SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 165510-33. July 28, 2006.]

BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON.

SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the
Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 1 assailing the

Decision dated September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated
July 12, 2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for
violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is
no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo.
Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857-04-
231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground
of prescription.
In its Comment, 3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the
informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that
petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause
in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint
with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and
the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the
prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines
from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment 4 that, in accordance with
the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the
petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the
Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
To Run , are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which
answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a
nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged
have already prescribed. AEScHa

Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision
that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal
Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal
thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution 5 dated February 10,
2004 which reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429-PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T.
ROMUALDEZ

Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in

G.R. Nos. 143618-41, entitled " Benjamin 'Kokoy' Romualdez vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.) " promulgated on July
30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on June
8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accused's motion to quash
the informations in these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned
Decision ruled that the herein informations may be quashed because
the officer who filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the
said Decision has become final and executory on November 29, 2002,
these cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the
archives.

The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan 6 where petitioner assailed the
Sandiganbayan's Order dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary
investigation conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his
arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000. 7 In
annulling and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we
held that:
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere
remediable defect of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the
wording of the certification in the information was found inadequate, or
i n People v. Marquez , where the required certification was absent.
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect
cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation.
An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis
for criminal proceedings. 8

In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan 9 petitioner's

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Motion to Quash and directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 because the informations were filed by an unauthorized party, hence
void.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent
and applicable. Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to
another prosecution; exception. — An order sustaining the motion to
quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless
the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i)
10 of this Rule.

An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than

extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing
of another information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed, we
held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals 11 that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained,
its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As
the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
first information would not be a bar in petitioner's subsequent
prosecution. . . . . 12

Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the

Ombudsman in the instant cases was not a violation of petitioner's right to
be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases
investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those
cases which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter
designed for efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket
Record in sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing
a case. SEIDAC

This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the
dismissed cases was merely for reference. In fact, after the new
informations were filed, new docket numbers were assigned, i.e.,
Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 . . . . 13

Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted

the above-referred preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan 14 when we categorically declared therein
that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion
when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by
Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No.
105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our
ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 rather than a procedural right. Petitioner's right was violated when the
preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted
by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing
that our directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve
its objective of affording petitioner his right to due process. 15

Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should

first resolve the question of whether this Court may validly take cognizance
of and resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in
the assailed Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of
the informations against the petitioner" 16 and that "it is only prudent that
evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to determine whether the
offense charged has already prescribed." 17 We reconsider our stance and
shall rule in the affirmative.
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any
time before he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information
18 on the ground that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished,
19 which ground includes the defense of prescription considering that Article

89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those

grounds which totally extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is
yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well
invoke the defense of prescription.
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the
subject criminal cases have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan 20 that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the
following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21

Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019

for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-
1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and
for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein
shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the
case of People v. Pacificador 22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982,
the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute
was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15)
years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P.
Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the
amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private
respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime
prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.
23

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up
to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand,
for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from
March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years. aSACED

As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act

No. 3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined
by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In the case of People v. Duque , 24 we construed the aforequoted

provision, specifically the rule on the running of the prescriptive period as
follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as
surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus,
Section 2 may be read as:

"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law; and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof;"
or as:

"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and until
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment." (Emphasis supplied) 25

Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein
began to run from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date
of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
against the petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto 26 this Court already took note that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to
the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not
have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
on Behest Loans. 27
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the
prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the
absence of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the
prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean
that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the
prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously
held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap
caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume
otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna
cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at
the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would
have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. 28

The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the

complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with
the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the
Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3,
2004, the offenses have already prescribed. ETDaIC

Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be

interrupted "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person."
However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to
warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged
against him.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan , 29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted
without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a
preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its competence. 30 This
Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the
possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes
petitioner's cases in the Sandiganbayan to take" 31 declared invalid —
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24
offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of
assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses. 32

I n Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan , 33 petitioner assailed the validity of

the informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 considering that the same were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In
granting petitioner's plea, this Court held, thus:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The
defect cannot be cured by conducting another preliminary
investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and cannot
be the basis for criminal proceedings. 34

Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General

Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in
1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist
that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of
prescription is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the
appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla , 35 this
Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for
purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period
of prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican, 36 this Court held
that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman
tolled the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong
body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of
the prescriptive periods.
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the
offenses charged against the petitioner could not have prescribed because
the latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and
thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May 8,
1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that " [t]he
term of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago."
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that —
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 ". . . supplementary
to [special laws], unless the latter should . . . provide the contrary."
Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary application of Article
91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in
Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run
only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.

There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article
10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line
of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno . Thus, the Court
has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on
the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the
latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People. SDITAC

He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the

ruling of the Majority Opinion and argues that —
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his
own prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the State's
jurisdiction. . . . An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a
fugitive from the State's jurisdiction. . . . .
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving
this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor
of the accused to the detriment of the State's ability to investigate and
prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this
Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or
prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction
to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion
unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.

With all due respect, we beg to disagree.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.
— Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide
the contrary.

Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a

special law such as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code
in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting
Opinion that —
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article
10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line
of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno . Thus, the Court
has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on
the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the
latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.

However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the

Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds
relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a
particular matter as evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the
Dissenting Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno , 37 this Court, before ruling that the
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be
applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the
defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung , 38 this Court applied the rules
on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No.
6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar
rules under the special law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury, 39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18
and 19 of the Revised Penal Code to define the words "principal,"
"accomplices" and "accessories" under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein
although it referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for
the crime of illegal recruitment.
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of
whether or not the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or
tolls the running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was
already in effect as early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof
categorically defines "special acts" as "acts defining and penalizing
violations of the law not included in the Penal Code". CcAHEI

Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

Behest Loans v. Desierto, 40 this Court was categorical in ruling that —
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91
of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For
those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of
the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from
the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not
consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to
the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
To elaborate, —
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute
had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned. 41

Had the legislature intended to include the accused's absence from the
Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in
special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No. 3326.
A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the
legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that —
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision
of this Code — All violations of any provision of this Code shall
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 prescribe after five (5) years.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty persons and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender
is absent from the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code

fills the so-called "gap" in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs
the operation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019,
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases
where the accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would
supplement Act No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the
Code suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the
ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
In the case of United States v. Serapio, 42 the Court had the occasion to
interpret the term "special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of
the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as
referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the
Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus —
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as
that phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase
"leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the
meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally
used? . . . It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes
especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this
general signification: In fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law
as above defined, but to a general law. A careful reading of said article
7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to
signify "special laws" in the general signification of that phrase. The
article, it will be noted, simply says, in effect, that when a crime is
made punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the
crime) is not subject to the provisions of said code. 43

Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to

RA No. 3019, the same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the
contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised Penal Code
explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be
a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does
not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it
specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code
shall apply to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction
dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over general ones. IHCacT

The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio's reservations about the effects of
ruling that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend
the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret
the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law
is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already
explained —
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap
caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume
otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna
cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at
the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would
have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. 44

Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the
statute of limitations in favor of the accused only relates to the following
issues: (1) retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or
extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the
felony committed vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the
reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs . Therefore, the
aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinion's
conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while
the accused is abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in
criminal cases equally provides the authority for the rule that the
prescriptive period runs while the accused is outside of Philippine
jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes supports
this conclusion. In the old but still relevant case of People v. Moran , 45 this
Court extensively discussed the rationale behind and the nature of
prescription of penal offenses —
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in
applying to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction that
has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of
statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is
interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two
contending parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there
is no intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the
right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the
ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is,
otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the
State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of
prosecution.' The statute is not a statute of process, to be
scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring
that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence;
that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country,
and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from
henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his
innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is
that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to
all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the
statute, is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact
that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of
guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay
in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the
State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion,
even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of
the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes,
enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are
not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself,
to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal
trials the best evidence that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits

accruing from the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal
statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or
cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply
be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this
endowment must be directly and expressly sanctioned by the source itself,
the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee
thereof, the accused.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws
on prescription. The exceptions to the running of or the causes for the
interruption of the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily implied.
The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or may only
be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law.
In the case of People v. Pacificador, 46 we ruled that:
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the
interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more
favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said legal principle
takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes
which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in
favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran , this Court amply
discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as
follows:

The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and

grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain
time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender
shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease
to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt
are blotted out. Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to be
liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because
such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and
grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a
recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that
time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys
proofs of guilt. 47

In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive

periods in the instant case, were not interrupted by any event from the time
they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged offenses
committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years
from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged
offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15
years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002. CEDScA

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the

preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3,
2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged
offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost
its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos.
28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
231857-04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending
before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857-04-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:

I vote to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In the Decision of 23 September 2005, the Court rejected petitioner's
contention that the 23 criminal cases filed against him for violation of
Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019") should be dismissed for being
barred by prescription. The Court held:
Petitioner also alleges that respondents acted with grave abuse
of discretion in not dismissing the preliminary investigation on the
ground of prescription of the offense. This allegation is a matter of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 defense which must be settled in a full-blown trial. Evidence must be
received to resolve the case on its merits.
I n Domingo v. Sandiganbayan , we considered the following in
resolving the issue of prescription: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

Petitioner is being charged under Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019, a

special law. Section 11 of the same statute provides for the period of
prescription for the offense charged, i.e., 15 years. However, the
applicable rule on the time the period of prescription starts to run is
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of

the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are

instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

This Court quotes the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice

Reynato S. Puno in Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto:

The law on prescription of special crimes like violation of

R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) is provided for in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326, viz:

"SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of

the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof . . ."
The application of this provision is not simple and
each case must be decided according to its facts. It
involves a careful study and analysis of contentious facts:
(a) when the commission of the violation of the law
happened; (b) whether or not the violation was known at
the time of its commission, and (c) if not known then, the
time of its discovery. In addition, there is the equally difficult
problem of choice of legal and equitable doctrines to apply to the
above elusive facts. For the general rule is that the mere fact
that a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right
to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not
prevent the running of the statute. This stringent rule, however,
admits of an exception. Under the "blameless ignorance "
doctrine, the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of
the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, courts decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff neither knew nor had reasonable
means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. Given all
these factual and legal difficulties, the public respondent
should have ordered private respondents to answer the
sworn complaint, required a reply from the petitioners
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 and conducted such hearings as may be necessary so he
could have all the vital facts at his front and, upon their
basis, resolve whether the offense charged has already
prescribed. (Emphasis supplied)
cdtai

It is noteworthy that petitioner did not raise the defense of

prescription in his motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation. It is
only in this petition that he raised this issue. As this case has never
progressed beyond the filing of the informations against petitioner, it is
only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to
determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed.
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against
whom it is taken in jeopardy. 1

In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated his claim of

prescription. Finding merit in petitioner's contention this time around, the
majority opinion grants reconsideration and dismisses the criminal cases.
The majority opinion does so on the ground that the "silence" in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 on the effect of the absence of the accused from this
jurisdiction in computing the period of prescription in Section 11 of RA 3019,
before and after its amendment, 2 should be resolved in petitioner's favor.
Thus, the majority opinion allows the prescriptive period to run
during petitioner's absence from this jurisdiction from 1986 to April
2000 or for a period of nearly 14 years.
I cannot subscribe to such view.
Article 91 3 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") provides that "[t]he term
of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago." Article 10 4 of the same Code makes Article 91
". . . supplementary to [special laws], unless the latter should . . .
provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary
application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the
prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its
amendment, should run only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on
27 April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent,
Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a
long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno . 5
Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions 6 of the
RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the
matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the
RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this
Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People. 7
The Court has followed Act No. 3326 in computing the prescriptive
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 period in cases involving special laws. 8 However, these cases dealt with the
question of when to reckon the running of the prescriptive period, 9 not with
the question of whether the prescriptive period in a special law runs when
the accused is outside Philippine jurisdiction. Similarly, in the cases where
this Court interpreted statutes of limitations in favor of the accused, the
issues relate to the (1) retroactive 10 or prospective 11 application of laws
providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the
nature of: the felony committed vis à vis the applicable prescriptive period;
12 and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs. 13 Thus, these
cases are no authority to support the conclusion that the prescriptive period
in a special law runs while the accused is abroad.
There is good reason for the rule freezing the prescriptive period while
the accused is abroad. The accused should not have the sole discretion of
preventing his own prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the
State's jurisdiction. This should be the rule even in the absence of a law
tolling the running of the prescriptive period while the accused is abroad and
beyond the State's Jurisdiction. An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by
being a fugitive from the State's jurisdiction. In this case, there is even a law
— Article 91 of the RPC, which Article 10 of the RPC expressly makes
applicable to special laws like RA 3019 — tolling the running of the
prescriptive period while the accused is abroad. ISHaTA

To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this

jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the
accused to the detriment of the State's ability to investigate and prosecute
crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should
not encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of
special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive
period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such
anomalous practice.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration.

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 180-502.

2. Id. at 475.
3. Id. at 537-554.
4. Id. at 558-569.
5. Id. at 57.
6. 434 Phil. 670 (2002).

7. Id. at 675.
8. Id. at 680.
9. Supra note 6.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 10. RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Sec. 3, pars. (g) and (i) provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds . — The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

xxx xxx xxx

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
11. 348 Phil. 190 (1998).

12. Id. at 201.

13. Rollo , p. 472.
14. Supra note 6.
15. Id. at 682-683.
16. Rollo , p. 474.
17. Id.
18. RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Sec. 1.
19. Id., Sec. 3(g).
20. 379 Phil. 708 (2000).
21. Id. at 717.
22. G.R. No. 139405, March 13, 2001, 354 SCRA 310.

23. Id. at 318.

24. G.R. No. 100285, August 13, 1992, 212 SCRA 607.

25. Id. at 615.

26. 415 Phil. 723 (2001).
27. Id. at 729-730.
28. Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 388, 394.
29. 313 Phil. 870 (1995).

30. Id. at 875.

31. Id. at 880.
32. Id. at 884.
33. Supra note 6.
34. Id. at 680.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 35. G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 392.
36. 328 Phil. 1272 (1996).

37. 60 Phil. 712 (1934).

38. G.R. Nos. 90440-42, October 13, 1992, 214 SCRA 504.

39. G.R. Nos. 129577-80, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 572.

40. G.R. No. 135482, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 721.
41. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994, 236
SCRA 197, 203.

42. 23 Phil. 584 (1912).

43. Id. at 591-592.
44. Canet v. Decena, supra note 28 at 394.
45. 44 Phil. 387, 405-406 (1923).
46. Supra note 22.
47. Id. at 319-320.
CARPIO, J., dissenting:

1. Romualdez v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, 23 September 2005, 470 SCRA

754, 767-769.
2. By Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 dated 16 March 1982.

3. Art. 91. "Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine Archipelago." (Emphasis supplied)
4. Art. 10. "Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary." (Emphasis supplied)
5. 60 Phil. 712 (1934).

6. Article 39 to impose subsidiary penalty for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22 (Jao Yu v. People, G.R. No. 134172, 20 September 2004, 438 SCRA 431),
Act No. 4003, as amended (People v. Cubelo , 106 Phil. 496 [1959]), and Act
3992 (People v. Moreno, supra ); Articles 17, 18, and 19 to determine the
liability of an accused in a case for violation of the Labor Code (People v.
Chowdury , 382 Phil. 459 [2000]); Article 70 for the sentencing of an accused
found guilty of multiple counts for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (People
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 v. Li Wai Cheung, G.R. Nos. 90440-42, 13 October 1992, 214 SCRA 504);
Article 45 to confiscate unlicensed money in a case for violation of Central
Bank Circular No, 37 (People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 [1957]).
7. Supra.
8. People v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 101724, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 241;
People v. Duque , G.R. No. 100285, 13 August 1992, 212 SCRA 607;
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto, 375 Phil. 697 (1999). But
see People v. Tamayo (No. 584, 28 December 1940, 40 O.G. 2313) where the
Court, following Article 10, gave supplementary effect to Article 91 to resolve
the issue of prescription in a case for violation of the Revised Administrative
Code.

9. Significantly, in People v. Duque, supra , the Court resolved such issue by

applying both Act No. 3326 and Article 91.
10. People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923).
11. People v. Pacificador , G.R. No. 139405, 13 March 2001, 354 SCRA 310.
12. People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956).
13. People v. Reyes , G.R Nos. 74226-27, 27 July 1989, 175 SCRA 597.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com