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Final Report
Upgrader Utility RAM Analysis
Report for Upgrader Utility RAM Analysis Project DET NORSKE VERITAS LTD, UK
Palace House
For: 3 Cathedral Street
London, SE1 9DE
PDVSA/Toyo Engineering Corporation United Kingdom
Tel: +44 207 357 6080
Fax: +44 207 357 6048
Account Ref.: http://www.dnv.com
Org. No: GB 440 6013 95
Rev. No.: / Date: Reason for Issue: Prepared by: Verified by: Quality Check: Approved by:
1 / 15 / 04 / 2011 Draft Christina Keilert Carlo Carlo Buccisano Carlo
Buccisano Buccisano
2 / 21 / 04 / 2011 Client Comments Christina Keilert Carlo Carlo Buccisano Carlo
incorporated Buccisano Buccisano
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................1
4 RELIABILITY DATA.....................................................................................................19
4.1 General......................................................................................................................19
4.2 Failure Data and Repair Data....................................................................................21
4.2.1 Natural Gas System (Unit 101)..........................................................................21
4.2.2 Steam System.....................................................................................................21
4.2.3 Industrial and Potable Water System.................................................................22
4.2.4 Boiler Feed Water System..................................................................................23
4.2.5 Cooling Water System........................................................................................25
4.2.6 Nitrogen Generation System..............................................................................26
4.2.7 Plant and Instrument Air System........................................................................27
6 RESULTS..........................................................................................................................29
6.1 Definitions.................................................................................................................29
6.2 Natural Gas System...................................................................................................30
7 APPENDIXES....................................................................................................................44
1 INTRODUCTION
Toyo Engineering Corporation is performing a conceptual design assessment for the Utility and
Offsite Facilities for Extra Heavy Oil Upgraders. These are located in the Orinoco/Carabobo
field in Venezuela and are operated by PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.) as the ultimate
client.
Toyo Engineering Group has, during its review of the Facilities, proposed an alternative to for
some of the Offsite and Utility Systems, and has contracted DNV to perform a RAM Analysis
on their propositions. DNV will use the simulator TARO to model the various systems.
This report document details the basic data and assumptions from which the RAM model of the
Offsite and Utility Facilities have been constructed plus all the results of the analysis, and
consists of the following sections:
Note 1: the given design capacities include a 15% design margin. It is assumed that the
facilities will be running continuously at the normal capacities (design capacities minus 15%)
throughout the analysis period.
Note2: the nitrogen system design capacity also includes an additional 2% of flow capacity to
ensure requirements can be satisfied during peak demand of upgrader start-up for a limited time
period.
Note 3: the design capacities given are for the utility cooling system and the individual
upgrader utility systems respectively.
Note 4: the design capacities given are for plant and instrument air respectively.
Note 5: the tables in the following sections list the equipment included in the model for the
relevant systems, along with configuration, tag number and criticality information.
Additionally, a column labelled ‘Rate during Equipment Outage’ is added. This refers to the
reduced flow rate at which the system will operate during failures of each individual piece of
equipment in the configuration. For fully spared or non-critical equipment (2*100%, 3*50%
etc) there is no rate reduction so the system can keep operating at 100% while for overdesigned
or partially spared systems the total rate has to be reduced upon failure (e.g. steam boilers are
3*46%, if one fails the system can operate at capacity of 2*46% = 92%)
The natural gas system receives gas from the national gas transportation system and
distributes it to the various users. As the gas is required at differing pressure levels, the
pressure is gradually let down and the gas is spread to the end users while resulting
condensate is collected and disposed off via truck collection.
The steam system supplements the main steam generation from the hydrogen unit to
enable production flexibility. It receives boiler feed water from the deaerator and
produces steam to compliment the primary steam generation from the reformers in the
hydrogen unit. The steam is then distributed to the high pressure steam end users, and low
pressure steam requirements are met via let down stations, a steam turbine generator and
turbines driving the air compressors.
The industrial and potable water system receives its feed form the Orinoco Socialist
Project and will distribute water requirements for human consumption, sulphur and coke
storage, cooling water and boiler feed water accordingly.
The boiler feed water system provides demineralised and degassed water to the steam and
hydrogen producing units by treating industrial water in various packed beds to remove
salts, CO2 and other impurities.
Cooling water
Nitrogen is produced to supply the upgrader process units and relevant storage tanks. The
nitrogen package compresses air which is subsequently cooled, dried and distilled to
separate nitrogen from an oxygen rich gas.
Plant and Instrument Air uses ambient air and compresses it to feed the various process
units and their instruments. It is assumed that instrument air has priority over plant air.
Further drying is required for the instrument air to comply with specifications. Hold-up
capacity is also provided as a supply security measure.
The study will quantify the availability for natural gas. This will be a single number for both
the feed to the Hydrogen unit and the use of natural gas as fuel gas.
Included in the model will be the following equipment (100% refers to the total steam produced
by the system):
Rate
Criticalit
during
Equipment Configuration Tag No y/
Equipmen
Comment
t Outage
non-
Phosphate Injection Package 3*77% A-0201 100%
critical
SG-0201
Steam Boilers 3*77% critical 100%
A/B/C
non-
Steam Turbine Generator 1*100% A-0210 100%
critical
High Pressure Let-down non-
1*100% A-0202 100%
Station critical
Low Pressure Let-down non-
1*100% A-0203 100%
Station critical
Table 3-2, Steam System Equipment and Criticality
For the purpose of this study it will be assumed that:
Preliminary steam supply priority is first to the upgrader, secondly to the instrument air
steam turbine driver and thirdly to the steam turbine generator.
The study will quantify the availability of steam supply to these 3 destinations (3
different values).
The study will also quantify the estimated power production from the steam turbine
taking into account the failure of the steam turbine and of the generator.
The Phosphate Injection Package consists of one vessel and 2*100% pumps.
Hydrochloric Acid Package is used to regenerate the Cationic Exchange Unit and the
Mixed Exchanger Bed Unit. There is one package for each Cationic Exchange Unit and
it is assumed that the Hydrochloric Acid Package is made up of one vessel and 2x100%
pumps.
The Decarbonised Water Pump is assumed to be centrifugal and electric motor driven.
The Air Blower is assumed to be centrifugal and electric motor driven.
There are 4 beds in the Anionic Exchange Unit. Normally 3 are operating and one is
being regenerated. Due to the short nature of the regeneration cycle it is assumed that
the outage of one bed will not have a significant impact on operations as shortages
occurring during regeneration can be made up via the overcapacity, therefore it is
possible to maintain full capacity for the package with only 3 beds in operation. Hence
it is assumed that the beds are 4 x 12.7%
There are 4 beds in the Mixed Exchanger Bed Unit. Normally 3 are operating and one is
being regenerated. Due to the short nature of the regeneration cycle it is assumed that
the outage of one bed will not have a significant impact on operations as shortages
occurring during regeneration can be made up via the overcapacity, therefore it is
possible to maintain full capacity for the package with only 3 beds in operation.
Therefore it is assumed that the beds are 4 x 12.7%
Sodium Hydroxide Package is used to regenerate the Anionic Exchange Unit and the
Mixed Exchanger Bed Unit. There is one package for each set of Anionic and Mixed
Bed Exchange Units, and it is assumed that the Sodium Hydroxide Package is made up
of one vessel and 2x100% pumps.
It is assumed that if one Demineralised Water Tank is out of service, the system can
continue to operate with reduced storage.
The nominal capacity of each Demineralised Water Tank is 72400 m3 (per tank). The
working capacity is assumed to be 85% of the nominal capacity.
The capacity of each demineralized water package is 885 m3/hr, therefore the total
capacity is 2655 m3/h; this value includes a 15% overdesign. Approximately 230 m3/hr
are used for the regeneration of the bed. The normal demineralised water flow pumped
from the tank is 2061 t/hr.
A simultaneous outage of both the regeneration pumps will cause a shutdown of the
water demineralisation packages after 20 hours due to the inability to regenerate the
resin beds.
Demineralised Water Pumps P-0403 A/S are providing water to the deaerator (for the
upgrader and the steam system). Each pump is capable of pumping 643 m3/hr. The
normal flow is 559 t/hr.
Demineralised Water Pumps P-0430 A/B/C/S are providing water to the deaerator in the
hydrogen unit. Each pump is capable of pumping 576 m3/hr. The normal flow is 1502
t/hr.
BFW Pumps P-0431 A/B/S are providing water to the steam system. Each pump is
capable of pumping 204 m3/hr. The normal flow is 236 t/hr.
BFW Pumps P-0432 A/B/C/S are providing water to the Upgraders. Each pump is
capable of pumping 213 m3/hr. The normal flow is 555 t/hr.
Water
Pump for Upgrader2&H2Unit2 P-0502 critical,
3*57.5% 100%
Cooling Water System A/B/S spared
Chemical Injection Package for
A-0521-
Upgrader2&H2Unit2 Cooling 1*100% non-critical 100%
27
Water
Cooling Tower for
Upgrader1&H2Unit Cooling 4*28.75% cells CT-0503 critical 86%
Water
Pump for Upgrader1&H2Unit P-0503 critical,
3*57.5% 100%
Cooling Water System A/B/S spared
Chemical Injection Package for
A-0531-
Upgrader1&H2Unit Cooling 1*100% non-critical 100%
37
Water
Table 3-5, Cooling Water System Equipment and Criticality
T-0701
Nitrogen Storage Tank 2*50% critical 50%
A/B
Nitrogen Vaporiser 1*100% E-0701 critical 0%
Table 3-6, Nitrogen Generation System Equipment and Criticality
Note that the possibility of purchasing liquid nitrogen during unexpected outage of the nitrogen
generation package has not been included in this study, If purchasing liquid nitrogen is a
reliable option this would make this system not critical (as availability of liquid nitrogen would
be guaranteed by external supply).
Each compressor includes inlet air filter, silencers, 3 compression stages with interstage
coolers (2), aftercooler and outlet air filter
Normally 1 motor driven and one steam turbine driven compressor are operated and the
other two compressors are in stand by. It is possible to operate two motor driven
compressors or two turbine driven compressors if needed.
Steam supply to the steam turbines is assumed to be always available for calculating the
availability of the instrument and plant air.
There are two drier packages. Each package has two drier, one operating and one being
regenerated. Each package is able to process 100% of the instrument air demand. It is
assumed that the spare package is kept in standby and available for use when needed.
Note that 15% of dry air flow is used for dryer bed regeneration.
The 2 driers (the one operating and the one being regenerated) are considered in series
from a reliability point of view.
There are 2 instrument air receivers, each sized for 10 minutes of instrument air
consumption. Note that it is assumed that in case one of the receivers fails it is possible
to isolate the receiver and continue to operate at 50% of the instrument air production.
The study will estimate the availability of instrument air supply and the availability of plant air
supply (two separate values).
4 RELIABILITY DATA
4.1 General
Mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) are two of the parameters that
contribute to an equipment item’s ability or inability to fulfil its role in the production process.
Below is a very brief explanation of the terms used in the failure data tables:
Failure Distribution;
Characterisation of the likelihood of equipment failure over time. This
could, for example, be exponential or rectangular (see below).
Repair Distribution;
Characterisation of the repair duration following a failure. Examples
include constant and rectangular distributions (see below).
Failure Duration As a combination of MTTR and MTTF, it indicates the number of hours
Per Annum (hrs) / in an operating year during which the system is failed. An MTTF of 5
Annual Downtime years with an MTTR of 10 hours will have a failure duration of 2 hours
per annum.
Equivalent Lost Equivalent lost hours incorporate the impact of a failure into the failure
Hours per Annum duration. If an outage has a 50% impact and a failure duration of 10
hours per annum, the equivalent lost hours per annum will be 5 hours as
the system is still able to operate at 50% during the outage.
(Absolute) Losses Percentage of equivalent lost hours per annum in an operating year (here
taken to be 8760 hours).
Number of Outages The number of times a system or equipment fails in an operating year.
Per Annum
The failure rates reflect critical failures only, i.e. those requiring immediate shutdown of the
unit to allow repair, prior to resuming normal production. In addition to these critical
failures, equipment can also incur incipient failures, which do not require immediate repair
of the equipment (for example small leakages). For modelling purposes, it is assumed that
these incipient failures can be accommodated until the next plant turnaround at which time
they are repaired. These failures have therefore not been included in the simulation models.
The failure modes listed in the following section reflect the average number of times a
piece of equipment causes total or partial production loss. In order to achieve these
‘expected’ equipment failure rates, it is assumed that industry standard inspection and
maintenance activities are carried out during plant turnarounds.
Please note that all the given repair durations include restart durations and preparation time
but exclude mobilisation delays.
The equipment failure data in the following sections will be used for this analysis. Please note
that all this failure data has been taken from the internal DNV databases. This is a collection of
data derived from over 15 years of experience in performing RAM analysis. The data is
specific for downstream applications (refineries and upgraders). Note that the data is often the
average of several individual sources and that these individual sources cannot be disclosed for
confidentiality reasons.
The following failure data will be used for the steam turbine and the power generator:
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Equipmen Failure Mode Most Impac
(years Downtim ability
t Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.97
Short Critical Failures 10.00 12.0 48.0 100% 3.0 %
Medium Critical 168. 99.91
Failures 13.00 48.0 0 100% 8.3 %
Steam 240. 99.95
Turbine Long Critical Failures 50.00 168.0 0 100% 4.1 %
4380. 99.90
Rotor Failures 500.00 0 100% 8.8 %
99.72
Total 5.03 24.1 %
Steam Critical 5.90 32.7 100% 5.5 99.94
Turbine %
Power 99.94
Total 5.90 5.5
Generator %
The following failure data will be used for the Industrial Water Tanks and Potable Water Tank:
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Equipmen Failure Mode Most Impac
(years Downtim ability
t Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.99
Water Critical 200.00 72.0 144.0 100% 0.5 %
Tanks 99.99
Total 200.00 0.5 %
The following failure data will be used for all other centrifugal pumps in this section:
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.80
Critical 3.40 48.0 72.0 100% 17.6
%
Centrifugal 99.94
Motor Failure 14.10 69.3 100% 4.9
Pumps (<100HP) %
99.74
Total 2.74 22.6
%
99.72
Critical 3.40 72.0 96.0 100% 24.7
%
Centrifugal 99.94
Motor Failure 14.10 69.3 100% 4.9
Pumps (>100HP) %
99.66
Total 2.74 29.6
%
The following failure data will be used for the air blowers.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.83
Critical 3.00 44.0 100% 14.7
%
99.98
Air Blowers Motor Failure 15.00 28.0 100% 1.9
%
99.81
Total 2.50 16.5
%
The following failure data will be used for the Demineralised Water Tank:
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
144. 99.99
Critical 0.5
Demineralised 200.00 72.0 0 100% %
Water Tank 99.99
Total
200.00 0.5 %
The following failure data will be used for the reciprocating pumps in the Hydrochloric Acid
Package and in the Sodium Hydroxide Package.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
Critical 99.82
1.60 25.0 100% 15.6
Reciprocating (including motor) %
Pumps 99.82
Total 1.60 15.6
%
The following data will be used for the switching valves associated with the vessels in the
Demineralised Water Package.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.97
Critical 2.6
7.00 12.0 24.0 100% %
DWP Vessels
99.97
Total
7.00 2.6 %
The following data will be used for the vessels in the Demineralised Water Package.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
144. 99.98
Critical 98.00 100% 1.5
Demineralised 0 %
Water Package 99.98
Total 98.00 1.5
%
The following failure data will be used for individual fans/cells in the cooling towers.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Equipmen Failure Mode Most Impac
(years Downtim ability
t Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.04
Fan 1.00 48.0 120.0 100% 84.0
%
Cooling
99.73
Tower Fan Electrical 1.50 24.0 48.0 100% 24.0
%
Cells
98.77
Total 0.60 108.0
%
The following failure data will be used for the nitrogen cryogenic package.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.93
Cryogenic General Critical 50.00 240.0 360.0 100% 6.0
%
Nitrogen
99.93
Package Total 50.00 6.0
%
Note that no specific data is available for Nitrogen Vaporizers. For the purpose of this study the
failure data for a low fouling S&T heat exchanger will be used for this equipment.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.93
Critical 25.00 144.0 100% 5.8
Nitrogen %
Vaporizer 99.93
Total 25.00 5.8
%
The following failure data will be used for the Nitrogen Storage tank.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
99.98
Critical 98.00 144.0 100% 1.5
Nitrogen %
Storage Tank 99.98
Total 98.00 1.47
%
The following failure data will be used for steam turbine drivers.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
Control Valve 99.96
17.70 55.2 100% 3.1
Sealing Problem %
Other Critical
168. 99.93
Steam Turbine 17.70 48.0 100% 6.1
0 %
Steam Failures
Turbine RPM Control 99.98
Driver 13.40 24.0 100% 1.8
System Failure %
Axial Bearing 99.95
17.70 72.0 100% 4.1
Failure %
99.83
Total 4.10 15.1
%
The following failure data will be used for intercoolers and aftercoolers.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
Air 99.99
Critical 100.00 72.0 100% 0.7
Compressor %
Inter- and Fouling 100.00 62.0 100% 0.6 99.99
%
99.98
Aftercoolers Total 50.00 1.3
%
The following failure data will be used for receivers and driers.
MTTR (Hours)
MTTF Annual Avail-
Failure Mode Most Impac
Equipment (years Downtim ability
Description Min Max Likel t (%)
) e (hours) (%)
y
144. 99.99
Critical 80.00 48.0 100% 1.2
Receivers 0 %
and Dryers 99.99
Total 80.00 1.2
%
There will be sufficient resources to satisfy normal maintenance and operational demands.
The maintenance team provides cover 24 hours/day, 7 days per week. A mobilisation
period of 2 hours is assumed should any maintenance be required. This mobilisation delay
is assumed to account for mobilisation of personnel, equipment and spares.
Maintenance of the plant is carried out only on items that have failed critically or have a
degraded mode of operation. It is assumed that all incipient and unknown failures will be
addressed on an opportunity basis.
6 RESULTS
6.1 Definitions
Availability is defined as:
"The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions at
a given instant of time, or an average over a given time interval, assuming that the required
external resources are provided"
The predicted Plant Availability is a ratio of the actual product produced against the planned
production over the system life. Note that availability does not include upstream or downstream
losses or the effect of recovery operations through buffers.
Note that the availability of this system assumes that the supply of natural gas from the national
gas transportation system is 100% available.
The losses in the natural gas system of 0.066% are caused by the in-series arrangement of the
separators, resulting in an outage of the system if any one of the vessels fails.
If these vessels could be isolated and bypassed during failure, allowing the rest of the system to
continue operating, the system availability would be greatly enhanced.
The results above assume that the demineralised water and fuel gas supplies are 100%
available. It also assumes that inspection of the boilers is taking place in periods of low
demand.
DNV has also evaluated the impact of assuming boiler inspection with a 2 year frequency and
an overall duration of 14 days (each boiler).
The impact of this assessment is shown in the following table. The Availability of the boilers
decreases to 99.96% and the frequency of two boilers being down simultaneously increases to
0.22 per annum (every 4.5 years).
Unit of
Key Parameter Value
measurement
Steam Boiler System Availability 99.959% %
Standard Deviation 0.025% %
Availability Losses 0.041% %
Equivalent Total Down Days per Annum 0.15 days
Number of Outages per Annum (simultaneous outage of two
0.22 #
boilers)
Steam Supply Efficiency
To the Upgrader 99.999% %
To the Air System 99.999% %
To the Steam Turbine Generator 99.565% %
Availability of the Steam Turbine Generator 99.652% %
Utilization of the Steam Turbine generator 99.565% %
Potential Power Production from the Steam Turbine generator 10.95 MW
Table 6-11 - Key Results for the Steam System – Sensitivity with Boilers Inspection
Improvements of the steam boiler system availability are very difficult to achieve as the
availability of 99.99% is very high.
In order to increase the steam supply efficiency to the steam turbine generator an increase in
steam boiler capacity could be considered.
Absolute
Criticality Breakdown
Tag Losses
Potable Water Tank T-0302 0.007%
Pump P-0302 S 0.000%
Pump P-0302 A 0.000%
Total 0.007%
Table 6-13 – Potable Water System Losses Breakdown
Note that for both these systems the criticality lies in the power supply to the pumps. Should
the power supply be interrupted both pumps will fail and therefore the industrial water and
potable water supply would be interrupted. A detailed analysis of the power supply
configuration to these pumps could be performed in the next phase of the design to ensure the
necessary redundancy.
The availability of the industrial water system is 100% hence no improvement suggestions are
required. The potable water system availability is 99.99% so again improvements on this would
be very difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the system as such is not plant critical hence no
improvements are considered relevant.
The table below reports the breakdown of the losses in the Demineralised Water System.
Equipment Absolute Losses %
Mixed Exchanger Switching Valves 0.087%
Cationic Exchange Unit Switching Valves 0.048%
Anionic Exchange Unit Switching Valves 0.048%
Hydrochloric Acid Vessel 0.017%
Sodium Hydroxide Vessel 0.016%
Decarboniser Bed 0.014%
Anionic Exchange Unit 0.012%
Mixed Exchanger Bed 1 0.012%
Cationic Exchange Unit 0.012%
Stop Demi system when Reg pumps down 0.001%
Hydrochloric Acid Pump 0.000%
Air Blower 0.000%
Sodium Hydroxide Pump 0.000%
Decarboniser Water Pump 0.000%
Total 0.272%
Table 6-15 – Demineralised Water System Losses Breakdown
Of course the availability of the system to produce the normal water demand will be higher.
The availability of the pumping systems downstream the tanks is reported in the following table
and Table 6 -17 reports the Water supply efficiency to the 3 customers. This supply efficiency
is very high and the small losses are driven by unavailability of the pumps and deaerators. The
Demineralised Water tanks seem to be correctly sized as these tanks will always have inventory
to cover for outages in the Demineralised Water Packages.
Unit of
Key Parameter Value
measurement
Availability of the Regeneration System 99.999% %
Availability of the pumping system to the Hydrogen unit 99.999% %
Availability of the Demin Water Pumps and deareators 99.991% %
Availability of the BFW Pumps to the Upgrader 99.998% %
Availability of the BFW Pumps to the Steam System 100.000% %
Table 6-16 - Key Results for BFW Pumping Systems
Normal Achieved
Water Supply Efficiency Efficiency
tonnes/hr tonnes/hrs
To the Hydrogen Unit 1502.10 1502.09 99.999%
To the Upgrader 555.00 554.97 99.995%
To the Steam System 236.10 236.07 99.986%
Table 6-17 – Water Supply Efficiency
Note that, as for the previous systems, the criticality for the pumping systems lies in the power
supply to the pumps. Should the power supply be interrupted all pumps in the same service will
fail and therefore the BFW supply to a particular destination would be interrupted. A detailed
analysis of the power supply configuration to these pumps could be performed in the next
phase of the design to ensure the necessary redundancy.
Although the Demineralised Water Package availability is significantly lower than other
systems, the water supply efficiency to the various downstream users is nearly 100% so no
significant improvements can be achieved. In order to increase the demineralised water
package availability, more redundancy or overcapacity could be incorporated in the packages.
The availability of cooling water to the compressed air system is ~98.93%, the availability of
cooling water to the Upgrader is 99.29%.
Unit of
Key Parameter Value
measurement
Cooling Water System Availability - to Compressed Air System 98.929% %
Standard Deviation 0.129% %
Availability Losses 1.071% %
Equivalent Total Down Days per Annum 3.91 days
Cooling Water System Availability - to the Upgrader 99.295% %
Standard Deviation 0.059% %
Availability Losses 0.705% %
Equivalent Total Down Days per Annum 2.57 days
Table 6-18 - Key Results for Cooling Water Systems
Note that all losses are incurred because of outages of the fans (mechanical or electrical), as
indicated in the breakdown in the following tables.
Absolute
Criticality Breakdown Tag
Losses %
Cooling Water Circulation Pump 2 P-0504S 0.000%
Cooling Water Circulation Pump 1 P-0504A 0.000%
CW Tower CT-0504 0.537%
CW Tower CT-0504 0.534%
Total 1.071%
Table 6-19 – Cooling Water System Availability - to Compressed Air System -Losses
Breakdown
Absolute
Criticality Breakdown Tag
Losses %
Cooling Water Circulation Pump 3 P-0501S 0.000%
Cooling Water Circulation Pump 2 P-0501B 0.000%
Cooling Water Circulation Pump 1 P-0501A 0.000%
CW Tower CT-0501 0.177%
CW Tower CT-0501 0.176%
CW Tower CT-0501 0.176%
CW Tower CT-0501 0.175%
Total 0.705%
Table 6-20 – Cooling Water System Availability - to Upgrader - Losses Breakdown
Note that the model has assumed that if one fan is down the cooling water supply will be
reduced (according to the redundancy stated in section 3.5). Of course in real life it might be
that the cooling water temperature can be adjusted to ensure that the flow is not affected.
Also please note that the results do not consider the natural draft cooling that would occur
during outage of one fan. If data is provided on the natural draft cooling it might be possible to
incorporate it in the model and to evaluate the benefit of natural draft on cooling water
availability.
The main losses in the cooling water system arise from the outages of the cooling tower cells;
hence increasing the overcapacity of the individual cells will increase availability. If the
upgrader cooling tower cell arrangement would be changed from 4*28.75% to 4*33.3%
(effectively one cell in each cooling tower is spare) the availability of the system would
increase to 99.969%.
For the air compressor cooling tower cells, an effective cell sparing in a 2*100% arrangement
would increase the availability o the system to 99.984%.
The supply inefficiency to the upgrader is caused by long outages in the Nitrogen production
system (mainly related to the cryogenic package) that cannot be handled by the storage. Air
compressor losses will generally not cause interruption of the supply because the nitrogen tank
can provide the necessary inventory. The nitrogen storage tanks will bottom out on average
every 50 years.
Criticality Breakdown - Nitrogen Production Absolute
Tag
Availability Losses %
Air Compressor K-0701 0.252%
Cryogenic Package A-0702 0.070%
Aftercooler 0.015%
Total 0.337%
Table 6-22 – Nitrogen Generation System - Losses Breakdown
It can be seen that the air compressor is the main cause for losses. Sparing this compressor
would increase the system's availability, as would the possibility of buying liquid nitrogen
during system outages.
The air system’s losses are caused by vessel outages only. Similarly to the natural gas system,
the ability to isolate and bypass any one of the 2 instrument air receivers during outage would
enable continued operation at 100% throughput as significant hold-up volume is provided
rather than having to reduce throughput to 50%, and would hence increase the availability of
the system.
The figure below shows the data for all the units in the sample.
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
45.0% 43.3%
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
Probability %
25.0%
20.0%
16.7%
15.0% 13.3% 13.3%
10.0%
10.0%
5.0% 3.3%
0.0%
0% - 1% 1% - 2% 2% - 3% 3% - 4% 4% - 5% 5% - 6%
Unit Unplanned Losses %
This figure shows that 43% of the units in the sample have availability losses <1%, 16.7% of
the units in the sample have availability losses between 1 and 2% and so on.
7 APPENDIXES
The following is a list of reference documents as provided by Toyo on April 19th 2011 that have
been used for this study.
Doc.No. DESCRIPCION
101 NG SUPPLY UNIT
0008-101-IP106000 Process Description of NG Supply Unit Made by VEPICA
0008-101-IP147000 Design Basis of NG Supply Unit Made by VEPICA
0008-101-IP204000 PFD of NG Supply Unit Made by VEPICA
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