be released under pressure.
Besides the latching system, packer seals and piping, the principal components of the
retrievable valve blocks are the SPM pilot valves and regulators.
SPM (Sub Plate Mounted) Valves
As described above, these valves direct the regulated power fluid to the desired side of the
preventer, valve or connector operating piston, and vent the fluid from the other side of the
piston to the sea. The annular preventers typically use large 1 1/2" SPM valves in order to
provide sufficient fluid flow; the ram preventers use 1" valves, and the other functions such
October 2005 8-61

as failsafe valves and connectors use 3/4" valves. Figure 8.10.17 shows a NL Shaffer 1 inch
SPM valve.
The valve is a poppet type, in which a sliding piston seals at the top and bottom of its travel
on nylon seats. In the normally closed position, a spring attached to the top of the piston shaft
keeps the piston on the bottom seat and prevents the power fluid from passing through the
valve to the exit port. Power fluid pressure, which is permanently present, also assists in
keeping the valve closed by acting on a small piston area on the spindle. In this position,
fluid from the valve’s associated operating piston is vented through the sliding piston at
ambient conditions.
When pilot pressure is applied to the valve, the sliding piston moves up and seals against the
upper seat, which blocks the vent ports and allows regulated power fluid to flow through the
bottom section of the valve to function the BOP. Note that the pilot fluid therefore operates
in a closed system, while the hydraulic power or control fluid is an ‘open’ circuit with all
used fluid being vented to the sea.
As illustrated previously in Figures 8.3.12 (A), (B), & (C), two SPM pilot valves are required
to operate a BOP function.
Shown below is an illustration of a single SPM Valve.
Figure 8.10.17 NL Shaffer 1” SPM Valve
8-62 October 2005

Regulators
Each subsea control pod contains two regulators - one to regulate pressure for the ram
preventers and one to regulate the pressure for operating the annular preventers. Some
control systems incorporate a third regulator so that the operating pressure of each annular
preventer can be individually manipulated.
Typical regulators are 1 l/2" hydraulically operated, stainless steel, regulating and reducing
valves. The output line of each regulator is tapped and the pressure routed back to a surface
gauge through the umbilical. This readback pressure is used to confirm that the subsea
regulator is supplying the power fluid at the pressure set by the pilot surface regulator.
Redundancy/Shuttle Valves
The two subsea control pods are functionally identical. When a pilot control valve (‘ram
close’ for example) is operated on the hydraulic control manifold, a pilot signal is sent down
both umbilicals so that the associated SPM valve in each pod ‘fires’. If the pod selector valve
is set on yellow, then power fluid is sent only to this pod, and it is only through the SPM
valve in this pod that the fluid will reach the ram operating piston. The pod selection has no
effect on the pilot system.
Once the yellow pod SPM valve ‘fires’, the power fluid passes through it to a shuttle valve,
the shuttle piston of which moves across and seals against the blue pod inlet. The fluid then
passes through the shuttle valve to move the ram to the close position. Fluid from the
opposite side of the operating piston is forced out through the ‘ram open’ shuttle valve and
vented through the ‘ram open’ SPM valve and into the sea.
Note that if the blue pod was now selected to open the rams, the power fluid would flow to
the ram through the ‘open’ SPM on the blue pod, but the fluid from the ‘close’ side of the
piston would be vented through the yellow pod SPM since the ‘close’ shuttle piston would
still be sealing the blue pod inlet port.
The shuttle valve(s) should be located as near as possible to their relevant ports on the BOP,
stack since the system is redundant only down as far as the shuttle valves.
Figure 8.10.18 shows a NL Shaffer shuttle valve.
Figure 8.10.18 NL Shaffer Shuttle Valve
October 2005 8-63

Flowmeters
A flowmeter is mounted on the surface accumulator, with digital readouts provided at each
remote control station. Locate on the hydraulic supply line immeditately upstream from the
pod selector valve, the flowmeter indicates the amount of hydraulic power fluid delivered to
the subsea BOP/subsea accumulators via whichever pod hose is currently selected. By
zeroing the flowmeter reading prior operating a function, the flowmeter can provide good
evidence of proper BOP function.
To benefit from the measurement of fluid used during a specific function, it is important to
have a record of the volume previously (normally) required for the same function. By zeroing
the flowmeter immediately prior to operating a single function (i.e. ‘close upper annular’),
specific failures can be detected, as would be indicated by either insufficient or excessive
fluid volumes used during that function (compared to normal volume requirements). Failures
such as only partial closure or a having a broken hydaulic hose could thus be detected;
alternative action could then be immediately taken to effect well shut in or isolation of the
hose leak.
Subsea Bottle Dump Provisions
As water depth varies, so does the subsea accumulator pre-charge. Along with stack mounted
bottles, an additional function should be supplied - a subsea accumulator dump. As
mentioned, these bottles are a part of the entire 3,000 psi control system. When opened and
on line with the surface bank, they retain an internal pressure higher than the surface reading.
This is the control fluid hydrostatic head. Without a dump provision, retrieving the stack
reduces the differential pressure and the bottle shells experience the higher actual pressure.
For example, if the stack was pulled from 3,000' subsea and no fluid dumped, the
accumulator gauge pressure when reaching the surface would be 3,000 psi plus 0.43 psi/ft X
3,000 ft or 4,290 psi. With a shell test pressure of 4,500 psi, the bottle is well above working
pressure and just below test pressure. Therefore, dump valves are essential in deep water.
On any rig, a check valve must be installed in the power fluid line to the surface, so that a
power fluid leak subsea does not bleed down all accumulators, both surface and subsea. With
the check valve in line, a surface pop-off valve cannot be relied upon to dump excess subsea
pressure.
Direct Accumulator Functions
Access for some “straight through” or direct functions supplied only from the surface
accumulator may be provided for each pod. Examples of such functions are the ball joint
pressure balance, pod latch, etc. With these functions, pressure flows from the pod directly to
that function. These direct functions usually take a very small fluid volume for operation and
are not changed that often, therefore the long time to complete the operation does not cause a
problem.
8-64 October 2005

8.11 Trouble Shooting Subsea Control Systems
Trying to locate a fluid leak or a malfunction of the subsea control system requires a very
thorough knowledge of the equipment and a systematic approach to tracing the source of the
problem. Subsea control systems are very complex in their detail and there are always minor
variations and modifications even between similar models, therefore trouble shooting should
always be carried out with reference to the relevant schematics.
Leaks
A fluid leak is usually detected by watching the flowmeter. If a flow is indicated when no
function is being operated, or if the flowmeter continues to run and does not stop after a
function has been operated, then a leak in the system is implied.
Once it has been determined that there is a leak, then the following steps could be used to try
and locate its source:
Check the Surface Equipment:
• examine the hydraulic control manifold for a broken line or fitting

• examine the accumulator bottles for signs of a fluid leak
• check the jumper hoses for signs of damage
• check the hose reels and junction boxes for loose connections
• examine the hose reel manifold to ensure that all valves are centered
Make certain that the shut-off valve to the reel manifold pressure supply is tightly closed (if
this is left open when the junction box is connected to the reel, it will allow fluid pressure to
be forced back through one of the surface regulators and vent into the mix water tank, thus
indicating a leak).
If this fails to locate the source of the leak, then return to the hydraulic control manifold for
an item-by-item check of the system:
Use the Pod Selector Valve to Operate the System on the Other Pod
If the leak does not stop, then it must be located either in the hydraulic control manifold or
downstream of the subsea control pods.
If the leak does stop, then it will be known which side of the system it is in.
October 2005 8-65

Further checks would then be as follows:
If the Leak stops -
• Assuming conditions permit, switch back to the original pod and block each function in
turn (allow plenty of time for the function to operate and check the flowmeter on each
operation).
• If the leak stops when a particular function is set to block, then the leak has been
isolated and it is somewhere in that specific function.
• In this case, run the subsea TV to observe the pod while unblocking the function.
• If the leak is coming from the pod, it will be seen as a white “cloud” in the water and a
bad SPM valve or regulator can be assumed. The options then are:
• Pull the pod to repair the faulty component (assuming pod can be pulled)
• Leave the function in block until the stack or lower marine riser package is
retrieved
If the leak is seen to be coming from below the pod, then the options are:
• Attempt repairs using divers (shallow water)
• Leave the function in block until the stack is brought to surface
If the Leak does not stop -
• Check the return line to the mix water tank (if there is fluid flowing from this line then
there is a leaking control valve or regulator)
• Check that all the control valves are in either the open, closed, or block position (a
partially open valve can allow fluid to leak past it)
• If the valve positions are correct, disconnect the discharge line from each valve - one at
a time (fluid flow from a discharge line indicates a faulty valve)
• If the discharge lines do not show any signs of a leak, disconnect the discharge lines
from the regulators in the same way
A case can exist in which flowmeter run-on occurs after a function, which is caused by
foreign material in the SPM valve preventing a seal, and creating a leak path. This leak may
8-66 October 2005

be stopped by functioning that SPM valve several times to flush out the foreign material. If
the leak persists, the pod will need to be retrieved.
Malfunctions
Typical control system malfunctions are slow reaction times or no flowmeter indication when
a button is pressed to operate a function. A slow reaction time could be due to:
• low accumulator pressure

• a bad connection between the jumper hose and hose reel
• a partially plugged pilot line
• air in the pilot line
In this case the trouble shooting sequence would be:
Check the Pressures
• verify that the gauges are indicating the correct operating pressures
• if a low pressure is indicated, verify correct operation of the high pressure pumps and
check the level of hydraulic fluid in the mix water tank
• check that the shut-off valve between the accumulators and the hydraulic control
manifold is fully open
Check the Hoses
• if the pressures are good then check all the surface hose connections
• check the junction box connections (if they are not tightly seated, the flow rate through
the connection can be restricted and cause the function to operate slowly)
Check the Pilot Lines
• if the above checks fail to locate the problem, then the final option will be to retrieve
the pod and check the pilot line for any sludge that may have settled out from the
hydraulic fluid (disconnect each pilot line from the pod one at a time and flush clean
fluid through it).
• Flush thoroughly to remove possible air bubbles.
In the situation where there is no flowmeter indication when a function button is pressed, this
could be due to -
• No accumulator or pilot pressure.
October 2005 8-67

• The control valve on the hydraulic manifold did not shift.

• The flowmeter is not working properly.
• There is a plugged pilot line or a faulty SPM valve.
Check the Pressures
• verify that the gauges are indicating the correct operating pressures
• if a low pressure is indicated, verify correct operation of the high pressure pumps and
check the level of hydraulic fluid in the mix water tank
• check for correct operation of the pressure switches
• check the fluid filters to make certain they are not plugged
• check the accumulator pre-charge pressures by bleeding the fluid from the bottles back
into by the reservoir tank, and check the nitrogen pressure in each bottle
Check the Hydraulic Control Manifold
• use the ‘test’ button on the control panel to make certain that the position lamps are not
burned out
• check the air and electrical supply to the hydraulic control manifold
• check the electrical circuits to the control panel, and also the solenoid valves and power
relays
• if the air supply pressure is sufficient to work the control valve operator, check for an
obstruction to the manual control handle
• if the valve can be easily operated manually, replace the entire valve assembly with a
valve known to be in good working order (Note: Valves should be slightly resistant to
movement.)
Check the Flowmeter
• if the regulator pressure drops by 300 to 500 psi when the function is operated and then
returns to normal, the function is probably working correctly and the flowmeter is
faulty
• monitor the flowmeter on the hydraulic manifold to verify that the one on the drillers
panel is not at fault (the impulse unit that sends the flowmeter signal to the panel could
malfunction)
8-68 October 2005

8.12 Other Control Systems
Backup Control Systems
Additional methods to operate certain pre-selected functions may be present on the BOP
stack. In the event of a total pressure loss, an inability to access the surface accumulators,
complete severing of the control bundle or cable, rupture of a supply line, or even riser
separation, control of critical BOP functions must still be possible.
These operations may include closing the shear/blind rams, closing one set of pipe rams, and
releasing the LMRP connector. The functions typically will not be possible in both operating
directions (i.e. it is only possible to close, not open the ram).
Three items are required on every back up control system: 1) power fluid plumbing
modifications, 2) a method to select the operation and 3) a power fluid source. The methods
to select an operation and provide power fluid differs for each back up control system; the
basic plumbing modifications do not. On each function selected, one additional shuttle valve
is necessary. See Figure 8.12.1.
The blue/yellow pod shuttle valve is removed from the operator fluid entry port and a
piggyback shuttle valve is installed. The outlet of the original shuttle valve is attached to one
inlet of the new shuttle valve. The other inlet of the second shuttle is attached to the control
fluid source for the back up system. Fluid can be supplied via acoustic controls, diver stabs,
or emergency control funnels.
October 2005 8-69

Figure 8.12.1 Back-up Control System Plumbing
Acoustic Controls
Acoustic controls provide access to a wide range of functions. Typically included are LMRP
connector release, shear/blind ram close, and designated hangoff pipe ram close. The system
8-70 October 2005

operates by sending encoded acoustic signals through the water to a receiver on the BOP
stack (see Figure 8.12.2).
The information is decoded and electronic signals are sent through discreet wires to
individual solenoids with valves, which are grouped on a rack. The solenoid valves trip and
allow power fluid to enter the secondary shuttle valves mounted on an operator.
For the system to operate, a large supply of power fluid must be available on the stack;
subsea accumulator bottles are necessary. Assuming that the primary controls cannot be
accessed and consequently bottles not recharged, the fluid volume used on any one function
will reduce the overall accumulator pressure. This provides less usable fluid for each
successive operation. Because of the limited power fluid resource, plan every function
sequence carefully, realizing the advantages and disadvantages of any attempted function.
Figure 8.12.2 Acoustic Receiver
Once a specific amount of fluid is used, certain operations may not be possible. For example,
if the pipe rams are closed before the shear/blind rams, the remaining accumulator pressure
may not shear the pipe. The volume is available, but the pressure could be too low.
October 2005 8-71

Therefore, the number and size of stack mounted bottles, as well as the initial bottle pressure
and pre-charge, should be maintained at optimum levels.
Acoustic controls are generally planned for use with the rig off location. If an LMRP
disconnect has occurred, operations of the stack may still be desired. Therefore, acoustic
control systems and the associated subsea accumulators should be BOP mounted, not
attached to the LMRP. Stack positioning of the equipment allows maximum flexibility for
use. The disadvantage of BOP mounting is the associated framing, brackets and access
restrictions. LMRP subsea bottle positioning will, however, cost the contractor slightly less.
Acoustic System
In addition to either of the primary control methods mentioned above, the subsea BOP stack
can also be equipped with an acoustic emergency back-up system. In principle this is similar
to the other two systems, but with the hydraulic or electrical commands to the pilot valves
being replaced with acoustic signals. Being a purely back-up system, the number of
commands is limited to those which might be required in an absolute emergency.
• Dedicated system includes subsea accumulators, battery packs, electro-hydraulic

control module, acoustic communication transponders, and fixed and portable surface
control and communication systems.
• Usually operates seven functions to include pipe ram, shear ram, Choke and Kill
valves, Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP), and stack connector release.
• Does not depend on integrity of normal BOP stack control system nor marine riser or
MUX Umbilical.
• Accumulators require charging from normal BOP stack control system (however, any
pressure loss is protected by check valves if normal BOP stack control system fails).
• It must be noted that many contractors and operators still do not consider acoustic
backup systems reliable.
ROV Stabs
Remote ROV stabs provide access through a plate to pre-selected functions. Both divers and
ROVs may be used for the operation, but ROV usage is most common. A manual stab makes
contact with a subsea mating surface. Control fluid is then pumped directly into the operator
chamber through the secondary shuttle valve (see Figure 8.12.3). The fluid may be sea water
or control fluid using a small bottle brought from the surface. However, a more practical
source of power fluid is a hotline from the surface. In this way, pressure and volumes can be
accurately supplied.
Diver stabs are the least expensive backup control method. Problems have been experienced
due to the open line from the stab plate to the shuttle valve. Marine growth can cause
bridging if the hose and stab mating surface are not cleaned regularly. With multiple stab
8-72 October 2005

functions, manifolding can be done, but each function should be clearly numbered to avoid
confusion. The type of stab used should also be a simple design. Any item which requires
two hands on the surface is not recommended. Generally, discuss stab designs thoroughly
with a diving service company prior to installation. Valuable information may be gained
regarding hand holds, associated cathodic protection, stab designs, positioning of equipment,
etc.
Figure 8.12.3 ROV Stab
Hydraulic Quick-Response Systems
The standard hydraulic system can be upgraded with a ‘quick-response’ pilot operated
system to achieve faster BOP operating times. With additional, relatively inexpensive pilot
hoses installed, BOP response times as low as 12-15 seconds on a ram and 20-25 seconds
on a bag-type annular in 3,000 feet of water can be achieved.
The quick-response system is an adaptation of standard hydraulic controls. It employs an

additional bank of quick-release valves mounted upstream of the main control pod, which
maintain the 3000 psi pilot fluid behind them. Once the quick-release valves are activated,
they allow the pilot fluid to flow to the standard SPM valves, which in turn direct the
regulated power fluid. The overall operating time is reduced, as all pilot lines (now attached
October 2005 8-73

directly to the quick response valves) are pre-pressured and maintained between an 800-
1000 psi bias. The pressure bias eliminates an initial, slow expansion of the pilot lines from
0-500 psi. Just prior to shifting a preventer from ‘open’ to ‘close’, a standard system has
zero pressure on the ‘close’ pilot line. With a quick-reponse system, the ‘close’ pilot line
has 800-1000 psi already on it.
Note: Spring performance decreases with fatigue. Therefore, spring tension settings on the
quick-response SPMs should be greater than 1000 psi, to avoid accidental firing.
When the quick-reponse valve line pressure reaches 1,300-1,500 psi, the quick-repsonse
valve trips. This allows 3,000 psi pilot fluid, located at the pod, to flow into the function –
controlling the SPM valve almost instantaneously. The SPM valve moves off seat
immediately and the overall operating time is reduced by half or more. All other features of
the standard hydraulic control apply. A schematic of the quick response system is shown in
Figure 8.12.4.
Note: Trapped air in the pilot line near the pod can migrate to surface and cause extra
pressure on the SPM valve, causing it to fire without functioning a manipulator
valve at surface. Care should be taken in flushing air from the pilot lines.
Figure 8.12.4 Hydraulic Quick-Response System
8-74 October 2005

MUX Control Systems
A Multiplex, or MUX processor is mounted above each pod/solenoid rack in a one

atmosphere bottle. A multiplex control bundle size is generally 1 to 1-1/2" OD (the
electronic signal and solenoid valve arrangement is analogous to a pre-pressured control
line and extra pilot operated valve in a quick-response system). EH and MUX pods are
larger than hydraulic pods and are typically not remotely retrievable.
Solenoid valves are used to send SPMs hydraulic signals. See Figure 8.12.5. With two
additional equipment packages, these control systems are obviously much more complex. The
advantage of each is a lower response time (i.e., the function signal is delivered to the pod
much faster). Rams will respond in 6-8 seconds, bag-type annulars in 12-18 seconds. MUX
has an additional advantage over a straight EH system with the control cable options. Since
only one pair of signal wires is required, extra features such as riser angle indicator read-back,
or coaxial cables for stack mounted TV, can be added without a significant bundle OD
increase. Additional stack functions may be added easily since all signals travel via one pair
of wires.
Figure 8.12.5 MUX Solenoid Valve
October 2005 8-75

8.13 Definitions of Subsea Terms
Accumulator —A pressure vessel containing stored hydraulic fluid under pressure, with a
nitrogen pre-charge.
Accumulator Pre-Charge — An initial nitrogen charge in an accumulator, which is further

compressed when the accumulator bottle is charged with fluid to give it potential
energy.
Acoustic Control System — A subsea control system that is activated by a coded acoustic
signal. Acoustic control systems are normally used as an emergency backup with
limited control function.
Blowout Preventer Control System (Closing Unit) —The assembly of pumps, valves, lines,
accumulators, fluid storage and mixing equipment, manifold, piping, control valves,
and other items necessary to operate the blowout preventer equipment hydraulically.
Check Valve — A uni-directional valve, to allow flow in one direction only.
Control Fluid/Hydraulic Fluid — Normally hydraulic oil or water based fluid which,
under pressure, operates functions.
Control Hose Bundle—A group of small diameter pilot and signal hoses (usually 1/8“ –
3/8“) assembled into a bundle with an outer protective sheath. For subsea applications
it could contain a larger diameter hydraulic supply line.
Control Line — A flexible or rigid hose that carries the hydraulic fluid to a function.
Control Manifold — The system of valves and piping normally mounted on the closing unit
to control the flow of pressure regulated hydraulic fluid to operate the various
functions on the blowout preventer stack.
Control Panel — Diverter panel; driller's panel; master panel; and mini or auxiliary remote
panel.
All of these panels are remote from the main hydraulic unit and can be air, electric or
hydraulic powered. The master panel on a straight hydraulic control system will be
hydraulic, remotely driven, normally by electric panels. The master panel for a multiplex or
electro-hydraulic system will be electrical.
8-76 October 2005

Each panel will be an array of either switches, push buttons, lights, or valves and various
pressure gauges or meters to control or monitor the BOP functions.
• Diverter Panel — A panel that is dedicated to the diverter and mud system functions
only. It will be positioned for easy driller's access and visual observation of the activated
functions.
• Driller's Panel — Normally refers to the control panel mounted at the driller's position
on the rig floor. In some cases, it could also be the master panel.
• Master Panel (Hydraulic or Electric) — This panel is, as stated, the master, and is
mounted in close proximity to the main accumulator unit. All control functions are on
this panel including all regulators and gauges. All remote panels would route through the
master panel; therefore, if a malfunction occurred on this panel the whole system would
be affected.
• Mini or Auxiliary Remote Panel — Usually a smaller, limited function panel mounted
in a remote location for use as an emergency backup. On an offshore rig, it is normally
found in the toolpusher’s office; and, on a land rig, 100 feet from the well center upwind
of the prevailing wind.
Control Pod — An assembly of subsea valves and pressure regulators which, when
activated from the surface, will direct hydraulic fluid through special apertures to
operate blowout preventer equipment.
Control Valve — A valve mounted in the hydraulic manifold which directs hydraulic power
fluid to the selected function (such as annular BOP close), while simultaneously
venting to opposite function (annular BOP open). Control valves are usually
pneumatically-piloted, 4-way, 3 position valves with manual handle for override.
Electro-hydraulic (EH) — A control system or valve that is initially operated via an

electrical signal to a solenoid valve, which hydraulically pilots a larger hydraulic valve
to operate a function.
Function or Operation — Operation of a BOP function (e.g., to close the blind rams is a
function). In a subsea BOP control system, this requires one pilot hose in the
umbilical hose bundle (to open the blind rams is another function).
Hydrophone — An underwater listening device that normally receives signals from beacons
on or near the ocean floor.
Junction Box (Hydraulic) — Used for quick connection of the multi-hose bundle to the
pod, hose reel and hydraulic manifold.
October 2005 8-77

Limit Switch — A hydraulic or electrical switch that indicates the motion or activation of a
device.
Multiplex (MUX) — A system that uses multiple electronic signals which are coded and
transmitted through a single wire in a cable. This eliminates the requirement of a
single dedicated cable for each required function.
Mixing System — A system, either air or electrically powered, that mixes a measured
amount of water soluble lubricant to feed water, and delivers the mixture to a storage
tank or reservoir.
Non-Retrievable Control Pod —A pod that is bolted or pinned in place on the LMRP and
not retrievable independently from the LMRP.
Pilot-Fluid — Hydraulic fluid that is dedicated to the pilot supply system.
Pilot Line — A hydraulic line that transmits pilot hydraulic fluid from a panel valve to a pod
valve. Pilot lines are normally grouped in a common bundle or umbilical.
Pilot Response Time — For subsea systems, the time it takes when the hydraulic function
valve is activated on the surface for the signal to travel through the pilot line and
activate a valve in the pod.
Readback —An indication of response caused by a separate initiation of command (i.e.,
during adjustment response, a subsea pressure readback is sent to the surface to
indicate that the annular regulator pilot pressure has been changed. The readback
pressure shows the regulated output pressure of the regulator has responded to the
regulator pilot pressure adjustment).
Reel (hose or cable) — Reels, usually power-driven, that store, pay-out, and take-up either
control hose bundles or armored electrical cables.
Regulator (pressure) — A hydraulic device that reduces its supply pressure to a required
(regulated) pressure. It may be manual or remotely operated and, once set, will
automatically maintain the regulated output pressure, unless reset to a different
pressure.
Relief Valve — A device that is built into a hydraulic piping system to relieve (dump) any
excess pressure.
Response Time —The time between activation of the function from the control panel until
the function has been fully operated.
Retrievable Control Pod — A subsea pod that is retrievable from the LMRP remotely on a
wire line.
Surface Selector Valve — A 3-positioned directional control valve that has the pressure
inlet port blocked and the operator ports blocked in the center position (see note at
the end of the glossary).
Shuttle Valve — A valve with two or more supply pressure ports and only one outlet port.
8-78 October 2005

When fluid or gas is flowing through one of the supply ports, the internal shuttle
seals off the other inlet port and allows flow to the outlet port only.
Solenoid Valve — An electrically-operated valve that controls a hydraulic or pneumatic
signal.
SPM Valve (SPM) — The sub-plate mounted, pilot operated control valves in the pod or
separate pockets mounted subsea.
Umbilical — A control hose bundle or electrical cable that runs from the reel on the surface
to the subsea control pod on the LMRP.
October 2005 8-79

Section 9 – Diverters/Shallow Gas
9. Diverters/Shallow Gas
9.1 Introduction
Well control operations that involve use of a BOP can only be performed successfully when
the well can be closed in and still remain intact. This requires using a BOP mounted on a
casing string that is cemented in a formation strong enough to withstand wellbore pressures
greater than those caused by the mud density in use.
Until this BOP/casing/competent shoe formation combination exists, wells must be

controlled by hydrostatic pressure alone. Obviously, some additional protection is desirable
for those circumstances in which such primary well control is lost, particularly while drilling
through a shallow, potentially productive gas zone. Conventionally, diverters are used to
provide that protection.
Diverters are designed to direct the flow from an uncontrollably flowing well in such a way
as to minimize risks to rig personnel and equipment. Diverting equipment and procedures are
designed to impose as little backpressure as possible on the weak downhole formations. By
definition, however, diverting does not control a well; a successful diverting operation is one
that allows the well to bridge over or deplete itself without loss of life or equipment.
Unfortunately, diverters have often failed to perform reliably, too often resulting in
catastrophic losses. If at all possible, therefore, diverting should be avoided. When possible,
casing shoes should be chosen to permit shut-in should shallow gas be encountered. Leak-off
tests should be considered for conductor casing shoes to determine if it is possible to shut the
well in and utilize normal well control procedures.
Since flow from a shallow gas zone may reach the surface very quickly, very little time is
available for detecting the kick and either shutting in the well or diverting the flow. Whatever
the planned response method, crews must have a clear plan of action defined at all times
while drilling, particularly in shallow sections of the well.
Chevron has historically considered it permissible to allow essential personnel to remain

onsite to attempt a dynamic kill immediately after a well has been diverted. But due to risks
inherent in remaining on location while a well is flowing uncontrollably through a diverter,
Chevron now recommends a “divert and desert” policy: A full rig evacuation should be
performed if the well is diverted.
The question often arises as to how the rig should be left after full abandonment (in terms of
rig power). Typically, the drilling contractor will require the rig’s prime movers to be shut
down, with only emergency power available. This issue, as with all others pertaining to
October 2005 9-1

diverting and well control, should be clearly discussed prior to spud and, where appropriate,
addressed in a bridging document.
After all personnel are safely evacuated it may become possible to return selected essential
personnel to the rig if, in the judgement of senior, onsite supervisory personnel (Drill Site
Manager and OIM/senior Toolpusher), it is clearly safe to do so. This may make possible an
attempt to perform a dynamic kill. It should be remembered, however, that most shallow gas
flows stop as the result of either wellbore bridging or zone depletion, either of which may
well occur without need for intervention by rig personnel.
For wells that fail to stop flowing themselves, it is strongly recommended that expert
guidance be obtained before attempting remedial or control operations. Before starting any
such operations, it is essential to perform good analysis and risk management of the potential
hazard and likelihood of success for a dynamic kill. It is also necessary to prepare appropriate
related plans and drills regarding evacuation, emergency communications, limiting
parameters and hazard management activities (e.g. fire suppression).
9.2 Causes of Shallow Gas Kicks
Low Overbalance
At shallow depths, what might seem to be a very adequate margin of overbalance in mud
weight terms is actually quite small when converted to pressure. This leaves very little room
for error when drilling a shallow gas sand. As an example, a 0.5 ppg overbalance at 1000 feet
is only 26 psi. Any reduction in bottom hole pressure in this situation can result in a kick.
The table below lists some more depths and overbalances for comparison.
Table 9.2.1 Overbalance Pressure
Depth Normal Pressure Mud Weight Overbalance

9.0 ppg (PSI) 9.5 ppg (PSI) (PSI)
0 0 0 0
500 233 247 15
1000 465 494 29
1500 698 741 44
2000 930 988 58
3000 1395 1482 87
4000 1860 1976 116
5000 2325 2470 145
9-2 October 2005

High Permeability
Because shallow gas sands have relatively little overburden, they tend to be fairly
uncompacted and unconsolidated. This means that they are able to deliver formation fluid to
an underbalanced wellbore at very high rates. Once a well goes underbalanced, formation
fluid starts flowing into the wellbore, further reducing the hydrostatic pressure in the well,
which causes the formation to flow at even higher rates, and this vicious cycle continues
rapidly until the well has been unloaded. Since these formations are shallow and have high
permeability, this happens rapidly during a shallow gas kick and it does not give the drill
crew much time to react.
Structural Overpressure
A normally pressured gas sand can be abnormally pressured at the formation top due to the
low hydrostatic gradient of gas. The base of the formation may have the normal water
gradient, but since the formation fluid's gradient is less than water, the top of a thick sand
will be abnormally pressured.
Drilled Gas
Gas cut mud due to drilling formations with gas filled porosity is not usually considered to be
a hydrostatic problem. It is generally accepted that the mud weight is only cut significantly at
the top of the hole because the hydrostatic pressure deeper in the well will compress the
entrained gas. In shallow holes, gas cutting will have more of an effect, though it may be
offset by cuttings being circulated up the annulus.
Gas cut mud has a definite effect on uncased sands that are shallower than the one being
drilled. If more than one sand is open to the wellbore, then the upper sand could be caused to
kick due to drilled gas from the bottom sand cutting the mud weight near surface.
In any case, gas cut mud is an indicator that the zone being drilled has porosity and this
porosity contains gas. It may be necessary to control the ROP to limit the gas cutting.
Extreme care should be taken from this point on, especially when it is time to trip out of the
hole. If a high degree of gas cutting is seen, drilling should be stopped and the well circulated
clean, keeping a close eye on the pit level at the same time. Before tripping, consideration
should be given to leaving a heavy pill on bottom.
Swabbing
As stated earlier, the total amount of overbalance in psi is small for shallow sands. Any
swabbing tendency at all can be enough to bring the well in. Once the flow starts it does not
take long to unload the hole. Factors that affect swabbing include mud viscosity, annular
clearance, and the speed the pipe is being pulled from the hole. One factor that can lead to
greater swabbing tendencies and is common when drilling shallow is a balled up bottom hole
assembly (BHA). Other factors related to shallow holes like large hole and the short length of
October 2005 9-3

drill pipe help reduce the swabbing effect. However, when drilling a pilot hole, the worst of
both worlds may be present, a small hole and a balled up BHA. Swabbing must be
recognized immediately in order to catch it before the well begins to flow when the pipe is
not moving. A slug can be advantageous in ensuring that proper fill-ups are being recorded.
If the pipe is pulled wet, there is too much possibility for error due to the lost mud and to the
fact that crews often force the pipe to pull dry by filling short until it does. A continuous
filling trip tank is obviously much better than intermittent fills at this low level of
overbalance. The surest way to prevent swabbing when pulling out of the hole is to circulate
through the drill pipe while pulling pipe. A top drive is perfect for this since it allows stands
to be pulled while circulating. A circulating elevator is an option to consider if a top drive is
not available.
Lost Circulation
At shallow depths, any drop in the fluid level in the well due to lost circulation represents a
significant portion of the hydrostatic pressure in the whole well. Care must be taken to never
exceed formation fracture pressure at any time while drilling shallow hole. Care also must be
taken when drilling multiple shallow sands. Loss of circulation in a deeper zone can cause a
shallower sand to kick or vice versa. It is a good idea to case shallow sands before drilling
further, but this is often not practical.
Not Keeping the Hole Full
Divert situations have also occurred as a result of failure to keep the hole full, either while
tripping or while pipe is out of the hole. Filling the hole while tripping is critical. The
practice of filling the hole every 5 stands or before 75 psi loss of hydrostatic is not applicable
in shallow hole; since overbalance in shallow hole is often very low, it is generally necessary
to fill more often or, even better, continuously. Even a very slight loss of mud hydrostatic
pressure may result in enough loss of overbalance to initiate a kick.
9.3 Diverting vs. Shutting-In
Wells with shallow casing strings may have insufficient integrity at the shoe to withstand the
pressures imposed by shutting-in the well on a kick. Closing in on a shallow well with little
or no shoe integrity can cause the shoe to break down and allow formation fluids to broach
back to the surface. A broached shoe can seriously jeopardize a bottom supported rig (i.e.
jack up, platform, land rig) and its crew, but is generally not as dangerous for a floating
vessel. For bottom supported rigs, diverting is the only viable alternative to shutting-in when
shallow gas kicks are encountered without adequate casing set and cemented.
When the well begins to unload, the flow must be directed to minimize physical damage and
to afford time for evacuation and/or remedial action to be taken. It must be stated, however,
that if there is any possible way, a BOP system or modified BOP system should be installed
prior to the penetration of any sand with shallow gas potential. This would allow some type
9-4 October 2005

of proven well control procedure to be used. To do this, there must be enough formation
integrity to allow the well to be shut in and/or back pressure applied such that the well can be
killed.
There are two governing criteria for use of a diverter system as opposed to a BOP stack:
1. A diverter system is used when drilling below drive or structural pipe.

2. A diverter system is used when drilling below conductor pipe without enough
formation integrity to withstand shut-in pressure, meaning the formation fluids would
broach the casing shoe if the well was shut-in on a kick.
1It must be emphasized again that full shut-in, if possible, is the preferred course of
action. To support a shut-in plan, a leak-off test must be performed on the conductor
shoe to confirm adequate shoe and formation integrity.
Use of Combination Stack
Since the decision to divert or shut in may be based upon

the formation integrity at the conductor shoe, and this is not
known for sure until the shoe has been drilled out, it may
be difficult to know beforehand whether to nipple up a
diverter or a BOP stack after cementing conductor casing.
To get around this problem, combination diverter/BOP
Diverter
stacks have been nippled up on conductor casing, and the Vent Line Vent Line
decision to shut in or divert made only after the conductor

shoe has been tested. A schematic of an example
combination stack arrangement is shown in Figure 9.3.1. Blind Ram
Another way to address this problem is to rig up a diverter Pipe Ram

system that will enable full shut-in and circulation through Kill Line Choke Line
a choke line and choke manifold in addition to the ability to
divert through large vent lines. One way to do this is to use
two spools, one with choke and kill lines and one with
large vent lines. Using a diverter for complete shut-in does Figure 9.3.1 Possible
not offer the same redundancy or pressure handling Combination Stack
capability as a full BOP stack, but the surface pressures are
expected to be low (just the flow rates are expected to be
high).
October 2005 9-5

9.4 Shallow Gas
Onshore Shallow Gas
The shallow geology of onshore locations varies widely, but shallow gas is a relatively
uncommon occurrence onshore. Geological control is usually sufficient to predict formations
accurately and, when necessary, specific contingency plans should be made to counter
potential problems.
Shallow onshore reservoirs are generally older, more consolidated and less permeable than
those offshore, which will tend to restrict the flow potential of a shallow kick onshore.
Onshore, most wells are spudded through a thin layer of weathered formation into a bed rock.
The conductor and surface casing strings are normally set in competent formation which can
permit secondary well control by normal means.
However, if it is not possible to positively exclude the possibility of either a shallow gas
accumulation or a weak casing shoe, a means of diverting the flow away from the rig should
be provided. Provision should also be made to ensure an adequate supply of water is
available to pump to the hole at a high rate without taking returns.
Diverter procedures for an onshore well will be similar to those for a bottom supported
offshore rig. However, if water supply is known to be limited, a barite plug may be the only
practical method of halting a shallow gas flow.
Most flows from shallow onshore reservoirs are associated with aquifers that outcrop at
higher elevations (or indeed lower elevations if air or foam drilling fluid is in use). A water
flow of this type is usually predictable and of limited consequence. Severe shallow flows
have been encountered in the past as a result of a shallow zone becoming charged by a lower
high pressure zone; the shallow zone having been charged by a faulty cement job in a
previously drilled well.
For wells drilled on land, a diverter may be located below the rig floor to reduce the risk to
the rig and crew in the relatively unlikely event of a shallow gas flow. But since it is
generally quite easy to evacuate the rig, ultimate reliability of diverter equipment is a less
critical issue when drilling on land.
Going offshore, however, where evacuation is much more complicated, methods to reliably
cope with potential shallow gas flows are much more important. For this reason, most
discussions about diverters are focused on offshore operations.
9-6 October 2005

Offshore Shallow Gas
Naturally occurring offshore shallow gas accumulations are often associated with recently
laid down sand lenses that are totally enveloped by mudstones. When encountered at shallow
depths, lenses tend to be highly porous, permeable and relatively unconsolidated. They
are commonly thin, flat and normally pressured. However, overpressured lenses have been
encountered. Overpressure at this depth is generally caused by inclination of the lens which
has the effect of increasing the height of the lens and hence the pore pressure gradient at the
top of the lens.
Shallow buried reefs or vuggy limestone formations that happen to contain shallow gas can
be particularly dangerous, as such formations can be extremely porous and almost infinitely
permeable.
In general, kicks from shallow formations (gas and water) while drilling in the top hole
section with short casing strings can be very hazardous, as documented by many case
histories. Some of the kicks are caused by charged formations; poor cement jobs, casing
leaks, injection operations, improper abandonments, and previous underground blowouts can
produce charged formations.
But kicks resulting from loss of hydrostatic control over normally pressured zones may also
be a hazard. Such shallow gas kicks are generally caused by loss of hydrostatic head due to
one or a combination of the following:
• Overloading the annulus with cuttings and hence causing losses

• Drilled gas expanding and unloading the annulus
• Improper hole fill while tripping
• Loss of effective hydrostatic pressure as cement sets (flow after cementing)
Consequently it is strongly recommended to take the following general precautions to

minimize the possibility of inducing a shallow gas flow:
• Restrict rate of penetration while drilling large diameter surface holes

• Accurately monitor the hole during drilling and tripping operations
• Utilize properly designed cement slurries and cementing techniques
Shallow gas flows are often extremely prolific, producing very high flow rates of gas and
considerable quantities of rock from the formation, particularly when a long section of sand
has been exposed.
In the event of a shallow gas flow while using a diverter, the rig should be immediately
evacuated as per the established procedure (i.e. Divert and Desert). If the flow occurs through
water below the rig, the Company Representative must immediately liaise with the Senior
Contractor Representative to make preparations to evacuate initially non-essential personnel
October 2005 9-7

from the rig. The eventuality of having to completely evacuate the rig must also be addressed
(the contractor’s emergency evacuation procedures will be implemented).
A well should generally not be drilled through a shallow seismic anomaly (bright spot),
which may indicate the presence of shallow gas. If a bright spot is present at the proposed
drilling location it is good practice to either move the rig to avoid the hazard or directionally
drill around the hazard if the surface location can’t be moved. The new drilling location
should, if possible, be located on a shallow seismic shot point.
It should be noted that the absence of bright spots does not entirely rule out the possibility of
the existence of shallow gas. Thin zones may not be visible on seismic plots, particularly as
depth increases. Further to this, the absence of shallow gas in one well of a series drilled
from a surface location does not guarantee the absence of shallow gas in subsequent wells
drilled from essentially the same surface location.
Drilling Top hole from a floating rig without a riser
Chevron recommends that, where possible, surface hole should be drilled riserless from
floating rigs.
Drilling riserless ensures that the major cause of blowouts from shallow, normally pressured
gas reservoirs – namely, the loss of hydrostatic head – is largely eliminated. There remains
however, the danger of penetrating an overpressured reservoir.
A contingency plan must be developed, prior to spud, in conjunction with the Drilling
Contractor to cover the following situations:
• The procedures to be adopted in the event of a shallow gas flow

• The procedure for winching the rig off location
The contingency plan must be discussed in detail at the pre-spud meeting.
A gas blowout in open water produces a narrow cone of low density water and a discharge of
highly flammable gas. The intensity of the blowout depends to a large extent on the water
depth and current. The plume is likely to become more dispersed with greater water depth,
while the effect of a current would be to displace the plume away from the rig.
Within a plume of expanding gas, a floating vessel could suffer some loss of buoyancy;
however, this diminishes rapidly with water depth. The effect on a semi-submersible’s
buoyancy and stability at operating draft is generally negligible. The eruption of the gas tends
to displace a vessel and, if constrained by its moorings, might cause a drill ship to keel
towards the plume, thereby reducing its freeboard. Under calm conditions, the gas cloud may
disperse slowly and can constitute a serious fire hazard.
9-8 October 2005

The severity of the hazard can only be assessed at the time, and while the risk of this hazard
may be low, the following precautions or considerations should be addressed before and
while the surface hole is open:
• The rig should be moored with length of moorings remaining in the locker
to allow the rig to be winched 400 ft away from the plume. If practical, the
windlasses should be held on their brakes and the chain stoppers only
applied after surface casing is set.
• All hatches should be secured to prevent taking on board gas or water if
the freeboard is reduced by loss of buoyancy or heel. This is critical for a
drill ship, where hatches are close to the waterline.
• Facilities and personnel should be continuously available at short notice to
slack off the moorings closest to the plume, and heave in those up-current
(but not downwind). Before spudding, a contingency plan should be
prepared detailing individual responsibilities and duties.
• Drill pilot hole, limiting the ROP and circulating at a high rate to distribute
the cuttings and drilled gas.
• A float valve should always be run in the drill string.
• Sufficient mud should be kept on site to fill the hole volume twice.
• Weather conditions and current should be continuously monitored and the
sea surface should be checked for evidence of gas.
If a shallow gas flow is detected:
• If there is no immediate danger to personnel or the rig - Attempt to control

the well by pumping mud/seawater at a maximum rate.
• If the gas flow is endangering personnel or the rig:
Drop the drill string or shear the pipe.
Winch the rig to a safe position outside the gas plume.
Drilling Top hole from a Floating Rig with a riser
Drilling top hole from a floating rig with a riser is not typical Chevron practice. However, if
for reasons of local regulation or very shallow water depth a decision is made to use a marine
riser connected to the conductor pipe, the well may have to be diverted if shallow gas is
encountered. The following options may be considered to reduce associated risks:
1) Install a subsea diverter (annular preventer and subsea dump valve at the mud
line) in addition to the normal diverter system. If the subsea diverter begins to fail,
or rig safety is impaired by the gas flow in the water below the rig (which is
generally less dangerous than gas on the rig), utilize option #2 below.
2) Use the rig based diverter if flow is observed, but immediately disconnect the pin
connector linking the riser to the conductor pipe. This allows the rig to be
immediately pulled off location using tensions in the mooring system.
October 2005 9-9

3) Upgrade rig diverter systems to large diameter, straight lines. Note that even the
largest diverters employed have low reliability. Provision to disconnect (#2
above) should be considered as a back up alternative.
A contingency plan must be developed, prior to spud, in conjunction with the Drilling
Contractor to cover the following situations:
• The exact procedures to be immediately followed in the event of a shallow gas

flow
• The procedure for winching the rig off location
• The procedure to be adopted in the event of failure of any of the major
components of the riser/diverter system
The contingency plan must be discussed in detail at the pre-spud meeting.
The surface diverter system ensures that there is a back-up system available in the event of a
failure of the subsea system. It can also be used to divert gas which may be in the riser above
the stack.
The following precautions should be taken routinely while the surface hole is open:
• The rig should be moored with length of moorings remaining in the locker to allow
the rig to be winched 400 ft away from the plume. If practical, the windlasses should
be held on their brakes and the chain stoppers only applied after surface casing is set
• All doors and hatches should be closed to prevent intake of water or gas. This is
critical for a drill ship where loss of freeboard could affect vessel stability.
• Facilities and personnel should be continuously available at short notice to slack off
the moorings closest to the plume, and heave in those up-current (but not downwind).
Before spudding, a contingency plan should be prepared detailing individual
responsibilities and duties
• Care should be taken to ensure that the annulus does not become overloaded with
cuttings, causing losses or cuttings liberated gas, and hence the possibility of
unloading the annulus. This is achieved by drilling a pilot hole, limiting the ROP and
circulating at a high rate to distribute the cuttings and drilled gas
• Facilities should be continuously available to fill the annulus rapidly from surface in
the event of sudden losses
• Care should be taken to monitor the hole and ensure that it remains full while tripping
• A float valve should always be run in the drill string
• Sufficient mud should be kept onsite to fill the hole volume twice.
Should the well start to flow, the following procedure can be used as a guideline:
(1) Open the subsea dump valves and close the annular preventer at the seabed.
(or activate subsea diverter).
(3) If there is no immediate danger to personnel or the rig:
9-10 October 2005

(a) Attempt to control the well by pumping sea water/mud at a maximum rate.
(4) If the gas flow is endangering personnel or the rig:
(a) Consider dropping the drill string or shearing prior to (b)
(b) Unlatch the LMRP or pin connector and winch the rig to a safe
position outside the gas plume
In the event of failure of the subsea diverter system there remains the option to divert
at surface or to unlatch the LMRP or pin connector, thereby venting the gas at the
wellhead.
Drilling Top hole from a Bottom Supported Rig
Shallow gas reservoirs are potentially much more hazardous when penetrated from a jack-up
or platform. Because the conductor extends almost to the rig floor, the products of a kick are
discharged directly into a hazardous area.
Offshore platforms pose a particular problem, as a diverting system failure there could
threaten many more people, equipment and nearby wells. To help mitigate this risk, batch
drilling of surface holes for multiple wells is frequently accomplished using a MODU. In this
way, shallow gas risks to the eventual platform can be reduced. It is important to note,
however, that shallow gas problems can occur long after these surface strings have been set
due to charging of shallow zones as a result of casing and cement imperfections; it is
important to consider the possibility of shallow gas when conducting drilling or workover
operations throughout the platform’s operational life.
On a bottom supported rig, a hazardous situation is created if diverter failure occurs resulting
in either gas flow within the rig structure or a restriction in the diverter line. A restriction
may lead to subsequent pressure build up that may cause gas to broach around the conductor
pipe to the seabed. In this event there is a real risk that the seabed becomes fluidized, thus
undermining support for the rig or platform.
The following precautions should be taken routinely to minimize probability of shallow gas
flows while the surface hole is open:
• Care should be taken to ensure the annulus does not become overloaded with cuttings,
thus causing losses or gas to be liberated from the cuttings to such an extent that the
annulus unloads. This is achieved by drilling pilot hole, limiting the ROP, and
circulating at a rate sufficient to efficiently remove the cuttings and drilled gas
• Facilities should be continuously available to rapidly fill the annulus from surface in
the event of sudden losses
• Facilities should be available and care taken to monitor the hole and ensure that it
remains full while tripping
• Consider pumping out of the hole on trips
• A float valve should always be run in the drill string
• A means of diverting the flow away from hazardous zones, without restricting flow or
imposing backpressure on the well, should be available for immediate activation
October 2005 9-11

• Sufficient mud should be kept onsite to fill the hole volume twice
For platforms or jackups using conventional conductor pipe equipped with a diverter, the
following procedure may be used as a guideline should the well start to flow while drilling:
(1) Immediately initiate the safest, pre-planned evacuation procedure (i.e. Divert and
Desert). The rig specific procedure should include provisions for shutting down rig
power, post-evacuation muster/personnel count, notification to shore-base of
emergency, etc.
(2) Evaluate the situation from a safe distance, maintaining awareness of gas dispersion
by the wind (or lack thereof). Check for gas flow into water below the rig that could
result from diverter plugging.
(3) If flow from diverter outlet(s) is not extreme, consider reboarding options. Use gas
detection equipment to continuously monitor gas levels when nearing the rig,
watching out for H2S in particular.
(4) When it is considered safe to reboard and restart rig generators, do so with minimum
numbers of essential personnel. Be sure to hold pre-job safety meeting to thoroughly
evaluate communication, well monitoring, specific goals and responsibilities, and
abort/evacuation parameters and procedures.
(5) If still necessary to attempt a dynamic kill (to reestablish control over a moderate, but
persistent flow), establish maximum pump rate while using pre-mixed kill mud.
(6) If possible, space out such that the lower kelly cock (if any) is just above the rotary
table.
(7) Be ready to switch to high volume saltwater source to permit continued pumping if
kill mud supply is consumed before return flow reduces to a flow rate matching pump
output.
(8) Monitor the sea for evidence of gas breaking through outside the conductor.
(Evacuate all personnel if any evidence of gas flow from below the rig is detected.)
Drilling from a Jack Up Rig
Several options exist to reduce the danger of diverting shallow gas when drilling from a jack
up.
Option 1) The conventional choice is to follow land/fixed rig practices, with a diverter
connected to the top of the conductor pipe used to direct uncontrolled flow of
shallow gas away from the rig. But this choice has led to numerous failures
over the years and loss of many rigs. Because of this historically poor
performance, two other alternative techniques have been developed.
Option 2) If the probability of encountering Shallow Gas is high or uncertain:

In calm waters, drill pilot hole (8 1/2” hole is recommended) to required
surface casing setting depth taking returns to the sea floor from a semi-
9-12 October 2005

floating position (legs loosely pinned to sea bed and tugs attached to provide a
way to move off location if shallow gas is encountered). After the pilot hole
confirms that there is no shallow gas, the rig is jacked up and the well is
drilled conventionally.
If shallow gas is encountered, vent or dynamically kill w/mud, then cement

hole. If necessary to protect personnel and the rig, pull the rig off location
with tugs. After well flow stops, reconsider drilling location, possibly moving
rig down dip and repeating test hole until absence of gas is confirmed.
Option 3) If the probability of encountering Shallow Gas is known to be low:

With well-specific management approval (based on good offset & seismic
data), drill surface hole without conductor pipe (taking returns to sea bed).
Then set/cement surface pipe, install BOP and continue normal drilling,
shutting in on any kick encountered.
This practice is referred to as “Diverterless Drilling” within Chevron.
Guidelines for Use of Option 2 – Pilot / Test hole from Jack Up
After the rig has been positioned on location by tugboats, it will jack-up to zero air-gap/draft.
This creates “Anchoring” holes in which the legs float during the next operation. This
procedure also confirms the water depth and whether the rig will be able to pre-load and jack
up at that location, particularly if the seabed is soft.
The legs are then retracted to the point that they just hold the rig on location with the rig in
floating mode. The tugboat remains tied to the drilling unit.
Once confirmation of all the safety criteria are in place a small diameter hole (8 ½” or less) is
drilled to at least the pre-determined surface casing shoe depth taking returns to the sea bed.
This test hole shows whether there is gas unexpectedly present down to that depth.
After the hole has been circulated clean, it should be observed for 30 minutes for any signs of
gas (indicated by gas bubbles in the water below or around the rig).
Positive Gas Shows
If there is any sign of gas during the drilling or observation period, the following actions are
required:
• Pre-planned dynamic kill activities will commence. If conditions exceed safe limits:
o The drill string will be dropped
o The legs will be retracted
o The tugboat pulls the rig off location
October 2005 9-13

No Gas Shows:
If shallow gas is not encountered, the test hole should be filled with cement while the drill
string is pulled out.
Note: To avoid swabbing, the pulling speed should not exceed the pumping rate.
The drilling unit is then pre-loaded and jacked up. The derrick is skidded out to its drilling
position from where the top hole shall be drilled without the use of a diverter (returns to sea
bed).
Preparations Prior to Drilling Gas Test Hole (example):
1. Tugboat remains tied to the drilling unit up-wind.

2. All water tight doors and hatches are closed.
3. A safety meeting will be held just prior to drilling the shallow gas test hole.
4. Drilling procedures will be used to focus on preventing an influx in spite of the
unlikely occurrence of same. This should include planning for:
a) High flow rates to be maintained at all times to ensure good hole cleaning
b) Hole sweeps should be timed to coincide with connections.
c) Drilling to cease if only one mud pump is available.
d) All personnel should be well versed in specific response actions.
5. The barge engineer will review the move-off procedures with the tugboat captain.
6. The rig’s stern is manned on each side of the key slot by the assistant driller and the
derrick man to watch the water surface for gas flow.
7. The toolpusher, the company drill site manager and the drill crew will be on the rig
floor.
8. The rig superintendent and the drilling engineer will be at either side of the cantilever
deck with radios/mobile phones, to watch the water for gas flow.
9. The barge engineer will be on standby in the control room at the jacking console, with
jacking stations manned as appropriate.
10. The barge engineer will ensure salt water system is ready to supply mud pumps at
short notice.
11. The electrician will be on standby in the SCR room.
12. The spare set of elevators will be rigged up on the rotary table to aid in dropping the
drill pipe.
13. Both mud pumps will be serviced prior to spud and dressed with large liners (6” or
greater).
14. A pit of kill weight mud will be pre-mixed and ready to pump on short notice.
15. Drill string will be pumped out of the hole with the pulling rate not exceeding 7.5
times the pumping rate.
Example: If pumping at 4 bpm, the pulling rate must not exceed 30 fpm.
16. No welding, cutting or smoking is allowed outside.
17. Prior to drilling the test hole, the mix water required to mix 100 bbls of cement slurry
should be mixed.
9-14 October 2005

Move-off Procedures (example):
If the decision is made to move off location because conditions exceed safe limits:
1. The company Drill Site Manager or OIM will alert the barge engineer.
2. The following simultaneous operations will take place:

• All non-essential personnel will report to their abandon ship station.
• The drill crew will raise the drill string as high as possible and drop the string
from the connection nearest the rotary table.
• The barge engineer will notify the tugboat captain to make all way ahead.
• The barge engineer will retract the legs.
• The rig will be towed a safe distance upwind from the location.
Note: If for any reason the rig cannot be towed off location, the crew will abandon ship
immediately.
Note: To abandon a rig with gas around, only closed-in lifeboats can be used, since H2S
may be present. For the same reason, personnel should never be allowed to jump in the
water when gas comes to surface.
Guidelines for Use of Option 3 – Diverterless Drilling from Jack Up
A formal Diverter Exception Review Process should be conducted to review all the aspects,
with respect to safety, of drilling from a jack up rig without use of a diverter. Again, this
option should be considered only when reliable evidence is available to suggest a low
probability of encountering shallow gas.
A rig/site specific plan should be made as part of the Diverter Exception Review Process. As
part of such a plan, the following precautions have been utilized for one Chevron operation
while spudding the well and drilling the surface hole (utilizing casing drilling) without a
diverter system in place:
• A safety meeting is held just prior to spud to ensure that all personnel understand
their roles, responsibilities and actions required if something were to occur.
• A standby vessel will hold station upwind of the drilling unit.
• Both mud pumps will be serviced prior to spud and will be dressed with large liners
(6” or greater)
• Kill weight mud will be pre-mixed and ready to pump on short notice.
• Both the derrick man and the mud engineer will remain in the pump room ready with
a VHF radio.
• The tool pusher on duty, driller and a full crew of roughnecks will remain on the rig
floor from the time of spud until 9 5/8” casing is drilled to the desired setting depth.
• The electrician will standby in the SCR room throughout the time the top hole section
is being drilled.
October 2005 9-15

• The stern of the rig will be manned at all times for bubble watch. A VHF radio will
be used for communication.
• The barge engineer will ensure that the raw water system is fully functional and lined
up ready to supply the mud pumps on short notice. He will be available in the control
room while the conductor hole is being drilled with the VHF radio tuned to the same
channel as the drill floor.
• Drilling procedures will be in place to focus on preventing an influx in-spite of the
unlikely occurrence of same. We will treat the hole like it could come in even though
it is a very unlikely occurrence.
• High flow rates will be maintained at all times to ensure adequate hole cleaning.
• Sweeps will be timed to coincide with connections.
• We will not drill ahead if only one mud pump is functional.
• All personnel will have a list of response actions to take and will be well versed in
same.
9.5 Diverting Operations
Diverting is a method of directing the flow from an unloading well in such a way as to
minimize physical damage to rig personnel and equipment. Diverting equipment and
procedures are designed to impose as little backpressure as possible on the weak downhole
formations. Diverting is not a well control procedure, per se, and a successful diverting
operation is one that allows the well to bridge over or deplete itself without loss of life or
equipment. In essence, a divert is a “managed” surface blowout.
If at all possible, diverting should be avoided. If it can be done, casing shoes should be
chosen such that full shut in is possible when shallow gas is encountered. Leak-off tests
should be considered on conductor casing shoes, to determine if it is possible to shut the well
in. Since the gas is shallow, any flow from the formation will reach the surface very quickly.
Thus, very little time is available for detecting the kick and either shutting in the well or
diverting the flow.
Diverting, typically associated with shallow gas, is a high risk operation. In fact, there is
ample evidence to support the contention that shallow gas divert operations pose the single
greatest well control hazard to the drilling industry. The US Minerals Management Service
(MMS) defines all divert events as blowouts, regardless of technical success, since by
definition a divert is an uncontrolled flow of formation fluid(s). The technical success of any
divert operation depends largely on how the inherent risk is managed. The best approach to
manage the risk is to avoid the need for diverting in the first place.
The best way to avoid having to divert is not to drill through any shallow gas. While shallow
seismic data can help to avoid drilling through shallow gas zones, it is not always possible to
simply drill where there is no potential for shallow gas. If it is necessary to drill through
potential shallow gas zones, and it is not possible to design the casing program so that
shutting in on kicks is possible, then the only way to avoid diverting is not to take a shallow
9-16 October 2005

kick. Swabbed kicks are examples of avoidable kicks, but drilled kicks can be caused by
hydrostatic imbalances that are sometimes unavoidable. In these instances, the best chance
for technical success lies in making sure that the key elements of a good drilling diverting
system (i.e., people, technique, training and equipment) are all well integrated into an
effective response plan.
Recognizing the critical nature of diverting operations, the American Petroleum Institute
issued Recommended Practice 64 entitled "Recommended Practices for Diverter Systems
Equipment and Operations". RP 64 is a useful reference document for both surface and
subsea diverting.
Diverter Failure Rates
Published studies from around the world have consistently shown an alarming failure rate for
diverts, typically in the range of 50% - 70%. Shallow gas blowouts have caused more
offshore rigs to be lost or damaged than any other type of well control problem. The MMS
corroborated this poor performance, reporting a 46% failure rate on the U. S. Outer
Continental Shelf over the consecutive twenty-one year period ending in 1991. In spite of the
advent of mandatory well control training during this time, the MMS concluded that "the
drilling data do not indicate a significant reduction in blowout frequency over the period
1971-1991. The failure to reduce drilling blowout occurrence rates is largely attributable to
difficulties in drilling through shallow gas sands". It is probably better to think not in terms
of if a diverter will fail, but when it will fail. The hope during a shallow gas divert is that the
well depletes or bridges off before there is a failure in the diverter system. Obviously, the
longer a diverter system can divert a shallow gas blow before it fails, the more likely the well
will deplete or bridge in that time.
There are three common types of diverter system failures: failure of vent line valves to open,
resulting in formation fracture, formation fracture due to excessive back pressure through the
diverter system, and metal erosion. The first two types of failures can be addressed by proper
choice of vent line valves and actuating systems, and the proper sizing of vent lines.
Following the guidelines outlined in this section for the vent lines and vent valves, along with
proper maintenance, will minimize the risk of failure due to vent line valves not opening or
excessive back pressure due to vent lines that are too small.
Metal Erosion
Metal erosion is dependent upon fluid velocity, type of fluid, the abrasiveness of the particles
entrained in the flow, and the geometry of the diverter system. Many erosion failures can be
attributed to undersized vent lines or poor vent line flow paths that cause turbulence. Failures
tend to occur at turns in the vent line, at valves or downstream of valves, at the diverter
spool, and at flexible hose connections. Of the factors that influence metal erosion rates,
drilling personnel only have direct control of the geometry of the system. Fluid velocity rates
depend upon the pressure and permeability of the formation as well as the geometry of the
October 2005 9-17

system, and the type of formation fluid and the abrasiveness of the particles are beyond the
control of rig personnel.
Louisiana State University has performed studies on metal erosion in divert type situations.
Their data indicated that the type of formation fluid being expelled has a very strong
influence on metal erosion. Gas will cause metal erosion at rates on the order of 100 times
that of liquid. Their data also showed that the erosion rate is directly proportional to the
amount of sand being produced with the fluid until very high concentrations of sand are
reached, at which point the sand starts to interfere with itself, partially protecting the metal
from increased erosion rates. Fluid velocity had a drastic effect on metal erosion. Erosion
was seen to be proportional to the square of the fluid velocity. Simply put, this means that
twice the fluid velocity results in four times the metal erosion, and four times the fluid
velocity results in sixteen times the erosion.
As far as the geometry of the system is concerned, large diameter, straight vent line systems
will help minimize fluid velocity and turbulence at the surface, while smaller pilot hole sizes
can provide a downhole restriction that will also limit fluid velocities. When turns have to be
made, there are several types of fittings that can be used. Table N.1, adapted from LSU's
data, shows several types of fittings and their relative erosion rates. These erosion rates can
be used to estimate relative performance between the fittings. For example, the cast steel ell
with a r/d ratio (radius of bend to pipe inside diameter) of 1.5 has 282.1 times the erosion of a
vortice ell. The vortice ell should last over 200 times as long under the same divert
conditions (Note: the vortice ell is a proprietary fitting used in pneumatic solids transport
applications; at the time this Guide was written, it had not been used in a diverter system).
Figure 9.1 shows the different types of turns being compared in the table.
9-18 October 2005

Table 9.5.1 Erosion Rate of Fittings
Fitting Type Radius of Curvature Relative Dry Gas Erosion Factor

to Diameter (r/d) (smaller is better)
Ell (Cast Steel) 1.5 282.1
2.0 256.4
2.5 217.9
3.0 192.3
3.5 153.8
4.0 115.4
4.5 89.7
5.0 64.1
Ell (Seamless Steel) 1.5 114.1
2.0 101.3
2.5 88.5
3.0 76.9
3.5 66.7
4.0 57.7
4.5 51.3
5.0 44.9
Flexible Hose 6.0 128.2
8.0 51.3
10.0 47.4
12.0 42.3
15.0 37.2
20.0 32.1
Targeted Tee(Cast Steel) N/A 3.3
Targeted Tee(Seamless Steel) N/A 1.5
Vortice Ell 3.0 1.0
October 2005 9-19

Targeted Tee
Flexible Hose
Vortice Ell
Ell
Figure 9.5.1 Types of Turns used in LSU Study
Chevron’s Recommended Approach
The historical performance of diverters continues to be poor. Chevron has therefore adopted
a "divert and desert" philosophy whereby it is recommended to completely abandon the rig
immediately after placing a well on divert. It is therefore necessary to establish associated
evacuation procedures well in advance with the drilling contractor and thereafter ensure rig
personnel are trained to respond correctly and quickly.
Use of Kill Mud While Diverting
If, after the initial diverting procedure and associated evacuation, it is determined to be safe
to return personnel to the rig, Chevron's general opinion is that use of kill mud could prove to
be an asset in attempting to regain control of a well on divert. In the early stages of a divert
situation, the pumping of a weighted mud could balance the formation and kill the well (i.e. a
dynamic kill). The weight of the kill mud must be set in advance, based on knowledge of the
formation fracture pressure. This pressure is obtained either by a pressure test of the
formation below the casing shoe, or from a known fracture gradient for the area. In any
event, the use of or avoidance of kill mud should be addressed in the diverting contingency
plan.
Multi phase fluid flow network simulators are available which can be used to assist in
developing a diverting contingency plan. These programs can assess the likelihood of a
successful dynamic kill for a given hole geometry, based on estimated reservoir parameters,
and can help to determine what weight and volume of kill mud would be required. One
reason to immediately involve 3rd party well control specialists before attempting a dynamic
kill is that they have access to and experience with such programs. In cases in which the
9-20 October 2005

probability of success of a dynamic kill is low, given available rig resources, there is little to
be gained by exposing personnel to the risk associated with attempting such a procedure.
9.6 Flow After Cementing
Shallow gas flow has often occurred after cementing due to the loss of hydrostatic pressure
that occurs as the cement transitions from a liquid to a solid state. Flow that occurs as a
result of this effect can be particularly problematic, particularly if flow occurs when the
diverter assembly is nippled down to allow installation of the BOP. If this occurs, rig
personnel may not be able to either shut-in or divert the flow, thereby putting personnel and
the operation at great risk.
For this reason, it is imperative that good cementing techniques be used for shallow
cement jobs. These techniques should be designed to:
• ensure cement job is designed to maintain balancing hydrostatic pressure during
placement and utilize good displacement techniques
• ensure cement changes rapidly from liquid to solid states (right angle set)
• ensure free water in slurry is minimized
• ensure relevant calculations and/or tests support “waiting on cement” time
planning
Equally important as good slurry design is the actual field mix. A poorly mixed slurry
should be discarded and not pumped down hole.
There are two approaches which have historically been used to deal with flow after
cementing. They are:
1) Diverting the well flow from the outset of detection, and

2) Shutting in the well immediately upon detection of flow and diverting only if
the build up of surface pressure reaches a preset limit based on the conductor
shoe leak-off.
Of these two options, the second is preferred. Naturally, if this option is selected, a
means of holding and monitoring wellbore pressure must be provided for. In some
cases, the diverter can be immediately flushed after cementing, and the diverter
functioned (i.e., the annular preventer closed and the diverter valves functioned). The
well can then be monitored for flow through the diverter lines. If flow is detected, the
well can be rapidly shut in with the diverter valves and the surface pressure monitored.
Diverting will only be performed if surface pressure becomes excessive.
Flow after cementing can be disastrous, since if it is necessary to divert after cementing
surface pipe, there is a high risk of diverter failure, and even if the divert is a success, it
is likely that the hole will be damaged or lost. Conversely, shutting in the well may
allow the cement to set up in place. But if the shoe is broached, the hole will be lost, and
October 2005 9-21

it is likely that the drilling/production structure will be extensively damaged or

destroyed.
Ideally, the integrity of the diverter system should not be compromised before the
cement has taken its initial set. Common Chevron practice is to use cement samples at
the surface and the slurry thickening time design as guides to when the cement is
sufficiently set.
In certain areas, field experience may be the best guide to the formulation of policy. In
such locations, drilling management may make the decision to allow the diverter system
to be nippled down prior to cement set, provided the following conditions are met:
1) no gas zones are known to exist,

2) no potential for hydrocarbon flow is known to exist,
3) full mud and cement returns are maintained, and
4) the annulus stays full.
The best solution to the problem of flow after cementing is to never let it happen in the
first place.
NOTE: If the decision to shut in on casing is made, then the manufacturer's chart of
maximum allowable closing pressure for the make and model of diverter in use must be
consulted in order to avoid casing collapse during closure.
9.7 Surface Diverter Systems and Equipment
Modern diverting equipment technology reflects what the industry has learned about
shallow gas and diverting over the years. During a divert event, the primary purpose of
the diverting equipment is to provide a means by which the uncontrolled flow from the
well can be directed away from the rig in the interest of safety. To minimize the chance
of human error or equipment malfunction, the system must be kept as simple as
possible.
From past experience, three common causes of diverter failure have been identified, as
follows:
1. Erosion, due to the extreme velocity (which can approach sonic velocities) of
the flowing gas/liquid/solids mix.
2. Formation breakdown, due to excessive back pressure imposed on the open
hole.
3. Blockage of the diverter equipment, due to malfunctioning valves or produced
solids in the fluid stream.
9-22 October 2005

Each of these failure modes are directly impacted by the design of the equipment.
Annular Preventer Type Diverters
The most common surface diverter in use today

is merely an adaptation of conventional annular
preventer technology, coupling a large bore
annular with a diverter spool. The typical
arrangement of this diverter is shown in Figure
9.7.1. A complete description of this type of
system is given in this section. Descriptions of
other types of diverting systems will follow,
highlighting the differences with and similarities
to the large annular drilling spool system
explained here.
The system should consist of an annular

preventer, diverter spool, two divert valves and
two overboard lines. With this diverter Figure 9.7.1 Diverter
arrangement flow is directed overboard via Arrangement
closure of the annular packing element, through
vent lines affixed to the diverter spool outlets. Chevron recommends a minimum vent
line internal diameter of 10", unless local regulation mandates a more stringent
minimum. To minimize the chance of vent line failure, these lines should be kept as
straight as possible with a minimum of turns, since the greatest amount of erosion will
occur at the points the flow changes direction. Ideally, all bends should be long radius.
Sharp turns, if required, should be targeted.
NOTE: Due to piping logistics, some installations (notably platforms) make use of only
a single vent line. In such cases, proper risk assessment necessitates a proper gas
dispersion study (based on prevailing wind direction).
In some offshore operations, the annular preventer and diverter spool are placed close to
mean sea level while the drilling unit's work deck and vent lines are a considerable
distance above. In such instances, consideration can be given to having the divert lines
exit from the spool at or just above sea level (see Figure 9.10).
If this approach is not practical, then a riser should be used to raise the diverter
equipment to the elevation of the fixed vent lines. This riser should have a pressure
rating at least equal to that of the casing to which it is attached. Unsupported vent lines
should not be installed. The use of hose or flexible pipe to connect the fixed vent lines
to the diverter spool would present a hazard and amplify the chance of premature
failure.
October 2005 9-23

A nominal 20" 2K bag-type annular

preventer should be used when
possible because of its field proven
Flow
dependability. When a larger bore bag
Line Annular
type preventer is necessary, it should
Packing
be replaced with a nominal 20" 2K
Head preventer as soon as possible. In RP
64, the API declares that “. . . the
Pisto
Diverter closing system should be capable of
Open operating the vent line and flow line
Diverter valves, as necessary, and closing the
Close Body annular packing element on pipe in
use within 30 seconds of actuation if
the packing element has a nominal
bore of 20 inches or less.” For
Vent
packing elements greater than 20
Line
inches, the maximum operating time
Figure 9.7.2 Annular packing Element for the system is 45 seconds. The
Driver annular preventer must be visually
inspected for damage prior to
installation. All flange bolts, both top and bottom, must be used. A schematic cross-
section of this type of diverter is shown in Figure
9.7.2.
Hydril markets their line of "MSP" bag type

diverting annulars in the following bore sizes and
working pressures: 21-1/4" 2,000 psi, 29-1/2" 500
psi, and 30" 1,000 psi. A schematic of the MSP
diverter hook-up is shown in Figure 9.7.3.
Shaffer and Cameron do not market a specific line

of annular bag type diverters, although each
manufactures bag type annular preventers which
are used for this purpose (i.e., Shaffer's 30" 1,000
psi and 21-1/4" 2,000 psi Sphericals, and
Cameron's 21-1/4" 2,000 psi Model D annular). Figure 9.7.3 Hydril MSP
Diverter
A brief discussion of other equipment components
for annular type diverter installations follows.
9-24 October 2005

Diverter Spool
The diverter spool must be of a pressure rating equal to or greater than that of the annular
preventer, with two 10" minimum ID side outlets and with 10" minimum vent line size. For
MMS operations, two 8" outlets are acceptable provided that they are swaged up to 10" at the
spool. No other adapters or swages should be used to install the divert valves. If the spool has
only one outlet, then it must be a minimum of 10" in diameter and must Tee into two 10"
overboard vent lines. Of course, two 10" diameter outlets with no swages would be
preferable. For onshore operations, the spool should have at least one outlet with a 6"
minimum ID, local regulations and policy permitting. The spool should be inspected to
assure its integrity prior to installation. All bolts must be installed and new ring gaskets used
to minimize the possibility of leaks.
Diverter Valves
The diverter valves should be installed immediately adjacent to the diverter spool. This is a
precaution against a failure between the spool and the valve, where washing due to
turbulence can be a problem. These valves should be full opening, with a minimum ID of 10"
(unless local regulations mandate a larger bore size). The design of the diverter vent line
assembly (spool outlets, valves, and vent lines) should promote a uniform internal diameter,
as ID changes accelerate erosion. Diverter valves are not intended to be exposed to shut-in
wellbore pressure in diverting service, but conceivably they could be subjected to such
pressure due to sudden vent line plugging. The hydraulic gate valve has been field proven
with BOP systems over many years, and is recommended over the hydraulic ball valve for
use with the diverter system.
Hydraulic instead of pneumatic valve operation is recommended for the following reasons:
1) Hydraulic operators develop a greater closing force with a smaller operating

chamber compared to a pneumatic operator in the same service.
2) Hydraulic control lines are less likely to be damaged than pneumatic tubing
because they are heavy duty, high pressure steel lines.
3) Hydraulic fluid is consistent with the control station fluid.
4) Hydraulic systems are less likely to have freezing problems.
5) Hydraulic system leaks are easier to find.
6) Hydraulic valves can still function if the rig air supply is depleted or turned
off.
In a study of divert situations, it was found that the single most common cause of failure in
the diverter system was the malfunction of the divert valves. As a result, the selection of a
hydraulic gate valve is preferable whenever possible. Again, all valves should be routinely
function tested to ensure they are not seized up. The diverter and valves should be function
tested once every 24 hours.
October 2005 9-25

Certain operations require a booster pump to be installed on the drive pipe close to the water
level to reduce lost return problems. If this pump is being used, it must have a remote valve
installed adjacent to the drive pipe with a pressure rating consistent with the system. Its
operations must be tied into the diverter panel such that it will be closed automatically when
the diverter is closed.
Diverter Vent Lines
The diverter vent lines or overboard lines should have the same pressure integrity as the rest
of the system for the same reason as the divert valves. If a line plugs, it must be able to
withstand pressure for the time it takes to open the opposite line. The lines should extend at
least beyond the edge of any decking below the lines. As previously mentioned, the lines
must be installed as straight as possible since changes in flow direction can cause significant
erosional problems at the area of change.
If at all possible, hard piping from the divert valves to the overboard lines should be used. In
the case where hard piping is not possible, flexible hoses typically are used to connect the
overboard lines with the divert valves. These flexible lines must be of a pressure rating
consistent with the system, be as short as possible, be as straight as possible, and have
integral end couplings for connecting. Collapsible hoses with hose clamps or dresser sleeves
are not acceptable. The hoses and overboard lines must be securely anchored to
accommodate the severe forces to which they will be subjected.
Diverter Control Stations
The component most often lacking in consistency and

definition is the control station that will be used to execute
the divert function. Simplicity and reliability of a diverter
system demands the control station be readily accessible
and simple in operation, leaving no room for error. The
system should operate as a remote station to the main
accumulator system. A typical diverter control station
would consist of two levers in a panel that are labeled as to
their function. One lever should be used to divert the flow
overboard. When this handle is moved to “Divert”, the four
way valve on the main accumulator for the annular
preventer will shift to the close position, closing the
annular preventer. Simultaneously, the four way valves on
the main accumulator for both port and starboard divert
valves will shift to the open position, opening both
overboard lines. If at this time the need arises to close the
upwind overboard line, the second lever on the control
station should be used. This lever, when moved to “port”, Figure 9.7.4 Diverter
Control Station
will shift the starboard four way valve on the main
accumulator to the close position and shift the port four
9-26 October 2005

way valve to the open position, if closed, opening the port divert valve. No combination of
these handles should allow the well to be shut in. A diverter control station rigged-up this
way is shown in Figure 9.7.4.
Two separate diverter control stations are required; one on the rig floor, and the other station
at a safe and remote distance from the rig floor. The diverter control stations will be air
operated, supplied by the rig’s continuous air supply. As a safety precaution, the control
stations should contain an air reserve bottle with adequate volume to function each operation
two times, independent of rig air, in the event the rig air supply is disrupted for any reason.
The major advantages of a separate diverter control system are:
a. It has the sole function of controlling the divert operation.

b. It will be a permanent fixture of the rig.
c. The chance of human error in diverting a well is eliminated.
d. By using the main accumulator system, the stored energy of the system is
utilized.
e. The control lines from the unit to the component are high pressure steel lines
that are permanently installed on the rig.
Integral Vent Valve Diverters
Diverters with integral vent valves were

introduced in the 1980's and have been field
proven in gas flow diverts. The key advantage
of integral vent valves is the elimination of the
diverter valve (a weak link in the traditional
diverter system described earlier), and thereby
the need to rely on sequencing functions to
execute a divert. A schematic of a typical
integral venting diverter unit is shown in
Figure 9.7.5.
Hydril's FS
and FSP
Diverter
Systems are Figure 9.7.5 Integral Vent
annular type Diverter
diverters
with integral
vent lines and valves. The FSP can be used as a diverter in
the upper hole and then after cementing conductor pipe it
can be used as a blowout preventer. The integral vent valve
design of these units ensures that as the packing unit closes
Figure 9.7.6 Hydril the vent simultaneously opens. These units have a full seal-
FSP Diverter
October 2005 9-27

off range, including on open hole. A schematic of an FSP unit is shown in Figure 9.7.6.
The Hydril FSP and FS diverters are normally teamed with Hydril's DS-12-500 Flow
Selector. The Flow Selector provides the capability to switch from one vent line to another
without the possibility of complete shut off in the process. It provides a massive target made
of hardened steel that causes the flow to be diverted down one of two branches of the vent
line system. A schematic showing the DS-12-500 Flow Selector is shown in Figure 9.7.7.
Hydril also offers an SXV/MSP diverter arrangement. The SXV/MSP combines an MSP bag
type annular preventer with an SXV Diverter Spool containing integral vent valves. The SXV
spool can either be attached to the MSP annular diverter or separated by a spacer spool. The
SXV/MSP combination can be used either for surface diverting or for subsea diverting from
a bottom founded offshore drilling rig. The SXV/MSP assembly is available in 21-1/4", 29-
1/2", and 30" sizes. A schematic showing alternative SXV/MSP diverter arrangements is
given in Figure 9.7.8.
Fixed Housing Diverters
The following two diverter systems have fixed outer housings that mount to the rotary table
beams underneath the rig floor. The vent lines are attached to this outer housing. The diverter
itself can be run through the rotary table and locked into the outer housing. The packing
element is inserted into the diverter and J's in place. This insert packer can close on a range
of pipe sizes but not on open hole. The insert packer has to be pulled when pulling the BHA
through the diverter. This means the diverter is incapable of being closed while the BHA is
being pulled. Newer model insert packers are split into more than one concentric piece that
allow the inner packing element to be removed in order to pull the BHA, leaving the outer
piece of the packing element which can seal on the collars.
Figure 9.7.7 Hydril Figure 9.7.8 Hydril SXV/MSP system for surface
Flow Selector (left) and subsea diverting
9-28 October 2005

Vetco Gray Products
Vetco Gray markets their line of KFDJ diverter

units for non-floating surface diverting
operations. This equipment has been marketed by
a succession of companies over the years.
Originally developed and marketed by Regan
Forge and Engineering Company, the product was
later acquired by Hughes Tool Co. and marketed
by Hughes Offshore. A name change followed
once again with the creation of the Baker-Hughes
organization, and eventually Vetco Gray acquired
the technology.
The KFDJ is a 500 psi or 2000 psi working

pressure diverter system, with a 27-1/2" bore in
conjunction with a 37-1/2" rotary table
installation and a 36-1/2" bore in conjunction with
a 49-1/2" rotary table installation. The unit is
designed to run through the rotary table to
minimize nipple up time. It seats into a diverter
support housing permanently mounted under the Figure 9.7.9 Vetco Gray KFDJ Fixed
rotary table and hydraulically locks in place. The Diverter
support housing provides fixed outlets for flow
line, fill-up line, and vent lines, eliminating the
need to disconnect and reconnect these lines. A
range of insert packers is utilized to provide pack
off over a full range of pipe sizes, but open hole
closure is not possible. The inserts are deployed
with a "J" type running tool. A schematic of the
KFDJ diverter is given in Figure 9.7.9.
A spacer spool and an over-shot packer are used to

install the KFDJ diverter onto casing (either
structural or conductor). The overshot packer uses
hydraulically inflatable seals to pack off on the
casing, and is available in a single or dual packer
assembly. It can also be energized manually by
torquing large socket head set screws in the bottom
retaining flange. The overshot assembly is equipped
with wash out ports above the packer to clean out
debris trapped in the annular area between the
casing and the ID of the overshot packer housing.
Figure 9.7.10 KFDJ The Vetco Gray EC-6 Coupling is used to connect
Diverter System Overshot
the diverter assembly to the spacer spool and
Packer
October 2005 9-29

overshot packer. The EC-6 is a stab type coupling utilizing a large lip seal. After the coupling
is stabbed, a course ACME thread nut on the EC-6 pin is made up to the EC-6 box external
thread. The diverter, spacer spool, and overshot packer assembly are deployed in one piece
with a handling tool, without the need to connect or disconnect the flow line, fill-up line, and
vent lines. A schematic of the overshot packer is
The KFDJ Model J is an enhanced version of the

KFDJ diverter unit, featuring fewer hydraulic
connections and a "J" lock between the diverter and
the support housing. A mechanical latch secures the
diverter in the housing and the latch handle
provides a visual confirmation of lock engagement.
A schematic of the KFDJ Model J diverter is shown
in Figure 9.7.11.
The KFDJ Model J diverter only requires three

hydraulic functions to install and operate the
system. These functions are: energize and vent the
diverter package; energize the flow line seals; and,
energize the overshot packer connecting the diverter
to the casing. A schematic of these hydraulic
functions is shown. Usually the hydraulics of the
KFDJ are piped into the control panel in such a way Figure 9.7.11 Vetco-Gray KFDJ
Model J. Diverter
that operating one divert lever will control all three
of these hydraulic functions.
Figure 9.7.12 Hydraulic Function Arrangement for KFDJ

Model J Diverter
9-30 October 2005

Drill-Quip, Inc. Products
Dril-Quip markets a fixed diverter system for use with 37-1/2" and 49-1/2" rotary tables. The
Dril-Quip diverter has a working pressure of 2,000 psi. It utilizes a permanent housing
attached under the rotary table, eliminating the need for mechanical connection of the flow
line and fill-up line. The diverter assembly, spacer spool, and overshot packer are run
through the rotary table using a "J" type handling tool. The handling tool is selectively
equipped to permit running and retrieving either the insert packers individually or the entire
diverter assembly. Complete installation and lockdown of the diverter assembly is
accomplished with spring loaded snap rings, without the need for hydraulics. Self-energizing
seals, sealing on hard-faced surfaces, are used to isolate the diverter outlets. These seals do
not require hydraulic pressure to seal.
The diverter incorporates several sizes of packer inserts to affect a pack off across a full
range of pipe sizes. The diverter itself only requires two hydraulic functions to install and
operate: energizing and venting the diverter packer, and energizing the overshot packer
connecting the diverter to the casing. The overshot packer is energized through the external
hydraulic port to 200 psi above the expected operating pressure. Naturally, other hydraulic
functions are needed to control the diverter valves. Testing of the diverter is accomplished
using a test tool attached to the handling tool.
The diverter, spacer spool, and overshot packer are connected to each other using stab type
couplings. After engagement, air wrenches are used to drive the captive screws against a split
lock ring. The coupling can be tested through the external port. A schematic of the Dril-Quip
diverter is given in Figure 9.7.13.
Figure 9.7.13 Dril-Quip Diverter System
October 2005 9-31

Shaffer Fixed Housing Diverter
Shaffer markets a combination diverter/BOP system in 21-1/4", 2000 psi, and 30", 1000 psi
models. This fixed diverter integrates the Shaffer Spherical annular with a vent outlet spool
piece. The assembly fits into a housing permanently mounted under the rig floor. The unit
can close on open hole or a wide range of tubular sizes. A schematic of the Shaffer
diverter/BOP is shown in Figure 9.7.14.
Figure 9.7.14 Shaffer Diverter Unit
Diverter Casing Connector
While the welded starting head is the most common means of connecting the diverter to the
casing, there have been several products introduced that speed up the process. One such
product discussed above in the section on fixed housing insert packer type diverters, uses an
overshot packer with hydraulically activated seals below a diverter housing that is fixed to
the rotary beams. These connecters are only required to form a seal since the diverter itself is
secured to the rotary beams.
9-32 October 2005

Other products are

designed to seal and hold
the diverter in place. These
"quick connect" type
connecters can be used in
conjunction with annular
style diverters. One such
product is the Vetco Gray
VG Loc. This connector
provides fast reliable
connection of the diverter
onto plain end pipe,
without the need for
welding or extensive
preparation. Mechanically Figure 9.7.15 Vetco-Gray VG-Loc
set slips engage the casing
wall while seals affect a
pack off. A schematic of the Vetco Gray VG-Loc is shown in Figure 9.7.15.
9.8 Mud Gas Separator (MGS)
WARNING: A Mud Gas Separator (MGS) is not part of a diverter system, should not be
piped into the diverter system, and definitely should not be used during divert
situations.
By definition, the diverter system is used to divert the flow away from the rig. The MGS, by
design, is an integral part of the rig. Thus, if the flow was directed to the MGS, it would in
effect be directed to the rig. As a result, any malfunction in the MGS can and has caused
considerable damage and/or loss of life. The inability of the MGS to handle high flow rates
can create an extremely hazardous situation. It is recognized that under certain conditions,
the availability of a MGS as part of the system could be of use in circulating raw drilling
fluid which is simply gas cut. The primary concern with using the MGS is if the flow rate
becomes excessive and is not recognized, the results could be catastrophic. Also, the use of
an MGS requires additional valving and controls to the diverter system. As was stated earlier,
the diverter system must be kept as simple as possible. Therefore, the mud-gas separator
should not be used as part of the diverter system.
October 2005 9-33

9.9 Pressure Testing the Diverter System
Diverter systems are required to be pressure tested and function tested on a regular basis. The
required tests are described below.
Upon initial Nipple-Up:
a. Pressure test the diverter bag, diverter valves, and vent lines (if possible) to 200
psi. This test may be conducted with a test plug, or in conjunction with the
conductor pipe pressure test before drilling out the shoe. For diverters nippled up
on drive or structural pipe the 200 psi test pressure may not be possible, so a lower
test pressure will need to be used. Record the test on a test chart and make a written
notation of the test in the tour/morning report.
b. Function test all equipment and circulate through the overboard lines to ensure they
are free from obstruction. Make a record of the test in the tour/morning report.
Note: Verify that each diverter valve is functioning both fully opened and fully
closed. This should be done visually.
While drilling ahead:
a. Function test all equipment (open and close) at least once every 24 hours. Make a
written notation of the test in the tour/morning report.
b. The diverter bag, spool, diverter valves, and vent lines (if possible) should be
pressure tested weekly. This test will require a test plug. Record the test on a test
chart and make a written notation of the test in the tour/morning report.
9.10 Diverting Procedure
The following procedures serve only as examples. Specific divert procedures should be
prepared for every rig.
While Drilling (example for jack up with conventional diverter)
Upon noticing the first positive indicator of well flow (pit gain or increase in flow or
flow with pumps off):
a. Sound the alarm – long blast on Driller’s air horn.
9-34 October 2005

b. Close the diverter. (This should open both vent valves, close the fill up line and
shaker valve, and close the diverter element)
c. Pump mud from the active system at the fastest feasible rate. Use both pumps if
possible.
Note: The pumps should be lined up to switch over to seawater or location water
when three-quarters of the active pit mud has been pumped away without killing
the well. If the situation has progressed this far, realize that ECD, the formation
bridging over, or the depletion of the reservoir are the only lines of defense that
exist for stopping the flow.
d. Pull the first tool joint below the rotary up to breakout position at the rig floor.
e. Close the upwind vent line valve if necessary.
f. Notify the Drill Site Manager and Toolpusher. Prepare for immediate evacuation of
the rig.
g. Evacuation procedures should ensure that rig power is shut down and all potential
sources of ignition are eliminated.
While Tripping (example for jack up with conventional diverter)
Upon noticing the first positive indicator of well flow (pit gain or flow with pumps off):
a. Sound the alarm – long blast on Driller’s air horn.
b. Close the diverter. (This should open both vent valves, close the fill up line and
shaker valve, and close the diverter element)
c. Make up the top drive onto the drill pipe. (Stab Full opening safety valve if no top
drive, then make up kelly and open FOSV.)
d. Start pumping at a high rate from the active pit or from a kill mud pit if available.
Note: The pumps should be lined up to switch over to seawater or location water
when three-quarters of the active pit mud has been pumped away without killing
the well. If the situation has progressed this far, realize that ECD, the formation
bridging over, or the depletion of the reservoir are the only lines of defense that
exist for stopping the flow.
e. Notify the Drill Site Manager and Toolpusher. Prepare for immediate evacuation of
the rig.
October 2005 9-35

f. Evacuation procedures should ensure that rig power is shut down and all potential
sources of ignition are eliminated.
9.11 Diverter Equipment Considerations
a. A mud-gas separator should not be tied into the diverter system.
b. The diverter system should be made as simple as possible in its hookup and
operation.
c. Consideration should be given to accepting as the minimum diverter system an

annular preventer, a diverter spool with two outlets of 10" minimum ID, two
hydraulic valves with a minimum of 10" ID, and two vent lines with a minimum of
10" ID. All components should be consistent in their pressure rating. The vent lines
must be well anchored and as straight as possible.
d. A diverter valve should be installed on each vent line unless the valves are integral
to the diverter itself. There should be no additional valves or lines tied into the vent
lines downstream of the diverter valves.
e. A hydraulic valve, with a pressure rating consistent with the system, must be used
when a booster pump is installed. The valve should be hooked up such that it
closes when the diverter closes.
f. Diverter systems that require long unsupported sections of pipe to connect the
divert valves with the vent lines should be eliminated by utilizing risers to bring the
diverter spool up to the work deck.
g. Hoses connecting the vent lines with the diverter valves are not recommended.
h. Utilize two separate control stations specifically designed to control the diverter
system. These stations should be tied into the existing accumulator system.
i. If the diverter has two 1" hydraulic fluid inlets on the closing chamber, utilizing
both will speed annular closure. Alternatively, consider increasing the annular
four-way valve and line to 1-1/2" or larger.
9.12 Guidelines for Training of Crews
Since a diverting operation is so very critical and also difficult in that everything is
happening quickly, special training for everyone in the drilling crew is required. It is the
Drill Site Manager’s responsibility to see that the crews are trained and have defined
9-36 October 2005

responsibilities during the operation. Several items are listed below which should be included
as part of the rig crew's training.
a. Go over each component of the diverter explaining its purpose and operation.
b. Explain the control stations, i.e., position and operation of each control valve.
Emphasize that the well is not to be shut in at any time. If manifolding does not
provide for simultaneous opening of the hydraulically operated valve and closing
of the annular preventer, be sure that it is understood that the closing procedure is
to:
1) Open valves on the drilling spool.

2) Close annular preventer.
c. Explain that the pumps are not to be stopped unless so ordered.
d. Assign positions and responsibilities for each crew member. This should be
determined by the contractor’s Toolpusher.
e. Establish warning and abandon rig alarms.
f. Establish contingency plan for fluid type and fluid density to be pumped.
g. Establish evacuation procedures including details relating to whether or not to

leave pumps running prior to a complete evacuation.
October 2005 9-37

Section 10 – Horizontal Well Control
10. Horizontal Well Control
10.1 Introduction
Conventional well control assumes a relatively vertical well bore, with some corrections
made for significantly deviated sections. These corrections adjust for hydrostatic and
frictional consequences of differences between measured and true vertical depths. While
horizontal wells share many of the adjustments needed for deviated wells, wells with hole
sections having significant horizontal, but negligible vertical extent, present some unique
well control issues. As horizontal reaches continue to increase, these issues require further
attention.
The fact that a well is deviated or has been drilled with its final section horizontal does not
change the fundamental principles of well control during the circulation of a kick from the
well.
Well Kill Procedure
Circulation is established and maintained at a constant drill pipe pressure sufficient to

maintain the bottomhole pressure higher than the formation pressure. The drill pipe pressure
is controlled by adjusting the choke at a selected pump rate.
If the procedure requires the use of a kill mud weight higher than the drilling mud weight, the
heavier mud is displaced at constant rate into the drill pipe, making adjustments as necessary
to ensure that the drill pipe pressure:
• decreases in proportion to the increase in drill pipe hydrostatic pressure and

• increases to reflect changes in system friction losses as mud density is changed
The geometry of horizontal wells complicates calculations to schedule such changes. Since
the Driller’s Method doesn’t require such schedule calculations, it is often preferred for
horizontal well kills. But computer generated kick sheets (such as those generated using the
Chevron Well Control CD) make generation of pressure schedules (for use with either the
Driller’s or Wait & Weight Methods) relatively easy. Actual kill operations for wells drilled
with balancing mud weights (as opposed to wells drilled underbalance, which are a whole
different subject) are therefore very similar to kill operations for vertical wells.
Kick Monitoring
While kill procedures may be similar, the hydrostatic changes resulting from movement of
fluids of differing densities between horizontal and vertical sections of the hole make casing
October 2005 10-1

pressure profiles quite different for horizontal well kills. Awareness of some of the likely
differences can make the control process easier.
Borehole Geometry Can Be Simplified For Well Control
A typical well has three distinct components:
• The vertical section from RKB to KOP.

• A deviated section turning the well from vertical to horizontal.
• The horizontal penetration of the producing formation.
For an understanding of well control behavior, the deviated section can be depicted as one or
more straight line sections connecting the vertical to the horizontal sections.
Although the actual well bore will turn progressively with build up angles between 2 and 6
degrees per 100 ft, it is sufficiently accurate for well control purposes to segment the well
into 3 components using straight line geometry as follows:
• In the vertical section the MD = TVD;

• For the deviated section the MD x Cosine Deviation Angle = TVD;
• For the horizontal section there is only MD with no TVD change.
Figure 10.1.1 Simplified Geometry for Horizontal Well
10-2 October 2005

Kick Detection in Horizontal Wells
Kick detection in horizontal wells is similar to detection in vertical wells. Since, however, the
horizontal well may be intended to stay within a particular formation, indications of
formation change (such as change in penetration rate / torque or LWD indications) may be
more reliable early indicators of a potential kick than they are in vertical sections, where new
zones are being routinely encountered.
Unlike in vertical holes, it is often not possible to immediately detect presence of an influx in
the horizontal hole section by flow checking or shutting the well in. Until the influx reaches
the vertical section, there will be a negligible hydrostatic change resulting from dilution of
the mud in the annulus by low density influx fluids. Use of reliable PVT and differential
flow measurements thus become more important for horizontal drilling operations.
10.2 Productivity of Horizontal Wells
Since horizontal wells are drilled to improve production, it follows that a kick in a horizontal
well could “produce” an influx more rapidly than the corresponding vertical well.
Figure 10.2.1 Horizontal Well vs. Vertical Well
October 2005 10-3

Productivity increases either because of longer penetration of the production zone or, in the
case of fractured reservoirs, because more fractures have been intersected by the longer well
bore. It is important to know which of these alternatives is involved prior to drilling the well.
Figure 10.2.2 Horizontal Well vs. Vertical Well
10-4 October 2005

10.3 Types of Kicks and Kick Components
Kicks Due to Swabbing
While possible influx types include water, oil, and gas, the characteristics of gas (low
density, high compressibility) make it clearly the most complex to deal with. Therefore, even
though a producing zone’s native fluid type may be anticipated, all well control calculations
should be made assuming a dry gas “worst case” scenario.
Since reservoir pressure in horizontal intervals are generally known (since they are typically
drilled as development wells in known fields with established formation pressures) drilled
kicks can generally be avoided. However, when the producibility of a long horizontal section
is high, swabbing is of concern and may result in relatively large influx volumes. While the
possibility of encountering higher than anticipated formation pressures cannot be ruled out
(most commonly when drilling across a fault or into a fracture), the resulting drilled kicks
can generally be detected and handled with no more difficulty than in a vertical well.
If the bit is pulled away from the end of the hole, for instance on a connection, the far end of
the well will be the main contributor to the inflow. In this case the swabbing effect is similar
to a normal vertical well.
But if swabbing occurs when the pipe is at the beginning of the horizontal hole (during a trip
out) then the entire length of the horizontal section is exposed to the differential swab
pressure and a high rate of entry can occur.
Figure 10.3.1 Swabbing In Horizontal Hole
October 2005 10-5

With pipe in the horizontal section, the well may swab when the pipe is moved. But since the
true vertical height of the mud column in the well is still available, the well may not flow.
Flowing conditions will only be induced if the swabbing action continues past the beginning
of the horizontal section.
Regardless of how large the swabbed influx may be, it will only influence and reduce bottom
hole pressure when it moves into the vertical or deviated section of the well.
Kicks Due to Penetration of a Pressure Barrier
This type of kick could occur if the well bore crosses a fault into a zone which had not
previously been depleted or had different oil-water contact.
Such an event is more likely to occur if the well is drilled late in the development program to
improve productivity at low (depleted) reservoir pressures.
A similar situation can occur if an existing development well is redrilled to target a new zone.
Kicks Due to Error in Mud Weight
Despite good pore pressure information, a kick may develop because of reduction in mud
weight caused by “barite sag”. This is the phenomenon of barite settling out on the low side
of a highly deviated or horizontal wellbore. With the barite resting on the bottom side of the
hole, the fluid on the top side of the hole is lightened. If circulation / agitation of the lower
side of the hole is inadequate, this lighter fluid can circulate into the vertical hole section
without the barite, potentially lowering the hydrostatic pressure of the fluid column and
allowing the well to kick.
Barite sag is compounded in oil based muds containing gas in solution; as gas goes into
solution, the rheological properties of the fluid are altered, which compounds the sag
problem. There is therefore a high potential for barite sag after starting the pumps at a kill
(slow) rate following shut-in of a gas influx located in the horizontal section of a well. Using
the Driller’s Method to keep the shut-in period short can help to reduce this complication.
10.4 Recognizing & Evaluating Kicks
In a horizontal well, all the mud in the horizontal section can be displaced without there
being any difference between SIDDP and SICP because the kick has virtually no vertical
height.
If a kick results from swabbing or from a minor underbalance of a highly permeable zone, it
may therefore not be possible to confirm presence of even large volumes of influx from shut-
in pressures or flow checks.
10-6 October 2005

3000 ft. 3000 ft.
Figure 10.4.1 Kick Recognition in Horizontal Well vs Vertical Well
Behaviors of Gas in a Horizontal Well Kick
Free gas in the well will follow the gas laws in its behavior moving up the well. In the
horizontal section there will be no volume change as it is moved by the mud circulation at
constant pressure along the borehole. In the deviated middle section of the well and in the
vertical section, the reducing hydrostatic pressure causes the gas to expand in accordance
with Boyles Law, which states that the volume of a given mass or amount of gas varies
inversely with its pressure P.
10.5 Kick Scenarios for Horizontal Wells
Swabbed Kicks
The rate of entry for a typical swab kick will be very similar to the swabbing action on a
vertical well if the event occurs at the bit as the pipe is pulled off bottom as for a connection.
This follows because the bit exposes only a short section of hole as it is pulled away from
bottom and only this section is affected by the swab pressure; however it must be realized
October 2005 10-7

that gas can be swabbed in behind the bit if the string is lowered before circulation restores
the ECD.
If swabbing occurs when the pipe is at the beginning of the hole (as when tripping out of the
hole), then the entire length of the horizontal section is exposed to the differential swab
pressure and a high rate of entry can occur. It can be readily seen the earliest possible
detection of swabbing is necessary to avoid large swab kicks with the pipe a long way from
the end of the hole.
IN-FLOW NOT ALWAYS

LIMITED TO END IN-FLOW FROM ENTIRE
SECTION WHILE MAKING SECTION BEYOND BIT
CONNECTIONS
Figure 10.5.1 Figure 10.5.2

Swab off Bottom -- Minor Pit Gain Well Swabbed When Making Trip
Well Penetration Kicks
If the bit penetrates a pressure barrier the resultant kick will develop in the same way that a
typical drilling kick occurs in a vertical well. Only the formation newly exposed by the bit
can contribute to the inflow.
There will be a pit gain and the drill pipe pressure will build up when the well is shut in. The
casing pressure will be the same as the drill pipe pressure as long as the kick remains in the
horizontal part of the well.
A penetration kick can become an underground flow from the higher pressure formation to
the lower pressure formation (crossflow). If this occurs the SIDP and SICP will reflect the
“flowing pressure” in the horizontal wellbore.
Since both formations will be located at the same TVD, many interventions techniques
suitable for vertical wells that rely on hydrostatic pressure (e.g. heavy pills, barite plugs) may
be less applicable in horizontal sections. It is therefore more important to design the well
properly in order to avoid exposure to permeable zones with varying formation pressures.
10-8 October 2005

Figure 10.5.3 Entering an Abnormally Pressurized Zone
Secondary Kicks
Secondary kicks can be a greater problem in horizontal wells because the entire formation
section can contribute to the inflow if, by reason of poor choke control, pressure in the
horizontal hole section falls below its formation pressure. Obviously great care is necessary
to avoid this situation.
Figure 10.5.4 Secondary Kicks
October 2005 10-9

Gas Migration
Practical experience shows that gas can migrate faster in deviated than in comparable vertical
holes. This occurs due to segregation developing in the bore hole, with the lighter fluid
tending to rise on the high side of the hole whereas heavier mud moves down the low side of
the hole.
Figure 10.5.5 Segregation Developing in the Borehole
If located in a section of the well that is truly horizontal, a kick can not migrate since gravity
will only result in separation of gas to the high side and mud to the low side of the hole.
Migration will only start when the kick is moved into the deviated (non-horizontal) section of
the hole.
Figure 10.5.6 Migration in Horizontal Hole
While nearly horizontal, most wells may slope continuously in one direction either up
(deviation more than 90°) or down. Alternatively the section may have one or more minor
reversals in elevation producing high and low spots similar to those on a surface pipeline.
10-10 October 2005

In such conditions gravity segregation can occur as a kick is moved along the horizontal
section. Parts of the kick may become stranded in high spots if the rate of circulation is low
compared with the rate of segregation.
10.6 Methods of Well Control for Horizontal Wells
Kick behavior can be significantly different in highly deviated and horizontal wells. If the
influx is mainly gas, problems can be experienced getting the gas to move out of the
horizontal section. It may be impossible to remove the gas if the horizontal section is greater
than 90 degrees. Swabbed influxes can be hard to detect in the horizontal sections and care
must be taken while making connections or tripping in these sections of the hole. Drill pipe
pressure graphs will also be significantly different for horizontal and deviated wells.
Key Differences from Normal Well Control
• Kill mud increase hydrostatic pressure in the annulus only after the annular volume of the
horizontal sections of the well is displaced. In a normal well, kill weight mud starts to
increase hydrostatic pressure in the annulus as soon as it leaves the bit.
• When the kick is in the deviated part of the hole it will tend to migrate faster than in
corresponding conditions in vertical hole.
• If the horizontal hole has an undulating profile, kill fluids may bypass kick fluids at the
“high” spots, particularly when using slow pump rates.
• Heavy mud used to bullhead may bypass lighter material in the deviated section.
• Initial SIDPP and SICP may be very near the same pressure reading in spite of the influx
type.
Advantage of Driller’s Method
The abnormal conditions outlined above can be largely overcome by using the Driller’s
method as soon as the kick is secured by closing the well. A majority of horizontal well kicks
will be induced kicks; no mud weight change is involved, and consequently the Driller’s
method applies automatically.
If desired, the Wait & Weight Method can be used for highly deviated / horizontal wells. It
will, however, be necessary to make adjustments to the pumping schedule to account for hole
geometry effects on depth vs. stroke calculations.
October 2005 10-11

Need for High Circulation Rate
In conventional well control, kicks are circulated out of the well at a slower rate than while
drilling to permit better control of bottom hole pressure. In horizontal wells, these low rates
may not move the kick out of the horizontal section as gas is trapped at the upper side of the
horizontal borehole and the mud by-passes underneath.
To fully remove a gas kick, it may be necessary to flush the influx from the horizontal hole
section into the vertical section by using much faster rate. Movement of the drill string,
where practical, can also help improve influx removal efficiency. If high rates are used to
displace the influx, care should be taken to reduce these higher circulating rates to
conventional values as the influx approaches the surface. This can be accomplished by
maintaining casing pressure constant while reducing pump rate, thereby ensuring the
bottomhole pressure is kept constant until a new pump pressure is established. Such an
adjustment is particularly important when using subsea BOPs where high circulating rates
through long choke lines would otherwise likely impose excessive pressure on the bottom of
the hole.
It may require a number of circulations to remove the influx from the wellbore. Caution
should be exercised after a kill operation when starting to circulate at drilling rates. Traces of
influx, sometimes referred to as “ghost kicks”, may be circulated up the hole, possibly
requiring shut-in if expanding gas volumes result in additional pit gains.
Well Problems Encountered at High Circulation Rate
High pump rates may be needed to flush the kick out of the horizontal or highly deviated well
bore; however, a slower rate can be resumed as the kick moves through the upper part of the
well and approaches the surface. If a high circulation rate is needed, the following points
should be considered:
• When a kick is being circulated, the bit will be off bottom (not drilling). Pumping at a
high rate in this situation will tend to over speed a mud motor and may damage it. This is
probably less of a concern than possibly undercutting and inadvertently sidetracking the
well. This problem can be avoided by using a circulating sub in the drilling assembly,
although it will still be necessary to pump for a time through the bit to get the opening
ball to seal in its seat.
• Choke line friction will increase substantially compared with “normal” well kill
situations. This will be noticeable in floating rig applications with long choke lines.
• Mud Gas Separator capacity may also limit the pump rate.
10-12 October 2005

Bullheading Swabbed Kicks
Bullhead procedures in horizontal wells are only effective in displacing mud to the beginning
of the horizontal section. Displacement past this point will not change the surface pressures
and may not move kick fluid if the bullheaded fluid enters the formation near the beginning
of the section.
While bullheading could still be used when there is no pipe in the hole or the bit is far from
bottom, it is less likely for this situation to occur, as swabbed kicks are likely to remain in the
horizontal section (and not migrate) until the string is run back in.
10.7 Kick Prevention Considerations
Prevention During Drilling
• During well planning a casing seat should be set as close as possible to the horizontal
section. This will allow adequate mud weight to be used to prevent underbalance without
risking the integrity of the formation at the shoe.
• After the horizontal formation has been penetrated the well should be checked to ensure a
sufficient hydrostatic head is available prior to drilling further.
• An action plan must be ready for dealing with potential losses while drilling the
horizontal section.
• Minimize the formation of cuttings beds that can increase the risk of swabbing - optimize
hole cleaning.
• Always keep the pumps running when moving pipe off bottom for hole cleaning, and
keep pipe movements slow.
• Keep clearances between drilling assembly and hole diameters as large as possible,
consistent with drilling objectives.
Prevention During Tripping
• Use the trip sheet and trip tank to monitor the well during trips. Adopt routine procedures,
such as always using the same pill size and weight, so that true comparisons are possible
with previous trips.
• The string should be pumped out of the horizontal hole section up to a pre-determined
pipe depth. Rotation helps avoid cuttings build up at the BHA during this operation.
October 2005 10-13

• When running into the hole, consideration should be given to circulating through the
horizontal section. Care must be taken in case the string displaces a previously swabbed-
in influx.
• Trip speed must be minimized to limit surge pressure. Move the pipe slowly until bit is
above casing shoe.
• Minimize the number of round trips by optimizing the drill string and bit design.
10.8 Kick Sheets for Deviated / Horizontal Wells
The presence of deviated and horizontal hole sections has a major effect on kill sheet
pressure schedules which are often used for well control operations involving a change of
mud weight.
The simplified well geometry outlined mentioned earlier can be used as a basis for the
construction of the kick sheet.
An example of the difference between pressure schedules for conventional and deviated /
horizontal well kicks is shown in the figure below.
The well bore is broken down into sections each with its specific drill string / casing
specification and deviation angle.
Most wells can be divided into three sections: Vertical to Kick Off Point (K.O.P.), K.O.P. to
End of Build (E.O.B.) and Horizontal. Subdivision of each section is required to
accommodate changes in drill string dimensions (drill collars, etc).
The TVD of each section is used to determine the hydrostatic pressure increase in the drill
string as the new mud weight traverses the section.
The MD of each section is used to calculate the number of strokes required to displace the
corresponding length of drill string as well as the associated change in friction caused by
increasing the mud density.
The Chevron Well Kill CD includes software that greatly simplifies the development of
pressure schedules appropriate for deviated / horizontal wells.
10-14 October 2005

Figure 10.8.1 Vertical vs Deviated Well Pressure Schedules
Example:
Horizontal
Water depth 1000’
Hole = 8-1/2”
Well Data
MW = 10 ppg
Shoe = 2127 psi w/ 10 ppg @ 8182’ TVD
Pump = 0.1 bb / strk
SCR = 30 spm @ 700 psi
DC = 0.01776 bb/ft
DP = 5” - 19.5#
CLF = 50 psi
DP Press 952 psi

KOP
5000’ TVD 888 strks
5000’ MD DP Press 742 psi DP Press 805 psi
1687 strks 2220 strks
EOB (9 5/8” SHOE) TD
8182’ TVD 8182’ TVD
9500’ MD 12,500’ MD
Kick Data
SICP = 650 psi
SIDPP = 600 psi
Kick Size = 50 bbl
Figure 10.8.2
October 2005 10-15

WAIT & WEIGHT METHOD WORKSHEET

Directional / Horizontal Hole - Subsea BOP Stack
( Use SCR Pressure through Riser for Subsea ) X 30 700 0.1000 3.0
(Pump #1 Selected)
Directional Data (Build and Hold & Horizontal profiles)
MD (feet) TVD(feet)
Start of Build (KOP) 5,000 5,000
End of Build (EOB) 9,500 8,182
INFORMATION RECORDED WHEN WELL KICKS Time of Kick: dd/mmm/yy Hr:Min .

B. Old Mud Weight B 10.00 lb/gal
C. Initial Shut-In Drill Pipe Pressure (SIDP) C 600 psi
E. Initial Pit Volume Increase E 50 bbl
MUD WEIGHT TO BALANCE KICK

Intitial C
G= = = G 1.50 lb/gal
(0.052) (TVD) (0.052) (F)
H. New Mud Weight H= B+ G= H 11.50 lb/gal
J. Barite Required (15.0) (G)

J=I x = J 1,230 sacks
(35 - H)
INITIAL CIRCULATING PRESSURE - ICP

K. Slow Circ Rate Pressure + SIDP - ICP K = A+ C= K 1,300 psi
FINAL CIRCULATING PRESSURE - FCP H

L. Slow Circ Rate Pressure X (New Mud Wt / Old Mud Wt) L = Ax = L 805 psi
B
Figure 10.8.3
10-16 October 2005

INTERNAL CAPACITIES: Section 1 - Surface to Kickoff Point

DP 1 5,000 ft. x 0.01776 bbl./ft. = 88.8 bbl.
DP 2 ft. x bbl./ft. = bbl.
HWDP ft. x bbl./ft. = bbl.
DC 1 ft. x bbl./ft. = bbl.
Section 1 Ftg = 5,000 ft. Internal = 88.8 bbl. = 888 Strokes
INTERNAL CAPACITIES: Section 2 - Kickoff Point to End of Build

DP 1 4,500 ft. x 0.01776 bbl./ft. = 79.9 bbl.
INTERNAL CAPACITIES: Section 3 - End of Build to Bit

DP 1 3,000 ft. x 0.01776 bbl./ft. = 53.3 bbl.
Total Ftg = 12,500 ft. Total Internal = 222.0 bbl. = 2,220 Total Internal Strokes
Figure 10.8.4
CHANGE IN PRESSURES AND PSI PER STROKE FROM SURFACE TO KOP

M. Friction Pressure (Dynamic Loss) of KWM from Surface to KOP
KOP MD
M = SCR + ( FCP - SCR) x =
TD MD
KOP MD
M = A + ( L - A) x = M 742 psi
TD MD
N. Remaining SIDPP at KOP
N = SIDPP - ( (KWM - OMW) x 0.052 x KOP TVD ) =
N = C - ( (H - B) x 0.052 x KOP TVD ) = N 210 psi
O. Circulating Pressure when KWM at KOP O= M+N= O 952 psi
P. Strokes from Surface to KOP (Section # 1, above) P 888 strokes
Q. Pressure Drop Per Stroke from Surface to KOP

Change in Press K-O
Q= = = Q 0.39 psi/stk
Section Capacity Strokes P
Figure 10.8.5
October 2005 10-17

CHANGE IN PRESSURES AND PSI PER STROKE FROM KOP TO EOB

R. Friction Pressure (Dynamic Loss) of KWM from KOP to EOB
EOB MD
R = SCR + ( FCP - SCR) x =
TD MD
600 EOB MD
KWM = = 1.41 + 10 =R 11.41
= A + PPG( L - A) x = R 780 psi
(0.052)(8182) TD MD
R = 700 + [ (805-700) x
S. Remaining SIDPP at EOB 9500 ]
------------
Pumped 11.5 PPG
S = SIDPP - ( (KWM - OMW) x 0.052 x 12500
EOB TVD ) =
(11.41 - 11.5)(0.052)(8182) = - 38S psi
= C - ( (H - B) x 0.052 x EOB TVD ) = S -38 psi
T. Circulating Pressure when KWM at EOB T= R+S= T 742 psi

S = 600 - [ (11.5 - 10) x 0.052 x 8182 ]
U. Strokes from KOP to EOB (Section # 2, above) strokes
U 799
V. Pressure Drop Per Stroke from KOP to EOB

Change in Press O-T
V= = = V 0.26 psi/stk
Section Capacity Strokes U
Figure 10.8.6
CHANGE IN PRESSURES AND PSI PER STROKE FROMEOB TOBIT
W. Change Circulating Pressure from EOB to Bit W = T - FCP =

WW = =742
T - L-=805 W -63
X. Strokes from EOB to Bit (Section # 3, above) X 533
Y. Pressure Drop Per Stroke from EOB to Bit

Change in Press W
Y= = = Y -0.12
Section Capacity Strokes X
Figure 10.8.7
10-18 October 2005

DRILL PIPE PRESSURE PROFILE
Surface to KOP KOP to EOB EOB to Bit

Strokes Press Strokes Press Strokes Press
- 1,300 888 952 1,687 742
100 1,261 900 949 1,700 743
200 1,222 1,000 923 1,800 755
300 1,182 1,100 896 1,900 767
400 1,143 1,200 870 2,000 779
500 1,104 1,300 844 2,100 791
600 1,065 1,400 817 2,200 803
700 1,026 1,500 791
800 986 1,600 765
888 952 1,687 742 2,220 805
Figure 10.8.8 Chevron Kick Sheet (from CD)
DP Schedule
1,600
1,500
1,400
First
Circulation
1,300 -
1,200
PRESSURE (psi)
1,100
Straight
Line
1,000
900 KOP
888 Stks
TD
800
Second 2,221 Stks
Circulation
700 EOB
1,688 Stks
600
- 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
STROKES
Figure 10.8.9
October 2005 10-19

10.9 Effect of Well Profile on Casing Pressures and Pit Gain
The shape of a deviated / horizontal well profile influences both the casing pressure trend and
the pit gain during the circulation of a kick. Changes in casing pressure and pit gain that
should occur while circulating out a gas kick may be delayed until after the influx leaves the
horizontal hole section. This is illustrated in Figure 10.9.1 which compares pit level changes
to be expected in a vertical well with changes expected in a long horizontal well.
Of course, gas evolving from either OBM or a high GOR crude oil kick may also contribute
to dramatic increases in pit gain that will only become apparent as the influx approaches the
surface.
Figure 10.9.1
Casing pressures during kill operations may reflect a similar delay, since casing pressure
increases should occur to compensate for hydrostatic pressure changes caused by
displacement of mud by expanding influx gas.
What is more significant, however, in high angle / horizontal wells is that casing pressures
will also likely increase even when no additional pit gain is observed. This happens whenever
a given volume of influx moves into a hole section in which its vertical height is increased.
10-20 October 2005

If for example, a 50 bbl gas kick is circulated from a horizontal section (in which its vertical
height is essentially zero) to a deviated section in which it has a vertical height of 500 ft, the
hydrostatic pressure in the annulus will decrease due to the replacement of 500 ft of mud by
500 ft of gas in this section. Even if the influx expands minimally at this point, the casing
pressure needed to keep constant BHP may therefore increase by hundreds of psi as the
influx moves into the deviated and vertical sections of the well.
Added to this effect is the possible lengthening of an influx due to the presence of drill
collars that may be installed part way up the drill string. In any case, such changes should be
anticipated and not allowed to interfere with continued use of the selected kill method.
Figure 10.9.2 contains an example of theoretical casing pressure changes that occur while
circulating a gas kick out from a horizontal well with a long deviated section. In this case, the
change caused by gas leaving the horizontal hole section can be seen as a casing pressure
increase starting at about 500 strokes, long before the pressure changes resulting from the gas
nearing the surface.
Figure 10.9.2 Comparison of Casing Pressure and Pit Gain Profiles
October 2005 10-21

10.10 Stripping in Horizontal Wells
If a kick swabbed in while tripping has already entered the deviated / vertical portion of the
hole, it may be necessary to get the bit back to bottom (to the end of the hole) in order to
clean up any kick fluid left in the well.
In killing a horizontal well, it may be sufficient to strip pipe in until the bit is at the beginning
of the horizontal section (at final TVD, but not MD). At this point, the Driller’s or Wait &
Weight Methods can be used to “kill” the well, filling the annulus with clean, kill density
fluid while holding BHP constant.
After that, it should be possible to stage further into the hole, being careful to close the well
in and use the Driller’s Method 1st circulation technique to remove limited quantities of gas
influx displaced up the hole as the drill string is pushed into the horizontal section. In this
way it should be possible to eventually reach TD even when string weight is insufficient to
strip through the horizontal section.
10-22 October 2005

Section 11 – Deepwater Well Control
11. Deepwater Well Control
Deepwater Well Control is defined by Chevron in the following manner:
• Shallow water 0 – 3000 ft

• Deepwater 3000 – 5000 ft
• Ultra deepwater > 5000 ft
Policies, procedures and decision on how to proceed in a well control situation will be based
on minimizing pressures at the surface and minimizing equivalent mud weights downhole.
Redundancy is of paramount importance and equipment will be configured and procedures

adopted that maximize redundancy.
Deepwater well control is recognized to be a potentially hazardous operation and more

difficult to control than non-deepwater well control. There is a much greater likelihood of a
well control operation becoming an underground blowout in a deepwater situation than for
the same operation on a land rig or in a shallow water environment.
11.1 Kick Prevention and Detection
Kicks are more difficult to detect due to rig motion causing telescoping joint length changes
and drilling fluid movement in the pits.
In a deepwater environment, the drilling takes place from a floating vessel. In floating
drilling operations the drilling fluids are returned to the vessel via the riser. To compensate
for the heave caused by wave action, there is a pressure tight telescoping joint between the
riser and the mud system. As the vessel heaves, the telescoping joint strokes a distance equal
to the heave.
In bad weather conditions this causes the mud returns to vary in a periodic manner. The mud
return rate can vary by as much as 1 bbl per minute which can mask the early warning of a
kick indicated by an increase in flow rate from the well.
Mud Density
As the water depth increases, the overburden in the top hole and intermediate section
decreases because of the hydrostatic head of seawater. It is then more difficult to drill with a
sufficient riser margin for disconnect purposes.
October 2005 11-1

Section 11 –Deepwater Well Control
Synthetic-based muds and oil-based muds have different compressibility and thermal
expansion properties than water-based fluids.
Surface mud density alone may not be an accurate measure of downhole density and
hydrostatic pressure. This is particularly true when using synthetic fluids in long, deepwater
risers with their associated cooling effect.
Careful consideration should be given to these differences during well planning and during
deepwater drilling operations.
Mud Viscosity
Kick detection becomes more difficult as the viscosity increases in choke and kill lines, due
to the length and cooling effect, can mask the shut-in casing pressure. The effect is even
more pronounced with synthetic muds that have high viscosity at low temperature.
In order to reduce viscosity, the choke and kill lines may be filled with a clear or gelled fluid.
While this prevents the effect of mud solids settling in the choke and kills lines and the
resulting plugging, it creates problems interpreting initial shut-in pressures and establishing
proper circulating pressures during kills. It also increases the probability of hydrate or
freezing problems.
Note: It is therefore recommended to maintain the current mud weight in both choke and
kill lines and have a procedure in place to circulate these lines at regular intervals to
prevent viscosity build-up and solids settling.
Drilled Cuttings
Due to the increased length of riser in deepwater operations, the annulus may become
overloaded with cuttings. This creates a higher hydrostatic pressure which can lead to
fracturing of low strength casing shoes. This becomes especially important if a booster line is
not available or cannot adequately lift the cuttings out of the riser.
Abnormal Pressure Detection
The relatively large riser volume also increases lag time for observing gas units, cutting
samples, etc. In addition to impacting synthetic mud density, the cooling effect of the long
riser also prevents flow line mud temperature from being an effective tool in assessing
formation temperature (as used to detect formation pressure changes) unless mud
temperature can be measured directly at the BOP.
Mud logging operations may need to use an in-line sample heater on the mud prior to
measuring gas units because cold mud may give misleading (lower) gas unit readings.
11-2 October 2005

Environmental Effects (Adverse Weather)
Weather conditions are an important factor for accurate measurement of pit gain and flow
increase. As the floating drilling vessel heaves, rolls and pitches in response to wave action,
the drilling fluid in the pits responds in a similar manner. This movement of drilling fluid
complicates the reading of pit gain which is a primary early warning of a kick.
Two or more level sensors are required in each active pit that is subjected to pitch and roll.
These sensors are connected to a pit volume totalizer that incorporates averaging technology
to dampen these effects. The location of these pit sensors is important for accurate
measurement, not just for adverse conditions, but also during crane operations and ballasting
of the rig.
Figure 11.1.1
11.2 Circulating to Kill Wells
A number of factors should be considered when planning a method for circulating a kick to
the surface.
These factors include the following:
• Start-up procedures
• Correct reading of shut-in pressures
October 2005 11-3

• Slow circulating rates

• Time for gas reaching surface
• Hydrate considerations
• Gas in riser
• Gas migration
• Gas /Mud separator effect in choke line
• Friction increase as kill mud displaces choke line
Driller’s Method
Chevron recommends use of the Driller’s Method for deepwater and ultra deepwater well
control.
First Circulation: Circulate out the influx.
Second Circulation: Increase the mud density as required.
The advantages of the Driller's Method include:
• A shorter time with influx in the well bore. (Reduces time for hydrates to form)
• Circulation brings wellbore heat up to the BOP and choke and kill lines, helping to
reduce hydrate formation.
• The kill weight mud is only circulated after the influx has been circulated out of the
well. This eliminates the risk of over estimating the kill weight required due to
residual applied pressures (from pumping open a float valve etc.). Higher than
required kill mud weights could induce losses.
• Circulation keeps the BOP equipment temperatures higher than in a static well.
• Circulation begins earlier, which reduces likelihood of temperature induced changes

in mud viscosity and density from complicating pump startup and pressure
interpretation.
Wait & Weight Method
The Wait & Weight Method is often credited with the following advantages:
• Fewer circulations for total kill
• Potentially reduced casing shoe pressure when the gas influx approaches the shoe
11-4 October 2005

As the distance from TD to the casing shoe in deepwater and ultra deep water is usually
minimal, this benefit is not often applicable and this method is not recommended in
deepwater.
Note: Chevron does not recommend the Wait & Weight Method for deepwater well
control.
Bullheading
Bullheading may be a viable alternative when the open hole section is short. But pumping
influx fluids down a long open wellbore may induce losses which can result in inter-zonal
flow (underground blowout). Bullheading may be the best choice if other options would
exceed pressure limits or excessive hydrogen sulfide is expected and if the hole situation is
favorable (limited open hole with exposure to single highly permeable zone).
Number of Choke and Kill Lines
To provide redundancy on floating rigs it is normal practice to have both a choke and kill line
at the same pressure rating in the event that the choke line becomes inoperable. In deep water
operations the internal diameter of these lines is generally greater than those used in shallow
water operations, which reduces the effect of choke line friction.
In deepwater operations the kill line can be used as a static line to monitor the bottomhole
pressure and can be used to start up the pumps to circulate out a kick. This prevents the
choke line friction from increasing bottom hole circulating pressure (as long as choke line
friction is less that SICP). By keeping the static kill line gauge constant, the casing gauge
pressure will fall by the value of the choke line friction as pump is brought up to kill rate.
In deepwater operations it is preferable to have a BOP pressure sensor which gives a direct
readout of wellbore pressure at the BOP stack. This frees up the kill line to increase
redundancy and permit simultaneous use of both choke and kill lines to reduce the friction on
the well while circulating out a kick.
Multiple choke and kill line outlets on the BOP stack are also useful:
• To circulate through a hung-off string

• To circulate across the BOP to remove gas trapped in the BOP
• To reduce casing shoe loads at the end of the kill
BOP ‘Separator’ Effect
Using two choke and kill lines allows the BOP stack to act as a gas/mud separator. This is
assuming that the gas and mud are in two phases, i.e., not dissolved.
October 2005 11-5

Figure 11.2.1 Separator Effect
As shown in Figure 11.2.1 the consequences of the BOP separator effect are as follows:
• Gas will preferentially rise to the top of the BOP cavity. Therefore a larger volume of
gas will enter the upper choke/kill line in comparison to the volume that enters the
lower line.
• During this phase, the hydrostatic head in the gas filled line will be reduced.
• This allows the upper choke/kill line to take a greater proportion of the total flow.
• As the upper choke/kill line head decreases the lower choke and kill line flow
reverses, resulting in a U-tube flow.
11-6 October 2005

This flow of mud from the lower choke/kill line is then added to the stream of gas from the
wellbore, so that fluid entering the upper choke/kill line is mixed with more mud.
The overall effect is to reduce the gas/mud swapout and therefore minimize fluctuations of
hydrostatic pressures in these kill lines.
This may make it easier for the choke operator to keep the bottom hole constant as changes
rapidly occur.
Note: The BOP separator effect is mostly likely to affect a segregated kick.
11.3 Gas in Marine Riser
With deepwater operations, there are three ways for gas to enter the drilling riser
• Gas kick is undetected/ well is not shut-in until influx is above BOP
• Trapped stack gas is released when BOP is opened
• Closed BOP elements leak gas into the riser during well control operations
Obviously, it is most important to prevent this situation from occurring, as gas coming to
surface up the riser poses a safety hazard to personnel and equipment. It also poses an
environmental hazard should it be diverted, along with some mud, directly overboard.
The first and most important step in dealing with gas in the riser is to shut in the well at the
BOP. This step should effectively prevent a gas-in-riser problem from escalating into a
blowout.
Some rigs have specialized equipment installed to help handle gas in the riser such as having
the ability to divert flow through large volume gas separators. Riser fill valves located on the
marine riser are utilized to prevent riser collapse in the event of large gas volumes displace
riser fluids. Where such equipment exists, plans should be in place to help mitigate
consequences of gas in the riser.
Where no special equipment exists, it may be necessary to immediately use the diverter
system to divert riser return flow overboard, with attendant environmental consequences of
gas in the riser.
The difference here (which must be emphasized) is that none of these measures are intended
to control wellbore pressures – they are all required simply to protect people and equipment.
It is the act of shutting in the well before the problem escalates that is critical for maintaining
control of the well.
October 2005 11-7

Trapped Gas in BOP
As with all subsea operation safe handling of gas trapped in the BOP during kill operations is
essential. Since the magnitude of the problem relates to the pressure of the trapped gas
(hydrostatic pressure of fluid in the choke line), it is even more significant in deepwater
operations.
Furthermore, mishandling of any gas entering the long subsea drilling riser presents a greater
risk for riser collapse, making proper removal of trapped stack gas even more important.
It is recommended that, prior to spud, a bridging document is prepared that details the rig
specific procedures to be used to handle trapped stack gas.
11.4 Shallow Water Flows
Shallow water flows are uncontrolled water flows with returns to the seafloor resulting from
natural or induced overpressures in the top-hole section. They may exist in water depths
greater than 500 ft, in the interval from 200 feet to 2,000 ft below the mud line.
Shallow water flow can occur when encountering the combination of:
• Increased pore pressure

• Presence of a top seal
• Permeable formation
Overpressures that are greater than hydrostatic with shallow flows are more difficult to stop
due to the narrow margin between the pore pressures and fracture pressures.
Shallow water flow can be caused by:
• Induced fractures
• Induced storage
• Geo-pressured sands (most commonly due to rapid sedimentation)
• Transmission of geo-pressured sands through cement channels
As it is often necessary to extend the casing lengths in order to reach well total depth, the
setting depths may have to be extended to approximately 2,000 ft below the mud line. It
should be noted that on the floating rigs this hole section is normally drilled riserless.
During drilling of this particular hole section, Shallow water flow can occur after sweeps
have been pumped to clean away cuttings. In such a case, placement of kill weight mud in
the open hole is required to shut-off the flow.
11-8 October 2005

Consequences Of Uncontrolled Shallow Water Include:
• Compromised wellbore integrity
• Abandonment of well
• Seafloor heap, crater, or subsidence
• Loss of well support and buckling of structural casing
• Project delays
Guidelines To Mitigate Shallow Water Flows Include:
• Mechanical shut off devices
• Drilling techniques (drill section with kill weight mud)
• Increase mud weight prior to running casing
• Geophysical prediction / Seismic surveys (offset data)
• Pore pressure and fracture gradient prediction
• Cementing techniques / Special designed foamed cements
• Re-spud well
Problems with shallow water flow can also occur after running the conductor string and
cementing. When the cement is in the transition phase, hydrostatic forces are reduced and the
zone flows disturbing the cement before it can set up. This results in an uncontrolled flow to
the seafloor. Remedial work at this point may not be successful.
The API has developed a cementing recommended practice (RP 65) to help avoid shallow
water flow hazards.
11.5 Hydrates
Hydrates are an operational hazard found in all forms of drilling but have extra significance
in deepwater well control operations. They consist of host molecules (water) forming a lattice
structure acting like a cage to entrap guest molecules (gas).
October 2005 11-9

They can form in temperatures well above 32° F under sufficient pressure, resemble dirty ice,
are solid in nature and have a tendency to adhere to metal surfaces. They are generally very
stable and are dangerous only in that they release significant quantities of gas when
dissociating. Pressure of released gas bubbles in, for example, hydrates dissolving in a
tubular pulled to surface (such as core barrels or plugged choke lines) have been known to
shoot chunks of hydrates forcefully out from the tubular. By incorporating an awareness and
acceptance that an environment exists where hydrates may form, they can be safely dealt
with, although they can create significant mechanical problems such as difficulty in
unlatching connectors, blockages to function of BOPs, and plugs in circulating paths.
Note: One cubic foot of hydrates could release 170 standard cubic feet of gas at surface
conditions
Hydrates form under certain combinations of gas composition, pressure, and temperature in
the presence of free water. As deeper water environments are challenged, the potential for
hydrate formation increases due to the combination of higher pressures and lower
temperatures encountered.
Requirements For Hydrate Formation
Figure 11.3 shows the relationship of average seawater temperature as a function of water
depth in the Gulf of Mexico. At 700 ft water depth, the average sea floor temperature in the
Gulf of Mexico is approximately 60°F. It drops very quickly to approximately 48°F by 1500
ft water depth, then slows down and is approximately 40°F at 3000 ft water depth.
Figure 11.5.1 Relationship of Seawater Temperature and Water Depth in Gulf

of Mexico
11-10 October 2005

As the specific gravity of the associated gas increases so does the potential for hydrate
formation. Phase behavior diagrams describe the physical state of any gas composition as a
function of pressure and temperature. The points along this curve actually represent the
temperature at which the last hydrate melts or dissociates at any given pressure.
Figure 11.5.2 Effect of gas composition on hydrate formation
Hydrates do not instantly form with favorable pressure and temperature as defined by their
phase equilibrium curve; rather, some amount of supercooling (or overpressure) is required,
typically 10-12°F, to initiate nucleation and experience growth.
The Figure 11.5.3 depicts line C-D as the threshold, line E-F where the hydrates will form,
and A-B shows the crystal growth rate as a function of decreased temperature and pressure.
October 2005 11-11

This region below the dissociation phase equilibrium curve and above the super cooled curve
(hydrate forming region) can be thought of as a safety factor for a given system if designed
on the dissociation curve.
Figure 11.5.3 Temperatures and Pressures for Hydrate Formation
Methanol Injection
Methanol injection can be used as a cure or prevention for hydrates on surface and downhole
production systems. Methanol is not normally used on drilling operations due to its toxicity
and volatility.
For hydrates forming in BOP cavity and choke and kill lines with the well shut-in, circulating
at the highest possible rate with hot fluid or mud across BOPs down a second drill string, or
through coiled tubing run beside the drill pipe has worked to dissociate the plug.
The internal diameter of the second string of pipe run should be maximized to reduce the
time and pressure required to displace the heated fluid to the area needing heat. However,
below 4,000 ft water depth this process is extremely marginal due to heat loss and ambient
temperature cooling effect.
11-12 October 2005

Hydrate Inhibition
Most hydrate inhibition today is done by use of thermodynamic inhibitors which depress the
temperature required for hydrate stability at any given pressure. These inhibitors include
materials such as salt, glycol, and methanol. Inhibition is also possible by used of kinetic
inhibitors, generally certain polymers. A combination of both types of inhibitors is most
likely required as conditions become increasingly severe.
Salt/polymer inhibition systems are most commonly used during deepwater drilling in the
Gulf of Mexico, North Sea & offshore Brazil. Systems comprised of 20-26% by weight
sodium chloride (NaCl) with required polymers have been safely used in water depths >7500
ft in the presence of gas kicks.
10000
PRESSURE (PSI)
1000
100
Figure 11.5.4 Glycol Content to Prevent Hydrate Formation
Glycols are also effective inhibitors as can be seen in Figure 11.5.4, but are less effective
than salts by weight, and experience severe viscosity increases at cooler temperatures. They
October 2005 11-13

are excellent in combination with salt systems at lower concentrations. At 90°F it is virtually
impossible to form stable hydrates under normal well control pressure ranges.
Hydrates formed by percolating gas have been documented numerous times in subsea
connectors and have caused wells to be permanently abandoned that otherwise would have
been temporarily abandoned for a future completion. Typically, the rig and riser can be
"winched" around to cause the hydrate to break or loosen up. Circulation of heated fluids
down the drill string both on the inside and the outside of the connector has sometimes
worked successfully.
Hydrate Formulation Inside Wellbore or BOP Equipment
The second problem, where hydrates form inside the wellbore or BOP equipment, is much
more serious from a well control standpoint and can affect an operation in many ways.
Chevron recommends the Driller’s Method of well control is used to avoid hydrates forming
in the BOP. If warm muds are continuously circulated from the bottom of the hole to the
BOP, hydrates are less likely to form. Be aware of non-circulating time in the kill line if used
as a monitor, as this is prone to hydrate plugging.
Hydrates typically do not form during routine drilling and/or circulating operations since the
combination of required properties do not exist. Hydrates usually occur when a gas influx is
taken into the wellbore and is being circulated out through the choke and/or kill line.
Hydrates form from increased velocity and expansion cooling in the lines, or during an
extended shut-in period where the gas bubble reaches the mud line, rapidly cools, and forms
hydrates in the wellbore and/or choke and kill lines.
Note: Hydrates will extract free water from the drilling mud, causing it to dehydrate and
settle out similar to a barite plug.
Many different scenarios involving hydrate formation have been observed and documented,
including the following plugging problems:
• Choke and/or kill line causing inability to continue circulating out kick.
• BOP cavity or just below stack resulting in loss of wellbore circulation and pressure
monitoring.
• Drill string-x-riser (or BOP or casing) annulus causing stuck pipe.
• Drill string BOP annulus opposite a preventer hampering shut-in capability.
• Closed ram not allowing the ram to be opened back up.
Hydrate evaluation should be thoroughly investigated prior to undertaking any deepwater

drilling activity. Any non-routine occurrence with any BOP function or subsea wellhead
equipment should be suspect for hydrate formation, especially during an extended shut-in
period.
These incidents may include the following:
11-14 October 2005

• Abnormal hydraulic operating fluid volumes measured when functioning valves, rams
or connectors suggesting improper functioning
• depth measurement discrepancy when setting casing hanger seal assemblies even if a
positive test has been experienced
• problems running and/or retrieving the seat protector
11.6 DP Emergency Disconnect
Subsea stacks are designed to allow a floating drilling vessel in dynamically positioned (DP)
load to disconnect from the well while the well remains shut-in. The object of the
disconnection is to prevent damage to the well or drilling equipment in the event of a station
keeping failure.
Modern DP systems have greatly enhanced the reliability of DP systems for drilling, but
incidents still occur. When an incident occurs there is a requirement to secure and disconnect
the well before any damage occurs to either:
• The wellhead
• Drilling equipment
• BOP stack lower marine riser package (LMRP)
• Slip joint
• Moon pool
• Riser tensioners
• DST / Well Testing equipment in use
• Rig or vessel integrity
Predicting Vessel Movements
Modeling analysis can be done to predict various vessel movement scenarios that could
possibly occur. These models can predict excursions of the vessel for various combinations
of environment for drift off, power loss scenarios and drive offs. It is also possible to model
the reaction of rig equipment during these movements.
The items that are critical during a vessel movement are as follows:
• The LMRP connector/lower flex joint angle

• Moon pool clearance
• Slip joint stroke
• Tensioner stroke limits
All floating drilling units operate within operational criteria typical for that unit, its
equipment, and environment.
October 2005 11-15

It is critical to have the LMRP disconnected before either the LMRP connector reaches its
limits for disconnect or the slip joint strokes out or contacts the moon pool. Otherwise, there
is a high risk of bending, damaging or losing the wellhead.
Once the disconnect sequence is initiated there will be a finite interval of time before the
disconnect actually takes place. Therefore, it is necessary to initiate the disconnect well
before limits of any of the equipment are reached.
On most drilling units in use today, systems are designed so that once the final disconnect
sequence is initiated with all required subsea functions taking place in sequence
automatically, the LMRP will lift off in 30-40 seconds. Therefore the sequence would be
initiated at least 30-40 seconds prior to limits of any equipment being reached. In reality, it is
best to begin this sequence earlier in the event of any malfunctions or miscalculations.
The point, at which to initiate the disconnect, must be clearly defined with no ambiguities,
since the driller alone may have to make this decision quickly with no help from a toolpusher
or company representative (Drill Site Manager). The following questions must be answered
well in advance of an event:
When should preparations to disconnect begin? What is the best indicator to use?
If a certain pre-defined limit is reached, then the sequence must be initiated. It is critical that
there be good communication between the Dynamic Positioning Operator (DPO) and driller.
Watch Circle
Historically during DP operations, many marine engineers have used the offset distance
measured in percent of water depth, to establish "watch circles" to indicate when to begin
disconnect procedures.
To simplify some of these procedures, preparation for disconnect would begin at a distance
of 2.5% of water depth, and disconnect initiated at 5.5% of water depth. Generally, an offset
of 2.5% constituted a "yellow alert" and an offset of 5.5% of water depth constituted a "red
alert".
During normal drilling operations, it is planned that there will be time to safely disconnect
and clear the LMRP before any equipment reaches its limits. With low mud weights, this is
probably true except for the most extreme conditions. With higher mud weights, however,
lower flex joint angle will be much higher than for lower mud weights for the same given
offset. Additionally, the lower flex joint angle, particularly at higher mud weights, reaches its
limit before the other items reach their limits. At the lower mud weights, the lower flex joint
angle reaches its limit at about the same time as the other items.
On most modern DP rigs, equipped with a multiplex control system, flex joint angle read out
is available at the DP console on a real time basis, and can be tied into an alarm on the drill
floor. For this reason, some rigs use the lower flex joint angle instead of offset as the primary
11-16 October 2005

indicator of the time disconnect. Offset is a part of the equation, but is used for information
rather than the definitive indicator. Tying flex joint angle readings into alarms on the rig floor
allows for an independent alarm over and above direct communications with the DPO.
On rigs in a degraded status, a reading of flex joint 3° would indicate to the driller to hangoff
drill pipe and prepare to disconnect ("yellow alert" status). A reading of flex joint 5° would
indicate that point which to disconnect ("red alert").
Except for the most extreme conditions, if a disconnect is effected at a lower flex joint of 5°
and if the LMRP lifts off in 30-40 seconds, all equipment should remain within its operating
limits. While communications with the DPO are crucial, the driller's access to a direct read
out is a redundancy in the event communication with the DP room is lost for any reason.
As rigs move into deeper water, slip joint stroke could well become the limiting factor rather
than lower flex joint, especially at lower mud weights. Since offset increases for a given
lower flex joint angle in deepwater, longer slip joints will be a requirement in ultra
deepwater.
Establishing Disconnect Procedures
Whatever criteria are selected for yellow and red alert, these procedures must be short, clear,
and concise with no ambiguities. Failure to successfully disconnect in an emergency could
result in:
• Uncontrolled subsea blowout

• Loss of or damage to riser
• Damaged wellhead
• Damaged BOP
Emergency disconnect systems should be capable of automatically disconnecting the lower

marine riser package (LMRP) and securing the well.
At a certain limit, the pipe is to be sheared and the LMRP disconnected. Procedures should
be posted in the driller's station. There should be a clear procedure for each of the following:
• Normal drilling operations

• Bit above the BOP
• BHA across the BOP
• Casing across the BOP
• Well control situations
In some operations, standing procedures require the Toolpusher and Drill Site Manager to be
present on the rig floor if there is anything across the BOPs that can't be sheared.
October 2005 11-17

Modern dynamically positioned systems are fitted with a multiplex BOP control systems.
This is a requirement due to the speed of response required to disconnect. Additionally,
sufficient hydraulic storage should be available on the BOP/LMRP to allow for the
disconnect sequence to function with no recharge from the surface.
Details concerning the various situations mentioned above are listed below.
\
Normal Drilling Operations (Drill Pipe Across Stack):
The driller must be prepared to hang-off, shear and disconnect at any time with drill pipe in
the hole.
Consideration should be given to the rig drifting off location during a station keeping failure.
The driller should leave enough room to slack off the block as needed to keep the tool joint at
the hangoff-point.
Shear rams must be tested on the rig that will both shear and hold working pressure on any
drill pipe across the stack. During deep water operations consideration should also be given
to providing casing shear rams and blind rams in the BOP stack.
Bit Above BOP Stack:
This is the point of least exposure when tripping (other than the bit on or near bottom)
because the well can be closed-in and the lower marine riser package disconnected.
BHA Across Stack:
The BHA should be planned for a minimum operational length if the BOP system is not
capable of shearing the components. The driller should flow check the well on the trip tank
before pulling the BHA into the BOP stack. Dropping the string would not be applicable in
this scenario during deep water applications.
Casing Across The BOP:
This is possibly the most vulnerable scenario during deep water drilling operations. The
BOPs must have the ability to shear casing. Dropping the casing is not an option in deep and
ultra deepwater operations.
Well Control Situations (Kick):
It is advisable to hang-off during well control situations so that in the event of a station
keeping incident, activity is kept at a minimum in the event a disconnect is necessary.
Running a drill pipe float or drop-in check valve sub should always be considered to keep
pressure off the drill string for reconnect operations. Consideration should also be given to
the effects of disconnect with the riser full of mud and the lower annular closed.
11-18 October 2005

Disconnect Sequences
Non-Emergency Disconnect:
Circulate bottoms up and pull into casing.
Calculate space out to land hang-off tool in the wellhead.
Make-up hang-off tool in the string and run it into the hole (making sure that the bit is still
inside the casing).
1) Land hang-off tool inside the wellhead with the compensator stroked open. Position
compensator in mid-stroke and adjust the compensator to support the pipe weight (use
weight in air, not buoyed weight) above the rams.
2) Close the appropriate pipe rams and locks.
3) Back off the right hand release sub on the hangoff tool.
4) Pick-up drill pipe above the BOP stack. Check for flow and close the shear/blind
rams. Close the wedge locks if ram is a Cameron ram.
5) Displace the riser with sea water and adjust riser tensioning. Dump the subsea
accumulator bottles, if applicable. De-ballast part or all of the air buoyancy tanks on
the riser, if applicable.
6) Pull the remainder of the drill pipe out of the riser. Disconnect the LMRP and pull the
riser.
Emergency Disconnect
Situations that might require an emergency disconnect include: the loss of well control, a
sudden change in weather, or waiting too long to do a "non-emergency" disconnect. In these
situations, a rig specific procedure similar to the following is recommended:
1) Pick-up and space out to hangoff on the designated hang-off ram.
2) Close hang-off ram with 1,500 psi closing pressure. Close wedge locks if ram is a
Cameron ram.
3) Close lower pipe rams for a backup.
4) Adjust compensator to support string air weight above rams, plus overpull of 10,000
lbs (time permitting).
October 2005 11-19

5) Shear drill pipe with full operating pressure (3,000 psi). Some BOP manufacturers
have had trouble with new drill pipe. On some new drill pipe, the tapered section next
to the tool joint has been lengthened. If some of this type of drill pipe is in the string,
the BOPE manufacturer should be contacted to determine shearing capability.
6) Raise the sheared off drill string enough to clear the BOP.
7) Check the riser tensioning then disconnect the LMRP. Move the vessel off location
sufficiently to stay clear of the BOP stack.
Note: Studies conducted by Chevron and ram manufacturers indicate that complete
shear of some grades of drill pipe will not be obtained using 1,500 psi closing pressure. Five
inch grade G drill pipe may require up to 3,000 psi closing pressure for a complete shear.
Also, note that high strength drill pipe that has been sheared can explode, long after
shearing. A sheared stub should be handled carefully and removed from the rig as soon as
possible.
Re-entering The Well After Disconnecting
While disconnected from the well, gas may "seep" into the wellbore and then migrate to the
BOP stack. Also, the wellbore is cooled by circulating, but circulation has stopped. The
wellbore temperature therefore begins to increase, which may cause the wellbore pressure to
increase. When reentering the well, care must be taken to remove the trapped gas from under
the BOP stack. A rig specific procedure similar to the following is recommended:
1) After reconnecting the LMRP, displace the riser with mud using the drill pipe or riser
fill line. Open the lower pipe rams (if closed), upper kill line valves and the lower
choke line valves. Check pressure on the choke line for indication of trapped gas.
Attempt to bleed off any excess pressure.
2) Circulate the proper mud weight down the kill line while taking returns through the
choke.
3) After clearing the well of any trapped gas, open the shear/blind rams.
4) Screw into the hang-off tool. If the pipe was sheared, dress-off the top of the drill pipe
stub and latch with an overshot.
5) Open the middle pipe rams and monitor the well for flow.
6) Pull the hang-off tool (or overshot, if pipe was sheared) out of the hole.
7) Trip to bottom, circulate and condition mud as required.
11-20 October 2005

Note: If S-135 drill pipe has been sheared, "shattered" pieces of the drill pipe will
be on top of the shear rams. Pick up these pieces with a magnet prior to opening the shear
rams.
11.7 Riser Margin
Riser Margin is defined as the additional mud weight (ppg) needed to maintain hydrostatic
control of the well in the event the riser fails or is disconnected. In such a case, the
hydrostatic pressure of sea water would replace mud hydrostatic over the sea water depth
interval.
To compensate for the loss of weighted fluid in a long, deepwater riser, it would generally be
necessary to use an excessively high mud weight. Since deepwater operations are almost
always limited by relatively weak formations, such a high mud weight cannot normally be
used without breaking down exposed formations. Riser margin is therefore almost always
impractical, and is not used, for deepwater operations,
For this reason, emergency disconnect procedures become particularly critical and must be
considered the principle means of ensuring well control in the event of riser disconnect or
damage. Secondary emergency activation devices such as “dead man” systems which
automatically activate emergency disconnect procedures in the event of riser
failure/disconnect are essential in order to provide ability to maintain well control in such
events.
October 2005 11-21

Section 12 – HPHT Well Control
12. HPHT Well Control
HPHT Wells Definition
High pressure/high bottomhole temperature wells are defined as wells where the undisturbed
formation temperature is greater than 300 deg. F and, either the maximum pressure gradient
of any porous formation to be drilled exceeds 0.8 psi/ft, or pressure control equipment with a
rated working pressure in excess of 10,000 psi is required.
In some locations regulations require preparation of extensive, additional documentation of

design, equipment, procedural and training plans prior to drilling a well section which meets
the above conditions. This chapter contains examples of procedures developed specifically to
comply with such requirements.
In actuality, such procedural guidelines simply document due diligence that is equally
important in other difficult, but non HPHT wells. Operations personnel involved in any
challenging drilling operation are encouraged to review the following discussions of topics,
many of which may be found to be equally relevant to their non-HPHT operations.
12.1 Well Planning and Design
Before operations commence:
– All safety aspects of each step of any proposed program must be closely scrutinized.
– The capability to deal effectively with non-anticipated situations must be evaluated.
– Responsibilities for all well control functions must be clearly defined.
When operations are extended to involve work classed as “High Pressure High Bottomhole
Temperature” specialized drilling and well control procedures with increased equipment
considerations and training will be specified and implemented.
To be able to drill an HPHT well safely under all circumstances, a detailed and optimal study
of all parameters is required. Uncommon types of operation should be approached in small
steps so that there is a way back if a decision turns out to be incorrect.
The HPHT procedures only apply to the HP section of an HPHT well, following the setting
of a deep intermediate casing.
Pre-planning of HPHT wells shall include kick modeling and well control simulations,
especially for high angle and horizontal wells.
October 2005 12-1

Drilling Program
The drilling program is a written document intended to cover all details in managing and
conducting the drilling operation. It is produced by the drilling department and used as an
information source in achieving the operation’s objectives. Based on available well data it
provides, with as much accuracy as possible, information on:
– Well Targets.
– Characteristics of formations (i.e. porosity, permeability, fluid types, gas zones, lost
circulation, etc).
– Abnormal pore pressures and expected formation strength gradients at the proposed
casing setting depths.
– The deviation control program (this is issued for all wells including intended straight
holes).
– The sequence of operations.
– Any shallow gas predictions and shallow gas procedures.
– Hole sizes with recommended drilling assemblies.
– Formation integrity tests (leak-off tests) required to confirm formation strength

gradients.
– Minimum leak-off values required to maintain acceptable kick tolerance.
– Special instructions regarding any unusual circumstances that may be encountered.
– Casing, cementing and mud programs.
Note: Any deviation from the Drilling Program will need to be confirmed and approved by
the appropriate Chevron supervisor (operations Drilling Engineer, Drilling Superintendent
or Drilling Manager as applicable).
Technical challenges may include:
• Reduced safety margin between required mud weight and formation breakdown
gradient.
• Uncertainty in the evaluation of the pore pressure that is already approaching the
design limit of drilling equipment in use.
• Lack of casing program flexibility.
12-2 October 2005

• Potentially large volumes of gas and liquid hydrocarbons at the shale shaker and mud
pits
• Limited mud/gas separator capacity
• Equipment reliability at elevated temperatures
• Ballooning or supercharged formations
• Abrupt unloading of well due to gas breakout from OBM
• Mud system challenges due to high temperatures and high density requirements
• Temperature effects on cement slurry design.
Responsibilities of the Chevron On-site Drill Site Manager (DSM)
It is the sole responsibility of the Chevron Drill Site Manager to ensure that Drilling
Operations are conducted with due regard to safety and well control.
It is the Drill Site Manager’s duty to:
– Ensure that Company policies and instructions are properly given and that they are
properly understood and implemented.
– Familiarize him/herself with the environment in which he/she is operating.
– Review the Well Plan (Drilling Program) in detail.
– Advise Office Management of the day to day progress and of any aspects of the
prognosis or well plan which might cause the loss of well control.
– Understand applicable Government rules and regulations and ensure compliance.
– Ensure Contractor’s emergency procedures manual and operating/safety procedures

conform to the Government regulations and Contractor complies with all
requirements.
– Ensure all personnel are fully familiar and trained in applicable well control
procedures.
– Ensure pressure tests and drills are carried out in accordance with procedures
specified.
– Ensure that Mud logging personnel are fully familiar and experienced in over-
pressure prediction, and all other aspects relating to data monitoring for well control.
– Ensure calculated mud/slurry weights provide sufficient overbalance to control the

well.
– The cement unit is fully operational at all times.
October 2005 12-3

The responsibilities of the Chevron Representative do not reduce those of the Drilling
Contractor, with regard to well control and the safety of the installation and the personnel
onboard.
It is the ultimate responsibility of the Drilling Contractor’s Senior Person-in-Charge,

commonly referred to as the OIM, to ensure the safety of the installation and its personnel.
Should a conflict occur between the objectives of the well and the Rig Personnel or well
safety, the OIM will have the final decision. Issues regarding individual’s responsibilities
should be addressed prior to spudding the well. A bridging document is often useful in this
regard.
12.2 Communication
Field and Office Communication
Each operation should have a minimum of two modes of communication between the office
and field operation.
As a minimum the Chevron Drill Site Manager should communicate with his/her Office
Drilling Superintendent or designated substitute daily.
The Drilling Contractor should establish independent lines of communication between the
office and field operation in accordance with their operating policy. This policy should
follow along similar lines as practiced by Chevron.
The Chevron office and the Drilling Contractor’s office should communicate with each other
as required. Daily communication while drilling below the last casing seat above the HPHT
section should take place. This frequency should increase if field operation concerns become
apparent.
All Chevron office personnel as well as the Drilling Contractor’s personnel who have a
position of responsibility over the field operation should be available on a 24 hour basis via
pagers, mobile telephones, etc.
Rig Site Communication
A Daily Operations Meeting should be held on the rig by the Senior Rig Staff. In attendance
will be the Chevron personnel, Senior Drilling Contractor personnel and Third Party
Personnel directly involved in well operations, such as the Mud Engineer, Mud Logging
Engineer and Cementer. This meeting is often chaired by the OIM and will discuss current
and planned operations. Recording of this meeting is typically documented in the vessel log
book.
12-4 October 2005

Briefings, from the Daily Operations Meeting, to the crews will be passed on by those in
attendance. All instructions to the Driller should be in written form and posted on the drill
floor, and a copy kept on file.
All crews should start each working shift with a brief meeting, stressing Safety Awareness
for procedures and practices to be followed. Each crew member should have a short hand-
over with his counterpart. This person should bring to his Supervisor’s attention anything out
of the normal practice. The Supervisor should correspondingly discuss any points he/she
feels needed with the person in charge, so all personnel are fully conversant with the
operations and conditions present.
Rig Safety Meetings should occur as normal in field operations. The out of norm procedures
and practices will be highlighted in each meeting where crews have open discussions,
increasing their safety and operational awareness.
In the event of an emergency, the installation OIM will be responsible to initiate his own
Emergency Procedure and also report the incident to the Chevron Office. For out of office
hours the Drilling Superintendent’s on duty person should be called.
Chevron and Drilling Contractor personnel will then follow the procedures laid down in the
Emergency Procedures Manual. Chevron personnel should also ensure that the installation’s
owners, management and duty personnel are alerted and stand-by for assistance.
HPHT Kick Handling
The OIM should be prepared to take charge in any kick situation in which risk to personnel
and/or the installation is becoming evident. The OIM must take action to move personnel
(and the installation, if a mobile unit) off location before a well control situation deteriorates
to the extent that safe evacuation options are compromised. This decision should be made
after consultation with key members of the offshore management team.
Consultation with shore based operational personnel can be made, but depending on the
gravity of the situation, it may not be possible or warranted.
12.3 HPHT Well Control Equipment
It is of the utmost importance that the correct equipment is selected when drilling an HPHT
well. An example of well control and surface equipment temperature limitations and pressure
ratings for a typical HPHT operation are shown in Table 12.3.1.
October 2005 12-5

BOP Equipment
The following recommendations are the minimum standard that applies to an HPHT well:
1. Sequence (manual or automatic) closing of the Inner/Outer choke and kill lines on a
subsea stack, with the outer valve closing first, should be used to limit the effects of
cutting of the gates. Also, consideration should be given to the closure mechanism and
whether additional hydraulic assist should be incorporated in order to increase closing
force.
2. There should be a minimum of two outlets to the choke manifold below the upper set of
pipe rams on a subsea stack.
3. For subsea stacks the upper pipe rams should be positioned in the stack so that they can
be used to hangoff the drill string with the shear/blind rams closing above.
4. BOP Rams should be fitted with high temperature elastomers with a continuous working
temperature rating of 250 degrees F and a peak working rating of 350 degrees F for one
hour emergency service. Variable bore ram packers are generally rated to lower
temperatures than equivalent size fixed ram packers.
5. Choke and kill lines and their elastomers will be rated to the same pressure, temperature
and H2S service as the BOP rams.
6. Choke manifold valves and chokes intended to be operated under high pressure to be
fitted with hydraulic actuators.
7. Flexible Hose used in choke and kill lines will be fit for the same pressure and H2S
service as the choke and kill lines. These flexible hoses will have a continuous working
temperature of 250 degrees F and a peak working rating of 320 degrees F for one hour
emergency service.
8. Compatibility between drilling fluids and BOP elastomers should be confirmed prior to
commencing drilling operations.
Examples of Subsea and Surface BOP systems are shown in Figures 12.3.1 & 12.3.2.
12-6 October 2005

Table 12.3.1
WELL CONTROL AND SURFACE EQUIPMENT

Temperature Limitations and Pressure Ratings
Continuous Emergency
Service Service
Equipment Rating (1 Month) Rating (1 Hour) Pressure (psi)
Max Deg F Max Deg F
PIPE RAMS 250 350 15,000
VARIABLE RAMS 190 N/A 15,000
BOP CHOKE AND KILL

250 350 15,000
VALVES
SHEAR RAMS 190 N/A 15,000
RAM DOOR SEALS &

250 350 15,000
RAM SHAFT SEALS
ANNULARS 170 225 5,000/10,000
FLEXIBLE HOSE 250 320 15,000
CHOKE AND KILL LINE

250 350 15,000
STAB SEALS
CHOKE MANIFOLD
VALVES, UPSTREAM 250 350 15,000
OF THE BUFFER TANK
CHOKE MANIFOLD
VALVES,
250 350 5,000
DOWNSTREAM OF
THE BUFFER TANK
CHOKE MANIFOLD
OVERBOARD 250 350 5,000
PIPEWORK
SLIP JOINT - CHOKE

250 350 15,000
KILL BOX SAVER SUB
October 2005 12-7

Figure 12.3.1 Example of Subsea BOP System
12-8 October 2005

Figure 12.3.2 Example of Surface BOP System
October 2005 12-9

The Choke Manifold and Choke
A typical HPHT choke manifold is shown in Figure 12.3.3. It is essential that the choke
manifold should be designed to provide the following principal features:
a) Pressure integrity for the highest anticipated working pressures.
b) A range of flow-path options with at least 2 variable power (remote) chokes and one
manual adjustable choke.
c) A point upstream of the chokes at which glycol can be injected to suppress hydrate
formation.
d) The buffer chamber, between the downstream side of the chokes and the mud gas
separator, should be capable of dampening out pressure surges and accommodate
slugs of mud/gas.
e) A means of by-passing the mud gas separator, rapidly, in the event of the blow-down
pressure rating of the MGS being approached, so that the pressure in the MGS can be
reduced and the well can be shut in safely.
f) There will be a blowdown line fitted downstream of the choke and prior to the mud
gas separator. This line should be rated to 5000 psi and capable of a gas flow rate of
50 mmscf per day.
g) The blowdown line will be used:
• If the pressure in the mud gas separator cannot be maintained below the
maximum allowable.
• If the line from the choke manifold to the mud gas separator fails or becomes
blocked with hydrates.
h) In the choke manifold, choke lines and HCR valves through entry into the buffer
chamber should have the same pressure rating of the BOP stack.
i) Pressure rating of buffer chamber and lines downstream of the buffer chamber should
be as follows:
• 5K for a 10K BOP stack

12-10 October 2005

Figure 12.3.3 Typical HPHT Choke Manifold
October 2005 12-11

BOP And Choke Line Temperature Rating
The temperatures at the BOP and choke line are likely to be of importance in a well control
operation from two aspects:
a) If the well is flowing rapidly, the temperature at sub-sea flexible elements may be near to
their operational limit.
b) In a sub-sea BOP stack system, there will be a cooling effect between the BOP and the
surface choke manifold. The expansion of gas across the choke may then lead to
downstream temperatures which are low enough to cause hydrates to form.
Computer model predictions of both the sub-sea BOP temperature and surface choke
temperatures for a deep HPHT well for various uncontrolled flow rates through the choke are
shown in Figure 12.3.4. In a typical HPHT well control kill operation it is estimated that the
subsea BOP temperature would be about 250°F.
Figure 12.3.4 Example of Predicted BOP and Choke Temperature
12-12 October 2005

Additional Rig Instrumentation
1. Additional Rig Instrumentation should be made available on the installation to monitor

critical well parameters. This data will be displayed where it is visible from the remote
choke operating console.
2. This additional instrumentation could consist of temperature and pressure sensors.
3. Temperature Sensors should be located to record the following data:
• At BOP (subsea optional) and upstream of any coflexip hose.

• Upstream of the chokes on both choke and kill lines.
• Buffer tank downstream of the choke.
4. Pressure sensors upstream and downstream of the choke.
5. Kill manifold pressure gauge.
6. One data gathering point on the MGS should be used (i.e. a single pressure gauge/sensor)
to monitor and manage the vessel operation, as related to fluid head in the mud leg and
temperature gauge.
High Pressure Kill Facility
1. A high pressure, low volume kill pump rated at 15,000 psi working pressure or greater
will be fitted. This is normally the cement pump incorporating two triplex pumps, both
with 15k fluid ends. Its working pressure rating should be the same as the BOP stack. It
should be independently driven and not rely on power from the installation. The high
pressure pump and its circulating system will be such that the well can be circulated
should rig power be lost. The BOP kill-line shall be permanently hooked up to the kill
pump. At least 2 valves shall separate the kill line from the cement unit. Procedures
should be in place to flush the surface section of the kill line after every cement job.
2. Dedicated high pressure (15k) kill manifold and high pressure (15k) kill hose.
3. High pressure kick single assembly to link the kill pump to the drill string through the
high pressure kill manifold and hose.
4. Should the installation lose power during a well kill situation the rig emergency generator
will be capable of supplying sufficient power to run:
• Main air compressor.

• Mud mix pump.
• Agitator.
• Fuel oil transfer pump.
October 2005 12-13

Miscellaneous Equipment
Additional equipment recommended for HPHT operations includes:
• Glycol injection pump

• Glycol feed storage tank
• Calibrated Stripping tank
• Sufficient 15k safety valves for the drilling stand, for a kick single assembly (pipe
joint with high pressure circulating head), and for normal stabbing purposes.
• Circulating subs to be run with a core barrel, mud motor, or down-hole turbine.
• Subs must be fitted with seals appropriate for anticipated temperatures.
• Subs used above the circulating sub should be drifted to assure passage of the ball
that will be used to shift the sleeve of the circulating sub.
Pit Level Monitoring System
The installation will require a good pit level monitoring system. For floating operations it is
recommended to have a minimum of 2 pit level sensors placed strategically in each active
system tank to minimize inaccuracy due to vessel motion. Where the installation
instrumentation is supplemented by a mud logging contractor, a systematic cross checking of
the 2 systems should be performed and any discrepancy investigated.
Mud/Gas Separator
In order to safely circulate out a kick from a high pressure, high temperature well, the
capacity of the mud gas separator (MGS) system must not be exceeded. The specific
consequence of overloading the system is that gas can blow through the MGS into the mud
pit area that, obviously, creates an extremely hazardous situation.
Many MGS systems are under-designed for HPHT drilling applications. Therefore, a design
review of the MGS system should be undertaken for any rig to be used for HPHT drilling
applications. There are several calculations and techniques that can be used, as a guide to
evaluating the design capacity and operational procedures required of the MGS system.
Modifications to the MGS system may be required such as increasing the size of the gas vent
line, increasing the height of the mud leg return line, or installing pressure and temperature
gauges. Figure12.3.5 shows several of the critical dimensions used to calculate the design
capacity of the MGS. The Chevron Well Control CD provides one convenient method to help
evaluate MGS design limits.
There must be a means by which the mud-gas separator can be by-passed and isolated when
approaching overload conditions or blockages. The aim is to ensure that the separators are
used only within their operating limitations.
12-14 October 2005

This by-pass can be a fully automated device or simply a pressure induced alarm that triggers
a procedure whereby the bypassing and isolation of the mud-gas separator is performed
manually.
Figure 12.3.5 Critical MGS Dimensions Diagram
Once drilling has commenced, the onboard drilling engineer should calculate (and review
with the Toolpusher and Drill Site Manager) the maximum allowable kill rate based upon the
design limits of the MGS system and the initial kick conditions. Using MGS analysis
software it is possible for the maximum allowable kill rate to be calculated quickly, once the
initial kick conditions have been measured.
The mud/gas separation process is complex and difficult to model because the operating
conditions of the separator are variable. While calculation methods may vary, two specific
scenarios are basic to the overloading of the MGS system, namely:
1) The mud/gas separation capacity of the vessel is exceeded due to insufficient retention
time. In other words, the downward liquid velocity within the vessel exceeds the upward
gas migration rate. When this occurs, gas carryover is experienced and the evacuation of
the mud from the vessel can occur.
October 2005 12-15

2) Friction pressure of the gas escaping through the vent line can exceed the hydrostatic
column of the mud leg return line to the mud pits. This also results in the evacuation of
the mud from the separator.
HPHT MGS Operation
1. The MGS will be on-line and the overboard line routed to the downwind side of the
rig. The overboard bypass selector should be functioned at least weekly and the U-
Tube flushed or drained daily and after any use.
2. The separator should be fitted with an alarm that will activate if the pressure in the
mud gas separator reaches a given setting.
3. The separator should be fitted with a hot mud inlet allowing the mud in the u-tube to
be replaced periodically.
4. Both the MGS and vacuum degasser should be circulated through at least once during
each shift. If instrumentation is installed on the dip tube, it should be checked against
mud weight daily.
5. All U-tube mud-gas separators should be fitted with gauges to directly read:
• The internal vessel pressure

• The U-tube liquid hydrostatic head (Indicators should be positioned so that they can
be easily read during a well control operation.)
6. One data gathering point on the MGS should be used (i.e. a single pressure gauge/
sensor) to monitor and manage the vessel operation, as related to fluid head in the
mud leg.
12.4 HPHT Drilling Techniques
While Drilling The Transition and HPHT Sections:
1) Ensure all appropriate personnel have reviewed the Drilling Program.
2) Ensure that all essential personnel are kept informed and understand the current
operational plans through daily briefings.
3) Ensure that all personnel prepare and deliver hand-over notes daily and at the end of a
tour.
12-16 October 2005

4) Always have two fully trained Cementers onsite for setting barite, cement plugs, or
emergency high pressure pumping. Cementer should ensure his unit is in proper
working order and cementing chemical inventory is adequate.
5) The rig team should utilize checklists to ensure minimum stock levels are checked
and pressure control equipment is in good working order. Examples are provided for
floater and jackup rigs.
6) A daily work schedule should be posted on a rig notice board to keep all personnel
informed of the daily drilling activities.
7) An accurate assessment of the pressure integrity at the last casing shoe will have been
carried out and remedial action taken if the shoe strength did not meet the required
criteria. At any given time, the maximum pressure the well can withstand must be
based upon existing wellbore conditions; inclusive of but not limited to:
• Previous LOT
• Mud properties
• Lost circulation history
8) Gas and H2S sensors will have been checked prior to drilling out of the previous
casing shoe and weekly thereafter.
9) BOP tests will be conducted in compliance with Chevron procedure and drilling
contractor Well Control Procedures. Closing times and volumes will be recorded.
While drilling HTHP wells the guidelines in this chapter should be followed.
10) When drilling the High Pressure Section, Wellsite Operations Engineers should be
assigned to the rig. Also two Mud Engineers should be assigned for the duration of
the HPHT section.
11) Mud logging crew should not contain any trainees.
12) All other personnel should be kept to a minimum.
Drilling Operation Procedure
When drilling the Transition and HPHT sections of the well the following practices should be
adhered to:
• Rig specific procedures should be developed and followed to ensure consistency

between all crews when measuring Flowback and Drainback, when conducting flow
checks, when breaking circulation and when making connections.
October 2005 12-17

• Chevron recommends drilling with a float in the string. A non-ported is preferred.

This requires special precautions when tripping to avoid excessive surge pressure.
• A Hydril type drop-in Dart Sub should be run in the drill string on top of the first
single above the HWDP.
• BHA length should be maintained at a minimum to reduce potential influx height and
decrease surface handling time.
• When approaching or drilling in pressure transition zones and/or potential HPHT

intervals, drilling should be done with a drilling stand with full opening safety valves
(FOSV) arranged (top to bottom) as follows to allow a fast shut-in of the drill string
(Certification should be attained that the FOSV can support potential string weight):
– 10 inch pup joint

– One joint of drill pipe
– FOSV
– FOSV
– FOSV
– Saver Sub
Note: Adjust length of drilling stand to suit.
• Ensure that the flow line run-off volume (flowback) and the time it takes to drain back
(drainback) during connections is documented. Connections will likely take 10 minutes
(due to use of drilling stand) and therefore flowback can be accurately measured by
diverting flow from the well into the trip tank when the pump is turned off. Record this
data at the most likely circulating rates for the HPHT section. Compare against base case
when making connections.
• Whenever the pipe is left sitting in the rotary table disconnected from the top drive
(except at connections), a FOSV valve should be stabbed and made up to the drill string.
• Once in the transition zone and until in the HPHT zone with reservoir pressure
confirmed, it is recommended not to drill ahead if pit activities such as weighting up
mud, transferring, or centrifuging the active mud are in progress.
• These activities could mask an influx from the well. Stop and circulate if these activities
cannot be avoided. However, simultaneous drilling and treating of the mud may take
place in circumstances where all parties involved in monitoring mud volumes are
confident that the instrumentation allows measurement of the total volume of mud (i.e.
both in the active and in the pit being bled in or treated). Approval of both Chevron and
the drilling contractor management should be sought before this takes place.
12-18 October 2005

• If a single shot survey is required the survey barrel should only be dropped on a full trip
out of the hole. Dropping it on a wiper trip is not recommended.
• Whenever work with wireline equipment is done through the drill string, for instance
retrieving survey instruments, running free point tool or back off shots, it is
recommended to have a FOSV with a pressure rating greater than or equal to the BOPs
rating, a pump-in tee and wireline pressure control equipment installed.
• Utilization of wireline pressure control equipment should be considered for open hole
logging.
• Check all drill pipe to ensure hard banding is of ‘flush’ type to minimize potential for
casing wear. A monitoring program for casing wear will be a part of the drilling program.
• It is recommended to keep adequate amount of string shots, severing tools, etc. (rated for
expected BHT) on the rig for back-off and hole punching purposes. The string shot
calibration should be checked.
• A Kick Assembly should be made up, tested and racked in a position convenient for
installation in the drill string. It will consist of (From the Top): 8 Foot Pup, FOSV, Side
Entry Tee with two 15 k lo-torque valves attached, 1 Joint DP, FOSV, Saver Sub. Any
Chicksan lines associated with this kick assembly should also be tested.
Note: Adjust length of kick assembly to suit.
• Arrangements should be in place to minimize the effects of settling of barite in the active
tanks and surface lines.
• The calculated collapse and burst pressures (allowing for string weight) of the drill pipe
or other tubulars in use during pressure testing and well control situations should be
posted in the doghouse for general awareness and every effort should be made not to
exceed them.
• The choke and kill lines should be flushed every 24 hours (to be recorded in the IADC
drilling report).
• The BOP and Choke manifold valves should be lined up for the Hard Shut In (though
shut-in using a pipe ram instead of an annular may be specified for additional speed).
• The MGS should be on-line and the overboard line routed to the downwind side of the
rig. The overboard bypass selector should be functioned at least weekly and the U-Tube
flushed or drained daily and after any use.
• Bit Nozzle Size should be kept as large as practicable to facilitate pumping of LCM or
cement should the need arise.
• It is recommended to cross check well critical pressure gauges on the rig floor and
cement unit to ensure accurate calibration and operation. This could be achieved during a
BOP or choke manifold pressure test.
• It is recommended to monitor temperature of mud returns at all times while circulating to
ensure that the safe working temperature of critical equipment is not being exceeded.
October 2005 12-19

Drilling operations will be suspended if the temperature of the mud returns at surface
exceed 200°F or if the temperature measurement system fails.
• Rotate slowly (approx. 30 RPM) and pick up drill string prior to breaking circulation to
help break gels, etc.
• Break circulation at 1 bpm with one pump until returns are observed. Then slowly bring
up one pump to normal speed prior bringing on second pump.
• When not circulating, the well should be monitored by circulating across the Trip Tank.
• The Trip Tank should be kept half full when not in use. This should provide a more
accurate reading for measuring returns and a supply of mud for circulating across the well
if required. If it is not being used the contents should be pumped out and replaced every
tour to ensure it has the same properties as the mud in use.
• Accurate tide charts should be available such that accurate space outs can be made in
active floating operations.
Note: At no time during any well control situation should the well be allowed to flow in
order to prevent the casing pressure exceeding the formation breakdown pressure
(i.e. there will be no MAASP setting). Any devices designed to open the choke when
pre-set casing pressures are reached should be disabled.
Preparation
1. The following specific instructions are issued regarding equipment:
• All pressure gauges used in the drilling and well control circulating system should
be calibrated to ensure they are accurate and consistent with one another. Each
gauge should be backed up by a second gauge that is active at all times.
• A Gray type inside BOP or equivalent should be kept on the drill floor and ready
to run.
• A Hydril dart sub should be included in every BHA. The dedicated drop-in dart
should be kept fully serviced in the Driller’s dog house. The Driller should ensure
that on each trip out of the hole the dart sub is checked for damage and erosion.
He should also ensure that the dart will pass through every component in the
string above the dart sub including the stab in valves kept on the drill floor. The
dart must be rated for the temperature and pressures that could be encountered in
the well.
• Two full opening safety valves with the same pressure rating as the BOP should
be kept on the drill floor with crossovers for each type of connection in the drill
string.
2. The choke manifold and BOP valves should be lined up for a hard shut-in procedure as
selected for each hole interval and checked at the start of each shift by the Driller.
12-20 October 2005

The preferred line up for the Hard Shut-in Method is as follows:
During normal operations this line-up of BOP stack valves and choke manifold valves
involve the following:
• Hydraulically operated BOP stack inner/outer choke and kill valves to be in the
CLOSED position. HCR on choke line side should be on the inside.
• Those valves on the Choke Manifold not in line with normal flow routing CLOSED.
Manual valve on choke line side at the BOP (outboard of the HCR) should be in the
OPEN position.
• Those valves on the Choke Manifold in line with flow or pressure sensors to be
OPEN.
• Remote Choke CLOSED.
• Valve immediately downstream of the chokes on the choke manifold to be kept in the
CLOSED position. Valve immediately upstream of the choke to be in the CLOSED
position.
• Mud Gas Separator Valve OPEN.
• MGS Overboard Valve CLOSED.
Special gauges at the choke control panel (and related transducers) that are used to accurately
measure the drill pipe and annulus pressure over the entire range should be connected up and
properly functioning.
3) As with non-HPHT operations, Chevron does not recommended routine measurement

and pre-recording of SCR pressures. Instead, the normal method for establishing
circulating drill pipe pressure (using constant casing pressure, or static kill line pressure
subsea) and calculating actual SCR pressure should be used.
It may be preferred to kill an HPHT well using very slow pump rates, often ½ to 1
bbl/min, using the high pressure kill pump. Depending on the lines actually used during a
kill to connect the kill pump to the drill string, the mud standpipe (and the attached
pressure gauges) may be bypassed. Plans need to be in place to provide accurate pump
pressure information to the choke operator when the standpipe pressure gauge at the
remote choke control panel is isolated from the kill pump lines.
4. The choke and kill lines, trip tank, MGS and vacuum degasser should be circulated
through at least once during each shift. If instrumentation is installed on the MGS dip
tube, it should be checked against mud weight daily.
5. A kill sub with the same or higher pressure rating than the BOP, complete with spacer
sub and Chicksan swivel, should be made up, pressure tested, and available on the rig
floor at all times.
October 2005 12-21

Mud Weight / Hydraulics Management
Mud weight management is a strategy for keeping the mud at the right density (measured at
surface) to provide the required downhole pressure. Whereas for a ‘normal’ well a simple
calculation is adequate to estimate the downhole pressure, this is not necessarily the case for
this type of well, where pressures and temperatures can have a significant impact on the
overall pressure exerted by a column of mud.
Figure 12.4.1 shows the relative impact of pressure and temperature on fluid density.
Sufficient mud additives or reserve mud to replace 50% of the total active mud system must
be kept on board during normal operations. The amounts should be based on the current
concentrations of all various additives. It will normally be the Mud Engineer’s responsibility
to ensure proper levels are maintained.
Figure 12.4.1
The mud engineer will typically specify the flow line temperature and mud weight required
(measured using a pressurized mud balance) to achieve a specific bottomhole pressure. As
the temperature of the mud in the pits will be different to the flow line temperature, it will be
necessary to provide a ‘conversion’ such that the mud man knows when to add weighting
material. For example a requirement of a 16.3 ppg mud at the flow line, measured at 160°F,
may convert to a 16.7 ppg mud in the pits measured at 140°F.
12-22 October 2005

A board should be kept in the mud pit area to keep the mud weight/temperature requirement
for the mud engineer and derrickman.
Note that if the flow line temperature were to change over a period of time (i.e. not just a
temporary change), it would be necessary to change the mud weight if it was required to
maintain a constant bottom hole pressure. Adequate pressurized mud balances should be
available on-site together with a ‘master’ balance, accurately calibrated, for use as a
comparator.
An example is given below for 16.7 ppg mud.

1) Reservoir pressure = 13200 psi at 15421 ft TVD.
2) Required mud weight (250 psi overbalance at static conditions) = 13450 psi.
(This corresponds to a ‘straight line’ surface mud weight of (13450/15421/0.052 = 16.7 ppg)
and is satisfied by a mud weight of 16.7 ppg (measured at 140°F surface conditions).
3) Likely surface temperature is 150°F (measured at Flow line).
4) Mud weight should be 17.1 ppg (heavy) at 150°F to be the same as 16.7 ppg at 140°F.
5) Monitor mud weight and flow line temperature - report any changes in either parameter.
The mud engineer should ensure the pressurized mud balance is calibrated with both water
and Cesium Formate and that the calculated hydrostatic pressure is reconciled with the PWD
data.
Mud Property Management
The mud properties should be managed to achieve the following objectives:
1) Keep the hole clean.

2) Provide appropriate hydraulics (i.e. avoid excessive swab/surge and annular friction
pressure).
3) Maintain suspension of barite even during long shut-down periods (avoiding barite
sag).
4) Avoid excessive pressures to break gels after a shutdown period.
The above objectives are competitive (to an extent). Compromises in the mud properties
utilized should therefore be made. In addition, there is a requirement to minimize or abstain
from using certain mud treating equipment (e.g. the centrifuge on the active mud) when
drilling in Kick Alertness Levels 2 and 3 (defined below).
Finally, the effect of downhole temperature and pressure on mud properties should be taken
into account. For example, although a mud may have acceptable rheological properties
October 2005 12-23

during steady state circulation, the rheology may become very thick when the mud cools, as
could happen in the upper portion of the well after a long shutdown.
Mud Hydraulics Management
Management of mud and well hydraulics is important in all phases of this HPHT drilling
program. The mud engineer is normally responsible for running hydraulics modeling. PWD
information should be used to refine hydraulics modeling. Well hydraulics normally become
more critical in a HPHT well once the 9 7/8 inch casing string is set (i.e. in the 8 ½ inch hole
and smaller) because of the relatively high values of annular friction pressure and swab/surge
pressures etc, caused by the small hole section.
Paying attention to mud hydraulics management may ensure that this section is drilled
without ‘flowback’ or ‘ballooning’ and therefore in a safe and cost effective manner.
The objectives of mud hydraulics management are:
1) Maintain sufficient downhole wellbore pressure at all times to overbalance any
potential producing formation.
2) Maintain, where possible, sufficient margin between formation fracture pressure
(weakest exposed formation) and the wellbore pressure such that mud losses and
subsequent flowback (ballooning) do not occur - this may not be possible.
3) Allow operations to be carried out in an efficient manner (e.g. allow reasonable
tripping speeds, circulating rates etc).
The overall methodology is:
1) Assess the formation pressures to be encountered based on offset data.
2) Measure the fracture pressure of the weakest exposed formation (perform a LOT or
FIT at the casing shoe).
3) Assess the overall margin for well operations, i.e. the difference between potential
producing formation pressure and weakest exposed formation fracture pressure.
Take actions (squeezing etc.) to improve the measured fracture pressure if appropriate.
4) Assess the impact of well operations (e.g. circulating or tripping) on downhole

pressures.
5) Set the downhole static pressure (and then calculate the required surface mud weight/
temperature) and allocate margins of uncertainty based on the overall margins
available.
6) Monitor well operations and continually reassess margins based on current mud
properties and ongoing operations.
12-24 October 2005

Figure 12.4.2 Mud hydraulics management while drilling (example)
Propagation)
Figure 12.4.3 Mud hydraulics management while tripping (example)
The parameters that can be changed or managed are:
1) Mud weight.
2) Mud properties.
3) Operational practices (for example, trip speed, circulation rate).
October 2005 12-25

The implications of mud hydraulics management are very wide ranging and require the input
and concurrence of a significant portion of the rigsite operations team. The direction taken
and the implications of such a direction must be fully communicated to all members of the
rigsite drilling team.
Combining PWD and Modeling (Fingerprinting)
The combination of PWD information and realistic modeling is very powerful and should be
used to the maximum while drilling HPHT wells.
PWD information will indeed tell you the value of downhole static and circulating pressures.
It may also allow for the recognition of ballooning or flowback. However, unless realistic
modeling is utilized there is no means of checking the PWD data. Using realistic modeling
tools to corroborate PWD data provides a comprehensive picture of what is occurring at
various points in the wellbore.
Finally, once there is confidence in the modeling (we call this ‘fingerprinting’) it is possible
to continue drilling without the PWD information - this may be a rational choice in the event
of a PWD failure, thereby avoiding a trip, the time/cost involved and the potential dangers.
During operations the approach should be:
1) Establish the depth and pressure required using measured (absolute) reservoir pressure
and incorporating an appropriate safety margin.
2) Using the appropriate temperature profile, and a standard temperature for measuring mud
density, establish the required mud density (at standard temperature) - establish the
required mud density at the temperature range that is to be expected at the flow line and
in the pits.
3) Monitor mud density and temperature at the flow line and in the pits - report any
deviations from required values or any changes.
Flow Checks
1) Position tool joint

2) Shut down pumps
3) Follow rig specific procedures to ensure consistency between crews.
4) Line up and circulate across riser and through trip tank.
5) It is recommended to keep drill pipe slowly rotating (idle speed) during flow check to
ensure breaking gels.
6) Records of previous flow checks provide the expected rates and volume increase in the
trip tank.
12-26 October 2005

7) Record increase (if any) and rate of increase in trip tank level over time and compare to
records of the previous flow check.
8) If flow is obvious, shut-in immediately.
9) If no decline in rate of increase, shut-in.
10) If no flow, observe well for minimum of 15 minutes.
11) If there is a gain-loss situation, the flow check volume should not exceed 5 barrels.
12.5 Specialized HPHT Kick Monitoring and Procedures
Kick Alertness Levels
The Kick Alertness Level is a description of the actions that must be taken to ensure that a
kick that is detected and shut in is of a size that can be readily handled. For the transition and
HPHT zones it is critical that smaller kicks are detected and shut in - this requires tighter
drilling practices.
Three levels of kick alertness can be applied during the drilling of the well. These levels are
based on available margin between mud weight and leak off test value and/or position in
wellbore as defined below.
The appropriate level of kick alertness should be determined by the Senior Drill Site
Manager and the Drilling Superintendent (in conjunction with the Senior Toolpusher and Rig
Manager), dependent on well conditions.
Generally:
• Kick Alertness Level 1 should apply until the top of the pressure transition zone is
reached. Normal drilling, tripping and well control detection practices apply.
• Kick Alertness Level 2 should apply while drilling the transition zone
• Kick Alertness Level 3 should apply while drilling the HPHT section.
Pit Discipline
Pit discipline is always important in drilling operations, but in high pressure, high
temperature wells this becomes extremely important as the consequence of a mistake can be
extremely serious.
The following precautions should be observed:
1) The mud engineer should provide written instructions to the derrickman and these should
be signed by the driller and toolpusher.
October 2005 12-27

2) All unexpected pit volume changes should be reacted to as if they were caused by the
well.
3) Always notify the Driller and Mud Logger prior to transferring mud, starting/ stopping
solids control equipment, making chemical additions and dilutions, or any other action
that may affect the mud volumes. Also, notify Driller and Mud Logger when mud
transfer has ended.
4) When drilling in the transition zone or in Level 3 kick alertness, never add anything to
the active mud in quantities that will mask an influx from the well bore. If large amounts
of mud or chemical additions are to be made to the active mud system, stop and circulate.
The Mud Engineer will calculate the volume increase to be expected.
5) When drilling in the transition zone or in Level 3 kick alertness do not use the centrifuge
on the active system.
6) When drilling in the transition zone or in Level 3 kick alertness always have 2 competent
persons at the shale shakers when circulating bottoms up after trips, flow checks etc.
The PVT sensors should be checked every shift. In addition, confirm that the volumes
recorded by the mud loggers and driller are in agreement.
Casing Wear
Casing wear can considerably reduce casing burst strength if left unchecked. Experience has
shown that a program of monitoring and precautionary measures will be sufficient to control
casing wear to within acceptable levels. The problems with casing wear usually concern the 9
⅝ inch – 10 ¾ inch production casing.
Every joint of drill pipe is to be inspected offshore to ensure that hard banding is of ‘flush’
type and does not have any damaged or raised areas. Tool joints will be visually checked on
trips for signs of polishing or other indicators of wear.
Reducing the drill string rotation will also reduce the casing wear. In addition, tong marks
need to be removed from the tool joints.
The Multi-Finger Caliper Tool (MFCT) can be run immediately after the casing is cemented,
i.e. before the drill string is run/rotated in the casing. Such a log then forms a baseline to
gauge any casing wear that may subsequently occur.
The following criteria should be used as guidelines for when to run a baseline MFCT:
1. If in accordance with the Casing Design Guide casing wear needs to be monitored.
2. If the well is deviated and the casing wear areas have been predicted/verified by a
torque and drag program. Contact force should not exceed 2,200 lbs.
3. If the angle of the BOP stack is greater than 1 degree.
12-28 October 2005

Results of the casing wear log can be extrapolated and plotted against the casing burst line in
order to determine on critical sections where any points of crisis occur.
Due to complicated geometrical interface between casing, well head, BOP test tool and wear
bushing, an improved model of wear bushing has now been developed with extended neck
and a smaller ID than the uppermost casing. Test tools have been redesigned accordingly.
Casing protectors have been fitted retro-actively in response to metal particles in the mud
returns. In order to establish a consistent approach to monitoring the quantity of metal
recovery, the parameter of grams per 1000 revolutions should be used by dividing the total
weight of metal recovery by the total number of revolutions of the drill string and recorded
every 2 hrs.
A torque and drag model can be used as a monitoring tool using actual details of metal
recovered. The use of casing protectors can be planned at the design stage; their use can also
reduce torque and drag. If returned cuttings contain metal then the wear bushings should also
be inspected to verify that it is not the rig’s position over the wellhead that may give rise to
concern.
Non-rotating casing protectors should be fitted in areas of casing wear derived from the
torque and drag program, known areas of comparative casing wear and the comparison of
subsequent and baseline MFCT logs. The protectors are usually fitted just above the tool
joint. It is important that a log is kept where each casing protector is fitted.
To help monitor casing wear, ditch magnets should be installed in the rig’s flow line. The
magnets should be cleaned of metal swarf every 12 hours, during drilling operations. The
swarf should be weighed, recorded and plotted on a graph by the mud loggers. One graph
will show the grams of metal recovered each 10,000 drill pipe revolutions, plotted each tour.
Another graph will show total metal recovered versus total revolutions since the casing was
set. These results should also be compared to the well’s historical baseline data.
A base line Multi-Finger Caliper Tool (MFCT) or log may be run after setting the
intermediate casing string. Future logs will be run if wear is suspected. Alternatively an
ultrasonic type wall thickness measuring log may be run after the liner has been set and the
well displaced to water prior to testing.
Casing protectors may be used to limit wear if casing wear is of concern. Repair would be
extremely difficult due to the pressure limitations of casing patch designs available. Serious
wear would almost certainly result in either a tie-back or scab liner installation.
Suspension of Operations
Drilling ahead, or any operation which may result in loss of primary well control, shall be
suspended as soon as practicable when operating below the last casing seat before
October 2005 12-29

penetrating formations of potential or known high over pressure or when operating inside a
casing or liners set across such formation if the following conditions occur:
1) The senior supervisors on the rig are not satisfied that operations can progress safely.
2) Barite, base fluid, mud chemicals/additives/LCM, cement or glycol stock levels fall
below minimum stated levels for each hole section.
3) Well control equipment has been exposed to 250°F continuously for 25 days or to
temperatures in excess of 310°F for one hour.
4) Weather conditions are such that installation evacuation would be prevented.
5) Facilities for weighting-up or mixing new mud become inoperable and there is no
adequate reserve of mud of the anticipated maximum kill fluid density onboard the
installation.
6) Failure of the following occurs:
• Pressure containment (casing, mud line hanger, landing string, wellhead)

• Any component of the BOP stack unless complete redundancy remains
• Any component of the choke/kill manifold or lines unless complete redundancy
remains
• Gas levels monitoring device unless complete redundancy remains
• Mud return temperature measurement system fails
• Upstream choke manifold temperature measurement system fails or indicates that the
continuous temperature rating of the BOP is being exceeded during a kick situation
• Mud level electronic PVT measurement system unless complete redundancy remains.
7) If the temperature of the mud returns at surface indicates the continuous temperature
rating of the BOP is being exceeded.
In the event that the reason for suspension of operations cannot be easily resolved with
resources available at the well site, then management should be consulted.
Tripping Procedures
As with other normal drilling operations, the general intention while tripping is to safely and
efficiently pull the drill string out of the hole without swabbing and possibly inducing an
influx of formation fluids. After completing the requirements of the trip, it is also necessary
to run the drill string back into the hole without causing any damage to the formation through
12-30 October 2005

surging. Since consequences of errors on trips either out of or into the hole are magnified in
HPHT operations, special procedures are recommended.
Pumping out of a fresh hole to mitigate against swabbing is commonly recommended. When
doing this, it is important to coordinate hoisting and pumping operations to ensure that
circulation delivers more mud to the open hole than the closed end displacement volume of
the pipe being removed.
The drill string should be pumped out of the hole far enough to ensure that swabbing does
not take place once pumping is stopped and the pipe is pulled normally. This has been known
to necessitate pumping all the way out of the hole, including while pulling the HWDP.
A short trip through a new hole section will provide confirmation of sufficient overbalance
for a newly penetrated reservoir section (required in 8 ½ inch hole section).
In all cases it is essential that tripping practices are consistent and records are kept so that a
comparison can be made with previous trips. It is the responsibility of the Driller and the
Toolpusher to ensure that this is done.
General Notes on Tripping
Rig specific tripping procedures should be developed to reflect the comments below and to
ensure consistency between crews.
While pumping out of the hole, take the volume reading at the same stage in the sequence
and endeavor to keep the sequence and timings the same for each stand. Any inconsistencies
must be investigated.
In open hole leave the pump on as long as possible and, if hole conditions dictate, rotate the
pipe until just before setting the slips. In this case, minimize the time that the string is
stationary.
When not pumping out of the hole, pull the pipe at a speed derived from the closed end swab
pressure calculations. It is often advisable to pump out through a liner, since annular
clearances are small.
When pumping a weighted slug ensure that the slug weight and the amount of dry pipe is
kept consistent throughout a hole section. This will provide accurate fingerprinting
information. Calculate the mud return that should result from pumping a slug. Allow time for
the slug to stabilize with the drill pipe open to atmosphere and confirm that the volume of
returns is correct. Rotate the pipe while the slug is settling in order to break the gels.
Drillers and Mud Loggers should keep separate trip sheets and communicate frequently. Any
variation from the expected trends should be flow checked immediately and if necessary the
well shut-in. It is not critical that the Driller and Mud Loggers instrumentation should be
October 2005 12-31

displaying the same numbers in terms of total volume. What is critical is that both systems
register any gains, losses or variations from the calculated trip sheet.
Due to the effects of temperature, high gels and mud weight, it is unlikely that trip measured
displacements and hole fill will tally with the calculated values at the start of a trip. The
variation should be fully investigated to confirm that the difference is not due to the well
flowing. As the well progresses and data is recorded a trend should become apparent. For this
reason it is important that every Driller has access to the trip records of preceding trips.
The Chevron Drill Site Manager and the Toolpusher should be on the rig floor when tripping
through the transition zone or reservoir hole section. Do not pull all the way out of the hole if
the weather is forecast to deteriorate to a level which may prevent the trip from being
completed. The trip should be stopped with the bit inside the shoe.
Always evaluate the trip margin. If pressure margins do not allow the mud weight of the
whole mud column to be increased, a heavy mud pill may be spotted on bottom.
Always circulate bottoms up after a round trip or short trip before drilling ahead. When
circulating bottoms up after a trip, short trip or a flow check, always route the mud through
the choke manifold and mud gas separator when bottoms up reaches the depth of the bubble
point depth + 25% below the rotary table. This guideline may be revised as well specific
experience is evaluated.
If required to slip and cut drill line, do so at the shoe when tripping out of the hole. During
these operations ensure that the defined kick alertness level is maintained.
Consideration should be given to slipping and cutting on the initial short trip.
Minimize time spent on surface. Run back in as soon as possible. Have any BHA or other
tools ready and accessible to the rig floor. Consider making up sections of BHA in advance
of starting out of hole (e.g. when at the shoe during the short trip).
Calculate surge and swab pressure before trips and choose the running speed accordingly.
Compare to PWD information.
While breaking circulation slowly rotate the drill string and pick up the drill string when
starting the pump. Avoid surging the formation by breaking circulation too quickly or
moving the pipe downwards while starting the pumps.
Ensure that FOSVs, Gray Valves, darts, etc are on the rig floor and have crossovers to the
pipe size that is to be pulled or run.
Tripping must be stopped to allow for filling or emptying the trip tank. Stop and observe
well (flow check) when bit is inside casing shoe on surface wells and again when BHA just
reaches surface.
12-32 October 2005

Tripping Out - Transition Zone
A check/wiper trip is not required in this section providing a swab test has been carried out.
A swab test in the transition zone will provide a good test of formation pressure in relation to
mud hydrostatic. Do not perform a swab test in the reservoir section.
Pump out to the casing shoe or far enough to ensure that swabbing does not take place once
pumping is stopped and the pipe is pulled dry (with a slug).
Tripping Out - HPHT Section
When a trip out of the hole is required, circulate until the last cuttings are inside the casing
shoe (a minimum of twice the open hole volume). If approaching or drilling in the reservoir
any connection gas should also be circulated out of the hole.
Raise the drill string off bottom to place a FOSV at a convenient height above the rotary
table.
With the pipe rotating, stop the pump and perform a flow check.
Continue circulating and return the bit to bottom, slowly rotate and reciprocate the pipe while
circulating bottoms up. As bottoms up approaches the bubble point depth, divert the flow
through the open choke and MGS. This procedure will provide a benchmark by giving a gas
reading from a static overbalance situation. Assess whether the gas level indicates that there
is sufficient overbalance to make a trip. If this is the case then proceed to the next step,
otherwise consider the options available, e.g. raising the mud weight, changing mud
properties, spotting a heavy mud slug, or pumping all the way out of the hole.
Perform a check/wiper trip as follows:
• Pump out to the casing or liner top

• Pull 5 stands
• Run back in to bottom
• Circulate bottoms up, diverting returns through the choke and MGS once bottoms up
approaches the bubble point depth below the rotary table. Assess the gas readings at
bottoms up and compare these with the previous bottoms up gas record. This will
indicate whether the swabbing effect while pulling pipe inside the casing is
acceptable.
If it appears OK, then proceed.
October 2005 12-33

Pump out of the hole to the casing shoe or liner top and make a flow check. If flow check is
acceptable, pump or pull far enough to ensure that swabbing does not take place once
pumping is stopped and the pipe is pulled dry, then pump slug as per procedures.
Continue to rotate to prevent the mud gel strength from building. Ensure there is a siphon
break to allow the slug to fall quickly.
When the slug has settled, pull out of the hole at a speed calculated not to result in swabbing.
Continue to monitor the hole fill throughout the trip (using trip sheet).
Tripping Out - Still in the Reservoir, but once Pressures are known (No short trip)
Once the well site and shore based teams agree that sufficiently accurate data about the
exposed formation pressures is available to provide a high level of confidence that there is an
adequate overbalance provided by the mud system, the Transition zone and HPHT reservoir
tripping procedures may be relaxed. The following procedure is recommended:
• Circulate until the last cuttings are inside the shoe (minimum of twice open hole
contents).
• Raise the string off bottom to place a FOSV at a convenient height above the table.
With the pipe rotating, stop circulating and flow check.
• Break circulation and return to bottom.
• Circulate bottoms up while slowly rotating and reciprocating the pipe.
• Divert bottoms up through the open choke and MGS once bottoms up approaches the
bubble point.
This procedure will provide a benchmark by giving a gas reading from a static overbalance
situation. Assess whether the gas level indicates that there is sufficient overbalance to make a
trip. If this is the case then proceed to the next step - otherwise revert to Standard HPHT
Tripping Guidelines.
• Pump out to the casing or liner top or far enough to ensure that swabbing does not
take place once pumping is stopped and the pipe is pulled dry.
When at the shoe or top of liner, a check trip is not required if there is sufficient trip margin
based on previous results. Pump back or pump slug and continue to rotate to avoid the mud
gel strength from building. Ensure there is a siphon break to allow the slug to fall quickly.
When the slug has settled, pull out of the hole at a speed calculated not to result in swabbing
while continuously monitoring the hole fill.
12-34 October 2005

Tripping into the Hole
Great care must be taken while tripping into the hole to avoid surging the formation. Pipe
lowering speed may need to be considerably reduced if the mud weight/fracture pressure
envelope is tight. A swab and surge program should be prepared and adhered to for the
duration of the tripping operation. Excessive surge pressures can also be generated while
breaking circulation and if hole problems and packing off is experienced.
When running in, monitor the well on the trip tank with the trip tank pump running and
circulating over the well.
Limit pipe lowering speed as per the surge/swab calculations produced by the mud loggers.
Fill the pipe every 15 stands when running in cased hole and every 10 stands when in open
hole. Flow check the well if any discrepancy occurs. Shut in immediately if any flow is
observed.
Break circulation at depths to be determined by the Chevron Drill Site Manager. This has the
desirable effect of introducing cooler mud from surface in stages, breaking the gels and
cooling any LWD tools in the BHA. Circulation must be broken slowly and then continued at
a reduced rate as the cold mud will have a significantly higher viscosity and could cause
extra pressure on exposed formations. The rate would also need to be kept below the
maximum for turbine, motor, or core barrel when off bottom.
Break circulation at the casing shoe and displace the hole to the mud weight needed for
drilling (if running a two mud system i.e. one for drilling and one for tripping).
Flow check and then wash down from the shoe to break the gels and get the mud moving
gradually, thus reducing the risk of inducing losses with high ECD.
Until reservoir pressures are known or unless no new formation has been exposed since the
pipe was last tripped, always circulate bottoms up after reaching TD, routing returns through
the choke and MGS when bottoms up approaches bubble point. In the event that bottom hole
pressures have been well established and management teams are confident of overbalance,
then drilling can go ahead once on bottom. But no connections should be made until bottoms
up from after the trip has been achieved.
As barite sag could be a problem in HPHT wells it is advisable to circulate bottoms up and
get the mud in balance before drilling ahead. On wells where barite sag is a big problem
(particularly in deviated hole sections) it may be necessary to circulate the mud into balance
at stages on the way in the hole.
October 2005 12-35

12.6 Transition Zone Procedures
Until the point that the Transition Zone between normal and abnormally pressured
formations has been reached, the well will be considered as a normal well, and will follow
the normal Chevron and drilling contractor practices and procedures. Once the Transition
Zone has been reached, procedures and guidelines as laid out in this section should be
followed.
Transition zone procedures will be started at the top of the anticipated pressure transition
zone if an increase of background gas is seen which indicates the start of the transition zone.
The goals of the transition zone procedures are:
• Be able to detect lithostratic and biostratic markers

• Be able to recognize any indicators of increasing pressure
• Be able to handle any influxes that occur, including those that might result from
encountering high pressured tight streaks
Drilling practices must be tight and consistent such that trends can be established and small
changes observed.
Note: It is essential that the transition section is not overdrilled into the HPHT zone.
Transition Section Guidelines:
1) Regularly establish and check the flow back behavior of the well.
2) If the well continues to flow beyond what is ‘normal’ for the well it must be shut-in and
checked for pressure build up.
3) Accurate pressure gauges are essential to identify the pressure build up mentioned above.
4) A maximum target gain detection level of 5 to 10 bbl should be set to prevent excessive
gas break out and possible unloading of the well.
5) Pit discipline and monitoring are very important because the gains could be very gradual.
6) Generally, the Wait & Weight or Driller’s methods are appropriate for kicks taken while
drilling in the intermediate hole section.
7) Consideration should be given to shutting in the well and restarting the kill at 2 to 3 bpm
(slower than normal rates) when the influx reaches the bubble point depth below the
rotary table.
12-36 October 2005

Minimum Stock Inventories
Recommended minimum stock of barite, cement and mud chemicals should be determined
and defined in the well's drilling program and must be in compliance with Chevron
procedures.
Glycol
Sufficient glycol to allow injection continuously for 24 hours at normal injection rate should
be maintained.
While drilling the transition zone, the Chevron drilling supervisor may apply Kick Alertness
Level 2 and HPHT practices and procedures from these guidelines if he or she deems it
appropriate.
Note: At no time during any well control situation should the well be allowed to flow in
order to prevent the casing pressure exceeding the formation breakdown pressure (i.e. there
will be no MAASP setting).
October 2005 12-37

Table 12.6.1 Kick Alertness Level for Transition Zone - Level 2
General Safety
BOP Drills Weekly each crew.
Pit/Trip Drills Daily for each crew unless conditions do not permit.
Pre-shift Safety Meetings Daily each crew.
Barite Plug Preparation Pilot test. Review procedures with each crew. Have chemicals
assigned.
Kick Tolerance Drilling Engineer to update kick tolerance curves daily or
when significant changes to mud weight or other significant
factors occur.
Kill Mud Mix Rate test required. Mixing system must be capable of
increasing mud weight by 2 ppg in 1 circulation. If system
does not meet this criteria, kill mud will be maintained on
board.
Weather Favorable forecast before making a trip.
Kick Detection
Active Pit Volume 500 bbls (maximum).
PVT Sensitivity 5 bbls.
Flow meter increase/decrease Flow check (minimum of 15 minutes).
Gains Shut-in, check for pressure. If no pressure flow check through
choke. If no noticeable flow through choke, open up well and
flow check. Circulate bottoms up, flow check at 75% bottoms
up and route flow through choke/MGS. Establish PVT trends
prior to drilling ahead.
Positive/Reverse Drilling Breaks Flow check (minimum of 15 minutes).
Hole Fill Records Normal trip record procedures.
Mud Density Checks Every 15 minutes.
Communications Normal.
Trip Procedures Standard tripping procedures - No wiper trip required - May
perform ‘Swab Test’.
Pressure Detection
Pressure Trends Gas Units Report significant trends. Calibrate Mud loggers gas sensors at
casing points. Run Calibration test on gas sensors each shift.
Check degasser response. Limit maximum gas by units by
adjusting ROP and/or pump rate. Run de-gasser every tour.
Rate of Penetration Control drill if in transition zone.
Logs As required for pressure evaluation.
Simulated Connections Drilling As required to monitor gas trends. As detailed in the Drilling
Procedures Program.
12-38 October 2005

Transition Zone Drilling Procedures
The Transition Zone is perhaps the most critical phase of the well. Diffusion of highly
pressured formation fluid from the reservoir into the overlying formation causes pore
pressure to ramp steeply from normal hydrostatic pressure with negligible amounts of
hydrocarbons at the top, to full reservoir pressure with large amounts of hydrocarbons near
the bottom. If there are any open fractures this diffusion can take place more easily.
The intermediate casing shoe (typically 9 5/8 inch) should be set deep enough to allow
completion of the reservoir section. If it were set much higher than this there may be
insufficient shoe strength to contain the pressures likely to be encountered in the reservoir.
Drilling too far without having set the casing would mean the reservoir is being penetrated
without the protection of a string of casing with a sufficiently strong shoe.
Consequently special procedures have been developed for drilling the Transition Zone and
these must be adhered to if they are to be successful in achieving their main aims of:
a) Identifying the lithostratic and biostratic markers in formations drilled.

b) Providing a real time estimate of pore pressures at bit depth to ensure that mud
hydrostatic is maintained above pore pressure.
c) Ensuring that the most appropriate casing depth is selected before entering the reservoir.
Organization
Drilling the transition zone must be a team effort. Access to quality information by all
members of the team at all times is a key component of success. Good reliable
communication is essential. The Drilling Program may contain additional specific guidance
for drilling the transition zone. Any apparent conflict between the Drilling Program and these
guidelines documents should be referred to the Drilling Engineer.
Pore Pressure and Biostratigraphy specialists may be required to work with the drilling team
during this phase.
Rate of Penetration
The ROP will be controlled in the Transition Zone so that the bit is never more than 50 feet
ahead of bottoms up. The Mud Loggers will ensure that the Driller has the information to
allow him to do this. To enhance the effectiveness of ROP-related pore pressure prediction,
ROP must be controlled by stopping and circulating rather than by altering drilling
parameters. The bit should be allowed to drill as fast as it wants provided WOB, RPM and
SPM remain constant until it is 50 ft ahead of the last bottoms up. Drilling in the transition
zone must be carried out in a consistent manner to enable trends and changes to be
recognized.
October 2005 12-39

Allowing the bit to drill as fast as possible with constant drilling parameters means the
drilling exponent (Dxc) can be used most effectively. This type of “controlled drilling” does
NOT mean the driller drills to a fixed ROP! The disciplines practiced while drilling in this
manner through this section also serve as a dress rehearsal for drilling the reservoir.
Mud Density While Drilling the Transition Zone
The recommended approach for managing mud weight in the transition zone is as follows:
Drill to a predetermined depth above the pressure transition. This depth should be sufficiently
above the transition point to develop a fingerprinting trend.
At the predetermined depth weight up the mud system to the anticipated mud weight at
planned casing point.
Drill with constant parameters and mud weight (allowing the ROP to fluctuate) to establish
trend lines prior to entering the pressure transition.
While drilling in the transition, changes in pore pressure should be more easily observed
based upon ROP changes, Dcx, etc.
Drill to casing setting depth or until drilling parameters indicate a higher mud weight is
required.
Weight Up of Mud System
Weight up of the mud system above planned densities may be necessary. This decision will
be made by the drilling team based on well observations and estimates of pore pressure from
the specialist. All members of the team should be aware of the decision. All mud weight
increases will be logged. All pore pressure increases should be plotted on a depth/density plot
which should be maintained in a central location. Keep a current estimate of pore pressure
increase. Base weight up and drill ahead distances on the most recent estimate of pore
pressure gradient.
If it is necessary to raise the mud weight in response to pore pressure indicators, such
increases in mud weight must be carried out by circulating the mud without drilling ahead -
this will allow pressure trends to be properly observed.
Indicators and Tests/Checks
Mud gas levels will provide one of the first indicators of pore pressure increase. A rise in
background gas level is a good qualitative indication of pore pressure increase but care
should be taken when using gas levels to infer pore pressure because there are many factors
that can alter the readings seen at surface. For this reason it is essential that certain activities
(e.g., connections and flow checks) be carried out in exactly the same way each time.
12-40 October 2005

An understanding of the way in which gas has entered the hole can provide a basis for using
gas levels to infer pore pressure. The degree of overbalance is indicated by the degree of ease
of entry of gas into the hole. Table 12.6.2 summarizes a typical relationship.
Table 12.6.2
Type of Gas Show Relative Comment

Overbalance
Pump Off Low Possible gas flow if ECD removed.
Swabbed Gas Low/Medium Possible gas flow if ECD removed
plus swab.
Trip Medium Possible gas flow if swabbed.
Using the above, planned pump rate changes and pipe reciprocation in conjunction with
knowledge of ECD and swab/surge pressures can be used to induce gas shows into the
annulus which can then be interpreted. Some simple procedures have been adopted to assist
this process.
1) Only one connection gas or dummy connection shall be allowed in the hole at a time. Too
many shows can lead to misidentification. It is unlikely that this will significantly slow
down the overall ROP in the Transition Zone.
2) A standard ‘Pump Off’ procedure will be adopted that can be used to produce an
identifiable response at surface (e.g. carefully record the results of each such test -the
information the tests provide is only of use when compared with other tests carried out in
the exact same manner).
‘Pump- Off’ Test (dummy connection)
a) Drill interval and wipe hole.

b) Circulate for a specified time period (3-10 minutes) - to separate drilled gas from ‘pump
off’ gas.
c) Turn pump off for a specified time period (10 minutes) slowly rotating pipe.
d) Circulate for a specified time period (3-10 minutes)
e) Recommence Drilling.
This ‘Pump Off’ procedure should also be as close as possible to a normal connection to
allow for gas readings to be compared. For example, if the ‘Pump Off’ time during a normal
connection is 8 minutes, then 2 minutes of additional ‘Pump Off’ time can be added to the
connection time in order to make the ‘Pump Off’ time identical to the 10 minutes noted in
Step (c) above. The pipe should be slowly rotated during this additional 2 minutes.
October 2005 12-41

The time interval stated above can be adjusted if it is found not to give a satisfactory
difference between drilled gas and pump off gas. If changed with the agreement of
Toolpusher and Drilling Supervisor, the new times should be used consistently.
If it is decided that because of changes in drilling trends or behavior that drilling should stop
while a cuttings sample is circulated to surface, then a ‘Pump Off’ test should be carried out
once the sample is clear of bottom.
3) Attempt to eliminate step changes in background gas level by maintaining a steady mud
flow rate.
4) Attempt to eliminate step changes in drilled gas by maintaining consistent drilling

parameters (an increase in ROP with the same parameters provides additional
information for pore pressure prediction).
5) Use quantitative gas level devices to measure gas if possible. Utilize one at the flow line
and one in the active system.
6) A ‘Swab Test’ may be used to determine the actual mud weight overbalance.
Pore Pressure Analysis and Casing Point Selection
Cuttings
As pore pressure increases, cuttings should become larger and may appear spalled and
fractured. Obviously lithology changes will also be evident in the cuttings and used to
identify geological bit location.
Nannofossils
Although identifying cuttings does not provide an exact record of the stratigraphic sequence,
the appearance of a new rock type is an indication that a geological boundary has been
crossed. Nanofossils found in these different formations can act as useful markers prior to
drilling into the HPHT target formation.
Mud Temperatures
Mud temperatures may be used to provide qualitative indication of the transition zone. Some
indication of temperature increase should be expected and observed by plotting lagged delta
temperature vs. depth (this being the difference between the temperature of the fluid entering
the well and the temperature of the same fluid as it exits the well). Increases in lagged delta
temperature indicate increasing pore pressure.
12-42 October 2005

Logging While Drilling
Logging While Drilling giving gamma ray and formation resistively will be used to assess
formation pressure using knowledge from possible offsets and software analysis (e.g. Sperry
Sun’s software, PPFG).
Look ahead VSP
Consideration should be given to running a VSP (seismic while drilling) prior to entering
transition zone as a means of refining the pore pressure prediction and target depth.
Swab Test / Tripping Out in the Transition Zone
A procedure has been developed to address transition zone tripping that will not only reduce
the risk of inducing a kick while off bottom but also give additional information regarding
the degree of the overbalance (or lack of) on bottom. This procedure is as follows:
1) Circulate sufficient volume to ensure that cuttings from TD are already out of the hole
before it is necessary to route returns through the choke and MGS (see Step (8).
2) Shut off the Pump but leave the top drive made up.
3) Pull out the drill string one full stand at greater than normal trip speed - watching for
swabbing.
4) Run back to bottom and flow check.
5) Pump for 30 seconds.
6) Pull out the drill string one full stand at greater than normal trip speed - watch for
swabbing.
7) Run back to bottom and flow check.
8) Pump bottoms up - when bottoms up reaches bubble point reference then open up both
choke lines, close the Annular Preventer and direct returns through the MGS.
9) Assess gas levels of mud exiting the MGS, and into the flow ditch. If gas levels are
acceptable, then pump slug and POOH. If gas levels are too high, then either raise mud
weight or adjust mud properties and repeat tests before pumping out of hole.
Note: The procedures noted in Steps (3) to (9) constitute a ‘swab test’.
Early Penetration of Reservoir
If the reservoir or a fracture is encountered before the intermediate casing is set that allows
pressure to be communicated from the reservoir, a severe kick could result. On shutting in it
is likely that an underground blow-out will result.
October 2005 12-43

In this case one strategy to consider would be to ensure that annulus pressures are kept down
by pumping fluid down the annulus in order to prevent influx gas from migrating above the
loss zone. Further remediation for controlling the underground blowout will then need to be
applied.
12.7 HPHT Zone Procedures
The HPHT section of the well will be considered as the period from the time the intermediate
casing shoe is drilled out until the time that all formations below the shoe have been cased
off.
HPHT drilling and well control practices should apply for this section except:
1) When quantitative measurements show that the pore pressure and temperatures are low
enough such that normal drilling practices can be applied.
2) When the reservoir has been penetrated and pressure regime and trends in the reservoir
have been established, then tripping procedures can be revised if pore pressure is not
increasing with depth and all relevant parties agree to the change.
The approach to drilling this section is:
• Select a mud weight that will give the appropriate overbalance such that all drilling
operations can be carried out without inducing a kick or without suffering lost circulation.
However, for exploration and delineation drilling, the mud density used to drill out the
casing shoe in the transition zone should be the same mud density as used to drill to the
casing seat (this strategy will be used to assist in refining future casing setting depths). If
a change out of mud system is required, drilling out with a higher mud density should be
considered.
• Monitor the drilling operation closely to ensure that if an influx does occur, it is small
and is safely dealt with
• Use PWD information to optimize operating parameters
• Use risk assessment methodology to ensure risks are identified and precautions taken to
minimize risks
Annulus friction pressures are frequently high in this hole section. It is most likely that if an
influx occurs, it will be as the pump is turned off, or as the result of swabbing.
HPHT Section Guidelines:
1) All mud weights must be adjusted for temperature to give an accurate reading. A record
of flow line temperature must be kept throughout the hole section.
2) Using rig specific procedures, full circulation rates must be established in a slow and
controlled manner after a trip or after the well has been static for a long period.
12-44 October 2005

3) Prior to any trip the swab pressures and tripping rates will be calculated and compared to
PWD information.
4) Do not pull pipe without the pumps on in the open hole. Always pump out to the previous
casing shoe.
5) Check trips (short trips), if required, will be performed by pumping out to the shoe,
pulling 5 stands above shoe, tripping back to bottom and circulating bottoms up.
6) Following any trip or check trip, bottoms up will be circulated over the choke from
bubble point. This guideline may be reviewed based on well specific trends and
evaluation of PWD and formation test information.
7) When circulating over the choke, MGS pressure must be monitored to avoid blowing the
U-tube seal.
8) The well control method will be determined based on the origin of the kick and if the
mud system requires a weight increase.
Kick Alertness Level 3
Kick Alertness Level 3 will be applied for drilling the HPHT section.
Note: At no time during any well control situation will the well be allowed to flow in order
to prevent the casing pressure exceeding the formation breakdown pressure (i.e.,
there will be no MAASP setting.)
October 2005 12-45

Table 12.7.1 Kick Alertness Level for HPHT Section Level 3
General Safety
BOP Drills Daily for each shift
Pit/Trip Drills Daily for each crew unless conditions do not permit.
Pre-shift Safety Meetings Daily each shift – Drill Site Manager or Drilling Engineer to be present
Barite Plug Preparation Mix water prepared and cement unit lined up. Formulation agreed upon.
Kick Tolerance Drilling Engineer to continuously calculate kick tolerance curves and
anticipated surface pressure for various kick sizes to determine whether
to bullhead or circulate kicks. He/she should also calculate possible
SCRs based on mud/gas separator capacity versus expected gas
volumes.
Kill Mud Mix rate test required. Mixing system must be capable of increasing
mud weight by 2 ppg in 1 circulation. If system does not meet this
criteria, kill mud will be maintained on board.
Weather 2 forecasts each day from two stations at 6 hour intervals. Favorable
forecast before making a trip.
Kick Detection
Active Pit Volume on Minimum workable volume.
PVT Sensitivity 5 bbls gain on any shut-in well
Flow meter increase/ Flow check (minimum of 15 minutes).
decrease
Gains Shut-in, check for pressure. If no pressure flow check through choke. If
no noticeable flow through choke, open up well and flow check.
Circulate bottoms up, flow check at 4000 feet. Route flow through
choke/MGS. Establish PVT trends prior to drilling ahead.
Positive/Reverse Drilling Shut-in well using ‘Fast shut-in’.
Breaks
Hole Fill Records Supervisor or Engineer to monitor recording process and data.
Mud Density Checks Every 15 minutes.
Communications Mudlogger and rig floor to have two means of communication.
Trip Procedures Tripping procedures for HPHT drilling applies. Wiper trip may be
required - No ‘Swab Test’. If heavy mud pills are placed on bottom, this
will be done after the wiper trip.
Pressure Detection
Pressure Trends Report significant trends.
Gas Units Calibrate Mud loggers gas sensors at casing points. Run Calibration
test on gas sensors each shift. Check degasser response. Limit
maximum gas by units by adjusting ROP and/or pump rate. Run de-
gasser every tour.
Rate of Penetration Control drill if in reservoir zone.
Logs As required for pressure evaluation.
Simulated Connections As required to monitor gas trends.
Drilling Procedures As detailed in the Drilling Operations Plan
12-46 October 2005

12.8 HPHT Well Control Events
The reason HPHT wells are treated with such caution is mainly because there is very little
margin between formation pressure and fracture pressure and therefore the overbalance
(safety margin) afforded by the mud hydrostatic is minimal.
In addition, when drilling with oil based mud any gas entering the wellbore at these pressures
and temperatures will go straight into solution, not coming out of solution until very close to
surface. It will then rapidly expand. Rig personnel would be given very little time to react to
such an event.
Three well control events unique to this type of well could occur:
1) A small isolated volume of gas enters the well (usually swabbed). This is then circulated
to surface by a drill crew unaware of its presence in the hole. When it is very close to
surface it reaches its bubble point, comes out of solution and expands rapidly. As well as
pushing mud ahead of it, hydrostatic pressure is removed from the mud/gas mixture
immediately below and this gas in turn is instantly liberated. The result is that there is a
surge of gas from the wellbore creating an explosive and possibly toxic atmosphere.
It is obvious from the above that not only is extreme vigilance in pit level and return flow
monitoring necessary, but also that any time there is potential for gas to be approaching
surface, the return flow should be routed through the Choke and Mud Gas Separator to
enable the unloading effect to be controlled and prevent the release of gas into the
working areas. This is addressed in the procedures adopted for HPHT drilling.
2) A second serious event could result from drilling through a tight highly pressured
formation. In this case a slow but continuous flow from a highly pressured but ‘tight’
formation enters the wellbore over a long period of time undetected. Again the overall
volume is small - perhaps a couple of barrels spread out over an hour of circulating time.
However, it results in a column of mud contaminated with gas in solution being
circulated up the wellbore. When the first of the contaminated mud nears surface (and if
the influx is sufficiently concentrated) the gas reaches bubble point and expands rapidly,
expelling mud from the hole and further reducing hydrostatic in the fluid immediately
below it, which then ‘flashes off’. This continues as a domino effect, potentially
unloading a large part of the annulus, reducing hydrostatic pressure on bottom and
allowing the ‘tight’ zone to flow formation fluids into the well exacerbating the situation.
The key to prevention of this second type of incident is in being able to recognize
small/slow influxes into the wellbore.
October 2005 12-47

3) Flowback or ‘Ballooning’ may also occur. In this case drilling mud is lost to the
formation while pumping at full rate and is then gained back with the pumps turned off
and the ECD removed. This situation is fully discussed in later paragraphs.
4) Oil Base Mud Considerations:
Experience has shown that the formation gas dissolved in oil based muds breaks out and
expands at or near the surface.
The more classical models of gas expansion do not necessarily occur and therefore small
gains may not expand until the last minute in the upper portion of the annulus. This can
create a rapid underbalanced condition plus additional hazards of gas release around the
rig.
When circulating bottoms-up in hydrocarbon bearing zones consideration should be

given to circulating the last 25% (below wellhead) through the remote choke.
Additional Requirements Specific to Drilling the HPHT Section
Prior to drilling out the intermediate shoe, the connections between the top drive lower and
upper IBOPs will be broken and the valve and its threaded connections checked. The
connection will then be carefully doped and made up to the required torque. This will ensure
that the connection can be broken using the torque wrench should this be necessary in a well
control situation. All other IBOPs or FOSVs to be used in the section should be tested and
verified as being in good condition.
Additional Drilling Operation Procedures for the HPHT Section
When drilling the HPHT section of the well the following (additional) practices should be
adhered to:
1) Adhere to minimum stock requirements.

2) Conduct rig specific ‘weight-up drills’ to establish the volume of mud that can be
weighted up 2ppg/hr.
3) Co-ordinate swivel packing replacement to ensure that < 200 hours service exists on top
drive packing prior to entering HPHT section. During drilling of HPHT section, packing
should be replaced after a maximum of 400 hours of service. If swivel packing hours are
such that it requires changing prior to drilling out, then ensure that this is done early
enough (i.e. towards the end of the last hole section) so that the packing has proven itself
under drilling conditions before drilling out.
12-48 October 2005

12.9 HPHT Coring Procedures
Coring a high pressure reservoir introduces an increased level of operational risk. The
principal concerns include:
1) Inducing losses while running in.

2) Taking a kick with the core barrel in the hole.
3) Losing circulation with the core barrel in the hole.
4) Becoming stuck with the core barrel across the reservoir.
5) Swabbing while pulling out of the hole.
6) Additional time out of hole while handling core barrel at surface.
7) Gas expansion creating excess pressure within the core barrel as the core is pulled to
surface.
Coring Strategy
Coring operations on exploration wells should be undertaken only when approximately 10

feet of the objective sand has been penetrated. Coring operations should be conducted only
after sufficient mud weight overbalance exists based on short tripping and additional flow
checks.
In exploration wells, the length of the first core barrel to be run in a new reservoir section
should be 30 ft. If no problems are experienced on the first core, then core barrel length may
be increased to a maximum of 90 ft
a) A circulating sub will be run above the core barrel, in case LCM needs to be pumped, or
in case the core barrel or core head becomes plugged.
b) A drop in dart sub may be run above the core barrel and below the circulating sub.
c) If possible make up as much of the core barrel and stand it back in the derrick either
before drilling out or while in the hole (e.g. flow checking at shoe).
HPHT POOH Procedures for Core Barrels
The HPHT tripping procedures as described earlier will apply. If necessary due to minimum
overbalance, it may be necessary to pump all the way out of the hole.
It must be remembered that historically, across the industry, swabbing with core barrels has
been the cause of a number of serious well control incidents.
October 2005 12-49

When POOH with a fluted inner barrel, tripping speeds of 3-6 min/stand (slips to slips) has
proved successful.
12.10 Supercharging or Ballooning
The goal of this section is to set up a system to allow the difference between ballooning (or
flowback) and a real kick to be evident. In this way, drilling can continue in a safe and
effective manner. It is important to avoid ballooning in the first place by keeping the
wellbore pressure less than the fracture propagation pressure.
Flowback Issues
The downhole effect is for partial mud losses to occur during circulation followed by an
apparent influx when the pumps are turned off. For the purposes of these guidelines we will
refer to the overall phenomena as ‘Supercharging’ or ‘ballooning’ and to the resultant
symptoms observed at surface as ‘Flowback’.
Various theories describe the mechanism by which Supercharging occurs. The most common
are that either there is outward ballooning of the wellbore sides due to mud hydrostatic and
imposed pressures or that these same pressures force mud into fractures in the rock which
increase in length as the pressure continues to be applied. When pressure is released or
reduced then either the ‘balloon’ deflates or the fractures close up, forcing fluid back into the
wellbore and causing an apparent ‘flow’ at surface.
The term ‘Flowback’ is not to be confused with ‘Drainback’ (which is the term given to the
rise in pit level seen when circulation stops and mud in the tanks, ditches, lines and shaker
trays downstream of the flow line, drains back to the active pits).
Flowback itself can also be confused with the normal decay of flow seen at the flow line
when the pumps are stopped. This residual flow is a combination of the time taken for the
moving column of mud in the hole to decelerate to a stop, the bleed off of the drill string
internal pressure through the bit nozzles, and the effect of thermal expansion of mud.
For this reason, a measurement of these effects (Drainback and Flow Decay) at different
circulating rates will be done prior to drilling out the intermediate casing shoe and the well
‘fingerprinted’ for later comparison. Consideration should also be given to measuring
thermal expansion.
Flowback is not encountered in every high pressure well and the severity of the problem will
depend on the formations encountered, wellbore geometry and the typical operating
procedures used.
12-50 October 2005

The classic supercharging situation encountered could be triggered by the ECD. Essentially,
a flowback could be observed on shutdown of the pumps, which would look identical to a
wellflow occurrence. If this flow was shut-in, the shut-in pressure would be equal to or less
than the ECD.
It has been frequently observed that the bottoms up from a ‘flowback’ event often contains
sufficient gas to show a peak above normal connection, drilled, and background gas levels.
This contributes to misinterpretation of the situation by implying that gas has entered the
wellbore due to insufficient hydrostatic overbalance.
The difficulty is in telling the difference between a flowback and a genuine kick. This is
particularly difficult because, given the high ECD, it is quite likely that the genuine kick will
only become apparent once the pumps are turned off and the ECD pressure is taken off the
wellbore.
Getting the interpretation wrong could mean that unnecessary rig time is wasted in trying to
kill a non-existent kick (making matters worse because the increased mud weight leads to
higher losses while pumping and more flowback with the pumps off). Worse still: If
flowback is assumed and it is in fact a true kick, then a very dangerous situation can develop.
Note: For this reason, any flow from the well when the pumps have been shutdown must
be treated as a kick unless careful analysis of all data and trends indicate otherwise.
Procedures and tests have been developed to enable the rig team to differentiate between a
kick and flowback with some confidence.
Procedures and Guidelines
It is essential that all operations be carried out in a consistent manner. In this respect, the
toolpusher who is on tour is responsible for ensuring that sufficient information is relayed
from one Driller to the Driller on the opposite tour. The mud loggers are responsible for
making similar arrangements such that continuity of action and observation takes place.
Comprehensive records must be kept so that loss/gain events can be accurately tracked.
Fluid should not be bled from the well without first consulting with the management team. If
consistent "flowback" is occurring, more general rules can be set up as to what volumes of
fluid can be bled off without specific authorization from base operations.
Some important points should be noted:
1) Flowback should be fairly consistent from connection to connection. There should not be
a sudden increase in flowback between one connection or dummy connection and the
next. It is therefore possible to monitor what the flowback is after each connection and
produce a trend. The mud loggers should be rigged up to perform this service as a support
to the Driller’s observations. Great caution must be exercised when establishing the trend
October 2005 12-51

(i.e. when flowback first starts it is wise to treat it as a kick until it can be shown to be
otherwise), but once established a continuation of the trend may be regarded as a
flowback and drilling can continue.
2) As one can never be certain that an event was flowback and not a kick, it is essential that
any positive flow indicators are shut-in before being flow checked. The reason being that
it is impossible to tell the difference between a kick that is occurring at the bit and an
influx that was taken a while ago and is now expanding a short distance below the rotary
table. The first event may produce some danger to personnel at some time in the future.
The second event may produce a very dangerous situation immediately. Note that the
expansion below the rotary could be from a kick that was mistaken as a flowback or the
result of a kick from a tight formation which was simply not picked up because of the
low resultant flow.
3) Small kicks can be circulated out of the wellbore without high surface pressures and gas
rates. It is therefore acceptable to allow a small influx into the wellbore in order to
confirm that a kick is occurring. However, the size of such an influx should be as small as
possible. Allowable kick volumes should be calculated (modeled) based upon recent well
bore conditions.
4) The position of all flowback events and fluid influxes must be known at all times. As a
result of this knowledge, special attention can be given as the ‘flowback’ nears surface to
ensure that it is not expanding and to route returns through the choke as per the flowchart
procedures.
5) Experience will be gained as flowbacks are taken and these procedures can be modified
to include this experience.
6) The following is generally true:
• All influxes and potential influxes should be treated as kicks unless it can be shown
otherwise
• The first time that a ‘flowback’ occurs it should be treated as a kick and circulated out
using the Driller’s Method
• The Driller’s Method is preferred over the Wait & Weight Method because it allows
for the influx/flowback to be brought to surface (to be looked at, while going through
the choke) without increasing the mud weight and worsening the problem
• If a flowback has occurred (and is confirmed) it should be circulated to surface and

then put over a choke, because it may contain associated gas.
The flowchart procedures shown in Figures 12.10.1, 12.10.2 & 12.10.3 have been put
together as a general procedure that can be used when flowback is occurring or suspected.
12-52 October 2005

Figure 12.10.1 Flowback Chart 1
October 2005 12-53

Figure 12.10.2 Flowback Chart 2
12-54 October 2005

off
Figure 12.10.3 Flow Chart 3
October 2005 12-55

In the case of a "normal" influx situation, the effects of opening the choke to bleed off and
then closing the choke again should lead to:
i.) An increase in choke pressure (more influx has been taken) and
ii.) The SIDPP should remain unchanged while
iii.) The pit gain rises slightly.
In the case of wellbore ballooning, the effects of opening the choke should give the following
i.) The choke pressure should either stay the same or drop when the choke is closed
again.
ii.) The SIDPP should drop by a little, as the ballooning effect is allowed to relax, when
the well has been shut in again.
Note: It cannot be over-emphasized that this procedure is one which should be taken only
after full consultation with all senior personnel.
While this material has been written with respect to shales, there have been indications that
this problem has arisen in HPHT wells in shales, limestones and sandstones in deep Jurassic
sections in proximity to gas sands when ECD effects were substantial. One way of reducing
the ballooning may be to circulate slowly and to minimize annular pressure loss.
Identifying Ballooning or Flowback
The sequence of events for ballooning or flowback is:
1. Start pumps and impose annular friction pressure on wellbore in addition to mud
hydrostatic (note: the annular friction pressure is significant in the 8 1/2" hole amounting
to 300 psi or more at drilling circulating rates)
2. Lose mud to formation
3. Turn pump off and take away annular friction pressure.
4. Get back some or all of the mud previously lost to the formation
It will be the responsibility of BOTH the Driller and Mud Logger to keep accurate logs of the
amount of mud lost to the formation and subsequently gained back. Accurate records are the
key to successfully managing ballooning.
Note: The difficulty is in telling that it is the extra mud coming back and not a genuine kick.
Unless you are sure that it is the ‘Lost’ mud being returned, the gain when the pump
is turned off must be treated as an influx.
12-56 October 2005

Definitions
1. Drainback is the volume of mud (in barrels) that will flow from the settling and mud
processing pits into the active pits after the mud pump is turned off. Drainback will occur
whether the formation is ballooning or not. It is a function of the layout of the mud
processing system.
2. Flowback is the volume of mud (in barrels) that flows out of the top of the well when the
pump is turned off.
October 2005 12-57

Section 13 – Slim-Hole Well Control
13. Slim-Hole Well Control
13.1 Introduction
The concept of slim-hole drilling and continuous wireline coring has been practiced by the
Mining Industry for many years, because this is seen as the most effective method of
gathering information about the ore content of formations. The technique has been
improved for oil field applications in order to allow its application as a viable exploration
method. Due to their small size and coring capabilities, slim-hole exploration wells can
provide extensive, high quality data, especially in remote, difficult and environmentally
sensitive areas.
The most commonly accepted definition of a slim-hole is one in which 90% or more of the
length of the well is less than 7" in diameter. A more general definition would be a well
with hole diameters smaller than what is typically present in a comparable, conventional
well.
While the immediate difference between conventional wells and slim-hole wells are those
of dimensions, other major differences include the practice of long sections of continuous
coring, and use of lower drilling flow rates, higher rotation speeds and lower weights on
bit.
In terms of well control, the differences between slim-hole and conventional well drilling
can be significant. The annular volume of slim-hole wells is so small that an influx
occupies a significantly greater height for a given volume.
This increased sensitivity to influx volume leads to the requirement for more sophisticated
volume and flow change detection systems.
Due to the reduced annular clearances, annular friction pressures (ECDs) are often
significant in slim-hole operations, whereas ECD is typically ignored in conventional well
control.
For example, a typical annular pressure drop for a given mud system in the conventional
well Figure 13.1.1(A) would be approximately 150 psi, whereas for a similar slim-hole
well Figure 13.1.1(B) this could be of the order of 450 psi. Swab and surge pressures are of
even more importance in the case of slim-hole wells.
This all leads to the requirement for tailored well control procedures to be available during
slim-hole drilling.
October 2005 13-1

Figure 13.1.1 (A) Figure 13.1.1 (B)
Wellbore diagram of typical conventional and slim-hole wells
13.2 Slim-Hole Well Control Circulating
Annular Friction Pressure Losses
Conventional circulating well kill procedures rely on the principle of maintaining

bottomhole pressure constant and equal to, or slightly greater than, the formation pressure.
In order to circulate an influx from a well and to displace the well to a fluid of sufficient
density to regain primary control, additional pressure is applied at surface using an
adjustable choke.
If the annular frictional pressure is low enough, or can be reduced enough so that they will
not cause a problem, then conventional well control can be used. See Figure 13.2.1.
13-2 October 2005

ESTIMATED ANNULAR PRESSURE

LOSSES FROM SCRs
Figure 13.2.1
Circulating pressure must be constantly adjusted to ensure approximately constant

bottomhole pressure as fluids of various densities are circulated round the well.
Figure 13.2.2 shows a slim-hole well schematic in the form of a `U' tube for the conditions
of shut-in and the initial establishment of circulation. Nomenclature for this section is
clarified on the subsequent page.
October 2005 13-3

Figure 13.2.2 Well Control Pressure Scheme for the Annulus leg
13-4 October 2005

Nomenclature – for this section
SIDPP - shut in drill pipe pressure (psi)

SICP - shut in casing pressure (psi)
BHP - bottomhole pressure (psi)
Pf - formation pressure (psi)
ICP - initial circulating pressure (psi)
FCP - final circulating pressure (psi)
Pchoke - flowing choke pressure (psi)
Hia - hydrostatic pressure exerted by influx in the annulus (psi)
Hmdp - hydrostatic pressure exerted by mud in the drill string (psi)
Hma - hydrostatic pressure exerted by mud in the annulus (psi)
Fdp - actual friction pressure loss through the system, not including the annulus (psi)
Fa - actual friction pressure loss in the annulus containing influx and original mud
(psi)
Fdp(c) - calculated friction pressure loss through the system, not including the annulus
(psi)
Pscr - circulating pressure at a specified slow circulating rate when the well is full of
mud (psi)
SF - safety factor (psi)
MW1 - mud weight in use
MW2 - calculated kill mud weight
Example:
The circulating pressure necessary to keep BHP equal to Formation Pressure (Pf) is:
ICP = SIDPP + Fdp (Equation 1)
where Fdp represents the total actual frictional pressure drop through the surface equipment,
the drill string and the bit.
The flowing choke pressure (Pchoke) necessary to maintain a BHP = Pf is:
Pchoke = SICP – Fa (Equation 2)
where Fa represents the frictional pressure loss in the annulus
Equations (1) and (2) hold true for well kills in conventional sized wells and slim-hole well
geometries. For conventional kills we typically ignore the value of Fa as it is typically
negligible and acts as a small safety (overbalance) factor. But for slim-hole drilling, it can
be seen that the flowing choke pressure is dependent on the actual friction pressure loss in
the annulus if we want to avoid imposing a large overbalance on the formation.
As in conventional kill theory, the initial SIDPP and the actual frictional pressure drop
from the pump to the bit (Fdp) will remain constant provided that the properties of the fluid
in the drill string and the circulating rate remain constant.
October 2005 13-5

As the drill string is displaced to heavier mud, the frictional pressure drop in the drill pipe
will increase in direct proportion to the mud weight in the drill string. Thus the theoretical
circulating pressure at any point during a constant rate displacement of the drill string can
be obtained from the initial values of shut in drill pipe pressure and Fdp with the original
mud, and the final values of mud hydrostatic in the drill pipe (Hmdp) and Fdp with the
heavier mud displaced to the bit.
Conventional and Slim-hole Differences
The initial shut in drill pipe pressure can be read directly from the drill pipe pressure gauge
once the pressures have stabilized. However, the actual frictional pressure drop from the
pump to the bit with original mud (Fdp) cannot be measured independently from the total
system circulating pressure drop (Pscr) as measured on the drill pipe pressure gauge using
the original mud when circulating at the specified kill rate (i.e. the conventional practice of
taking SCRs).
In conventional wells, since friction losses in the annulus are small at kill rates, we
generally substitute the entire SCR value (Pscr) for the actual Fdp in equation 1, giving us the
familiar
ICP = SIDPP + Pscr (overbalanced by Fa)
MW2
and FCP = Pscr x MW1 (overbalanced by Fa)
The primary complication in circulating out an influx and displacing to kill weight mud in a
slim-hole well is that the annular friction pressure losses can be high, even at slow
circulating rates.
If the above conventional simplifications are made, the additional pressure applied to the
wellbore (Fa) may cause mud losses and/or fracture open hole formations.
If it can be shown that the additional pressure will not cause losses, then conventional
procedures can be used.
However, an alternative procedure for circulating out the influx and killing the well must
be available for use when the additional pressures are not acceptable.
13.3 Implementing Slim-Hole Well Control Techniques
Note: The objective, as with conventional well control, is to keep the bottomhole pressure
at least equal to or slightly greater than formation pressure.
13-6 October 2005

Considering the annulus, the immediate solution to the problem of high annular friction
losses in slim-hole drilling would appear to be to calculate the actual frictional pressure
drop in the annulus (Fa) and reduce surface pressures by that amount. Since the exact height
and flow characteristics of the influx will be unknown, it is unlikely that an accurate value
can be guaranteed. The pressure loss calculations in small slim-hole annuli are also
extremely sensitive to washout. This is, therefore, not a reliable option.
A more practical method involves calculating the friction in the drill pipe leg (Fdp) and
using that value with Equation (1) to determine an initial circulating pressure (ICP) that
balances, rather than overbalances the formation. Providing that there is reliable current
rheological data for the mud in circulation, Fdp can be calculated with an acceptable degree
of accuracy. It is clearly important that mud checks are carried out frequently.
Equation (1) then becomes:
ICP = SIDPP + Fdp(c)
where Fdp(c) = calculated frictional loss in drill string (surface lines + DP + DC +Bit)
This circulating pressure would balance the bottomhole pressure exactly with no safety
margin. But since we’re using a calculated value which may not be quite accurate, it is
recommended to include a suitable safety factor (SF), so that:
ICP = SIDPP + Fdp(c) + SF
and
BHP = Pf + SF
The choice of safety factor will depend on the open hole formation strengths and the error
margin in calculating the frictional pressure drop through the surface equipment, drill string
and the bit (Fdp(c)).
A 200 psi safety factor is commonly recommended in the case of slim-hole calculations.
The standard well kill calculations can now be modified as follows:-
ICP = SIDPP + Fdp(c) + SF
FCP = Fdp(c) x MW2 + SF

MW1
Since, of course, it’s not possible to eliminate the annular friction while circulating, the
only way to obtain this ICP when starting the pumps is to reduce surface pressure at the
choke (Pchoke) by an amount that can be calculated as:
October 2005 13-7

Pchoke reduction to make BHP = Pf + SF:
Reduce Pchoke by Fa - SF
And since Fa = Pscr – Fdp(c)
Pchoke = SICP + SF – (Pscr – Fdp(c))
This can be thought of as establishing ICP by holding choke pressure at a value of SICP,
but adding a safety factor and then subtracting an estimated, but calculable annular friction
pressure. It may be noted that this procedure is closely analogous to the way high choke
line friction losses are compensated for in subsea kill operations (in subsea kill operations
the choke line friction is typically measured, so no additional safety factor is generally
considered necessary).
The Significance of Improper Selection of Kill Rate
Consider the case if the estimated annular frictional pressure losses (Pscr – Fdp(c)) are equal
to the SICP + SF. In this case the expected choke pressure at the start of the kill would be:
Pchoke = 0
and the choke operator would have the choke wide open. The pump rate chosen in this case
can be considered the maximum rate that could be used in order to prevent applying more
overbalance on the well than the sum of the chosen safety factor plus whatever unknown
overestimation of Fdp results from the calculation of this value.
To avoid imposing additional pressures downhole, a kill rate should be chosen (where
possible) such that SICP + SF > estimated Fa.
If it is not possible to reduce the kill rate and the choke is still wide open, care must be
taken to observe the circulating pressure and follow a drill pipe pressure schedule. The
choke size may have to eventually be reduced as a gas influx rises and expands.
The following case highlights the choice of a suitable kill rate:
Let SICP = 95 psi
Estimated Fa @ 30 gpm = 364 psi
Estimated Fa @ 20 gpm = 238 psi
Using a 200 psi SF, the initial value for the flowing choke pressure would be set at:
Pchoke = 95 + 200 -364 = -69 psi (effectively 0 psi – choke wide open)
13-8 October 2005

By reducing the kill rate to 20 gpm, we get:
Pchoke = 95 + 200 - 238 = 57 psi
A practical figure is thus obtainable by reducing the kill rate to 20 gpm.
A pressure of 238 psi may also be acceptable as an annular frictional loss low enough not
to cause a problem during well kill (comparison to weak point pressure limits would have
to be made to determine this). If so, conventional well control may be used (i.e. start pump
holding Pchoke = SICP).
13.4 Kick Detection
Flow And Volume Detection
Kick detection in slim-holes uses the same general principles as conventional wells.
The two main kick detection methods are:
a) Increase in flow from the well relative to that pumped into the well
b) Increase in pit level
The biggest difference between the well types is simply that unless the kick response (shut-
in) in slim-holes is rapid, even small influxes will create significant hydrostatic changes in
the well annulus. Consequently, although the basic detection technology remains the same
for slim-holes, the detection systems have been enhanced to speed up kick awareness /
reaction times.
Detection Systems
a) Flow Measurements
A different type of flowmeter must be employed, instead of the standard paddle

flow meter used on most rigs. Two basic types of flowmeter are at present in use,
electro-magnetic and impulse. These flowmeters can read changes in flow to an
accuracy of better than 1%. The electro-magnetic flowmeter uses the characteristic
of flowing conductive fluids to generate an induced variable voltage directly
proportional to flow rate. These flow meters work relatively trouble free. However,
there are 6 points to note:
1. Mud Loggers should install and be responsible for the functioning of the
flow sensors.
October 2005 13-9

2. If the rig is equipped with its own electro-magnetic flow sensors, the
cleanliness and orientation of each should be checked by a qualified
engineer before drilling commences.
3. All factory calibrated flow sensors should be qualified in-situ by pumping

from a carefully calibrated trip tank using clean mud or water.
4. Because of the potential for unusual plumbing on slim-hole coring rigs, a

newly contracted rig should be inspected as early as possible to establish
ALL sensor installations.
5. The electro-magnetic flow sensor should be the same diameter as the line
into which it is fitted to avoid the risk of cuttings / solids build up in the
sensor.
6. Because slim-hole rigs frequently leave the pumps running while making
connections, bypassing mud to the flow line, a standpipe flow sensor would
not register flow, increasing the potential for false alarms. Therefore,
sensors should be attached to each pump, although it might be preferable to
be downstream of the pump on the "high" pressure side to aid in cleaning
the sensor.
b) Pit Level
Typically an increase of as little as 1 bbl must be detectable and as many

independent systems as possible should be used. The three usual systems to detect
a change in pit levels are:
Visual (bolt on a piece of string)

Drillers PVT
Mud Loggers Pit Level Indicator
All three systems rely on a change in pit level being spotted (either visually or by
instruments). In order to detect small influxes by pit level measurement we need to
reduce the size of the tank in which the measurement is being made. For this
reason, the slim-hole rig used should have an active tank of 50 bbl so a 1 bbl influx
will register a visible pit level increase.
c) Computer Modelling
To meet the detection need of slim-hole drilling particularly during changes in pipe
rotation and pump speed, a further system of detection is utilized. This is achieved
by using computer modelling.
13-10 October 2005

This system works by monitoring drilling parameters and using a mathematical

model which estimates the theoretical flow and compares these with actual
readings. Any discrepancy (losses, gains) triggers an alarm.
13.5 Kick Prevention
Procedure for making Connections
Since slim-hole operations are characterized by high annular frictional pressure losses, it is
not uncommon that an overpressured zone encountered during drilling may be
overbalanced by ECD, but not by mud weight in use.
A likely time for an influx to occur will thus be when the pumps are shut down to make a
connection. Unfortunately this is also the time that it will be most difficult to detect the
influx, as pit levels and flow rates will be fluctuating.
Note: The driller must be confident that the annulus is not flowing before he
adds a single to the string.
As the well progresses, crews will develop a good idea of how the annulus and active pits
behave on connections. However, crews should be particularly vigilant at this time.
To minimize confusion over pit levels;
No alterations to the active system should be made while drilling through or

approaching a potential pay zone.
The following procedure is suggested when making connections to allow a gradual

reduction in the ECD and make positive identification of an influx quicker:
Note: These procedures need only be carried out on wells with relatively high ECDs.
1. Drill (or Core) Kelly down.
2. Stop rotation.
3. Observe pit levels while circulating normally.
4. Raise kelly (break core).
5. Divert circulation across the well head without altering pump strokes.
6. Observe pit levels and any flow discrepancies while circulating across the
well head.
October 2005 13-11

7. Shut down the pump.
8. Observe annulus flow.
9. If annulus has stopped flowing, make the connection.
Note: Pit volumes will increase following steps 5 and 7. The amount of increase in step 5
will depend on the well geometry and the circulation rate used. The amount of
increase in step 7 will depend on drain back volumes, current mud conditioning
operations and tank configuration. Step 8 is the only direct method the driller has of
confirming that the well is not flowing.
Procedure for Tripping
Tripping Practices
Recommended practices include the following:
• Always circulate bottoms up and clean the hole prior to tripping.

• Always ensure that the hole takes the correct amount of fluid while tripping.
• Always keep the hole full.
a) Circulating Clean
This is relatively straight-forward. The hole and drill string diameter are known or
estimated and annular volumes calculated accordingly. Pump output is known and
bottoms up time / strokes can therefore be calculated.
During the course of drilling, the Mud Loggers may regularly drop carbide to
confirm calculated annular capacity and bottoms up figures. Any substantial
discrepancies should be investigated.
b) Hole Taking Correct Amount of Fluid
Since the drill string OD is often close to the wellbore diameter the dangers of
swabbing are increased. Consequently surge/swab pressure programs should be
used to establish a safe tripping speed. These swab/surge figures should be cross
checked by the mud logging engineers using their own proprietary software. The
results should be given to the Company Rep / Drilling Engineer prior to
commencing the trip.
The amount of fluid required to replace the pipe steel volume pulled in each single
is much less than for the 5" or 3 1/2" drill pipes common to conventional drilling
operations. Consequently to make the drop in the trip tank measurable we need to
utilize a smaller trip tank.
13-12 October 2005

Slim-hole rigs should use a trip tank with a much smaller cross section so that levels
can be readily observed. The trip tank should be sized (this is important at the
planning stage) so as to be able to reliably detect a 9 gallon change in displacement.
This is equivalent to the displacement of a 90' stand of 2.87" OD RSA 4K drill pipe.
c) Always Keep the Hole Full
As mentioned above, the drill string displacement is smaller in slim-hole wells than
conventional wells. However, since the hole is small the drill pipe displacement
represents a greater percentage of total hole volume in a slim-hole than in a
conventional hole. This in turn means that if we do not replace the fluid displaced in
the well by the pulled pipe then the level in the annulus will fall much further for a
given length of pipe pulled in a slim-hole than a conventional hole.
To highlight this point, it is worth noting that 90' of 5" drill pipe causes a 10.8 ft
drop in mud level when pulled out of 8 1/2" hole whereas 90' of 2.87" RSA 4K
causes a 20.4 ft drop when pulled out of a 3.77" hole. The consequences of not
filling the hole on trips are obvious.
When tripping out of slim-hole wells it is good practice:
a) To have extra supervision on the drill floor when pulling out in open
hole.
b) To perform a flow-check when the bit is inside the casing shoe.
c) To keep an inside BOP on the drill floor with the required crossovers for
the string being run in the well.
Table 13.5.1 Operational Procedures
Operation To be Carried Out by To be Checked by

1. Calculate surge/swab Drilling Engineer / Mud
pressures and calculate safe Logger
tripping speed prior to trip Drill Site Manager
commencing. (DSM)/Toolpusher (TP)
2. Circulate bottoms up /
hole clean prior to trip Driller DSM / TP and Mud Loggers
commencing.
3. Pull out of hole ensuring Driller DSM / TP and Mud Loggers

hole takes correct amount of
fluid.
4. Ensure that hole is kept Driller DSM / TP

full at all times.
October 2005 13-13

Procedure for Wireline Core retrieval
For wireline retrieval of cores in slim-hole drilling, consideration must be given to the
bottomhole pressure reductions (swab pressures) that are induced when pulling the core
inner tube from the close tolerance drill pipe. These swab pressures can be of sufficient
magnitude to draw an influx into the wellbore if precautions are not taken.
The pressure reductions are a function of two parameters; rate of acceleration of the inner
tube and terminal velocity while retrieving the inner tube. The rate of acceleration creates
the greatest swab pressure in terms of magnitude, however the duration is very short and
limited to the time required to accelerate the inner tube from rest to its terminal velocity.
The swab pressure after reaching terminal velocity is of a lower magnitude, but of equal
importance, as this swab pressure represents steady state conditions.
As the drill pipe isolates the open hole from the induced swab pressure caused by retrieving
the inner tube, only the exposed formation directly below the drill string will be subject to
swab pressures. However, formations above the bit can be swabbed if the annulus at some
point above the bit is small enough to restrict the swab flow sufficiently.
It can therefore be concluded that the most severe swabbing pressure will occur upon the
initial acceleration of the inner tube from the base of the drill collars. The influence of inner
tube motion on bottomhole pressure (i.e. the bottomhole swabbing pressure) will decrease
with distance from the core head if the pulling speed is kept constant (fluid
compressibility).
When retrieving the inner tube, the following procedure should be followed after having
followed the sequence defined previously for making connections.
Operational Instructions for Wireline Coring in Hydrocarbon Formations
1. Cut core until inner tube is full.
2. Pull off bottom slowly breaking off core.
3. Lay down single.
4. Circulate bottoms up, monitoring for any hydrocarbon shows.
5. Flow check, following the procedures as described in earlier paragraphs.
6. Rack back kelly / raise top drive as appropriate.
7. Make up wireline with overshot / catcher.
13-14 October 2005

8. Pick up and install stuffing box / lubricator to drill pipe. Line up the lubricator to
the standpipe and install a pressure gauge on one lubricator outlet.
9. R.I.H. with overshot and engage inner tube. If necessary circulate down the string to
clean the latching profile of debris.
10. Close lubricator side outlets and retrieve the core slowly, particularly upon initial
acceleration through the drill collars. Do not exceed a pulling velocity that results in
a drill pipe pressure (at the lubricator) exceeding the static `trip margin'
overbalance.
11. Observe the well on the trip tank while pulling out the core.
12. At surface, with the core in the lubricator, bleed off any gas liberated from the core
to the mud gas separator.
13. Lay down core barrel and retrieve the core. When coring non-hydrocarbon bearing
formations a lubricator may not need to be used.
• The driller must ensure that no visual swabbing occurs at the drill pipe.
• Observe the trip tank level while pulling out the core.
• Have good wire cutters available to cut wireline in case of an emergency.
Advantages of using the lubricator
• Safe control of well pressures is assured.
• Due to the minimal mud loss at surface, the mud level in the annulus can be
observed accurately, which gives an indication of the well pressures.
Disadvantages of using the lubricator
• Time consuming
• When lubricator is installed, the drill sting cannot be rotated or reciprocated,

which in some areas is crucial to avoid differential sticking.
13.6 Slim-Hole Pre-Kick Information
Mud Rheology
Low /no solids systems may be used on slim-hole rigs. This system is necessary due to the
high rotating speeds of the drill pipe. At such speeds they act as a centrifuge which would
October 2005 13-15

cause plating of solids on the pipe inside diameter. This would eventually restrict the flow
and prevent wireline recovery of the core inner barrel.
Muds used for slim-hole drilling should have a low viscosity and a low solids content.
It is important, in light of the high annular frictional pressure drops associated with slim-
hole drilling, to maintain the rheology of the mud as low as possible and as such the PV
and YP should be kept in the range 7-12 CPs and 1-5 lbs/100 ft2 respectively.
In order to check this, full Fann viscometer readings and mud weights should be recorded
twice per shift and immediately on having a well control incident. The Fann viscometers
should be regularly calibrated and a back up should be available.
Slow Circulation Rates
In the case of slim-holes, it is especially important to be able to estimate the annular

frictional pressure drop as accurately as possible. Unlike with conventional drilling
operations, Chevron does, therefore, recommend measuring and pre-recording SCRs while
drilling slim-hole.
Slow circulating rates should be chosen to provide an optimum balance between total kill
time, ease of choke manipulation and surface influx handling capabilities. SCRs should be
recorded on the pressure gauge that will be used to kill the well.
The following procedures should be followed for taking SCRs:
l. SCRs should be recorded at 10, 20, 30 and 40 gpm.
2. SCRs should be taken prior to drilling out a casing shoe and on each
subsequent trip into the hole when the bit reaches the last casing shoe.
3. SCRs should be taken after tripping to bottom and/or at least twice per shift
with the bit at the drilling depth.
4. SCRs should be re-taken whenever there are changes in mud properties.
Note: Item 3 is relevant when calculating values of circulating MAASP and when
estimating the reverse circulating pressure at the shoe.
Figure 13.6.1 shows a typical worksheet used to record the various SCRs.
13-16 October 2005

Figure 13.6.1
Note: Friction losses through surface lines between the standpipe pressure gauge and the
top of the drill string are generally minimal and can therefore be ignored. In slim-
hole drilling, however, such losses, if significant, would cause inadvertent reduction
of bottomhole pressure during kill operations.
For this reason, it is recommended to measure friction losses through surface

equipment leading to the drillpipe by circulating through the surface equipment and
a single joint of drill pipe positioned in the rotary table. If pressure exceeds a few
psi, this value should be considered while calculating drill string (i.e. non-annular)
pressure losses. Calculations throughout this chapter are made with the assumption
that surface pressure losses are, in fact, minimal as is normal.
October 2005 13-17

Figure 13.6.2 Drill pipe Dimensions
Leak-Off Tests
The dynamic form of the leak-off test must not be used. For Slim Holes, the hesitation
type of leak-off must be used.
Values of relaxed pressure must be taken and used to calculate the equivalent mud weight
and MISICP. The trend of the pumping pressure may be used as an indication of leak-off,
but the value of the surface pressure to be used in the calculation must be the static relaxed
pressure.
13-18 October 2005

Figure 13.6.3 Typical hesitation leak-off test response
MISICP (Static MAASP)
This is calculated in the same way as on a conventional well.
(EMW – MW) x Depth x 0.052 = MISICP (psi)
Where Depth is in feet, EMW and MW are in ppg
Dynamic MAASP
Due to the relatively high annular pressure drops which can exist when circulating out an
influx, a circulating, or dynamic MAASP will exist which will be lower than the MISICP /
static MAASP.
The value will be reduced from the static value by the amount of annular frictional pressure
drop above the casing shoe (assuming that the weakest point in the well will be the
previous casing shoe). It is therefore important to record a slow circulating rate at the shoe
whenever the bit is tripped in the hole. From this value, the calculated pressure drop
through the string at that depth can be subtracted and a value of frictional pressure loss in
the cased hole section estimated:
MAASPcirc = MAASPstatic - Friction press loss in annulus above casing shoe
October 2005 13-19

During Volumetric kill operations, STATIC MAASP will obviously apply, but during any
circulation type of kill the DYNAMIC MAASP will be the surface pressure above which
shoe fracture would be expected.
As in conventional well control, MAASP values are relevant for only as long as the influx
is below the shoe. After this time, if the BHP is kept constant, the shoe pressure will vary
only with changes in the hydrostatic head of mud from the shoe to TD.
Kick Tolerance
The kick tolerance can be calculated using existing procedures for normal drilling
operations. The exception however is that kick tolerance levels as low as 2.5 bbls may have
to be tolerated.
A typical conventional rig's influx detection capability is often considered to be ~10 bbls
which is clearly inadequate for dealing with the limited kick tolerance typical of slim-holes.
The slim-hole rig's detection capability is typically ~ 1 bbl and therefore kick tolerances
down to 2.5 bbls may be considered acceptable.
Kick Sheet and Pre-Recorded Data
The information required on the kick sheet for a slim-hole well is, for the most part, the
same as that required for a conventional well. The additional information required will be a
calculation of annular friction loss for selected kill speed to determine if the slim-hole kill
procedure is needed and, if so, to provide information necessary to compensate for
significant annular friction pressure loss.
13.7 Standard Slim-Hole Well Kill Procedures
It is especially important in the case of the slim-hole well to contain the volume of influx in
view of the increased height in the slim-hole annulus such a volume will occupy. The
smaller the volume of influx, the lower the resultant wellbore and surface pressures will be,
throughout the kick control process.
In this respect, if a primary indicator of a kick, such as either a pit gain or an increase in
returns is detected, do not flow check the well but shut the well in immediately.
The hard shut-in is the preferred method of shutting in a well.
Trapped Pressure
In some instances it is possible that pressure in excess of that caused by the kick can be
trapped in the well. Any excess pressure will lead to a higher than required kill mud weight
and higher annular pressures throughout the kill circulation.
13-20 October 2005

From the point of view of a slim-hole well, neither of these are desirable.
For slim-hole applications the following is recommended to help remove excess, trapped
pressures prior to starting the kill circulation:
The pressure should be bled off from the annulus in stages of 50 psi or 5 gallons,
whichever is reached first. The bled off volume should not exceed 5 gallons. Consequently
an accurate means of measuring this volume should be available.
It is recommended that a strip tank of 1 barrel capacity, calibrated in 5 gallon intervals, be

available at the choke manifold for this purpose.
The bleed off should be repeated until pressure reading following bleed off builds back up
after the choke has been closed.
Bleeding off should be carried out with care and patience; after all trapped pressure has
been removed, this will cause a further influx to enter the well.
Shut-In Period
Once the well has been closed in, the data that requires recording and the initial kick data
sheet calculations do not differ much from those of conventional well control cases.
There are however, two additional quick calculations required, relevant to killing the slim-
hole well:
It must be ascertained if the estimated annular frictional pressure loss is significant in

relation to the safety factor advised for that particular hole section. If it can be shown not to
be significant then conventional theory may be used.
If, at the chosen kill speed, the estimated annular frictional pressure loss is significant, a
check should be performed as shown earlier to ascertain if a lower kill speed would yield
annulus frictional losses low enough to be able to use conventional methods.
Well Kill Decision Tree
Having established that the well is safely closed in, it then becomes necessary to decide on
the most appropriate method of killing the well. This decision will ultimately be the
responsibility of the Drill Site Manager, since he should have all the information to hand so
as to be able to choose viable alternatives.
Figure 13.7.1 represents such a Well Kill decision process when dealing with an influx in a
slim-hole well.
October 2005 13-21

Since it is much more straightforward and less trouble prone to kill the well conventionally,
circulating pressures should be kept to a minimum and so allow the use of conventional
technology.
It is also important to ensure that the mud is kept within specification at all times,
particularly with respect to mud weight, viscosity and gels.
If necessary, drilling should be suspended and the mud conditioned to bring ECDs down to
an acceptable level prior to drilling ahead.
Figure 13.7.1 Well Kill Decision Tree
Kill Start up Procedure
When commencing to kill a conventional well it is common practice to bring up pump

speed and keep Pchoke = SICP until ICP is established at the kill rate.
13-22 October 2005

In a slim-hole with substantial annular friction, this conventional well kill start up method
would result in additional back pressure exerted on the formation, which is neither
necessary nor desirable.
On the other hand, if the choke was opened fully at the start of the initial kill circulation,
then this could permit a further influx into the wellbore until the choke size is reduced
enough to bring circulating pressure up to the correct, scheduled pressure.
Clearly, it is preferable to have a system which progressively reduces the surface pressure
at the choke as annular frictional pressures increase.
In practice it is hard to predict exactly how the annular friction will increase as the pump is
brought up to speed. Since the kill rate in slim-hole well control is very slow, it is likely
that the pump throttle will be barely cracked open to give a typical kill rate of 15 gpm.
Consequently it would be difficult to slowly bring the pump up to speed in even smaller
increments.
This means that any control of the situation must be done at the choke and not with the
pump. The pressure wave running ahead of the pump can take +/- 2 seconds / 1000 ft of
hole depth before it reaches the choke. This figure gives a rough idea of the rate at which
frictional pressure will build up.
The only way the exact lag time for the pressure wave to travel from pump to choke can be
determined is to physically test it on the rig.
This can be done prior to drilling out the casing shoe as follows:
With the well open, bring circulating rate up to 15 gpm (~ 6 SPM) as quickly as possible.
Record: “A” How many seconds it takes before there is recordable flow in the annulus.
and “B” How many seconds it takes before there is full flow in the annulus.
The time taken “B” is the point at which we have full circulation and the annular frictional
pressure loss is at it’s full effect.
As described earlier, the static shut in pressure (SICP) is known and the likely flowing
choke pressure (Pchoke) that would correspond to our desired ICP can be estimated from:
Pchoke = SICP + Safety Factor - Annular pressure loss with mud
Therefore, in the kill situation, the pumps should be started and brought quickly up to the
kill speed. After time “A” the choke should be opened and controlled progressively so that
the flowing choke pressure decreases until it reaches its dynamic level after a total of 'B'
seconds.
October 2005 13-23

To highlight this, consider the following example:
In a slim-hole well, the casing was set at 7220 ft. At this depth a pump test was performed
which gave the following data:
At kill speed 15 gpm (6 SPM)
Time taken to detect recordable flow in annulus = 10 seconds (“A”)

Time taken to get full flow in annulus = 40 seconds (“B”)
Estimated annular frictional loss (Pscr – Fdp(c)) = 400 psi

Safety Factor = 200 psi
A kick is taken while coring at 9850 ft SICP = 800 psi
To obtain ICP at the start of the well kill:
Lag time at 9850 ft will be about 9850 / 7220 times the lag time at 7220 ft (i.e. ~1.4 times).
Therefore:
Estimated time taken for recordable annular flow = 10 sec x 1.4 = 14 sec (“A”)
Estimated time taken for full annular flow = 40 sec x 1.4 = 56 sec (“B”)
Initial SICP (static closed in) = 800 psi

Flowing choke pressure (Pchoke) = 800 + 200 - 400 = 600 psi
Therefore to start the kill, kick in the kill pump at 15 gpm.
After 14 seconds open choke and control pressure so that Pchoke reduces progressively until
after 56 secs the Pchoke is 600 psi.
At this point the drill pipe circulating pressure should be used for the well kill. It must be
remembered that delays in the system response will mean that very careful choke
manipulation will be required to follow the drill pipe pressure schedule.
13.8 Special Well Kill Procedures
Volumetric Method
As in conventional drilling, this method should only be considered if there is no means of

circulating in the well, such as when a gas kick is causing shut in pressures to build and you
have a plugged string or drill-pipe is out of the hole.
13-24 October 2005

Unless the gas bubble is allowed to properly expand, there is a chance that the pressure
created at the casing shoe could exceed the shoe strength. The controlled release of
pressure at surface in this respect represents the basis of Volumetric well control.
In slim-holes the gas migratory speed may be relatively fast due to the brine-like qualities
of the muds often used. Since the annular capacities are quite small, the bleed off volumes
per step will also be quite small. While this would be a serious problem on a conventional
rig, the mud measuring capabilities of a slim-hole rig should be capable of measurements
adequate to make the method work.
Another consequence of the small annulus, however, is that the choke pressure will likely
fluctuate much more quickly as the choke is opened and closed. To avoid overbleeding
with the Volumetric method it is recommended to utilize a manual choke. It will be easier
to get a “feel” for choke response with a manual choke rather than with a remote control
hydraulic choke.
While Volumetric procedures are applicable to slim-hole drilling, dealing with the gas after
it reaches surface (using Lubricate and Bleed procedures) can be more difficult. What is
much more difficult to predict is the hydrostatic head that would be exerted by the
lubrication into the small annulus of a given amount of mud.
Surface Tension effects will come into play in the restricted annular clearance and it would
be naive to expect good top filling characteristics in this case.
For these reasons, if there is drill string in the hole which can be run in against well
pressure, then consideration should first be given to either stripping in to a depth where the
well could be killed or, if the string is plugged, shooting holes in it to allow circulation.
Only if these options are not available should Volumetric and Lubricate and Bleed be
attempted.
Reverse Circulation Kill Method
In this method the influx is circulated to surface via pumping down the annulus and up
through the drill pipe. This option has the attraction that the influx is not circulated up the
annulus. This means that lower annulus pressures can be expected, which will be limited to
circulating frictional losses.
Due to the tendency of the bit to plug with drilled cuttings, this option is normally only
considered in conventional well control as a theoretical exercise. However, in the case of
slim-holes, removal of the core when coring can present a reverse circulation drill pipe
cross section which is larger than the annulus cross section. For example, the internal
cross-sectional area of 4 1/8" drill collars is 5.94 inch, compared to an annular cross
sectional area for 4 1/8" drill collars in 4.8" hole of 4.73 inch. Even with a core in place, it
is possible that the minimum cross sectional flow path (inner barrel stand-off or inner
barrel clearance) presented to the fluid, with the bit off bottom will be at least equal to the
cross sectional flow path of the drill pipe and casing annulus.
October 2005 13-25

The decision to reverse circulate kill a well will depend on many factors. The following
points must be considered before implementing a reverse kill.
1. Bit type and its position in the well
2. The cross sectional flow area at the bit
3. If present, the time taken and the chances of success of removing the core
4. The effect that the time taken before circulation can begin will have on the
estimated position of the top of the influx
5. The magnitude of the reverse circulation frictional pressures on annulus

weak points
It must be stressed that there is a minimum effective reverse circulating speed. The
downward velocity of the fluid in the annulus must be greater than the upward gas
migration velocity. This also applies to bullheading. It is recommended that the reverse
circulating speed of the fluid in the biggest annulus below the wellhead be at least equal to
2.5 ft/sec. As a rough guide, because of the tendency of the gas to migrate upward at a
speed of approximately 1.6 ft/sec, this will give a resultant downward velocity of 0.9 ft/sec.
This figure of 0.9ft/sec must be used to estimate the time taken for the top of the influx to
be circulated to the inside of the drill pipe.
Adaptation of Slim-hole Reverse Circulation Theory
When the well is first shut in on an influx, the static balance equations are still valid.
However, when reverse circulation is established, in order to maintain BHP = Pf (refer to

Figure 13.8.1):
For the Annulus leg
The flowing choke pressure (Pchoke) referred to earlier, now becomes the pressure
required to pump down the annulus.
Therefore:
BHP = Hia + Hma + Pchoke - Fa
Pchoke = BHP - Hia - Hm + Fa
and since BHP - Hia - Hm = SICP
Therefore: Pchoke = SICP + Fa
13-26 October 2005

For clarity, this reverse circulating pressure will be called Prev, as the choke will now have
to be lined up to handle returns from the drill pipe. Thus:
Prev = SICP +Fa
Any safety factors may be applied to the downstream (drill pipe side which is now Pchoke)
leg instead.
For the Drill pipe leg
The BHP as reviewed from the drill pipe side as circulation begins is now (before
influx is taken into the drill pipe):
BHP = Hmdp + Fdp + Pchoke
Recall that Fdp represents the total actual frictional pressure drop through
the surface equipment, the drill string and the bit. Since the flow from the
drill pipe to the choke will likely not go through the surface lines, the
pressure drop through the surface lines may be considered a minor safety
factor and generally ignored.
To maintain BHP = Pf
the flowing drill pipe choke pressure (Pchoke) becomes:
Pchoke = Pf - Hmdp - Fdp
And since Pf – Hmdp = SIDPP
Pchoke = SIDPP - Fdp
To avoid underbalance in the event the calculated Fdp is inaccurate, a safety

factor can be introduced as was done before for forward circulation. The
procedure for bringing pumps online (using the same time delay techniques
mentioned earlier) might involve starting circulation by letting the Pchoke
reduce to the value:
Pchoke = SIDPP + SF - Fdp
October 2005 13-27

Figure 13.8.1 Reverse Circulation- Well control Pressure Scheme
13-28 October 2005

Bullheading Method
Bullheading should be considered under the same circumstances as for a conventional well.
As always, injection rates must exceed gas migration rate for bullheading to work
Dynamic Kill Method
A dynamic kill uses the annular friction pressure losses to maintain a bottomhole pressure
in excess of the formation pressure as the influx is removed. The additional pressure
required to maintain this bottomhole pressure increases as the influx expands (hydrostatic
pressure decreases) in the annulus. The annular friction pressure loss at a given circulating
rate will also decrease as the influx expands.
While dynamic killing may seem an interesting possibility, given the magnitude of Fa
typical for a slim-hole, several factors dictate against using this method as a general
practice.
In conventional well control it is necessary to shut the well in when a kick is suspected to
have occurred. There are many reasons for this, and among them are the following:
- Confirmation that a kick has occurred

- Estimation of new BHP and influx volumes
- Organization of crews and materials
- Calculation of kill parameters.
- Planning for handling of returning wellbore fluids
Whether controlled systems of well control are used or a dynamic system of well control is
chosen, these reasons for closing in the well will still be applicable. Therefore to prevent
further influx when starting or stopping any controlled, circulating method, the use of the
choke will be required. This will severely complicate the dynamic kill method, and in effect
turn it into a fast Driller’s method (which is not easily controllable). For this reason alone
the dynamic kill method is not a practical rig site method of slim-hole well control.
The alternative procedures presented above reduce the additional pressures exerted on the
wellbore to a selected safety factor value, and are therefore more highly recommended for
controlled kill operations.
October 2005 13-29

Section 14 – H2S and SO2 Considerations
14. H2S and SO2 Considerations
14.1 Introduction
Drilling into areas where formations may contain hydrogen sulfide (H2S) requires that
additional precautions be taken to ensure the safety of personnel and integrity of equipment.
Since this gas is extremely dangerous, all personnel who could be exposed to hydrogen
sulfide must be thoroughly indoctrinated concerning the hazards.
The degree of danger depends upon the concentration. It must be remembered that changes in
atmospheric conditions, wind, gas composition, etc., can quickly increase H2S concentration.
Poor ventilation in enclosed spaces around or near a drilling rig where H2S is present can
cause a dangerous concentration of H2S to occur.
API and MMS define H2S wells as those wells capable of producing atmospheric
concentrations of 20 ppm or greater (The MMS definition can be found in Title 30 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 250, Subpart D, Section 49.)
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S)
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) is encountered in many regions of the world during well operations,
and in varying concentrations. It is extremely toxic, explosive, and is heavier than air. In
small concentrations it has an offensive (rotten egg) odor, while greater concentrations can
paralyze the olfactory nerves so no odor is detected. When ignited, it burns with a blue flame
producing sulphur dioxide (SO2), which can also cause serious injury.
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) is a gas produced by the burning of fluids containing H2S, such as
flaring the well during well testing operations. Because SO2 is toxic, precautions must be
observed similar to those for H2S.
14.2 H2S in Drilling Operations
When performing drilling operations on a well where H2S is suspected, all personnel will be
trained in special procedures relating to well control, well testing, and well intervention.
It is recommended that all H2S equipment be installed and functional within / before 1000 ft
(300 m) of, or one week prior to, penetrating the H2S potential zone, or as required by local
regulations, whichever is the most stringent.
October 2005 14-1

Even in areas of high H2S concentrations, H2S may not be detected during drilling
operations, and its presence only confirmed during well testing or circulating formation fluid
to surface.
• No work shall be carried out which is liable to expose the rigsite operation to H2S
until a risk assessment of the potential impact of H2S is conducted. Where the risk of
H2S occurrence cannot be assessed, short-term exposure shall be assumed, and an
appropriate level of detection shall be put in place.
• The materials selection process for wells expected to contain H2S shall comply with
NACE standards and shall be used wherever practical for all metals expected to come
into contact with sour environments.
• The BOP shall always be designed for an H2S environment, i.e. ‘H2S trim’.
• If a potential for H2S has been identified, an H2S contingency procedure should be
formulated between Chevron, the Drilling Contractor, and the H2S Safety Service
Company.
• Personnel working on Chevron operated installations that risk exposure to H2S should
be properly protected from the effects of H2S, and shall receive proper training in the
hazards of H2S and in the protective measures provided.
H2S monitoring equipment should be continually surveyed and tested periodically. Personnel
will be trained in H2S procedures and personal breathing apparatus usage. When H2S is
expected at surface, personal breathing apparatus will be worn.
Emergency Procedures
In the event of an emergency situation involving the release of H2S into the atmosphere, if
either the visual or audible alarm is triggered, all off duty or non-essential personnel must
immediately don their personal breathing apparatus and proceed to the designated briefing
area upwind of the wellbore.
If H2S is detected during a well control operation, the well should be shut-in immediately and
the contingency kill procedure implemented.
Note: Bullheading is the preferred well control procedure whenever significant levels of
H2S have been detected.
Drilling operations that are planned in areas where formations contain or are suspected to
contain hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas require additional precautions be taken to ensure the
safety of personnel and integrity of equipment. This gas is extremely dangerous due to its
corrosive and highly toxic nature, and all personnel associated with operations where a
potential hazard for H2S exists must be thoroughly indoctrinated.
The degree of danger H2S poses to personnel depends upon its concentration in the air.
Changes in atmospheric conditions, wind, gas composition, etc., can quickly increase its
density. Poor ventilation in enclosed spaces around or near a sour well can also produce a
dangerous level (a sour well is one containing H2S).
14-2 October 2005

The American Petroleum Institute (API) and the U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS)
define H2S wells as those wells capable of producing atmospheric concentrations of H2S
greater than or equal to 20 parts per million. One ppm of H2S gas means there is one part of
H2S per million parts of air, i.e., a volume per unit volume measurement.
The remainder of this section contains some basic information on H2S and SO2 gas, and
operating precautions which should be observed in these environments. For more details, the
reader is directed to API RP 49, latest edition (Recommended Practices for Safe Drilling of
Wells Containing Hydrogen Sulfide), API RP 55, latest edition (Recommended Practices for
Conducting Oil and Gas Production Operations Involving Hydrogen Sulfide), and MMS-
OCS-1 Standard, latest edition (Safety Requirements for Drilling Operations in a Hydrogen
Sulfide Environment).
Facts and Hazards of Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) & Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)
Danger Areas
H2S is slightly heavier than air, and on still days tends to accumulate in low places.
However, if the H2S is sufficiently warmer than the surrounding air, it will rise. Thus,
even personnel working in high places, such as derrickmen, should do so with caution
when there is a possibility of H2S.
SO2 is appreciably heavier than air. Thus, like H2S, it will tend to accumulate in low
places. At ambient conditions, the specific gravity of this gas is nearly double that of
H2S, and more than twice that of air.
Smell
H2S smells like rotten eggs in very small concentrations, but the sense of smell
rapidly diminishes above 5 ppm. For this reason, smell should not be used as a
warning indicator for the presence of H2S.
SO2 has a pungent odor associated with burning sulphur.
Toxicity
H2S is almost as poisonous as hydrogen cyanide, and 5 to 6 times more dangerous

than carbon monoxide. The exposure limit to H2S, as defined by the U. S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), is a ceiling concentration of
20 ppm (0.002% by volume H2S gas to air), or a peak concentration of 50 ppm
(permitted only once per eight-hour shift, for a maximum of ten minutes, and only if
no other measurable exposure occurs). Exposure levels in excess of 20 ppm require
the use of personnel protective breathing equipment. At 500-700 ppm, a person will
lose consciousness and death could occur in thirty minutes or to an hour. At 1000
October 2005 14-3

ppm, unconsciousness occurs immediately, breathing stops, and death occurs within
minutes.
The exposure limit to SO2, as defined by OSHA, is a 5 ppm eight-hour time weighted
average. Exposures in excess of this maximum dictate the need for personnel
protective breathing equipment. Exposures below 20 ppm can cause eye, throat, and
respiratory tract irritation, as well as chest constriction. At 50 ppm, breathing
congestion occurs promptly, and cannot be tolerated for more than 15 minutes by
most people. An exposure to 150 ppm produces extreme irritation and can only be
endured for a few minutes. A sense of suffocation occurs at 500 ppm, and at 1,000
ppm death may result unless rescue is prompt.
Human Tolerance
A resistance to H2S cannot be developed by working around it, but the effect is also
not cumulative. A person revived promptly after breathing even a high concentration
of H2S may not necessarily be permanently injured.
Prolonged exposure to SO2 has been reported to produce a chronic toxicity,

manifested as an alteration to the senses of smell and taste, shortness of breath on
exertion, and a higher frequency of respiratory tract infections.
Flammability
H2S is a colorless, flammable gas. Its explosive limits (percent by volume in air) are
wide, ranging from 4.3% to 45.5%. In contrast, the explosive limits for natural gas
only range from 4.8% to 13.5%.
SO2, like H2S, is a colorless gas, but unlike H2S it is nonflammable.
Solubility
H2S is soluble in both water and hydrocarbons such as gasoline, kerosene, and crude
oil. At atmospheric pressure, water will absorb approximately three times its own
volume of H2S. Solubility decreases as the fluid temperature increases.
SO2 is readily soluble in water and oil. The solubility decreases as the fluid
temperature increases.
Symptoms, First Aid Requirements and Safety Precautions
Symptoms
Irritation Case:
Exposure to low concentrations (50 to 100 ppm) of H2S will cause coughing, eye
irritation, and loss of sense of smell after 2 to 15 minutes; altered respiration, pain in
14-4 October 2005

the eyes, and drowsiness after 15 to 30 minutes; and throat irritation after 1 hour.
With prolonged exposure these symptoms gradually increase in severity, and death
occurs in 8 to 48 hours.
Acute Case:
Breathing of H2S concentrations of 500 to 1000 ppm or higher will cause almost
immediate loss of consciousness. Breathing will become difficult, and cramps,
paralysis, and loss of color are other possible effects
Table 15.1
H 2S 0-2 2 - 15 15 – 30 30 – 60
Concentration Mins Mins Mins Mins
50 – 100 ppm Mild conjunctivitis;
respiratory tract
irritation
100 – 150 ppm Coughing; irritation *Disturbed Throat irritation
of eyes; loss of respiration; pain in
sense of smell eyes; sleepiness
150 – 200 ppm Loss of sense of Throat and eye Throat and eye
smell irritation irritation
200 – 350 ppm Irritation of eyes; Irritation of eyes Painful secretion or
loss of sense of tears; weariness
smell
350 – 500 ppm Irritation of eyes; Difficult Increased irritation
loss of sense of respiration; of eyes and nasal
smell coughing; irritation tract; pain in head;
of eyes weariness; light shy
500 – 600 ppm Coughing; collapse Respiratory Serious eye Severe pain in eyes
and disturbances; irritation; light shy; and head;
unconsciousness irritation of eyes; palpitation of heart; dizziness;
collapse* a few cases of trembling of
death* extremities; great
weakness and
death*
600 – 1500 ppm Collapse; Collapse;
unconsciousness; unconsciousness;
death* death*
October 2005 14-5

Table 15.2
H2S 1–4 4–8 8 – 48

Concentration Hours Hours Hours
50 – 100 ppm
100 – 150 ppm Salivation and Increased symptoms Hemorrhage and death*
mucous discharge;
sharp pain in eyes;
coughing
150 – 250 ppm Difficult breathing; Serious irritation effect* Hemorrhage and death*
blurred vision; light
shy
250 – 350 ppm Light shy; nasal Hemorrhage and death
catarrh; pain in eyes;
difficult breathing;
conjunctivitis
350 – 500 ppm Dizziness; weakness; Death*
increased irritation;
death*
500 – 600 ppm Death*
600 – 1500 ppm Death*
First Aid
1. Remove victim from contaminated area into fresh air as soon as possible.
2. If breathing has stopped, start artificial respiration immediately.
3. Keep victim warm and at rest.
4. Get victim to doctor, but continue artificial respiration enroute if breathing stops.
5. If an oxygen resuscitator is available, use it in lieu of artificial respiration, as

concentrated oxygen will more quickly oxidize H2S into the blood. However, begin
with artificial respiration rather than wait for a resuscitator.
6. For conjunctivitis (irritation of eyes), wash eyes with 1% boric acid solution,
followed by 10% Argyrol drops. Ophthalmic boric acid ointment will also give some
relief.
Safety Precautions
1. Keep upwind of H2S source.
2. Keep proper air breathing apparatus on location, and school all personnel in its
operation and maintenance. H2S drills should begin prior to drilling into formations
that may contain H2S so that all persons will react immediately to a warning signal.
14-6 October 2005

3. Have adequate H2S detection devices in key areas around the rig, with responsibilities
for monitoring them clearly defined.
4. Train all personnel in artificial respiration and other first aid techniques pertaining to
the treatment of H2S poisoning.
5. Restrict wellsite locations to only those persons necessary to the operation. Provide
adequate warning signs at all access points around the rig.
6. Install blower fans in main areas to dissipate H2S. Keep ammonia available to
neutralize contaminated areas.
7. Develop, post, and practice an H2S contingency plan.
14.3 H2S Equipment, Corrosion and Fluid Treatment
Equipment:
Ram Type Blowout Preventers
The ram bodies must be heat treated and certified for H2S service by the
manufacturer. The following parts must be new and certified for H2S service:
• Bonnet Seals (2)

• Connecting Rod Seals (2)
• Connecting Rod (heat treated)
• Ram Packer
• Ram Rear Seal
Annular Preventer
The body must be heat treated and certified for H2S service by the
manufacturer. The Hydril annular preventer meets this specification.
The rubber element can be natural rubber or Buna N; both are suitable for H2S
service. The upper and lower piston and piston head seals should be new when
the preventer is installed.
Spools and Cross
The spools and crosses must be flanged, low carbon steel types certified for
H2S service, with a maximum hardness of Rockwell Rc22.
October 2005 14-7

Gasket Materials
Reference API Spec 6A, latest edition. New 316 stainless steel ring gaskets
must be used. Gasket design should be pressure energized API RX or BX
type, assuming the flange ring grooves are compatible. Alloys such as Inconel
62S and Incoloy 82S are acceptable upon Chevron approval.
Fasteners
Fasteners should meet all requirements of NACE MR-0175, latest edition.

Bolts are to be new, continuous thread steel with ASTM A-194 Class 2H
heavy nuts. Bolting should be ASTM A-193 B-7. The equipment supplier may
determine that high strength fasteners may be needed to maintain flange
ratings. For these instances, Chevron may choose to approve the use of higher
strength fasteners on a case by case basis.
Valves
Materials for valves in sour gas (H2S) service must conform to NACE
Standard MR-01-75. All valves must be certified for H2S service by the
manufacturer and be flanged.
Chokes
Chokes must also conform to the general specifications in NACE Standard

MR-01-75 and be flanged.
Accumulator Units
Accumulators should be located in a safe place easily accessible to rig

personnel in an emergency. When the accumulator is not permanently fixed, it
should be located a safe distance upwind from the rig, in the direction of the
prevailing wind. Each location should be equipped with a sufficient number of
remote control panels so that the BOP can be controlled from a position
upwind of the prevailing wind.
Remote Choke Control Panel
A remote choke control panel to operate the choke manifold should be set a
safe distance upwind from the rig, in the direction of the prevailing wind.
Corrosion Reduction and Mud Treatment
The most dramatic type of H2S corrosion is brittle failure of steel. H2S also results in a
normal acid-type general and pitting corrosion. Sources of H2S include formation water,
14-8 October 2005

make up water, sour crude or gas, electrochemical reactions, degradation of sulphur-

containing organic compounds, and bacterial activity.
The most important effects of H2S on the mechanical behavior of steel are:
• A reduction in ductility
• A lowering of the fracture stress
• A susceptibility to delayed brittle fracture
These effects are due to the reaction of hydrogen sulfide with steel, which produces atomic
hydrogen. The hydrogen atom, smaller than the lattice structure of steel, can migrate into
steel in a fashion similar to fine sand passing through a coarse sieve.
When two hydrogen atoms come together within the steel lattice, a hydrogen molecule is
formed, causing a 20:1 expansion. Pressure created by the expansion, added to the stress
already present, can cause a brittle material to fail. Thus, higher strength steels, which exhibit
brittleness, are much more susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement than are lower strength
steels.
Tests on hydrogen-charged specimens show that:
1. Steel can lose more than 90% of its ability to withstand a sustained tensile load.
2. Embrittlement failure of high-strength material occurs at lower stress levels than for
lower strength material. Tubular materials above approximately 95,000 psi strength
are not recommended for H2S service.
3. There is little effect on 75,000 psi or lower yield strength steel (Rc22).
4. Stress accelerates embrittlement failure. As corrosion inhibition programs are

expensive, they should not be undertaken unless experience has shown them to be
needed. When a known or suspected H2S zone is to be penetrated, the minimum
protection should be a filming amine inhibitor added to the fluid and applied directly
to the work string, inside and out. Other steps (but not all) can be taken to reduce or
monitor corrosion during drilling operations, as listed below:
1) Maintain the pH at 10.0 or higher (particularly with oil base and invert-
emulsion fluids, which have a built-in corrosion inhibition of alkaline water).
2) Do not use anionic inhibitors such as chromates.
3) Use oxygen scavengers and bactericides only in relatively constant volume
systems (due to high cost).
4) Use "weight loss coupons” to monitor the corrosion rate and inhibitor
effectiveness if operations are to be prolonged in a corrosive environment.
October 2005 14-9

Keeping the hydrostatic pressure of the fluid above the formation pressure is very important
in H2S bearing formations.
Between trips, tubing used in H2S areas should be sprayed or otherwise treated with amine
inhibitor. This should also be done weekly to the outside of the BOP stack, wellhead, and
choke manifold.
The method of application and product types for H2S inhibitors are varied, depending on the
workover fluid system and operating conditions. Each condition should be checked with a
corrosion engineer or the product’s representative.
Supervisory Responsibilities in an H2S Environment
Since H2S can be lethal, a clear cut assignment of responsibilities is extremely important, in
order that each man on location knows exactly what to do in an emergency. This means
setting up detailed contingency plans and training programs for safety.
Personnel
The responsibilities listed below are in addition to the normal duties of the position, and
cover only the requirements for safety in H2S environments.
Operations Manager
The Operations Manager has the overall responsibility for operations, approves the final
completion/workover program, and endorses the contingency plan. He must be sure that the
necessary precautions have been taken and that an emergency involving H2S will bring forth
maximum response.
Superintendent
The Chevron Drilling Superintendent is responsible for ensuring the preparation of a detailed
completion/workover program, a safety program, and contingency plans for all personnel at
the well site and surrounding residents. It's important to follow the operation closely and
make sure that all necessary precautions have been taken. Whenever possible, an on-site
inspection of equipment and training efforts should take place.
Drill Site Manager
The Drill Site Manager (DSM) provides on-site supervision of operations, including the
installation and testing of BOP equipment, plus training of rig-site personnel in BOP drills
and safety. Check to be sure that all equipment has been certified for H2S service; that safety
equipment, such as the self-contained breathing apparatus, is available for all personnel on
location (plus extras for visitors); and that corrosion inhibitors, blower fans, and all other
items required for maximum safety of the operation are available. The Drill Site Manager
must be thoroughly familiar with the contingency plan for evacuating surrounding areas, and
14-10 October 2005

be assured that contract toolpushers, drillers, and crews know their responsibilities in
emergencies.
14.4 Planning H2S Operations
Man-in-Charge
The ranking company person on location (fixed rig) is typically the "Man-in-Charge." The
designation of someone in charge of, and responsible for implementing emergency
procedures, is essential to the proper execution of a contingency plan. The drill site manager
will fill this job unless one of his superiors is on location.
Overall Planning
Proper well planning in H2S areas includes the same information requirements as for normal
wells, plus additional precautionary plans and equipment details that must be completed prior
to commencing well work operations. These special items include all area and geological
information, detailed plans for special equipment installation, inspection, testing, and safety
procedures. These items should be in the contingency plan attached to the drilling program,
and be understood by all concerned. Specifications for equipment should be stated in the
original bid requests to contractors, since the BOP equipment must be certified for H2S
service prior to moving onto the well.
Additional Equipment and safety Requirements
In addition to the requirements for shut-in procedures, the following points should be
considered:
1. Tubular goods that could possibly be exposed to H2S (surface and protective casing)
should be inspected and their hardness limited to Rockwell Rc24 or less. Mill tests
and records may be acceptable, if available, in lieu of inspection in the pipe yard.
2. Drill string components should be limited to maximum yield strength of 95,000 psi.
This will avoid catastrophic failure due to hydrogen embrittlement should the
workover fluid be contaminated with H2S.
3. Corrosion inhibitors for tubular protection (i.e. filming amines) should be on location
and applied before an H2S zone is penetrated.
4. Tubing, safety valves, and all downhole tools should be certified for H2S service.
5. Two flare lines, attached to the choke manifold degasser and the mud gas separator,
should be installed on opposite sides of the well, perpendicular from the well to the
prevailing winds.
October 2005 14-11

6. Flare stacks should have LPG piped to them and be furnished with automatic igniters.
In addition, a flare gun or rifle with tracer ammunition should be on location as a
backup ignition source.
7. Flare and other lines subject to corrosion by H2S may be susceptible to some sulfide
stress cracking, if the steel contains residual stresses. Yield strength of steel used
should be limited to approximately 95,000 psi maximum, and/or a hardness of Rc22.
Also, working stresses should be limited to 80 percent of the yield strength.
8. All welds and heat affected zones should be stress relieved and their hardness limited
to Rc22. The use of drill pipe for lines subject to H2S service is not recommended.
9. NACE, API, and ASTM specifications are guides for acceptable materials.
10. Breathing air supply stations, resuscitators, and self contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA) units should be located strategically, with one of the latter assigned to each
man on location.
11. Mud logging units should have devices with alarms continuously monitoring for H2S.
12. All personnel should have ear plugs, or have their drums checked for puncture by a
doctor.
Contingency Plan
A contingency plan and an evacuation plan should be prepared for each well capable of
producing an atmospheric concentration of H2S in excess of 20 ppm. Copies of the plans
should be maintained at the rig site and posted so that they are available to all personnel.
These plans should, at a minimum, include:
1. Responsibilities of personnel, including the “Man-in-Charge,” and must define

essential and nonessential personnel
2. Location of residences, businesses, parks, schools, churches, roads, medical facilities,
etc., in a one mile radius from the well - a larger radius may be required depending on
well conditions, terrain, atmospheric conditions and concentrations of H2S
3. Emergency telephone numbers, including emergency services (ambulance, hospital,
doctor, helicopter, etc.), government agencies, operator and contractor personnel, and
service companies
4. Emergency and warning procedures
5. Safety equipment and supplies
6. Training of personnel.
14-12 October 2005

Well Control Guide - Chevron Energy Technology Company 2006

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Well Control Guide - Chevron Energy Technology Company 2006

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Drilling Well Control Guide

Copyright 2005 Chevron Energy Technology Company

This manual may not be reproduced in whole or part without

To: CVX Drilling & Completion Community

From: CVX Global Well Control Team

Subject: CVX Well Control Philosophy

¾ Policy 530: Health, Environment, & Safety

¾ 4+1 Strategic Intents

Well Control Goals

Deviation From The Corporate Guidelines

Changes To The Corporate Guidelines

The change proposal MOC process is as follows:

CVX Well Control Philosophy

3. Primary Objective: The primary objective of well control is to reestablish hydrostatic

4. Underground Blowouts: Underground blowouts (UGBOs), though undesirable, are

8. Conventional Drilling: Drilling with overbalance is normal operational practice.

12. Contractor Certification: Chevron requires documentation from drilling contractors of

6) Riserless Drilling: Drill shallow hole riserless on floating operations. No diverting

OE Tenets Support Incident-Free Operations

Well Control Philosophy 1

SECTION 1: Fundamentals of Well Control 1-1

SECTION 2: Causes of Kicks 2-1

SECTION 3: Kick Detection 3-1

SECTION 4: Shut-In Procedure 4-1

SECTION 5: Planning and Operations 5-1

SECTION 6: Well Control Methods and Procedures 6-1

SECTION 7: Well Control Equipment 7-1

SECTION 8: Subsea Well Control 8-1

October 2005 iii

8.13 Definitions of Subsea Terms 8-76

SECTION 9: Diverting Shallow Gas 9-1

SECTION 10: Horizontal Well Control 10-1

SECTION 11: Deepwater Well Control 11-1

SECTION 12: HPHT Well Control 12-1

12.7 HPHT Zone Procedures 12-44

SECTION 13: Slimhole Well Control 13-1

SECTION 14: H2S and SO2 Considerations 14-1

1. Fundamentals of Well Control

1.1 Categories of Well Control

• Primary Well Control

Primary Well Control

While an overbalance, or slight excess of hydrostatic pressure over formation pressure is

Secondary Well Control

If primary well control is inadequate, fluid contained in an exposed, permeable formation

October 2005 1-1

Tertiary Well Control

Listed below are further examples of tertiary well control:

• A well is killed by use of a relief well and a “dynamic kill” technique

1.2 Understanding Fluids and Pressure

Understanding pressure and pressure relationships is important in understanding well control.

Force = Pressure x Area

1-2 October 2005

October 2005 1-3

Figure 1.2.1 Pressure exerted by 1 foot of a liquid

The conversion factor 0.052 psi/ft per lb/gal is derived as follows:

A cubic foot contains 7.48 US gallons.

Weight (force) = 7.48 lbs = 7.48 lbs/ft²

7.48 lbs = 0.052 lbs/in2 or 0.052 psi

1-4 October 2005

10 x 0.052 psi/ft = 0.52 psi/ft

10 ppg x 0.052 psi/ft/ppg = 0.52 psi/ft

Gradient = pressure = 43.3 psi = 0.433 psi/ft

0.433 psi/ft = 8.33 ppg (gradient of fresh water)