Pre-Islamic Arabic Prose Literature & Its Growth

PG PROGRAMME
ISLAMIC STUDIES
Semester—II
IS18202CR
('ILM AL-KALAM AND MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY)
DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF KASHMIR
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Course Prepared by:
Unit I
Ms. Saleeqah Ashraf
Research Scholar, Department of Islamic Studies
Maulana Azad National Urdu University
Unit II
Dr. Naseem Gul
Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies
Baba Ghulam Shah Badshah University, Rajouri
Unit III
Mr. Shahzad Bashir
Research Scholar, Shah Hamadan Institute of Islamic Studies
University of Kashmir
Unit IV
Ishfaq Amin Parray
Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies
Baba Ghulam Shah Badshah University, Rajouri
Content Editing by:
Dr. Sheikh Jamil
Head, Department of Islamic Studies
Islamic University of Science and Technology, Awantipora
Coordinated by:
1. Dr. Mohammad Altaf Ahanger
Sr. Assistant Professor (Urdu)
Directorate of Distance Education, University of Kashmir
2. Dr. Mohammad Dawood Sofi
Assistant Professor Islamic Studies (Contractual)
Format Editing by:
Dr. Mohammad Dawood Sofi
Assistant Professor Islamic Studies (Contractual)
Published by:
Prof. (Dr.) Tariq Ahmad Chisti
Director
Directorate of Distance Education
University of Kashmir, Srinagar
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Table of Contents Page No
Unit I Muslim Philosophy: An Introduction
i) Beginning of Intellectual Discussions among Early Muslims 8-21
ii) The Quranic Account of ‘Aql, Ḥikmah, Tadabbur, Tafakkur, 22-37

and ‘Ilm
iii) Interaction with Greek Philosophy during the early Abbasid

Period 38-50
iv) Institution of Bait al-Hikmah 51-61
Unit II ‘Ilm al-Kalam
i) Meaning and Origin 64-73
ii) Development and Significance 74-87
iii) Main Doctrines of Jabariyah and Qadariyah 88-98
iv) Main Doctrines of Mu'tazilah and Ashariah 99-111
Unit III Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers
i) Al-Kindi 114-129
ii) Al-Farabi 130-149
iii) Ibn Sina 150-164
iv) Ibn Miskaweh and Ibn Tufayl 165-193
Unit IV Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers
i) Imam Ghazzali 196-213
ii) Ibn Rushd 214-235
iii) Ibn Taimiyya 236-246
iv) Iqbal 247-261
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A Note to the Students
Assalamu Alykum
Dear Students
It makes me ecstatic to welcome you to the first semester of PG Program in Islamic Studies. To
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1. Introduction/Background
2. Aims and Objectives
3. Main Topic/Lesson
4. Let Us Sum Up
5. Check Your Progress
6. Suggested Readings
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Craving and praying for your success and ambitious for your intellectual pursuits.
Coordinators
1. Dr. Mohammad Altaf Ahanger
Sr. Assistant Professor (Urdu)
2. Dr. Mohammad Dawood Sofi
Assistant Professor, Islamic Studies (Contractual)
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Unit I
Muslim Philosophy: An Introduction
i) Beginning of Intellectual Discussions among Early Muslims
ii)The Quranic Account of ‘Aql, Ḥikmah, Tadabbur, Tafakkur, and ‘Ilm
iii) Interaction with Greek Philosophy during the early Abbasid Period
iv) Institution of Bait al-Hikmah
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UNIT I: Muslim Philosophy: An Introduction
Lesson 01: Beginning of Intellectual Discussions among Early Muslims
Lesson Structure
1.1.1 Introduction
1.1.2 Objectives
1.1.3 Pre-Islamic Philosophical thought
1.1.4 Philosophical thought in Islam
1.1.5 Let Us Sum Up
1.1.6 Check Your Progress
1.1.7 Suggested Readings
1.1.1 Introduction
At its simplest, Philosophy (from the Greek word ‘Philosophia’, meaning the ‘Love of wisdom’)
is the study of knowledge, or ‘‘thinking about thinking’’. As used originally by the ancient
Greeks, the term "philosophy" meant the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and comprised
all areas of speculative thought, including the arts, sciences and religion. Philosophical questions
(unlike those of the sciences) are usually foundational and abstract in nature. Philosophy deals
with questions through reflection and does not tend to rely on experiment, although the methods
used to study it may be analogous to those used in the study of the natural sciences. In common
usage, it sometimes carries the sense of unproductive or frivolous musings, but over the centuries
it has produced some of the most important original thought, and its contribution to politics,
sociology, mathematics, science and literature has been inestimable. Although the study of
philosophy may not yield "the meaning of life, the universe and everything", many philosophers
believe that it is important that each of us examines such questions and even that an unexamined
life is not worth living. It also provides a good way of learning to think more clearly about a
wide range of issues, and its methods of analyzing arguments can be useful in a variety of
situations in other areas of life.
Philosophy is an activity of thought, a type of thinking. Philosophy is the most critical and
comprehensive manner of thinking which the human species has yet devised. This intellectual
process includes both an analytic and synthetic mode of operation. Philosophy as a critical and
comprehensive process of thought involves resolving confusion, unmasking assumptions,
revealing presuppositions, distinguishing importance, testing positions, correcting distortions,
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looking for reasons, examining world-views and questioning conceptual frameworks. It also
includes dispelling ignorance, enriching understanding, broadening experience, expanding
horizons, developing imagination , controlling emotion, exploring values, fixing beliefs by
rational inquiry, establishing habits of acting, widening considerations, synthesizing knowledge
and questing for wisdom.
Philosophy, as a process, functions as an activity which responds to society's demand for
wisdom, which is bringing together all that we know in order to obtain what we value. Viewed
in this way Philosophy is part of the activity of human growth and thus, an integral, part of the
process of education. Philosophy and education have as a common goal i.e., the development of
the total intellect of a person, the realization of the human potential. Philosophy is such a huge
subject that it is difficult to know how to break it down into manageable and logical sections.
Perhaps the most basic overall split at the highest level is geographical, between Eastern
Philosophy and Western Philosophy (with, arguably, African Philosophy as a possible third
branch at this level).
1.1.2 Objectives
1. To know about what ancient philosophy was.
2. To learn about Quranic view of philosophy.
3. To expound the beginning of intellectual discussions in the Muslim world.
1.1.3 Pre-Islamic Philosophical Thought
Philosophical thought depending upon original individual insights, arose in many cultures. In the
Western Philosophy, the spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire marked the ending of
Hellenistic philosophy and ushered in the beginnings of Medieval philosophy, whereas in
Eastern philosophy, the spread of Islam through the Arab World marked the end of Old Iranian
philosophy and ushered in the beginnings of early Muslim philosophy.
Ancient philosophy is philosophy in antiquity, or before the end of the Roman Empire. It usually
refers to ancient Greek philosophy. But it encompasses various other intellectual traditions also,
such as Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, and Iranian philosophy. Ancient philosophies are
generally deeply rooted in religious traditions. Accordingly, ancient philosophies have a
comprehensive outlook as opposed to modern or contemporary philosophies, which tend to have
more specific methodologies and areas of focus.
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In the Western tradition, ancient philosophy was developed primarily by Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle. Ancient philosophy, however, also includes the Pre-Socratics, Hellenistic philosophy,
and Roman philosophy. Ancient philosophy in the West is distinguished from Medieval
philosophy, which was largely influenced by Christianity and Islam. Ancient philosophies from
non-Western traditions, such as Chinese or Indian philosophy, often have strong ethical or
religious concerns that continue to be major parts of the traditions today.
The term ancient philosophy encompasses a variety of thoughts that emerged from the early
stages of various intellectual traditions. However, not all ideas are considered philosophies since
philosophy includes, as its primary component, a rational self-refection and conceptualization of
thought. Major philosophies include: Ancient Greek and Roman philosophy in the West, which
date approximately from the sixth century B.C. through the third century C.E; Chinese
philosophy including Yin-yang philosophy, Taoism, Confucianism; Indian philosophy including
Upanishads and Vedic traditions, Jainism, Buddhist philosophy, and Hindu philosophy; and
ancient Iranian philosophy including Zoroastrianism. Each philosophy has some distinct
characteristics which reflect intellectual climates, problems, issues, and approaches; despite these
differences, however, these philosophies have many factors in common.
First, ancient philosophy tends to have a comprehensive perspective which includes a wide range
of components, including myth, religious beliefs, ethics, literature, cosmology, and theories of
nature. The synthetic characteristic of ancient philosophy is different from modern and
contemporary philosophies in that modern and contemporary philosophies tend to focus on
specific, often narrower, areas and their approaches are accompanied with clearer
methodological awareness. Because of its synthetic character, thought processes found in ancient
philosophy also differs from that of modern philosophy. For example, the Pre-Socratics in
ancient Greek philosophy presented their metaphysical arguments in poetic verse and their
arguments are interspersed with religious-ethical themes such as divine justice and salvation of
the soul. In ancient Chinese philosophy, metaphysics is also fused with natural philosophy,
ethics, and is often extended to political philosophy. Because of their comprehensiveness, the
interpretation of ancient philosophy requires an understanding of the entire framework of
thought.
Second, ancient philosophy is often deeply embedded in religious traditions. For example, Indian
philosophy is deeply rooted in Upanishad, Vedas, Hinduism, and others. Even Plato's philosophy
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is built within the framework that presupposes such beliefs as immortality of the soul,
redemption, and divine justice. Modern and contemporary philosophy tends to develop
philosophy as an autonomous discipline independent of religious traditions. This tendency is
most evident in the development of modern and contemporary Western philosophy, which is the
main stream of contemporary philosophy.
Ancient Western philosophy
Ancient philosophy in the West refers to philosophies that date from approximately the sixth
century B.C. to about the third century C.E. and includes the philosophies of the Pre-Socratic,
Socratic, Plato, Aristotle, and those developed in Hellenistic and Roman periods.
The pinnacle of ancient philosophy is the classical Greek philosophy as developed by Plato and
Aristotle. These two philosophers defined the issues, philosophical vocabularies, methodologies,
and types of discourses of philosophy as a discipline and influenced the entire tradition of
philosophy. Their philosophies are far more comprehensive than those of other philosophers in
antiquity.
In the Western tradition, primarily Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle developed ancient philosophy.
Ancient philosophy, however, also includes the Pre-Socratics, Hellenistic philosophy, and
Roman philosophy. Ancient philosophy in the West is distinguished from Medieval philosophy,
which was largely influenced by Christianity and Islam. Ancient philosophies from non-Western
traditions, such as Chinese or Indian philosophy, often have strong ethical or religious concerns
that continue to be major parts of the traditions today.
Chinese Philosophy
Yin-Yang philosophy is probably the oldest among classical Chinese philosophies. It is a
comprehensive metaphysics built upon the principle of Yin and Yang, which encompasses both
natural phenomena and human affairs. Centuries later, it was applied to various areas and
disciplines including medical sciences, nutrition theory, arts, martial arts, and others.
Practical orientation is a distinctive characteristic of Chinese philosophy and it has guided its
entire tradition since antiquity. Unlike western philosophy, there is a continuity of thought from
ancient to contemporary. Ancient philosophies, which guided the entire tradition, include
Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. These philosophies are all deeply rooted in or fused into
religious and ethical thoughts.
 Chinese philosophy—Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism
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 Buddhist philosophy arose in India but contributions to it were also made in China,
Japan, and Korea.
 Eastern philosophy
Indian Philosophy
Vedic Philosophy: Indian philosophy begins with the Vedas where questions related to laws of
nature, the origin of the universe and the place of man in it, are asked. In the famous Rigvedic
Hymn of Creation the poet says:
Whence all creation had its origin, he, whether he fashioned it or whether he did not, he, who
surveys it all from highest heaven, he knows— or maybe even he does not know.
In the Vedic view, creation is ascribed to the self-consciousness of the primeval being (Purusha).
This leads to the inquiry into the one being that underlies the diversity of empirical phenomena
and the origin of all things. Cosmic order is termed Rta and causal law by Karma. Nature
(Prakriti) is taken to have three qualities (Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas).
 Vedas
 Upanishads
 Hindu philosophy
Classical Indian Philosophy
In classical times, these inquiries were systematized in six schools of philosophy. Some of the
questions asked were:
 What is the ontological nature of consciousness?
 How is cognition itself experienced?
 Is mind (Chit) intentional or not?
 Does cognition has its own structure?
The Six schools of Indian philosophy are:
 Nyaya
 Vaisheshika
 Samkhya
 Yoga
 Mimamsa (PurvaMimamsa)
 Vedanta (UttaraMimamsa)
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Other traditions of Indian philosophy include:
 Hindu philosophy
 Buddhist philosophy
 Jain philosophy
 Sikh philosophy
 Carvaka (atheist) philosophy.
Old Iranian Philosophy
While there are ancient relations between the Indian Vedas and the Iranian Avesta, the two main
families of the Indo-Iranian philosophical traditions were characterized by fundamental
differences in their implications for the human being's position in society and their view on the
role of man in the universe. The first charter of human rights by Cyrus, the Great, is widely seen
as a reflection of the questions and thoughts expressed by Zarathustra or Zoroatser and
developed in Zoroastrian schools of thought.
1. Zoroastrianism
 Zarathustra
 Avesta
 Gathas
2. Mazdakism
3. Manichaeism.
1.1.4 Philosophical Thought in Islam
To understand the meaning of Islamic philosophy it is best to examine the use of the terms
Falsafah and Ḥikmah in various traditional sources and the definitions provided for them by the
Muslim philosophers themselves. The term ‘Ḥikmah’ appears in twenty places in the Qur’ān, of
which perhaps the most often cited, when referring to philosophy, is, “He giveth wisdom
[Ḥikmah] unto whom He willeth, and he unto whom wisdom is given, he truly hath received
abundant good” (Qur’ān, 2: 269). It also appears in the Ḥadīth literature in such sayings as “The
acquisition of Ḥikmah is incumbent upon thee: verily the good resides in Ḥikmah,” and “Speak
not of Ḥikmah to fools. The Qur’ān leads to a mode of thinking that combines empirical
observation, rational analysis, moral judgment and spiritual refinement. This rich vocabulary
points to the wholeness of perceiving and thinking. In contrast to categorical distinctions
between sensate (perceived through senses) and conceptual analysis, our natural or ‘first-order'
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encounter with things takes place as a unitary experience. In perceiving things, sense organs and
reason work together. The sharp distinctions between sensate qualities, which correspond to the
physical-material world, and intellectual notions, which correspond to the world of the mind, are
reflections of the Cartesian bifurcation [means Philosophy of Rene Descartes] between res
extensa and res cognitas and hardly give us an accurate description of the actual act of perceiving
and understanding. These categories belong to the ‘second-order' reflection upon reality whereby
we make distinctions between subject and object, the knower and the known, the perceiver and
the perceived, mental and material, etc. First-order encounter with the world takes place in a
different context. The wholeness of epistemic experience of things stems from the wholeness of
existence. Knowing as encounter means standing before object of knowledge. This puts one in a
special relationship with the reality of things in that he responds to it through his epistemic
faculties rather than create its meaning in a self-referential way. This meaning of knowing
through reason is reflected in one of the root meanings of the word ‘Aql, which is to tie, to link,
to relate. Reason ties one to the truth and thus opens up a new horizon beyond the ordinary chain
of causes. In a horizontal way, the human reason moves between and across facts and concepts
and links them to one another. In a vertical way, it links the lower levels with the higher ones.
The Qur’ān insists on the convergence of the two axes of causality: horizontal, which regulates
the world of physical causes, and vertical, which introduces the ‘Divine command' (Amr) into the
natural realm. There is no contradiction between the two but they follow different rules. The day
and night follow each other as part of the natural order in which we live and there is no breaking
of this rule. But also "when God wants something to happen, He says to it "be" and it is" (Yāsīn
36:82). Each realm of existence requires a different type of thinking. The elaborate vocabulary of
sensing, reasoning and thinking which the Qur’ān employs is necessitated by the nature of reality
itself. A multilayered and multidimensional reality cannot be perceived by a single cognitive
method. It requires a larger toolset of conceptual abilities. At this point, the Qur’ān speaks of
‘Ilm al-Ghayb, "the world/knowledge of the invisible" and ‘Ilm al-Shahādah, "the
world/knowledge of the visible". The invisible world refers to that realm of existence known to
Allah alone. Allah has given intimations of this world but no comprehensive knowledge of it has
been made available. While not accessible to the human experience, the invisible world guides
our encounter with the world of visible existence and thus functions as a signpost for our
conceptual analyses and moral judgments. In a metaphysical and moral sense, it regulates the
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affairs of the visible world in which we live. What is striking about the Quranic notion of the
‘visible world' is that a proper perception of it is based on an experience of ‘witnessing'
(Mushāhadah), which has a deeper meaning than mere looking and seeing. Witnessing means
standing before that, which presents itself. It entails looking and seeing but also attending to. It is
more like the experience of looking at a landscape and having a gestalt/overall perception of it.
In contemplating a landscape, we move between parts and whole and each time discover a new
relationship. In this sense, our encounter with the reality of things is a rational and conceptual
process but takes place within a larger context of intelligibility and significance that goes beyond
purely logical and discursive thinking. Concepts, which are not created in vacuum, correspond to
different aspects of reality and emerge in our encounter with reality, which the Qur’ān describes
as "bearing witness to the truth". Thus, we ‘see' the light, ‘touch' the wood, ‘smell' the rose,
‘taste' the cherry, ‘perceive' the dimension, ‘think of' the infinitude, ‘have consciousness of' the
nearness of the water, ‘discern' between a thing and its shadow, ‘understand' a command,
‘respond' to a call, ‘submit' to truth, ‘accept' the evidence, ‘contemplate' the meaning of life, and
so on. Each of these epistemic acts says something about our mental and conceptual abilities
with which we understand the world. But more importantly, they correspond to something
outside us and expand the horizon of our subjectivity. Thus to clarify it, that the Qur’ān endorses
and encourages faculties of thinking and reflecting on things in letter and spirit.
The definitions given by the Muslim philosophers themselves are more revealing than those of
literary figures in elucidating the meaning of philosophy for Islam. In his well-known definition
of Falsafah, the first of the great Muslim Peripatetic, al-Kindī, writes: “Philosophy is the
knowledge of the reality of things within man’s possibility, because the philosopher’s end in his
theoretical knowledge is to gain truth and in his practical knowledge to behave in accordance
with truth.” His successor al-Farabī accepted this definition in principle, making in addition a
distinction between “philosophy rooted in certainty” (Falsafah-i- Yaqīniyyah), which is based on
demonstration (Burhān), and “philosophy deriving from opinion” (Falsafah Maḍnūnah), based
upon dialectics and sophistry. He also gives the well-known definition of philosophy as “the
knowledge of existents qua existents” and also states that “there is nothing among existents in
the world with which philosophy is not concerned.”
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Beginning of Intellectual Discussions in the Muslim World
During the times of Khilāfah, people often discussed and contradicted various dimensions of
Muslim theology but within the restrictions of revelation. Time passed on and Muslim
interaction with other faiths and dogmas increased and people judged revelation through the
prism of reason through which a new ism crept within the Islamic Discourses. This trend further
strengthened with the emergence of Umayyads and reached to its climax in the mid-eighth
century and fact is that it was partially a by-product of a massive translation effort undertaken by
the enormous Muslim empire. Ancient Greek, Latin, Persian, and Indian works were translated
into Arabic, primarily at Bayt al-Ḥikmah in Baghdad. While much of the translation was in the
field of empirical sciences, some of it had to do with ancient Greek philosophical ideas. The
works of Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato were translated. The result of this was the development of
a school of theology based on reason and rational thought, questions of divine justice and human
responsibility; such as whether the evils, as perceived in the world, were created by Allah, and
also the issue of predestination versus free will. Discussions also concerned whether the Qur’ān
was created or eternal, and whether attributes of Allah mentioned in the Qur’ān were to be
interpreted allegorically or literally. The earliest religious and ethical discussions in the 7th and
8th centuries appear to have centred most specifically on the question of 'Qadr', which could
equally mean: 'predetermination' as predicated of Allah, or 'capacity' as predicated of man. The
term, 'Qadr' would most literally mean 'measuring out' or 'setting out portions'; which some
followers interpreted as Allah measuring out our fate and what shall happen in the world, while
others (Qadarites [Qadariyyah]) interpreted as Allah measuring out our human capacity for both
knowledge and making good choices (vs. bad choices for which we also have a capacity). The
early so-called Qadarites of Damascus also raised the question of Qadr in the context of the
moral responsibilities of the Umayyad caliphs, who justified their most oppressive policies on
the ground that they were part of the divine decree (Qaḍawa Qadr). Qadarites were critical of
the Umayyad Caliphs for their sometimes unjust autocracy. However, the Umayyad argued in
favour of predestination and that all events must be Will of Allah, a theological position which
very nicely justified the righteousness of everything the Umayyad did, since everything is Will
of Allah. They could then say ‘our actions and their consequences are part of Decree of Allah’.
Countering this, the Qadarites insisted that man has free will, sometimes doing well but other
times not, and that we should not accept lies and injustice as being a necessary part of Decree of
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Allah. In the next centuries, the Mu‘tazilah continued the Qadarite line of questioning, asserting
the freedom of the individual on the one hand and the justice of Allah on the other. And although
they naturally supported their positions by quotations from the Qur’ān, their general tendency
was to advance arguments of a strictly ethical or rational character in support of these positions.
Subsequently, the Mu‘tazilah scholars of Basra and Baghdad refined upon the speculation of
their Qadarite predecessors, and they offered a rationalist approach for discerning right from
wrong, as well as an explanation of Allah’s justice and decrees. Mu‘tazilah scholars stressed
Allah’s wisdom and goodness and exonerated Him of the responsibility for evils and injustices in
the world, even what some called 'apparent' evil or apparent 'injustice'. They argued that there
are, indeed, human actions without any divine reason or good purpose, and that all such evils and
injustices are 'created' by humankind, rather than caused by or willed by Allah. Significantly
though, their explanations were expressed in 'reasons'. However, their disapproving
[traditionalist] rivals did not believe that Quranic explanations had to be supported by any
rational reasons, but instead they insisted that people simply believe what they preached since
they had a true religious knowledge. Therefore, the Mu‘tazilah use of reasoning, for use in
discussion and argument, was essentially rejected by the 'traditionalists' – who tried to persuade
more simply by their own positions of religious authority and also with references to the literal
statements in revelation. Mu‘tazilah were not willing to simply accept what the current political-
religious authorities claimed as being the absolute truth or the absolute right moral law. Instead,
they believed that the 'words of Allah' require interpretation and that man must apply reasoned
thinking to this task; otherwise, the religious authorities or those who happen to be favourites of
the current political regime will dictate their own interpretative views to the people in the guise
of absolute Allah’s truth. For without the freedom of reasoning, argument, and debate; the
intended meaning of Allah’s Message could be hijacked or falsified by those claiming to be the
righteous authorities of meaning. Thus, the Mu‘tazilah were courageous in challenging other
theologians, even those with political power or ties, to debating the true meaning of the Quranic
statements. But, the judge of truth for the Mu‘tazilah was human reason, in combination also
with revelation and with spiritual intuition, because they understood that the only alternative to
using reason was religious authoritarianism. However, many of those disagreeing with
Mu‘tazilah conclusions refused to use reasoning in debates, claiming that reason was incapable
of knowing the truth of revelation; so they sought to persuade people of their interpretation on
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the basis of their special religious knowledge and position of simply of knowing what the Qur’ān
means. In contrast, the Mu‘tazilah sought the agreement of others by the power of their
reasoning and logic, rather than gaining agreement by either an appeal to being the absolute
religious authority or by popularized emotional appeals. The Mu‘tazilah sought to ground the
Islamic creedal system in reason; though with the Qur’ān as a foundational faith in Islam as their
starting point and ultimate reference. Mu’tazilah intentionally applied logic and some aspects of
Greek philosophy, but the accusations levelled against them by the rival schools of theology that
they gave absolute authority to extra-Islamic paradigms reflect more the fierce polemics between
various schools of theology than any objective reality. It were the later Muslim philosophers, not
the Mu‘tazilah proponents, who took Hellenistic philosophy asa starting point and conceptual
framework for analyzing and investigating reality. Moreover, the actual translation of Greek
philosophical texts had not yet been started by the time the founder of the school, Wāsil ibn ‘Aṭā,
launched this theological movement in the second century AH. However, earlier Qadarite
theologians in contact with Christian theologians, such as John of Damascus and his disciple
Theodore Abū Qurrah, were most likely influenced by the scholastic methods of discourse that
Syriac-speaking Christian scholars had been applying to theological questions prior to the Arab
conquest of Syria, Egypt and Iraq.
Translation movement was later an important part of intellectual discussions. It helped to spread
different thoughts not only within the Arabia but also in other nations. Extended trade network
and international relations also gave a boost to these intellectual discussions. In the history of the
struggle and reciprocal influence between Falsafah and Kalām in Islam, for the sake of the
present discussion, there can be distinguished five periods:
1. The earliest period, from the beginning to the end of the third/ninth century, when the
Mu‘tazilite school was dominant in Kalām, and Falsafah was passing through its period of
genesis and early development with such figures as Iranshahri and al-Kindī and his students.
This period was one of distinct but parallel developments and of close association between
Falsafah and Kalām in an atmosphere of more or less relative mutual respect, at least in the case
of al-Kindi himself, although from the side of Kalām certain of its branches such as the school of
Basra opposed Falsafah strongly even during this early period.
2. The period from the end of the third/ninth to the fifth/eleventh century, from the rise of
Ash‘arite theology and its elaboration to the beginning of the gradual incorporation of certain
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philosophical arguments into Kalām by Imām al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī and his student al-
Ghazzali. This was a period of intense contradictions and often enmity between Falsafah and
Kalām, a period whose phases have been so ably studied along with those of the first period by
many Western scholars, from Munk, Steinschneider, Horovitz, and Horten to Anawati, Gardet,
and especially Wolfson, whose studies in the domain of the relation between Falsafah and
Kalām during the early period of Islamic history mark one of the highlights of Occidental
scholarship on Islamic thought. Names of more recent scholars such as Joseph von Ess, David
Burrell, and Wilfred Madelung can be added to this list.
3. The period from al-Juwaynī and Al-Ghazālī to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and including Abū al-Fatḥ
al-Shahrastānī, that is, from about the fifth/eleventh century to the seventh/thirteenth century.
During this period strong opposition between falsafah and Kalām continued as can be seen in the
well-known critiques of Ibn Sīnā by al-Al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī, but at the same time each school
became influenced in many ways by the other. Falsafah, going back to Ibn Sīnā, who lived at the
beginning of this period, began to discuss more than before such problems as the meaning of
prophecy and the Divine Word, the question of human and Divine Will connected with the issue
of predestination and freewill, the Divine Attributes, and so on, issues that had always been
central to Kalām. Meanwhile, Kalām became even more “philosophical,” employing both ideas
and arguments drawn from Falsafah. In fact, such a famous Ash‘arite theologian as Fakhr al-Dīn
al-Rāzī, had extensive knowledge of philosophy. That is why Ibn Khaldūn, who appeared shortly
after this period, wrote that there appeared men whom it was difficult to classify exclusively in
the category of Faylasuf or Mutakallim and who could be legitimately considered as belonging to
either or both groups. Still, during the period in question the attacks of Ash‘arite Kalām,
although itself “philosophized,” continued against Falsafah to the extent that they eclipsed
Peripatetic philosophy in the eastern lands of Islam.
4. From the seventh/thirteenth century to the tenth/sixteenth century a more peaceful relationship
existed between Falsafah, which now included the newly established school of Illumination or
‘Ishrāq, and Kalām. In the Sunni world many figures appeared who were masters of both
Falsafah and Ash‘arite Kalām (of the later school) such as Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, Jalāl al-Dīn
Dawānī, and even Dāwūd al-Qaysarī. In the Twelver-Imām/Ithnā ‘Asharī Shi‘ite world
systematic Kalām was established by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, who was himself one of the greatest
of Islamic philosophers. His student ‘Allama al-Hīlī, considered one of the most outstanding
19
authorities in Shi‘ite Kalām, was also a master philosopher. One can see during this period in
both the Sunni and Shi‘ite worlds a much less contentious relationship between Falsafah and
Kalām and the appearance of many more figures such as those to whom Ibn Khaldūn had
alluded, that is, men who were at once Faylasuf and mutakallim. Meanwhile, after the rise of
Suhrawardī and development of his school, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘aliyah began to develop rapidly
in the School of Isfahan.
5. From the tenth/sixteenth century to modern times when in the Shi‘ite world, following the full
development of al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘aliyah by Mulla Sadra, philosophy seen as Ḥikmat al-
Muta‘aliyah began to eclipse Kalām to the extent that Shi‘ite Kalām soon ceased to occupy the
important position it had held earlier and became marginalized. As for the Sunni world,
especially in India, the teachings of the masters of philosophy understood Ḥikmat al-Muta‘aliyah
flourished. There, however, in contrast to Persia, this Ḥikmah tradition did not completely
supplant and eclipse Ash‘arite Kalām, but the two were often integrated together, alongwith
Sufism, into a grand synthesis as we see in the writings of Shāh Walīyullah of Delhi and ‘Alī
Ashraf Thānwī.
1.1.5 Let Us Sum Up
God has subjected for the use of man, His vicegerent on the earth, everything in the heavens and
the earth–the sun and the moon; day and night; winds and rain; the rivers and the seas and the
ships that sail; pearls and corals; springs and streams, mountains, moisture, and pastures; and
animals to ride and grains and fruits to eat. God has also given man the will to choose, decide,
and resolve to do good or evil. He has endowed him with reason and various impulses so that by
his own efforts he may strive and explore possibilities. He has also given him a just bias, a
natural bias towards good. Besides this, He has given him guidance through revelation and
inspiration, and has advised him to return evil with good, to repel it with what is best (Aḥsan).
Since intellect being a natural gift given by God to mankind is utilized by man and the result is
intellectual discussions which began since ages and in this lesson it along with the brief
explanation of ancient philosophy it is described that how intellectual discussions began in
Muslim world after the revelation of Qur’ān and gave rise to what prominently is called Muslim
Philosophy. These intellectual discussions never stopped and are being performed till present
day.
20
1. Define philosophy as a term?
2. What does ancient philosophy include? Explain briefly.
3. Summarise following:
a. Western Philosophy
b. Indian Philosophy
c. Chinese Philosophy
d. Iranian Philosophy
4. Discuss the Islamic perspective of philosophy?
5. Discuss the emergence and beginning of intellectual discussions in Islamic world?
i. Nasr, Syed Hossein, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, USA: State
University of New York Press, 2006.
ii. Rafiabadi, Hamid Naseem, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, Srinagar: City Book
Centre, 2010.
iii. _____________, Muslim Philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2001.
iv. Sharif, M. M, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols., Delhi: A Venture of Low Price
Publications, , 2004.
21
Lesson 1.2: The Quranic Account of ‘Aql, Ḥikmah, Tadabbur, Tafakkur, and ‘Ilm
Lesson structure
1.2.1 Introduction
1.2.2 Objectives
1.2.3 The Quranic Account of ‘Aql
1.2.4 The Quranic Account of Ḥikmah
1.2.5 The Quranic Account of Tadabbur
1.2.6 The Quranic Account of Tafakkur
1.2.7 The Quranic Account of ‘Ilm
1.2.8 Let Us Sum Up
1.2.1 Introduction
Although the scriptures revealed to the earlier prophets, especially those of the Christians and the
Jews, are regarded by the Muslims as holy, yet the book (Al-Qur’ān) revealed to last Prophet,
Muḥammad (peace be upon him), is the final sacred book of Muslims. The doctrine propounded
by the Qur’ān is not a new doctrine but is considered by the Muslims, to be the culmination of
the Divine Revelation that started with Prophet Adam, went through Prophet(s) Nūḥ, Ibrāhīm,
Mūsā, ‘Isā etc and finally was completed by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), upon
whom the Qur’an was revealed. The Qur’ān is a book essentially religious, not philosophical, but
it deals with all those problems which religion and philosophy have in common. Both have to
say something about the problems related to the significance of such expressions as God, the
world, the individual soul etc. it is the book of wisdom. The Qur’ān uses a number of terms that
are closely related to reason/intellect and thinking. Tafakkur, "thinking", Qalb, "heart", Fu’ād,
"inner heart", and Qalb, literally "seed" meaning "essential heart", are among these terms and
each corresponds to a different aspect of the act of perceiving, thinking and reflecting. There are
also other terms which fall within the same semantic field of ‘Aql, ‘Ilm, "knowledge"; Fahm,
"understanding"; Fiqh, "perceiving/understanding"; Idrāk, "grasping"; Shu‘ūr, "consciousness";
Burhān, "demonstration"; Ḥujjah, "evidence"; Bayyinah, "clear evidence"; Sultān, "over-
whelming evidence"; Furqān, "discernment"; Tadabbur, "contemplation"; Nutq,
"talking/thinking"; Ḥukm, "judgment"; Ḥikmah, "wisdom"; and Dhikr, "remembrance/
22
invocation". The Quranic usage of these terms, whose full exposition requires a separate study,
establishes a context of integrated thinking in which our encounter with reality unveils different
aspects of the all-inclusive reality of existence.
1.2.2 Objectives
1 To learn about the different terms used in Islamic world of intellectualism
2 To learn from the verses in Qur’ān, the meaning and significance of the prominent terms
used by Muslims in their philosophical thought.
3 To develop the knowledge of Quranic terms for implementing these in practical life.
1.2.3 The Quranic Account of ‘Aql
The intellect (‘Aql) is the instrument of knowledge (‘Ilm), reflection (Fikr) is a function of ‘Aql
(intellect). The truth/reality (Ḥaqq) is the goal of ‘Aql (intellect) and also the ultimate point in the
journey of thought (Fikr). To distinguish Ḥaqq and Bāṭil is the function of ‘Aql (intellect); Fikr
is also function of ‘Aql, but Fikr guided by Ḥaqq is Furqān. ‘Aql is a facilitating faculty for
acquiring knowledge and that sometimes Aqlun is used for that kind of knowledge which
activates this faculty. For this reason Hadhrat ‘Ali (R.A) has been reported to have said: there are
two types of intellect that is natural and learnt or endowed and acquired (Al-‘Aqlu ‘Aqlan
Maṭbuh wa Masmu’). The intellect which is acquired will be beneficial only when one has
natural intellect perfectly intact. In the same manner as if there is no seeing power in the eye of a
person the light of the sun is of no use for such person. ‘Aql has been used in the sense of
intellect also and it is the faculty of reason and its noun derives from the verb that means to
hobble a camel.
Etymology: The literal meaning of ‘Aql is Imsāk and Istimsāk, the verb ‘Aqala has the following
meanings:
i. To intern, to arrest, confine, overcome. Thus ‘Aqala al-ba‘irabil ‘iqal means he tied (the
feet) of the camel with the rope.
ii. And ‘Aqalalisanhu means he tied his tongue or made him speechless, ‘Aqala al-Shay is
used sometimes meaning that he understood in the sense of Fahimahu or Taddaburahu
[meaning he looked into, considered, examined, or studied, the thing repeatedly, until he
knew it].
iii. ‘Aql also signifies to be or to bring something within the grasp of mind, to comprehend, to
understand. Also, to be reasonable, have intelligence, to be in one’s senses, to be conscious.
23
The word can also mean, to have memory of something. Thus, La a‘qalhadha means ‘‘I
have no memory of this.’’
iv. And also it means to pay blood money.
‘Aql in the Qur’ān
In the Qur’ān the meaning of the word is: ‘‘understanding’’ or ‘‘reasoning’’. In the Qur’ān, 2:
75, it is said that the Jews used to hear the word of God and then after understanding (aqalu) its
meaning used to change it. In other verses, the meaning is mostly reasoning. The answer to the
question that why ‘Aql is called ‘Aql is because it saves a person from getting perished in the
abodes of destructions and ignorance. ‘Aql is the specific trait with man which distinguished him
from all the animals and Ma‘qūl is that which one thinks with. Regarding the two types of ‘Aql
mentioned above i.e., acquired and endowed, it is established that there is no use of the acquired
without the presence of the other type that is, endowed. ‘Aql is a spiritual Noor (light) through
which the Nafs (soul/self) comprehends ‘Ilm. Close English equivalent of is discernment. People
acquire knowledge through various means, like it can be acquired through observation, reading,
listening, other senses, teacher, etc. The avenues are open for everyone and there are no barriers
for anyone for acquiring knowledge. In fact, everybody—including unbelievers—have been
originally bestowed with lot of knowledge. ‘Ilm is a raw data—knowledge—possessed by a
person. Though there are other meanings of ‘Ilm like manifesting and showing (kahf: 12, Al-
Imran: 140, Hadid: 25, Jinn: 28) but here the concern is knowledge. ‘Aql is the capacity for a
person also comes to understand the difference between ‘the right’ and ‘the wrong’. Fikr and
‘Aql can by themselves lead to the basic religious truth.
The Holy Qur’ān often says that the signs that Allah shows man in nature (2: 164, 13:3-4, 16:10-
12, 16:67-69, 30: 24, 28, 39: 42, 45: 5, 13), or in history (29:35), or in one’s self (3: 21, 39:42),
or in the Qur’ān (10:24) are for those who are in the habit of thinking and reasoning: li qawm
yatafakkarun and li qawmya‘qilun. This shows that thinking and reasoning are normally
necessary to find guidance. This is also clear from several verses stating that those who do not
use ‘Aql are not guided:
Surah Yūnus, Verse 42:
ُّ ‫َو ِم ْن ُه ْم َم ْن يَ ْست َِمعُونَ ِإ َليْكَ أَفَأ َ ْنتَ تُس ِْم ُع ال‬
َ‫ص َّم َولَ ْو كَانُوا ََل يَ ْع ِقلُون‬
And there are those of them who hear you, but can you make the deaf to hear though they will
not understand?
24
This verse shows that one needs to be in the habit of using one’s ‘Aql before one can be guided
by the message brought by the Prophet.
Surah Al-Anfāl, Verse 22:
َ‫ص ُّم ْالبُ ْك ُم الَّذِينَ ََل يَ ْع ِقلُون‬ َّ َ‫اب ِع ْند‬
ُّ ‫اَّللِ ال‬ ِ ‫إِ َّن ش ََّر الد ََّو‬
Surely, the vilest of animals, in Allah's sight, are the deaf, the dumb, who do not understand.
According to this verse human beings who do not use their ‘Aql are worse than all living
creatures. This idea is also stated in another place in following verse:
Surah Al-A‘rāf, Verse 179:
And certainly We have created for hell many of the jinn and the men; they have hearts with
which they do not understand, and they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears
with which they do not hear; they are as cattle, nay, they are in worse errors; these are the
heedless ones.
A common way to reject the use of ‘Aql is to insist on ideas received from past generations
without question. The Qur’ān condemns this and once again uses comparison with animals:
Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 170:
َ َ‫اَّللُ قَالُوا بَ ْل نَتَّبِ ُع َما أ َ ْلفَ ْينَا َعلَ ْي ِه آَبَا َءنَا أ َ َو َل ْو َكانَ آَبَا ُؤ ُه ْم ََل يَ ْع ِقلُون‬
َ‫ش ْيئًا َو ََل يَ ْهتَدُون‬ َّ ‫َوإِذَا قِي َل لَ ُه ُم اتَّبِعُوا َما أَ ْنزَ َل‬
And when it is said to them, Follow what Allah has revealed, they say: Nay! we follow what we
found our fathers upon. What! and though their fathers had no sense at all, nor did they follow
the right way.
‫ي فَ ُه ْم ََل يَ ْع ِقلُون‬ ُ ‫َو َمث َ ُل الَّذِينَ َكفَ ُروا َك َمث َ ِل الَّذِي يَ ْن ِع ُق بِ َما ََل يَ ْس َم ُع إِ ََّل د ُ َعا ًء َونِدَا ًء‬
ُ ‫ص ٌّم بُ ْك ٌم‬
ٌ ‫ع ْم‬
And the parable of those who disbelieve is as the parable of one who calls out to that which
hears no more than a call and a cry; deaf, dumb (and) blind, so they do not understand.
The following verse also clears that without Fikr and ‘Aql the guidance does not come.
َ‫س َعلَى الَّذِينَ ََل يَ ْع ِقلُون‬ َّ ‫َو َما َكانَ ِلنَ ْف ٍس أ َ ْن تُؤْ ِمنَ إِ ََّل بِإِذْ ِن‬
ِ ‫اَّللِ َويَجْ عَ ُل‬
َ ْ‫الرج‬
And it is not for a soul to believe except by Allah's permission; and He casts uncleanness on
those who will not understand.
Several verses describe those who do not think and do not use their ‘Aql as deaf and/or dumb
and/or blind. In case of blindness Allah says:
Al-Ḥajj, Verse 46:
25
Have they not travelled in the land so that they should have hearts with which to understand, or
ears with which to hear? For surely it is not the eyes that are blind, but blind are the hearts
which are in the breasts.
Thus, blindness is the failure to apply ‘Aql to what one sees and as a result fail to see a great
many important truths. For various reasons we ignore or suppress or deny some of what one
observes and experiences. This makes one blind to some important religious truths. Similarly,
speaking of deafness as the failure to apply ‘Aql to what one hears. But what is Dumbness?
Dumbness is not to speak the truth as one sees it but as habit say what serves one’s interests or
the interests of one’s group. When one does this for a long period his capacity and ability to
perceive truth is all but lost.
1.2.4 The Quranic Account of Ḥikmah
Allah Almighty says in Qur’ān
Even as We have sent among you an Apostle from among you who recites to you Our
communications and purifies you and teaches you the Book and the wisdom and teaches you that
which you did not know.
Etymology: Allah has been called Aḥkam al-Ḥākimūn and also Ḥākim to whom belong Ḥukm.
The Ḥikmah is the statement about the best knowledge of the best things and a person who does
perform the delicate and minute details and finishing of the things beautifully is called Ḥākim
(Daqā’iq al Sannat). Ḥukm and Ḥikmah also is from the genre of ‘Ilm and Ḥākim is an ‘Ilm and a
person endowed with wisdom (Ṣahib al-Ḥikmah). Al-Ḥukm is equivalent to Al-‘Ilm wa al-Fiqh.
The statement mentioned in a Ḥadīth is that in some poetry there is Ḥukm means that in some
poems there is beneficial content which withholds man from unseemly behaviour and foolishness
and prevents him from these unlikely ways of behaviour. It has been also said in this regard that
it means the profitable sermons and parables (Al-Mawa’iẓ wal Amthāl) found in the contents of
the poetry which benefits people greatly. In Arabic Ḥakamatu Ḥukman in its primary acceptation
means he prevented, instructed or withheld him, from acting evil, or a corrupt manner. There is a
Ḥadīth of a Prophet (peace be upon him) in which it has been said that verily, of poetry, there is
that which is true judgement. Thus, Ḥikmatun properly and primarily signifies what prevents, or
restrains, from ignorant behaviour. It is derived from Ḥikmatun signifying a certain appurtenance
of a beast, because it prevents its possessor from having dispositions, it means knowledge, or
26
science, as also Ḥukmun or [generally] knowledge of the true natures of things and actions
according to the requirements thereof, and therefore it is divided into intellectual and practical;
or state, quality, often intellectual faculty, this is the theological Ḥikmatun.
Ḥikmah in the Qur’ān
To reach the truth through reason and knowledge and when it is used attributing to Allah it
means to have the knowledge and to bring things to existence in the best way and when
attributed to man then to know the existences and act on the righteous ways thus, when
Ḥakim/Ḥakīm is used for God, it has a different meaning but when used for man it has different
connotations. The Qur’ān has been called Ḥakīm because there are wise sayings in it. When the
Ḥikmah is used in respect of the Prophet (peace be upon him) it means he is teaching the
Companions, Ḥikmah, which means the knowledge. Secondly, it means the arguments and
wisdom behind the commandments of the Qur’ān. Thirdly, it means the Quranic realities and
truths. In Qur’ān (31: 11) by the Ḥikmatun given by God to Luqmān (A.S), is meant the evidence
of the intellect in accordance with the statutes of law. In the conventional Language of the word,
it means the perfecting of the human mind by the acquisition of the speculative sciences, and of
the complete faculty of doing excellent deeds, according to the ability possessed. Also, it means
the attainment of truth, or which is right, by knowledge and by deeds. So that in God it is the
knowledge of things and the origination thereof in the most perfect manner; and in man, the
knowledge of doing good things; or it means acquaintance with the most excellent of things by
the most excellent kind of knowledge.
Ḥikmah is called not only wisdom, but also science and philosophy. The ancient usage of the
word lent itself to this evolution. Jurjānī gives the word Ḥikmah the primary meaning of ‘‘to set a
thing in its place.’’ Many suggest this sense of equilibrium and stability. The Qur’ān calls it Al-
Ḥikmah al-Bāligha: wisdom has attained its maturity:
Surah Al-Qamar, Verse 5:
‫ِح ْك َمةٌ بَا ِلغَةٌ فَ َما ت ُ ْغ ِن النُّذ ُ ُر‬
Consummate wisdom (this Qur’ān)—but warnings do not avail;
It uses Ḥikmah many times in current sense of wisdom, a wisdom, however, which implies
knowledge of high spiritual truths. The book and wisdom together often constitute a single gift:
27
Our Lord! and raise up in them an Apostle from among them who shall recite to them Thy
communications and teach them the Book (this Qur’ān) and Al-Ḥikmah (the wisdom), and purify
them; surely Thou art the Mighty, the Wise.
Ḥikmah may be mostly considered as something different from knowledge and not a part thereof.
But it can also be considered a part of knowledge (though a different aspect) based on the
context. It is named as Ḥikmah because it prevents a person from ignorance.
ِ ‫يرا َو َما َيذَّ َّك ُر ِإ ََّل أُولُو ْاْل َ ْل َبا‬
‫ب‬ ُ
َ ‫يُؤْ ِتي ْال ِح ْك َمةَ َم ْن َيشَا ُء َو َم ْن يُؤْ تَ ْال ِح ْك َمةَ فَقَدْ أو ِت‬
ً ‫ي َخي ًْرا َك ِث‬
He grants wisdom to whom He pleases, and whoever is granted wisdom, he indeed is given a
great good and none but men of understanding mind.
Ḥikmah is always used in good sense and for positive connotations. The Qur’ān, for example,
has been called Al-Hạkīm–one of the meaning to the verse “I swear by the Qur’ān al-Hạkīm.”
(36: 2)
Islam includes the process of revelation from God, the rituals God has sanctified, the Law God
has enshrined until the end of time, the education of the human spirit, and above all the detailing
of correct belief in God in all faiths dimensions. The method for personality development as
established by the prophets is that people should be taught divine Law and Divine Wisdom, so
that their personalities are sanctified from all types of material and moral filth. Allah says;
Surah Āl-i ‘Imrān, Verse 164:
‫َاب َو ْال ِح ْك َمةَ َوإِ ْن كَانُوا ِم ْن قَ ْب ُل‬
َ ‫وَل ِم ْن أَ ْنفُ ِس ِه ْم يَتْلُو َعلَ ْي ِه ْم آَيَاتِ ِه َويُزَ ِكي ِه ْم َويُعَ ِل ُم ُه ُم ْال ِكت‬
ً ‫س‬ َ َ‫علَى ْال ُمؤْ ِمنِينَ إِذْ بَع‬
ُ ‫ث فِي ِه ْم َر‬ َّ ‫لَقَدْ َم َّن‬
َ ُ‫اَّلل‬
َ ‫لَ ِفي‬
ٍ ِ‫ض ََل ٍل ُمب‬
‫ين‬
Certainly Allah conferred a benefit upon the believers when He raised among them an Apostle
from among themselves, reciting to them His communications and purifying them, and teaching
them the Book and the wisdom, although before that they were surely in manifest error.
So, Ḥikmah is concerned with that capacity and competence in man with which he makes
decisions according to the truth, so as to decide affairs from the influences of Ḥikmah, for the
purity of morals and culture.
1.2.5 The Quranic Account of Tadabbur
Etymology: Shaykh Muhammad 'Umar Bāzmūl said,
"At-Tadabbur linguistically derives from the Arabic word Al-ddubur which is the end of
something. Dubr al-Dābah, i.e. the end of the riding beast. Tadbīr and Tadabbur of an affair is
28
the consideration of the consequences of the affair, i.e. to consider what the end result will lead
to. At-tadabbur is thinking on it, i.e. the acquirement of two pieces of information to acquire a
third. Therefore, Al-tadabbur is thinking and understanding. At-tadabbur and al-i'tibaar
(consideration): a lesson or example; consideration of the past. Al-i'tibaar: contemplation and
discernment. Therefore, Al-i'tibaar is the condition and psychological framework with which the
knowledge of something observed leads to the knowledge of something unobserved.
In conventional language: Al-tadabbur is a term meaning the consideration of the consequences
of things, and it is similar in meaning to the term Al-tafakkur (i.e. thinking), although thinking is
the behaviour of the heart when considering a proof, and Tadabbur is the behaviour of the heart
with the consideration of the final consequences. And in the Islamic legislation: at-tadabbur is
the consideration, understanding, and thinking about the consequences to which the affairs
mentioned in the Noble Qur’ān lead.
Tadabbur Al-amr means to take care of a matter and its Tadabbur means to see its
consequences, thus it indicates consequentially to see where the matter is finally leading to. And
Al-tadabbur means to do Al-tafakkur in a matter.
Tadabbur in the Qur’ān
Allah says, Surah Al-Mu‘minūn, Verse 68:
ِ ْ ‫أَفَلَ ْم يَدَّب َُّروا ْالقَ ْو َل أ َ ْم َجا َء ُه ْم َما لَ ْم يَأ‬
َ‫ت آَبَا َء ُه ُم ْاْل َ َّولِين‬
Is it then that they do not ponder over what is said, or is it that there has come to them that
which did not come to their fathers of old?
Surah Ṣad, Verse 29:
ِ ‫اركٌ ِليَدَّب َُّروا آَيَاتِ ِه َو ِليَتَذَ َّك َر أُولُو ْاْل َ ْلبَا‬
‫ب‬ َ َ‫ِكتَابٌ أ َ ْنزَ ْلنَاهُ إِلَيْكَ ُمب‬
(It is) a Book We have revealed to you abounding in good that they may ponder over its verses,
and that those endowed with understanding may be mindful.
Surah Al-Nisā’, Verse 82:
Do they not then meditate on the Quran? And if it were from any other than Allah, they would
have found in it many a discrepancy.
Rāghib Isfahānī says about Tadbīr that it means, which signifies the consideration of any matter
by trying to assess its consequences and the result. For Tadabbur, signifies the thinking or
meditating, upon [a thing], and endeavouring to understand [it], and it is synonymous to
29
Tafakkur and Tafahhum. Thus, Tadabbarahu means he looked into it, considered it, or studied it
repeatedly, in order to know it, or until he knew it.
1.2.6 The Quranic Account of Tafakkur
Etymology: Tafakkur literally means to think on a subject deeply, systematically, and in detail.
The term ‘Tafakkur’ is a Quranic word used in many verses which is derived from the root world
‘Fakara’ meaning ‘ponderous’ or ‘deeper thought’. Thus, the term ‘Tafakkur’ has various
meanings (according to various Arabic English dictionaries) like ‘to think deeply’, ‘to meditate’,
‘to be thoughtful’, ‘contemplation’, ‘reflecting’, ‘considering’, ‘meditating’ and ‘thinking’. In
religious sense it means ‘to reflect and to meditate over the creation of Allah, to think deeply and
ponder on the Āyah (signs, proofs, evidences, revelations, lessons) mentioned in the holy Quran
and be thoughtful and deeply understand whatever is in the heavens and earth (on in the
universe). The term Tafakkur connotes deeper application of Fikr, which means thinking and
understanding. Rāghib Isfahānī says that Tafakkur indicates a process in which one is able to
form the image of a thing in mind like heaven, earth, and world but where one is not able to form
the image Tafakkur is not possible. It is for this reason it has been said that to make Tafakkur in
the verses, signs, and bounties of Allah and not His essence.
In this context, it signifies reflection, which is the heart’s lamp, the spirit’s food, the spirit of
knowledge, and the essence and light of the Islamic way of life. Reflection is the light in the
heart that allows the believer to discern what is good and evil, beneficial and harmful, beautiful
and ugly. Again, it is through reflection that the universe becomes a book to study, and the verses
of the Qur’ān disclose their deeper meanings and secrets more clearly. Without reflection, the
heart is darkened, the spirit is exasperated, and Islam is lived at such a superficial level that it is
devoid of meaning and profundity. Reflection is a vital step in becoming aware of what is going
on around us and of drawing conclusions from it. It is a golden key to open the door of
experience, a seedbed where the trees of truth are planted, and the opening of pupil of the heart’s
eye. Due to this, Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him), the foremost in reflection and all
other virtues, states: ‘‘No act of worship is as meritorious as reflection. So reflect on the God’s
bounties and the works of His Power, but do not try to reflect on His Essence, for you will never
be able to do that.’’ By these words, in addition to pointing out the merit of reflection
Muḥammad (peace be upon him), determines the limits of reflection and reminds man of his
limits.
30
Tafakkur in the Qur’ān
Tafakkur has been used in various verses of holy Qur’ān, in different chapters in different sense.
In Sūrah al-Baqarah verse no. 266, it is used in the sense that for a rich man who does good
deeds out of obedience of Allah, he will be bestowed by various blessings in the paradise.
In verse (50) of Al-An‘ām it is used in the sense that men of seeing or men of Allah cannot be
compared with blind men or ordinary men as men of Allah have the higher light with them; so
think deeply. In verse (176) of Al-A‘rāf it is used in the sense that people should use their ‘Aql’
(intellect) so that they may understand Allah’s Ayah (signs, proofs, evidences, revelations,
lessons). Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) is ordered (by Allah) to relate parables (i.e.
the stories of previous nations) to people so that they may get a lesson from these parables by
performing Tafakkur.
“Verily, the likeness of this worldly life is as the rain (water) which we send down from the sky….
Thus do we explain the Ayat in detail for a people who reflect (or who think or ponder)” (10:24).
In this verse ‘Tafakkur’ is used in the sense that this world is temporal and mortal. No one knows
except Allah what will happen at what time? So use your ‘Aql’ (intellect) that you may
understand what Reality is. Abdullah Yusuf Ali in the explanation of this verse writes:
“A beautiful parable, explaining the nature of our present life. The rain comes down in drops and
mingles with the earth. Through it, by God’s matchless artistry the womb of the earth is made
fruitful…. The earth is covered with bravery of green and gold and all kinds of colours…, but a
hailstorm or a blast, a frost or a volcanic eruption comes and destroys it and the bravery and
beauty of yesterday is destroyed. All that is left in ashes and dust. What more can we get from
this physical material life?”
In verse no. (3) of Al-R‘ad, Tafakkur is used in the sense that Qur’ān is the source of thinking
and people are asked to go for deep reflection or contemplation by understanding the holy
Qur’ān. In this verse the earth, mountains, rivers, every kind of fruit, night as a cover over day
are described as signs of Allah for a people who reflect and who think.
In Al-Nahl, verse (44), Tafakkur is used in the sense that clear signs and inspired books were
revealed to many prophets and also God’s message came to Prophet Muḥammad (peace be
upon). Muḥammad (peace be upon) is required to elucidate the teachings of the Qur’ān not
merely by word. He (peace be upon) is also required to do so by his conduct. People are asked to
give a thought on this Dhikr (Qur’ān) so that they may understand what is revealed. Verse (42)
31
of chapter Al-Zumar declares that one should understand the life and death, sleep and dreams as
there are signs in it for those who ponder (perform Tafakkur) and for those who understand.
Abdullah Yusuf Ali in its explanation writes:
“The mystery of life and death, sleep and death is fascinating enigma, of which the solus leep
and death is fascinating enigma, of which the solution if perhaps beyond the ken of man…”.
The Qur’ān also declares in verse (21) of Al-Ḥashr: “Had we sent down this Qur’ān a mountain,
you would surely have seen it humbling itself and rent asunder by the fear of Allah. Such are the
parables which we put forward to mankind that they may reflect (think or ponder)”. (59:21)
Abdullah Yusuf Ali in its explanation writes, “There are two ideas associated in men’s mind with
a mountain:
“One is its ‘height’ and the other is that it is rocky, stony and hard etc. The reality is that the
God’s revelation is so sublime that even the highest mountains humble themselves before it. The
revelation is so powerful and convincing that even the hard rock splits asunder under it. But the
man has became so arrogant that he considers himself superior to it and has become so hard-
hearted that he is not affected by the powerful message of the Qur’ān. The mountain refused to
accept the trust because they felt themselves to be ‘too humble’ to be equal to such a tremendous
truth”.
In this verse (59:21) Tafakkur is used in the sense that even the powerful and strong mountains
refused to take this trust (message) as they surrendered themselves before Allah’s power and
supremacy. So, think deeply on it so that you may understand what is reality and how powerful
convincing is the message to Qur’ān.
There is a verse related to Tafakkur in the Qur’ān that has effected Prophet Muhammad (peace
be upon) deeply. It is about the importance of “Tafakkur” in Islam. The Ḥadīth that is about the
verse that made Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon) cry upon reflection is that:
‘Aṭā’ said: “‘Ubayd ibn ‘Umayr and I entered upon ‘Ā’ishah (the mother of the believers) and
Ibn ‘Umayr said to her, ‘Tell us of the most amazing thing you saw on the part of the Messenger
of Allah (peace be upon). She wept and said, ‘He got up one night and said, “O ‘Ā’ishah leave
me to worship my Lord.”I said, “By Allah, I love to be close to you, and I love what makes you
happy.” So he got up and purified himself, then he stood and prayed. He kept weeping until his
lap got wet, then he wept and kept weeping until the floor got wet. Bilāl came to tell him that it
was time to pray, and when he saw him weeping, he said, “O Messenger of Allah (peace be
32
upon), you are weeping when Allah has forgiven you all your past and future sins?” He said,
“Should I not be a grateful slave? Tonight some verses have been revealed to me; woe to the one
who recites them and does not think about what is in them (interpretation of the meaning):
‘Verily! In the creation of the heavens and the earth…” This verse is:
ِ ‫ت ِْلُو ِلي ْاْل َ ْلبَا‬
‫ب‬ ِ ‫ف اللَّ ْي ِل َوالنَّ َه‬
ٍ ‫ار ََلَيَا‬ ِ ‫ت َو ْاْل َ ْر‬
ْ ‫ض َو‬
ِ ‫اختِ ََل‬ ِ ‫س َم َاوا‬ ِ ‫ِإ َّن فِي خ َْل‬
َّ ‫ق ال‬
Most surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the
day there are signs for men who understand.
The following ayah is about the characteristics of the people who have the habit of
contemplating on these miracles:
Those who remember Allah standing and sitting and lying on their sides and reflect on the
creation of the heavens and the earth: Our Lord! Thou hast not created this in vain! Glory be to
Thee; save us then from the chastisement of the fire:
One day Prophet Luqmān (A.S) was sitting in a desolate place all alone and thinking. Someone
asked him, “Wouldn’t it be better if you engage in social activities and converse with people”
He replied, “Long-term solitude is better for tafakkur. Keeping on tafakkur will lead a person to
the path of Heavens.”
1.2.7 The Quranic Account of ‘Ilm
Etymology: The term ‘Ilm appears very frequently both in the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth. ‘Ilm,
derived from the root word ‘I-l-m means the cognitive understanding of a particular thing and
thereafter its acquisition. The terms like ‘Ilm, Ḥikmah, Ma’rifah, Fiqh etc―and their verbs and
verbal derivatives―time and again find their representation in Qur’ān and Ḥadīth that further
adds to the characteristic beauty of ‘Ilm. ‘Ilm and Ma‘rifah seem to be synonymous terms “but
because of the various derivatives of Ma‘rifah such as ‘Ārif or ‘Arrāf, it is intended to be used
for the knowledge acquired through reflection and experience presupposing a previous
ignorance.” The famous Arab lexicon Lisan al-Arab mentions that the term ‘Ilm is one of the
attributes of Allah, as He has been described as ‘Ālim and ‘Alīm in the Qur’ān. The term ‘Ilm and
its synonyms occur about 750 places in the Qur’ān. ‘Ilm is a complex, multifaceted Arabic term
used in various derivations to denote the many aspects of knowing and knowledge acquisition,
production, and dissemination, including teaching and learning, education, and science, as well
33
as comprehension, perception, feeling, experience, and familiarity. From ‘Ilm also comes the
term ‘Ālam, “the world,” signifying that the divine act of creation is fundamentally an act of
knowing and an expression of knowledge. Through the Qur’ān and prophetic traditions, Islam
has placed a strong emphasis on ‘Ilm, considering the seeking of knowledge to be obligatory on
all Muslims. Accordingly, the enterprise of knowing has been central to all aspects of cultural
production in Islam, particularly in the fields of science, religion, and the arts. On the one hand,
‘Ilm fuses science and religion together into an indissoluble whole, and on the other, it makes art
an act of knowledge before being an expression of feeling. Historically, there has been no
specific word for “science” in Arabic, and early-modern and modern Arab intellectuals, linguists,
reformers, and “scientists” did not coin a new term for it to help delineate the territories of
modern science from that of traditional ‘Ilm in Arabic thought. The Arabic word ‘Ilm (pl. ‘Ulūm)
has continued to be used to describe both religious and non-religious pursuits of knowledge, that
is, the devotional and intellectual engagements with the divine revelation as well as the rational
and empirical study of nature. It has also continued to be associated with art (Fann), imagination
(Khayāl), and artistic creativity (‘Ibdā’). As both science and religion have formed the common
foundation of artistic production in the Islamic tradition, ‘Ilm has acted as a unifying cultural
force throughout Islamic history.
‘Ilm: Science, Religion, and Art in Islam presents an opportunity, at the national and
international levels, to examine the concept of “knowledge” in Islamic culture in order to explore
and generate innovative perspectives on its role in science, religion, and the arts. It invites
reflections on and discussions of the idea of ‘Im and its role in pre-, early-, and post-modern
Islamic culture.
‘Ilm in the Qur’ān
From Islamic viewpoint, the spring of all the knowledge is Allah, which reaches to the different
Messengers through the institution of Waḥy. It is through this institution that Allah invites and
appeals the mankind to make use of the faculties of reason and perception (‘Ayn al-Yaqīn) and
understand the significance of the whole phenomenon (including Knowledge). This has been
illustrated in different verses of the Qur’ān. For example:
ِ ‫ت َو ْاْل َ ْر‬
ٍ ‫ض ََلَ َيا‬
َ‫ت ِلقَ ْو ٍم َيتَّقُون‬ ِ ‫س َم َاوا‬ ِ ‫ف اللَّ ْي ِل َوالنَّ َه‬
َّ َ‫ار َو َما َخلَق‬
َّ ‫اَّللُ فِي ال‬ ْ ‫ِإ َّن فِي‬
ِ ‫اختِ ََل‬
34
Most surely in the variation of the night and the day, and what Allah has created in the heavens
and the earth, there are signs for a people who guard (against evil).
And at another place Allah says:
Surah Al-Nahl, Verse 78:
َ‫ار َو ْاْل َ ْفئِدَة َ لَعَلَّ ُك ْم ت َ ْش ُك ُرون‬
َ ‫ص‬َ ‫س ْم َع َو ْاْل َ ْب‬ َ َ‫ون أ ُ َّم َهاتِ ُك ْم ََل ت َ ْعلَ ُمون‬
َّ ‫ش ْيئًا َو َجعَ َل لَ ُك ُم ال‬ ِ ‫ط‬ُ ُ‫اَّللُ أ َ ْخ َر َج ُك ْم ِم ْن ب‬
َّ ‫َو‬
And Allah has brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers-- you did not know anything--
and He gave you hearing and sight and hearts that you may give thanks.
Surah Al-Ḥujurāt, Verse 16: Say: Do you apprise Allah of your religion, and Allah knows what is
in the heavens and what is in the earth; and Allah is Cognizant of all things.
Surah Al-Rahmān, Verse 1:
‫الرحْ َم ُن‬
َّ
The Beneficent Allah,
Surah Al- Raḥmān, Verse 2:
َ‫َعلَّ َم ْالقُ ْرآَن‬
Taught the Quran
Surah Al-‘Alaq, Verse 4:
‫علَّ َم ِب ْالقَ َل ِم‬
َ ‫الَّذِي‬
Who taught (to write) with the pen
Surah Al-An‘ām, Verse 91:
And they do not assign to Allah the attributes due to Him when they say: Allah has not revealed
anything to a mortal. Say: Who revealed the Book which Musa brought, a light and a guidance
to men, which you make into scattered writings which you show while you conceal much? And
you were taught what you did not know, (neither) you nor your fathers. Say: Allah then leave
them sporting in their vain discourses.
Surah Al-Kahf, Verse 65:
‫فَ َو َجدَا َع ْبدًا ِم ْن ِعبَا ِدنَا آَت َ ْينَاهُ َرحْ َمةً ِم ْن ِع ْن ِدنَا َو َعلَّ ْمنَاهُ ِم ْن لَدُنَّا ِع ْل ًما‬
Then they found one from among Our servants whom We had granted mercy from Us and whom
We had taught knowledge from Ourselves.
In this verse the mention of ‘Ilm pertains to a special knowledge (‘Ilm al-Laddunnī) which
cannot be received by man through his own efforts until he is made acquainted by Allah about
35
this knowledge. Knowledge is the central concern of the Qur’ān. ‘‘Are those equal, those who
know and those who do not know’’ the Qur’ān declares explicitly.
Imām Ghazāli̇̄ says that: “Knowledge is like the fruit of a tree and it flows from intellect, or like
the light of the sun or like the vision of the eye. Why should it not be honoured when it is the
cause of the fortune in this world and the next?”. Ibn Khaldūn, the famous Muslim sociologist
and historian, asserts that Knowledge can flourish only in a society that is civilized and the same
is achievable through the faculty of reasoning. He further states: “Man is a social animal and his
prosecution of learning is conditioned by the nature of the material, intellectual and spiritual
forces of the civilization in which he lives”.
Likewise, in many traditions/Aḥādith, one finds heavy emphasis has been laid on the significance
of acquiring Knowledge coupled with the invitation to comprehend and understand the reality of
the things by using the intellectual faculty (‘Aql).
1.2.8 Let Us Sum Up
It is clear from above mentioned Quranic verses and its interpretations that man has been given
(signs, proofs, evidences, revelations, lessons) of Allah so that he may understand the reality.
From this whole discussion, it emerges that there is no harm at all if a person acquires knowledge
by making use of his intellect/‘Aql―rationality or reasoning―provided it is guided and
enmeshed within the very knowledge revealed by Allah. The fact is that the intellectual faculty
(‘Aql) and thereafter its use in gaining Knowledge either through rationalism, logic, or through
empiricism, has undoubtedly serious limitations. Therefore, owing to this fact if the intellect is
not made subservient to the revealed Knowledge then it can mislead and misdirect the entire
humanity. Last, inquisitive seeking and search for knowledge is one of the prime duties assigned
by Islam to the Muslims (Ṭalab al-‘Ilm) and as such every Muslim (man or woman) is always a
seeker of knowledge/ Ṭālib al-‘Ilm. The knowledge, thus gained, should not be meant for
procuring fame or something similar to it rather its basic aim should be, inter alia, to win the
favor of Allah and to work for the betterment of the humanity.
1. Give the Etymological account of terms: ‘Aql, Ḥikmah, Tadabbur,Tafakkur and ‘Ilm?
2. Discuss Quranic account of ‘Aql?
3. Discuss Quranic account of Ḥikmah?
4. Discuss Quranic account of Tadabbur?
36
5. Discuss Quranic account of Tafakkur?
6. Discuss Quranic account of ‘Ilm?
7. Explain the importance of above mentioned terms briefly?
i. Al- Qur’ān
ii. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, USA: State
iii. Rafiabadi, Hamid Naseem, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, Srinagar: City Book
Centre, 2010.
iv. ______________, Muslim philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2001.
v. Sharif, M. M, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols., Delhi: A Venture of Low Price
Publications, 2004.
37
Lesson 1.3: Interaction with Greek Philosophy during the early Abbasid
Period
Lesson Structure
1.3.1 Introduction
1.3.2 Objectives
1.3.3 Pre-Translation Period
1.3.4 Translation Movement: A Doorway of Greek Philosophy in Muslim world
1.3.5 Emergence of New Philosophical Thought after Interaction with Greek Philosophy
1.3.6 Theologian(s) response on Philosophers
1.3.7 Let Us Sum Up
1.3.1 Introduction
There are various interpretations about the emergence of intellectual discussions among the
Muslims during the Ummayad and Abbasid periods after the Greek Philosophical books were
translated into Arabic. Moreover, various people have interpreted the very translation enterprise
in itself in different ways. Some people say that the basic sources of inspiration for it were
Islamic ones and the Greek philosophy, Indian thought, Persian ideas, Egyptian concepts worked
as secondary sources. The indigenous trends among the early Muslims, the advocates of which
later on came to be known as the Qadarites and Jabarites are also cited by some people as an
evidence that intellectual discussions had started long before the Greek and the foreign sciences
were translated into Arabic.
The pre-Islamic Arabs had no arguments on their beliefs and practices. They were following
ancestral practices on the basis of oral authority. As the Qur‘ān has indicated at various places.
The Qur‘ān has declared the Arabs as the ‘‘ignorant’’ (Umiyyīn). No doubt the Arabs were at
Home in poetry, eloquence, wisdom, and intelligence, but had not developed any civilization of
their, own. Same was the case with the Persian, Indian or Greek nations. Even they had not
invented the rules of eloquence (Balāghah) or semantics (Ma‘anī) or rhetorics (Badih). The
Islamic scholars invented the theories about these sciences after the advent of Islam in Arabian
Peninsula. While as in pre-Islamic period, the Arabs always gave edge to sword on pen.
38
In a tradition/Ḥadīth also it has been indicated that Arabs were illiterate, who could neither write
nor count. Arabs had, no doubt, some wise people among them as they had erudite poets, but no
philosophers like Indians and Greeks had, were found among Arabs. They did not inherit
Philosophy or wisdom from their ancestors. Three sciences, of course, were there among the
Arabs during their age of ignorance/Jāhiliyyah, i.e. (1) genealogical accounts: historical and
religious records (Ansab). (2) Interpretation of dreams (Ta‘bīr al-Rūya’) and (3) Astrological
assumptions. Their religious conditions indicated that some of them were inclined towards
Judaism, others to Christianity and still others to Sabean ways of religion, who mainly believed
in the astrological hypothesis of the astrologists. The wise people among the Arabs were very
little in number and most of their wisdom was based on fragment of their imagination or mental
gymnastics.
Arabs worshipped the inanimate objects like idols, stars and trees during the period of ignorance.
They were not exposed to any logic reasons or aesthetic sciences. Their social, political, moral,
religious and economic life depicts utter chaos and disturbances. Moreover their internal wars
had ruined their system; thousands of people were becoming victims of these civil brutal
conflicts. All the progress made by Arabs later was made possible only after the revelation of
Qur‘ān started. All aspects of Arab life, political, economic, civilizational were influenced by the
Quranic inspirations. It gave birth to Arab thought and Islamic philosophy. Because though the
Qur‘ān was not the book of philosophy in its technical sense, but it solved philosophical
problems, prescribed a rational vision, rejected the opponents with sound rational arguments,
these all aspects led to the emergence of Islamic philosophy and Arabic thought.
1.3.2 Objectives
1. To know those conditions of early Abbasid period which led Muslims to interact with
Greek Philosophy.
2. To learn about the changes which emerged during interaction, with Greek thought.
3. To determine the post-interaction facts in Muslim world due to Greek philosophy.
1.3.3 Pre-Translation Period
There is no doubt that the people who read the Qur‘ān, memorized it or taught it came across
numerous verses which invited people to knowledge, research; consideration, contemplation and
elevated the status of knowing people over those who don’t know. It was for the same reason that
a sizeable number of the Arabs were led to indulge in acquisition of knowledge and perusal of
39
invention. There are Quranic verses which invite people to thinking, observation and deep
contemplation. These verses are indicative that the Qur‘ān invites considerably to knowledge and
understanding, and insists on investigation and research about the creations of God and to travel
in the land for discovering God’s signs and acquire much information as possible about the
mysteries of existence. These verses, all and sundry, instigate the believers for discovery,
investigation and deeper insights about the matters which are found in the universe and also
make them to believe in the realities which lie beyond appearances and, outside the purview of
their faculties of comprehension and apprehension; In this way the Qur‘ān has provided a
complete ‘‘metaphysical thought about the universe’’. So Qur‘ān is the first source of inspiration
of Muslim thought and philosophy.
Before the translation of Greek books into Arabic, the issue of predestination (Jabr) and free will
(Ikhtiyār), and that of divine Justice, became current among Muslims during this first half of the
second century hijrah. Perhaps the first formal centre of such discussions was the circle of Ḥasan
al-Basarī (d. 110/728-9). Among the Muslim personalities of the latter half of the first century,
the names of Ma‘bad al-Juhānī (d. 80/699) and Ghylan ibn Muslim al-Damashqī (d. 105/723)
have been mentioned, who adamantly defended the ideas of free will were called Qadariyyah
and their opponents were known as Jabariyyah. According to Shibli the emergence of freedom
of will and predestination owes its origin to politics, as in Umayyad period, especially during the
Governor-ship of Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf, the people were coerced to declare: ‘‘we believe that good
and evil (is from God).” So, this was the first intellectual conflict.
There are various interpretations of about the enterprise of the translation. But the most relevant
and pertinent interpretation, has been provided by Ziauddin Sardar as he discusses the issue in
the context of the unique character of the epistemology of Islam. According to this interpretation,
it provides a middle path for the pursuit of knowledge answering that no individual form of
knowledge or method of knowing becomes the sole criteria of truth or is pursued to the exclusion
of all others. It is for the reason that a predilection for systematic classification of knowledge is
so prominently noticeable in Muslim civilization. The classification of knowledge into its
various branches was the prime occupation of many Muslim scholars of classical age. It was the
concern of Muslim scholars with the classification of knowledge that enabled them, first to
appreciate intellectual output of other civilizations and then, to synthesize it with the world-view
of Islam. This international and synthetic character of Islamic thought did not only avail the
40
Greek treasure of knowledge, but all sciences of the ancient civilizations of India, China, Persia,
and Egypt as well. These all civilizations were not similar in their influences that they exerted on
one another and among these two were highly influential. One is Indian and the second Greek.
However, since Indian civilization could not retain its originality because of its conflicts with
other nations and, therefore, could not expand its impact any further. But so far as Greek
civilization is concerned it expanded far and wide and included in its fold great learning centres
like Alexandria, Rome, Syria for about fifteen centuries. During this period, Islam could make its
inroads into the central areas of the Greek thought and interacted with the communities which
were fascinated by Greek culture. Therefore, as a natural consequence, Muslim thought mingled
with the Greek philosophy and Greek thought became identical with Islamic thought. The
Muslims translated the Greek books and changed the orientation of this thought to the extent that
it became a new enterprise. There is no doubt that the infiltration of the Greek ideas was very
slow in the case of the Christian European theology and culture but on the other impact of Islam
on Europe was ‘‘sudden, violent and short’’ because the translation of the Muslim books took
place suddenly and after the translated books became available to the Europeans, extensive
discussions and debates became rampant throughout the western world and they tried to imbibe
Islamic ethos so quickly as it was something to be absorbed without any second thought.
1.3.4 Translation Movement: A Doorway of Greek Philosophy into the Muslim world
Greek or to be precise Hellenistic philosophy came into the Muslim world by way of Syriac. At
Haran, in northern Iraq, a philosophical school kept versions of the Hellenistic philosophical
heritage intact either in the original Greek or in Syriac translations. In the time of the Abbasid
rule, that fertile period, in which the Greek heritage was being translated into Arabic. The Caliph
at first was interested to see what sciences were there, and then works on civil administration,
then to ethical works, and then it was all works. So it was no surprise that there was a vigorous
effort to translate all the works (ca. 754-833). The spread of Hellenistic philosophy in the
Muslim world would be first expounded on by the first Arabic philosopher al-Kindī (ca. 800-
865). He wrote many works on Greek science and philosophy. He laid the foundation for others
to follow in studying philosophical works. His main contribution was the firm conviction that
Greek heritage contained important truths that Muslims could not afford to overlook. As a
mathematician he realized the importance of Aristotelian logic, however, he found Aristotelian
metaphysics contradictory; that Aristotle did not offer valid logical support to the issue of the
41
eternity of the world. The Arab conquest of Syria and Iraq in the seventh century did not, on the
whole, interfere with the academic pursuits of Syriac scholars at Edessa, Nisibis, Qinnesrin and
other centres of Greeko-Syriac learning. To these Christian centres should also be added Harran
in Northern Iraq, home to a sect of star-worshippers known in the Arabic sources as the Sabaeans
and alleged to have been founded by Alexander the Great. When the Abbasid Caliphate was
founded in Baghdad in 750 CE, the centre of learning gradually moved to the Abbasid capital,
which became in due course the heir of Athens and Alexandria as the new cultural metropolis of
the medieval world. Throughout the eighth and ninth centuries (second and third centuries AH),
a new impetus was given to the translation movement thanks to the enlightened patronage of
three of the early Abbasid caliphs at Baghdad, al-Manṣūr, Hārūn and his son al-Mamūn, who
founded the House of Wisdom/Bayt al-Ḥikmah in Baghdad to serve as a library and institute of
translation. It was during the reign of al-Mamūn that the translation of medical, scientific and
philosophical texts, chiefly from Greek or Syriac, was placed on an official footing. The major
translators who flourished during al-Mamūn's reign include Yaḥyā ibn al-Baṭrīq, credited with
translating into Arabic Plato's Timaeus, Aristotle's On the Soul, On the Heavens and Prior
Analytics as well as the Secret of Secrets, an apocryphal political treatise of unknown authorship
attributed to Aristotle. However, the shining star of al-Māmūn's reign was the Nestorian Ḥunayn
Ibn Isḥāq (d. AH 264/CE 873), who hailed from al-Hirah in Iraq and, jointly with his son Isḥāq
(d. AH 299/CE 911), his nephew Hubaysh and other associates, placed the translation of Greek
medieval and philosophical texts on a sound scientific footing. The chief interests of Ḥunayn
himself were medical, and we owe to him the translation of the complete medical corpus of
Hippocrates and Galen, but Ḥunayn and his associates were also instrumental for translating
Galen's treatises on logic, his Ethics (the Greek original of which is lost) and his epitomes of
Plato's Sophist, Parmenides, Cratylus, Euthydemus, Timaeus, Statesman, Republic and Laws.
(Only the epitomes of the Timaeus and the Laws have survived in Arabic). The interest of
Ḥunayn (and of his school) in Galen, the outstanding Alexandrian physician and Platonist, is
noteworthy and this philosopher-physician is a major figure in the history of the transmission of
Greek learning into Arabic. Not only his sixteen books on medicine but a series of his logical and
ethical writings were translated and played an important role in the development of Muslim
thought. Apart from the epitomes of Plato's Dialogues, his Pinax (list of his own writings), That
the Virtuous can Profit from Knowing Their Enemies, That One Should Know His Own Faults
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and especially his Ethics have influenced moral philosophers from Abū Bakr al-Rāzī to Ibn
Miskawayh and beyond. Of the works of Aristotle, Ḥunayn's son of Isḥāq generated the
translations of the Categories, De Interpretatione, On Generation and Corruption, the Physics,
On the Soul, the Nicomachean Ethics and the spurious De Plantis, written by the Peripatetic
philosopher Nicolaus of Damascus (first century BCE). By far the most important Aristotelian
treatise to be translated into Arabic during this period is the Metaphysics, known in the Arabic
sources as the Book of Letters or the Theologica (al-Ilāhiyāt).” According to reliable authorities,
a little-known translator named Astat (Eustathius) translated the twelve books (excluding M and
N) for al-Kindī, as did Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī a century later. However, Isḥāq, Abū Bishr Matta and
others are also credited with translating some parts of the Metaphysics. Equally important is the
translation by Ibn Naimah al-Himsi (d. AH 220/CE 835) of a treatise allegedly written by
Aristotle and referred to in the Arabic sources at Uthulugia or Theologia Aristotelis. This
treatise, which consists of a paraphrase of Plotinus' Enneads IV-VI, made by an anonymous
Greek author (who could very well be Porphyry of Tyre), together with Proclus' Elements of
Theology (known as the Pure Good or Liber de causis), thoroughly conditioned the whole
development of Arab-Islamic Neo-Platonism. Al-Kindī is said to have commented on the
Theologia Aristotelis as did Ibn Sīnā and others, and al-Farabī refers to it as an undoubted work
of Aristotle. A series of other pseudo-Aristotelian works also found their way into Arabic,
including Secret of Secrets, De Plantis, Economica and the Book of Minerals. Among other
translators of Greek philosophical texts, we should mention Qustā ibn Luqā (d. AH 300/CE 912),
Abū 'Uthman al-Dimishqī (d. AH 298/CE 910), Ibn Zurah (d. AH 398/CE 1008) and Ibn al-
Khammar (d. AH 408/CE 1017), as well as the already-mentioned Abū Bishr Matta (d. AH
328/CE 940) and his disciple Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī. None of those translators made any significant or
original contribution to Arabic philosophical literature, although they laid the groundwork for
subsequent developments and served as the chief purveyors of Greek philosophy and science
into the Islamic world. However, there were noteworthy exceptions: Abū Bishr Matta was a
skilled logician, and the Jacobite Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī stands out as the best-known writer on
Christian theological questions and on ethics in Arabic. The Harranean Thābit ibn Qurra (d. AH
289/CE 901) was an outstanding mathematician and astronomer as well as a translator. About
two centuries later Cordoba, capital of Muslim Spain, began to vie with Baghdad as the centre of
‘ancient learning’. From Cordoba, Greek–Arabic philosophy and science were transmitted across
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the Pyrenees to Paris, Bologna and Oxford in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. The initial
reception of Greek–Hellenistic philosophy in the Islamic world was mixed. It was frowned upon
at first as being suspiciously foreign or pagan, and was dismissed by conservative theologians,
legal scholars and grammarians as pernicious or superfluous. By the middle of the eighth century
CE the picture had changed somewhat, with the appearance of the rationalist theologians of
Islam known as the Mu‘tazilites, who were thoroughly influenced by the methods of discourse or
dialectic favoured by the Muslim philosophers. Of those philosophers, the two outstanding
figures of the ninth and tenth centuries were al-Kindī and al-Rāzī, who hailed Greek philosophy
as a form of liberation from the shackles of dogma or blind imitation (Taqlīd). For al-Kindī, the
goals of philosophy are perfectly compatible with those of religion, and, for al-Rāzī, philosophy
was the highest expression of man’s intellectual ambitions and the noblest achievement of that
noble people, the Greeks, who were unsurpassed in their quest for wisdom (Ḥikmah). To
conclude, we can say there is no doubt that the Greek philosophy influenced the Islamic
philosophy, but some may wrongly assume that the influence was to the extent that Muslim
philosophers did nothing except for copying the Greeks ideas without contributing to the
Philosophy from their own. That is why Muslim philosopher's contributions to the philosophy
and scientific activities must be read out. Thus, it deserves to be mentioned that Muslim
philosophers had a deep influence upon Western philosophers, not only in the fields of logic or
natural philosophy, but also in metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of
religion as well.
1.3.5 Emergence of New Philosophical Thought After Encounter of Muslims with Greek
Philosophy
The early centuries of Islamic philosophy were marked by the appearance of several schools of
thought. The most prominent school, which is often identified with Islamic philosophy as such in
Western sources, is the Mashshā‘ī (Peripatetic). This school is not simply Aristotelian, as the
name might indicate, but marks a synthesis of Islamic tenets, Aristotelianism, and Neo-
Platonism. Its founder is Abū Ya‘qūb al-Kindī (d. 260/873), the “Philosopher of the Arabs.”
Some Islamic sources have spoken of the Persian philosopher Abū al-‘Abbās Iranshahrī as the
first Muslim to have written on philosophy, but nothing survives of his works save a few
fragments. In contrast, a number of al-Kindī’s works have reached us, some only in Hebrew and
Latin, for he was well known in the West. Al-Kindī, like most of the early Peripatetics, was at
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once a philosopher and a scientist. Although much of his voluminous corpus has been lost,
enough has survived to reveal his mastery in both domains. Al-Kindī was the first Islamic thinker
to grapple with the problem of the expression of Peripatetic thought in Arabic. He also
confronted one of the central problems of philosophy in the monotheistic world, namely,
harmonization of faith and reason. Among his philosophical works his treatises on the intellect,
Fī al-‘Aql (On the Intellect),and metaphysics, Fī al-Falsafat al-‘Ulā (On Metaphysics), were
particularly influential in the Muslim world; Fī al-‘Aql, known as De Intellectu in Latin, also had
a wide-spread influence in medieval Europe. Most of al-Kindī’s immediate students were more
significant as scientists than as philosophers, and his real successor on the philosophical scene
was not among them. Yet their philosophical views, especially those of Abū Ṭayyib al-Sarakhsī,
deserve to be closely studied and integrated into general histories of the Peripatetic school. As
for al-Kindī’s real successor, this title must be given to Abū Nasr al-Farabī (d. 339/950), who
hailed from Khurasan in Central Asia. Many consider al- Farabī to be the real founder of Islamic
Peripatetic philosophy, and it was he more than al-Kindī who formulated the Arabic
philosophical language and wrote about the relation between the Arabic language and the
expression of Aristotelian logic. He commented on Aristotle’s Organon and is the father of
formal logic in the Islamic world. He furthermore sought to synthesize the political philosophy
of Plato and Islamic political thought in his masterpiece Kitāb Ārā’ Ahl al-Madīnat al-Fāḍilah
(The Book of the Opinions of the Citizens of the Virtuous City), and is considered to be the
founder of Islamic political philosophy. Al-Farabi also wrote of the harmony between the views
of Plato and Aristotle, as well as on these philosophers individually and on various metaphysical
and epistemological questions. He is, moreover, the first Islamic philosopher to systematize the
emanation scheme (Fayḍ) of the ten intellects from the One, for which Peripatetic philosophy is
known. After al-Farābī, Khurasan gradually became the major center of philosophical activity,
but throughout the fourth/tenth century Baghdad continued as an important center, following the
earlier activities of al-Kindī. In the second half of the tenth century, however, the philosophical
scene in Baghdad turned mostly to the study of logic under the guidance of Abū Sulayman al-
Sijistānī, who was also known as al-Manṭiqī (the Logician). Meanwhile, Abū al-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī
from Khurasan was developing the Farabian teachings further and adding a new chapter of his
own to Islamic philosophy by attempting to incorporate certain pre-Islamic Iranian ideas into his
political philosophy. Early Peripatetic philosophy reached its peak soon after al-‘Āmirī with
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another Persian philosopher, Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Abd Allah, Ibn Sīnā (369–428/980–1037),
usually known as Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna).Often considered the greatest Islamic philosopher, Ibn
Sīnā created a vast synthesis of Peripatetic thought in his Kitāb al-Shifā (The Book of Healing),
which dominated many dimensions of Islamic thought for centuries. His ontological distinction
between Wujūb (necessity) and Imkān (contingency) became central to Islamic thought and also
deeply influenced Jewish and Christian philosophy and theology, as did his integration of the
study of the three kingdoms within the scheme of the great chain of being, that is, the scheme
that places all creatures in a chain or levels of being stretching from the dust to the highest angel.
Ibn Sīnā’s major works, which also included Kitāb al-Najah (The Book of Salvation) and his last
philosophical masterpiece, Kitāb al-Isharatwa al-Tanbīhāt (The Book of Directives and
Remarks), were widely read by defenders and opponents of Islamic philosophy alike. Moreover,
Ibn Sīnā also wrote certain “visionary recitals” and philosophico-mystical treatises that contain
what he called “al-Ḥikmah al-Mashriqiyyah” (Oriental philosophy), which is of great importance
if one looks upon the later tradition of Islamic philosophy. In writing of this period of Peripatetic
philosophy, it is not, however, sufficient to go from al-Farabī to Ibn Sīnā and even include a few
words on al al-‘Āmirī and al-Sijistānī. A great deal needs to be said of the philosophical
dimension of the circle of al-Sijistānī and figures such as al-Tawhīdī, as well as of other
Peripatetic figures. This period is in fact witness ton many philosophical figures who are rarely
mentioned in general histories of Islamic philosophy, even those who emphasize the Peripatetics.
This is also a period, which although known as far as the most famous figures are concerned,
needs monographic studies for the lesser known figures, including Ibn Sīnā’s important students
such as Bahmanyar.
Although Islamic philosophy is predominantly associated with schools that transcend the
individual, the early centuries did produce a few independent philosophers who wielded some
influence. The first among them is Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī (d. around 320/932),
known in the West as Rhazes, the greatest Muslim physician after Ibn Sīnā, who was also a
philosopher known especially for his denial of the necessity of prophecy. He was strongly
attacked by the Ismā‘īlism for this view, as well as for positing “five eternal principles”
consisting of the Demiurge, the Universal Soul, materia prima, Space, and Time. But Rāzī
remains an important philosopher worthy of further study. Another independent philosopher and
one of Islam’s greatest scientists, Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (d. 421/1030), held a philosophical view
46
different from Rāzī’s but admired al-Rāzī’s scientific works greatly. Al-Bīrūnī’s most important
philosophical contribution was his criticism of Avicenian natural philosophy, as well as his
introduction of Hindu philosophy into the Islamic world. Finally, an important independent
philosopher, Aḥmad ibn Miskawyah (Miskawayh; d. 421/1030), wrote the first major Islamic
work on philosophical ethics, Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (Purification of Morals), as well as a book
entitled Jāwidān-i Khirad (Philosophia Perennis).
Islamic Philosophy in Spain: While philosophy was in eclipse in the eastern lands of Islam, it
flourished in Islamic Spain. Muslim philosophy in the western lands of Islam actually began with
the Sufi philosopher Ibn Masarrah (d. 319/931), who profoundly influenced later thinkers. This
link between Sufism and philosophy continued in Spain to the end except for the major figure of
Ibn Rushd. Another early thinker, Ibn Ḥazm (d. 454/1064), jurist, theologian, philosopher, and
author of one of the first Muslim works on comparative religion, also composed a famous
treatise on Platonic love entitled Ṭawq al-Hamāmah (The Ring of the Dove).The first major
philosopher in the Maghrib to follow the eastern Mashsha‘ī school was Ibn Bājjah (d. 533/1138),
known both for his significant commentaries on Aristotelian physics and his philosophical
masterpiece, Tadbīr al-Mutawahid (Regimen of the Solitary), which maintains that the perfect
state can come about only through the perfection of individuals who can unite their intellects
with the Active Intellect. This work has a definite mystical bent as does the masterpiece of his
successor, Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 580/1185), who like Ibn Bajjah was a political figure and scientist but
is likewise known for his magnum opus, Ḥayy ibn Yaqzqān (Living Son of the Awake), which
has also a mystical meaning and which bears the name of Ibn Sīnā’s visionary recital but with a
different structure. The work deals in a symbolic language with the harmony between the inner
illumination received by the intellect and the knowledge revealed through revelation. Ibn
Ṭufayl’s philosophical novel was translated immediately into Hebrew but not into Medieval
Latin until the seventeenth century, when it became famous in Europe as Philosophos
Autodidactus and exercised wide influence in both philosophical and literary circles. The most
famous Islamic philosopher of the Maghrib, Ibn Rushd (523–95/1126–98) known in Latin as
Averroes, chief religious judge of Cordoba and a physician, wrote the most famous medieval
commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus and was referred to in the West as “The Commentator.”
He set out to revive Peripatetic philosophy by responding to Al-Ghazālī’s Tahafut in his own
Tahafut al-Tahafut (Incoherence of the Incoherence). In contrast to his image in the West as a
47
rationalist “free-thinker” and author of the double-truth theory, however, Ibn Rushd was a pious
Muslim and in fact a religious functionary who set out to harmonize faith and reason, especially
in his Fasl al-Maqāl (The Decisive Treatise). His influence in the West, however, was greater
than in the Islamic world, where the later destiny of philosophy was more closely associated with
the name of Ibn Sīnā, than with his. After Ibn Rushd, Islamic philosophy began to wane in the
Maghrib but did not disappear completely. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq ibn Sab‘īn (d. 669/1270) wrote a
number of important treatises based on the doctrine of Waḥdat al-Wujūd (the transcendent unity
of being), and the Tunisian ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn (d. 780/1379) developed a philosophy
of history in his al-Muqaddimah (Prolegomena). The most important of these later figures from
the Maghrib, however, was Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240), expositor of Sufi
metaphysics. Although not a philosopher in the sense of Faylasūf, he is one of the greatest
expositors of mystical philosophy in any time and clime, and he exercised a profound influence
on Sufism as well as later Islamic philosophy. Although Islamic philosophy in the Maghrib
seems to have come suddenly to an end, philosophical thought did not disappear completely but
took refuge mostly in philosophical Sufism and philosophical theology as we see also in much of
the rest of the Arab world. This later phase has hardly ever been treated in general histories of
philosophy and therefore, needs to be brought under careful study.
1.3.6 Theologian(s) Response to Philosophers
From the fifth/eleventh to the seventh/thirteenth century, the domination of western Asia by
Saljuqs led to the eclipse of philosophy in the eastern lands of Islam. The caliphate, supported by
the Saljuqs, preferred the teaching of Kalām in the Madrasahs (Islamic schools) to philosophy,
although Kalām itself, as discussed earlier, developed overtime in a more philosophical form.
During this period, the only notable philosopher in the eastern lands was the Persian poet and
mathematician Omar Khayyam to whom we shall turn later in this book. The major theologians
of this era, such as Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Abūl Fatḥ al-Shahrastānī
(d. 548/1153), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), wrote treatises against Peripatetic and, in
the case of Ghazzālī and Razī also against Ismā‘ilī philosophy, thereby curtailing philosophical
activity in the eastern lands of Islam. The most famous attack against the Falāsifah came from
the great Sufi theologian al-Ghazzalī, who, however, dealt with philosophical themes himself
and even composed treatises on formal logic. In his autobiography, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl
(The Deliverance from Error), Al-Ghazālī criticized the Peripatetic philosophers severely. Then
48
he summarized their views in his Maqāsid al-Falāsifah (The Purposes of the Philosophers),
which caused the Latin Schoolmen to think of al-Ghazzālī himself as a Peripatetic. Finally, in his
Tahāfut al-Falāsifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers), he sought to demolish the views of the
philosophers, accusing them of deviating from Islam in their denial of the createdness of the
world, God’s knowledge of particulars, and bodily resurrection. Al-Ghazālī’s attack had the
effect of curtailing the power of rationalism in Islamic philosophy, but it did not end rational
philosophy, as some have thought.
The influence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the technical discussions of later Islamic philosophy
was even greater than that of Al-Ghazālī. Al-Rāzī’s most important attack against Peripatetic
philosophy came in the form of his detailed criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s Kitab al-Isharat in a work
entitled Sharh al-Isharat (Commentary upon the Isharat), to which Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d.
672/1274) was to write the celebrated response that resuscitated Avicennian philosophy. In the
fourteenth century, this central debate was carried further by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his al-
Muhakamāt (Trials), in which he sought to judge between the commentaries of Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī. Although going back to Max Horten there has been awareness of the Rāzī-Ṭūsī
debate, most Western histories of Islamic philosophy and their Islamic imitations continue to
emphasize the importance of the Ibn Sīnā, Ghazzālī, and Ibn Rushd debates rather than the those
of Ibn Sīnā, Rāzī, and Ṭūsī, whereas the second is more important for the later history of Islamic
philosophy than the first.
1.3.7 Let Us Sum Up
The lesson discusses the interaction of the Muslim world with Greek philosophy from its early
history up to the early Abbasid period and some after events. Detailed account of how the
Muslims came into interaction with Greek philosophy and Greek ideology has also been given in
addition to discussing that how it affected the Muslim world and what was its outcome.
Translation Movement is most founding step in the history of intellectual discussions and
interaction with Greeks. The city of Baghdad was founded in 762 C.E and in 786, C.E Hārūn al-
Rashīd became its ruler. Baghdad became a centre of such a vibrating movement, which was
started for transferring Greek sciences in Arabic language. From the establishment of Baghdad
city till the reign of Harūn al-Rashīd, the 24 years period provided the atmosphere of such a vital
movement. Within the 75 years after the establishment of Baghdad city, Aristotle’s philosophical
books, commentaries on Neo-Platonism, Medical books of Galen had been transferred into
49
Arabic language, including books in Sanskrit and Persian as well. It was during al-Mamūn’s
reign (198-217/813-833) that Greek philosophy made its main thrust into the cultural centres of
Islam. Muslims in general and the philosophers in particular were greatly influenced by the
Greek Philosophy, which gave rise to diversity of thought or ideologies within the Muslim
community.
1. State the conditions in pre-translational period briefly?
2. Discuss translation movement as a path of interaction with Greek philosophy?
3. Expound the philosophical thought that took birth after interaction with Greek
philosophy?
4. Give the brief account of theologian response to philosophy?
Centre, 2010.
iii. ______________, Muslim philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2001.
iv. Sharif, M. M, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols., Delhi: A Venture of Low Price
Publications, 2004.
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Lesson 04: Institution of Bayt al-Ḥikmah
Lesson Structure
1.4.1 Introduction
1.4.2 Objectives
1.4.3 Establishment of Bayt al-Ḥikmah
1.4.4 Bayt al-Ḥikmah as an Institution
1.4.5 Significance of Bayt al-Ḥikmah
1.4.6 Downfall of Bayt al-Ḥikmah
1.4.7 Let Us Sum Up
1.4.1 Introduction
Allah has invited man in the Qur’ān to explore the universe and understand its diverse
phenomena to ascertain their belief in His Unity/Tawḥīd. Almighty Allah, in many verses of the
Qur’ān invites man to observe and study carefully different objects, like, stars, rivers, plants,
animal, birds etc. and learn or gather knowledge from them: thus, Allah says: “See how Allah did
originate creation” (29:20); “See they not how Allah originates creation?” (29:19). Likewise, the
teachings of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) taught the people how to conceive the
essence of the objects, creatures and the wonders of nature. It invited mankind to speculate and
take the advantage of observation, sense and experience. Even, the Quranic revelation started
with the word Iqra’ [Sūrah Al-‘Alaq, 96:1] meaning, to ‘read or recite’ and the Prophetic
teachings greatly stressed and motivated people to acquire and strive for gaining as much as
knowledge and wisdom they can. Also, even after the battle of Badr, those captives who were
not able to pay ransom, but had the ability to teach were each given the option of teaching at
least ten children of Muslims as ransom. Furthermore, the encounter of Muslims with the Roman
and Persian civilizations and Greek sciences instigated them to achieve excellence in scientific
learning and knowledge. Abbasid caliphs especially Harūn al-Rashīd and Māmūn greatly
facilitated this process of learning and wisdom. Thus, Bayt al-Ḥikmah/House of wisdom was
established by Hārūn al-Rashīd and culminated under his son al-Māmūn, who reigned from 813-
833 CE and it is he (al-Māmūn), who is credited with the supervision and sustenance of this
institution.
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1.4.2 Objectives
1. To know about the emergence and development of Bayt al-Ḥikmah.
2. To learn about the contribution of different Muslim intellectuals in different fields of
knowledge through this institution (Bayt al-Ḥikmah).
3. To determine the significance of Bayt al-Ḥikmah.
1.4.3 Establishment of Bayt al-Ḥikmah
The necessity of reading and reciting the Qur’ān and tradition/Ḥadīth, interpreting religious texts
and deducing religious codes led to the appearance of some sciences which had no prior
background. Writing and compiling books received an elevated position in the Muslim world and
the number of literate people increased day by day. Muslims paid attention to the intellectual
sciences, which were highly emphasized in the Qur’ān, only after the establishment and
consolidation of Islamic state and the termination of civil and foreign wars. After the Prophet
migration (Hijrah) from Makkah to Madinah, he established a Masjid during his first days in
Madinah. This Masjid/mosque that was the first one in the Islamic epoch turned to the centre for
education, advocacy, judiciary, political and military affairs as well as cultural practices. The
mosques were the first centres for religious gatherings in the Islamic world. If one were to
discuss the ancient school of thought and scientific centres within the Islamic states, attention
must be paid to the mosques. Under the Abbasids the educational and scientific pursuits were
greatly patronized. The educational institutions were graded and comprised elementary schools,
schools for senior students, and institutions for advanced students. The formal education of
children usually began at the age of six when they were admitted to the elementary schools. The
elementary schools were generally attached to Masājid. After completing education in Masjid
School (elementary) a student could seek admission in institution meant for senior students. The
curriculum at such institutions included theology, jurisprudence, rhetoric, and literature. In the
institutions for advanced studies, the curricula included astronomy, geometry, philosophy,
medicine and other studies. Over the two centuries, most of the ancient sciences were transferred
to Islamic world and implemented. At the end of the first century (A.H.), Muslim translators
initiated the translation activities; however, the true Translation Movement started from the
middle of the second century A.H/eighth century C.E. This movement reached its heyday in the
second and third centuries, referred to as the Golden Age of Islam and continued until the end of
the fifth century A.H. Muslims were engaged in translating scientific, philosophical, literary and
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religious works of the previous civilizations for more than three centuries. They took the
advantage of the great human legacy which had its sources in the six known languages of that
time, namely Hebrew, Syriac, Persian, Indian, Latin and the most important of all, Greek. To
facilitate and accelerate this process, a scientific centre called the House of Wisdom (Bayt al-
Ḥikmah) was established for sheltering the translators and preserving their works. Some people
sent on mission to travel to Iran, India and Constantinople to find precious and invaluable books.
This translation process was the initiating point for scientific activities and research. The very
first translations dealt with sciences related to people’s daily life. Khālid ibn Yazīd, the ruler of
Egypt at the time of the Umayyad dynasty, was very interested in alchemy and natural sciences;
may be this was because of his residence in Egypt. He wrote some books in alchemy as well.
This alchemy-loving ruler asked Alexandrian scholars to translate the books related to alchemy
and medicine from Greek or Coptic into Arabic. According to Ibn al-Nadīm, these books were
the first works of translation in the Muslim world. By the command of ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz,
the Umayyad caliph who was more interested in science in comparison with the other caliphs, a
dissertation in medicine was translated into Arabic. However, all these translations were
incomplete and the Abbasid dynasty continued Islamic translations seriously. The second
Abbasid caliph, al-Manṣūr, who was greatly interested in science, initiated a great change in the
scientific history of Arabs. He established Baghdad in145 (A.H.) and turned it to be an heir of
Athena and Alexandria. While establishing this Abbasid institution, he sought for physicians and
translators who were efficient in elevating and promoting the position of Islamic culture.
Following his path al-Māmūn encouraged and patronized the translation and study of the classic
works. After a short while, Arab Muslims became familiar with the sciences of the various
nations such as Greeks, Syriacs and Iranians. They learned different sciences from various
nations and made their original contributions to them. They adjusted the sciences as per their
own belief system and turned them into tools for developing Islamic thoughts. Those sciences
which were heading decline regained their position in an Islamic framework and became the
centre of attention for European researchers in the sixteenth and seventh centuries (C.E). Most of
the texts written by Muslim scientists such as Avicenna, al-Farabī, al-Bīrūnī, Ibn Rushd and
many other scholars were taught at the scientific and educational centres of Europe after- the
Middle-Ages.
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The initiating point for the scientific development of Islamic civilization was the translation of
scientific texts by Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Sabean, Arab and non-Arab translators and
interpreters under the patronage of Muslim Caliphate especially the Abbasids. The scientific
centres had a special position in the Islamic civilization. The great cultural heritage over the
centuries disclosed that these scientific centres achieved much superiority at the heyday of the
Islamic civilization and were considered as pivotal pillars to the Islamic society. In fact, libraries
and the other educational institutions namely, schools, universities, learning circles (Ḥalaqāt)
houses of Wisdom (Buyūt al-Ḥikmah) and others were founded and flourished at times of peace
during Muslim rule. Such places assisted the growth and the flourishing of great schools and
libraries in the Islamic civilization and became well-known centres of culture during their era.
To advance/improve Bayt al-Ḥikmah, al-Māmūn brought the well-known scholars to share their
thoughts, ideas, information and culture in the house of wisdom. Many of the most learned
Muslim scholars were part of this excellent research and educational institute in Baghdad from
9th and 13th centuries. In fact, it appears that Bayt al-Ḥikmah so represented and frequently
called Khīzanat al-Ḥikmah, had already existed in the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd and the
Barmakids who had begun to have Greek work translated. Al-Mamūn may only have given a
new encouragement to this movement. Bayt al-Ḥikmah was the very first institution of higher
scientific studies in the Muslim world where books were translated and copied by graceful
famous scholars, while another part of this institution served as a library for these books. Al-
Māmūn commissioned some persons to Byzantine to search for books on Greek philosophy and
sciences and purchase them for him. Scholars of this academy translated these works. This
centre, House of Wisdom (Treasure of Wisdom) is famous for learning and translation in Muslim
history. Ibn Nadīm and Qiftī calls it Bayt al-Ḥikmah, but Ya‘qūt Hamawī called it Khazīnat al-
Ḥikmah (Treasury of Wisdom).
1.4.4 Bayt al-Ḥikmah as an Institution
The Abbasids played a very strong significant role in the development of scientific learning
among Muslims especially after they established Baghdad as a new capital instead of Damascus.
The Abbasids, especially al-Māmūn, were rationalistic and many of the scholars/intellectuals of
that time were Mu‘tazilah scientists. Through the adoption of rationalism, Science was
flourishing in Bayt al-Ḥikmah. It was during of the reign of al-Māmūn (813-833 CE), the Greek
Philosophy made its main thrust into the cultural centre of Islam. He himself was a scholar and
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an author too and well-versed in all branches of learning. Al-Mamūn agreed with the Mu‘tazilah
view that ‘Aql (intelligence, creative reason) should be applied to reading the Qur’ān, against the
literal interpretation or Naqal (copying/mimesis) advocated by the traditionalists. Al-Mamūn was
very affectionate of listening to the people belonging to different religious factions/sects, and he
used to provide them complete liberty of thought and speech. It is generally said that Al-Mamūn
founded it on the advice of Mu‘tazilites. Bayt al-Ḥikmah worked as an academic library and
translation bureau in Baghdad. It had strength of 65 translators, working from Greek, Syriac,
Persian, Sanskrit and Aramaic. Ibn al-Nadīm in his book Kitāb al-Fihrist says that in Bayt al-
Ḥikmah alone 47 translators worked from Greek and Syriac, 17 from Persian, two from Sanskrit
and one from Aramaic. In the ninth century, most of the translations were produced in Baghdad.
During the reign of Abbasid caliph Al-Mamūn (813-33), the translation activities were greatly
accelerated and it was continued under several of his successors. Translations were frequently
produced at the request of patrons who commissioned and financed them. In addition to such
rulers as Al-Mamūn, their patrons included government official and civil servants as well as
scientist and physicians often employed by members of the political elite. Some of the officials
who commissioned translator were involved in court politics as well as large scale development
projects undertaken in the rapidly growing urban centres, the most famous example of this group
were Banū Mūsa brothers, who in addition to their political involvement were among the leading
practicing scientists of that time. Some translations were also prepared for various practicing
scientists of this time and some translations were also prepared for various members of the social
elite. Banū Mūsa ibn Shākir like Al-Mamūn made efforts in the pursuance for manuscripts,
sending their own agents to Byzantine. They are said to have spent some 500 gold dinar a month
on translations and used the works to write pioneering Arabic treatises on medicine,
mathematics, astronomy and the topics like the atom and the eternity of the world. Among the
translators they patronized were the Sabean mathematician Thābit ibn Qurrah (836-901) and the
great translator physician Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq was the most distinguished
scholar, who was paid by Al-Mamūn in gold against the weight of books he translated. He is
credited with translating around 100 manuscript into Syriac and 39 into Arabic, including the
works of Aristotle, Plato and Ptolemy. Ḥunayn also wrote at least twenty nine original treatises
of his own on medical topics and a collection of ten essays on ophthalmology, which concerned
in systematic fashion the anatomy and physiology of the eyes and the treatment of various
55
diseases that affect the vision. The first known medical work to include anatomical drawing, this
book was translated into Latin and for centuries was the authoritative treatment of the subject in
both western and eastern universities. After his death, most of his work was continued by his
students and by his nephew Hubasih. This man Hubasih also wrote book on medicine among
which was a treatise on nutrition. Ḥunayn studied medicine under Yuhanna ibn Masawayh of the
Bayt al-Ḥikmah at Baghdad. A great number of the translators active during this period were also
Christian. Yuhanna ibn Masawayah was the most notable who headed Bayt al-Ḥikmah and wrote
Daghal al-‘Ayn (Disorder of the eye). Yuhanna bin Musawayh was an early director of the
House of Wisdom. He served almost four caliphs: Al-Māmūn, Al-Mu‘tasim, Al-Wāthiq and Al-
Mutawakkil. He wrote about medicine especially gynaecology. Most notable translation on
Aristotle’s Ethics, were the first to be translation of Greek work on moral philosophy by
Thābitibn Qurrah that laid the foundation for the native version of philosophy known as Tahzīb
al Akhlāq. Thābit ibn Qurrah not only translated the work but also contributed to the
development of various fields of science, mathematics, astronomy, geometry etc. During this
period the translators like Yuhanna ibn Batrīq, Hajjāj ibn Mater (d. 833) Qustā ibn Luqa al-
Bulābakki (922), ‘Abdul Maṣīh ibn ‘Abdullah Naima al-Himsi (220) Hūnayn ibn Isḥāq (809-73),
Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn (290), Thābit ibn Qurrah (d. 901), Hubaish ibn al-Ḥassan (800), flourished.
These people translated mostly books of the Hippocrates, Galen, and Aristotle and to some
extent Plato, (Plato’s book the Timaus, Siyasatul al Madinah, Kitab al-Nawamis). In the 10th
Century the work of the translations was still proceeding. Among those who especially
distinguished themselves, were, Abū Bishr Matta ibn Yūnus al-Qannā’ī (940), Abū Zakariyyā
Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī al Mantigi (974), Abū ‘Alī Āsī ibn Isḥāq, ibn Zura (1008) and finally Abū al-
Khayr al-Ḥassan ibn al-‘Ammār (b. 942).
In Bayt al-Ḥikmah not only translation work was done but it also helped in the development of
various fields of science. Bayt al-Ḥikmah had an astronomical observatory as well. Here many
works related to astronomy, medicine, mathematics, geography, physics, philosophy etc were
generated. Here are mentioned some Muslim scholars who contributed original works on various
fields and their works were later translated into many other languages. They were famous in the
West and played great role in European renaissance. Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwarizmi (780-
850) the greatest mathematical genius among Muslims, flourished in the time of Caliph Al-
Mamūn. He was the first and most eminent author on arithmetic and algebra. Unfortunately, the
56
original Arabic versions of both fields are lost. We rely today only on in his Latin translation.
His Ḥisāb al-Jabr wa al-Muqābalah (The Calculation of Integration and Equation) was
translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in the twelfth Century, while the Latin version of his
book on arithmetic was edited and published by prince Bonocompaqni at Rome in 1857 under
the title De Numero Indico. Jābir al-Battānī (850-925) was one of the greatest Muslim
mathematician and astronomers of all times. Several books on mathematics and astronomy are
credited to him. But his claim to fame rests on his hand book of astronomical tables which
remained influential in the West until the Renaissance. Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, the alchemist ‘Geber’
of the Middle Ages is generally known as the father of chemistry (alchemy). His major
contribution was in the field of chemistry. He introduced experimental investigation into
alchemy, which rapidly changed its character into modern chemistry. Isḥāq Al-Kindī was a
contemporary of Al-Māmūn, Mu‘tasim and Mutawwakkil and flourished largely at Baghdad. Al-
Kindī was a philosopher, mathematician, physicist, astronomer, physician, geographer and even
an expert in Music. It is surprising that he made original contribution to all of these fields. On
account of his work he became known as the philosopher of the Arabs. Al-Rāzī, (863-930 C.E)
was a Ḥakīm/philosopher, an alchemist and a philosopher. In medicine, his contribution was so
significant that it can only be compared to that of Ibn Sīnā. Some of his works in medicine Kitāb
al-Manṣūrī, Al-Hawi, Kitāb al-Mulūkī and Kitāb al-Judari wa al-Hiṣābah achieved everlasting
frame. Kitāb al-Manṣūrī was translated into Latin in the 15th century C.E, comprised in volumes
and dealt thoroughly with Greco-Arab medicine. Some of its volumes were published separately
in Europe. His Al-Judarī wa al-Ḥisābah was the first practice on smallpox and chickenpox.
Rāzī’s, outstanding scientific contribution has more than 200 works, out of which about half deal
with medicine and 21 are concerned with alchemy. The Banū Mūsā were the three sons of Mūsā
ibn Shākir and were named as Muḥammad, Aḥmad and Ḥasan. They lived in the reign of Al-
Mamūn and were mathematicians, astronomers and great patrons of the sciences. They served in
the House of Wisdom. They visited this houses to consult books or for the sake of copying or
translation or compilation. Naubakht was a Persian astronomer and engineer and helped in the
construction of Baghdad but his son Faḍl was the chief librarian to Hārūn al-Rashīd. He
translated from Persian into Arabic and also wrote various astrological treatises. Several
descriptions of roads and countries come into existence in the ninth century C.E. Ibn
Khurdādhbīh a geographer of Persian origin composed such description entitled the Kitāb al-
57
Masālik wa Mamālik. ‘Abdul Ḥusayn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ṣafī was a permanent astronomer of
the medieval times. His knowledge of both the Islamic and great astronomy particularly
uninometry was comprehensive. He was the first to observe the change of the colour of stars.
Baghdad was known as the world’s richest center for intellectual development of this time, and
had a population of over a million, one of the largest in its time. Many foreign works were
translated into Arabic from Greek, Chinese and many other languages like Sanskrit in the
Abbasid Empire. Large libraries were constructed and scholars persecuted by the Byzantine
Empire were welcomed. The House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Ḥikmah) introduced the concept of the
library catalogue and other medieval Islamic libraries, where books were organized into limited
genres and categories. This academy introduced different types of categories like translators,
scientists, scribers, authors, and dialoguers. Many manuscripts and books in various scientific
subjects and in different languages were translated in the Bayt al-Ḥikmah/House of Wisdom.
1.4.5 Significance of Bayt al-Ḥikmah
Writing (books and other treatises) and the transfer of large number of works from those places
which had been annexed by the Muslim Caliphate led to the increase in the number of books in
different Muslim cities and gave rise to libraries, both large and small, in the Islamic world.
According to Sayyid Ḥusayn Naṣr, following the establishment of a new Islamic system of
government and the maturity of identity with Islamic society, educational institutions emerged
which played a pivotal role in the promotion of the arts and sciences. The first important centre
especially concerned with philosophy and the natural and mathematical sciences was the House
of Wisdom (Bayt al-Ḥikmah). Bayt al-Ḥikmah became a versatile scientific centre in the
medieval world. In Qur’ān Allah calls human “Ashraf al-Makhlūqāt” because He gave them
mind (intellect). In Qur’ān, many verses emphasized on investigation, observation, use of
intellect and encouraged them to study the sky and the earth to find proofs to their faith. Also,
Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) himself had besought his Companions to seek
knowledge and highlighted its importance. During the Abbasid period scientific learning
flourished greatly. The works produced at Bayt al-Ḥikmah were translated into Latin and various
other European languages. No doubt, one can say that these books played an important role in
European renaissance. After the fall of Baghdad at the hands of Mongols, most of the scientific
works were transferred to Europe and Europeans took help from these sources and developed
science and technology. These works had a great impact on the scientists and scholars of the
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West. Bayt al-Ḥikmah contributed to the scientific advancement and growth of Muslim world. It
was a very important institution of translation works and was considered a major intellectual
centre. Its precious effects influenced Eastern and Western world for many years and the most
eminent universities throughout the world took the advantages of its blessings. In Bayt al-
Ḥikmah works were not only translated but also many scholars contributed original works which
proved the basis for modern scientific, logical, astronomical, medicinal, surgical and
philosophical studies and inventions. World owes much to the contribution and contributors of
Bayt al-Ḥikmah. It introduced the systematic and classical methods that should be followed in
any institution, university or scientific laboratory. It introduced the need of developing a
particular environment, well maintained place and accessories for carrying on the knowledge
from one place to another.
1.4.6 Downfall of Bayt al-Ḥikmah
Early Abbasids caliphs had a strong rationalistic outlook in which Al-Māmūn and his successor
tried hard to promote the rationalist views. Because of this reason the house of wisdom
flourished under Al-Mamūn’s successor al-Mu‘tasim and Wāthiq (842) but decline under Al-
Mutawakkil (847-861). He wanted to stop the spread of Greek philosophy which was among the
main tools in Mu‘tazila thought. This became the start of actual downfall of scientific learning.
In the start, the determination of spreading Islamic teachings and idealism was the guiding force
to the progress of science and achievement and this was at its peak when the Muslim states were
stable and, their economic conditions were sound. Muslims gradually deviated from the
teachings of the Qur’ān and their political power was declining one after another. The Christians
at this time started to realize their religious superstition and waves of renaissance stirred up in
Europe. Meanwhile the Muslim world began to face severe challenges and their scientific
advancement declined because no encouragement or incentives were there for new scientific
ideas or discoveries, instructions in the Quran on science education were wrongly interpreted by
some ignorant or vested interests to keep people away from scientific studies, and interference of
international delegations in political affairs of Muslims lead to the weakness in Muslim political
control. Muslims became politically week and Halaqū Khan, grandson of Mongol, Chengis
Khan, in the middle of the 13th century along with Mongol army destroyed many cities such as
Samarqand and Bukhara, killing all their inhabitants, particularly the intellectuals, and burning
libraries in 1258 C.E., he burned and destroyed Baghdad, killed Khilāfah Al-Mu‘tasim (by
59
tearing him alive, tied to two horses), massacred most of the in habitants and destroyed books
and libraries. This stage was very destructive and an era of decline of Muslim power and proved
fatal for the Muslim intellectual development, although it was a partial decline as the Muslim
educational set up and their rule lasted till 18th century C.E and institutions, universities and
libraries continued to be established after this drastic event.
1.4.7 Let Us Sum Up
Translation Movement once initiated in the second century A.H. is one of the most important
turning points in Islamic history. This Movement was greatly sustained and advanced through
the establishment of Bayt al-Ḥikmah/the House of Wisdom. The study elaborated the importance
of this scientific institute that contributed to the scientific advancement and growth of Muslim
world. Its precious effects influenced Eastern and Western world for many years. Through this
institute, the findings of sciences were circulated throughout the world. Based on translation
movement, the preliminary steps were taken for the establishment of this scientific institute.
Those who were professional and competent in translation initiated translating the works. The
existence of numerous books which were transferred to the Caliphate centre, Baghdad and the
proliferation of paper, as well as the translation of the transferred works and producing them in
great numbers necessitated the establishment of such a place for keeping and maintaining them.
Therefore, this public library was established in a large area with the open doors and rooms, full
of books and was named the House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Ḥikmah). This study implied that the
House of Wisdom was the Islamic scientific base and referral point to flourish sciences in
Islamic history and civilization. Bayt al-Ḥikmah was the center of research activities in different
fields of sciences namely medicine as well as in astronomy and physical sciences. Bayt al-
Ḥikmah was more than a translation office. It had an astronomical observatory, a translation
office and a great library, serving research scholars and their pupils. Bayt al-Ḥikmah was a large
building with many halls and rooms which included a collection of scientific collection of al-
Rashid and the collection of Al-Mamūn. Bayt al-Ḥikmah staff was scientists, librarians and other
employees. The work was carried out by competent translators who were assisted by excellent
scribes, copyists and bookbinders. The staff came from different religious and cultural
backgrounds. In this lesson are mentioned number of personalities who contributed to the
intellectual golden age of Muslims and this thing helped the other nations to develop and groom
their culture with scientific and educational treasure.
60
1. Discuss the establishment of Bayt al-Ḥikmah as an institution?
2. Write account of different works and observations done in this institution?
3. Evaluate the significance of Bayt al-Ḥikmah?
4. Discuss in brief the downfall of Bayt al-Ḥikmah?
i. Arnold, Thomas Walker and Alfred Guillaume, (Eds), Legacy of Islam, Delhi: Adam
Publishers and Distributors, 1995.
ii. Hasan, Masudul, History of Islam, 2 vols., Delhi: Adam Publishers and Distributors,
1998.
iii. Hitti, Phillip K., History of the Arabs, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
iv. Nasr, Syed Hossein, Science and civilization in Islam, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society,
1987.
v. Rafiabadi, Hamid Naseem, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, Srinagar: City Book
Centre, 2010.
vi. ____________, Muslim philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2001.
vii. Sharif, M. M, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols., Delhi: A Venture of Low Price
Publications, 2004.
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62
Unit II
'Ilm al-Kalam
i) Meaning and Origin
ii) Development and Significance
iii) Main Doctrines of Jabariyah and Qadariyah
iv) Main Doctrines of Mu'tazilah and Ashariah
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UNIT II: ‘Ilm al-Kalām
Lesson 2.1: Meaning and Origin
Lesson Structure
2.1.1 Introduction
2.1.2 Objectives
2.1.3 Etymology
2.1.4 Meaning of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
2.1.5 Origin of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
2.1.6 Let Us Sum Up
2.1.1 Introduction
Islamic intellectualism and spiritualism have been mainly expressed through few
sciences/streams of knowledge including primarily, Falsafah or (old form of) philosophy, ‘Ilm
al-Kalām and ‘Ilm al-‘Irfān or Ma‘rifah. ‘Ilm al-Kalām is usually translated as theology, whose
propagators, the Mutakallimūn, were referred to by Thomas Aquinas, as the “loquentes.” The
significance of these intellectual dimensions is not the same in Islam as corresponding
perspectives in the West. This is especially true of Kalām, which does not at all occupy the same
central role in Islamic thought as theology does in Christianity. Furthermore, the Islamic schools
have interacted with each other in a totally different manner from what one observes in the
Christian West. Gnosis has played a more central role in the Islamic tradition than it has in the
West, and the destiny of philosophy has been very different in the two worlds despite their close
affinity in the European Middle Ages. As for theology, it has continued to harbour over the
centuries the profoundest religious and spiritual impulses of Christianity, whereas in Islam it has
always been less central than in Christianity. As was mentioned earlier, much that is considered
to be theology in the West is to be found in Islamic philosophy, especially during later centuries.
In Christianity, not only has theology attempted to provide a rational defence for the faith, but it
has also sought to provide access to the highest realms of the life of the spirit, as one finds in the
mystical theology of Dionysius the Areopagite or, in the Protestant context, in the Theologica
Germanica of Martin Luther. Such has never been the case in Islam, where Kalām, literally
“word,” continued to be “the science that bears responsibility of solidly establishing religious
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beliefs by giving proofs and dispelling doubts.” The deepest spiritual and intellectual expressions
of Islam are not to be found in works of Kalām. Yet, this science is important for the
understanding of certain aspects of Islamic thought and must be dealt with in this overall
treatment of the Islamic intellectual tradition, especially since Kalām has interacted in so many
ways with philosophy.
2.1.2 Objectives
1. To learn the facts about the term ‘Ilm al- Kalām.
2. To know the meaning of the term ‘Ilm al-Kalām in technical sense.
3. To expound the events involved in origin of the science of ‘Ilm al-Kalām.
2.1.3 Etymology
The word Kalām means ‘speech’ and therefore the Qur’ān is called Kalām Allah denoting the
fact that the Qur’ān is the speech of Allah. But, as a term, Kalām has several implications. As
Wolfson (1976) indicates, ‘‘Al-Kalām is a Maṣdar or verbal noun of Takallam, Yatakallamu.
Though basically meaning, “to speak intelligibly” (Nutqun Mufhim). And the term Kalām, which
literally means ‘speech’ or ‘word’ is used in Arabic translations of the works of Greek
philosophers as rendering the term logos in its various senses of ‘word’, ‘reason’, and
‘argument’”. The term Kalām is also used in those Arabic translations from the Greek in the
sense of any special branch of learning, thus the Greek expression ‘‘discussions’’ about nature is
translated by ‘the physical Kalām’. Greek term for ‘theologians’ is translated as ‘masters of the
divine Kalām’. Explaining the Kalām, T. J. De Boer says, ‘‘An assertion, expressed in logical or
dialectical fashion, whether verbal or written, was called by the Arabs generally, but more
particularly in religious teaching, a Kalām and those who advanced such assertions were called
Mutakallimūn [Mutakallimīn]. The name was transferred from the individual assertion to the
entire system and it covered also the introductory, elementary observations on method, and so
on.” Though, Kalām literally means ‘speech’ or ‘word’ but it has several, and special by nature,
implications which render Kalām as a tool of theological polemics. This is why some persons
have translated it as simply ‘theology’ or ‘speculative theology’. In the Encyclopaedia of Islam
mentions that Kalām is ‘‘one of the religious sciences of Islam”. The term is usually translated as
an approximate rendering of ‘theology’. Mohsin Mehdi, on the other hand, translates ‘Ilm al-
Kalām as ‘‘the science of speculative theology’’. Since Kalām is dialectical in its nature,
therefore, it was also translated as ‘‘dialectics’’ and the Mutakallimūn (practitioners of the
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Kalām) as ‘‘dialecticians’’. De Boer says, ‘‘Our best designation for the science of the Kalām is
"theological dialectics" or simply 'Dialectics', and in what follows we may translate
'Mulakallimūn/Mutakallimīn' by "Dialecticians’’. If the Kalām is dialectical in its nature, it is
polemic in its method. A Mutakallim always presupposes an opponent and tries his best to defeat
him by his argumentation. In other words, the methodology adopted by the Mutakallimīn to
establish their viewpoint was polemical, therefore, some persons had translated it as ‘polemic
theology’. McCarthy, for example, says, ‘‘In the present work, it might well be translated by
‘polemic theology’. Most Muslim theology is polemic, and Kalām seems to mean the kind of
polemic which makes considerable use of rational argument’’. In Ihsa al-‘Ulūm, Al-Farabī
regards ‘Ilm al-Kalām as a science which enables a man to procure the victory of the dogmas and
actions laid down by the legislator of the religion, and to refute opinions contradicting them. The
doctors of Kalām [Mutakallimūn] themselves were to take a very similar view. This is one of
many well-known definitions. Kalām is the science which is concerned with firmly establishing
religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with banishing doubts. Ibn Khaldūn and Muḥammad
‘Abduh are also of the same opinion. ‘‘‘Ilm al-Kalām is the discipline which brings to the service
of religious beliefs (‘Aqā’id) discursive arguments, which thus provides a place for reflection and
meditation and hence for reason, in the elucidation and defence of the content of the faith. It
takes its stand firstly against “doubters and deniers” and its function as defensive ''apologia"
cannot be over-stressed.’’ Another interpretation sometimes suggested explains ‘Ilm al-Kalām as
"science of the Word of God." The attribute of the Word of God and the nature of the Quran
were indeed among the first themes treated, the discussions on this subject continued throughout
the centuries. But this was by no means the first question undertaken, nor that later treated at
most length. It seems much more likely that Kalām referred at first to discursive arguments, and
the mutakallimīn were “reasoners’’. This was the case as early as the time of Ma‘bad al-Juhanī
(d. 80 AH/699-700 CE).
2.1.4 Meaning of ‘Ilm al- Kalām
It is difficult to establish precisely when ‘Ilm al-Kalām came to mean an autonomous religious
science or branch of knowledge. In any case, whereas the term ‘Ilm meant ‘the traditional
knowledge’, the term Kalām acquired the senses of “conversation, discussion, controversy”. As
discussed above In Ihsa’ al-‘Ulum, Al-Farabī regards “‘Ilm al-Kalām as a science which enables
a man to procure the victory of the dogmas and actions laid down by the Legislator of the
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religion, and to refute all opinions contradicting them”. The doctors of Kalām (Mutakallimūn)
themselves were to take a very similar view: this is one of many well-known definitions: “Kalām
is the science which is concerned with firmly establishing religious beliefs by adducing proofs
and with banishing doubts”. Similar definitions are to be found in Ibn Khaldun, and again in
Muḥammad ‘Abduh: they summarize a long elaboration, but add nothing new. As for the term
Kalām, the Kalām is an art which enables man to defend the statutes of the Sharī‘ah through
demonstration composed of well-known premises that are established with certainty among the
followers of religion whether they lead to self-evident premises or not. A common synonymous
term is ‘Ilm al-Tawḥīd (science of the Unity of God) understood as concerned not merely with
the divine unity but with all the bases of the Muslim faith.
Kalām became a regular discipline when these arguments and discussions dealt with the content
of the faith. It is this character of discursive and reasoned apologia which was to attract the
attacks both of the traditionists/Muḥaddithīn and of the Falāsifa/philosophers.
Kalām/‘Ilm al-Kalām, can be explained as a science in which religious beliefs, practices and
moral values are discussed and established on the basis of arguments and demonstration.
Moreover, the allegations levelled against religion and suspicions raised are dispelled on sound
rational and authoritative (‘Aqlī wa Naqlī) grounds. In this way, ‘Ilm al-Kalām becomes a branch
of the theology (Dīniyāt). The word ‘‘theology’’ however, does not exist in Islam as an
idiomatic or natural term. It can be expressed in Arabic, of course, in which it is known as, ‘Ilm
al-Lahūt, ‘‘the science of divinity’’ or al-Lahūtiya, which is close in meaning to ‘‘divinity’’ in
the sense of a field of study. In the past, ‘Ilm al-Kalām was also called Uṣūl al-Dīn, or ‘Ilm al-
Tawḥīd wa al-Ṣifāt. The technical term is closest parallel to theology is Kalām meaning ‘‘words,
discussion, discourse.’’ ‘Ilm al-Kalām is, thus, ‘‘the science of discourse’’ on divine themes. Its
usefulness is in the acquiring of knowledge and the perfection of the theoretical faculty of the
mind and not in the preservation of statutes. Thus it is clear that this art [Kalām] cannot be one of
the means of acquiring knowledge (Ma‘rifat).
‘Ilm al-Kalām discusses the fundamental Islamic beliefs and doctrines which are necessary for a
Muslim to believe in. It explains them, argues about them, and defends them. It deals with
doctrines or ‘Aqā’id of Islam, which constitute the issues which must be understood and believed
in such, as the unity of God (Tawḥīd), the divine attributes, universal and restricted Prophethood,
Beatific vision, Reward, and punishment, sources of knowledge; places of revelation in Islam;
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Freedom of will and Determination etc. The question is why this science is called ‘Ilm al-
Kalām? And why this name has been given to it? Some scholars have proposed that it was called
Kalām because it gives an added power of speech and argument to one who is well versed in it.
Some say that the reason lies in the habit of the experts of the science who have begun the
discussion by uttering Al-Kalām Fa hākazā wa hak̄azā. Others explain it was called Kalām
because it discusses the issues regarding which the Ahl al-Ḥadīth preferred to maintain complete
silence. Yet according to others this name came to be in vogue when controversy regarding the
issue whether the Holy Qur’ān, called Kalām Allah, the divine utterance is created (Makhlūq) or
not, became a matter for hot debate amongst the Muslims, a controversy which even led to
bloodshed. This is, since most of the debates about the doctrines of the faith revolved around the
Ḥudūth (createdness), temporarily, or the Qidm (pre-eternity) of the utterance or Kalām of God,
this discipline which discussed the principal doctrines of the faith came to be called as ‘Ilm al-
Kalām (lit. the science of the utterance).
Here, is one question, why Kalām was called Islamic scholasticism? For this purpose, one should
refer to its origin. Scholasticism was derived from Latin word Scholasticus meaning the master
of a school. St. Augustine (354-430 CE) was the first Christian philosopher who, on individual
level, tried his best to defend Christianity and the dogmas of its faith with the help of logical
proofs and rational arguments and in the medieval period in Europe, this footstep of ‘Ilm al-
Kalām was followed by some other philosophers like Abelard and Thomas Aquinas. They
attempted to harmonize between reason and revelation and defended the dogmas of Christianity
on the basis of reason. Thus, scholasticism was introduced in philosophy and theology as a
defence method. C.G. Nonn defines Scholasticism as, "A set of scholarly and structural
techniques developed in western European schools of the late medieval period, including the use
of commentary and disputed questions. The scholastic method is usually presented as beginning
in the law school and as being then transported into theology and philosophy by a series of
masters including Abelard and Peter Lombard.
2.1.5 Origins of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
The demise of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) was a critical event in Islamic history. It
is considered to be the spark that lit up the path of ‘Ilm al-Kalām. Prior to the Prophet’s (peace
be upon him) demise, Muslims learned from one another, references were not prevalent. De Boer
writes, “Not much was learned in the east at that timeout of books, any more than it is to-day:
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more was learned from the lips of the teacher.” The message of Islam spread by words spoken,
which meant the Muslims engaged their minds and used their knowledge to convey the belief
and understanding they had of Islam. Their main reference was, and still, is to this day, the
Qur’ān and the Sunnah of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him).De Boer (1970) says that,
referring to the Qur’ān and Sunnah was crucial but was not sufficient enough to answer certain
questions. After the Prophet’s demise (peace be upon him), the Muslims split into two clear
groups. The first group followed an integrated system of belief based on the teachings in the
Qur’ān and consisted of early Muslims, who are also referred to as traditional. The second group
consisted of the heresies, those who started questioning and inquiring about the details in the
Qur’ān. Wolfson (1976) says, “The early Muslims, in trying to explain the articles of faith, at
first quoted verses from the Koran and reports from the Sunnah. Later, when differences of
opinion occurred concerning details (Tafāsīl) of these articles of faith, “argumentation framed by
the intellect (Al-‘Aql) began to be used in the addition to the evidence derived from tradition and
in this way the science of Kalām originated.” Wolfson (1976) maintains that, referring to the
Qur’ān was significant, but when they referred to it, they started questioning and thinking about
Allah, the world around them and their creation. They started demanding logical reasons for their
beliefs and practices. The first believers of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him)
accepted the message of Islam and believed in it easily because everything was direct and clear,
they lived and witnessed the unfolding and development of Islam and it was so clear to them that
they accepted it and grew with it. The spread of the Islamic empire in various landscapes and
areas caused Muslims to question their lifestyles and whether or not Islam had an answer for
them. Muslims were living a completely different way of life in the areas surrounding Arabia.
Their surroundings, irrigation, business dealings and general way of life were simply different.
They felt that their way of life required specific answers since, it was much different than the life
of those Muslims living in Medina and Mecca.
New issues started arising, issues that were not present during the time of Prophet Muḥammad
(peace be upon him) and during the rule of the caliphates. “Land tenure, irrigation and intensive
agriculture, continuous trade between large urban centres which had hitherto dominated world
empires and the physical and social mobility which Islam and the Islamic state brought-all these
created problems for which no ready-made answers were available precisely because life in the
Peninsula presented no parallel. The new situations called for an intellectual effort to discover
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the relevance of Islam to them. Al-Faruqi (1986) says, “What is contrary to logic there in was
simply accepted by the first believers, without asking questions about the “how and why.” De
Boer, (1970) writes, ‘‘They did not need to question why a certain verse was recited and why the
Prophet (peace be upon him) reacted to situations in a certain way. They simply listened,
observed, learned and obeyed.
Traditionally, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (R.A), the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet (peace upon
him), is credited with having established the science of Kalām, and his Nahj al-Balāghah (Path
of Eloquence) contains the first rational proofs of the unity of God, following upon the wake of
the Quran and the Ḥadīth. Already in the first Islamic century, the early community was
confronted with such problems and questions as the relation between faith and works, salvation,
the nature of the Qur’ān, and the legitimacy of political authority, all of which became
crystallized later into the structure and concerns of Kalām. Moreover, the debates held in Syria
and Iraq between Muslims and followers of other religions—especially Christians, Mazdaeans,
and Manichaeans, all of whom had developed philosophical and theological arguments for the
defence of the tenets of their faith—caused the Muslims to seek to develop a rational edifice of
their own for the protection and defence of Islam. This response to the theology of other
religions is particularly true for the case of Christianity, whose theology directly challenged the
young faith of Islam to construct its own theological edifice. Greco-Alexandrian philosophy,
which early Christian thinkers had already encountered and with which Muslims were also
becoming acquainted, was also an important factor in the formation of the early schools of
Kalām. The rapid spread of Islam had brought diverse groups within the fold of the Islamic
community and necessitated a clear definition of the creed to prevent various kinds of error.
Because of the emphasis of Islam upon the Divine Law and its practice, these creeds are not as
important as the credo in traditional Christianity, but they are nonetheless of significance for an
understanding of the early theological concerns of the Islamic community. These creeds include
the Fiqh al-Akbar (The Great Knowledge) and the Waṣiyyah (Testament) either by or based upon
the teachings of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767), who was also the founder of one of the major
Sunni schools of Law. These creeds emphasize above all else the unity of God and His power
over human life. They usually also emphasize the importance of gaining knowledge of God to
the extent possible. There were later theologians who insisted that every Muslim must know as
many proofs for the existence of God as he is able to master.
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Need of ‘Ilm al- Kalām: Following the Prophetic and pious Caliphate period, Muslims had to
confront many and ever evolving issues and problems for which they needed viable answers or
solutions as per the religious texts from its experts. They needed Islam to be simplified in order
for it to be applicable to their life. The group of thinkers wanted to translate the words of the
Qur’ān into actual instructions, something that can be applied easily and can adapt to the ever-
changing development and changes in their way of life. The development of this reasoned
thinking went into three phases, clearly explained by Souaiaia below:
“In Islam, it will be shown that there were attempts to adopt reason and discard revelation; that
school of thought flourished and then collapsed due to its over confidence in reason. But the
school of traditionalists (revelation-based knowledge) also failed to create the responsible
believers. Hence, the emergence of a third position [i.e., the ‘Ilm al-Kalām] that relied on both
reason and revelation to explain the world and that which is beyond this world to adherents” was
incumbent (Souaiaia, 2007).
The first attempt suggested disregarding the revealed texts, referring to the Qur’ān and strictly in
light of reason and logic to answer their questions. However, this attempt failed because
guidelines were not set. Since, they disregarded the most important text to Islam, the Qur’ān,
they were lost and deviated away from the core principles of Islam. The second attempt was to
rely on revelations as the one and only source of knowledge and understanding, however this
was difficult because the Muslims did not fully understand why and how things were the way
they are. They needed answers to ease their understanding of the revealed texts. The reliance on
the Qur’ān and Sunnah of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) while applying reason made
following their religion easier for them to refer back and ensure they do not deviate away from
the principles of Islam. The Qur’ān was a reference and a guide. This approach was successful
because it was moderate; it was not too rational and was not too traditional. Al-Ghazālī refers to
the revealed Islamic knowledge as Fiqh. He describes Fiqh as ‘the root of al lthe traditional
sciences. Wolfson, (1976), says that the matters of traditional and philosophical sciences
complete each other.
The situations that led to the development of Kalām were as could be expected, since, the human
being has a mind and is bound to think. Al-Ghazālī is quoted saying, the subject matter of each
of these sciences, the problems which they deal with, and the methods of demonstration which
they use in solving those problems’ all originate in by reason of his being ‘a thinking human
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being.’ The thinking and analyzing is natural, and inevitable of the human to do. Both traditional
revealed knowledge and Kalām aim at extracting something absent from something that is
present today, they try to derive something unknown from something known. According to Al-
Ghazālī, Fiqh is “the daily bread of believing souls, while the doctrine is only valuable as a
Medicine for the sick.” He is emphasizing the importance of general Islamic knowledge among
Muslims. Every Muslim from moral and religious viewpoint has some idea of the difference
between right and wrong. This knowledge does not have to be learned, however, it is an
important part of a proper religious upbringing. De Boer metaphorically describes that Fiqh is as
a crucial aspect of a Muslim’s life, as crucial as bread and food is. He also claims that the
reference and reliance on doctrine is as rare as taking medicine, which is only needed when one
is sick, or far away from faith and belief, someone who is fading away and needs to be reminded
of the importance of Islam. According to Fiqh, Islam classifies the various Islamic principles into
the following categories:
1. Acts, the practice which is an absolute duty [obligatory/Faraḍ] and is therefore rewarded and
the omission of which is punished.
2. Acts which are recommended by the law and are the subject of reward, but the neglect of
which does not call for punishment.
3. Acts which are permitted, but which in the eyes of the law are matters of difference.
4. Acts which the law disapproves of, but does not hold as punishable.
5. Acts which are forbidden by the law [Unlawful/Ḥarām] and which demand unconditional
punishment.
What Kalām came to answer is the details based on these four classifications. What happens to a
sinner? who is really a Muslim and who is not? What can be used to determine the strength of
one’s faith? Is it possible that the traditional Muslims living at the time of the Prophet
experienced everything in their life and what they lived through can be applied to all situations
today?
2.1.6 Let Us Sum Up
In this lesson is discussed the term Kalām in a descriptive manner, its evidence, its meaning and
origin from historical accounts. The details in this lesson say, Islamic theology or ‘Ilm al-Kalām,
was established in an attempt to understand faith and religion by logical reasoning (rational proof
and evidence) instead of relying on revealed texts. Logical reasoning was used to prove the
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origins of faith and basis of religion. The establishment of Kalām was needed to answer
questions that revealed texts could not answer. The death of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon
him) is considered to be a major event in the establishment of Kalām. The spread of Islam to
neighboring lands is also an important aspect in the development of Kalām. Kalām answered
many inquiries and caused debate and discussion on various issues. ‘Ilm al-Kalām developed
until it branched out into various sections and groups. These groups took ‘Ilm al-Kalām as their
source to prove the fundamentals of religion and various matters of belief. As a result of this
logical and reasoned development, there were supporters and opponents. The supporters
developed ‘Ilm al-Kalām into what it is today and the opponents considered this heresy and
relied on traditional revelation. When researching the starting point of ‘Ilm al-Kalām, many
scholars and authors had varied opinions on when exactly this science was originated. Many
events in Islamic history are considered crucial turning points in the development of ‘Ilm al-
Kalām.
1. Explain the literal and technical meaning of the term ‘Ilm al-Kalām?
2. Bring forth the meaning of ‘Ilm al-Kalām in a broader view in Muslim theology?
3. Discuss the origin of ‘Ilm al-Kalām?
4. What brought ‘Ilm al-Kalām to the Muslim world?
1. Boer, D. T., The History of Philosophy in Islam. (E. R. B. D., Trans.) London: Luzac &
Company Ltd., 1970.
2. Nasr, Syed Hossein, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, USA: State
3. Rafiabadi, Hamid Naseem, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, Srinagar: City Book
Centre, 2010.
4. ____________, Muslim philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2001.
5. Sharif, M. M, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols., Delhi: A Venture of Low Price
Publications, 2004.
6. Wolfson, H. A., The Philosophy of the Kalam, London: Harvard University Press, 1976.
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Lesson 2.2: Development and Significance
Lesson Structure
2.2.1 Introduction
2.2.2 Objectives
2.2.3 Development of Kalām
2.2.4 The Development Various Schools of Kalām
2.2.5 Significance of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
2.2.6 Let Us Sum Up
2.2.1 Introduction
Early Muslims, especially during the time of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his
Companions do not appear to have had any speculative discussions in matters of belief. Their
faith was simple; they were sufficed with the theological injunctions of the Qur’ān and the
teachings of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to prove the unity of God or other tenets of their
religion. This state of affairs did not continue for long. With the expansion of Islam, dogmatic
speculations began to creep into the body politic of the Muslims. Several reasons may be
suggested for this. Firstly, the Qur’ān itself contains plenty of verses which appeal to human
reasoning. For instance, some verses indicate that every act of man is preordained and that man
is subordinate to God's will, while according to some other verses, man is responsible for his
actions. Secondly, Islam had to defend itself against the attacks by peoples of different faiths -
Christians, Jews and Polytheists. In refutation of their dogmas, polemical arguments were
employed in the Qur’ān. The Prophet was asked to call the people to the way of God with
wisdom and fair exhortation and to have dialogue with them in the best way (Qur’ān, 16:126).
Thus, the Qur’ān itself contains the seed for the later development of 'Ilm al-Kalām—the
Scholastic Theology of Islam. Thirdly, instances of speculative discussions among the
Companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) were not totally absent. It is narrated that once
some of the Companions were discussing Qadr (predestination), whereupon the Prophet (peace
be upon him) became very angry and asked them not to indulge in such matters. He further
wished them to perform the commandments of God and to refrain from His prohibitions.
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Similarly, it is related that after the battle of Siffīn a man asked whether God destined their
journey to Syria.
‘Ali (R.A) gave the explanation in terms of Qaḍā and Qadar, i.e., all actions were eternally
decreed by God, hence destined. Finally, before the end of the first century of Hijrah, a large
number of people of other faiths and cultures were converted to Islam, hence some influence of
their cultures in the subsequent developments cannot be denied. Whatever would have been the
causes of the future developments of ‘Ilm al-Kalām, a close observation of the political events
that took place in early Islam would show that they had a great impact on the theological ideas
which developed later. According to Watt, "Exponents of the sociology of knowledge would
hold that all theological and philosophical ideas have a political and social reference." So, there
are different factors which are responsible for emergence and development of particular thought.
2.2.2 Objectives
1. To learn about the conditions that led to the development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām.
2. To learn about the output of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
3. To determine the importance of ‘Ilm al-Kalām.
2.2.3 Development of Kalām
In the days of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him), companions and the followers, there
was hardly any need of such sciences, as ‘Ilm al-Kalām, because whenever a problem raised it
simply returned to the Prophet (peace be upon him). In this period, Islam was confined among
the Arabs only who were more interested in the spread of Islam, the Jihad and in the observation
of worships rather the philosophical thought process about Gaybiyyāt/unseen. Soon after the
Prophet’s demise, there arose a serious controversy between the Muhājirīn (the Migrants of
Makah) and the Anṣār (the Helpers of Madīnah) in connection with the selection of his
successor. This controversy was not allowed to result in any immediate development of ideas. A
theological factor, however, first arose with the battles of the Camel and Siffīn. The political
conflicts that arose out of these two civil wars divided the Muslims into several groups, which
ultimately resulted into so-called theological sects—the Shī‘ah, and the Khawāirij and the
Murjī‘ah. A glance over the fundamental principles of these groups will show that the question
of succession to the Prophet was the fountain-head of all their dogmatic controversies. Some of
the Companions, though few in number, are said to have been of the opinion that 'Mi was of
greater excellence and was more preferable than Abū Bakr, ‘Umar and others. Among them are
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mentioned ‘Ammār b. Yāsir, Abū Dharr al-Ghiffārī and al-Miqdād b. al-Aswad. In the course of
time, however, this thought began to take a new colour, and those favouring the cause of ‘Alī
were now called Shī‘an-i ‘Alī (Supporter of ‘Alī) or Shī‘ah. Towards the end of the Caliphate of
‘Uthmān, ‘Abd Allah b. Saba‘, a Jew converted to Islam, is said to have formulated the major
points of the Shī‘ah dogmas.
It seems that it is from the battle of Siffīn and the schisms to which it gave rise that can be dated
not of course the first meditations on the content of the faith but their grouping into tendencies
and schools. The appearance of the three main politico-religious traditions, Khwarijī, Shī’ah and
Sunni, set before Muslim thinkers the problem of “the validity of the Imāma” and “the status of
believer” which the Imām/leader must possess; thence arose the question of faith and the
conditions for salvation and the question of man’s responsibility, then, as parallel considerations,
the nature of Qur’ān (created or not created) and hence the stress laid upon the divine attributes,
their existence and their connection with the divine essence, and its Unity. Many other questions
were added in course of time; but already at this early period(i.e., the age of the Umayyads and
the ‘Abbasids) the essential themes which were to constitute ‘Ilm al Kalām had emerged and
dominated the scene. Whatever may have been the effect of external influences- discussions with
Mazdean Zanadiqa on good and evil in human actions or with the Christian theologians of
Damascus on the word of God, and the discovery of Greek science and philosophy-Kalām
tended at first to take shape over specifically Muslim dogmatic problems.
With the advent of the Abbasid dynasty, Muslim theology marked a distinct departure from what
was till then in a rather early stage to a place where the most important chapter was added to the
history of Islam. It was in this period that the administrative responsibilities were transferred
gradually to the class of secretaries who were the bearers of Persian culture or rather Persianised
culture of Iraq including the Hellenistic elements. Among them were those who had been
Christians, Zoroastrians and Manicheans before they accepted Islam. In the early Abbasid period,
however, there seems to have been two main streams of philosophical tradition influencing the
Islamic world. Firstly, that of Jundishapur from where a Nestorian family supplied court
physicians to the Caliphs, and at the same time were responsible for a teaching hospital in
Baghdad. Besides the strict medical curriculum, there must have been some philosophical works
here, Secondly, that of Alexandrian college of Harran which was under Christian direction. In
Harran there was a centre belonging to the Sabi’ah/Sabeans who had a basis in Greek
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philosophy. It is probable that long before the time of Al-Māmūn and his organisation of
translations, the Muslims had begun to realise the importance of logical methods to be employed
in the defence of Islam from the criticisms of the members of other faiths. In fact there is
evidence that sometimes discussions and disputations were held between Muslim and non-
Muslim scholars in matters of doctrine. Eventually, the Muslims, particularly the Mu'tazilites,
studied the Greek philosophy and adopted the dialectical methods in discussing the dogmas of
Islam on the conception of substance, accidents, actions, generated actions, essence/Dhāt of God,
His attributes and so on.
It appears that in the beginning, Fiqh was used for the speculative side of theology, as well as of
cannon law, as opposed to ‘Ilm for the traditional side. Imām Abū Ḥanīfa is reported to have
said, “Al-Fiqh fi al-Dīn Afḍal min al-Fiqh fī al-‘Ilm”, ‘‘Knowledge of faith is superior to
knowledge of law.’’ A theological discourse ascribed to him is named as Al-Fiqh al-Akbar.
The external influences probably had some effect as a result of the controversies, emphasizing
some aspects of the subjects dealt with, giving direction to the choice of arguments and the
method of argumentation. The fact remains, however, that ‘Ilm al-Kalām is certainly not an Arab
adoption of Mazdean or Christian theology but arose within the Muslim community, where it
preserved its own originality.
Factors responsible for the Development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
The major reasons which paved the way for the development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām as below:
1. The conversions of the people of other faiths to Islam, such as the Jews, Christians,
Zoroastrians and Buddhists etc.
2. Rise of religio-political schisms in the Muslim community, such as Khawārij, Shī‘ah,
Qadariyyah, Jabariyyah, Mu‘tazilah etc.
3. The development of Islamic religious sciences and the new political issues.
4. The fact that Islam denies the blind imitation and the belief on superstition lead to a new
thought. It served as a major cause to think that Qur’ān is either the Word of God or his creation.
Some other controversies also led on such Quranic terms as: Muḥkam, Mutashābih, Nāsikh,
Mansūkh, Ẓāhir and Bāṭin etc.
5. The compilation of Ḥadīth literature was also carried out in this period. Several studies on the
authority of Ḥadīth literature were made in this period. It also played a key role in the
development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām.
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The fundamentals of this discourse are five:
1. Divine unity/Tawḥīd
2. Divine justice/‘Adl
3. The promise of reward and the threat of punishment
4. The state between belief and un-belief
5. To order the doing of right and prohibit the doing of wrong/Amrbil Ma‘ruf wa Nahy ‘Anil
Munkar
In these debates, some Muslim factions were engaged seriously like, Khawārij, Shī‘ah,
Qadariyyah, Jabariyyah, Murjī‘ah, Mu‘tazilah, Ash‘ariyyah etc.
2.2.4 The Development Various Schools of Kalām
The Muslims differed with one another in matters of the Law (Fiqh), following differing paths
and dividing into various schools, such as Ja‘farī, Zaydī, Ḥanafī, Shafa‘ī, Mālikī and Hanbalī,
each of which developed an understanding (of the religious texts) of its own. Similarly, from the
viewpoint of the belief system, they divided into various schools, each with its own set of
doctrines. The most important of these schools are: the Shī‘ah, the Mu‘tazilah, the Ash‘ariyyah,
and the Murjī‘ah. Here it is possible that the question may arise as to the reason behind such
regretful division of the Muslims into sects in matters dealing with Kalām and Fiqh, and why
they could not maintain their unity in these spheres. The difference in matters of Kalām causes
disunity in their Islamic outlook, and the disagreement in the matter of Fiqh deprives them of the
unity of action. However, it is necessary to pay attention to the two following points:
(i) The disagreement in issues of Fiqh among the Muslims is not so great as to shatter
the foundations of the unity of doctrinal outlook and mode of practice. There is so
much common in their doctrinal and practical matters that the points of difference can
hardly inflict any serious blow.
(ii) Theoretical differences and divergence of views is inevitable in societies in spite of
their unity and agreement in principles, and as long as the roots of the differences lie
in methods of inference, and not in vested interests, they are even beneficial; because
they cause mobility, dynamism, discussion, curiosity, and progress. Only when the
differences are accompanied by prejudices and emotional and illogical alignments,
and lead individuals to slander, defame, and treat one another with contempt, instead
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of motivating them to endeavour towards reforming themselves, then they are a cause
of misfortune.
In the Shi'ite faith, the people are obliged to imitate a living Mujtahid (an authoritative expert of
Islamic religious sciences) and the Mujtahidūn (plural of Mujtahid) are obliged to independently
ponder the issues and form their independent opinions and not to be content with what has been
handed down by the ancestors. Ijtihād [to exercise Ijtihād means to be able to give legal opinions
on the basis of the basic Islamic textual sources] and independence of thought inherently lead to
difference of views; but this divergence of opinions has given life and dynamism to the Shī‘ah
Fiqh. Therefore, difference in itself cannot be condemned. What is condemnable is the difference
which originates in evil intentions and selfish interests, or when it centres around issues which
drive Muslims on separate paths, such as the issue of Imāmah and leadership, not the difference
in secondary and non-basic matters. To undertake an examination of the intellectual history of
the Muslims so as to find which differences originated in evil intentions, vested interests, and
prejudices, and which were a natural product of their intellectual life, whether all points of
difference in the sphere of Kalām should be regarded as fundamental, or whether all problems in
Fiqh should be regarded as secondary, or if it is possible that a difference in Kalām may not be
of fundamental significance whereas one in Fiqh may have such importance - these are questions
which lie outside the brief scope of this discussion.
Before the schools of Kalām are discussed, it is essential to point out that there has been a group
of scholars in the Islamic world which was basically opposed to the very idea of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
and rational debate about Islamic doctrines, considering it a taboo and an innovation in the faith
(Bid‘ah). They are known as Ahl al-Ḥadīth [not to be confused with the Ahl al-Ḥadīth sect or
movement that emerged in India in 19th century in India and was greatly influenced with the
ideas of ‘Wahābiyyah Movement’ of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb Najdī. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal,
one of the Imāms of jurisprudence of the Ahl al-Sunnah, stands foremost among them.
The Hanbalis are totally against Kalām, Mu‘tazilite or Ash‘arites, not to speak of the Shi'ite
Kalām. In fact, they are basically opposed to logic and philosophy. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, a
notable figure among the Ahl al-Ḥadīth, has written a book called Sawn al-Manṭiq wa al-Kalām
‘an al-Mantiqwa al-Kalām (Protecting speech and logic from [the evil of] ‘Ilm al-Kalām and the
science of logic).
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Mālik ibn Anas is another Sunni Imām who considers any debate or inquiry about doctrinal
matters to be unlawful. The important schools of Kalām, as mentioned earlier, are: Shī‘ah,
Mu‘tazilah, Ash‘ariyyah, and Murjī‘ah. Some sects of the Khawārij and the Bāṭinīs, such as the
Ismā‘īlīs, have also been considered as schools of Islamic Kalām.
However, none of these two sects can be considered as belonging to the schools of Islamic
Kalām. The Khawārij, although they held specific beliefs in the matters of doctrine, and perhaps
were the first to raise doctrinal problems by expressing certain beliefs about Imāmah, the Kufr
(apostasy) of the Fāsiq (evil-doer, one who commits major sins), and considered the disbelievers
in these beliefs as apostates, but they did not, firstly, create a rationalist school of thought in the
Muslim world, and, secondly, their thinking was so much deviated―from the viewpoint of the
Shi'ites—that it is difficult to count them among Muslims. What makes things easy is that the
Khawārij ultimately became extinct and only one of their sects, called "Abadiyyah" has some
followers today. The ‘Abadiyyah were the most moderate of all the Khawārij, and that is the
reason why they have survived until today. The Bāṭinīs, too, have so much liberally interfered in
Islamic ideas on the basis of esotericism that it is possible to say that they have twisted Islam out
of its shape, and that is the reason why the Muslim world is not ready to consider them as one of
the sects of Islam.
Schools of Thought that arose in the Development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām
Khawārij or Kharijites: Due to the misunderstandings between Caliph ‘Alī and Mu’āwiyah
(R.A) and serious position of some groups of Caliph ‘Alī (R.A) who were later named Kharijites.
They called themselves the believers or the people of paradise while other party was the
unbeliever, the idolaters or the people of hell. The reference to paradise and hell farther shows
that the Kharijites regarded ultimate salvation or damnation as linked with membership of this
group. Because of this linking the Kharijites were much concerned about associating only with
the people of paradise and disassociating from the people of hell. Some went further and held
that not all grave sins would lead to an eternity in hell. Najda for example, distinguished between
what was fundamental in religion and what was not and insisted that for sins in non-
fundamentals. God’s punishment would not be in hell and would not be eternal, that is a man
who admitted a single act of theft or adultery would not thereby become one of the people of
hell.
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They boycotted Muslims other than themselves, would not marry with them, had no social or
political transactions with them and considered killing them or looting their property as
legitimate.
Qadariyyah or Qadarites: This group who asserted the doctrine of free will and held that man is
responsible for his deeds/acts. Ma’bad al-Juhānī (d.743) was one who exposed these views and
had to pay a heavy price. He was accordingly sentenced to death by the orders of Ḥajjāj ibn
Yūsuf. Qadarites quoted Qur’ān to show that man could select, out of many ways open to him,
the one that he wished or liked. This invited them the wrath of the unjust rulers among the
Umayyads.
Jabariyyah or Jabarites: It is the group of Jahm ibn Ṣafwān and his adherents. He was advocate
of pure determinism ‘‘Predestination’’ and opposed ‘‘free will’’ Due to his thought he was put to
death by Salīm ibn Ahwas al-Mazinī in Marw in the last days of the Umayyads. Jabris a doctrine
which denies that a deed is in reality to be attributed to man, but is to be ascribed to God.
Mu‘tazilah or Mu‘tazilites: Mu‘tazalites are called generally as the rationalists in Islam. The
leader of Mu‘tazalites was Wāṡ̄ il bin ‘Aṭā’ (b. 699 C.E). He was a student of Imām al-Ḥasan al-
Baṣarī. The name Mu‘tazilites got from a warm discussion between the teacher and the student.
They were called people of ‘Unity and Justice’. Their main discussion was initiated with the
created and un-createdness of Qur’ān. They opposed this view and hold that good and evil can be
apprehended by and distinguished through the activity of reasoning. They developed more
principles on the basis of reason.
Murji’tes: The word Irjā‘ has two meanings. The first is ‘postponement’ as in the words of God:
‘they said put him off, him and his brother that is give him respite or delay him’. The other
meaning is to give hope. To use the term Al-Murjī’ah in the first sense for this group is correct,
because they look upon deeds as secondary to intentions and resolve. The term can absolutely be
used of them in the second sense also, because they hold that disobedience with faith is not
harmful as obedience with disbelief is not beneficial.
It is also said that Irjia’ means deferring the case of one who commits a grave sin to the Day of
Judgment, in this world; therefore no judgment is made as to whether he belongs to the people of
paradise or to the people of hell. If the world is understood in this way the Murji‘tes and the
Wājidiya are two opposing sects. Some say that al-Irja ‘means bringing ‘Alī down from the first
to the fourth Caliph. In this sense the Murjī‘ah and Shī’ah became two opposed sects.
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The Murjī‘ah consist of four groups; the Khwārijī Murjī‘ah, the Qadirī Murjī‘ah, the Jabarī
Murjī‘ah and pure Murjī‘ah. Muḥammad ibn Shihāb, al-Sehilī and al-Khālidī belonged to the
Qadiritie Murjī‘ah.
Ash‘ariyyah or Ash‘arites: Ash‘ariyyah is attributed to Abul Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Ismā‘īl al-Ash‘arī
(260-324A.H). He was a staunch supporter of Mu‘tazalites and wrote for that up to his fortieth
year in 300 A.H and after that he announced that he no more supports the Mu’tazilah views. He
specially mentioned that he disagrees with that the Qur’ān was created, God will not have been
with eyes and we were the creations of one action.
These were the main groups which fostered the intellectual discussions and led to the
development scholastic theology in Islam. With the advent of these groups orthodox Muslims
also got a work of developing the sciences which lead the Muslims towards the search and
implementation of truth.
2.2.5 Significance of ‘Ilm al Kalām
During the early years of Islam many learned Muslims spread all over the world, and a large
number of pupils gathered around them. In the main centres of Islam, ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar, ‘Abd
Allah b. ‘Amr b. Al-Ās, Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī and Anas b. Mālik, were among the Companions
who were responsible for upholding the teachings of Islam during the time of the Umayyads. It
appears that since the time of the Prophet a general religious movement was in progress among
the Muslims, and this movement does not seem to have been politically affected like those of the
Kharijites and the Shi‘ites. Instead of showing any interest in the political conflicts, the pioneers
of this movement, which may be called as a moderate body of the Muslims, used to meet,
probably in mosques, to discuss purely religious questions. During this period, no clear
distinction was apparent between the different fields of interest, and views in different fields
might be reported of the same person. Gradually, however, the science of Tradition became of
great importance. There arose responses in the minds of people against the extreme rationalist
thought which developed throughout. ‘Ilm al-Kalām actually represents that rational response of
religious dialogue.
It was the practice of the Companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) that they used to
decide their day-to-day affairs in the fields of law, doctrine and individual piety according to
what they understood from the Qur’ān and heard from the Prophet (peace be upon him) or saw
him performing (any deed/act). It is equally true that sometimes they used to apply reason (Rā’y)
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or analogical judgment where they failed to find any direct ruling in the Qur’ān and the
Traditions. Among them ‘Umar and ‘Abd Allah b. Mas‘ūd are quoted as having frequently
applied Rā’y in legal matters. In course of time this came to be associated with Abū Ḥanīfa, the
Imām of the Iraqi school of Rā’y. A separate trend of thought appears to have been in progress
simultaneously in legal matters, which later came to be known as the Ḥijāzī school of Ah1 al-
Ḥadīth. Here also were a number of leading Companions, namely, ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar and
‘Abd Allah b. ‘Amr b. Al-Ās, who were not in favour of giving opinions, even though they did
not find any ruling in the Qur’ān and Traditions. Imām Mālik and Shāfa‘ī are regarded as the
champions of this school, although they used a certain degree of reasoning. It was perhaps as a
reaction to the tendency towards a rather frequent use of Rā’y in legal matters that the
Traditionist movement grew up, since many men felt that a Tradition from the Prophet (peace be
upon him) was a sounder basis for action in legal matters than a combination of personal opinion
or discretion. A number of schools of thought within the Traditionist movement, notably those of
al-Awzā‘ī in Syria and Al-Layth b. Sa‘d in Egypt, grew up almost independently of the Ḥijāzī
school of Ah1 al-Ḥadīth, but could not survive as separate disciplines. However, towards the end
of the Umayyad period, the Traditionist movement as an independent discipline started, and
during the subsequent Abbasid period, it dominated the Muslim religious thought. During this
period, the famous books of Traditions were compiled, and the Traditionists/Muḥaddithīn
devised a critique of Tradition to separate the genuine from the false. Indeed, the
Traditionists/Muḥaddithīn played a great role in the field of Muslim dogma. They reacted against
the dogmas which were leading in Muslim world. In the formative period of the Traditionist
movement before 850 A.D., the Traditionists were not so much specialists in Traditions as
persons with particular standpoint. In the general religious movement of the Umayyad period,
out of which the Traditionist movement grew, many different opinions had been held. There had
been Traditionists who sympathised with the dogma of free will, as well as with the dogma of
Irjia‘. There were also men of Shī‘ah sympathies among them. Gradually, however, the
Traditionist movement settled down to a rejection of the doctrine of Free will, Irjia‘ and Shī‘ah,
and to the formation of the dogmas of Sunnism. It appears that the Mutakallimūn of the
Mu‘tazilites could not gain much ground until the time of Al-Māmūn. Hārūn al-Rashīd is said to
have asked the people to refrain from discussing dogmas (Jidl Fī al-Dīn); he even imprisoned
some of the Mu‘tazilites. The Mu‘tazilites were, however, favoured by Al-Māmūn, and at the
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instigation of its advocates, Mu‘tazilism was declared as the official creed. With the accession of
al-Mutwakkil to power, the situation was just the reverse. Mu‘tazilism was denounced by a royal
decree. Ibn Ḥanbal proved himself a hero during the Mihna instituted by Al-Māmūn, and now
the Ḥanbalīs, or rather the puritanical wing of the Sunnis, became prominent.
In theological matters, the fundamental difference between the Mutakallimūn and the
Traditionists/Muḥaddithīn was that the approach of the former was mainly rational, and that of
the latter was to uphold the traditional views which had developed within the general religious
movement since the time of the Prophet (peace be upon him). With regard to the verses that
speak of the attributes of God, apparently tending to an anthropomorphic idea, the Traditionists
maintained that they should be taken in their literal sense without asking any question and
drawing any comparison. Sometimes it might have been thought that to enter into the speculation
of the apparently anthropomorphic verses would in no way be beneficial for the average people.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) himself expressed satisfaction when a slave girl testified that
God is in Heaven. ‘Alī is reported to have said, "Say to the people what they understand. Do you
want them to be led to unbelief in Allah and His apostle?' Mālik b. Anas is quoted as saying,
"Istiwā‘, is known, its specification is inconceivable, to believe in it is obligatory, and to ask
about it is a Bid‘ah". To be precise, the Traditionists were by no means at par with the
Mutakallimūn in the speculation of dogmas.
The Traditionists or the Ah1 al-Sunnah appear to have attached great importance to the
consensus of opinion in determining their position regarding the early political controversies.
According to them, the institution of Khilāfah was not a matter to be divinely decreed, nor was
anyone designated by the Prophet as his successor. The Khilāfah of Abū Bakr and that of the
subsequent three Caliphs were established by the consensus of the Muslims in accordance with
the hierarchical order. But, it is said that there was a group of Ah1 al-Sunnah who held that ‘Alī
was superior to ‘Uthmān. To this group, however, all the Companions were just and pious
believers. Their attitude was, "We shall not make any adverse comment against the Companions
for what occurred among them". To them, all the conflicts resulted from difference of judgement
(Ikhtilaf Fī al-Ijtihād). With regard to the head of state, their doctrine was that the Khalīfah must
be a member of the Quraysh. This was established by the consensus of the Muhājirīn and the
Anṣār on the Day of the Thaqīfa, and was later agreed upon by other Muslims. The disagreement
of the Khawārij and the Shī‘ah could not be regarded as doing any harm to what was established
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earlier by Ijma‘. Revolt against the existing Sultan was not lawful, and to go into Jihad under his
direction was obligatory, except when he committed an act of Kufr.86 It has been said earlier
that actions were excluded from the Murji‘ite conception of Īmān/belief. To the Mu‘tazilites,
actions constituted a part of Īmān. The Traditionists appear to have adopted a middle way
between these two extreme views, as will be seen presently. Although the conception of the
Traditionists seems to have corresponded to that of the Mu‘tazilites in counting actions as a part
of Īmān, yet their difference was unbridgeable. According to the Mu‘tazilites, actions were a
constituent part. But in the Traditionists’ view, they were included in it as a condition to
complete Īmān. In effect, it would mean that the man who committed a grave sin or did not
perform an obligatory act was a perfect Mumin/believer in the Murji’te view. To the Mu‘tazilites,
he was neither a Mu’min, nor a Kāfir/unbeliever. But in an intermediate position between Īmān
and Kufr, and according to the Traditionists, he was not a perfect Mu'min–Fasiq/sinner as held
by the majority or a Munāfiq/hypocrite as was the opinion of Ḥasan al-Baṣarī. The acceptance of
belief would, however, commit a man to the community of Islam. He would not be regarded a
Kāfir/unbeliever unless he performed a sin liable to Kufr. Since Īmān, according to the
Traditionists, comprised belief and actions, it was liable to increase and decrease. This would
mean that the performance of the acts of Sharī’ah would lead a man to the position of a perfect
Mu’min, and to neglect them would bring him down from that position. Imām Abū Ḥanīfah did
not include actions in his conception of Īmān. Therefore, Īmān, according to him, would neither
increase nor decrease. Yet he did not deny the merits of actions for a Mu’min. That is why he and
his supporters were held as Murjī‘ah Ah1 al-Sunnah by Al-Shahrastānī. It appears, however, that
Īmān has two perspectives: (i) belief in God and His apostle, (ii) its expression in actions. In its
first perspective, it can neither increase nor decrease. But in the second perspective, it certainly
increases and decreases. Probably in consideration of these two implications, Imām Mālik
withheld his opinion about the decrease, but did not deny its increase. On the question of Jabr
and Qadar, the Traditionists (or rather the Ah1 al-Sunnah) appear to have adopted a middle
course between the theory of Compulsion of the Jabriyyah and that of Free Will of the
Qadariyyah. They uphold the Divine Qadar, that is, God has eternally decreed the good and bad
of His creatures as well as their misery and happiness, their sustenance, their sex and so on. For
them, this neither means that man is under compulsion in his actions, nor does it mean that he
has no power to acquire them. In their view, predetermination by God and His knowledge are
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rather identical, that is, predetermination of things by God means that they are known to Him
eternally. In other words, man will go to what is destined eternally for him in the knowledge of
God by his own choice and will. To speak clearly, God creates actions in which man has no
effective power to share with Him. Man rather acquires them on his own accord.
Imām Taqī al-Dīn al-Subukī, said in his collection of responses to the questions put forth by
Ḥāfiz ‘Afīfuddīn al-Matarī:
‘‘No one among those that came after the companions (of the Prophet peace be upon him)
reached their level. This is because most of the sciences that one research and focus on day and
night—such as language, grammar, morphology, and the fundamentals of jurisprudence —were
already in their possession as a part of their natural makeup. The strength of their intellect and
the light of Prophethood that Allah enlightened them with (through the Prophet peace be upon
him) that protected them from error in thought, sufficed them from (involving themselves with)
logic and the other rational sciences.
‘Ilm al-Kalām provided a way for discussion in the light of truth. In Sunni world, much of the
Traditionists/Muḥaddithīn unease with theological debate and rationalism came to dominate,
gradually leading to a significant decline and marginalization of Kalām among Sunnis.
2.2.6 Let Us Sum Up
In this lesson are discussed different trends which led to the growth of ‘Ilm al-Kalām in the
Muslim world. This lesson contains the history of events and some particular reasons responsible
for the development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām and its spread. The development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām resulted
in many popular schools of thought, some were extreme rationalists who developed principles
and theories regarding divine truths of Islam on the basis of reason and ideology. Significance of
‘Ilm al-Kalām is explained by the discussion that occurred in response to those sects and schools
of thought. ‘Ilm al-Kalām being a rational talk gave rise to various orthodox Muslims who
interpreted Qur’ān and Sunnah and in the light of divine knowledge provided through Qur’ān
and Sunnah they answered the reason based ideologies and developed different schools of
thought. Traditionist movement can be said the very outcome of ‘Ilm al-Kalām. Ḥadīth were
taken seriously and learned and taught so that there remains no ambiguity about the truth of
Islam.
1. Express the development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām in early years of Khilāfah?
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2. Write the factors responsible for development of ‘Ilm al-Kalām?
3. Discuss the development of different schools of Kalām?
4. Explain the significance of ‘Ilm al-Kalām?
Company Ltd., 1970.
Centre, 2010.
4. ____________________, Muslim philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons,
2001.
5. Sharif, M. M, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols., Delhi: A Venture of Low Price
Publications, 2004.
6. Wolfson, H. A., The Philosophy of the Kalam, London: Harvard University Press, 1976.
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Lesson 2.3: Qadariyyah and Jabariyyah
Lesson Structure
2.3.1 Introduction
2.3.2 Objectives
2.3.3 Qadariyyah
2.3.4 Jabariyyah
2.3.5 Let Us Sum Up
2.3.1 Introduction
Though nothing definite can be said about the beginnings of ‘Ilm al- Kalām among Muslims,
what is certain is that discussion of some of the problems of Kalām, such as the issue of
predestination (Jabr) and free will (Ikhtiyār), and that of Divine Justice, became current among
Muslims during the first half of the second century of Ḥijrah. The discussions had been started
perhaps during the time of Muḥammad (peace be upon him) but at that time the discussion
mostly occurred with the Prophet (peace be upon him) so the answers were clear and discussion
continued even after the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) demise because there arose different
issues which had to be solved through discussion and deriving out solutions based on the
teachings of Qur’ān and Sunnah. Discussion never stopped but later it took shape of variant
ideologies which led to development of sects and groups in the Muslim society. Civil wars
among Muslims are one of the major causes of development of sects. Perhaps the first formal
centre of such discussions was the circle of Al-Ḥasan al-Basarī (d. 110/728-29). Among the
Muslim personalities of the latter half of the first century, the names of Ma‘bad al-Juhānī (d. 80/
699) and Ghaylān ibn Muslim al-Dimashqī (d. 105/723) have been mentioned, who adamantly
defended the ideas of free will (Ikhtiyār) and man's freedom. There were others who opposed
them and supported predestination (Jabr). The believers in free will were called "Qadariyyah"
and their opponents were known as "Jabariyyah". Gradually the points of difference between the
two groups extended to a series of other issues in theology, physics, sociology and other
problems relating to man and the Resurrection, of which the problem of Jabr and Ikhtiyār was
only one. The Orientalists and their followers insist on considering the beginnings of discursive
discussions in the Islamic world from this point or its like. However, the truth is that rational
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argumentation about Islamic doctrines starts with the Holy Qur’ān itself, and has been followed
up in the utterances of the Holy Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) and especially in the
sermons of Amīr al-Mu’minīn 'Ali (R.A). Despite this, the fact is that their style and approach
are different from those of the Muslim Mutakallimūn.
2.3.2 Objectives
1. To know the emergence and development of Jabariyyah and Qadariyyah.
2. To learn about the beliefs and doctrines developed by Jabariyyah and Qadariyyah.
3. To know the extremities of both the sects in the Muslim thought.
2.3.3 Qadariyyah
Origins and Development of the Qadariyyah: The problem of free will and determinism is both
old and complex. From the early days of human civilization, men reflected on it and formed their
opinions about its various aspects. The Greek philosophers, Socrates (470-399 B.C), Plato (427-
347 B.C) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C) concentrated on the internal capacity of man to find the
truth of practical good. The medieval Christian dogmatism led man to despair as he had no
freedom to enquire about the authority and had to suffer for the 'original sin'. The Renaissance
thinkers of Europe like Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Rene' Descartes (1596-1650) and Leibniz
(1646-1716) focused more on the rational mechanism of the universe than on the spiritual and
ethical reality of man. The promulgators of Enlightenment and empirical science revolved round
the material progress and happiness in the world of cause and effect, thus, ignoring the role of
transcendental or spiritual powers. To many of them, man is subject to cosmic physical
determinism, which, in consequence, restricts his domain of activity. Islam, the primordial and
revealed religion of God for all-embracing guidance of mankind, treats the problem of free will
and determinism in totality. In the history of Islam, scholars have dealt with it in various
dimensions and paradigms. Its conspicuous rise was during the period of Umayyads/‘Umawiyyah
and it continued to stimulate the scholars of subsequent times. During the time of the Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him) there were people who usually engaged in religious pursuits
and discussions as early as the time of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him). The Ahl al-
Suffah (People of the bench i.e. in the Masjid of the Prophet peace be upon him in Madīnah)
could be cited as example. This group generally did discuss matters religious applying reason
where needed. It may not be out of place to mention Ali, Ibn Mas‘ud, ‘Ā’ishah, Mu‘ādh ibn
Jabal along with them. And the people who belonged to other religions as well as polytheists
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were engaged with the problem of destiny (Taqdīr). They used to ask twisted questions to
Muslims about Allah—His Essence and Attributes. They, out of evil designs, attributed acts of
their polytheism to God. The Quran addresses their queries and characterises such men as
followers of conjecture (Ẓan) rather than knowledge: “Those who are bent on ascribing divinity
to aught beside God will say, "Had God so Willed, we would not have ascribed divinity to aught
but Him nor would our forefathers [have done so]; and neither would we have declared as
forbidden anything [that He has allowed]." Even so did those who lived before them give the lie
to the truth—until they came to taste Our punishment! Say: "Have you any [certain knowledge
which you could proffer to us? You follow but [other people's] conjectures, and you yourself do
nothing but guess.” (Al-’An‘ām:148-149). Even the question of destiny struck the minds of some
of the Prophet's companions (Saḥābah) and they were told to believe in it rather than have
discussions on it. It is reported through the various well known narrators of Traditions (Aḥādith)
that once when the Prophet saw some Companions discussing destiny (Taqdīr) he got offended
and forbade them from doing so. He advised them that it does not belong to such matters of
Sharī’ah (Islamic Law) about which they have to form their opinion definitely. He added that it
is better to remain calm than to discuss it which might lead to harm. This refrainment from the
discussion is even found in the Prophet's attitude which he showed when he visited the house of
‘Alī and Faṭimah during a night, enquiring them about their failure to offer Tahajjud (additional
night prayer). In his reply ‘Alī seemed to attribute their failure to Allah who made him not to rise
up for Tahajjud that night. This displeased the Prophet who left their house by mentioning the
following verse of the Qur’ān: “But man is, in most things, contentious” (Al-Qur’ān:18:54). It
was, however, through the interaction with and influences of the other religions and philosophers
that the problem of destiny became the subject of debate and discussion during the Umayyad
period of Islamic history. Two groups or schools of thought emerged during this period. One is
called Qadariyyah and the other Jabariyyah. Qadariyyah was founded by Ma‘bad ibn Khālid al-
Juhānī (b. 699 CE). The school took its name from the view that man has the capacity to action
and Qadr or Qudrah—is responsible for his deeds. He was succeeded by Ghylān ad-Dimishqī in
leading the school who preached the principles laid down on the basis of their understanding.
Ma‘bad al-Juhānī lived during the early days of Umayyads. These were very harsh times: there
were relentless persecutions and ruthless blood shedding in the Muslim world because of the
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Umayyad hegemony. The freedom loving Arabs could not easily brook all this, they would
demand answers from the state officials of queries such as the following:
‘‘Why do you practice such barbarities? Is not it all against the spirit of Islam? Are you not
Muslims? The officials would reply: we are not responsible for what we do. It is God who does
everything. His is the power for good and evil.’’
It is reported that Ma‘bad ibn Khālid al-Juhānī with ‘Aṭā ibn Yassār, one of his companions,
came one day to Ḥasan al-Baṣarī and said; ‘‘O Abū Sa‘īd, these rulers shed blood of the Muslims
and do grievous things and say that their works are by decree of Allah.’’ To this Ḥasan al-Baṣarī
replied: ‘‘the enemies of God, they are liars.’’ According to Shibli the emergence of the issues of
freedom of will and predestination owes its origin to politics, as in Umayyad period, especially
during the governorship of Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf, the people were coerced to declare: ‘‘we believe
that good and evil (is from God).’’
The free will position was generally anti-Umayyad on the political level and resulted in an
attitude that viewed opposition to that regime. The upholders of free will came to be known as
Qadarites, from the Arabic word ‘Qadr’ meaning ‘determination’ or ‘measuring out’ and
including the sense of the capacity to determine events. The closely related term Qudrah,
meaning ‘‘power’’ ‘‘capability’’ is what Free Willers, claimed for themselves and for all
humans, it seems probable that the free will-position was developed and held for moral and
religious reasons that is, what is religion without responsibility, and how is responsibility to be
conceived without a real capacity to act.
Qadariyyah/Qadarite Principles:
1. Man is free and the author of his own actions. They asserted that man has his own volition,
independence and free will to do what he likes and will be rewarded accordingly, good or bad,
depending solely on his choice and freewill. Because of the emphasis they laid on freewill of the
people thus negating the control of God on man.
2. Allah will reckon with man on the Day of Judgment and reward him for good deeds and
punish him for bad deeds. God does not do evil and does not condone evil practices. That is why
He punishes evildoers and rewards righteous people. God does not create anybody to be rich or
to be poor; success or failure, wealth and poverty are results of every man’s advantages and
initiatives. God does not create anyone to do evils. If He were to do this, it would be injustice on
His part to turn round and punish evildoers. Furthermore, God does not guide certain people
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aright and lead others astray. If He were to do this, it would amount to arbitrariness and partiality
on His part.
3. Īmān (belief) is the consequences of knowledge and understanding.
4. According to the promoters of free will, God has given man the faculty to reason and
differentiate between the lawful/good and unlawful/bad. Besides that, 104 holy books have
explained elaborately the lawful/right or unlawful/wrong. Furthermore, that was the purpose of
sending 124000 prophets like Ibrahīm, Mūsā, Dāwūd and ‘Īsā to different peoples and nations at
different times; and also that was why Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) was sent as the
last of the prophets. They go further to say that that is why the Qur’ān asserts that everybody will
be responsible for his own deeds. Qur’ān, says: ‘he who receives guidance receives it for his own
benefit and he who goes astray does it at his own risk. No bearer of burden will bear the burden
of another nor would we give out punishment to any group of people until we have sent an
apostle to give warning’.
5. The grave sinner is indeed a Muslim yet Allah will surely punish him on the Day of Judgment.
‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul ‘Azīz is said to have questioned Ghylān about his views and to have warned
him of its danger and also warned others not to hold Ghylān’s doctrines of Qadr. His views again
brought him into trouble in the Caliphate of Hishām (724- 743) and he is said to have fled to
Armenia with a companion. Eventually he was captured and executed probably towards the end
of the reign of Hishām.
2.3.4 Jabariyyah
Origins and Development of Jabariyyah: Towards the closing period of the Umayyad rule, the
doctrine of Jabr (compulsion) was pioneered by Jahm ibn Ṣafwān, a client of Banū Rasib, called
al-Tirmidhī, sometimes al-Samarqandī, in contrast with the dogma of Qadar. Jahm was secretary
of Al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj, 'The man with the black banner', who revolted against the Umayyads
from 116/734to 128/746 in Khurasan and was executed shortly before Ḥārith himself. Jahm is
considered as the initiator of the doctrine of Jabr, according to which man acted only
metaphorically as the sun acts in setting. To speak more clearly, man is like a feather hung in the
wind, it moves when the wind moves and stops when the wind does so, there being no distinction
between a man and an inanimate nature. This extremism in the conception of Jabr is probably
resulted from his anti-anthropomorphic ideas, as will be seen presently.
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Jahm ibn Ṣafwān denied the attributes of God. To him, God cannot have any attributes that a
created being possesses. He is neither seen, nor does He talk to anybody. Therefore, the Qur’ān
is created. Hell and paradise cannot be everlasting, because the eternity is only God's attribute.
God has only two attributes, viz., F‘i1 and Khalq, the attributes of doing and creation which no
man can possess, thus placing man completely under compulsion in his actions. More generally,
Jahm and his followers denied the distinct existence of all attributes of God, and were, therefore,
accused of Ta‘tīl (making God a bare unity), and called Mu‘atazilah. For attributes of God, such
as hand and face occurring in the Qur‘ān, he had a metaphorical interpretation. It is said that
Jahm had a quarrel with Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767) who was an extreme
anthropomorphist. Imām Abū Ḥanīfa is quoted as saying that Jahm went so far in his denial of
anthropomorphism (Tashbīh) as to declare that ‘God is nothing (Allah Laysa bial-Shay’).’ And
Muqātil’s extremism, on the other side, likened God with His creatures. Jahm might have been
greatly influenced by foreign ideas in the formulation of his theological views. He is reported to
have taken his dogmatic views from al-Ja‘d b. Dirham who was an inhabitant of Harran where
the Sabi‘ah/Sabeans and the Falāsifah/philosophers were the vigorous upholders of anti-
anthropomorphic ideas. He is also quoted as having taken the idea of Khalq al-Qur’ān through
two intermediate links from Labīd b. al-A‘sam al-Yahūdī who bewitched the Prophet. Jahm also
had a debate on the nature of God with a group of Sumniya, an Indian sect who were extreme in
anthropomorphism and held the theory of transmigration of souls. After the debate he was so
greatly puzzled that he abandoned saying prayers for forty days on the plea that he would not
pray to whom he did not know.
It has been seen from the above discourse that Jahm, on the one hand, upheld the doctrine of
Jabr which the Qadariyyah totally denied. On the other hand, Jahm was the forerunner of the
Mu'tazilites in the denial of the attributes of God, on which stood the foundation of their dogmas.
The Jabriyyah and the Qadariyyah, however, did not appear to have survived as regular sects in
the history of Muslim theology. The dogmas initiated by them merged into the doctrines of other
sects, as will be seen later.
Contrary to the Qadariyyah was the school of Jabariyyah—Lit. “The Necessitarians”, a sect of
Muslims who deny free agency in man. Its founder as discussed above was Jahm ibn Ṣafwān
(127 AH/745 CE). The group is also known by the name of its founder as Jahmiyyah. In this
group of Jahm and his adherents were advocates of pure determinism. Due to his thought, he was
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put to death by Salīm ibn Ahwas al-Mazinī in Marw in the last days of the Umayyads. Jabr is a
doctrine which denies that a deed is in reality to be attributed to man, as ascribes it to God. To
such people, man is so weak that he cannot take any action independently. He is nothing more
than a puppet in the hands of God Who manipulates him the way He likes. People of such belief
often supported their stand with quotations from both the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. An instance of
such quotation is in the Qur’ān, chapter 35 verse 8, which says ‘verily God leads astray whom
He pleases and guides to the right path whom He pleases’; and Chapter 10 verse 26, which says
‘God calls to the abode of peace and guides whom He wills into the right path’; and Chapter 42
verse 14 which also asserts that ‘God elects for Himself whom He pleases and guides unto
Himself who turns to repentance.’ An example of quotations from the prophetic traditions
(Ḥadīth) is the one which says ‘what hits you could not possibly have missed you and what
misses you could not probably have hit you, the pens have been raised and the papers are dry’.
Another Ḥadīth stipulates that ‘a man during the process of his growth in the womb gets his life
span and where he would be after death by the decree of God ever before he was born’.
Since, God creates man, since God directs his actions, he has no choice but to behave according
to what has been predestined for him.
They take their denomination from Jabr, which signifies “necessity or compulsion;” because
they hold man to be necessarily and inevitably constrained to act as he does by force of God’s
eternal and immutable decree. This sect is distinguished by two species, some being more rigid
and extreme in their opinion, who are thence called pure Jabariyyah; and others, more moderate
who are therefore called middle Jabiriyyah. The former will not allow man to be said either to
act, or to have any power at all, either operative or acquiring, asserting that men can do nothing,
but produce all his actions be necessity, having neither power, nor will, nor choice, and more
than an inanimate agent. They also declare that rewarding and punishing are also the effects of
necessity and the same they say of the imposing of commands. This was the doctrine of the
Jahmiyyahs, the followers of Jahm, who likewise held that Paradise and Hell will vanish, or be
annihilated, after those who are destined thereto respectively shall have entered them, so that at
last there will remain no existing being besides God, supposing those words of the Qur’ān which
declare that the inhabitants of Paradise and Hell shall remain therein for ever to be hyperbolical
only, and intended for corroboration, and not to denote an eternal duration in reality. The
moderate Jabariyyah are those who ascribe some power to man, but such a power as hath no
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influence on the action; for as to those who grant the power of man to have a certain influence on
the action, which influence is called Acquisition, some will not admit them to be called
Jabriyyah, though others reckon those also to be called middle Jabriyyah, and to contend for the
middle opinion between absolute liberty, who attribute to man acquisition, or concurrence, in
producing the action, whereby he gained commendation or blame (yet without admitting it to
have any influence on the action). There are two main groups of Jabariyyah.
1) The pure Jabariyyah who do not allow any deed at all to man, not even the power to act.
2) The moderate Jabariyyah who admit that man has power but maintain that it is a power which
is in no way effective. Other groups of Jabariyyah are:
The Najjāriyyah—Husain ibn Muḥammad al-Najjār
The Barghūthiyyah—Muḥammad ibn ‘Īsa
The Ḍirariyyah—Ḍirar ibn Amr
The followers of Ḥafz al-Farḍ
Doctrines of Jabariyyah: Jahm ibn Ṣafwān agreed with the Mu’tazilah in denying the eternal
attributes, but he also added other doctrines,
1) It is not lawful to apply to God an attribute which is also applicable to creatures, because this
would imply likeness between God and creatures, he, therefore denies that God is living and
knowing, but maintains that he is powerful, an agent and a creator because to creature cannot be
attributed power, action and creation.
2) God has cognitions which are not eternal and these cognitions are not in a substrate.
According to Jahm ibn Ṣafwān it is not right to say that God could know a thing before he
created it, for the question would arise whether his knowledge remains as it was before or not
3) With regard to created power Jahm ibn Ṣafwān says that a man does not have power over
anything, nor can he be said to have capacity. Man is absolutely determined in his deeds. He has
neither power, nor will, nor choice. Man is determined by God in all his actions, including the
acts of faith, faithlessness, good and evil. In support of this, the group quoted the following
verses of the Qur’ān: “Verily, all this is an admonition: whoever, then so wills, may unto His
sustainer find a way. But you cannot will it unless God wills [to show you that way]: for behold,
God is indeed all-seeing, wise” (Al-Qur’ān: 76: 29-30).
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4) All motion in heaven and hell will come to an end paradise and hell with both pass away after
those who have gone to paradise have enjoyed its bliss, and those who have to hell have suffered
its torments
5) If a man has knowledge of God but outwardly denies him, this denies does not make him an
unbeliever because it does not take away his knowledge.
6) Jahm ibn Ṣafwān also agreed with the Mu’tazilah in denying the beatific vision. The vision of
Allah on the Day of Judgment is possible. In maintaining that the Qur’ān is created, and in
holding that knowledge is obligatory upon reason before revelation.
7) Paradise is not eternal.
The Muslim Majority’s Opinion: From the Sunni point of view, it is incumbent upon every
Mukallaf (one on whose religious duty is imposed) to believe that it is possible for God to create
good and evil; to create Islam in Zayd and unbelief in ‘Amr, knowledge in one of them and
ignorance in the other. It is also incumbent upon every Mukallaf, to believe that the good and the
bad of things are by act of Destiny (Qaḍa) and act of Decree (Qadr). And there is a difference of
opinion as to their meaning. It is said that Destiny (Qaḍa) is the will of God and the eternal
(Azalī) connection of that will, and Decree (Qadr) is God’s bringing into existence the thing in
agreement with the will. So the Will of God that is connected eternally with your becoming a
learned man or a Sultan is destiny, and the bringing of knowledge into existence in you, after
your existence, or the Sultan-ship in agreement with the Will, is decree. And it is said that
Destiny is God’s eternal knowledge and its connection with the thing known, and Decree is
bringing things into a man after he enters existence. Furthermore to the Sunnis, this belief
belongs to the category of things the doing of which is only possible for God. By this, they assert
that there is nothing incumbent upon God. He creates faith in Zayd, for example, and gives him
knowledge out of His grace without there being any necessity upon Him. Hence the saying:
‘‘God’s rewarding the obedient is a grace from Him, and His punishing the rebellious is justice
by Him’’. Obedience does not advantage Him nor does rebellion injure Him. And these acts of
obedience or rebellion are only signs of God’s rewarding or punishing those described by them.
The ones whom He wills to draw near to Himself, He helps to obedience, and in Him who’s
abandoning and rejecting He wills, He creates rebellion. And all acts of good and bad are by the
creation of God, for He creates the creature and that which the creature does as He has said (Al-
Qur’ān:37: 9): “and God has created you and that which ye do”.
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And the proof that possible things are possible in the case of God is that there is a general
agreement on their possibility. If the doing of any possible thing was incumbent upon God, the
possible would be turned into a necessary thing, if they were hindered from Him, the possible
would be turned into an impossible. But the turning of the possible attribute into a necessary or
an impossible one is false.
2.3.5 Let Us Sum Up
In this lesson are discussed the two sects which gave rise to many major sects and whose thought
got developed later in the shape of other sects. Jabariyyah and Qadariyyah are the found to be
the basic bodies of discussion on various Divine truths. Both these groups were disapproved by
the Muslim community for their rigid, extremist and heretical stands. Qadariyyah regarded man
absolutely free in his actions and reject the role of any other power or powers. Jabariyyah, on the
other hand, characterise man's actions as rigidly fatalistic, determined by Allah, reducing man a
passive agent. The doctrine displacing man from his proper status by rigid fatalism of Jabariyyah
and the irresponsible and absolute freedom posted to man by Qadariyyah both met with a
general rejection under the Umayyad rulers particularly ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and Hishām
ibn ‘Abd al-Malik. This prompted the refutation of these schools by Traditionists (Muhaddithūn)
and the jurists (Fuqahā’) of the age. The pre-determinists who were surprisingly supported by
the majority of the Muslims rejected the argument of free-will group saying that the latter were
dualists who had set up the human being as a co-creator with God by believing that human
beings can initiate their own actions and thereby determine their own fate. Similarly, free-willers
were also supported by many people but also rejected by many orthodox Muslims.
1. Discuss the origin and development of Qadariyyah?
2. Discuss the origin and development of Jabariyyah?
3. Explain the doctrines of Qadariyyah?
4. Explain the doctrines of Jabariyyah?
5. Compare the ideologies of Jabariyyah and Qadariyyah?
Company Ltd., 1970.
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Centre, 2010.
4. ___________________, Muslim philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons,
2001.
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Lesson 2.4: Mu‘tazilah and Ash‘ariyyah
Lesson Structure
2.4.1 Introduction
2.4.2 Objectives
2.4.3 Mu‘tazilah
2.4.4 Ash‘ariyyah
2.4.5 Let Us Sum Up
2.4.1 Introduction
Since, ‘Ilm al-Kalām aims to establish Islamic beliefs and dogmas with the help of reason and to
harmonize between reason and revelation, therefore, it was also called 'scholasticism'. But in
order to distinguish the Kalām from that of Christianity it was named ‘Islamic scholasticism’,
which is used for the Kalām that generally covers the Kalām of the Qadariyyah, the Jabariyyah,
the Mushabbihah, the Mujassimah, the Ṣifātiyyah, the Khawārij and the Shī’ah. But more
particularly, it covers the Kalām of the Mu‘tazilah and the Ash‘ariyyah. Whereas the Mu‘tazilites
and the Ash‘arites chiefly differ on the point of priority of reason and revelation. The former
emphasize the importance of reason and the latter believe in the authority of revelation. Nadvi,
for example, says, “It is clear that, though the Arabic word ‘Kalām’ meaning science of reason
includes both Mu‘tazilism and Ash‘arism, the word 'scholasticism' which is generally used as an
English equivalent for Kalām, is not wide enough to cover the two. To avoid the confusion,
therefore, I shall refer in ‘Ilm al-Kalām, Mu‘tazilism as a rationalistic school and Ash‘arism as a
scholastic school.” Accordingly, we can say that the Mu‘tazilites were not the Mutakallimīn in
the real sense; rather they were the philosophers of this ‘Ummah. Because Mutakallimīn are
those who take the truth of Islam as their starting point and they do never deny any of its dogmas
at any cost. On the other hand, “a philosopher does not take them as his starting point but follows
a method of research independent of dogma, without, however, rejecting the dogma or ignoring
it in its sources. We can infer that the Mu‘tazilites could not strictly follow this methodology,
that is, they could not take the truth of Islam as their starting point and if they did so, they could
not justify the dogmas of the Faith. For example, they denied the very existence of Attributes of
God thinking that this was contrary to the Unity of God, or this did entail the plurality of the
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Deity and so on along with the fact that they stressed more on reason than revelation.
Consequently, they were called rationalists rather than Mutakallimīn. Abu Zuhra, on the
contrary, regards the Mu‘tazilites to be the real Mutakallimīn. But in other opinion, the
Ash‘arites are the Mutakallimīn in the real sense. Nevertheless, the Mu‘tazilites can also be
regarded Mutakallimīn at least in some respects, because they tried their best to defend the
dogmas of faith and their efforts remained confined to the Islamic framework. Further, it were
the Mu‘tazilites who had introduced the term ‘Kalām’, as a special branch of learning in Islam.
Their aim was to propound a science of their own, as a counterpart of Manṭiq (logic) of Greek
philosophers. Shahrastānī says, "The Mu‘tazilite leaders studied the works of the philosophers as
they were available during the reign of Al-Māmūn. They then introduced the methods of the ‘Ilm
al- Kalām philosophers into theology, which they turned into a branch of science. They gave it
the name of Kalām: either because the chief question on which they spoke and disputed was that
of Kalām Allah (God’s Word), by which the whole discipline was called; or in imitation of the
philosophers, who so called one of their branches of learning logic, for logic and Kalām are
synonymous. Briefly, Kalām includes in its connotation, different methods of the study of
theology including discourse, dialogue, defence, philosophy, etc., resulting into theosophical
efforts to justify faith and beliefs of the religion either with the help of reason or revelation.
Kalām passed through three stages: in its primary stage it was directed only to refute the
arguments of new converts against Islam and to prove Islamic tenets by quoting Quranic verses
and traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him). In the second stage it became rationalistic in
the hands of the Mu‘tazilites, but in its final stage it was reduced to mere scholasticism aiming at
a reconciliation between reason and revelation on the basis of reasoning, that is, the work of the
Ash‘ariyyah.
2.4.2 Objectives
1. To know the origin and genesis of Mu‘tazilah/Mu‘tazilites and Ash‘arites/Ash‘ariyyah.
2. To exposit the basic beliefs of Mu‘tazilah and Ash‘ariyyah.
3. To know the fundamental doctrines of Mu‘tazilah and Ash‘ariyyah.
4. To know the emergence of ‘Ilm al-Kalām in Muslim Intellectualism.
2.4.3 Mu‘tazilah
Origins of Mu‘tazilah: Subsequent to the times of the Companions of the Prophet of Islam, the
Mu‘tazilah creed made its appearance. It had its inception nearly two centuries after the
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migration (Ḥijrah) of the Prophet from Makkah to Madīnah. The Mu‘tazilah were thoroughgoing
rationalists. They believed that the arbiter of whatever is revealed has to be theoretical reason.
The Mu‘tazilah were named so, because one day Ḥasan al-Baṣarī was imparting instruction to
his pupils in a mosque/Masjid. Before the lessons were finished a person turned up and
addressed him thus: “Now, in our own times a sect of people has made its appearance, the
members of which regard the perpetrator of a grave sin as an unbeliever and consider him
outside the fold of Islam. Yet another group of people have appeared who give hope of salvation
to the perpetrator of a grave sin. They lay down that such a sin can do no harm to a true believer.
They do not in the least regard action as a part of faith and hold that as worship is of no use to
one who is an unbeliever, so also sin can do no harm to one who is a believer in God. What, in
your opinion, is the truth and what creed should we adopt?” Ḥasan al-Baṣarī (d. 110/728-29) was
on the point of giving a reply to this query when a pupil of his got up and said: “The perpetrator
of grave sins is neither a complete unbeliever nor a perfect believer; he is placed midway
between unbelief and faith an intermediate state (Manzilah bayn al-Manzilatayn).” Having
spoken he strode to another corner of the Masjid and began to explain this belief of his to others.
This man was Wāsil ibn ‘Aṭā. Ḥasan al-Baṣarī shot a swift glance at him and said, (I‘tazala
Anna,) i.e., “He has withdrawn from us.” From that very day Wāṣil and his followers were called
al-Mu‘tazilah, the Withdrawers or Secessionists. Ibn Munabbih says that the title of al-
Mu‘tazilah came into vogue after the death of Ḥasan al-Baṣarī. According to his statement, when
Ḥasan al-Baṣarī passed away, Qatādah succeeded him and continued his work. Amr ibn ‘Ubayd
and his followers avoided the company of Qatādah; therefore, they were given the name al-
Mu‘tazilah. In brief, the word I‘tazal means ‘to withdraw’ or ‘secede’, and the Mu‘tazilah are the
people who in some of their beliefs were diametrically opposed to the unanimous consent of the
early theologians or the People of the Approved Way (Ahl Al-Sunnah). The leader of all of them
was Wāsil ibn Ata who was born in 80 A.H/699 A.H at Madīnah and died in 131 A.H/748 AH.
Mu‘tazilah Belief System: Muslims generally speak of Wāṣil’s party as the Mu‘tazilah , but the
latter call themselves the People of Unity and Justice (Ahl al-Tawḥīd wa al-‘Adl). By justice they
imply that it is incumbent on God to requite the obedient for their good deeds and punish the
sinners for their misdeeds. By unity they imply the denial of the divine attributes. Undoubtedly,
they admit that God is All-knowing, powerful, and seeing, but their intellect does not allow them
to admit that these divine attributes are separate and different from the divine essence. The
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reason for this view of theirs is that if the attributes of God are not considered to be identical
with the essence of God, “plurality of eternals” would necessarily result and the belief in unity
would have to be given up. This, in their opinion, is clear. The emergence of this sect took place
during the latter part of the first century or at the beginning of the second. Obviously, ‘Ilm al-
Kalām, like any other field of study, developed gradually and slowly attained maturity. The
opinions held by the Mu‘tazilah are many, and are not confined to the religious matters, or which
according to them form an essential part of the faith. They cover a number of physical, social,
anthropological and philosophical issues, which are not directly related with the faith. However,
there is a certain relevance of these problems to religion, and, in the belief of the Mu‘tazilah, any
inquiry about the matters of religion is not possible without studying them.. In the following
section the principles of Mu‘tazilite beliefs or the basic and salient points of their school of
thought have been enumerated.
Mu‘tazilah Doctrines: There are five principle doctrines which, according to the Mu‘tazilah
themselves, constitute their basic tenets:
The first two doctrines may be said to be more central then the rest of them for the Mu‘tazilah
verily called themselves people of unity and justice Ahl al-Tawḥīd wa al-‘Adl.
1. Tawḥīd: i.e. there is absence of plurality and attributes in the essence of Allah. They believe
that, Allah is without qualities and devoid of all shades of plurality in His essence. He is the
creator of the body, but not body Himself. He is creator of objects but Himself nothing like His
creations, he is away from all the accidental qualities. The Attributes are there by His Essence
and if the Attributes are separated from His Essence, these will be tantamount to substances
existing from all eternity.
2. ‘Adl (Justice): i.e. Allah is just and that He does not oppress His creatures. Like the ancient
Greeks, the Mu‘tazilah believed in absolute free will. In their view, Allah does not predetermine
the lives of humans, but rather that they make decisions entirely independently of what Allah
wills. As a result, they believed that humans are bound to a fate on the Day of Judgment that is
entirely determined by Divine justice (‘Adl). The Mu‘tazilah rationalized that any Faḍl (mercy)
exercised by Allah was a violation of justice and incompatible with His nature. Mu‘tazilah
believe that some acts are essentially, ‘Just’ and some intrinsically ‘unjust’ for instance,
rewarding the obedient and punishing the sinners is justice, and that God is just, i.e. He rewards
the obedient and punishes the sinners, and it is impossible for Him to act otherwise.
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3. Divine retribution (Al-Wa‘d wa al-Wa‘īd): i.e. Allah has determined a reward for the obedient
and a punishment for the disobedient, and there can be no doubt about it. Therefore, Divine
pardon is only possible if the sinner repents, for forgiveness without repentance (Tawbah) is not
possible. The doctrine of retribution is intimately related to that of divine justice. Since God is
Just, He should punish the sinners and reward the virtuous in the life after death. But the
Ash‘arites don’t find any difficulty in declaring that the rewards of God (Thawāb Allah) is the
mercy or grace (Faḍl) from God, and His punishment (‘Iqab) is His justice (‘Adl) in which He
will not be lenient.
4. Manzilah bayn al-Manzilatayn (a position between the two positions): This means that a Fāsiq
(i.e. one who commits one of the "greater sins," such as a wine drunkard, adulterer, or a liar etc.)
is neither a believer (Mu‘min) nor an infidel (Kāfir); Fisq is an intermediary state between belief
and infidelity. The basis of this doctrine is that in their view the faith remains embedded in heart
and actions are its branches (I‘tiqād bi al-Qalbwa ‘Aml bi al-Jawāriḥ).
5. Al- Amr bi al-Ma‘rūfwa al-Nahy ‘Anal-Munkar: (bidding to do what is right and lawful, and
forbidding what is wrong and unlawful). The opinion of the Mu‘tazilah about this Islamic duty
is, firstly, that the Sharī‘ah is not the exclusive means of identifying the Ma‘rūf and the munkar;
human reason can, at least partially, independently identify the various kinds of Ma‘rūf/pious or
good deeds and Munkar/wrongdoings. They consider this incumbent upon every Muslim as a
Farḍ al-‘Ayn i.e. duty of perfect obligation. They deemed that it is necessary to spread their
creed not only by word of mouth but also by force of State authority.
Other beliefs
1. They deny that punishment and reward is given to the dead in the grave and also deny of the
questioning by the angels known as Munkar and Nakīr in grave.
2. They deny the existence of Kirāman Kātibīn (respected writers) as recording angels on the
plea that God is well aware of all the deeds done by His servants.
3. They deny that heaven and hell already exist. They believe that they will come into existence
on the Day of Judgment.
4. They deny the miracles of pious men or saints.
5. They consider angels who bring message of God to the prophets are superior in rank to the
prophets.
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Occasionally, the Mu‘tazilite Mutakallimīn have devoted independent volumes to discussion of
their five doctrines, such as the famous Al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah (the Five Principles) of Qārī ‘Abd
al-Jabbār al-’Astarābādī (d. 415/ 1025), a Mu‘tazilite contemporary of Sayyid al-Murtaḍā A‘lām
al-Hudā and Al-Sahib ibn ‘Abbas (d. 385/995). As can be noticed, only the principles of Tawḥīd
and Justice can be considered as parts of the essential doctrine. The other three principles are
only significant because they characterize the Mu‘tazilah. Even Divine Justice—although its
notion is definitely supported by the Quran, and belief in it is a necessary part of the Islamic faith
and doctrine—has been made one of the five major doctrines because it characterizes the
Mu‘tazilah. Or otherwise belief in Divine Knowledge and Power is as much an essential part of
the Islamic faith and principle doctrine. Also, in the Shiite faith the principle of Divine Justice is
considered one of the five essential doctrines. It is natural that the question should arise: what is
particular about Divine Justice that it should be counted among the essential doctrines, though
justice is only one of the Divine Attributes? Is not Allah Just in the same manner as He is the
Omniscient, the Mighty, the Living, the Perceiver, the Hearer and the Seer? All those Divine
Attributes are essential to the faith. Then why justice is given so much prominence among the
Divine Attributes? The answer is that Justice has no advantage over other Attributes. The Shī’ah
Mutakallimīn have specially mentioned justice among the principle Shi‘ite doctrines and the
Ash‘arites, implicitly deny that it is an Attribute, whereas they do not reject the Attributes of
Knowledge, Life, Will, etc. Accordingly, justice is counted among the specific doctrines of the
Shī’ah, as also of the Mu‘tazilah. The above-mentioned five doctrines constitute the basic
position of the Mu‘tazilah from the viewpoint of Kalām, otherwise, as said before, the
Mu‘tazilite beliefs are not confined to these five and cover a broad scope ranging from theology,
physics and sociology to anthropology, in all of which they hold specific beliefs.
2.4.4 Ash‘ariyyah
The early Abbasid Caliphs, particularly Al-Māmūn, began to patronize the rationalism of the
Mu‘tazilah in public and made it state religion. The Mu‘tazilah speculation, in the hands of the
later Mu‘tazilah, those of the second and third generations, under the influence of Greek
philosophy and with the active support and patronage of the Caliphs, tended to be purely
speculative and "absolutely unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of
thought." They made reason the sole basis of truth and reality and thus identified the sphere of
philosophy with that of religion. They tried to interpret faith in terms of pure thought. They
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ignored the fact that the basic principles of religion are, by their very nature, incapable of logical
demonstration or rational proof. The basic principles of Islam deal with super sensible realities
and, as such, they must first be accepted on the authority of revelation. The Mu‘tazilah, in their
zeal to judge everything by reason alone, diminished the essence of Allah and reduced Him to a
bare indefinable universality or to an abstract unity. This idea of an abstract, impersonal,
absolute Allah could not appeal to the ordinary Muslims. The orthodox section of the people
reacted strongly against the Mu‘tazilite rationalism and began to consider the Mu‘tazilah to be
heretics. The extreme rationalistic attitude of the later Mu‘tazilah was followed by powerful
reaction from the orthodox section of the people. This reaction was greatly aggravated by the
unfortunate attempt of the Caliph al-Māmūn to force Mu‘tazilism (rationalist Kalām) on his
subjects by introducing Mihnah (a compulsory test of faith) in the Mu‘tazilah doctrines,
particularly in their doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’ān. The whole of the third/ninth
century was a time of reaction. The orthodox Muslims (and among them were the Traditionists—
the Muḥaddithīn), the Ẓāhiriyyah (the followers of Dāwūd ibn ‘Alī), and the Muslim jurists
(Fuqahā) adhered strictly to Tradition and literal interpretation of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah,
and refused to admit any "innovation" (Bid‘ah) in the Sharī’ah (the Islamic Code). Any
theological discussion was considered an "innovation" and was as such a cause of displeasure to
them. The reactionary influence of Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and his followers including
Zāhirites was very strong at that period and the orthodox Muslims kept themselves safely aloof
from the Mu‘tazilah and the philosophers. The reaction against the rationalists went to such an
extreme that even the anthropomorphic verses of the Qur’ān were interpreted in a purely literal
sense. Mālik ibn Anas said: “Allah's settling Himself firmly upon His Throne is known, the how
of it is unknown; belief in it is obligatory; and questioning about it is an innovation.” Any
speculation about sacred things was considered an innovation. Every dogma was to be believed
in without raising the question how or why (Bilā Kayfa). Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, in his early
youth, came under the care of the great Mu‘tazilah scholar of the Baṣrite school, Abū‘Alī
Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbā‘ī, and, as a disciple of his, became an adherent of the
Mu‘tazilah school and continued to support its doctrines up to the age of forty. After that, there
happened a sudden change in his mind and one day he went to the Masjid of Baṣrah and
declared: “He who knows me, knows who I am, and he who does not know me, let him know
that I am Abu al-Ḥasan Ali al-Ash‘arī, that I used to maintain that the Qur’ān is created, that eyes
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of men shall not see Allah, and that the creatures create their actions. Here, I repent that I have
been a Mu‘tazilī. I renounce these opinions and I take the engagement to refute the Mu‘tazilah
and expose their infamy and turpitude.” With this sudden change in his thought and ideology, he
maintained an intermediary position between the two diametrically opposed schools of thought
prevailing at the time. He had to fight against both the opposing parties. At the one extreme were
the Mu‘tazilah, who made reason in preference to revelation the sole criterion of truth and reality
and, thus, passed slowly into comparatively innocuous heretics. At the other extreme were the
orthodox groups, particularly the Zahirites, the Mujassimites (anthropomorphists), the
Muḥaddithīn (Traditionists), and the Jurists, all of which were wholly opposed to the use of
reason or Kalām in defending or explaining religious dogmas and condemned any discussion
about them as innovation. Al-Ash‘arī wrote his Istiḥsān al-Khaud mainly to meet the objections
raised by the orthodox school against the use of reason in matters of faith. In that treatise he says:
"A section of the people (i.e., the Zahirites and other orthodox people) made capital out of their
own ignorance; discussions and rational thinking about matters of faith became a heavy burden
for them, and, therefore, they became inclined to blind faith and blind following (Taqlīd). They
condemned those who tried to rationalize the principles of religion as ‘innovators.’ They
considered discussion about motion, rest, body, accident, colour, space, atom, the leaping of
atoms, and attributes of Allah, to be an innovation and a sin. They said that had such discussions
been the right thing, the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Companions would have definitely
done so; they further pointed out that the Prophet (peace be upon him), before his death,
discussed and fully explained all those matters which were necessary from the religious point of
view, leaving none of them to be discussed by his followers; and since he did not discuss the
problems mentioned above, it was evident that to discuss them must be regarded as an
‘innovation.’ They further contended that these so called theological problems were either
known to the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Companions and yet they kept silent and did
not discuss them or they were not known to them. If they knew them and yet did not discuss
them, we are also to follow them in keeping silent, and if they could remain unaware of them we
can also do so. In both cases, discussion about them would be an ‘innovation.’ These were, in
brief, their objections against the use of Kalām in matters of faith.
Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī Ibn Ismā‘īl al-Ash‘arī (258-322/873-935): Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī started
his career as member of the Mu‘tazilah and as student of Abū‘Alī Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-
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Wahhāb al-Jubbā‘ī of Baṣrah branch. At the age of forty as discussed above he abandoned the
Mu‘tazilah and countered its views preaching against it in the Masjid of Baṣrah. His views
gained popularity when Niẓām al-Mulk opened the Niẓāmiyyah Madrasah in Baghdad. Later
Ash‘arite thought was taught in different branches of Niẓāmiyyah.
Following the public statement made at the age of forty, al-Ash‘arī set out to develop a theology
that used reason in the defence of the tenets of the faith and yet remained loyal to the dicta of
revelation while making use of dialectic. He composed more than ninety works, many of which
have survived. Among the most famous are Al-Ibānah ‘An Uṣūl al-Dīniyyah (Elucidation
concerning the Principles of Religion), in which he sought to draw to his side the extreme
“traditionalists,” who were opposed to the use of dialectic in matters of religion; Kitāb al-Luma‘
(The Book of Light), which contains the principles of Ash‘arite Kalām; and Maqālāt al-
Islāmiyyīn (Doctrines of the Muslims), a later work, which sets out to describe the views of
various theological schools. Al-Ash‘arī sought to charter an intermediate course between two
extremes: that of Mu‘tazilah rationalists, who made revelation subservient to reason, and that of
“externalists” of different persuasions, who rejected the role of reason completely and remained
satisfied with the purely external meaning of the verses of the Qur’ān and the teachings of the
Ḥadīth. One of the great Ash‘arite theologians of later centuries, al-Juwaynī, stated in fact that
al-‘Ash‘arī was not really a theologian (mutakallim) but a reconciler of the two extreme views
prevalent in Islamic society at his time. To combat the extreme views of the day, al-Ash‘arī held,
against the view of the Mu‘tazilah, that the Divine Attributes were real but added that they were
not like human attributes as claimed by the anthropomorphists. He believed that on the Day of
Judgment man could see God, but without there being an incarnation (Hulūl) of God in a human
or nonhuman form. He believed that the Qur’ān was uncreated and eternal, yet its ink and paper,
individual letters and words were created. Again in contrast to the Mu‘tazilah and their extreme
opponents on this matter (the Murji‘ites), Al-Ash‘arī believed that the Muslim who sins is in
God’s Hands and can be forgiven by God and go to paradise, or he can be punished in hell for a
temporary period. Also against the view of Mu‘tazilah, who believed that the Prophet (peace be
upon him) could not intercede for Muslims before God, and the extreme Shi‘ites, who believed
that the Prophet (peace be upon him) and ‘Alī (R.A) could intercede for Muslims on their own,
Al-Ash‘arī held that the Prophet (peace be upon him) could intercede on behalf of a sinner but
with God’s permission.
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Doctrines of Ash‘ariyyah/Ash‘artite thought
1) Relation between God (Allah) and His attributes: Ash‘ariyyah hold that since God is all
powerful, all knowing etc. therefore, His attributes should not be taken on par with the
similar attributes of the creation which are quite limited and perhaps equal to nothingness
if compared with the attributes of God, and human’s limited senses cannot comprehend
these attributes .
2) Created or uncreatedness of Qur’ān: Al-Ash‘arī Believed in uncreatedness of the Qur’ān
which is a command of God and in the Qur’ān it is clear that creation and command (Al-
Qur’ān: 7:45) are used with different meanings. To strengthen his view Al-Ash‘arī sought
the help of logic and will.
3) Possibility of beatific vision: Ash‘arites believe in the beatific vision even in the physical
state. For this, they sought help from the Qur’ān, the Ḥadīth and logic as well. ‘‘that day
faces be looking towards their lord. (Al-Qur’ān:75:22, 23) this will be a gift to the good
doers on the Day of Resurrection.’’
4) God is Seeing Himself on the throne: This concept is clear in the Qur’ān by specific
words and several verses point towards it, (Al-Qur’ān:20:5).
5) Freedom of will: Al-Ash‘arī took a middle course between, the old totalistic view in
which man was put to be a playing entity in the hands of God and the Mu‘tazilah view of
divine justice which gave man absolute free will making God a simple judge announcing
His judgements. Al-Ash‘arī is of thought that God creates in a person power (Qudrah)
and choice (Ikhtiyār). Thus, the creations action is his own acquisition (Kasb) (Al-
Qur’ān:2:286) for it corresponds to his power (Qudrah) and choice (Ikhtiyār) previously
created in him.
The principles of Ash‘ariyyah/Ash‘arite Kalām/Theology
1. The Divine Attributes, contrary to the belief of the Mu‘tazilah and the philosophers, are not
identical with the Divine Essence.
2. The Divine Will is all embracing. The Divine providence and predestination encompass all
events (this belief, too, is contrary to the view held by the Mu’tazilah, though in agreement with
those of the philosophers).
3. All evil, like good, is from God (of course, this view is a logical corollary, in al-Ash‘arī’s view
of the above belief).
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4. Man is not free in his acts, which are created by God (this belief, too, in al-Ash‘arī’s view,
necessarily follows from the doctrine of all al-embracing nature of the Divine Will).
5. Acts are not intrinsically good or evil, i.e. Husn or qubh of deeds is not intrinsic, but
determined by the Sharī’ah. The same is true of justice. What is 'just', is determined by the
Sharī’ah not by reason (contrary to the belief of the Mu’tazilah).
6. Grace (Luṭf) and selection of the best for creation (Al-Aslah) are not incumbent uponGod
(contrary to the belief of the Mu’tazilah).
7. Man’s power over his actions does not precede them [Lā Istiṭā‘ah Qabl al-Fi‘l], but is
commensurate and concurrent with the acts themselves (contrary to the belief of the Muslim
philosophers and the Mu’tazilah).
8. Absolute de-anthropomorphism (Tanzīh Muṭlaq), or absolute absence of similarity between
Allah and others, does not hold (contrary to the Mu‘tazilah view).
9. Doctrine of acquisition: Man does not 'create' his own acts; rather he 'acquires' or 'earns' them
(this is in justification of the Ahl al-Sunnah belief in the creation of human acts by Allah).
10. Possibility of the beatific vision: Allah shall be visible to the eyes on the Day of Resurrection
(contrary to the view of the Mu‘tazilah and the philosophers).The Fāsiq is a believer (Mu’min)
(contrary to the view of the Khawārij, who consider him Kāfir, and contrary to the Mu‘tazilah
doctrine of Manzilah bayn al-Manzilatayn).
11. There is nothing wrong about Allah’s pardoning someone without repentance. Similarly,
nothing is wrong about Allah's subjecting a believer to chastisement (contrary to the Mu‘tazilah
position).
12. Intercession (Shafā‘ah) is justifiable (contrary to the Mu‘tazilah position).
13. To tell a lie or break a promise is not possible for Allah.
14. The world is created in time and not eternal (Ḥādith) (contrary to the view of the
philosophers).
15. The Qur’ān is Qadīm/eternal; however, this is true of Al-Kalām al-Nafsī (meaning of the
Qur’ān), not Al-Kalām al-Lafẓī―the spoken word (this is in justification of the Ahl al-Sunnah
belief about the Qur’ān that it is Qadīm).
16. The Divine Acts do not follow any purpose or aim (contrary to the view of the philosophers
and the Mu’tazilah)
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17. It is possible that Allah may saddle a person with a duty beyond his power (contrary to the
belief of the philosophers and the Mu’tazilah).
Al-Ash‘arī, altogether, sought to create a moderate position in nearly all the theological issues
that were being debated at that time. He made reason subservient to revelation and negated the
free will of man in favour of a voluntarism that deprives man of his creative free will and
emphasizes the omnipotence of God in a way that according to many schools goes beyond even
the text of the Quran. In the Sacred Book, on the one hand, God’s omnipotence and omniscience
are constantly emphasized, and, on the other, human beings are held responsible for their actions.
In emphasizing the doctrine of voluntarism, al- Ash‘arī in a sense reduced the Divine Nature to
the Divine Will and conceived of God as an All-Powerful Will rather than the Supreme Reality,
which is and also wills. Ash‘arism is concerned not only with specifically religious issues but
also with epistemology and the philosophy of nature.
2.4.5 Let Us Sum Up
In this lesson, we discussed the emergence and establishment of two major (philosophical and
theological) sects of Islam. The major sects arose nearly 12 centuries ago having a major effect
on Islam. They developed some principles on the basis of reason and revelation respectively.
One creed (Mu’tazilah) on the basis of reason gave the rational views on the basic tenets of
Islam, and the other, the Ash‘arī creed countered the absolute rationalistic creed of Mu‘tazilah,
who wished to prove each and every basic principle of divine religion in the light of reason and
intellect. Though for some time, the Mu‘tazilah were taken as defenders of the dogmas of the
religion against the severe attacks of the philosophical and sceptic mind. But, it was impossible
to defend so long for a religion which was beyond the reach of reason and Human intellect.
Thus, it was but natural that orthodox Muslims were not ready to rationalize the religion in the
absolute sense of the word. So, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, who groomed under the teachings of
Mu‘tazilah reached the stage where from he challenged, refuted and destroyed all the
rationalistic fervour of the Mu‘tazilah. Equipped with rational and intellectual sagacity, al-
Ash‘arī uprooted the foundations of Mu‘tazilism and, Muslim orthodoxy got back its ascendency.
1. What is Mu‘tazilism. Discuss its origin and genesis?
2. Explain the main doctrines of Mu‘tazilah?
3. What is Ash‘arism. Discuss its origin and doctrines?
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4. Write in brief about Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī?
5. Compare and contrast the views of Mu‘tazilah and Ash‘arites?
Centre, 2010.
iii. ___________________, Muslim philosophy and Science, New Delhi: Sarup & Sons,
2001.
iv. Shaikh, M. Saeed, Studies in Muslim Philosophy, Delhi: Adam Publishers and
Distributers, 1994.
v. Sharif, M. M, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols., Delhi: A Venture of Low Price
Publications, 2004.
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Unit III
Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers

i) Al-Kindi
ii) Al-Farabi
iii) Ibn Sina
iv) Ibn Miskaweh and Ibn Tufayl
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UNIT III: Contribution of the following Muslim Philosophers
Lesson 3.1: Al-Kindī
Lesson Structure
3.1.1 Introduction
3.1.2 Objectives
3.1.3 An Overview of Al-Kindī’s Life
3.1.4 An Overview of Al-Kindī’s Works
3.1.5 Back Ground of Al-Kindī’s Philosophy
3.1.6 Philosophical Journey of Al-Kindī
3.1.7 Let Us Sum Up
3.1.1. Introduction
Under the influence of the Quran and its interpretations/explanations through acts and words of
the final Prophet of Allah, Muḥammad (peace be upon him) various theoretical and practical
sciences developed swiftly with the expansion of Islamic dominion .Great emphasis on the
generation of Knowledge, learning, research, translation of existing knowledge structure
provided the most optimum and fertile soil for the growth of various natural and philosophical
sciences. All this reached to its climax during the emergence of Abbasid Empire. Under the
Abbasid patronage the Greek and Hellenic knowledge was rendered into Arabic which opened
the gateways of rationalistic understanding of texts in the Muslim intelligentsia. This resulted in
the emergence of classic scholarships in various sciences, which are related to human lives
directly or indirectly. In this unit we are dealing with few pioneering philosophical scholarships
of various philosophers.
The Arab philosopher who was among the first of his race to interest himself in strictly
philosophical questions and not merely for theological or apologetic purposes. As a pioneer in a
new field, Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb ibn Isḥāq Al-Kindī was especially remarkable for the magnitude of
his literary output and the range of his interests which not only included speculative philosophy
but extended over the whole field of scientific enquiry, and included astronomy, mathematics,
meteorology, optics, music and medicine. That is why few scholars described him as a natural
scientist rather than a philosopher. Al-Kindī's chief importance lies in the fact that as the first
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Muslim philosopher he was influential in determining the method to be followed and the
problems to be discussed by his successors in the same field.
3.1.2 Objectives
The objectives of the lesson are as:
1. To know Al-Kindī as a pioneer in the legacy of Muslim Philosophy
2. To highlight Al-Kindī as the mediator between Greek Philosophy and Muslim intellectualism
3. To highlight the influence of Greek philosophy on Al-Kindī’s thought
4. To highlight the main contribution of Al-Kindī in the Muslim Philosophy.
3.1.3 An Overview of Al-Kindī’s Life
Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb ibn Isḥāq Al- Kindī, was born in the year 800 C.E, in Kufa in an aristocratic
family of Kindah tribe which had played an important role in the early history of Islam. His
father was governor of Basra, a South Iraqi city of Persian Gulf, where he received primary
education.
Al-Kufa and Al-Basra, in the eight century C.E, were the two rivalling centers of the Muslim
world. Al-Kufa was more inclined to rational studies; and in this intellectual atmosphere, Al-
Kindī passed his early boyhood. He learnt the Quran by heart, the Arabic grammar, literature,
and elementary arithmetic, all of which formed the curriculum of the schools/Madāris (sing.,
Madrasah). He then studied Fiqh and the new born discipline called Kalām. But it seems that he
was more interested in sciences and philosophy, to which he dedicated the rest of his life,
especially after he went to Baghdad.
Qāḍī Sa‘īd ibn Aḥmad al-Andalusī gives us some information in the Tabaqāt al-Umam.
According to this source, Al-Kindī's father, Isḥāq ibn al-Sabāh, was governor of Kufa under Al-
Mahdī and Al-Rashīd, and his great-grandfather, Al-Ash‘ath ibn Qays, was a companion of the
Prophet (peace be upon him). Thus, Al-Kindī was of noble origin and belonged to the ruling
classes. Al-Qifṭī tells us that Al-Kindī was born at Kufa during his father's governorship but that
he received his early education at Baṣrah and later studied at Baghdad.
In Baghdad, he enjoyed the support of Abbasid rulers. He became famous in the Abbasid capital
as a scholar and physician. He was patronized by Al-Mā’mūn and Al-Mu‘tasim who were
Abbasid Caliphs. Al-Mā’mūn had appointed him to work at a recognized center for Greek
philosophical and scientific texts translation in Baghdad known as House of Wisdom (Bayt al-
Ḥikmah). Here, Al-Kindī worked with a group of translators who were engaged with the work of
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Aristotle, Plato, Neo-Platonists, and Greek mathematicians and scientists into Arabic. Jerome
Cardano (ca. 1501-1576 C.E), the Italian physician and mathematician says in his book De
Subtilitate that Al-Kindī is one of the most influential figures in human history. Cardano
considered Al-Kindī one of the twelve greatest minds in history.
AI- Kindī is well known to the academic world as Philosopher of the Arabs, followed a Neo-
Platonic path, although he attempted to argue for the creation of the world as against the theory
of constant production and reproduction. In fact, Al-Kindī introduced metaphysics into Islamic
philosophical world in which it had not existed earlier. He worked very hard to introduce specific
technical philosophical terms in Arabic. Simultaneously, he reconceived Greek philosophy in
terms of Islamic doctrines. Scholars believe that, Al-Kindī was pioneer mainly because he
developed a requisite Arabic vocabulary that made Greek thinking expressible in the Arab idiom
and thus, accessible to Muslims.
Al-Kindī was a pioneer in chemistry, physics, psycho–somatic therapeutics, geometry, optics,
music theory, as well as philosophy of science. His significant mathematical writings greatly
facilitated the diffusion of the Arabic numerals into Asia and Africa (today called ‘Arabic
numerals’). A distinctive feature of his work was the conscious application of mathematics and
quantification, and his invention of specific laboratory apparatus to implement experiments.
3.1.4. An Overview of His Works
Tenth century book seller Ibn al-Nadīm’s Catalogue (Al-Fihrist) lists more than 240 works under
the name of Al-Kindī, most of which have unfortunately been lost. Thanks to Ibn al-Nadim, we
know that Al-Kindī has written so many books on a very wide variety of scientific and
philosophical disciplines. In fact, the scientific and mathematical works outnumber his
philosophical works. Following Ibn al-Nadīm, the versatile Arab writer Al-Qifṭī classified his
writings, most of which are short treatises, into seventeen groups:
(1) Philosophical,
(2) Logical,
(3) Arithmetical,
(4) Globular,
(5) Musical,
(6) Astronomical,
(7) Geometrical,
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(8) Spherical,
(9) Medical,
(l0) Astrological,
(11) Dialectical,
(12) Psychological,
(13) Political,
(14) Causal (meteorological),
(15) Dimensional,
(16) On first things,
(17) On the species of some chemicals and metals etc.
Al-Kindī was very much known in the West mainly because of his scientific works which were
translated into Latin in the middle Ages: Tractates de Erroribus Philosophorum, De Quinque
Essentiis (matter, form, motion, space and time). Moreover, his well-known work on
psychology, the Discourse on the Soul is a modification of the views of the Greek philosophers.
He mainly focused on Aristotle's Categories to prove that the soul is immaterial.
In his psychological work On Sleep and Dream, Al-Kindī uses Aristotle's theory of imagination
to explain prophetic dreams. In his work on ethics, On Dispelling Sorrows, he tries to theorize
his views relating it to psychology. We have to mention here that his contribution to our
knowledge of cosmology is profound. He produced cosmological theories in two texts, On the
Proximate Agent Cause of Generation and Corruption and On the Prostration of the Outermost
Sphere. While these works are influenced by Aristotle, Al-Kindī gave extensive attention to
Greek scientific sources such as Ptolemy.
Al-Kindī was one of the first Arab thinkers who engaged himself in studying and commenting on
Greek scientific and philosophical manuscripts. First of all, he wrote books in epistemology and
logic. A few years ago, a number of his treatises were found in Istanbul which include most of
his philosophical works. These treatises include his famous philosophical works On First
Philosophy (Fī al-Falāsafah al-Ūlā) and On The Classification of Aristotle's Works and On The
Intellect.
In fact, On First Philosophy's version which is found in Istanbul is incomplete, comprising only
of the first part, which is divided into four sections. The first section praises and honors Greek
philosophical wisdom. The second section deals with the author's deep involvement in the issue
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of the eternity of the world. His main engagement in the third and fourth sections is to assert the
existence of the "true one" i.e. God, which is the source of unity in all other things.
In this book, he appropriates various Aristotelian concepts and tries to incorporate them into a
world which is shaped by Islam. He laid the foundations of a new philosophy which was highly
influenced by Aristotle (ca. 384-322 BCE) and Greek ideas. The influence of Aristotle and the
Greeks could be traced in his work Fi Kammiya Kutub Aristutalis wa ma Yahtāju Ilaihi fī Taḥsīl
al-Falsafah (The Quantity of Aristotle's Books and What is Required for the Acquisition of
Philosophy) and in his philosophical treatise Fī Waḥdāniyat Allah wa Tunhiy Jism al-‘Ālam (On
the Oneness of God and the Limitation of the Body of the World). In these works, he elaborated a
system of thought which is based on the logic of Greek philosophy. Thereafter, he applied this
logic to the issues of his time, such as creation, immortality, God's knowledge and prophecy.
Al-Kindī's work, Introduction to the Study of Aristotle contains a chapter about the difference
between prophetic and philosophical knowledge. His important treatise On Cause and Effect was
addressed to Al-Mā’mūn which was an attempt to answer the existing theological questions.
Then, another long treatise on causality, Explanation of the Proximate Cause of Coming-to-be
and Passing away, shows Greek influence on Al-Kindī.
Al-Kindī’s On the intellect (Fi al-'Aql) is the first treatise to give a taxonomy of the types of
intellect. It was translated into Latin by Gerard de Cremona. According to Al-Kindī, no one can
be a philosopher without studying mathematics. His philosophy, therefore, naturally, consists of
mathematics and natural philosophy. He is highly influenced by Neo-Phythagoreanism as well as
Neo-Platonism. He proved his philosophical theorem with the help of mathematics.
Another of Al-Kindī's book, Fī Ḥudūd al-Ashyā’ wa Rusūmihā (On the Definitions and
Descriptions of Things), is an attempt to integrate Greek ideas into his own culture in a different
way. In this treatise, he indicates the importance of having accurate philosophical terminology.
He made a list of technical philosophical terms and definitions. But, he faced problems in
relation with his use of philosophical terms.
This treatise was found in Istanbul as a manuscript which Abū Riḍa edited and published in 1952
along with other treatises by Al-Kindī. But its authenticity has been doubted. Abū Riḍa remarks
in the introduction that handwriting of On the Definitions differed from the other treatises. But,
some Islamic philosophers view that the work certainly belongs to Al-Kindī's translation group.
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3.1.5. Back Ground of Al-Kindī’s Philosophy
For a proper evaluation of Al-Kindī's contribution to Islamic philosophy, it is essential to set him
in his proper historical and intellectual milieu. We cannot understand his treatises if we isolate
them from their context. Al-Kindī is important because he was the first Muslim to attempt to
integrate with his Muslim beliefs the scientific and philosophical knowledge which reached the
Arabs by way of the Syrian Christian translators during the ninth century C.E. The works of Al-
Kindī are not the original productions of an isolated genius, but are the reformulation in Arabic,
in a later version of Greek philosophy as it had been commentated upon and systematized down
the centuries. Al-Kindī was a scholar; he derived his knowledge from the written word rather
than from personal reflection. For that reason, an accurate interpretation of his writings demands
an understanding of the various traditions and influences to which he was subjected. We have to
examine who were his teachers, where was he educated, what were his sources. Unfortunately,
the biographers give us almost no information about his life and intellectual development, nor
about the nature of his relationships with his contemporaries.
Al-Kindī's philosophical thought was influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophical notion of
Plotinus, Proclus and John Philoponus. During Al-Kindī's period there was an anonymous
Neoplatonic work called Theologica Aristotelis which was the most important source of Neo-
Platonism for early Muslim scholars. This work was paraphrased from the fourth, fifth and sixth
enneads of Plotinus. Al-Kindī wrote a commentary on it, which was a bridge to the thought of
philosophers such as Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā whose numerous short writings suggest his
significant role in spreading Neo Platonic ideas among the Muslims. Moreover, in his famous
book On First Philosophy, Al-Kindī attempts to merge Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in his
coherent philosophical vision.
In fact, it is beyond dispute that, Al-Kindī has moulded his thought through a free environment
saturated by Neoplatonic ideas. However, some scholars have interpreted the impact of the
Neoplatonic system on Al-Kindī's thought as somewhat confined within strictly defined limits.
These scholars have cited some examples that show Al-Kindī did not follow throughout the
substantial doctrine of Neo-Platonism and its founder Plotinus. Al-Kindī rejected the ontological
concept of Neo-Platonism even though he used to shape his own doctrine of the ineffable One.
And such scholars mention that Al-Kindī has taken only a very few ideas which are important,
from Plotinus Enneads via his paraphrase Theologia Aristotlies. In the view of these scholars Al-
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Kindī is a Neo-Platonist only in a limited way. According to Netton, these kinds of remarks do
not have a rational base. Moreover it leads the casual readers to assume that the element of Neo-
Platonic tenets in Al-Kindī's work is completely negligible. Even though, he is not a thorough-
going Neo-Platonist like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Al-Kindī has more than a little vestige of Neo-
Platonism in his theological thought.
3.1.6. Philosophical journey of Al-Kindī
Al-Kindī the first Muslim philosopher defines philosophy as the’ “Knowledge of the reality of
things within man’s possibility, because the philosopher’s end in his theoretical knowledge is to
gain truth and in his practical knowledge to behave in accordance with truth.”
Al-Kindī's philosophical life started around the translation movement that had grown from its
early beginning in the eight century and had been supported by the Abbasid rulers especially by
Al-Mā’mūn. The Abbasid period (750 - 1285 C.E.) was the most magnificent period in Arab
history which marked substantial material, cultural and intellectual development. The period
witnessed two main groups of translators who had translated Greek scientific philosophical text
into Arabic. Al-Kindī became a patron of one of the two main groups of translators. This
experience contributed much to his philosophical and theological enquiries.
Al-Kindī cannot be considered as a mere translator of ancient text. He had a large number of
Christian scholars and translators working with him. It is acknowledged that he guided the effort
of several important early translators, who had special interest in Greek metaphysical works
concerning God and the soul. Al-Kindī's circle included famous translators of the Abbasid
period, Yaḥyā bin al-Biṭrīq, who translated Aristotle's De Caelo and Ibn Na‘īm al-Himsī, who
translated the logical work of Aristotle and a part of the Enneads of Plotinus.
His philosophical career peaked under Al-Mu‘tasim to whom he dedicated his famous work On
First Philosophy. This was published during the period of speculative theologians' ascendancy.
Their theological view made a deep impact on Al-Kindī. Moreover, Al-Kindī shared their view
on dogmatic questions. But, during the reign of Al-Mutawakkil (ca. 847-861 CE), Al-Kindī lost
his privilege in the court and his reputation was sullied. According to some historians, the early
period of Al-Mutawakkil was characterized by the clash of two hostile groups i.e., the rationalist
Mu‘tazilah and the orthodox Ash‘ariyyah. Consequently, Al-Kindī was denied his patronage.
Apart from this, his personal library in the House of Wisdom was confiscated. But the Caliph
didn't behave like the Byzantine emperor Justinian.
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Overtime, his library was restored through the help of a friend. But, he couldn't regain his
reputation in the court and he died in Baghdad in about ca. 873 CE. He was one among the
important philosophers for whom truth was more valuable than patronage.
In a way, within the Arabic philosophical tradition, Al-Kindī's philosophical legacy was very
persistent and permanent, but in another way it was narrow and temporary. He introduced
philosophy into the Arabic speaking milieu through the translation of Greek philosophical texts.
To this extent, Al-Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes are said to be the true heirs of Al-Kindī. But,
on the other hand, Al-Kindī had a more direct influence on subsequent philosophers through his
own works. The philosophers who were influenced by him initiated the 'Kindīan Tradition'. It
had a significant role in the Islamic scholarly environment for about two centuries after Al-
Kindī's death.
Al-Kindī's ideas had been followed by his own students and their followers. Two prominent
figures of Kindīan tradition from the first generation were Abū Zayd al-Balkhī (d.934 C.E) and
Aḥmad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Sarakshī (d. 899 C.E). Unfortunately, no complete philosophical work
has been found in the name of these thinkers.
According to Peter Adamson, many of the works attributed to Al-Sarakshī resemble Al-Kindī's
works. It is also observed that he used Al-Kindī's own words as it is to some extent. While
defending the conservative people's argument that “acquisition of knowledge of the reality of
things is atheism”, Al-Kindī said of such accusers, “they disrupted with good men in defense of
untrue position, which they had founded and occupied without any merit only to gain power and
to trade with religion.” In his paper On the Definitions of Things and Their Descriptions (Risālah
fī Ḥudūd al-Ashyā’wa Rusūmiyya) Al-Kindī gave six definitions of philosophy:
1. He explained the Greek etymology of the words 'philo' and 'sophia'. 'Philo,' means
friend and 'Sophia' means wisdom. So, philosophy is the love of wisdom.
2. Then he gives the functional definition by viewing the Philosophy as the human
endeavor to emulate divine excellence as much as is possible.
3. He added that philosophy is, in a way, the practice of death. While death means the
separation of the soul from the body, it also touches upon the meaning of soul.
4. He explained how philosophy allows man to know himself.
5. According to Al-Kindī, philosophy is the science of all sciences and the wisdom of all
wisdoms.
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6. In his most significant work, On First Philosophy, Al-Kindī describes First
philosophy or metaphysics as the knowledge of the first cause or that of God. For
him, the rest of philosophy is included in this primary knowledge. According to Fuad
al-Ehwan, Al-Kindī’s definition of philosophy proceeds by taking philosophy as the
knowledge of the reality of things within man's possible limits. The philosopher’s end
in his theoretical knowledge is to gain truth and in his practical knowledge to behave
in accordance with truth.
Al-Kindī divided philosophy into two major branches: theoretical and practical. Thus, theoretical
philosophy is made up of physics and mathematics which had to do with mind and matter, that
is, metaphysics or theology, which dealt with non-material things. Practical philosophy included
ethics, economics and politics. It is equally important to mention here that there was a debate
over the philosophical status of Al-Kindī. Some scholars cited that Al-Kindī was not a
philosopher because of the lack of logical theory in his system.
Sa‘īd Al-Andalusī says:
Al-Kindī wrote on logic many books which never became popular, and which
people never read or used in the sciences, because these books missed the art of
analysis which is the only way to distinguish the right and wrong in every study.
By the art of synthesis, which is what Ya’qūb meant by his writings, no one can
profit, unless he has sure premises from which he can make the synthesis.
Al-Kindī wrote so many treatises on God and Creation, the two important treatises inevitably
stood for the specific subjects. The treatises were On First philosophy and On the Unity of the
God and the Finitude of The Body of The Universe. Although, Al-Kindī reveals his influence of
the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian pattern in various metaphysical subjects, he tries to come up
with his own unique conclusions rooted in Islamic principles.
On the philosophical issue of the eternity of the world, Al-Kindī opposes strongly the
Aristotelian metaphysics. For Aristotle, the world is eternal and its motion and time are also
eternal. Aristotle contradicts himself in his argument by saying that infinity cannot exist in
actuality and at the same time he stated that the actual existent world is eternal and therefore is
infinite. Al-Kindī's mathematical foundation reflects the independence of his philosophical
reasoning and it gives him a strong identity in his thought. He strongly supported the theory of
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"creation out of nothing" (Creation Ex Nihilo). Hence, he believes that God was the only Creator
of the universe and He created out of nothing.
According to Al-Allāf, Al-Kindī's philosophical notion about the world is clearly emphasized in
the following themes stated by Al-Kindī:
A- "The world is created.
B- The world is created from nothing.
C- Allah is the Creator of this world.
D- Allah created the world in time (at a specific time), thus, the world has a beginning in time or
it is Ḥādith (created in time).
E- Allah created the world in time by His Will.
F- The world not only has a beginning in time, but also will have an end in time, and that end is
based on the Will of its Creator to end it.
Al-Kindī perceives that the world must have been created because it has a finite body that has
motion like human beings, animal, plants all of which seem to have been created in time and
they will have to have a definite end. Kevin Staley says that Al-Kindī attempts to establish the
notion of creation in time and its non-eternity in the following premises.
1) All that is quantitative (which includes body, time and motion) is finite.
2) But time is the measure of the being of the body of the universe.
3) Therefore, the universe is of finite duration, that is to say, it must have a temporal beginning
with regard to its very existence.
4) But the body of the universe cannot have been the cause of its own existence.
5) Therefore, it has been caused to exist by another, in time and from nothing."
The conception of causality in Al-Kindī’s Philosophy is mostly dependent on Aristotle and is a
bit modified by early Neo-Platonic doctrines. Following Aristotle's material, formal, efficient
and final causes, Al-Kindī makes out four categories of “Causes” which are: “whether”, “what”,
“which” and “why.” Eric Ormbsy explains that, the “weather?” of something, is “does it exist;”
the “what?” of something, is, “what it is;” the “which?” of a thing is, the specific category into
which it falls; and the “why?” is the ultimate purpose of a thing. Aristotle's concept of the God as
the prime mover is portrayed as an unmoved cause of the universe. But, Al-Kindī defines this
Cause in terms of unity which is the ultimate cause of all existing things. According to him this
unity is eternal and its unity is to be identified with its existence.
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Al-Kindī perceives that the eternal is perfect and it is independent of any cause. The being of this
eternal is simple, unique and changeless. lvry quotes Kindī from his treatise On Definitions "the
eternal is that which has never been non-existent; it does not require another for its subsistence,
and that which does not require another for its subsistence has no cause, while that which has no
cause endures forever" Al-Kindī's notion is clearly indebted to John Philoponus’ view of God as
the only ungenerated and uncaused and Philoponus rejected Aristotle’s doctrine of eternal world.
Al-Kindī emphasizes that "the eternal has no cause; the eternal has neither subject nor
predicated, nor agent not reason, i.e. that for the sake of which it is for there are no causes other
than one." In this passage Al-Kindī observes that eternal has no subject, predicate, agent and
reason. These synonyms of causal terms are the physical correlation of the causation which is not
associated with eternity, and therefore, he asserts that eternal is not caused. Despite the fact that,
Al-Kindī departed from Aristotle’s view that the world is eternal, he agreed with Aristotle that
heavenly bodies and the basic elements of matter are “permanent” It is “uncreated” and
imperishable. But Al-Kindī clearly states that, they continue like this only until and unless God
wills. Therefore, he assumes that the world is originally created and it can't be taken as
something which is not ultimately imperishable.
Thus, in his view, the world is being created and now, it is “uncreated.” Thus, the distinction is
clear in Al-Kindī's terminology that he uses the term Azalī simply for the eternal and the objects
that are.
These causes are themselves four ways of knowledge. The whole knowledge system of Kindī in
the Almighty is based upon the tenets of causality. He asserts that there has to be a cause for any
existence. He perceives that there are two realms of existence; the realm of nature and the realm
above nature. The first is the created world which is characterized by movement and material,
the latter is the divine realm which is characterized by immateriality and immovability.
According to Al-Kindī, the material world is the subject of natural inquiry and the divine realm
is the subject of metaphysics or the study of first causes.
For Al-Kindī, the series of causes are finite and therefore, there is a ‘true’ or ‘prime’ cause which
is God, which always remains infinite. This can be traced along the trajectory of Aristotle who
takes the catalyst of causes as material, formal, efficient or the final. This kind of philosophy
taken into a nutshell proves God to be the efficient cause or the sole progenitor of action.
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Taking into account the path of efficient causes, it can be compartmentalized into a significant
cause that is the efficient cause and its action is creation from nothing, taken as Ibda‘. The other
causes are intermediate; that is, they are the outcome of other causes. They, thus, become the
effects of the other causes and the causes of the other effects. In analogical terms, this can be
taken as synonymous. In real sense, they cannot be taken as true efficient cause. Thus, the
moment of God's act is ever untraceable.
Al-Kindī portraits God on the basis of three notions: Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic and creationist
which would assert the involvement of God in creation as efficient cause, not just as a final
cause. In his unorthodox interpretation of Aristotle, Al-Kindī explains that God is an unmoved
mover but at the same time God gives himself to his creation. This action of creation is defined
by Kindī as “bringing being to be from non-being”. Moreover, Al-Kindī brought the terminology
Fayḍ, ‘emanation’ in his treatises and he perceived that the Godas true agent acts on the world
through intermediary causes.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Muslim Philosophy discusses Al-Kindī’s philosophy under two broad
headings:
a. Metaphysics
Al-Kindī’s best known treatise is the metaphysical study, Fi al-Falsafa al-Ula (On First
Philosophy). Aristotelian influence can be seen in certain elements, such as the four causes.
However he is Aristotelian only up to a point. The point of divergence is reached over the
question of the origin of the world. Aristotle teaches the eternity of the world; Al-Kindī
propounds creatio ex nihilo. The later philosophers, such as Al-Fārābī, are usually considered to
understand Aristotle more accurately; they had the advantage of better translations and a greater
number of works. In his, Fī al-Falsafah al-U̅lā, Al-Kindī described the first philosophy, which is
also the most noble and highest philosophy, as the knowledge of the first truth, including the
cause of every truth (the first cause). The first cause is prior in time because it is the cause of
time. By the study of philosophy, people will learn the knowledge of things in reality, and
through this the knowledge of the divinity of God and his unity. They will also learn human
virtue. Throughout many of his treatises, Al-Kindī emphasizes the importance of the intellect
(‘Aql) and contrasts it with matter.
He also discusses the One Truth, which is another name for God, and states that it does not have
any attributes, predicates or characteristics. This view is consonant with the Mu‘tazilī declaration
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of the Unity of God as being strictly without attributes, and consequently Al-Kindī has
sometimes been deemed to be a Mu‘tazilī by scholars.
Other aspects of his position include emphasis on the absolute unity of God, his power—
particularly as creator—and creation ex nihilo. The Eternal, that is God, is not due to another; he
has no cause and has neither genus nor species. There is no ‘before’ for the Eternal. The Eternal
is unchanging, immutable and imperishable. In human terms, death is the soul’s taking leave of
the body, which it employed during life. For Al-Kindī, the intellect continues. Perhaps the soul is
primarily the locus of the intellect. He reiterated in his ethical treatise the idea that humans must
choose the world of the intellect over the material world.
Al-Kindī differs from the Hellenistic philosophical tradition primarily in espousing the belief that
the world was created ex nihilo. In Aristotelian metaphysics, the Prime Mover set the world in
motion, but in the Hellenistic tradition, time and motion are intrinsically linked. Matter set in
motion is eternally existing, since it exists before motion (and therefore before time). In this
system, time is defined as the extension of the series of movements. Thus time begins with
movement. In Al-Kindī’s system, matter, time and movement are all finite, with a beginning and
a cessation at some future point. Other subjects that concern Al-Kindī can be seen from his titles,
including Fī Waḥdāniyat Allah wa Tunahī Jism al-‘Ālam (On the Unity of God and the
Limitation of the Body of the World), and Fi Kammiya Kutub Aristutalis wa ma Yaḥtāj Ilayhi fī
Taḥsīl al-Falsafah (The Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and What is Required for the
Acquisition of Philosophy).
In his philosophical writings, Al-Kindī does not give so much direct arguments to the concerns
of religion as avoids them altogether, instead describing a parallel universe of philosophy. He
consistently tries to show that the pursuit of philosophy is compatible with orthodox Islam. The
Mutakallimūn had previously speculated on questions about matter, atoms and substance, which
he also considers. Another reason for the claim that he was a Mu‘tazilah was his persecution by
the Caliph, Al-Mutawwakil, who instigated a reactionary policy against the Mu‘tazilah and a
return to traditionalism. Al-Kindī was caught in the general net of the Caliph’s anti-
intellectualism; the Kindian emphasis is always on rationalism, an attitude which the orthodox
establishment of a revealed religion is bound to find inimical.
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b. Ethics
Al-Kindī’s ethics and practical philosophy are mostly discussed in a treatise Fī al-Hīla li-Daf‘ al-
Aḥzān (On the Art of Averting Sorrows), of questionable authenticity. Fehmi Jadaane (1968)
argues that Al-Kindī was strongly influenced by the Stoic tradition, particularly the thought of
Epictetus, which was known throughout the Muslim world at that time through contact with
Syriac Christian scholars, if not through specific texts. Epictetus emphasized the importance of
freedom from the world and human beings’ status as agents, who through their ultimate
independence were responsible for their own happiness and independence of others. His last
logical step, however, was that suicide was permissible if life was no longer worth living. This
last idea is not repeated in Al-Kindī.
Like the writings of the Stoics, Al-Kindī’s treatise, which is of the ‘consolation of philosophy’
type, exhorts readers to concentrate on the life of the mind and the soul, not of the body. Al-
Kindī says that human beings are what they truly are in the soul, not in the body. Again, on the
futility of looking for eternities in the visible world, he says that whoever wishes for what is not
in nature wishes for what does not exist. In this treatise, Al-Kindī advocates maintaining an
internal balance through the mechanism of the individual’s interior autonomy. If worldly
property becomes a concern and is then lost or damaged, this will upset an individual’s mental
equilibrium. Stoics’s ideas about the ephemeral nature of earthly goods are recalled; Al-Kindī
warns against attachment to favourite worldly goods, using an example from Plutarch’s On
Moral Virtue. In that story, Nero receives a gift of a gorgeous, elaborate crystal tent, with which
he is obviously smitten. A philosopher who is present in the crowd advises him that he has
already been impoverished through his keen attachment to this object. If Nero were to lose it, the
philosopher says, he will suffer because it is irreplaceable. Later when the rare object is lost at
sea during transport, Nero is devastated. Scholars have argued that this treatise appears to be a
mélange of wisdom literature from various Hellenistic sources, with no ideas that sound Kindian.
Ibn Miskawayh refers to the ideas of Al-Kindī in his treatise on ethics, Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq.
Some ethical remarks are contained in other treatises. The virtues discussed in the treatise on
definitions are wisdom, courage and temperance. A reflection of each virtue which exists in the
soul is seen in the body. Virtue exists as a focal point between two extremes. Bravery, for
example, is both mental and physical; it is midway between rashness and timidity.
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Some reverberations of Al-Kindī’s thought also continued in the twelfth-century Christian Latin
West, as certain of his treatises were translated into Latin by the Scholastics, notably De
Intellectu (On the Intellect). In the thirteenth century Giles of Rome criticized ‘Alkindus’ with
other philosophers in his work Errores philosophorum (Errors of the Philosophers). Only a
portion of Al-Kindī’s work survives, so judgment of him must necessarily be imperfect.
However, Al-Kindī’s influence endured longer in the Western Islamic tradition than in the
Eastern, as reflected in the writings of the twelfth-century mystic Ibn al-‘Arabī. With Al-Kindī,
who pursued reason against the background of revealed religion, begins the Islamic
philosophical tradition, which continues with the works of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd.
3.1.7 Let Us Sum Up
In Al-Kindī, we find a balance unique in early Islam between an 'advanced' theology, based on
reasoned interpretation of revelation, and a philosophy which aimed at utilizing the totality of
our obviously limited human faculties in the understanding of God, the universe and man
himself. It was due to Al-Kindī that philosophy came to be acknowledged as a part of Islamic
culture. The early Arab historians called him “the Philosopher of the Arabs” for this reason. It is
true that he borrowed his ideas from Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism, but it is also true that he put
those ideas in a new context. By conciliating Hellenistic heritage with Islam he laid the
foundations of a new philosophy. Indeed, this conciliation remained for a long time the chief
feature of this philosophy. Furthermore, Al-Kindī, specializing in all the sciences known at his
time, of which his writings give sufficient evidence, made philosophy a comprehensive study
embracing all sciences. Philosophy is the knowledge of truth. Muslim philosophers, like the
Greek, believed that truth is something over and above experience; that it lies immutable and
eternal in a supernatural world. The definition of philosophy in Al-Kindī’s treatise on “First
Philosophy” runs like this: “Philosophy is the knowledge of the reality of things within man's
possibility, because the philosopher's end in his theoretical knowledge is to gain truth and in his
practical knowledge to behave in accordance with truth.” At the end of the treatise, God is
qualified by the term “truth,” which is the objective of philosophy. “The True One (Al-Wāḥid al-
Ḥaq) is, then, the First, the Creator, the Sustainer of all that He has created. ...” This view is
borrowed from Aristotle's metaphysics, but the Unmovable Mover of Aristotle is substituted by
the Creator. This difference constitutes the core of the Kindian system. Philosophy is classified
into two main divisions: theoretical studies, which are physics, mathematics, and metaphysics;
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and practical studies which are ethics, economics, and politics. A later writer, quoting Al-Kindī,
gives the classification as follows: “Theory and practice are the beginning of the virtues. Each
one of the two is divided into the physical, mathematical, and theological parts. Practice is
divided into the guidance of one's self, that of one's house, and that of one's city.” Ibn Nabata,
quoting also Al-Kindī, mentions only the theoretical divisions.“The philosophical sciences are of
three kinds: the first in teaching (Ta’līm) is mathematics which is intermediate in nature; the
second is physics, which is the last in nature; the third is theology which is the highest in nature.”
The priority of mathematics goes back to Aristotle, but the final sequence of the three sciences
beginning with physics came from the later Peripatetics. Most probably Al-Kindī was following
Ptolemy, who gave a division of sciences in the beginning of Almagest. Mathematics was known
to the Arabs from that time on as the “first study.” The definition of philosophy and its
classification, as mentioned above, remained traditional in Muslim philosophy.
1. Give the brief description of Al-Kindī’s life and works?
2. Elucidate Al-Kindī as the Philosopher of the Arabs?
3. Discuss Greek influence on Al-Kindī’s philosophical thought?
4. Discuss Al-Kindī’s contribution to Muslim Philosophy and its impact on his successors?
3.1.9 Suggested Readings:
1. M.M Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, Delhi: Adam Publishers
2. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Al-Kindī, (Online accessed on 1st July 2017)
3. M. Saeed Shaikh, Studies in Muslim Philosophy, Delhi: Adam Publishers
4. Sayid Hussain Nasr, A History of Philosophy in Islam, Routledge
5. Abdul Salaam Nadwi, Hukama-i Islam, Vol. I
6. Latif Hussain Shah Kazmi, Studies in Muslim Philosophy (Part One), AMU
7. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, Muslim Philosophy and Science: An Introduction
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Lesson 3.2: Al-Fārābī
Lesson Structure
3.2.1 Introduction
3.2.2 Objectives
3.2.3 An Overview of Al-Fārābī’s Life
3.2.4 An Overview of Al-Fārābī’s Works
3.2.5 Philosophical Contribution of Al-Fārābī
3.2.6 Let Us Sum Up
3.2.1 Introduction
Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī, generally referred to in the Arabic sources as the Second Teacher (Al-
Mu‘allim al-Thānī), occupies a unique position in the history of philosophy, as an important link
between Greek philosophy and the Islamic thought. His standing in the history of Aristotelian
logic is pivotal; no logician of any significance arose anywhere during the period separating
Boethius (d. 525 C.E), the Roman consul, who translated Aristotle’s logical works into Latin,
and Abe´lard (d. 1141 C.E) in Western Europe. Of the Arab philosophers who preceded Al-
Fārābī, Al-Kindī (d.866 C.E), a great champion of Greek philosophy, which was in perfect
harmony with Islam, according to him, does not appear to have made a significant contribution
to logic, although in other respects his learning was vast. Al-Razi (d. 925 CE) had the highest
regard for the Greeks, and in particular for Plato, ‘the master and leader of all the philosophers’,
but regarded philosophy and religion as incompatible. As the greatest non-conformist in Islam,
he rejected the whole fabric of revelation and substituted for the official Islamic view five co-
eternal principles, the Creator (Bari’), the soul, matter, space and time, inspired in part by Plato
and the Harranians. Al-Fārābī, in a lost treatise, on the Rise of Philosophy, traced the history of
Greek philosophy from the time of Aristotle, as it passed through the Alexandrian medium,
during the Ptolemaic period, down to the Islamic period and up to his own times.
Al-Fārābī was the founder of a philosophical system and devoted himself entirely to
contemplation/speculation and kept himself aloof from political and social perturbations and
turmoil. He left a considerable amount of literature. Besides his immediate pupils, there were
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many who studied his works after his death and became his followers. His philosophy set the
standard for scholarly speculation both in the East and the West long after his death.
3.2.2 Objectives
The lesson aims:
1. To highlight Al-Fārābī as the mediator between Greek Philosophy and Islamic thought
after Al-Kindī.
2. To know Al-Fārābī’s as ‘The Second Teacher.’
3. To know the main doctrines of Al-Fārābī’s Philosophy
3.2.3 An Overview of Al-Fārābī’s Life
Al-Fārābī did not write his autobiography, and no one among his disciples managed to give an
account of his life as Al-Juzjānī did for his master Ibn Sīnā. Information about Al-Fārābī in the
works of the biographers is quite unsatisfactory and inadequate. His biography in Ibn Khallikān’s
Wafayāt al-A‘yān, is open to criticism as regards its authenticity. Thus, in the life of Al-Fārābī,
several obscure points and some unsolved problems are still to be investigated and settled.
His life falls into two distinct periods, the first being the time from his birth till about the age of
fifty. The only information we have about this period is that he was born at Wasij, a village in
the vicinity of Farab in Transoxiana, in about 258AH/870CE. In spite of the scanty information
we have about his family, his childhood, and his youth, it has been believed that he was Turkish
by birth, that his father was a general, and that he himself worked as a judge for some time. What
is better known is the cultural and intellectual movement which flourished and spread with the
introduction of Islam in Farab at the beginning of the third/ninth century, and that the reputed
philologist Al-Jawharī, the compiler of Al-Ṣiḥāḥ, was one of his eminent contemporaries.
Al-Fārābī was able to draw largely on this movement. The basis of his early education was
religious and linguistic: he studied jurisprudence, Hadith, and the exegesis of the Qur’ān. He
learnt Arabic as well as Turkish and Persian. It is doubtful whether he knew any other language,
and what has been stated by Ibn Khallikān about Al-Fārābī's mastery of “seventy tongues” is
more akin to be fabulous than to exact history. From his interpretation of the word Safsafah
(sophistry), it is obvious that Al-Fārābī had no knowledge of the Greek languages. He did not
neglect to benefit himself from the rational studies which were current in his time, such as
mathematics and philosophy, although it appears that he did not turn to them until much later.
Contrary to what has been held, it does not appear that he paid much attention to medicine. And
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when he became extremely interested in rational studies, he did not remain content with what he
had acquired in this respect in his native town. Spurred by intellectual curiosity, he had to leave
his home and wander abroad in pursuit of more knowledge.
That marks the second period of his life, the period of old age and full maturity. Baghdad, as an
outstanding centre of learning throughout the fourth/tenth century, was naturally his first
destination where he encountered various scholars among whom were philosophers and
translators. It was the study of logic which attracted him to that circle of distinguished logicians
of Baghdad of whom the most renowned was Abū Bishr Matta ibn Yūnus considered to be the
foremost logician of his age. Al-Fārābī studied logic under Ibn Yūnus for some time. He
surpassed his teacher and, on account of the eminent position he had gained in this field, he came
to be called “The Second Teacher.” Another famous logician, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, was his disciple.
Al-Fārābī spent twenty years in Baghdad and then his attention was engaged by another cultural
center in Aleppo. There, in the brilliant and scholarly Court of Sayf al-Dawlah, gathered the most
distinguished poets, philologists, philosophers, and other scholars. In spite of the strong Arab
sympathies of that Court, no racial bias or prejudice could mar the scholarly and cultural
atmosphere in which Persians, Turks, and Arabs argued and disputed and agreed or differed in
the name of disinterested pursuit of knowledge.
In that Court Al-Fārābī lived, first and foremost, as a scholar and seeker after truth. The glamour
and the glory of Court life never allured him, and, in the garb of a Sufi, he addressed himself to
the hard task of a scholar and a teacher; and he wrote his books and his treatises among
murmuring rivulets and the thick foliage of shady trees.
Except for several short journeys abroad, Al-Fārābī remained in Syria till his death in 339/950.
Ibn Abī Usaybiyah maintains that Al-Fārābī visited Egypt towards the end of his life. This is
most probable, as Egypt and Syria have been closely linked for a long time in history, and
cultural life in Egypt at the time of the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids had its attractions. However,
the alleged report of the murder of Al-Fārābī by some highwaymen while he was travelling
between Damascus and ‘Asqalān quoted by Al-Bayhaqī is incredible.
3.2.4 An Overview of Al-Fārābī’s Works
He left a considerable amount of literature; yet, if we accept the reports of some of the
biographers, such as Al-Qifṭī and Ibn Abī Usaybiyah, the number of his writings is seventy,
small compared with that of his contemporaries, namely, Al-Kindī and Al-Rāzī the physician.
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However, we must bear in mind that in the lists of the works of these scholars, the biographers
have often mentioned the same book under two, maybe more, different titles, and that most of
the works they have listed were mere articles or short treatises.
Al-Fārābī's works may be divided into two equal parts, one dealing with logic and the other with
other studies. The logical works are concerned with the different parts of Aristotle's Organon,
either in the form of commentary or paraphrase. Most of these writings, however, are still in
manuscript; and a great many of these manuscripts are not yet available.
The second category of his works deals with the other branches of philosophy, physics,
mathematics, metaphysics, ethics, and politics. A good part of it is available, and it gives a clear
idea of the various aspects of Al-Fārābī's philosophy. But some of it is doubtful and his
authorship of it is a subject of controversy, as in the case of Fusūs al-Ḥikam (Gems of Wisdom)
or Al-Mufāriqat (Separateness). In this; category, no really scientific study was attempted; al-
Farabi did not even mention medicine, and his discussion of chemistry was rather in the nature of
a defense than in the form of elaboration and analysis. Ibn Khallikān is probably right when he
maintains that Al-Fārābī wrote most of his books in Baghdad and Damascus. There is no
evidence of his having written any of his books before the age of fifty, and even if he did write
any, it is not certain whether it was theological or philosophical. The biographers have not
reported anything contradictory.
Some scholars have attempted to make a chronological list of his works. But one wonders what
the value of such a list would be since all his works were written in the last thirty years of his
life, when he began to write as a fully mature philosopher; and there was certainly no noticeable
change or development in his thoughts or doctrine during this period.
The style of Al-Fārābī is characteristically concise and precise. He deliberately selects his words
and expressions as he profoundly thinks of his ideas and thoughts. His aphorisms are pregnant
with profound significance. That is why Max Horten has given a large commentary to explain
the small treatise entitled Fusūs al-Ḥikam. Al-Fārābī has a particular, style; anyone accustomed
to it can well recognize it. He avoids repetition and redundancy and prefers brevity and
conciseness.
It seems that Al-Fārābī was in favour of esoteric teachings and believed that philosophy should
not be made available to the uninitiated among the masses, and that philosophers should expound
their ideas garbed in obscurity, mystification, and ambiguity. Even today, it is not an easy task to
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comprehend the meaning implied in some Farabian aphorisms. His method is almost identical
with his style. He collects and generalizes; he arranges and harmonizes; he analyses in order to
compose; he divides and sub-divides in order to concentrate and classify. In some of his treatises,
division and classification seem to be his only objective. His treatise entitled What Should Be
Learnt before Attempting Philosophy is in the form of an index of the Greek schools of
philosophy, the meanings of their titles and the names of their originators. He has been chiefly
concerned with the study of the aims and the style of the works of Aristotle. His “Classification
of Sciences” is the first attempt of its kind in the history of Islamic thought.
Al-Fārābī was fond of opposites; in fact, he gave the opposite of almost every term he uses: thus
negation implies affirmation; and Being, Non-Being. He wrote a treatise in answer to the
questions he had been asked. In this treatise he gave the proposition with which he is confronted
and contrasts it with its opposite, in order to get an adequate solution. This reminds us of Plato's
Parmenides.
His main concern has been to elucidate the basis of a theory and the foundation of a doctrine, to
clear up obscurities, and to discuss controversial questions in order to arrive at the right
conclusions. However, he pays scant attention to ordinary topics; and what he supposes to be
self-evident is passed by without the slightest attempt at an explanation. A good example of this
is his treatise, “The Aims of the Stagirite in Every Chapter of His Book Named the Alphabet.”
This study is almost akin to our introduction to or criticism of a new book. It can be favorably
compared to a similar work by a contemporary philosopher. No wonder, Ibn Sīnā found in this
treatise the key to Aristotle's “Metaphysics”.
The works of Al-Fārābī became widespread in the East during the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh
centuries, and they eventually reached the West, where some Andalusian scholars became his
disciples. Some of his writings were also translated into Hebrew and Latin, and had their
influence on Jewish and Christian scholasticism. These works were published in the last decades
of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, and some of them were translated into various modem
European languages. Yet, there is still great need for their republication with meticulous editing,
especially now that the libraries of Istanbul are much more available to us than before, and we
can fill some gaps through them.
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3.2.5 Philosophical Contribution of Al-Fārābī
The philosophy of Al-Fārābī has its distinct features and clear-cut aims. He has adopted some of
the doctrines of previous philosophers, reconstructed them in a form adaptable to his own
cultural environment, and made them so closely knit that his philosophy has become most
systematic and harmonious. Al-Fārābī is logical both in his thinking and expression, in his
argument and discussion, and in his exposition and reasoning.
His philosophy might have depended on some false presuppositions, and might have expounded
some hypotheses which modern science has refuted, yet it played a very significant role and
influenced several schools of thought in subsequent times. Beginning with his logical studies, we
will briefly explain the characteristics and the chief elements of his philosophy
1. Logic
It has been already mentioned that a considerable part of the works of Al-Fārābī is devoted to the
study of logic; but it is almost limited to the delineation of the Organon in the version known to
the Arabic scholars of that time. He holds that “the art of logic gives, in general, the rules which,
if followed, can correct the mind and direct man to the right way to truth away from the pitfalls
of error.” For him, logic stands in the same relation to intelligibles as grammar to words, and
prosody to verse. He emphasizes the practical and applied aspects of logic, indicating that
intelligibles are to be tested by its rules, as dimensions, volumes, and masses are by
measurement. Logic also helps us in distinguishing truth from error and attaining the right way
of thinking or in guiding other people along this way; it also indicates where to start our thoughts
and how to conduct them necessarily to their conclusions. Practice in rhetoric and dialectical
discourses, or in geometry and arithmetic, can never be a substitute for logic, in the same way as
learning a considerable number of poems and speeches is of no avail to a man ignorant of
grammar. The art of logic—as is generally thought—is not an unnecessary ornament, because it
can never be replaced by natural aptitude.
However, Al-Fārābī has always had in mind the difference between grammar and logic; for the
former is concerned with words only, while the latter deals with meanings and is related to words
in so far as they are the embodiments of meanings. Moreover, grammar is concerned with the
laws of language, and languages are as diverse as peoples and races; but logic deals with the
human mind which is always the same anywhere and everywhere.
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The subject-matter of logic is its topics in which the laws of intelligibles are studied. They are
classified under eight heads: (1) Categories, (2) Interpretations, (3) First Analytics, (4) Second
Analytics, (5) Topics, (6) Sophistics, (7) Rhetorics, and (8) Poetics, all of which constitute the
real aim of logic. The fourth part is the most significant and noble of all the others; what is
anterior may be considered an introduction and what follows an application and comparison
leading to the avoidance of error and confusion.
It is obvious that Al-Fārābī follows in the footsteps of Aristotle, although he considers rhetoric
and poetics as branches of logic. The same error was committed by the Peripatetics, especially
by those of the school of Alexandria. Some of them even claimed that Porphyry's Isagoge was a
part of the Organon of Aristotle; but this claim is not supported by Al-Fārābī known as “The
Second Teacher,” Aristotle having been taken to be the First.
Undoubtedly, “Demonstration” was regarded by Aristotle as important, but he was rather proud
of his discovery of syllogism.
Al-Fārābī’s contribution to logic is two-dimensional. First, he has succeeded in properly and
lucidly expounding the logic of Aristotle to the Arabic-speaking world. In the introduction of one
of his recently published treatises, he indicates that he will explain the principle of syllogism
after Aristotle in terms familiar to the Arabs; consequently, he substitutes examples from the
daily life of his own contemporaries for the otherwise vague and unfamiliar examples originally
cited by Aristotle. His process is in no way detrimental to the study of the logic of Aristotle, nor
does it alter or vitiate the significance of his philosophy.
On the other hand, Al-Fārābī lays the basis for the quinary division of reasoning, indicating that
it is demonstrative if it leads to certainty; dialectical if it leads to a semblance of certitude
through good intention; sophistical if it leads to a semblance of certitude through bad intentions
and falsity; rhetorical if it leads to a probable opinion; and poetical if it leads to imagery giving
pleasure or pain to the soul. These different kinds are used according to the situation and the
standard of the audience.
Philosophers and scholars make use of demonstrative reasoning, theologians resort only to
dialectic syllogisms, and politicians take refuge in rhetorical syllogisms. It is obvious that the
way of addressing any group of people should be adapted to the standard of their understanding;
and, thus, to use demonstrative syllogisms when addressing the populace and the masses is
absurd.
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2. The Unity of Philosophy
Al-Fārābī maintains that philosophy is essentially one unit. Thus, it is imperative for great
philosophers to be in accord, the pursuit of truth being their one and only aim. Plato and
Aristotle, “being the originators of philosophy and the creators of its elements and principles and
the final authority as regards its conclusions and branches,” are closely in accord in spite of some
of their apparent and formal differences.
Thus, Al-Fārābī believes in the existence of only one school of philosophy, the school of truth.
Therefore, the terms Peripatetics, Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans denote only names of groups
of philosophers; all constitute one single school of philosophy. Parties and cliques are a nuisance
in philosophy as well as in politics.
Al-Fārābī, as a philosopher and historian; has been fully aware of the danger of partisanship in
philosophy. This partisanship was caused more or less by the fanatics among the disciples of the
great philosophers. Instead of attempting to harmonize the doctrines of various philosophers,
these disciples managed to widen the gap between two masters by stressing shades of difference
and sometimes even by altering and misrepresenting their doctrines. This attitude of Al-Fārābī is
identical with the attitude of the twelfth/eighteenth-century philosophers towards the disputes
and dissension of the Renaissance philosophers.
There is no novelty in this doctrine of Al-Fārābī; it has been previously held by the philosophers
of the later Greek schools, especially those of the school of Alexandria. When Porphyry speaks
about his master, he points out that he has found the ideas of the Peripatetics and the Stoics fused
in Plotinus' works. In fact, Porphyry has devoted several treatises to the attempt of reconciling
the philosophy of Plato with that of Aristotle; and a number of scholars of the school of
Alexandria followed in his footsteps; but none of these scholars ever thought of combining all
the philosophers in a single school. This has been an omission, and Al-Fārābī has been profuse in
his writings in an attempt to point this out.
Religious truth and philosophical truth are objectively one, although formally different. This idea
rendered possible the accord between philosophy and the tenets of Islam. Al-Fārābī undoubtedly
has been the first scholar to raise a new edifice of philosophy on the basis of this accord; later
philosophers have followed the lines chalked out by him; Ibn Sīnā has been to a certain extent
occupied in the exposition and delineation of its Platonic aspects, while Ibn Rushd has been busy
indicating the accord between Aristotelian philosophy and religion.
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This doctrine of reconciliation has been based on two main points: first, revising the Peripatetic
philosophy and garbing it in a Platonic form, in order to make it more consonant with Islamic
tenets; and, secondly, giving a rational interpretation of religious truths. In fact, Al-Fārābī
expounds philosophy in a religious way and philosophizes religion, thus pushing them in two
converging directions so that they may come to an understanding and co-exist.
This revision of the Peripatetic philosophy has been concerned with two theories, one
cosmological and the other psychological, viz., Theory of the Ten Intelligences and that of the
Intellect. His rational explanation depends on two other theories; the first is concerned with
prophecy and the second with the interpretation of the Qur’ān. Al-Fārābī’s philosophy is
summed up in these four theories which are inter-related and all of which aim at one end.
3. Theory of the Ten Intelligences
This theory constitutes a significant part in Islamic philosophy; it offers an explanation of the
two worlds: heaven and earth; it interprets the phenomena of movement and change. It is the
foundation of physics and astronomy. Its chief concern is solving of the problem of the One and
the many and the comparing of the mutable and the immutable.
Al-Fārābī holds that the One, i. e., God, is the Necessary by Himself; hence, He is not in need of
another for His existence or His subsistence. He is an intelligence capable of knowing Himself;
He is both intelligent and intelligible. He is quite unique by His essence. Nothing is like Him. He
has no opposite or equivalent.
If the above premises are admitted, what would be God's influence on the universe and the
relationship between Him and the many? Only through a kind of emanation has Al-Fārābī
laboured to elucidate these problems. He holds that from the Necessary One, flows or emanates
only one other by virtue of Its self-knowledge and goodness. This eminent is the first
intelligence. Thus, knowledge equals creation, for it is enough for a thing to be conceived in
order to exist. The first intelligence is possible by itself, necessary by another; and it thinks the
One as well as itself. It is one-in-itself, and many by virtue of these considerations.
From this point Al-Fārābī starts the first step towards multiplicity. From thinking by first
intelligence of the One flows another intelligence. By virtue of its thinking of itself as possible in
itself flow the matter and form of the “first heaven,” because every sphere has its specific form
which is its soul. In this way, the chain of emanations goes on so as to complete the ten
intelligences, and nine spheres and their nine souls. The tenth and last intelligence, or agent
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intelligence, is that, which, governs the sublunary world. From this intelligence flow the human
souls and the four elements.
These intelligences and souls are hierarchical. The first intelligence in this hierarchy is the most
transcendent, and then follow the souls of the spheres and then the spheres themselves. The last
in order is the earth and the world of matter, which falls in the fourth rank.
The ancient Greeks held that anything celestial is sacred and anything terrestrial is impure. The
tenets of Islam categorically assert that heaven is the Qiblah of prayer, the source of revelation,
the destination of the “ascension.” Everything in heaven is pure and purifying. Al-Fārābī here
conforms to both the religious tenets and the philosophical teachings; but his main difficulty lies
in maintaining that the impure earthly world has evolved from the sacred celestial one.
The number of intelligences is ten, consisting of the first intelligence and the nine intelligences
of the planets and spheres, because Al-Fārābī adopts the same theories as held by the Greek
astronomers, especially by Ptolemy, according to whom, the cosmos is constituted of nine
encircling spheres all of which move eternally and circularly around the earth. Intelligences and
souls are the originators of this movement. Every sphere has its own intelligence and soul.
The tenth intelligence manages the affairs of the terrestrial world. The soul is the immediate
mover of sphere: However, it acquires its power from the intelligence. It moves through its
desire for the intelligence; and pursuit of perfection moves its sphere. Thus, its desire is the
source of its movement. Intelligence in its turn is in a state of perpetual desire. The lower desires,
the higher and all, desire the One which is considered the Prime Mover although It is immovable.
The movement of the spheres is effected by a kind of spiritual attraction: the inferior sphere is
always attracted towards the superior. This process is a spiritual dynamism similar to that of
Leibniz in spite of its dependence on unequal spiritual powers. It seems that Al-Fārābī, the
musician, is attempting to introduce into the world of spheres the system of musical harmony.
However, Al-Fārābī's conclusions about physics are closely connected with his theories of
astronomy. From the tenth intelligence flows the prime matter, or Hyle, which is the origin of the
four elements, and from the same intelligence flow the different forms which unite with the Hyle
to produce bodies. The terrestrial world is only a series of different kinds of forms united with
matter or separated from it. Generation is the result of the unity of form and matter, and
corruption is the result of their separation. The movement of the sun produces hotness and
coldness necessary for change. All the separate intelligences provide the movements appropriate
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to the terrestrial world. In this way, physics is fused with cosmology and the terrestrial world is
subjected to the heavenly world.
Nevertheless, Al-Fārābī repudiates astrology which was prevalent at his time, and which had
been cherished by the Stoics and the Alexandrian scholars before him.
Al-Fārābī does not deny the law of causality and the connection between causes and effects. For
causes may be either direct or indirect; and if it is an easy matter to discover the former, the latter
are more difficult to detect. Hence, happens chance or coincidence; and there is no way of
controlling coincidence. For how could an astrologer associate the death of an Amir with an
eclipse? Or how could the discovery of a new planet have any connection with a war? However,
belief in fortuitous happenings is essential in politics and in religion, because it imbues men with
fear and hope, and stimulates obedience and endeavour.
It is, thus, through the doctrine of the ten intelligences that Al-Fārābī solves the problem of
movement and change. He has made use of the same theory in his attempt at solving the problem
of the One and the many, and in his reconciliation of the traditional Aristotelian theory of matter
and the Islamic doctrine of creation. Matter is as old as the ten intelligences, but it is created
because it has emanated from the agent intelligence. To vindicate the unicity of God, Al-Fārābī
has resorted to the mediacy of these ten intelligences between God and the terrestrial world.
Some of the elements of the Theory of the Ten Intelligences can be traced to the different
sources they have been derived from. Its astronomical aspect is closely identical with Aristotle's
interpretation of the movement of the spheres. The Theory of Emanation has been borrowed
from Plotinus and the school of Alexandria. But, in its entirety, it is a Farabian theory, dictated
and formulated by his desire for showing the unity of truth and his method of grouping and
synthesis. He reconciles Plato and Aristotle and religion and philosophy. This theory met with
some success among the philosophers of the East and those of the West in the Middle Ages. Yet,
reconciliation necessitates, from one side or the other, some concessions; and if it pleases some,
others are sure to resent it. Hence, this theory has been fervently embraced by Ibn Sīnā who has
given it a concise and elaborate exposition, while Al-Ghazālī is loud in denouncing it. Among
the Jewish scholars, Ibn Gabriol does not give it even the slightest notice, while Maimonides
enthusiastically subscribes to it. And in spite of the objections of Christian scholars to this
theory, it has always elicited their respect and esteem.
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4. Theory of the Intellect
The psychology of Aristotle has long been reputed for its conciseness and precision; and as an
objective study it has not been less noteworthy. Aristotle's classification of the faculties of the
soul is the first of its kind. He has emphasized its unity in spite of the plurality of its faculties and
explained its relationship with the body. He has but inadequately dealt with the Theory of the
Intellect, and in consequence stirred a problem which has puzzled the moderns as well as the
ancients. However, his treatise “On the Soul” is the best of its kind among ancient works on
psychology, and it even surpasses some of the modern works. In the Middle-Ages, it was as
much in vogue as the Organon.
This book was introduced to the Arabs through translations from Syriac and Greek, together with
ancient commentaries, especially those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Simplicius.
It was the subject of extensive study with Muslim philosophers, who in their turn commented on
it and paraphrased it. Influenced by Aristotle and drawing on his work, these philosophers wrote
various theses and treatises on psychology. They were chiefly concerned with the question of the
intellect which stood out among all the problems studied by the scholastic philosophers.
Al-Fārābī has been fully aware of the significance of this problem, and has recognized in it an
epitome of the whole Theory of Knowledge. He has closely identified it with his own philosophy;
for it is related to the Theory of the Ten Intelligences, and it is also the foundation of the Theory
of Prophecy. He has dealt with the problem of the intellect in several places in his works; and he
has devoted to its elaboration a whole treatise, “On the Different Meanings of the Intellect.” This
treatise had a wide circulation among the scholars of the East and the West in the Middle-Ages,
and it was translated into Latin at an early date.
He classifies the, intellect into practical intellect which deduces what should be done, and
theoretical intellect which helps the soul to attain its perfection. The latter is again classified into
material, habitual, and acquired.
The material intellect or the potential intellect as Al-Fārābī sometimes calls it, is the soul; or is a
part of the soul, or a faculty having the power of abstracting and apprehending the quiddity of
beings. It can be almost compared to a material on which the forms of beings are imprinted, just
like wax which becomes one with the inscriptions carved on it. These inscriptions are nothing
but perceptions and intelligibles.
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Thus, the intelligible exists in potentiality in sensible things; and when it is abstracted from the
senses, it exists in the mind in actuality. That explains perception and abstraction, the important
operations of the mind which bring the intelligibles from potentiality to actuality; and when these
intelligibles are conveyed to the mind, the intellect in its turn is transformed from an intellect in
potency to an intellect in action.
Therefore, the intellect in act, or the habitual intellect as it is sometimes called, is one of the
levels of the ascension of the mind in the acquisition of a number of intelligibles. Since the mind
is incapable of comprehending all the intelligibles, it is intellect in action with regard to what it
perceives, and intellect in potency with regard to what it has not yet perceived. The intelligibles
themselves exist in potency in the sensibles. Once they are stripped of them, they become
intelligibles in action. And once man has attained to this level of the intellect in action, he can
comprehend himself. This kind of comprehension has no relation with the external world; it is a
mental, abstract comprehension.
Once the intellect becomes capable of comprehending abstractions, it is raised again to a higher
level, that of the acquired intellect, or the level where human intellect becomes disposed to
conceive abstract forms which have no connection with matter.
The difference between this rational conception and sense-perception is that the former is a kind
of intuition and inspiration; or, in other words, it is a kind of immediate apprehension. This is the
noblest level of human apprehension, and it is reached only by the few and the select who attain
to the level of the acquired intellect, where the hidden is unveiled, and come in direct
communion with the world of the separate intelligences.
Thus, the intellect is capable of rising gradually from intellect in potency to intellect in action,
and finally to acquired intellect. The two consecutive levels are different from each other, though
the lower always serves as a prelude to the higher. While the intellect in potency is just a receiver
of sensible forms, intellect in action retains the intelligibles and comprehends the concepts. The
acquired intellect rises to the level of communion, ecstasy, and inspiration. Conceptions are of
different levels: originally, they are intelligibles in potency existing in matter; once abstracted
from matter they become intelligibles in action. Still higher are the abstract forms which can
never exist in matter.
However, this gradual elevation is not spontaneous; for its initial stage is the intelligibles and the
intellect in potency, and its transition from potentiality to actuality can never be effected except
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through the influence of a prior actuality whose action is appropriate to it. This actuality is the
agent intelligence, the last of the ten intelligences.
Human knowledge depends on a radiation from the separate intelligences; and agent intelligence
stands in the same relation to human intellect as the sun to our eyes: our eyes depend on daylight
for sight, and in the same way our intellect is capable of comprehension only, when it is unveiled
by the agent intelligence which illuminates its way. Thus, mysticism is fused with philosophy,
and rational knowledge coincides with ecstasy and inspiration.
The above-mentioned theory of Al-Fārābī concerning the intellect is obviously based on
Aristotle. Al-Fārābī himself declares that his theory depends upon the third part of De Anima of
Aristotle, but he has his own contribution to add. His conception of the acquired intellect is alien
to Aristotle; for it is almost identified with the separate intelligences, and serves as the link
between human knowledge and revelation. Thus, it is different from the acquired intellect, as
found in the theory held by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Al-Kindī; and it is the outcome of Al-
Fārābī's mystic tendency and his leaning towards Plotinus' system.
This fact becomes clearer if we consider the influence of the agent intelligence in the acquisition
of knowledge, since it is the outcome of vision and inspiration; it offers also to the mind the
abstract forms and enlightens the way for it. This theory helps in fusing psychology with
cosmology, but it underestimates the activity of the human mind, since it is made: capable of
comprehension only when it is illuminated by heaven; but would the Sufis care about this
deficiency of the human mind?
The general acceptance of this theory in the Middle Ages is clear from the fact that Ibn Sīnā has
not only embraced it, but has also added to it vigour and; clarity; and in spite of Ibn Rushd's
strict adherence to the teachings of Aristotle, he has also come under its influence. Among the
Jews, Maimonides has copied it almost to the letter. With the Christians, this theory has stood at
the top of the problems of philosophy, because it is concerned with the theory of knowledge and
is closely connected with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.
This theory has also given rise to different schools, some favouring and the others opposing it.
To sum up, Al-Fārābī's Theory of the Intellect has been the most significant of all theories
developed by Muslim thinkers, and it has exercised a great influence on Christian philosophy.
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5. Theory of Prophecy/Prophethood
The basis of every revealed religion is revelation and inspiration. A prophet is a man endowed
with the gift of communion with God and the ability of expressing His will. Islam, as well as all
the great Semitic religions, has Heaven as its authority. The Qur’ān says: “It is naught but
revelation that is revealed - the Lord of Mighty Power has taught him.”
It is most imperative for a Muslim philosopher to give due reverence to Prophethood, to
conciliate rationality with traditionalism, and to identify the language of the earth with the words
of Heaven. This has been the endeavour of Al-Fārābī. His theory of Prophethood may be
considered to be one of the most significant attempts at the reconciliation of philosophy and
religion. It may also be considered to be the noblest part of his system; it has its foundation both
in psychology and metaphysics; and it is also closely related with politics and ethics.
Influenced by his political and social environment, Al-Fārābī has stressed the theoretical study of
society and its needs. He has written several treatises on politics, the most renowned of which is
his Al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah (the Model City). He visualizes his city as a whole of united parts,
similar to bodily organism; if any part of it is ill, all the others react and take care of it. To each
individual is allotted the vocation and the task most appropriate for his special ability and talents.
Social activities differ according to their aims; the noblest of these activities are those allotted to
the chief, for he stands in the same relation to the city as the heart to the body and is the source
of all activities and the origin of harmony and order. Hence, certain qualifications are the
prerequisite of his station. The chief must be stout, intelligent, lover of knowledge, and supporter
of justice, and he must also rise to the level of the agent intelligence through which he gets
revelation and inspiration.
These attributes remind us of the attributes of the philosopher-king in Plato's Republic, but Al-
Fārābī adds to them the ability of communion with the celestial world, as if the city is inhabited
by saints and governed by a prophet. Communion with the agent intelligence is possible through
two ways contemplation and inspiration. As already mentioned, the soul rises through study and
quest to the level of the acquired intellect when it becomes recipient of the divine light. Only the
sacred spirits of the philosophers and sages, those who can penetrate through the unseen and
perceive the “world of light”, can attain this level.
The sacred soul, preoccupied with what is above, gives no heed to what is below; and its external
sensation never overwhelms its internal sensation; and its influence may go beyond its own body
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affecting other bodies and everything in this world. It receives knowledge direct from the High
Spirit and angels without any human instruction. Thus, through continuous speculative studies,
the sage gets into communion with the agent intelligence.
This communion is also possible through imagination, as happens to the prophets, for all their
inspiration or revelation is caused by Tak Ḥayyul/imagination. Imagination occupies an
important place in Al-Fārābī's psychology. It is closely connected with inclinations and
sentiments, and is involved in rational operations and volitional movements. It creates the mental
images which are not imitations of sensibles and are the source of dreams and visions.
If we could have a scientific interpretation of dreams, it would help to give us an interpretation of
revelation and inspiration, for prophetic inspirations take the form either of true dreams in sleep
or of revelation in waking- The difference between these two forms is relative; they are distinct
only as regards their degree. In fact, a true dream is but one aspect of prophecy.
When imagination gets rid of conscious activities as in sleep, it is wholly occupied with some of
the psychological phenomena. Influenced by some bodily sensations and feelings, or by some
emotions and conceptions, it creates new images or composes, from retained mental images,
their new forms. Thus, we dream of water or swimming when our temperament is humid, and
dreams often so represent the fulfillment of a desire or the avoidance of fear that the sleeper may
move in his bed responding to a certain emotion, or leave his bed and beat a person unknown to
him, or run after him. It is needless to point out that these views in spite of their simplicity are
similar to the ideas of modern psychologists, such as Freud, Horney, and Murray.
It is within the power of imagination to create mental images after the pattern of the spiritual
world. The sleeper may, thus, behold the Heaven and its inhabitants, and may feel its enjoyments
and pleasures. Imagination may also rise to the celestial world and commune with the agent
intelligence from which it can receive the heavenly judgments relating to particular cases and
individual happenings. Through this communion which may occur by day or at night, prophecy
can be explained, since it is the source of true dreams and revelation.
According to Al-Fārābī: “If the faculty of imagination is so powerful and perfected in a certain
person, and is not completely overwhelmed by external sensations ... it gets into communion
with the agent intelligence from which images of the utmost beauty and perfection are reflected.
He who sees those images would testify to the sublime and wonderful majesty of God. … Once
the imaginative faculty in man is completely perfected, he may receive, when awake, from the
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agent intelligence the pre-vision of the present and future events ... and thus he would, through
what he has received, prophesy divine matters. This is the highest level to which imagination
may be raised, and which man can attain through this faculty.”
Thus, the chief characteristic of a prophet is to have a vivid imagination through which he can
commune with the agent intelligence during waking time and in sleep, and can attain to vision
and inspiration. And revelation is but an emanation from God through the agent intelligence.
Some persons, although in a lower degree than the prophets, have a powerful imagination
through which an inferior kind of vision and inspiration can be achieved. In this way, Al-Fārābī
places the saints in a degree lower than the prophets. The imagination of the populace and the
masses is so weak that it does not admit of rising to union with the agent intelligence, neither at
night nor by day.
Al-Fārābī's attempt at reconciliation was not the only motive behind this theory. In the
third/ninth and fourth/tenth and centuries, a wave of skepticism refuting prophecy and prophets
was prevalent. Its spokesmen copied some of the arguments held by the unbelievers in prophecy.
At the head of these skeptics was Ibn al-Rawandī who was once one of the Mu'tazilites but later
rejected their doctrine, and Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī the physician, a tough and
powerful adversary. The latter, in particular, refuted any attempt to reconcile philosophy and
religion, assumed that philosophy is the only way to reform both the individual and society and
that religions are the source of conflict and strife.
This attack aroused various Islamic centers to defend their dogmas. Al-Fārābī had to contribute
to that defense. He explained prophecy on rational grounds and gave it a scientific interpretation.
He borrowed his explanation from Aristotle's theory of dreams, which had already been
introduced to the Arab world. Al-Kindī, the forerunner of Al-Fārābī, adhered to that theory. It
assumes that dreams are images produced by the imagination the capacity of which increases
during sleep after getting rid of the activities of wakefulness.
Aristotle, however, denies that dreams are revealed by God, and never admits of prophetic
predictions through sleep, otherwise the populace and the masses―who have so many
dreams―would claim foretelling the future. Here, Al-Fārābī diverges from his master, and
asserts that man through imagination can commune with the agent intelligence, but this is
available only to the privileged and the chosen.
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The agent intelligence is the source of divine laws and inspirations. It is, in Al-Fārābī's view,
almost similar to the Angel charged with revelation, as in the tenets of Islam. It is within the
capacity of the prophet or the philosopher to commune with the agent intelligence—the former
through imagination and the latter by way of speculation and contemplation. This is
understandable, for the two draw together upon the same source and get their knowledge from
high above. In fact, religious truth and philosophic truth are both the radiation of divine
illumination through imagination or contemplation.
The Farabian theory of prophecy had an obvious impact not only on the East and the West, but
on medieval and modern history. Ibn Sīnā adhered faithfully to it. His elaboration of that theory
is closely similar to that of Al-Fārābī. Ibn Rushd, admitting its validity, was much astonished at
Al-Ghazalī’s criticism of it; for it corroborates the religious tenets and affirms that the spiritual
perfection can be attained only through man's communion with God.
When the theory was introduced into the Jewish philosophic thought, Maimonides subscribed to
it and showed much interest in it. It is noticeable that Spinoza in his Tractatus theologico-
politicus expounds a similar theory which he most probably borrowed from Maimonides. It
continued to be echoed by some of the modern philosophers in Islam, such as Jamāl al-Dīn
Afghānī and Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduh.
6. Interpretation of the Qur’ān
Some of the religious tenets are traditional (Sam‘iyyāt); they are matters indemonstrable by way
of reason, such as miracles; and the Day of Judgment comprising the Doomsday and
Resurrection, the Path and the Balance, the Judgment and the Punishment. Acceptance of these
Sam‘iyyātis one of the pillars of religion. The believers have but to accept them and remain
content with the veracity of their source.
But some thinkers in their attempt at giving a rational explanation interpret them in a certain way
or reduce them to certain natural laws. The Mu`tazilites made a noticeable endeavour in this
field, for they went so far in the way of interpretation that they refuted the Transfigurists who
qualified God with certain attributes contradictory to His transcendence and uniqueness.
Al-Fārābī attempts a different interpretation. He admits the validity of miracles since they are the
means of proving prophecy. He holds that miracles although supernatural do not contradict
natural laws. For the source of these laws is to be found in the world of spheres and its
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intelligences which manage the terrestrial world; and once we get in communion with that world,
matters other than those of the habitual course happen to us.
A prophet, as mentioned above, has a spiritual power by means of which he is associated with
the agent intelligence. It is through this communion that he causes rain to fall, the moon to split
asunder, the stick to be transformed into a snake, or the blind and leprous to be healed. In this
way Al-Fārābī tries—as the Stoics had done before—to reduce to causality matters beyond the
habitual course of nature and even contradictory to it.
The Qur’ān points to various Sam‘iyyāt such as the Tablet and the Pen. Al-Fārābī holds that
these should not be understood literally, for the Pen is not an instrument to write with, nor the
Tablet a page on which sayings are registered, but they are mere symbols for precision and
preservation. The Qur’ān is also full of extensive stories about the hereafter, Day of Judgment,
and reward and punishment. No believer could deny these matters without undermining the
principle of divine sanction and individual responsibility.
Although Al-Fārābī fully admits the eternal bliss or the painful suffering of the hereafter, yet, he
reduces them to spiritual matters having no relationship with the body and material properties,
because the spirit, not the body, is that which enjoys or suffers, is happy or unhappy.
This interpretation conforms to the Farabian tendency towards spiritualism. Ibn Sīnā borrowed it
and widely applied it. In Ibn Sīnā's view, the Throne and the Chair are symbols of the world of
spheres. Prayers are not mere bodily movements, but aim at imitating the celestial world. It is as
if these two philosophers wanted to lay the foundation of a philosophical religion and a religious
philosophy.
However, Al-Ghazālī was dissatisfied with this attempt and he attacked it, taking the text of the
Scripture literally. Ibn Rushd, although advocating accord between religion and philosophy, was
also dissatisfied, because he claimed that for the sake of their security religion and philosophy
should be kept separate. If combined, they would not be understood by the ordinary man and
might lead astray even some of those capable of deep thinking.
3.2.6 Let Us Sum Up
Al-Fārābī's doctrine is fully harmonious and consistent as its parts are completely inter-related.
From the One, the First Cause, Al-Fārābī gets on to ten intelligences from which the two worlds
of heaven and earth have flowed. His spheres are moved by the managing intelligences, and
nature with its generation and corruption is subjected to these intelligences. The soul is governed
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by one of these intelligences which is the agent intelligence. Politics and ethics are no
exceptions, for happiness pursued by men is but the communion with the celestial world. His
“Model City” only aims at this end.
This doctrine is at the same time spiritualistic and idealistic, for Al-Fārābī reduces almost
everything to spirit. His God is the Spirit of the spirits, his astronomical spheres are governed by
celestial spirits, and the prince of his city is a man whose spirit transcends his body. This
spiritualism is rooted in ideas and concepts, and is given wholly to speculation and contem-
plation. The One is the Idea par excellence and is the Intellect that intellects Itself. The other
beings are generated by this Intellect. Through speculation and contemplation man can commune
with the celestial world and attain the utmost happiness. No spiritualism is so closely related to
idealism as that of Al-Fārābī.
Although Al-Fārābī's doctrine is a reflection of the Middle-Ages, it comprises some modern and
even contemporary notions. He favours science, advocates experimentation, and denies augury
and astrology. He, who, so fully, believes in causality and determinism that he refers to causes
even for those effects which have no apparent causes. He elevates the intellect to a plane so
sacred that he is driven to its conciliation with tradition so that philosophy and religion may
accord.
1. Give brief account of Al-Fārābī’s life and works?
2. How far Al-Fārābī was influenced by Greek Philosophers?
3. Write about basic elements of Al-Fārābī’s Philosophy?
4. Justify Al-Fārābī as ‘The Second Teacher’.
1. M.M Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, Delhi: Adam Publishers,
2. M. Saeed Shaikh, Studies in Muslim Philosophy, Delhi: Adam Publishers,
3. Sayid Hussain Nasr and Oliver Leaman, A History of Philosophy in Islam, Routledge
4. Abdul Salaam Nadwi, Hukama-i Islam
6.____________, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, Srinagar: City Book Centre,
7. Majid Fakhry, Al-Fārābī, Founder of Islamic Neo-Platonism: His Life, Works and
Influence, One world, Oxford
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Lesson 3.3: Ibn Miskawayh
Lesson Structure
3.3.1 Introduction
3.3.2 Objectives
3.3.3 An Overview of Ibn Miskawayh’s Life
3.3.4 An Overview of Ibn Miskawayh’s Works
3.3.5 Philosophical Contribution of Ibn Miskawayh
3.3.6 Let Us Sum Up
3.3.1 Introduction
Miskawayh was a prominent figure in the intellectual milieu and at different courts of the Arab-
Islamic world throughout the tenth and at the beginning of the eleventh century. Besides having
held various positions in the service of a number of rulers, he occupied himself with many
sciences, such as philosophy, history, literature, alchemy, medicine, and even cooking.
A contemporary of Ibn Sīnā and Al-Bīrūnī, Ibn Miskawayh has been discovered and studied
extensively. Based on his available works, Ibn Miskawayh has been acknowledged by scholars
as having made a great contribution to Arabic and Islamic thought. Ibn Miskawayh is considered
as the leader of Philosophical moralists in Islam and is the most important ethical writer in Islam.
His ethical ideas are mixed with many ideas of Platonism as well as few ideas taken from Neo-
Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, Stoicism and Peripateticism. He successfully, artfully, and
skillfully blends all these ideas with his own ideas in his ethical works. Majid Fakhry states,
“Miskawayh, like Al-Tawḥīdī and Al-Sijistānī, should be reckoned chiefly among the litterateurs
and polymaths of the period, His learning ranged from history to psychology to ethics.”
3.3.2 Objectives
1. To Know Ibn Miskawayh’s Life and works.
2. To highlight Ibn Miskawayh as a Muslim Philosopher.
3. To know Ibn Miskawayh as a moral Philosopher
3.3.3 An Overview of Ibn Miskawayh’s Life
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Miskawayh was born in Rayy around 320AH/932CE. His full name
was Abū‘Alī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ya’qūb. His name was Miskawayh, and not Ibn
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Miskawayh, but the Orientalists followed an inaccurate tradition and he became famous as Ibn
Miskawayh.
The notable historian, Ya‘qūt says that he was first a Magi (Majūsī) and was later converted to
Islam. But this might be true of his father, for Miskawayh himself, as his name shows, was the
son of a Muslim father, Muhammad by name.
He studied history, particularly Al-Ṭabarī’s “Annals,” with Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn Kāmil al-Qāḍī
(350/960). Ibn al-Khammār, the famous commentator of Aristotle's, was his master in
philosophical disciplines. Miskawayh was greatly engaged in the study of alchemy, together with
Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Rāzī, the alchemist. From certain statements of Ibn Sīnā and Al-Tawḥīdī, it
seems that they had a poor opinion of his aptitude for speculative philosophy. Iqbal, on the other
hand, regarded him as one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, moralists, and historians of
Persia.
He was a secretary and a librarian for the vizier, Al-Muhallabī (340-52 AH/950-63CE), Ibn
Miskawayh was part of the Arabo-Persian aristocracy of his times and frequented the circles of
the most learned of representatives of Islamic intellectual tradition. This included Al-Tawḥīdī,
Al-‘Āmiri, Ibn Ṣa‘dān, Ibn ‘Abbād, Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī, Badī‘ al-Zamān, Abū Bakr al-
Khwarizmī and many others. He studied the works of Ibn Tabari with Ibn Kamil who was a
student of the famous historian. According to Ya‘qūt, Ibn Miskawayh died on 9th of Safar 421
AH/16th February 1030, at the age of 100.
Like so many other intellectuals of his time, Ibn Miskawayh studied philosophy and history as
means of investigating the Truth (Al-Ḥaq). Working in the Islamic Neoplatonic tradition, Ibn
Miskawayh placed a great deal of importance on ethics. He formulated rules for the preservation
of moral health and described ways in which the various parts of the soul can be brought together
into harmony.
Ibn Miskawayh wrote on subjects as wide as history, psychology and chemistry. He was a fine
representative of that branch of Islamic philosophy that viewed the Greek philosophers in the
light of their views on the unity and existence of God. He also argued for Aristotle's
identification of the One Creator with an Unmoved Mover. Such a creator can only be described
in terms of negative concepts, an interesting pre-figurement of the tradition of the via negativa in
philosophy.
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Sometimes inaccurately cited as a pre-cursor to Darwinism, Ibn Miskawayh described emanation
as a process through which the creator produces the active intellect, the soul and the heavens
without intermediaries. This was a radical departure from the normal Neoplatonic account of
emanation, then current in Islamic philosophy, which used the notion of ‘a scale of being’ for
separating different levels of emanation.
Ibn Miskawayh's works on ethics are far more important than his works on metaphysics. His
Ṭahārat al-Ārā’ (Purity of Dispositions), better known as Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (Cultivation of
Morals, ed. C. Zurayk, Beirut 1967, Fr. Tr. M. Arkoun, 1969), explains, in detail, the path to
acquiring the correct balance to morally correct actions in an organized and systematic manner.
He uses a Platonic concept of nature of soul, seen as a self-subsisting entity or substance-in
marked contrast to the Aristotelian notion-to distinguish humans from animals and other things.
The soul cannot be an accident (or property of the body) because it has the power to distinguish
between accidents and essential concepts and is not limited to awareness of accidental things by
the senses. Rather, it can apprehend a great variety of immaterial and abstract entities. He argues
that if the soul were only an accident, it would not be able to distinguish and discern; it would
only be able to perform in the limited ways of the physical parts of the body. The soul is not an
accident, hence when we want to concentrate upon abstract issues the body is actually an
obstruction that we must avoid if we are to make contact with intelligible reality. The soul, then,
is an immortal and independent substance that controls the body. It has an essence opposite to
that of the body, and so, cannot die; it is involved in an eternal and circular motion, replicated by
the organization of the heavens.
This motion moves either upwards, towards reason and the active intellect, or downwards
towards matter. Our happiness arises through upward movement, our misfortunes through
movement in the opposite direction. This concept argues that unity is equivalent to perfection,
while multiplicity is equivalent to a meaningless plurality of physical objects. Expanding his
concept, Ibn Miskawayh explores the notion of justice. He distinguishes between human and
divine justice. Human justice is variable and depends upon the changing nature of particular
states and communities. The law of the state is based upon the contingent features of the time,
while as the divine law specifies what is to be done everywhere and at every time.
Ibn Miskawayh’s emphasis upon reason to guide humanity has led Mohammed Arkoun (1969) to
label him as a humanist. But this must be seen in the light of the Islamic intellectual tradition and
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not in the light of European humanism. And within the Islamic intellectual tradition, Ibn
Miskawayh was strongly criticized for his “humanism”. Al-Ghazali, for instance, seems to
consider his arguments about the religious rituals totally unacceptable. Ibn Miskawayh
considered the religious rituals in their functional aspects only; that is to say that they help us in
adapting to religious life, using the dispositions that are natural to us, so that the rules and
customs of religion are essentially reasonable. A whole range of authorities may be consulted to
help us understand our religious duties concerning how we are to live and what we are to
believe; some of these are Islamic, while others are not. Ibn Miskawayh seems overall to accord
greater respect to Greek rather than specifically Islamic authorities. Ibn Miskawayh avoided the
notion of revelation to resolve theoretical difficulties; he wanted to use only reason for all
problems. His elegant style, practical relevance and philosophical vigor prolonged his influence
in the Islamic world. It is his particular emphasis on reason alone, as well his emanation scheme
that is sometimes brought in favor of his supposed “Darwinism”.
3.3.4 An Overview of Ibn Miskawayh’s Works
Ya’qūt al-Ḥamawī gives a list of thirteen books attributed to Miskawayh. These are:
1. Al-Fawz al-Akbar
2. Al-Fawz al-Asghar
3. Tajārīb al-Umam
4. Uns al-Farīd
5. Tartīb al-Sa‘ādāt
6. Al-Mustawfa
7. Jāwidān-i Khird
8. Al-Jami‘
9. Al-Siyar
Of the above works, Al-Qifṭī mentions only 1, 2, 3 and 4 and adds the following:
10. On the Simple Drugs
11. On the Composition of the Bajats
12. Kitāb al-Ashribah
13. Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq
Numbers 2, 3, 13 are now extant and have been published. There are few other works, which
have not been mentioned by Ya’qūt and Al-Qifṭī. These are:
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14. Risālah fī al-Ladhdhāt wa al-Alam fī Jawhar al-Nafs
15. Ajwibah wa As’ilah fī al-Nafs wa al-‘Aql
16. Al-Jawab fī al-Masā’il al-Thalāth
17. Risālah fī Jawāb fī Su’al ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad Abū Ḥayyān al-Sūfī fī Ḥaqīqat al-‘Aql.
18. Ṭahārat al-Nafs,
As to the chronological order of his works, we know only from Miskawayh himself that Al-Fawz
al-Akbarwas written after Al-Fawz al-Asghar, and that Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq was written
after Tartīb al-Sa‘ādāt.
3.3.5 Philosophical Contribution of Ibn Miskawayh
The most important part of Miskawayh’s philosophical activity is dedicated to ethics. He is a
moralist in the full sense of the word. His three important books on ethics have come down to us:
(1) Tartīb al-Sa‘ādah, (2) Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, and (3) Jāwidān-i Khird.
Miskawayh’s Al-Fawz al-Asghar is a general treatise similar in conception to the earlier part of
Al-Fārābī's Ārā’al-Ahl al-Madīnat al-Fāḍilah. It is divided into three parts. The first part deals
with the proofs of the existence of God, the second with soul and its modes, and the third with
Prophethood.
For his treatment of philosophy, he owes much to Al-Fārābī, particularly in his effort to
conciliate Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. His historical turn of mind has been of benefit to him,
for he generally refers precisely to his sources. For instance, at the end of Chapter V of the first
part of Al-Fawz al-Asghar he expressly acknowledges his indebtedness to Porphyry. He also
quotes the commentators of Plato and Aristotle. His is the best expose of Plato’s proof
concerning the immortality of the soul. He benefits especially from the book of Proclus
entitled Kitāb Sharḥ al-Qawl al-Flātūn fī al-Nafs Ghayr Maitah.
The first part of Fawz al-Asghar dealing with the demonstration of the existence of God is clear,
and solid. His argument here is that of the First Mover, which was most popular at the time. In
that he is thoroughly Aristotelian. The fundamental attributes of God are: unity, eternity, and
immateriality. Miskawayh devotes the whole of Chapter VIII to the problem of defining God
affirmatively or negatively, and concludes that the negative way is the only possible way. He
also shows Neo-Platonic tendencies noticeably in Chapter IX.
He says that the first existent which emanates from God is the first intelligence which (so says
Miskawayh rather strangely) is the same as the active intellect. It is eternal, perfect in existence,
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and immutable in state, because “emanation is connected with it in a continuous way eternally,
the source of emanation being eternal and wholly generous.” It is, perfect in comparison with
beings inferior to it, imperfect in comparison with God.
Then comes the celestial soul inferior to intelligence; it needs motion as expression of desire for
perfection in imitation of intelligence. But, it is perfect in relation to natural bodies. The sphere
comes into being through the celestial soul. In comparison with the soul, it is imperfect and so
needs the motion of which the body is capable, i.e., the motion in space. The sphere has the
circular motion which assures it of the eternal existence assigned to it by God. Through the
sphere and its parts our bodies come into being. Our being is very weak because of the long
chain of intermediaries between God and us. For the same reason it is changeable and not
eternal. All classes of beings come to be through God, and it is His emanating being and
permeating might which conserve order in the cosmos. If God abstains from this emanation,
nothing will come into existence.
As a true religious thinker, Miskawayh tries to prove that creation comes ex nihilo. He mentions
that Galen said something against this view, but was refuted by Alexander of Aphrodisias in a
special treatise. The argument given by Miskawayh is as follows: Forms succeed each other, the
substratum remaining constant. In this change from one form to another, where do the preceding
forms go?
The two forms cannot remain together because they are contrary. Secondly, the first form cannot
go elsewhere, because motion in place applies only to bodies, and accidents cannot go from one
place to another. There remains only one possibility - the possibility that the first form goes into
nothing. If it is proved that the first form goes to Non-Being, then the second form comes and so
the third, the fourth, and so on also from nothing. Therefore, all things generated are generated
from nothing.
Aristotle conceived of the universe as a process of becoming. The “nature” of each thing is a
potentiality, which moves through a process of development to an actuality which is its final
nature. The movement is towards an end immanent from the first in the subject of movement. An
altogether different theory appears in the fiftieth “Epistle” of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-
Ṣafā), where the process of evolution has been shown to advance from the mineral to the human
stage under the guidance of the spiritual urge for return to God.
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The Brethren of Purity used this theory to determine the status of Prophethood. Miskawayh goes
further and finds in it a stable basis for his moral theory as well. Like Aristotle he does regard
happiness (Sa‘ādah) as the chief human good, but unlike him he identifies it in the end with the
realization of the vicegerency of God, the place which man occupies in the cosmic evolution by
virtue of his specific attribute of rationality.
Miskawayh’s theory of evolution is basically the same as that of the Brethren of Purity. It
consists of four evolutionary stages: the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and the human. Coral
(Marjān), date-palm, and ape (Qird) mark the transition from the mineral to the vegetable, from
the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to the human kingdom, respectively. The
prophet, in the end, completes the circle of Being by imbibing the celestial soul within him.
Psychology
Miskawayh’s psychology is based on the traditional spiritualistic doctrine laid down by Plato and
Aristotle, with a predominant Platonic tendency. He treats the subject in Al-Fawz al-
Asghar and Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq. In the first of these works he discusses the problems more
thoroughly. But he repeats himself on many points in both the books; in both we have the same
arguments, the same examples, and nearly the same words.
Against the materialists he proves the existence of the soul on the ground that there is something
in man which admits different and even opposed forms at the same time. This something cannot
be material, for matter accepts only one form in a determinate moment.
The soul perceives simple and complex things, present and absent, sensible and intelligible. But,
does it perceive them through one and the same faculty, or through many faculties? Soul has no
parts; divisibility applies only to matter. Does the soul, in spite of being one and indivisible,
perceive different things with different faculties and in different ways? In answering this
question, Miskawayh gives two different solutions: that of Plato, who says that similar perceives
similar, and that of Aristotle who says that soul has one faculty that perceives complex material
things and simple non-material things, but in different ways. In this connection Miskawayh
mentions Themistius and his book “On Soul.”
On the question of the immortality of the soul, Miskawayh gives at first Aristotle's doctrine.
Then he gives (Chapter VI) three arguments of Plato; referring first to Plato himself, then to
Proclus' “Commentary on Plato’s Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul,” and finally to
something that Galen said on this question.
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Miskawayh says that Plato's doctrine is too long and needs a commentary; therefore, he attempts
to summarize it as clearly as possible, with the help of Proclus’ “Commentary.” In this and the
following chapters (VII, VIII) he is a thorough Platonist and makes a special mention of
Plato's Laws and Timaeus.
Plato says that the essence of the soul is motion, and motion is the life of the soul. Miskawayh
explains and says: This motion is of two kinds: one towards intelligence, the other towards
matter; by the first it is illuminated, by the second it illuminates. But this motion is eternal and
non-spatial, and so, it is immutable. By the first kind of motion, the soul comes near to
intelligence which is the first creation of God; by the second it descends and comes out of itself.
Therefore, the soul comes nearer to God by the first motion, and goes farther by the second. The
first leads to its salvation, the second to its perdition.
Quoting Plato he says that philosophy is an exercise of voluntary death. There are two kinds of
life: life according to intelligence, which is “natural life,” and life according to matter, which is
voluntary life. The same applies to death; therefore, Plato says. If you die by will, you live by
nature. Here “will” is taken in the sense of “passion.”
But, Miskawayh at once corrects himself by saying that this voluntary death does not mean
renunciation of the world; that would be the attitude of those who know nothing about the
objects of this world and ignore that man is civil by nature and cannot live without the help and
service of others. Those who preach renunciation are iniquitous, because they want the services
of others without rendering any service to them and this is complete injustice. Some pretend that
they need very little, but even this very little needs the services of a great number of people.
Therefore, it is the duty of every human being to serve others fairly: if he serves them much he
can demand much; and if he serves them little, he can ask for little.
Moral Philosophy
Moral philosophy is so connected with psychology that Miskawayh begins his big treatise on
ethics Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, by stating his doctrine of the soul. Here his expose is less
philosophical but richer in detail.
The point of transition from psychology to ethics is given on pages 18 to 21 of Tahdhīb al-
Akhlāq where, following Plato, be draws a parallel between the faculties of the soul and the
corresponding virtues. The soul has three faculties: rational, courageous, and appetitive, and
correspondingly three virtues: wisdom, courage, and temperance. By the harmony of these three
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virtues, we have a fourth one, namely, justice. The Greek temperament being theoretical and
speculative, Plato could go no farther than this.
Equipped with a personal code of moral conduct, Miskawayh determined seven species of
wisdom, viz., acuteness of intelligence, quickness of intellect, clearness of understanding, facility
of acquirement, precision of discrimination, retention, and recollection; eleven species of
courage, viz., magnanimity, collectedness, loftiness of purpose, firmness, coolness, stateliness,
boldness, endurance, condescension, zeal, and mercy; twelve species of temperance, viz., shame,
affability, righteousness, conciliatoriness, continence, patience, contentment, sedateness, piety,
regularity, integrity, and liberality (which is further divided into six sub-species) ; and nineteen
species of justice, viz., friendship, union, faithfulness, compassion, brotherhood, recompense,
good partnership, fair-dealing, cordiality, submission, resignation, devotion to God, forgetting of
enmity, abstention from speaking ill of others, discussing the character of the just, ignoring the
account of the unjust, and abstention from trusting the ignoble, the mischief-monger, and the
flatterer.
We, however, cannot determine exactly whether these sub-divisions and distinctions are all
Miskawayh’s own. Surely, he benefited himself much from his predecessors, and especially from
the school of Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī al-Manṭiqī, the echo of whose works we find in Al-
Tawḥīdī’s Muqābasāt.
So far Miskawayh has been Platonic, but from page 29 onward (of Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq) he begins
to be Aristotelian, and takes virtue as a mean between two vices. He applies this doctrine of the
mean to the four cardinal virtues, and with this he ends the first chapter.
In the second chapter, Miskawayh goes on to discuss the question of human nature and its
original state: whether it is born good or bad. He states the opinion of the early Greeks who say
that nature can never be changed, but rejects it. Then he takes up the view of the Stoics who
think that men are created good but become bad by their inclination to bad appetites and by
keeping bad company. There is also a third opinion that men are created bad and they become
good only by education. Galen rejects the last two views and says that men are of three kinds:
some are good by nature, others are bad by nature, and a third class is intermediate between the
two.
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Finally, Miskawayh states the opinion of Aristotle as given in the Nicomachean Ethics, and gives
his own view that “the existence of the human substance depends on God's will, but the
amelioration of it is left to man and depends on man's will”.
Perfection attainable by man is of two kinds: the first is theoretical and the second practical. By
the first he attains perfect science, by the second perfect character. Human faculties are three; the
highest is reason, the lowest is appetite, and between the two lies courage. Man is man by the
first. Therefore, perfection belongs especially to the rational soul. In each faculty there are many
degrees, which Miskawayh enumerates in detail. Here we also find a long chapter on the
education of children and youth.
The essential part of Miskawayh’s ethics begins from the third chapter. In the first place he
follows Aristotle as commented upon by Porphyry. It seems that he depends entirely on the
commentary of Porphyry on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which was translated into Arabic
by Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn, in twelve books. Unfortunately, this commentary is lost both in Greek and
its Arabic translation. But, we can gather something of its form from Miskawayh’s Tahdhīb al-
Akhlāq.
Following Aristotle, Miskawayh says that the good is that at which all things aim. This
definition, which is supposed to be perhaps that of Eudoxus (c. 25 B. C.), is given in the very
beginning of the Nichomachean Ethics. Miskawayh goes on then to say that what is useful to this
end may also be called good, i.e., the means as well as the end can be called good. But happiness
or well-being is a relative good - good for an individual person. It is only a kind of good and has
no distinctive and autonomous essence.
Miskawayh, like Aristotle, gives a classification of happiness but adds more details, perhaps
taken from Porphyry’s commentary. This classification comprises (1) health, (2) wealth, (3)
fame and honour, (4) success, and (5) good thinking.
After giving Aristotle's doctrine of happiness, Miskawayh states the views of Hippocrates,
Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoics, and some physicians who believed that body is a part and not an
instrument of man, and so, held that happiness of the soul is incomplete if it is not accompanied
by happiness of the body.
Miskawayh discusses these different doctrines and concludes by saying that we should reject the
doctrine according to which happiness can come only after death and affirm that it is possible
also in this world. No happiness is possible except by searching for the good in this world and
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the world to come. Here he affirms anew his two-fold Anschauung. But as a true religious man
he gives preference to the next world.
In support of this, he refers to the translation by Abū ‘Uthmān al-Dimishqī of a treatise called
“Virtues of the Soul” attributed to Aristotle. We find this treatise attributed to Aristotle nowhere
else. There are two kinds of happiness, one according to this world, the other according to the
next, but no one can have the second without passing through the first, because, as Aristotle said,
divine happiness, notwithstanding being higher and nobler, is yet in need of worldly happiness;
otherwise, it would remain hidden.
The fourth chapter deals mainly with justice and explains in detail what is meant by it. Here
again he follows the corresponding parts in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.
In the fifth chapter he goes on to speak about friendship and love. A striking passage in this part
is about two kinds of love: (a) love of man for God, and (b) love of disciple for master. The first
is too high to be attained by mortal beings, and is reserved only for a few. As to the second kind
of love, Miskawayh draws a parallel between the son's love for his parents and the disciple's love
for his master, and says that the latter is nobler and more generous, because masters educate our
souls and by their guidance we obtain real happiness. The master is a “spiritual father and a
human lord; his goodness for the disciple is divine goodness, because he brings him up on
virtues, feeds him with high wisdom, and conducts him to everlasting life in eternal blessing”.
Friendship, in general, is most sacred and useful to all human beings. He who betrays it, is more
wicked than a counterfeiter of coins. A good man is a friend to himself and other people are also
friends to him; he has no enemy except the bad. The happy man is he who gains friends and tries
his best to be of use to them.
Miskawayh quotes Aristotle saying that man is in need of friends in good as well as in bad
circumstances. Even a king is in need of friends because he cannot know his people's needs
except through sincere friends, especially because they supply him information and help in
execution of his orders. Man should do his best to please his friends and to be always on good
terms with them without hypocrisy and flattery.
Miskawayh’s treatment of justice (‘Adl) is largely Aristotelian, although for him this virtue is a
shadow of divine unity, the true equipoise/balance. The knowledge of the mean or the limit that
moderation would set in each particular case is a prerequisite of justice, but, unlike Aristotle, he
assigns this function to the divine code rather than to reason or prudence. The king as the deputy
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of God can exercise royal discretion in minor details according to the exigencies of time and
place, without violating the spirit of the divine code.
Aristotle recognized benevolence vaguely in the imperfect form of liberality, which for him
meant giving to “proper persons, in right proportion, at right times.” With Ibn Miskawayh, it is
such an excess over the just award as would eliminate all possibility of under-estimation in
justice, provided that its prejudicial effects are confined to the rights of the benevolent person
himself only and the recipient himself is a worthy choice for it. Charity, thus, is a form of justice
which is safe from disturbance.
Similarly, love, according to him, is not an extension of self-love, as held by Aristotle, but a
limitation of it and love for another. He regards affection (Maḥabbah) as an inborn capacity for
associating with mankind in general, but confines friendship (Ṣadaqah) to a few individuals,
basing it on the considerations of profit, pleasure, or good as conceived by Aristotle. Love
(‘Ishq) being the excessive desire for pleasure or good—the consideration of profit is alien to
love—cannot extend beyond two individuals.
The object of animal love is pleasure and that of the spiritual love is virtue or goodness. The
former is condemnable, the latter praiseworthy. He makes a specific mention of the love of man
for God, of disciple for teacher, and of son for his parents in a graded series, as pointed out
earlier. Justice, he concludes, is brought about through fear and force, but affection is a natural
source of unity, so that justice is not required where affection reigns supreme. Affection, thus, is
the sovereign; justice is the vicegerent.
As in Al-Fawz al-Asghar, so in Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq Miskawayh is against all forms of ascetic life,
because ascetics “sever themselves from all the moral virtues mentioned above. How can he who
retires from men and lives in isolation be temperate, just, generous, or courageous? Is he
anything other than something inorganic and dead?” Divine happiness is the ultimate goal and
the good of man. It belongs to man's divine part. It is pure good, while reason is the first good.
Spiritual Medicine
The last two chapters of Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq are devoted to what may be called spiritual medicine,
a phrase which we find for the first time as the title of Muḥammad ibn Zakariyya al-Rāzī’s
famous book: Al-Ṭibb al-Rūḥānī. Miskawayh uses the phrase Ṭibb al-Nufūs, but the resemblance
in the general treatment of the subject is, obvious. This implies that Miskawayh is undoubtedly
acquainted with Al-Rāzī’s treatise, although he does not mention him by name.
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The two begin by saying that the mastering of one's passion is the essential foundation of
spiritual hygiene. Both refer to Galen's book On Knowing One’s Own Defects. But, whereas Al-
Rāzī contents himself with what Galen says in this respect, Miskawayh contends it by saying that
there does not exist a friend who can find for you your defects, and that an enemy is more useful
in this respect than a friend because he is more aware of your vices and would have no hesitation
in revealing them to you.
In this connection Miskawayh recommends the study of another of Galen's treatise: That Good
People Benefit from Their Enemies, which deals with this topic and is also mentioned by Al-
Rāzī. Miskawayh then refers to Al-Kindī, who, in effect, said that the man who is in search of
virtue should realize that the images of his acquaintances are mirrors in which are reflected the
evils arising out of pains and passions.
In the end, Miskawayh speaks of remedies for the diseases of the soul. He enumerates the most
important diseases—anger, vanity, contentiousness, treason, cowardice, vainglory, fear and
sadness—and deals with their treatment. Some of his chapters correspond with some chapters in
Al-Rāzī’s Ṭibb, namely, those on vanity, sadness, and fear of death. He also reproduces some
passages from Al-Kindī's treatise On the Rejection of Sadness.
We have all along been showing what Miskawayh owes to his Greek predecessors, but we
should not forget that Islamic culture also has an important influence on him. In supporting some
ideas which he expounds, he very often quotes the Qur’ān, traditions (Aḥādīth) of the Prophet
(peace be upon him), sayings of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, besides Arabic poetry.
Philosophy of History
Miskawayh is essentially a historian and moralist. His ethics is genetic (being based on the place
and position of man in the cosmic evolution), religious, and practical in character. He even felt it
necessary to reform himself morally before writing his Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq. In history, his point
of view is philosophical, scientific, and critical. Anticipating the modern outlook, he determines
both the function of history and the duties of the historian as follows.
History is not an amusing tale about the royal personages, but a mirror of the politico-economic
structure of society in a particular age. It is a record of the rise and fall of civilizations, nations,
and States.
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In order to realize this end, the historian should scrupulously guard himself against the common
tendency of mixing up facts with fiction or pseudo-events. He should not only be factual but also
critical in collecting his data.
Above all, he should not be content with the mere descriptions of facts, but, with a philosophic
insight, should interpret them in terms of the underlying “human interests,” their immediate
causal determinants. In history as in nature, there is no room for chance or accident.
History, thus, is no longer a collection of static and isolated facts, but a dynamic process of
creative human hopes and aspirations. It is a living and growing organism, whose structure is
determined by the basic ideals and the ideals of nations and States. It not only binds together the
facts of the past into an organic whole, but also determines the shape of things to come. The very
title of his monumental work, Tajārib al-Umam (The Experiences of the Nations) is itself
suggestive of its aims and methods, which, in the words of Leon Caetani, are “much akin to the
principles followed by Western and more modern historians.”
3.3.6 Let Us Sum Up
Ibn Miskawayh is one of the outstanding personalities in the history of philosophical thought
among the Muslims. Therefore, as seems clear, his fame did not come about as a result of his
involvement with teaching or with writing on education, in our modern terms, but his fame arose
from his work in philosophy that too in the realm of ethics which occupies the centrality of Ibn
Miskawayh’s thought.
The ultimate goal of ethics is consistent with the ultimate goal of human being’s creation, which
is reaching God and is the perfect goodness. Man’s real happiness is ensured when he reaches
this goal. Those properties which lead humans to achieving God, which is the manifestation of
man’s happiness, are considered as virtues, and those properties which forbear humans from
achieving this goal are considered as vices. Thus, it is only virtues that can bring human to
happiness. Although, worldly things create some sensory and superficial pleasures, but they can
never lead human beings to happiness. Man’s happiness is with actualization of all of his powers
or faculties. Happiness is a comprehensive state that includes human body and spirit, this world
and hereafter. In spite of this fact that the highest rank of happiness is possible in the hereafter, a
high rank of it, is possible in this world.
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1. Give the brief description of Ibn Miskawayh’s life and works?
2. Discuss Ibn Miskawayh’s contribution to Muslim Philosophy?
3. Elaborate Ibn Miskawayh as a Moralist?
1. M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, Delhi: Adam Publishers,
4. Abdul Salaam Nadwi, Hukama-i Islam,
5. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, Srinagar: City Book
Centre
6. ____________, Muslim Philosophy and Science: An Introduction
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Lesson 3.4: Ibn Ṭufayl
Lesson Structure
3.4.1 Introduction
3.4.2 Objectives
3.4.3 An Overview of Ibn Ṭufayl ’s Life and Works
3.4.4 Various Stages in the life of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān
3.4.5 Philosophical Contribution of Ibn Ṭufayl
3.4.6 Let Us Sum Up
3.4.1 Introduction
Ibn Ṭufayl was one of the Spanish philosophers who objected to major parts of the Ptolemaic
system. We have little information about Ibn Ṭufayl’s formative period and early days. He seems
to have worked for local rulers till he became secretary to the governor of Ceuta and Tangier,
thus, entering the service of the Almohads, the North African dynasty that ruled Muslim Spain
(Andalusia) and North Africa from the middle of the 12th century onwards. He then became
court physician and counselor to the caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, a sovereign who loved and
supported science and thought. At this influential administrative post, Ibn Ṭufayl seems to have
promoted most of the scientific and philosophical enterprises that characterize this period,
encouraging his disciples to develop his suggestions. It is recorded that he inspired Ibn Rushd’s
systematic commentary of Aristotle and, perhaps, his writing of a medical manual. As for
astronomy, Biṭrūjī informs us in his Kitāb al‐Hayʾa that Ibn Ṭufayl conceived a cosmological
system (Hayʾa) that described planetary motion without having recourse to Ptolemaic eccentrics
and epicycles, which violated the Aristotelian principles of uniform and circular motions
centered on the Earth. Biṭrūjī goes on to say that Ibn Ṭufayl promised to write a book about his
system, but, as far as we know, he never did so. This information is the only evidence of Ibn
Ṭufayl’s concern with this question, and, in spite of its brevity, is consistent with our knowledge
of the “Andalusian revolt against Ptolemy.” On the one hand, Ibn Ṭufayl was aware of the works
of the philosopher who paved the way for this “revolt,” i.e., Ibn Bājja; on the other hand, his
closest disciple, Ibn Rushd, devoted much time and effort to studying the problem. Nonetheless,
whatever intuitions Ibn Ṭufayl may have had, he must have kept his alternative system to himself
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because Ibn Rushd does not mention a single idea of Ibn Ṭufayl on the matter, and Biṭrūjī states
that his Kitāb al‐Hayʾa, the only cosmological proposal deriving from this “revolt,” was the
result of his own efforts and research.
Ibn Ṭufayl’s most important work, the philosophical romance Risālah Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, has
several references to astronomy. As is well known, the book describes the process of
self‐education by a child Ḥayy, either the son of a princess or born by spontaneous generation,
who grows up abandoned on a desert island. By means of his own understanding, he is able to
discover all kinds of truth and knowledge: technical, physical, philosophical, and spiritual. The
study of the heavens plays an essential role in Ḥayy’s inquiries; he is able to ascertain the
mechanics of celestial bodies without the help of others. The paragraphs devoted to this question
mainly deal with the philosophical sides of cosmology (the souls of celestial bodies, their
influence on the sublunary world, etc.) to the extent that it is difficult to deduce anything really
useful from them about Ibn Ṭufayl’s astronomical thought. Nevertheless, a passage in which he
mentions that the celestial bodies can move either around their own center or around another
center suggests that, in spite of what Biṭrūjī says, the author may have accepted eccentrics at
some stage, thus, sharing the opinion of Ibn Bājja.
3.4.2 Objectives
This lesson aims to:
1. Know Ibn Ṭufayl as an Andalusian Philosopher.
2. Highlight Ibn Ṭufayl’s contribution to Muslim Philosophy.
3. Highlight Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān as a Philosophical Novel.
3.4.3 An Overview of Ibn Ṭufayl ’s Life and works
Abū Bakr Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭufayl al-Qaysī
(also known by a Latinized version of his name, Abūbacer Aben Ṭufayl, 1105–85 AD) was an
Andalusian Muslim polymath who was born in the year 1105 in Wādī Ash (Guadix), a small
town in Spain about sixty kilometers northeast of Granada, Spain, and died in Morocco in the
year 1185. Apart from fragments of poetry, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān (Alive, son of awake), also
called Philosophus Autodidactus (The self-taught philosopher), is his only surviving work. This
first philosophical novel had much influence in the West. It takes place on an isolated and
uninhabited island, where the orphaned Ḥayy is suckled by a deer and comes to manhood,
reason, and an understanding of science and religious truth.
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Little is known about Ibn Ṭufayl’s life. But it is certain that he absorbed all the scientific and
philosophical knowledge available to that age. He made special studies of Medicine,
Mathematics, Astronomy and Philosophy. He was also a poet and some of his poems have been
preserved to us in some histories of the period. According to the statement of Ibn Khaṭīb, Ibn
Ṭufayl got his medical education at Granada. It has also been stated that he practiced medicine at
Granada for some time.
Nothing is known with certainty about his teachers. Al-Marrākushī represents him to be a pupil
of Ibn Bajja. De Boer also accepts this version. They are led to this view perhaps by some
apparent similarities in their philosophies or simply by the fact that Ibn Bājja was an elderly
contemporary of Ibn Ṭufayl. But, it appears that the holders of this view did not care to read the
full text of Ibn Ṭufayl’s book. In his Introduction, Ibn Ṭufayl has made some unfavorable
comments on Ibn Bājja’s philosophy and has unequivocally stated that he had never had an
opportunity of meeting Ibn Bājja personally. His official career bears testimony to his versatile
genius. He first acted as Secretary to the Governor of Granada, and, according to one version,
also acted as Governor of the place at some stage of his career. Then, he became the vizier of
Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf and also served as his Court Physician.
Ibn Ṭufayl, as the Grand vizier of the Caliph and also as his personal friend, had great influence
over the Caliph. According to the statement of ‘Abdul Wāḥid al-Marrākushī, Ibn Ṭufayl was so
beloved to the Caliph/Commander of the Faithful that he used to spent successive days and
nights with him without leaving the place. The Caliph used to pass most of his leisure time
discussing different problems of philosophy with Ibn Ṭufayl.
Ibn Ṭufayl was a man of retiring nature, “more fond of books than of men.” He spent most of his
time in the great library of Abū Ya’qūb, which, according to some estimates, was nearly as big as
the once famous library of Al-Ḥakam.
Ibn Ṭufayl used his influence with the Caliph in introducing and recommending men of learning
to the favors of the Caliph. Once the Caliph expressed the wish to find some philosopher, who
could analyze and explain the works of Aristotle. Ibn Ṭufayl recommended Ibn Rushd for this
purpose. This reflects not only the nobility of his soul but also his confidence in his own
scholarship. A man of superficial learning will never recommend a real scholar to the favors of
his patron.
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In 1182, he resigned his post as Royal Physician due to old age and was succeeded by Ibn Rushd.
After the death of Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf, his son Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr became the Caliph. He was
also a great scholar and a great patron of learning. But, he was even more orthodox and strict in
religious policy than his father. It is said that he had been guilty of some indiscretions in his
youth. Moreover, for the safety of his empire he had to kill his uncle and cousin. Though he had
repented afterwards yet these incidents had cast a gloom over his nature and had resulted in
making him more severe and harsh. The treatment that he meted out to Ibn Rushd is a sad page
of Spanish history. However, Ibn Ṭufayl continued to enjoy Caliph's favors and to hold his
official position at the court.
In 1185 he died at Morocco and was given a ceremonious burial. The Caliph himself attended
the funeral.
Ibn Ṭufayl, no doubt, was a man of encyclopedic learning. He was a born genius. He had made
extensive studies in literature and his style of writing showed great literary beauties and artistic
qualities. According to the testimony of ‘Omar Farrukh, in sweetness of expression and charm of
diction his style resembles that of Al-Ghazālī. He was also distinguished for his knowledge of
medicine, and according to the evidence of Ibn Khaṭīb, had written two books on medicine. Ibn
Abī Asiba‘a tells us, on the authority of Ibn Rushd, that Ibn Ṭufayl had written a book, and had
some special views about the heavenly bodies. Ibn Isḥāq Biṭrūdjī, who was a pupil of Ibn Ṭufayl
and a specialist of Astronomy, informs us that his teacher Qāḍī Abū Bakr Ibn Ṭufayl had told
him that he had discovered a new system to explain the movements of heavenly bodies and that
system was different from and superior to that of Ptolemy. De Boer doubts the validity of this
statement and interprets it as implying merely Ibn Ṭufayl’s inclination to adhere closely to
Aristotle rather than to Ptolemy. But, the opinion of De Boer is merely based on his guess and is
not supported by any reasons.
Ibn Ṭufayl’s command of scientific knowledge is also an established fact. In tracing the
development of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān he gives sufficient glimpses of his knowledge of Anatomy,
Physics, Mathematics, Astronomy, Geography, etc.
The greatest contribution of Ibn Ṭufayl, however, is in the field of philosophy. It is rather
surprising that a great philosopher like Ibn Ṭufayl should have left only one work, Ḥayy Ibn
Yaqẓān. But, Ibn Rushd, while discussing Aristotle's Logic in his commentaries on Aristotle,
states that Ibn Ṭufayl had also written a book on that subject. George Sorton informs us that Ibn
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Ṭufayl had written a commentary on one of Aristotle’s work, and Al-Marrākushī speaks of
another book of Ibn Ṭufayl on Soul, which he claims to have seen in Ibn Ṭufayl's own
handwriting. But, ‘Omar Farrukh is of the opinion that it must have been the very book Ḥayy Ibn
Yaqẓān that Al-Marrākushī had seen. However, he was not unfamiliar with Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān. He
refers to it elsewhere as a book “intended to explain the origin of human species.” Al-Marrākushī
also tells us that he had seen several works of Ibn Ṭufayl on Philosophy, Physics and
Metaphysics etc.
Ibn Ṭufayl had some correspondence with Ibn Rushd with regard to the latter's book “Al-
Kuliyyāt” But unfortunately, no work of Ibn Ṭufayl except Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān is available to us.
But even this one work is sufficient to give him an immortal place in the history of philosophy.
Ibn Ṭufayl’s greatness as a scholar and a philosopher is also proved by the fact that an eminent
thinker like Ibn Rushd was his student. He was a pious man, yet, it is interesting to note how he
has been sometimes misrepresented in the west as a magician. Since, Ibn Ṭufayl was a first class
physician also, it is possible that someone might have described his cures as ‘magical’ and this
mode of description was taken on its face value by some uncritical historian and found its way in
a book like Columbia Encyclopedia. However, more reliable sources tell us that he was a man of
calm and quiet nature. He had great revulsion against the masses. He liked seclusion and had
become all the more seclusive towards the later period of his life. He did not possess the courage
to face opposition or to express his views openly before public. Despite his philosophical
proclivities, he was considered to be pious man with a deeply religious personality.
Keeping in view these temperamental qualities and traits of Ibn Ṭufayl, and the characteristics of
the period, it is not difficult to understand why he chose the medium of a story for the expression
of his views.
3.4.4 Various Developmental Stages in the Life of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān
The Birth of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān
There are many versions of the birth of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān. According to the most popular version
of the story, there was a vast island, very fertile and well-populated. A prince of proud and
jealous disposition ruled over it. He had a sister gifted with exquisite beauty. He would not marry
her to any one as he did not consider any one worthy of her hand. At last, a relation of the prince,
named Yaqẓān, succeeded in winning her love, and married her privately in accordance with the
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customary rites. In course of time she gave birth to a child who was named Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān',
i.e. Ḥayy the son of Yaqẓān.
The princess, being afraid of her proud and haughty brother, put the baby into an ark, closed it
fast, and with the help of some of her servants and friends, set it afloat into the sea, in the
darkness of night. She did it with a heavy heart, praying to God in these words:
O God thou formedst this child out of nothing, and didst sustain him in the dark
recesses of my womb, till he was complete in all his parts; I fearing the cruelty of this
proud and unjust king, commit him to thy goodness, hoping that thou who art infinitely
merciful, will be pleased to protect him, and never leave him destitute of thy care.
As it was the time of a high tide the ark was carried by the waves to the other island, and was left
there in a safe and sheltered place by subsiding waters. The winds blew a heap of sand together
between the ark and the sea so that he was safe from the dangers of future tide. The child, feeling
hungry by now, began to cry. The cries were heard by a roe (deer), who had lost her fawn. She
felt pity and tender affection for him. The nails and the timbers of the ark had already been
loosened by the waves. The roe, with the help of her hoofs, opened it and suckled the child. From
that moment onward, she protected him and nourished him like a mother.
Early Development of Ḥayy
Ḥayy began to develop in the company of the deer and under the loving care of the roe. There
was a good and abundant pasture in the island and there was no beast of prey. The roe had plenty
of milk with which she maintained the little child.
The roe suckled him until he was two years old. Now, he could walk a little and began to breed
his teeth. The roe showed him the way to fruit trees and places of water. When the sun was hot
she sheltered him, and when it was cold she warmed him with her body. When the night came
she brought him back to his place.
When Ḥayy heard the voice of any bird or beast he tried to imitate it and came very near it in his
imitation. He could imitate the voices of the deer so perfectly that there was hardly any sensible
difference. He could express himself exactly as they did under the stress of various wants and
emotions. This helped him to develop such a close acquaintance with the wild beasts that they
were not afraid of him, nor he of them.
By this time, Ḥayy began to develop the power of imagination and thinking. He could fix in his
mind ideas of things when they were no more present to his senses. This led him to have desire
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for some of them and to have aversion against some others. Thus, he passed from the stage of
perception to that of concepts and conceptual thinking.
With the development of thinking he began to compare himself with other animals. He found
that they were swift and strong and were armed with such natural weapons as horns, teeth, hoofs,
spurs and nails. On the other hand, he was slow, weak and defenseless. It proved a great
handicap to him in his contests with other animals. For instance, when there, was a quarrel over
gathering of fruits he could neither beat them off nor run away from them.
He also observed that his fellow fawns had smooth foreheads at first, yet horns grew on them,
later on. Similarly, they were weak in the beginning but became strong and swift afterwards. He
eagerly waited for the same to happen to him, but he was disappointed.
About the same time, the sense of shame began to emerge in Ḥayy. He observed with grief and
shame his own nakedness, while in other animals he found that they were mostly covered with
fur/hair, wool, feathers or tails. All these handicaps pained him very much and he could not
understand the reason of this difference. By this time he was about seven years of age.
His intense feelings about these handicaps and need for self-preservation put him on the path of
creative thinking and invention. He took some branches of a tree, removed the twigs and the
leaves and made them smooth. Thus, he made clubs for the purpose of attack and defense against
wild animals. Similarly, he made two coverings with some broad leaves, one to wear on the front
side, and the other to wear behind. He tied these coverings to his waist by means of a girdle
made of the fibers of certain trees. This made him conscious of the superiority of his hands over
the forelegs of animals.
He had compensated for his handicap but there was a difficulty. The leaves soon dried and
dropped away. Thus, he had to repair and renew his coverings frequently. He tried to find some
better device. He thought of taking the tail of some dead animal and wearing it himself. But he
found that all beasts avoided the dead bodies of the fellow animals. He had the apprehension that
it may be unsafe and harmful for him. This marks the beginning of reasoning in Ḥayy. One day
he saw the carcass of a vulture, and found that no animal showed any particular aversion to it. He
cut off its wings and the tail and drew out its skin, which he divided into two equal parts. One of
these parts he put on his back and the other, on his front. He fixed the wings on each arm, and the
tail he wore behind. This dress brought him several advantages.
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It covered his nakedness and kept him warm. Moreover, it made him look so formidable that
none of the beasts, except the roe, would come near him.
Death of the Roe and 'Ḥayy's Search for its Cause
As Ḥayy grew up the roe became old and weak. Now Ḥayy had a chance of repaying the debt he
owed to her. He took care of her, led her to best pastures and plucked wild fruits for her. But she
became weaker and weaker every day and ultimately died. This was a great shock for Ḥayy. His
grief was unbounded. The death of a near one makes man reflective and inquisitive. The same
was the case with Ḥayy. He had a desire to know the cause of this phenomenon.
He had observed in himself that his eyes could not see when there was an obstacle before them.
He could not hear when he put his fingers into his ears. He could not smell anything if his
nostrils were closed. From this he had concluded that all his faculties were liable to impediments,
and that their operations could be restored only by removing those impediments. So, he peeped
into the eyes and ears of the roe and also examined other parts of her body in order to find out
any possible impediment. But, he found no visible defect or impediment in any external part of
her body.
This led him to suppose that there was some hurt in some internal organ of such vital importance
that no organ could function without its help. He concentrated all his attention and effort on
finding out that organ. Here we find clear beginning of inductive reasoning in Ḥayy. He observes
a situation, the death of the roe which raises a problem in his mind about the cause of that
phenomenon. Then, with the help of his past experience, he proceeds to frame a suitable
hypothesis to explain the phenomenon.
He knew from his personal experience that all the parts of the animal body were solid except
three cavities, the skull, the chest and the belly. He argued to himself that that vital organ must
be in one of those cavities. As the whole body stood in need of that organ, it was most probably
in the middle one, i.e. the breast. He was reminded of the fact that he had felt the presence of
some such organ in his own body. It was always active and constantly beating within his breast.
He could stop his hands, feet, eyes, ears and nose, etc. from functioning but he could not
conceive the possibility of stopping that organ even for the twinkling of an eye. It was for this
reason that he used to take special care to protect his breast from being pierced by the horns of
those wild animals with whom he was sometimes engaged in fighting.
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Ḥayy’s Discovery of the Animal Spirit
He decided to open the breast of the dead roe in the hope of reaching that organ and removing
the impediment from it. At first he feared lest his operation should do more harm than the
'disease' itself. He tried to recall if any animal, after reaching that state, ever returned to its
normal condition. He could not find any such instance. He concluded that if the roe was left in
that condition there was no hope of her getting well again. But, if he tried operation on her body
there might be some hope. He took some fragments of flints and splinters of dry cane and
sharpened them to serve as knives.
With these he opened the ribs and cutting through the flesh he reached one of the lungs. First he
mistook it for that vital organ. But, when he saw that it" leaned sideways he was satisfied that it
was not the organ he looked for, because, according to his way of reasoning, that vital organ
should have been in the center. Proceeding further, he found the heart covered by the lung on one
side. He wanted to know whether it was similar on the other side of it. When he found that it was
so, he was assured that the organ was really in the middle position. The regularity of its shape,
the firmness of its flesh, its being guarded by means of a stout membrane, and above all, its
central position, persuaded him that it was the goal of his search. He examined it thoroughly,
and, perceiving no apparent defect, he opened it. He found two cavities in it. One of them, on the
right side, was filled with clotted blood. The other one on the left was empty.
This made him argue to himself thus: That congealed blood, which filled one of the cavities, was
just the ordinary blood. He had often seen blood flowing out of the body of an animal and
congealing shortly. Moreover, it was common to all parts of the body. He had often lost much
blood in his fights with wild animals, without damage to his vital functions. So, that congealed
blood could not be that being which he was looking for. As far as the second cavity was
concerned, he could not suppose that such a fine chamber had been made in vain. That being
which was responsible for the functioning of the whole body must have resided in it. When it left
the body, its departure resulted in the privation of the sense and cessation of all motion of the
body. Ḥayy had no hope of its returning to the body. It had left the body when it was whole and
entire. It was highly improbable that it should return to it when operation had caused such ruin
and havoc to it.
It made Ḥayy realize that his mother, the roe, was not the body but that something which had
departed from it. All the actions of the body proceeded from it. The body was a mere instrument
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for that being, just like his weapons with which he fought against the wild animals. Thus, all his
care and regard for the body of the roe was transferred to that being which governed it. In the
meantime, the carcass of the roe began to disintegrate, and an obnoxious/bad smell emanated
from it. This increased his aversion for it. But, he did not know how to get rid of it. At last he
saw two crows fighting bitterly with one another. One of them killed the other and dug a pit with
his claws and buried the body of his adversary Ḥayy condemned, in his heart, the crow's act of
killing, but admired his cleverness in burying the dead body. He did the same with the carcass of
the roe. Here, we find an indication of the development of moral sense in Ḥayy.
Ḥayy now concentrated all his reflection on the being which moved and governed the body. He
observed that rest of the roes were of the same form and figure as he saw in his mother. This led
him to infer that every one of them was moved and directed by a being similar to that which
moved and directed his mother previously. This increased his affection for them and he used to
keep in their company for the sake of their likeness with his mother.
Ḥayy observed that every individual animal or plant had a great many more like it. He wanted to
know if there was any being like himself. But he did not find such a being in that island. As the
island was surrounded by the sea he had no idea of any other land beyond it.
Discovery of Fire
One day it so happened that a thicket of canes caught fire through friction. Ḥayy was very much
surprised at the phenomenon. The brightness of its light and its power in consuming everything
and changing it into its own nature impressed him very much. His admiration for it and his
natural boldness prompted him to touch it. It burnt his fingers. Then he caught hold of a half-
burnt stick by the end which was as yet untouched by fire and brought it to his lodging place,
(cave) There he kept the fire and went on adding dry grass and wood to it so that it may not be
extinguished. He admired the fire very much and tended it night and day. He considered it most
wonderful and the most excellent of all things that were around him. It supplied him light and
heat in the absence of the sun. He was persuaded that it was one of those celestial substances that
were shining in the firmament.
To test its power he used to throw all sorts of things into it. He found that it consumed and
vanquished all bodies, sometimes quickly and sometimes slowly according to the degrees of
combustibility of those bodies.
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Once he put into it some sea animals which had been thrown ashore by the water. It produced a
smell which stimulated his appetite. He tasted of them and found them delicious. Thus he
acquired the habit of eating meat, and for this purpose he applied himself to fishing and hunting.
Reflecting over the beneficial effects and the extraordinary power of fire, he began to think that
the substance which had departed from the heart of his mother the roe, was most probably
something of the nature of fire. He had observed that the body of the animal was warm as long as
he lived, and became cold immediately after death. Moreover, he had noticed greater degree of
heat about his breast where the heart was situated. These facts confirmed him in his opinion and
gave him the idea to dissect a living animal, to see if the substance residing in the heart was
really like fire. He took a wild beast, tied him down, dissected him and opened his heart. He
found that the left cavity of the heart was filled with airy vapour which looked like a mist or
cloud. When he put his finger into it he found it intolerably hot, and the animal immediately
died. From this he concluded that it was this hot vapour which moved and directed the body of
an animal and its departure from the heart caused death.
Ḥayy performed dissection on many more animals, both living and dead, to know more about
various parts of animal body and the way they enjoyed communication with that hot vapour.
Thus, he got the highest degree of knowledge of animal anatomy that was possible to a specialist
in this field.
Unity of Animal Body
Ḥayy clearly saw that every animal, in spite of the multiplicity of his organs and limbs, was one
in respect of that hot vapour or spirit, which dwelt in the heart and from there was diffused
among all the members. This spirit was the Master or the mover of the body and all the organs or
the limbs were its servants or instruments.
Just as he made use of different instruments and tools for different purposes, similarly, that spirit
made use of various organs for different functions. No organ or limb could function without
having correspondence with that spirit, through proper passages, nerves, etc. The nerves derived
the spirit from the cavities of the brain and the brain had it from the heart. This animal spirit is
one though its influence is diffused throughout the body. It is the source of all the functions of
the body. All actions and functions really belong to it. Its action, when it makes use of the eye, is
sight; when of the ear, hearing; when of the nose, smelling; when of the tongue, tasting; and
when of the skin and flesh, feeling. Similarly, motion and nutrition were its functions when it
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made use of the limbs and the liver. When the passages through which an organ or limb receives
this animal spirit is damaged or obstructed the corresponding member ceases to function. When
this spirit departs wholly from the body the whole body stops functioning and is reduced to that
state which is called death.
Hay’s Contrivances to Satisfy Practical Needs
Ḥayy had made these discoveries by the time he was twenty one years of age. Besides, he had
learnt to make good many pretty contrivances to satisfy his practical needs. He made himself
clothes and shoes of the skins of the wild animals he dissected. He made thread with the hair or
with the bark of the stalks of Mallows or Hemp trees, etc. He made awls of thorns and splinters
of cane whose edges he had sharpened. Observing the swallow's nest he built for himself a
dwelling place with a store-house and a pantry. He protected the house with strong doors made
of canes. He took birds of prey and trained them for hunting. He kept poultry for their eggs and
chicken. He made spears by fixing the horns of the buffaloes on strong canes and clubs made
from trees. He made a shield for himself by folding the hides together. He captured wild horses
and asses and tamed them for riding. He made bridles and saddles for them from the strips of the
skin and the hides of the beasts. This enabled him to chase the swiftest animals of the island.
Ḥayy had been busy so far with learning various practical things about life. His scientific
investigations had not proceeded beyond the animal anatomy and the properties of a few things
connected with his needs. Now, he enters the stage of classification and tries to reduce the
multiplicity of nature to higher and higher unities.
Different Species of Bodies and their Unity
He proceeded to examine the nature of bodies. He found himself surrounded by so many bodies,
viz. animals, plants, minerals, stones, earth, water, vapour, snow, flame, etc. He observed in
them different qualities and actions.
They agreed in some respects and differed in others. Fixing his mind on their common qualities,
he thought they were one. But in view of their differences they appeared as great many. The
same he found in his own person. When he looked at his various organs and their differences he
found that there was a plurality in himself. Each organ, in turn, could be divided into a great
many parts. On the other hand, he perceived that all his organs were conjoined together to make
one whole. No doubt, different actions and functions seemed to distinguish them from one
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another but these actions and functions proceeded from the animal spirit. So, from the point of
view of this animal spirit too, he was one.
He considered different animals and found that every individual of them was also one. Then he
looked at different species of animals and found that all the individuals of each species were
exactly like one another in shape and functions. From this, he concluded that the spirit which
actuated any species was one and the same and the multiplicity of individuals in the same
species was like the multiplicity of parts in the same individual person.
Then, he considered all the species of animals together and perceived that sensation, nutrition
and movement were common to them all. As these actions proceeded from the animal spirit, it
was one and the same animal spirit which actuated all living creatures. That spirit was divided
into so many hearts just as the same water may be poured out into different vessels. The
differences and peculiarities of species were like the differences of temperature in the water
contained in different vessels. Thus, he regarded the whole animal kingdom as one in relation to
the animal spirit that worked in it.
Similarly, he contemplated the different species of plants and found that the individuals of every
species showed some common characteristics. Then, taking all the species of plants together, he
found that they agreed in the function of nutrition and growth. He thought that there must be
something in them analogous to the animal spirit from which their common characteristics
proceeded. In view of that spirit the whole vegetative kingdom was One.
Then, he viewed the kingdoms of animals and plants together. He found that they both agreed in
the functions of nutrition and growth. The animals, no doubt, showed some functions over and
above these, viz. sensation, apprehension and movement. But, he had observed something
analogous to it in plants also. For instance, the plants extended their roots that way the
nourishment came; and some flowers turned themselves towards the sun. Thus, he was led to the
conclusion that plants and animals were one in respect to that spirit which was common to them
both In one case, (i.e. animals), it was more perfect, and in the other case, (i.e. plant), a bit
restrained.
He next considered the inanimate objects, such as stones, earth, water, air, flames, etc. They all
had the common characteristic of being extended in three dimensions, i.e. length, breadth and
thickness. Their differences lay in different qualities that belonged to them. Some of them were
colored, others not; some were warm, others, cold and so on. But, he found that these qualities
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were liable to change. The bodies that were warm grew cold, and those that were cold became
warm. Again water was rarefied into vapours and vapours were condensed into water. This
showed that all those bodies were at bottom one and their differences were accidental to them.
Then, taking the animals, plants and inanimate objects together, he tried to find out if they
possessed any principle of unity. He found that they were all bodies. They did not differ from
one another in this respect. They differed, of course, in their functions and acts. But, these acts
were perhaps not essential to the body itself, and proceeded from something else. If the peculiar
act of a body could be produced somehow in another body that body would be just like the first.
So, viewing the bodies as abstracted from their peculiar functions, he concluded that they were
all one.
This was the end of his scientific voyage. Now he enters the domain of philosophy and wants to
discern the nature of body as such, abstracted from all properties and differences that give
multiplicity to it.
Essential Nature of Body
He considered all sorts of bodies to discover their underlying unity. He found that they all had a
tendency either upward or downward. For instance a stone or water will always tend to go
downward unless it is interrupted in its course by some other object. On the other hand smoke
will tend to go upwards and if intercepted by an arch or dome will divide to the right and left and
will resume its upward journey. Similarly, if a leather bag is filled with air and is held under
water it will strive to get up and' rise to its place of air.
Ḥayy did not find anybody that was devoid of both these qualities, i.e. gravity and levity. But, he
could not take either of them as constituting the essence of body because there were heavy
bodies that were devoid of levity and there were light bodies that were devoid of gravity.
He compared the heavy bodies with the light bodies and found that they were one and
indistinguishable in respect to their corporeity, (i.e. Just the fact of being a body). But, because
of an attribute (levity or gravity) super-added to their corporeity, they were distinguished from
one another. However, mere corporeity is never found to exist. It is always corporeity and some
attribute superadded to corporeity that we come across. Thus bodies consist of two aspects; one
is corporeity and the other is some attribute or attributes superadded to it. In the former aspect all
bodies are one and indistinguishable. It is the latter aspect that gives them their distinctive
features, individuality and multiplicity.
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Form and Matter
Ḥayy had analyzed body into two aspects corporeity and something superimposed on corporeity.
This analysis corresponds to the distinction of Form and Matter as upheld by Plato and other
philosophers. It was Ḥayy's first lesson in philosophy as the knowledge of these forms is derived
not through sense but through an intellectual apprehension.
Now, Ḥayy began to think that it was really the form of a body which was responsible for all its
peculiarities and functions. The animal spirit, which was a fine body and which he had admired
so much for its wonderful functions, must also possess a form, something superadded to its
corporeity. In reality, it was this form that was responsible for those wonderful actions. It was the
same as philosophers call the animal soul. Similarly, the plants must also possess their peculiar
form which may be called the vegetative soul. The inanimate objects too had their form which
was responsible for their properties and actions. It is generally known as their nature. All his
regard and esteem was now transferred to the form or the soul and he wanted to know more
about it.
Ḥayy considered different objects of the world from this point of view. He found that there was a
hierarchy of forms. For instance, earth, stones, minerals, plants, animals and all heavy bodies had
one common form from which proceeded their downward movement. A class in this category,
(animals and plants), agrees with the rest in the first form, yet, has another form also superadded
to it from which flow nutrition and growth. Again, a group of this class, i.e. animals has the first
and the second forms in common with inanimate objects and plants but has a third form also
superadded to them from which arise sensations and movements. Moreover, he perceived that
each species of animals and plants showed certain characteristics peculiar to it. These
differences, he thought, must be due to some additional form peculiar to them.
It was evident to him that some objects of the world possessed a simple form while some other
objects possessed a more complex and richer form. As he wanted to understand the nature of
form more closely, he thought it better to concentrate on those things which exhibited form in its
simplest. In this effort he became acquainted with the so called ‘four elements’, earth, water, air
and fire.
Ḥayy had made himself familiar with so many forms but he had not fully understood the nature
of corporeity. He wanted to know if there was any attribute common to all bodies which he
should take as constituting the meaning of corporeity. He did not find any such attribute except
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the notion of extension. Extension was common to all bodies they all had length, breadth and
thickness But he could not find anybody in nature which possessed just extension and nothing
more. There was always something superadded to extension. There was something in which that
extension did exist. A body was the combination of these two notions, extension and something
in which that extension existed.
To understand more clearly the nature of this something behind extension he made some
experiments with clay. He took a certain quantity of clay and moulded it into different shapes,
one after another. He made it into a spherical shape, then into a cubical, then into oval, and so
on. The clay could not remain without assuming some particular shape, dimensions and
proportions. But the two notions (clay and its shape) were not identical. The clay remained the
same but the shape changed every time in his experiment. Shape and dimensions that kept on
changing represented to him the notion of form and the clay that remained constant represented
the notion of corporeity or matter devoid of all forms.
Inference about an Immaterial Agent
Ḥayy now takes another step forward. Observing the occurrences of nature and constant change
of one form into another he inferred the existence of an Agent as the efficient and ultimate cause
of all these phenomena. The actions and functions that he had previously attributed to the form
of bodies now appeared to him as proceeding from this Agent. This Agent was the source of
changes of forms too. And what was a form but the disposition of a body to act in such and such
a way. In reality, it was the Agent, and not the form, which was responsible for those acts. Thus
he had an earnest desire to know this Agent more distinctly. He first looked for it among the
sensible things. But they were themselves liable to corruption and change, and so could not be
that Agent. By this time Ḥayy was 28 years old.
Heavenly Bodies
He reflected on the nature of the heavenly bodies to see if the Agent was to be found among
them. He knew that the Heavens and all the luminaries in them were bodies extended in three
dimensions. But, the question was whether they were extended to infinity or they were
circumscribed by any limits. With ingenious arguments he proved to himself that the body of
Heaven, and in feet everybody, was finite.
Then he wanted to know the shape of the heaven. Observing the circles described by different
planets in their movements, and seeing that the sun, the moon and the stars set in the west and
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rise in the east, and on the basis of similar astronomical observations, he concluded that the
Heaven was of a spherical figure.
When he considered the whole orb of the Heavens it appeared to him that earth, water, air,
plants, animals and the like were all contained in it, and it formed one compact whole like the
body of an animal. Thus, he acquired the idea of Universe.
Is the World Eternal or Created in Time
The next question which occupied his mind was whether the world existed eternally or it was
created in time. The question puzzled him very much and he could not decide this way or that.
Both the alternatives were supported by plausible arguments and both suffered from certain
difficulties and disadvantages. 'At last he gave up the idea of proving it one way or the other.
What was material to him was the fact that the world whether it was eternal or created in time
stood in need of an Immaterial Agent or an Incorporeal Creator.
Attributes of the Immaterial Agent
All the interest of Ḥayy was now centered on knowing this Immaterial Agent. Being immaterial,
it was obvious, He could not be apprehended through senses or imagination. He must be free
from matter and from properties of body. Then from the wonderfulness of His workmanship he
inferred such attributes as knowledge, wisdom, power, beauty, elegance and perfection. From the
fact that He sustained all creatures, he inferred His benevolence and mercy, and so on. In short,
Ḥayy conceived Him as possessing all attributes of perfection and as free from all attributes of
imperfection. Ḥayy was 35 years of age by now
He was so much inflamed with the desire of this supreme Agent that his thoughts were
withdrawn from the creatures. Whenever his eye fell on any object he perceived in it the work of
that Agent.
Knowledge of the Supreme Agent through Immaterial Essence
Having attained to the knowledge of the Supreme Agent and His attributes, Ḥayy asked himself
about the means by which he had acquired that knowledge. As the Supreme Agent was free from
all the properties of body it was impossible to apprehend Him through sense or imagination.
Obviously, he had apprehended that ‘Being’ through his own essence which was also immaterial.
Now Ḥayy began to look down upon his body as insignificant and worthless and all his thoughts
were concentrated on his noble essence through which he had known the Supreme Agent or the
Necessarily Existent Being.
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Immortality of the Soul and its Reward and Punishment
Ḥayy wanted to know whether his noble essence was destined to perish or was it of perpetual
duration. He argued that since it was not a body it could not be liable to corruption or
destruction. He was also desirous of knowing about the condition of his essence after being
separated from the body. He tried to solve this question by means of an analogy. Suppose there is
a man who has enjoyed the sight of beautiful and glorious objects. If he is deprived of his vision
his desire for those objects will still continue and he will feel extreme pain and grief over his
loss. Similarly, if a man, after knowing the Perfect Being, turned his face against Him and
remained absorbed in sensuous pleasures till death overtook him, he will continue in that state of
privation which would be a source of great torture and suffering for him, especially when there
would be no objects of sense to distract his mind. On the other hand, if there was a person who
had known the Supreme Being, His Beauty, splendor and Perfection, and had remembered Him
till his death, he will continue in that extreme joy and bliss forever. Besides these two classes,
there is a third category of those who were never acquainted with that Being, nor had they heard
anything about Him during their lives. They will not feel any pains as they will have no sense of
their loss. This is true of brutes/animals and of men who are in the same stage of development.
These considerations made Ḥayy very anxious to have the vision of the Necessarily Existent
perpetually before him so that death may not overtake him when his thoughts were removed
from Him. But, he found it very difficult. He tried to observe various kinds of animals to see if
any of them enjoyed that vision, so that he may learn from him the way to salvation. But it
appeared to him that none of them had any knowledge or desire of that Being.
Looking at the spheres and stars and finding them bright, remote from change and corruption,
and engaged in regular motions, he was persuaded to believe that they possessed immaterial
essences which were acquainted with Him and enjoyed the Vision all the time.
What constitutes the suitability of a Body to receive the Noble Essence?
Then Ḥayy began to consider what should be the reason that he alone of all living creatures
should possess an essence like that of the Heavenly bodies! Was his body different from other
bodies so as to be able to receive that noble essence?
To understand these differences he looked again at different bodies and studied the principles
underlying them. This is what he discovered.
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The bodies which came nearest to purity and had least mixture in them were least disposed to
corruption e.g. gold and jacinth.
The bodies which were mixed and compounded of contrary things were most disposed to
corruption because of the conflicting tendencies of different elements.
The bodies that had a single form superadded to their corporeity were far removed from life and
had fewest actions, e.g. the four elements.
The bodies that were endowed with several forms had stronger manifestations of life and more
numerous operations, and e.g. plants and animals.
If there is a compound body in which no element prevails over the other but all combine in a
most equal and harmonious way, then it will have a rich form, unopposed by a contrary form,
and will be more disposed to life. And if the forms are so joined to matter that they cannot be
separated from it then the life would be most durable, vigorous and manifest.
He thought that the heavenly bodies were simple and pure and had no opposition to their form.
This was the secret of their power and durability. The animal spirit came nearest to the Heavenly
bodies. It was a mean between all the elements and so it was capable of receiving the highest
form and showing greatest manifestations of life. And it was for the same reason that his essence,
like the essence of the Heavenly bodies, possessed the knowledge of the Necessarily Existent
Being. Other animals lacked this noble essence. It suggested to him that he had been created for
a nobler purpose.
In short, he came to the conclusion that his noble essence, which gave him the knowledge of the
Necessarily Existent Being, was something Divine, not subject to corruption. It could not be
described by any attributes of body, nor could it be apprehended through sense or imagination.
Practical Program of Life—the Three Assimilations
Ḥayy decided to chalk out a program for himself, in order to realize the highest end of his life.
He found that there were three aspects of his nature. In his body he resembled the irrational
animals and beasts. In respect to the animal spirit which resided in his heart he resembled the
Heavenly bodies. And in his immaterial essence he resembled the Necessarily Existent Being.
To satisfy all these aspects of his nature, he thought of three kinds of assimilations. The first
assimilation required that he should imitate the actions of the animals, in nourishing his body and
protecting it from harm and injury. The second assimilation required that he should imitate the
Heavenly bodies. The third assimilation consisted in trying to assimilate more and more, the
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attributes of the Divine Being. It was to be achieved by knowledge, contemplation and vision of
the Divine Being and by trying to be as much free as possible from all bodily properties. This
third assimilation was his highest goal in virtue of his possessing the immaterial essence and it
was to be desired for its own sake. The second assimilation also helped in attaining to the vision
but it was not without mixture. It was necessary as a precondition and preparation for the third
assimilation. The first assimilation was in a way a hindrance to the vision. But it was necessary
for the preservation of the animal spirit which was the basis of the second assimilation. He,
therefore, decided not to indulge in it more than what was absolutely necessary. For this purpose,
he imposed certain restrictions on himself and made elaborate rules about his diet, etc. Some of
these rules are given below:
He will eat as far as possible, the pulp of the fruits which were fully ripe and had seeds in them
to produce others of the same kind.
He will always take care to preserve the seeds and will not throw them in such places which were
not fit for their growth.
If such pulpy fruits were not available he will take some variety of herbs, etc., choosing that
variety only which was in abundance. He will also take care that he does not pull up anything by
its roots.
If he could not find any vegetables or fruits he will take some living creature or its eggs. But, he
will always choose that variety which is plentiful so that he may not destroy any species totally.
With regard to the quantity of food he decided that he would eat just so much as was necessary
to satisfy his hunger.
As for the timings, he would not seek the food again unless he felt some disabling weakness in
himself.
In the beginning he was reluctant to eat anything at all. To eat a plant or a living creature would
mean destroying a work of the Creator and opposing His design.
But abstinence seemed to lead to the dissolution of his own body which was a higher and more
excellent work of the Creator. So he decided to eat under above mentioned restrictions.
In connection with the second assimilation he tried to imitate the Heavenly bodies in various
ways. They were beneficial and source of advantages to other creatures. He also tried to be
benevolent and helpful by removing those things from plants and animals that were obstructive
or harmful. If a stone stopped the flow of water he would remove it from its path. He watered the
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plants and fed the hungry animals. Observing that Heavenly bodies were pure and bright, he
would keep his body and clothes clean and apply fragrance to them. He would make circular
movements like them and take rounds of the island. The Heavenly bodies in his opinion, enjoyed
constant and uninterrupted Vision of the Divine Being. He also tried to concentrate on the
contemplation of the Divine Being, withdrawing all his thoughts from the sensible things. During
this condition he had some vision of the Divine Being but his bodily faculties would soon assert
and interrupt him.
Then he took to third assimilation. He first considered the attributes of the Necessarily Existent
Being. He found them of two kinds, (i) positive attributes like knowledge, wisdom and power,
and (ii) the negative attributes as immateriality and freedom from bodily attributes.
With regard to the assimilation of the former he came to the conclusion that to know Him was to
be like Him, because His knowledge and His Essence were not two different things.
In imitating the negative attributes he tried to strip himself of all bodily properties. He cut
himself off from everything, confined himself to his cave, and sat there with his eyes shut and his
head bowed down, meditating upon the Necessarily Existent Being. He would remain in this
condition for days together, without eating anything. He used to be so much absorbed in
contemplation that everything would disappear from his view except his own essence.
Ultimately, the Heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, and all spiritual forms
together with his own essence disappeared and there remained nothing but One, True,
Perpetually Self-existent Being. In this state he saw such splendor and beauty that no eye hath
seen, no ear heard, nor hath it ever entered into the heart man to conceive.
Before communicating further details about the mystical experiences of Ḥayy, Ibn Ṭufayl warns
his readers that they should not crave a description of what is impossible to describe. It is just as
if one should have a desire to taste colors. The only way to the knowledge of that state is to have
that state. However, he promises to convey something from it figuratively and by way of
parables without knocking at the door of truth. And this is what he relates.
Meet with Asal or Absal
After all these developmental stages, a man named Asal, who deeply understands religious truths
through symbols and rituals, comes to the island in search of solitude. He teaches Ḥayy to speak,
and after hearing his story, realizes that the realities of which Ḥayy is speaking are the same
realities described in his own religion as God, the angels, the holy books, prophets, and the
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afterlife. Ḥayy also finds the religious truths described by Asal in agreement with what he has
come to know, but cannot understand why Asal’s religion resorts to symbols and permits
indulgence in material things.
Ḥayy convinces Asal to accompany him to explain the truth to the people of the neighboring
island. Ḥayy is respected by the elders until he tries to go beyond the literal meaning of their
Scripture. He is then shunned, as the people go about their materialistic daily lives. Ḥayy realizes
that such people are unable to grasp direct truth, and that they need their religion to preserve
social stability. These people will never secure happiness in the afterlife, because they are
preoccupied with the physical world. Ḥayy concludes that though reason and religion recognize
the same truths, the majority of people adhere to religion in order to achieve worldly success. He
returns with Asal to the deserted island to practice mysticism in isolation.
3.4.5 Philosophical Doctrines of Ibn Ṭufayl
1. World
Is the world eternal, or created by God at will out of sheer nothingness? This is one of the most
challenging problems of Muslim philosophy. Ibn Ṭufayl, quite in keeping with his dialectical
ingenuity, faces it squarely in the manner of Kant. Unlike his predecessors, he does not subscribe
to any of the rival doctrines, nor does he make any attempt to reconcile them. On the other hand,
he subjects both the Aristotelian and the theological positions to scathing criticism.
The eternity of the world involves the concept of infinite existence which is no less impossible
than the notion of infinite extension. Such an existence cannot be free from created accidents and
as such cannot precede them in point of time; and that which cannot exist before the created
accidents must itself be created in time. Similarly, the concept of creatio ex nihilo does not
survive his scrutiny. Like, Al-Ghazālī, he points out that the notion of existence after non-
existence is unintelligible without supposing the priority of time over the world; but time itself is
an inseparable accident of the world, and so, its being prior to the world is ruled out. Again, the
created must needs have a Creator. Why then did the Creator create the world now and not
before? Was it due to something that happened to Him? Obviously not, for nothing existed
before Him to make anything happen to Him. Should it be attributed to a change in His nature?
But, what was there to bring about this change?
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Consequently, Ibn Ṭufayl accepts neither the eternity nor temporal creation of the world. This
antinomy clearly anticipates the Kantian position that reason has its own limits and that its
arguments lead to a maze of contradictions.
2. God
Both eternity of the world and its creatio ex nihilo equally and inevitably lead to the existence of
an eternal, incorporeal Necessary Being. The creation of the world in time presupposes a
Creator, for the world cannot exist by itself. Again, the Creator must, of necessity, be immaterial,
for matter being an accident of the world is itself subject to creation by a Creator. On the other
hand, regarding God as material would lead to an infinite regress, which is absurd.
The world, therefore, must necessarily have a Creator that has no bodily substance. And since He
is immaterial, it follows that we cannot apprehend Him by any of our senses or even by
imagination; for imagination represents nothing except the sensuous forms of things in their
physical absence.
The eternity of the world implies the eternity of its motion as well; and motion, as held by
Aristotle, requires a mover or an efficient cause. If this efficient cause is a body, its power must
be finite and consequently incapable of producing an infinite effect. The efficient cause of
eternal motion must, therefore, be immaterial. It must neither be associated with matter nor
separated from it, nor within it nor without it; for union and separation, inclusion and exclusion
are the properties of matter, and the efficient cause, by its very nature, is absolutely free from it.
However, a question is posed here. God and the world both being eternal, how could the former
be the cause of the latter? Following Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Ṭufayl, makes a distinction between eternity
in essence and that in time, and holds that God does precede the world in point of essence, and
not in respect of time. Take an example. If you have a body in your fist and move your hand, the
body, no doubt, will move with the movement of the hand, yet its motion will be subject to the
motion of the hand. The motion of the latter proceeds from its essence that of the former is
borrowed from the latter, though in point of time neither precedes the other.
As to the world becoming co-eternal with God, he maintains in a mystic strain that the world is
not something other than God. Interpreting the divine essence in terms of light, the essential
nature of which is perpetual illumination and manifestation, as held by Al-Ghazālī, he conceives
of the world as the manifestation of God's own essence and the shadow of His own light that has
no temporal beginning or end. It is not subject to annihilation as the belief in the Day of
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Judgment tends to suggest. Its corruption consists in its transformation into another form rather
than in its complete annihilation. The world must continue in one form or another, for its
annihilation is inconsistent with the supreme mystic truth that the nature of divine essence is
perpetual illumination and manifestation.
3. Light Cosmology
In full agreement with Ibn Sīnā and other predecessors, Ibn Ṭufayl accepts the principle that
from one nothing can proceed except one. The manifestation of the existing plurality from unity
is explained in the monotonous Neo-Platonic fashion, as successive stages of emanation
proceeding from the divine light. The process, in principle, resembles the successive reflection of
solar light in looking-glasses. The light of the sun falling on a looking-glass and from there
passing into another, and so on, gives an appearance of plurality.
All these are the reflections of the light of the sun, and yet, they are neither the sun, nor the
looking-glasses, nor anything different from both. The plurality of reflected light is lost into the
unity of the sun when we look to their source, but reappears when we look to the looking-glasses
in which the light is reflected. The same is true of the primal light and its manifestation in the
cosmos.
4. Epistemology
The soul, in its first state, is not a tabula rasa, or a blank slate. The image of God is implicit in it
from the very beginning, but, in order to make it explicit, we need to start with a clean mind,
with neither bias, nor prejudice. Freedom from social prejudices and prepossessions as a primary
condition of all knowledge is precisely the idea behind Ḥayy’s spontaneous birth in an
uninhabited island.
This being achieved, experience, intellection, and ecstasy play their respective roles freely in
giving a clear vision of the truth inherent in the soul. Not mere discipline of spirit, but the
education of the senses and the intellect, too, is essential for such a vision. The harmony of
experience with reason (Kant), on the one hand, and that of reason with intuition (Bergson and
Iqbal), on the other, constitutes the very essence of Ibn Ṭufayl’s epistemology.
Experience is a process of knowing the environment through the senses. The sense-organs owe
their respective functions to the animal soul with its seat in the heart; from there the confused
manifold of sense-data reaches the brain which spreads it all over the body through the nerve-
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paths. It is transmitted through the same paths to the brain, where it is organized into a perceptive
whole.
Observation gives us knowledge about bodies which the inductive intellect, with its instruments
of comparison and discrimination, classifies into minerals, plants, and animals. Each of these
classes of bodies exhibits certain specific functions, which lead us to postulate specific forms or
souls (like Aristotle) as the cause of the functions peculiar to the bodies of different classes. Such
a hypothesis, however, is untenable on inductive grounds, for the supposed form or soul is not
open to direct observation. Actions, no doubt, appear to be issuing from a certain body; in reality,
they are caused neither by the body, nor by the soul in a body, but by some cause external to it
and that cause is God as indicated before.
Ibn Ṭufayl also knows the limitations of his newly discovered method. Following Al-Ghazālī and
anticipating Hume, he sees no power in the cause which may necessarily produce the effect as it
does. Hume's empiricism ends in skepticism, but the mystic in Ibn Ṭufayl makes him see that the
bond of causality is an act of synthesis which he ascribes to God, but which Kant attributes to
the a priori form of understanding.
Ibn Ṭufayl is at once a forerunner of Bacon, Hume, and Kant. He anticipated the inductive
method of modern science; perceived the inability of theoretical reason to solve the puzzle of the
eternity and temporal creation of the world, and that of the inductive intellect to establish a
necessary connection between cause and effect; and finally cleared the clouds of skepticism by
declaring with Al-Ghazālī that the bond of causality is a synthetic act of God.
After educating the senses and the intellect and noticing the limitations of both, Ibn Ṭufayl
finally turns to the discipline of the spirit, leading to ecstasy, the highest source of knowledge. In
this state, truth is no longer obtained through a process of deduction or induction, but is
perceived directly and intuitively by the light within. The soul becomes conscious of itself and
experiences “what the eye hath never seen, nor ear ever heard, nor the heart (mind) of any man
ever conceived.”
The state of ecstasy is ineffable and indescribable, for the scope of words is restricted to what
can be seen, heard, or conceived. Divine essence, being pure light, is perceived only by the light
within, which comes into its own through the proper education of the senses, intellect, and spirit.
The knowledge of essence, therefore, is itself essence. Essence and its vision are identical.
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5. Ethics
No earthly felicity, nor even divine vicegerency, but complete union with God is the summum
bonum of ethics. Its realization, after the improvement of inductive and deductive intellect,
finally depends upon a three-point code of spiritual discipline, which, according to De Boer, has
a “Pythagorean appearance.” Man is a curious mixture of body, animal soul, and immaterial
essence, and, thus, at once resembles animals, celestial bodies, and God. His spiritual ascent,
therefore, consists in satisfying all the three aspects of his nature, by imitating the actions of
animals, heavenly bodies, and God.
As to the first imitation, it is binding upon him to provide his body with bare means of
sustenance and protect it against inclement weather and wild animals, with the sole intention of
preserving the animal soul. The second imitation demands of him cleanliness in dress and body,
kindness to animate and inanimate objects, contemplation of the divine essence and revolving
round one's own essence in ecstasy. (Ibn Ṭufayl seems to believe that the celestial bodies possess
animal soul and are absorbed in the unrestrained contemplation of God.)
Lastly, he must equip himself with the positive and negative attributes of God, viz., knowledge,
power, wisdom, freedom from corporeality, etc. Discharging one's obligation to oneself, others,
and God, is, in brief, one of the essentials of spiritual discipline. The last obligation is an end-in-
itself, the first two lead to its realization in the beatific vision, where vision at once becomes
identical with the divine essence.
6. Philosophy and Religion
Philosophy is purely intellectual apprehension of truth in concepts and images which, by their
very nature, are beyond the grasp of conventional modes of expression. Language is a product of
the material needs of social environment and as such can lay its hand only on the phenomenal
world. The celestial world, being abstract and immaterial, altogether eludes its grasp. Described
in material symbols, it loses its essential nature, and occasions men to think of it other than what
it really is.
Why then does the Qur’ān describe the divine world in parables and similitudes and thereby
waive aside a clearer notion of it, and occasion men to fall into the grave error of attributing a
corporeity to the essence of God, from which He is absolutely free? And why does not the Holy
Book go further than the precepts and rites of worship, and give men leave to gather riches and
allow them liberty in the matter of food, by which means they employ themselves in vain
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pursuits and turn away from the truth? Is it not the imperative need of the soul to free itself from
earthly passions and chains before starting its journey towards heaven? Would not men lay aside
worldly pursuits and follow the truth, if they were elevated to pure knowledge in order to
understand things aright?
Ḥayy's miserable failure to enlighten the masses by means of pure concepts clears the way to the
answers to these questions. The Prophet acted wisely in giving the masses sensuous forms
instead of full light, for they had no other way of salvation. Elevated to pure knowledge, they
would waver and fall headlong and make a bad end.
Nevertheless, though Ibn Ṭufayl voices the Muwaḥḥid State policy of withholding the teaching
of philosophy from the multitude, he clearly recognizes a class of gifted people who deserve
philosophic instruction and to whom allegory is the best means of imparting knowledge and
wisdom.
Religion is for the masses: but philosophy is a privilege of the gifted few. Their provinces should
be scrupulously kept apart. Philosophy, no doubt, is at one with religion properly understood;
both of them reach the same truth, but through different ways. They differ not only in their
method and scope but also in the degree of the blessedness they confer on their devotees.
Religion describes the divine world in terms of exoteric symbols. It abounds in similitudes,
metaphors, and anthropomorphic notions, so that they might better accord with the people's
understanding, fill their souls with desire, and attract them to virtue and morality. Philosophy, on
the other hand, is a species of esoteric truth. It seeks to interpret the material symbols of religion
in terms of pure concepts and images culminating in a state where the divine essence and its
knowledge become one.
Sense-perception, reason, and intuition are the bases of philosophical knowledge. Prophets too
have intuitions; their main source of knowledge is revelation from God. The knowledge of the
prophet is direct and personal, but that of the followers is constituted of testimony.
Philosophy is an exclusive affair of the individual; it presupposes a certain temperament and
aptitude for enlightenment. Religion, on the contrary, is a social discipline. Its point of view is
institutional, not individual. It aims, more or less, at a uniform betterment of the masses in
general, ignoring the individual differences in ability and inner light.
Philosophy brings us face to face with reality. It demands unrestrained contemplation of truth,
uninterrupted vision of the primal light, the source of all existence, by renouncing all worldly
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connections. Religion is not so exacting in its dictates. It decries asceticism in any and every
sense of the word; for the generality of mankind, for whom it is primarily meant, are incapable of
living up to this ideal. It, therefore, fixes the absolute minimum and then gives men leave to lead
a worldly life, without, however, transgressing the limits thereto.
Thus, the philosopher, left to his inner light, is capable of attaining to supreme bliss. As to the
masses, they should rest content with a second-rate salvation, beyond which, owing to their own
limitations, they cannot rise. Later on, this theory, under the influence of Ibn Rushd, armed the
medieval European scholars in their struggle against the Church, with the doctrine of “two-fold
truth,” John of Brescia and Siger of Brabant being two of its chief representatives.
The story does not seem to end here; for the redeeming individualistic attitude of modern
philosophy, an attitude that distinguishes it from both the medieval and the ancient outlook, also
appears to be a characteristic deposit of the same theory.
3.4.6 Let Us Sum Up
Ibn Ṭufayl’s thought can be summed up in his only extant work, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, the
philosophical treatise in a charming literary form. It relates the story of human knowledge, as it
rises from a blank slate to a mystical or direct experience of God after passing through the
necessary natural experiences. It is a fact that Ibn Ṭufayl has chosen the form of a philosophical
romance as the medium of his views. In his philosophical work, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, he has
depicted the story of a human child who, in the course of his development, uninfluenced by any
human society and uninstructed by any human teacher, discovers the highest truths of science,
philosophy, religion and mysticism. However, the charm and interest of the story often obscures
the real philosophical content behind it. The book does not yield all its treasure at one glance.
The focal point of the story is that human reason, unaided by society and its conventions or by
religion, can achieve scientific knowledge, preparing the way to the mystical or highest form of
human knowledge. The story also seeks to show that, while religious truth is the same as that of
philosophy, the former is conveyed through symbols, which are suitable for the understanding of
the multitude, and the latter is conveyed in its inner meanings apart from any symbolism. Since
people have different capacities of understanding that require the use of different instruments,
there is no point in trying to convey the truth to people except through means suitable for their
understanding.
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1. Give brief biographical sketch of Ibn Ṭufayl’s life and comment upon his literary activities?
2. Describe Ibn Ṭufayl’s contribution to Muslim Philosophy?
3. Discuss in detail the developmental stages of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān?
4. Elucidate Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān as a ‘philosophical Novel’?
1. M.M Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, Delhi: Adam Publishers,
4. Abdul Salaam Nadwi, Hukama-i Islam
5. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, Srinagar: Centre Book
Centre,
7. Latif Hussain Shah Kazmi, Studies in Muslim Philosophy (Part One), AMU
8. Lawrence I Conrad, editor, The World of Ibn Ṭufayl: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Ḥayy
ibn Yaqẓān, E. J. Brill
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Unit IV
Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers
i) Imam Ghazzali
ii) Ibn Rushd
iii) Ibn Taimiyyah
iv) Iqbal
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UNIT IV: Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers
Lesson No. 4.1: Contribution of Imām Al-Ghazālī
Lesson Structure
4.1.1 Introduction
4.1.2 Objectives
4.1.3 An Overview of the Life Sketch of Al-Ghazālī
4.1.4 Introduction to Al-Ghazālī’s Religious Thought
4.1.5 Al-Ghazālī’s Criticism on Philosophers
4.1.6 Al-Ghazālī’s Views on Knowledge- ‘Ilm al Yaqīn and ‘Ayn al Yaqīn
4.1.7 Al-Ghazālī's Assaults on Philosophy
4.1.8 Implications of Al-Ghazālī’s Attacks
4.1.9 Let Us Sum Up
4.1.1 Introduction
Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī is considered as one of the most original thinkers ever witnessed in the
history of mankind. Al-Ghazālī influenced the world of intellectuals, philosophers and Sufis after
him equally in any part of the world. Al-Ghazālī in his early life was inclined towards the Greek
philosophy and their Muslim collaborators. Later on, he realized the fallacies of Greek
philosophy and the faults of the Muslim philosophers. This led him to write about the objectives
of philosophy first, to make his case, succeeded in its refutation. The refutation was considered
by many as the major actor to shift the public opinion regarding Greek philosophy. During this
process, Al-Ghazālī tried to integrate the Sufism with Sharī‘ah. His critique of the Greek
philosophy was aimed at purifying the Islamic creedal science and Islamic inner science from the
toxic ideas of the Greek philosophy.
4.1.2 Objectives
 Introduction of Abu Hamid Al-Ghazālī as a philosopher and a Mutakallīm.
 The main assumptions of the Greek philosophy at the time of Al-Ghazālī.
 A view on the religious thought of Al-Ghazālī.
 Al-Ghazālī’s understanding of the Greek Philosophy.
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 Al-Ghazālī’s critique of the philosophy and the implications of the Al-Ghazālī’s assault
on the philosophy.
4.1.3 Life Sketch of Imām Al-Ghazālī
Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭā’ūs Aḥmad al-Ṭūsī al-Shāfi’ī,
generally known as Al-Ghazālī, was born in 450A.H/1058 C.E at Tabaran, one of the two
townships of Tus, now in ruins in the neighbor-hood of modern Meshed in Khurasan. Al-Ghazālī
was not the first scholar of distinction in his family. There had been another Abū Ḥāmid A l -
G h a z ā l ī (d.435 A.H/1043 C.E), his grand-uncle, who was a theologian and jurist-consult of
great repute, possibly a model which he might have set before him in his ambitious youth. But he
was early exposed to Sufistic influences. His own father was a pious dervish, who, according to
Al- Subkī would not eat anything but what he could earn with his own hands and spend as much
time as he could in the company of the Sufis. Early left as an orphan, Al-Ghazālī was brought up
and educated by a pious Sufi friend of his father along with his brother who later made a mark as
a great mystic. While still a boy, Al-Ghazālī began the study of theology and Sharī’ah/canon-law
(with the explicit desire for wealth and reputation as he himself has acknowledged) first in his
native town under Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Rādhkhānī al-Ṭūsī and then at Jurjan under
the Abū Naṣr al-Ismā‘ilī. After his return from Jurjan he stayed for a while in Tus, possibly
during this period studied Sufism under Yūsuf al-Nassāj, and perhaps even undertook some of
the Sufistic exercises. At the age of about 20, he proceeded to the Niẓāmiyyah Academy of
Nishapur to study under Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī known as Imām al-Ḥaramayn, the most
distinguished Ash‘arite theologian of the day, only fourth from Al-Ash‘arī himself in an
apostolic succession of the Ash‘arite teachers. The curriculum of the Academy included a wide
range of subjects such as theology, canon law, philosophy, logic, dialectics, natural sciences,
Sufism, etc. Imām al-Ḥaramayn allowed full freedom of thought and expression to his students;
they were encouraged to engage in debates and discussions of all kinds. Al-Ghazālī gave early
proof of great learning and also of a tendency towards philosophizing. Imām al-Ḥaramayn
described him as “a plenteous ocean to be drowned” and comparing him with two other students
of his observed, Al-Khawafī’s strong point is verification, Al-Ghazālī’s is speculation and Al-
Kiyā’s is explanation. In his debates with other students he showed great suppleness of mind and
a gift for polemics. Not long afterwards, he began to lecture to his fellow students and to write
books. But, Al-Ghazālīwasoneofthoseraremindswhoseoriginalityisnotcrushedbytheir learning.
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He was a born critic and possessed great independence of thought. It was verily during his
studentship at the Niẓāmiyyah Academy of Nishapur that he became impatient of dogmatic
teaching and freed himself from the bondage of authority (Taqlīd) and even showed the signs of
skepticism. During his stay at Nishapur, he also became a disciple to the Sufi Abū ‘Alī al-Faḍl
ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Farmādhī al-Tūsī, a student of Al-Ghazālī’s own uncle and of the
reputed Al-Qushayrī (d.465A.H/1074 C.E). From Al-Farmādhī, Al-Ghazālī learned more about
the theory and practice of Sufism. He even practiced rigorous ascetic and sufistic exercises under
his guidance but not to the desired effect. As he himself narrates, he could not attain to that stage
where the mystics begin to receive pure inspiration from “high above”. So he did not feel quite
settled down in his mind. On the one hand, he felt philosophically dissatisfied with the
speculative systems of the scholastic theologians and could not accept anything on authority; on
the other hand, the Sufi practices also failed to make any definite impression on him for he had
not received any sure results. There is no doubt, however, that the increasing attraction of the
Sufi teachings, with its insistence upon a direct personal experience of God, added to Al-
Ghazālī’s critical dissatisfaction with dogmatic theology. Al-Farmādhī died in 477 A.H/1084
C.E and Imām Al-Ḥaramayn in 478 A.H/1085 C.E. Al-Ghazālī was then in his 28th year,
ambitious and energetic; the fame of his learning had already spread in the Muslim world. He
betook himself to the Court of Niẓām al-Mulk, the great vizier of the Saljuq sovereign Malik-
Shah (r. 465A.H/1072 C.E–485A.H/1092 C.E) and joined his retinue of canonists and
theologians. Niẓām al-Mulk, by his munificent patronage of scholarship, science, and arts had
gathered round him a brilliant galaxy of scholars and learned men. He used to hold frequent
assemblies for debate and discussion and Al-Ghazālī soon made his mark at these and was
conspicuous for his skill in debate. Al-Ghazālī’s profound knowledge of Muslim law, theology,
and philosophy impressed Niẓāmal-Mulk so much that he appointed him to the Chair of
Theology in the Niẓāmiyyah Academy (established 458 A.H–60 A.H/1065 C.E–67 C.E) at
Baghdad in 484 A.H /1091C.E. He was then only 34. This was most coveted of all honors in the
then Muslim world and one which had not previously been conferred on anyone at so early an
age. As a professor in the academy, Al-Ghazālī was a complete success; the excellence of his
lectures, the extent of his learning, and the lucidity of his explanations attracted larger and larger
classes including the chief savants of the time. Soon, whole Muslim world acclaimed his
eloquence, erudition, and dialectical skill and he came to be looked upon as the greatest
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theologian in the Ash‘arite tradition. His advice began to be sought in matters of religious and
political, and he came to wield influence comparable to that of the highest officials of the State.
Apparently, he attained all the glory that a scholar could by way of worldly success, but,
inwardly he underwent an intellectual and spiritual crisis. His old doubts and skepticism began to
assail him once again and he became highly critical of the very subjects that he taught. He keenly
felt the hollowness of the meticulous spinning of casuistry of the canon-lawyers. The systems of
the scholastic theologians (Mutakallimīn) had no intellectual certainty, for they depended entirely
on the acceptance of their initial dogmatic assumptions on authority. He denounced their over-
emphasis on the doctrinal, for it led to a faulty representation of religion by reducing it to a mere
collection of orthodoxy and catechism of dogmas. He considered the disputes of the scholastics
amongst themselves as mere dialectical logomachies which had no relation with religious life.
Al-Ghazālī turned once again to the study of philosophy, this time as diligently and as
comprehensively as he could, but found, like Kant, that it was impossible to build theology on
reason alone. Reason was good so far as it went, but it could not go very far. The ultimate, the
Supreme Truth, could not be reached through it. Becoming keenly aware of the theological
limitations of reason, he fell into a state of skepticism and lost his peace of mind. The hypocrisy
of his orthodox teaching became unbearable and he found himself to be in a false position. But,
all was not lost. He had some assurances that he could be delivered from this state of despair
through the Sufi way. It was not that he now discovered that in Sufism lay the possibility for a
direct encounter with reality; this fact he had been realizing over a period of exercises, only he
had not advanced far enough into them. If he could consecrate himself to the Sufi way of life
through spiritual renunciation, sustained asceticism, and prolonged and deep meditation, he
might have received the light he sought. But this meant, in his case, giving up his brilliant
academic career and worldly position. He was, by nature, ambitious and had great desire for
fame and self-glorification. On the other hand, he was the most earnest seeker after truth.
Besides, he had the anxiety to reach a secure faith which was accentuated by his thought of life
after death. He remained in the throes of severe moral conflict and in a spiritual travail for about
six months beginning with Rajab 488A.H/July 1095 C.E. He collapsed physically and mentally,
appetite and digestion failed and he lost his power of speech. This made it easy for him to
renounce his post as a professor. He left Baghdad in Dhu’l al-Qa‘dah 488 A.H/November 1095
C.E, ostensibly on a pilgrimage to Makkah. Actually, he went into seclusion to practice the
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ascetic and religious discipline of the Sufis in order to secure certainty for his mind and peace for
his soul. He gave away all his fortune except some “trust funds” to maintain his family and
proceeded to Syria. For two years, from 488 A.H/1095 C.E to 490 A.H/1097 C.E, he remained in
strict retirement in one of the minarets of the mosque of the Umayyads in Damascus, undergoing
a most rigorous ascetic discipline and performing religious exercises. He moved to Jerusalem for
another period of meditation in the mosque of ‘Umar and the Dome of the Rock. After paying a
visit to the tomb of Abraham at Hebron, he went on pilgrimage to Makkah and Madīnah, and
then followed a long period of retreat at different places in shrines and mosques and wandering
in deserts. After 11 years, the life of a wandering dervish and scholar ended and he finally
returned to his native town, Tus, in 499 A.H/1105C.E. Of his inner spiritual experiences in their
experimental actuality, after he left Baghdad, Al-Ghazālī tells us almost nothing except that there
were revealed to him in periods of solitude things innumerable and unfathomable. Apparently,
these experiences culminated in his acknowledgement of the authority of the Prophet (peace be
upon him) and the complete submission of the truth revealed in the Qur’an. The first public sign
of his recovery to orthodoxy is perhaps Al-Risālah al-Qudsiyya, written during his retreat in
Jerusalem, where in all probability he was before 492A.H/1099 C.E, for in Sha‘ban of that year
Jerusalem was captured by the Crusaders. This has been inserted as Qawā‘id al-‘Aqā’id in the
third chapter of the second book of his massive magnum opus Iḥyā’ a l - ‘Ulūm al-Dīn (The
Revivification of the Sciences of Religion) in which he began to set down what he had learned
through his long periods of self-discipline and meditation. During his wanderings he not only
kept on writing other books besides Iḥyā’ but also resumed teaching from time to time. He
keenly felt it incumbent upon him to crush heresy and disbelief around him and to call people
back to the truth and moral power of Islam, both through writing and teaching; he virtually
assumed the role of a moral and religious reformer. He began to devote himself more and more
to the study of the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and make an extensive use of
them for the purposes of edification and spiritual guidance. On his return to Tus, he once again
gave himself to the life of retirement and contemplation, but soon Fakhral-Mulk, the son of his
old patron, Niẓām al-Mulk, who was the vizier of Sultan Sanjar, urged him to accept the care of
theology at the Maymūnah Niẓāmiyyah College at Nishapur, which he did after some hesitation
in Dhu’l Qa’dah 499 A.H/August 1106 C.E. But he did not stay there long and retired once more
to his home in Tus and established a madrasah at which he began to teach both theology and
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Taṣawwuf. At the instance of the learned and the common people of Baghdad he was once again
summoned by the Grand Vizier al-Said to take up teaching in the old Niẓāmiyyah Academy of
Baghdad but Al-Ghazālī chose to remain in Tus. There he lived in peace with some personal
disciples in charge of his seminary/Madrasah. Every moment was filled with study and devotion
until his death on the 14th of Jamad al-Thani 505 A.H/December 19, 1111 C.E. The end had
become a beginning in a beautifully complete and round life.
4.1.4 Introduction to Al-Ghazālī’s Religious Thought
Al-Ghazālī occupies a position unique in the history of Muslim religious and philosophical
thought by whatever standard we may judge him: breadth of learning, originality, or influence.
He has been acclaimed as the Proof of Islam (Ḥujjat al-Islām), the Ornament of Faith (Zayn al-
Dīn) and the Renewer of Religion (Mujaddid). Al-Subkī (d. 771 A.H/1370 C.E) went so far in
his estimation of him as to claim that if there had been a prophet after Muḥammad (peace be
upon him), Al-Ghazālī would have been the man. To be sure he gathered in his own person all
the significant intellectual and religious movements of his time and lived over again in the
inwardness of his soul the various spiritual phases developed by Islam. He was, in turn, a
canon-lawyer and a scholastic, a philosopher and skeptic, a mystic and a theologian, a
traditionist and a moralist. His position as a theologian of Islam is undoubtedly the most
eminent. Through a living synthesis of his creative and energetic personality, he revitalized
Muslim theology and reoriented its values and attitudes. His combination of spiritualization and
fundamentalism in Islam had such a marked stamp of his powerful personality that it has
continued to be accepted by the community since his time. His outlook on philosophy is
characterized by a remarkable originality which, however, is more critical than constructive. In
his works on philosophy one is struck by a keen philosophical acumen and penetration with
which he gives a clear and readable exposition of the views of the philosophers, the subtlety and
analyticity with which he criticizes them, and the open mindedness with which he accepts them
whenever he finds them to be true. Nothing frightened him nor fascinated him, and through the
philosophies of Aristotle and Plotinus and to their Muslim representatives before him, Al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. The main trends of the religious and philosophical thought of Al-Ghazālī,
however, came close to the temper of the modern mind. The champions of the modern
movement of religious empiricism, on the one hand, and that of logical positivism, on the other,
paradoxical though it may seem, would equally find comfort in his works. The teachings of this
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remarkable figure of Islam pertaining either to religion or philosophy, either constructive or
critical, cannot, however, be fully understood without knowing the story of his life with some
measure of detail, for, in his case, life and thought were one, rooted in his own personality.
Whatever he thought and wrote came with the living reality of his own experience. Al -Ghazālī,
the famous scholastic philosopher and thinker of the middle ages, was famous for his impact on
Muslim intellectual history. According to Iqbal, Islamic civilization saw three stages of
development. The first stage was when Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) was alive
guiding the public. This stage is termed as the age of faith, for believers had the source of truth,
the Prophet (peace be upon him) himself, with them, and the only thing required from them was
to have faith in whatever the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to tell them. Thus, Abū Bakr,
was given the title of Ṣiddīq, for he attested Prophet’s (peace be upon him) journey to heavens
or Mi‘rāj, without any hesitation or delay. This kind of attitude was required from the believers
when the Prophet (peace be upon him) was alive. That is why this age is called the age of faith.
The second era started after the Prophet (peace be upon him) was not among the Muslims.
During this period Ummah or the Muslim community had to think and decide about the
religious matters in the light of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, the deeds of the Prophet (peace be
upon him), his sayings and tacit approval. As far as the Qur’ān was concerned, there were no
doubts that it was completely intact, for according to the Qur’ān; God himself had taken the
responsibility to protect the Qur’ān from any kind of additions or deletions. However, in the
case of the Sunnah, scholars had to decide whether the sayings or deeds reported by different
sources actually belonged to the Prophet (peace be upon him) or not. To make sure that no
unauthentic Ḥadīth or deed is attributed to the Prophet (peace be upon him), Muslim scholars
invented the method of Aḥādīth authentication or Sanad. This method was very accurate and
comparable in its validity reliability and rigor to any of the modern methods of research. During
this same period, there started different intellectual movements in Islamic society, like
Ash‘arites and Mu’tazilites, who tried to rationalize the religion. Meanwhile, they tried to
justify the articles of faith on the basis of reason. Although, Ash‘arites were not in favor of
rationalizing faith, they also used rational and philosophical arguments to tackle their rivals, the
Mu‘tazilites. This age was called the age of reason or rationality. In this age, people tried to
know the ultimate reality through reason, and also tried to understand religion on the basis of
reason.
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The third stage of Islamic civilization started with Imām al-Ghazālī himself, and this was the
stage of experience. The truth of Islam was believed in the first stage, in the second stage it was
understood and rationalized, and in the third stage it was to be experienced. So, in the first
stage, people believed that there was a heaven and a hell, and God is going to hold people
accountable in the end, on the Day of Judgment. In the second stage, people rediscovered this
article of faith based on reason. They understood it, and saw it with the eyes of intellect. In the
third stage, they had to experience this truth, through their real experience. A l - Ghazālī, once
for all proved that the ultimate reality cannot be known through reason, therefore those who
think so, are going in a wrong direction.
4.1.5 Al-Ghazālī’s Criticism on Philosophers
Al-Ghazālī’s criticism on philosophers of his times became a criticism on philosophy in general
after him. However, from what he wrote in Tahāfat al-Falāsafah (The Incoherence of the
Philosophers), depicts that he was not at all against philosophy in general, neither he was
against each and every philosopher. On the other hand, he actually paid tribute to philosophers
like Plato and especially Aristotle. Moreover, he was not against subjects like logic and science,
and in fact, he exhorted his readers to avoid any kind of confrontation with science,
mathematics and logic, for these subjects according to him, were not against the spirit of
religion in any sense. So, Al-Ghazālī was neither totally opposed to philosophy, nor he was in
any sense opposed to sciences and other reason based inquiries. However, he criticized
philosophers for the illegitimate use of reason and presented this most important and influential
critique in his famous text Tahāfat al-Falāsafah, or The incoherence of the Philosophers. A l -
Ghazālī said that there is no connection between the cause and effect and what we know as
cause and effect is only our habit. So, when we say that the Sun rises from the east, it is not on
the basis of the knowledge of cause and effect that we say this. Rather, we say this, because we
see this happening on a daily basis and we are habitual of seeing this. On the other hand the
only cause behind whatever happens in this world is due to the will of God. If God wants to
bring out the Sun from the east; it will rise in the east. On the other hand if God wants to raise it
from the West; it will rise in the West. It is will of God that causes everything to happen and
gives existence to everything. Furthermore, in his Tahāfat al-Falāsafah, Al-Ghazālī criticized
philosophers like Ibn-Sīnā for propagating a wrong image of both religion and the great
philosophy masters like Plato and Aristotle. He says that the philosopher's belief in the eternity
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of the world and their notion of God need serious revisions. And in his Tahāfat al-Falāsafah,
Al-Ghazālī both criticized and revised what he thought was wrong with the philosophers of his
times.
4.1.6 Al-Ghazālī Views on Knowledge: ‘Ilm al Yaqīn and ‘Ayn al Yaqīn
Al-Ghazālī does not deny the possibility of spiritual knowledge and the vision of God. However,
he, in accordance with the Qur’ān, says that knowledge comes to us in three different stages. The
initial stage is the stage of faith. He calls this stage ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn. By ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn, he means
that if an authentic person tells something to a person, and he believes in the veracity of that
news, without confirming it either by senses or by reason, this is ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn. So, when the
Prophet ( peace be upon him) gathered the people of Makkah and said to them that if he says that
there is an army behind the mountain would they believe it? The people replied, yes, because the
Prophet (peace be upon him) was famed as Amīn (Trustworthy) and Ṣādiq (Thetruthful), and
people did not accept anything less than truth from him. So, such a belief is called ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn,
a blind faith in the veracity of the prophet, and the book. The second stage is to see through one’s
inner eyes or reason, or with one’s senses the truth of what was reported to him. This stage is
called ‘Ayn al-Yaqīn. ‘Ayn al-Yaqīn means that if somebody has told a person that there is a fire
behind the wall, the person after believing him without seeing the fact, finally himself come
across the fact and attests through his knowing faculties, the truth of what was reported to him.
The third stage is called the stage of Ḥaqq al-Yaqīn. This is the highest stage of knowledge, and
this means not only to see the fire, but also to feel it. Ḥaqq al-Yaqīn is the stage of experience; it
is the knowledge through experience.
Al-Ghazālī and Mysticism
With Al-Ghazālī, an urge to experience the ultimate reality, to know the reality of God as Ḥaqq
al-Yaqīn, became stronger in the Islamic community and was also institutionalized in the form of
Islamic mysticism. Thus, Al-Ghazālī’s mystic experiences and his thought, both, resulted in
developing mysticism in the Islamic civilization. According to Al-Ghazālī, spiritual knowledge
comes through the purification of one’s heart from all externalities and impurities in the form of
hellish passions and evil motives. It is the human heart or Qalb that receives the spiritual
knowledge and allows a person to experience the ultimate reality. Thus, it is imperative for a true
Muslim to follow the Sharī‘ah (The Islamic Way of Life) and to make efforts to purify his heart.
Al-Ghazālī was a great psychologist and educationist. Unlike traditional medieval psychologies,
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inspired by Aristotle’s De Anima, Al-Ghazālī’s psychology was aimed at defining different states
and passions of human beings. Thus, his psychology stands closer to Aristotelian Ethics. He
talked about different good and bad passions of human soul, and after defining them with clarity,
he also suggested remedies for evil emotions and passions.
Educational Philosophy of Al-Ghazālī
Farḍ al-‘Ayn and Farḍ al-Kifāyah: Al-Ghazālī also included these ideas of purification of heart
and following of Sharī’ah in his educational thought. However, even then his educational
philosophy, despite its metaphysical commitments, remains thoroughly practical and realistic.
Al-Ghazālī divided his curriculum in two parts; Farḍ al-‘Ayn and Farḍ al-Kifāyah. Farḍ al-‘Ayn
is the compulsory, or the early or elementary educational curriculum. Farḍ al-‘Ayn comprises the
compulsory tenets of the Qur’ān (including all spheres of life), hygiene, logic and
reading/practicing/understanding the Qur’ān. On the other hand, Farḍ al-Kifāyah included all
optional subjects including architect, Tafsīr/exegesis of the Qur’ān, Fiqh (Law and
Jurisprudence) etc. Farḍ al-‘Ayn is the early socialization part of education. Farḍ al-‘Ayn is
meant to teach young people how to live their lives in the Islamic society, and how to socialize
themselves properly. Farḍ al-Kifāyah on the other hand is the economic and practical part of
education; through acquiring the knowledge of the subjects related to Farḍ al-Kifāyah, people
could earn their living. Al-Ghazālī was very much concerned with the moral development of the
society, therefore he has paid much emphasis to this subject, and like Aristotle, Al-Ghazālī has
also written extensively on the subject of morality in his magnum opus, Kīmiyā-i Sa‘adat, The
Alchemy of Happiness. Al-Ghazālī has given the details of each and everything that a man does
in his life from the offering of, eating, clothing to marriage and friendship. Al-Ghazālī was not in
favor of enforcing education on the children and like Plato he was also of the view that education
should be given only through motivation. He opposed any act from the teacher that could result
in creating ill dispositions towards learning in the children. Although, Al-Ghazālī was against
corporeal punishment and any sort of coercion in education, his views are considered by some
traditionalist educators as license for giving thrashings to their students. This attitude was never
attested or recommended by Al-Ghazālī as he had never liked any kind of misbehaviour with
children.
4.1.7 Al-Ghazālī's Assaults on Philosophy
Al-Ghazālī claimed that he was the first to attack philosophy as he never saw any Muslim
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scholar so far, who would have given so serious attention on philosophy as he did. He seems to
doubt about the effectiveness of the methodologies used by his predecessors to deal against
philosophers' arguments. Instead, he claimed to be the first to do, so, perhaps he had succeeded
in his approach. In fact, several scholars before him had worked in arguing the philosophers. Al-
Imām al-Juwaynī (d. 1085C.E), his long-time teacher, Iṁ̄am Abī al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāt, and Ibn
Ḥazm (994-1064), all of whom had played a significant role in arguing against philosophical
ideas. Al-Juwaynī, for instance, had dismissed the ideas of those philosophers who argue that
there is “no beginning for created things.”Al-Khayyāt criticized lbn al-Ruwandī (d. 850 or 900)
about the concept of divine knowledge, arguing that the knowledge of God is immortal, and does
not change according to the change of the known as held by Ibn al-Ruwandī. lbn Ḥazm also
argued against philosophers on the issue of the created world (Ḥudūth al-‘Ālam).Their works
possibly paved the way for Al-Ghazālī in his attacks. According to Bayfum, the Egyptian
professor of Islamic philosophy of Al-Azhar University, Al-Ghazālī differed from his
predecessors in two things: Firstly, he devoted all his attention, in a certain period of his life, to
respond to them; secondly, he criticized their ideas intensely, including all their conclusions.
Apparently what Al-Ghazālī did, is to deal with philosophical issues not theological as his
predecessors did. Even theological arguments being part of philosophy but the issues were in
difference. The issue of “Khalq al-Qur’ān” (created nature of the Qur’ān) for instance, is
considered a theological issue and not a philosophical. Al-Ghazālī’s critics on philosophy were
much organized compared to others before him. This is supported by De Boer who says that Al-
Ghazālī directed his attacks from general points of view after thorough-going study against the
entire system of philosophy that was built up on a Greek foundation as no such attempt had been
made before.
Unlike his predecessors, some doubts arouse about his severe attacks on philosophers. Sulayman
Dunya of Egypt sees that, his attack in Tahāfat al-Falāsafah, had something to do with his
personal interest to pursue popularity to become widely- known, to ascend preeminent rank
among the scholars of his day. This can be inferred from his statement that he was ‘not sincere’,
when he went to teach and the inclination for choosing that work was to seek higher position and
make himself well-known scholar. This can be read from his statement, “I called for it with my
speech and my work that was my purpose (Qasdi/effort) and that was my intention (Niyyati).”Al-
Ghazālī earned everything what he sought for, getting a position of professor at Niẓāmiyyah
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Madrasa as he willed. The position that was competitively pursued by scholars of his time.
After he being in stability in his life, he began to reevaluate his knowledge and tried to
correct his life (Muḥāsabah al-Nafs) including his intention. Afterwards, having this self-
criticism, he removed the desire of gaining fame enjoying worldly happiness. During this period,
he inspected all his knowledge, bit by bit, beginning with theology, and followed by philosophy
and its methodology. He did this as a means to reach certainty (Al-Yaqīn), the truth and reality,
which he was doubtful before. For this reason also, he attacked philosophy as a dangerous
element to Muslim faith. Moreover, he argued that all philosophers become "infidels" due to
using their own intellects absolutely in rationalizing religion to the extent that was contradictory
to Shar‘. This probably can be found in a statement of Al-Fārābī, “The faculty of intellect offers
certainty (Al-Yaqīn) while the Shar‘ offers satisfaction (Iqtina).” Although this statement can be
interpreted in many ways, but it seems that al-Farab1's idea is in favour of placing the intellect
over the religion. What is obvious that Al-Ghazālī launched his extreme attack on
philosophers by using adhominem (i.e., personal criticism), such as accusing them as
unbelievers, labeling them ‘foolish’ and their arguments as ‘causing thinkers to laugh. This kind
of attack encourages Ibn Rushd to do the same to Al-Ghazālī by calling him as an ignorant evil
style of argument, in our view seems to be inappropriate Islamically and even from the
intellectual tradition.
Three Problems of Philosophy Rejected by Al-Ghazālī
Al-Ghazālī attacked the philosophers on twenty particulars, seventeen of which he said should be
categorized as Bid‘ah (innovation/heresy) and the three others should be judged as “Kufr”
(disbelieving). Those philosophers who hold them (three problems) become infidels because they
disbelieve in the Prophetic information. Thus, all their views on the matter are inappropriate to
Islam. This is the chief error that the philosophers have committed. The others need not to be
either affirmed or rejected because they are irrelevant to Islam. These are human sciences such as
mathematics, politics, and so on as stated.
The three problems are subject to disbelieving as follow,
(i) The eternity of the world
(ii) The denial of God's knowledge of the particulars (Juz’iyyāt)
iii) The resurrection of the body.
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Al-Ghazzali said that the idea of the immortality of the world is attributed entirely to the
philosophers. They argued that it is impossible for the world (‘Ālam) to be created, not from
immortality (Al-Qadīm), because such a process will affect something related to Al-Qadīm (God)
while any change in Al-Qadīm is impossible. The philosopher's analysis is based on analogy:
since every change means weakness or decrease, (Kullu Taghayyur Nāqis), it is definitely
impossible for God to change. The philosophers cannot imagine that the world was not, and then
was. For them that the world and God must have the same attribute whether the both are created
(Ḥādith) or uncreated (Al-Qadīm) while the former is impossible, therefore, the answer is, both
are immortal or uncreated (Al-Qadīm).
In reply, Al-Ghazālī argued that the world's corning out from Al-Qadīm is nothing wrong, and it
does not necessarily affect any change in Al-Qadīm, because Al-Qadīm has His immortal will
through which He can create the world at any time He wants. Thus, it is nothing wrong in saying
that the world was created by His immortal will. As to their saying that it is unthinkable that
something existed in the pre-eternity (Al-Zamān Qabl al-Zamān), Al-Ghazālī̇̄ said that this kind
of statement must not attract our attention either. He, indeed, said that the time and the world are
created (Ḥudūth al-Zamān wa al-‘Ālam) in the sense that there was God and the world was not,
then the world was (Kān Allah wa la al-‘Ālam, Thumma Kān Allah wa al-‘Ālam).
Concerning the knowledge of God, Al-Ghazālī accused the philosophers of saying that God does
not know about changing particulars (Al-Juz’iyyāt alMutaghayyirah) because God's knowledge
is not dependent on time. God knows entirely (Kull). Therefore, the knowledge of God does not
differ either previously, presently and in the future. Based on this analogy, the philosophers
maintain that the knowledge of God is consistent and does not change either. For them
(philosophers), change cannot be attributed to God, for it can undermine the Holiness of God.
Their argument is based on the nature of both knowledge and the known. When the known
changes, knowledge will consequently change, and the change in the knowledge will cause the
knower (God) to change, too, that is entirely impossible for God to change. Therefore, it is not
appropriate for God to know this kind of changing of the known that lead him to receive a
change too (in His changing knowledge).
In response to this analogy, Al-Ghazālī simply argued that whatever interpretations they give
about this, their opinions absolutely contradict what is basically known from the religion: that
God knows everything, as stated clearly in the Qur’ān. That God knows even a very small thing
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(Mithqāl al-Dharrah). Nothing is to be veiled from God's sight.
The third key problem is about the resurrection of the body on the Day of Judgment. Al-Ghazālī
argued that the philosophers’ view is that since only the intellect (‘Aql) is the tool of the
philosopher for understanding, the ‘resurrection’ is for the body in the sense that the reward and
punishment are to be felt only by the soul (Al-Rūḥ) and not the body at all. Even Al-Ghazālī
agreed with the philosophers regarding the immortality and the substance of the soul (Khulūd
al-Nafs wa Baqā’uhā) and also about soul enjoyment and soul suffering, but everything about
this information is derived from the Shara‘ not the intellect. Al-Ghazālī said that the
philosophers had rejected the idea of the heaven and hell, and that was absolutely unacceptable
and definitely contradicted the basic teachings of Islam.
Among the philosophers, however, including Al-Rāzī, viewed the intellect and the Shara‘ both
affirm the immortality of the soul (Khulūd al-Nafs). In this case, according to Al-Rāzī there was
no difference between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā on this issue, because the latter viewed that the
mortal body was impossible to return exactly as it is, but rather as alike (similar body). Al-
Ghazālī also viewed that what is resurrected is not the previous body, but a body that is just
alike. Therefore, it is no dispute between them on this. Apparently, the dispute between Al-
Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā, however, refers to their different points of view regarding the
source of knowledge despite the result is the same. Al-Ghazālī knows it (soul immortality)
through the Shara‘ and Ibn Sīnā knows it through the intellect. The latter actually said clearly
that the bodily resurrection is absolutely right but we know it from the Sharī’ah and from the
Prophet (peace be upon him). No other sources can be able to prove it.
However, some doubts arise about Al-Ghazālī’s understanding in this matter as remarked by
Bayfumi, that Al-Ghazālī is not seemingly very objective in his commentary on the
philosopher's ideas, especially in regard to two problems: the knowledge of God about
particulars (Juz’iyyāt) and the resurrection of the body (Al-Ma‘ād al-Jismānī). lbn Sīnā, whom
Al-Ghazālī criticized, never said that he rejected the knowledge of God with the particulars that
throw him into the possibility of being an unbeliever.
In general, we find that Al-Ghazālī criticized the philosophers because of their arguments based
totally on intellect, while he insisted that not everything in religious teachings can be perceived
by men’s intellect, which is limited. For him, the Shara‘ must stand side by side with the
intellect. Regarding the relation between both Shara‘ and the intellect, Al-Ghazālī said, "the
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intellect is the foundation on which the building of religion (Shara‘) is constructed, and it is
impossible to imagine a building (Al-Bina’) without foundation (Al-Asas), and a foundation
without a building is without use.” Thus, the relation between the two (Al-Asas wa al-Bina’) is
so close that they cannot be separated. To reject the role of the intellect in religion is a sign of
ignorance. The separation between both is totally rejected in Islam.
Therefore, what Al-Ghazālī did is in line with the Islamic teachings on the grounds that each
idea, except those coming from the Prophet (peace be upon him), is subjected to either
acceptance or rejection. The great philosophers like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā are also human
beings who probably make mistakes and errors in their arguments. When they were shocked by
the ideas of Aristotle, they - as the Muslim philosophers who love both Islam (Sharī’ah) and
philosophy (Ḥikmah)—tried to reconcile them with their religion in order to demonstrate that
Islam is the religion of intellect (Dīn al-‘Aql).
As creative Muslim philosophers, they both tried to do so based on their understanding of Islam
itself. Probably they are sincere in doing so but unfortunately they went beyond what is allowed
religiously: as God says in the Qur’ān, “...of knowledge is little communicated to you.”
(Qur’ān: 17:85).
Academically, we should study the ideas of Ibn Rushd who came to defend the philosophers
against Al-Ghazālī’s attacks. In his books, Tahāfut al-Tahāfat and Fasl al-Maqāl Ibn Rushd
affirmed the incoherence of Al-Ghazālī book of Tahāfat al-Falāsifah. This polemic has been a
significant argument between the two eminent scholars, which has greatly influenced the
later philosophical discussions.
Al-Fārābī and lbn Sīnā in Al-Ghazālī’s View: Al-Ghazālī recognized in his book Tahāfat al-
Falāsafah that Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā are the best commentators on Aristotle's philosophy as
they both were able to understand and transmit it properly. What others had done, instead,
seems to be much corrupted (Taḥrif) and deviated (Tabdi‘), from the authentic philosophical
ideas of Aristotle. Therefore, Al-Ghazālī attacked philosophy referring to the interpretations
provided by both philosophers. He was confident in their understanding, in the sense that what
they transmitted was true and perfect, because they both really understood Aristotle's
philosophy and no one else had their excellent understanding. Generally speaking, Al-Ghazālī
recognized them as the representative of the Greek philosophers in the Islamic world, as he
mentioned their names in his, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl and Tahāfat al-Falasafah. According to
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Majid Fakhri, Ibn Sīnā did not blindly follow all the Aristotelian doctrines. Thus, he disagrees
with the idea of branding Ibn Sīnā and Al-Fārābī as Neo-Platonists. He considered this as
misinterpretation of his philosophy. Fakhri further viewed that Al-Ghazālī was influenced by
the Ash‘arite school of theology, which stood against the contemporary Mu'tazilites.
Unfortunately, in his view, Ibn Rushd continued the same misinterpretation when
counterattacking Al-Ghazālī’s arguments against Al-Fārābī and lbn Sīnā.
4.1.9 Implications of Al-Ghazālī’s Attacks
Critical views in academic works are very useful and always play a constructive role in the
development of thought and, Islamically, there is nothing to worry about the variety of views that
are the consequences of freedom. Al-Ghazālī’s attack on the philosophers and their ideas,
however, has invited ongoing debate and arguments among the Muslim scholars even became
popular among the masses' perception of philosophy itself.
The question under exploration is about the circumstances that made a scholar having an idea
especially a controversial one and perhaps the question of methodology of Al-Ghazālī himself
that drew attentions of some scholars whether to support or to oppose. A great deal of the
scholars such as Ibn Rushd ( 1126-1198), Al-Rāzī (1149-1209), Ibn Taymiyyah (1262-1327),57
Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (547 or 548/1152) and Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) paid attention on
Al-Ghazālī.
According to Bayumi, Al-Ghazālī’s critics on philosophy might have contributed in terms of
providing his successors with a method to follow in doing the same critical works against the
philosophers. Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī for instance, used Al-Ghazālī’s methodology in
criticizing Ibn Sīnā and other. In fact, the development of Islamic thought after Al-Ghazālī is
much to do with criticizing the past rather than demonstrating one's excellent intellect, or
creativity or putting forth new ideas. Bayumi further explains that the situation also stimulated
jurists (Fuqahā’) and theologians to criticize philosophical ideas, especially on account of their
lack of understanding philosophers like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā at that time. This probably makes
the philosophical activities no longer active, strong, and vibrant as it was in the era of Al-Fārābī
and Ibn Sīnā. In this era philosophy failed to succeed in attaining for itself a commanding
position, or retaining the consideration which, it once enjoyed. This situation created more
trouble when the Abbasid Caliphate near the end of its reign-in order to serve political interests -
began to discourage the writing of philosophical works, backing the people in their rejection of
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philosophy. The ensuing environment did not help the philosophers to develop. Therefore, the
philosophical arguments were forced to be done in concealment under the rubric of theology
(Kalām). Works of philosophy were mixed with works of theology as a result. (During this time,
theology (‘Ilm al-Kalām) was not considered as part of philosophy, and theology became an
independent discipline).
It seems that many growing scholars tried to follow Al-Ghazālī by studying his logic, and using
it and philosophical arguments as well, but in a very careful manner e.g., hidden under the name
of the theology. Obviously, it is difficult to distinguish between philosophy and theology in their
works. The approaches, as such, were taken and the topics of theology also changed. The
practice of beginning with discussing logic in most philosophical books changed to begin with
the topics of religious faith or ‘Aqīdah. The discussion of the substance of God and His attributes
(Dhāt Allah wa Ṣifātihī) also changed to the discussion of the topics of being (Al-Mawjūd), or the
known (Al-Ma‘lūm), which were relevant in proving the truth of religious faith (Ithbāt al-‘Aqā’id
alDīniyyah). Despite such changes, the philosophical methods are hardly annihilated.
Historically speaking, the arguments of these theologians are still considered a rich philosophical
legacy recognized world-wide.
4.1.10 Let Us Sum Up
Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111 C.E) known as Al-Ghazālī or
Alghazel to the medieval western world was a Persian philosopher, theologian, jurist and a
mystic. Al-Ghazālī has been referred to by some historians as the single most influential
Muslim after Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him).
Al-Ghazālī, the philosopher, wrote very critically about philosophy. Starting with Maqāsid al-
Falāsafah and marking the end with Tahāfat al-Falāsafah, he changed the way of looking at
Greek philosophy not just in Muslim minds but beyond. Besides, his works that successfully
changed the course of Islamic philosophy, the early Neo-Platonism that developed on the
grounds of Hellenistic philosophy was successfully criticized by Al-Ghazālī. Al-Ghazālī
successfully brought integration of Islamic orthodoxy with Sufism. It made possible for
individuals being orthodox Muslim, combining theological orthodoxy with Sufism at the same
time.
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1. Give a brief Biographical account of Imām Al-Ghazālī.
2. Describe the shifts Al-Ghazālī faced during his struggle to realize the ultimate Truth.
3. What are the three fundamental problems in Greek Philosophy as pointed out by Al-
Ghazālī?
4. Describe Al-Ghazālī as a Mutakallim.
5. Identify the relation between Al-Ghazālī’s categorization of knowledge and his mystical
stand-point.
6. Give the account of Al-Ghazālī’s refutation of Greek philosophy and the after effects of this
rejection.
1. W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of Al-Ghazālī
2. Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Muslim Philosophy
3. Al-Ghazālī, Incoherence of the Philosophers, tr. Sabih Ahmed Kamali
4. Hamid NasimRafiabadi, ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy
5. Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology
6. M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy
7. Majid Fakhry, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism: A Short Introduction
8. W. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology
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Lesson 4.2: Contribution of Ibn Rushd
Lesson Structure
4.2.1 Introduction
4.2.2 Objectives
4.2.3 An Overview of Ibn Rushd’s Life and Works
4.2.4 Philosophical Journey of Ibn Rushd
4.2.5 The Polemics between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd on Philosophy
4.2.5 Let Us Sum Up
4.2.1 Introduction
Muhammad ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd (1126-1198 C.E) often Latinized as Averroes was a medieval
Andalusian polymath. Ibn Rushd—a defender of Aristotelian philosophy against Ash‘arite
theology lead by Al-Ghazālī was highly regarded as legal scholar of Maliki School of Islamic
jurisprudence. Ibn Rushd furthered the tradition of Greek philosophy in the Muslim world. His
commentaries removed the neo-Platonic bias of his predecessors. Criticizing Al-Fārābī’s attempt
to integrate the ideas of Plato with those of Aristotle, Ibn Rushd argued that Aristotle’s
philosophy diverged in significant ways from Plato’s. Hence, Ibn Rushd rejected Ibn Sīnā’s Neo-
Platonism. In metaphysics, or more exactly ontology, Ibn Rushd rejects the view advanced by
Ibn Sīnā that existence is merely accidental. Ibn Rushd, following Aristotle, holds that individual
existing substances are primary. One may separate them mentally; however, ontologically
speaking, existence and essence are one and the same.
4.2.2 Objectives
This lesson aims to discuss:
1. The life sketch of Ibn Rushd.
2. The making of a philosopher out of Ibn Rushd.
3. The debate between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd on validity of philosophy.
4. The emergence of Ibn Rushd as a defender of Aristotelian philosophy.
4.2.3 An Overview of Ibn Rushd’s (Averroes) Life and Works
Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is regarded by many as the most important of the Islamic philosophers. A
product of twelfth-century Islamic Spain, he set out to integrate Aristotelian philosophy with
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Islamic thought. A common theme throughout his writings is that there is no incompatibility
between religion and philosophy when both are properly understood. His contributions to
philosophy took many forms, ranging from his detailed commentaries on Aristotle, his defense
of philosophy against the attacks of those who condemned it as contrary to Islam and his
construction of a form of Aristotelianism which cleansed it, as far as was possible, at the time of
Neoplatonic influences. His thought is genuinely creative and highly controversial, producing
powerful arguments that were to puzzle his philosophical successors in the Jewish and Christian
worlds. He seems to argue that there are two forms of truth, a religious form and a philosophical
form, and that it does not matter if they point in different directions. He also appears to be
doubtful about the possibility of personal immortality or of God’s being able to know that
particular events have taken place. There is much in his work to suggest that religion is inferior
to philosophy as a means of attaining knowledge, and that the understanding of religion which
ordinary believers can have is very different and impoverished when compared with that
available to the philosophers. While discussing political philosophy he advocates a leading role
in the State for philosophers, and in receiving State patronage he became both royal physician
and Qāḍī (judge) of Cordova in succession to his father. Due to the political turmoil in Andalusia
(Islamic Spain) at that time, he was not always in favor, and was banished to North Africa, when
he was seventy during a period of persecution of philosophy. He died in 595 A.H /1198 C.E after
having been rehabilitated, but his religious orthodoxy still seems to have been suspected by the
public.
4.2.4 Philosophical Journey of Ibn Rushd
There is a famous story that when Ibn Rushd was about forty-two there was a meeting between
the Caliph and Ibn Rushd, at which the latter was asked to summarize the works of Aristotle in
order that the ideas of that thinker might be better understood by the Caliph himself, and no
doubt also by the intellectual community. Ibn Rushd’s reported nervousness at accepting this
commission was well-founded, since changing political circumstances had in the past— and
would in the future—put Aristotle and those influenced by him under a theological cloud; the
interest of a ruler in philosophy could quite easily turn into hostility. Over the next twenty-six
years, however, Ibn Rushd wrote commentaries on most of Aristotle’s works. These
commentaries took a variety of forms. Often he would write a summary, medium commentary
and long commentary of the same text, thus, presenting the ideas of Aristotle to a variety of
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audiences; those who were seeking a detailed discussion of the whole text would look to the long
commentary, while those who wanted just to get a flavour of the original could be satisfied with
the paraphrase. As Aristotle’s Politics was not available to him, he used Plato’s Republic instead
for his commentary on a political text. The remarkable feature of these commentaries is the way
in which Ibn Rushd tried to get back to the original arguments of Aristotle, cleansed of the
Neoplatonic accretions which had developed. This was very difficult to do, since a long and
well-developed tradition of Neoplatonic commentary had very much set the agenda over the
previous centuries in the Islamic world. However, Ibn Rushd was often able to distinguish
between the points which Aristotle was trying to make and those which had been imposed upon
him by the commentators. He certainly respected some of the classical commentators such as
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistus, as well as some of the Muslim philosophers and
especially his own countryman, Ibn Bājjah, but the style of his commentaries is to try to
understand the text anew and to reconstruct the Aristotelian argument in a way which represents
Aristotle’s original view. Sometimes he is more successful than others, and he was not averse to
adding his own comments on the text when he felt this would be useful. The paraphrases are
certainly very loose summaries of the originals, and often gave Ibn Rushd the opportunity to
express his own views on an Aristotelian theme. However, the long commentaries are very
impressive analyses of the text, especially given the nature of the translations with which Ibn
Rushd was working, and they came to wield great influence in the Christian and Jewish worlds.
Although, Ibn Rushd did discuss theological topics in his commentaries on occasion, he usually
reserved them for his more polemical works, where he has a more contemporary philosopher in
mind. His Tahāfat al-Tahāfat (Incoherence of the Incoherence) is a response to an earlier attack
upon philosophy, the Tahāfat al-Falāsafa (Incoherence of the Philosophers) written by Al-
Ghazālī, who had argued in this work that there are two major problems with Islamic philosophy.
The first problem is that it misapplies the very philosophical techniques which it advocates; that
is, its arguments fall foul of the criteria for validity which philosophy itself advocates. The other
problem is that the conclusions of philosophy go against the principles of Islam, which the
philosophers pretend they are supporting. Al-Ghazālī produced accurate descriptions of
philosophical arguments and then set about demolishing them, using the same philosophical
principles which his opponents try to employ. He argued that although the philosophers purport
to prove that philosophy is merely a more sophisticated analysis of the nature of reality than that
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available to ordinary Muslims, the philosophers are in fact involved in dismantling the religious
notion of God, the afterlife and creation in the guise of merely analyzing these ideas. Although,
the object of his attack is primarily the work of Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā; Ibn Rushd perceived that
the whole peripatetic approach to philosophy was being challenged by Al-Ghazālī, and he rushed
to its defense. The nub of Al-Ghazālī’s attack on philosophy is what he regards as its misguided
interpretation of the relationship between God and the world. The Qur’ān is full of references to
the creation of the world and to its eventual destruction by God, yet, Muslim philosophers tends
to argue that the world is eternal. If God really is an agent, Al-Ghazālī asks why cannot he just
create the world ex nihilo and then later destroy it? Ibn Rushd replies that temporal and eternal
agents act very differently. We can decide to do something, we can wait for a certain time before
acting, we can wonder about our future actions; but such possibilities cannot arise for God. In his
case there is no gap between desire and action, nothing stands in the way of his activity; and yet,
we are told by Al-Ghazālī that God suddenly created the world. What differentiates one time
from another for God? What could motivate him to create the world at one particular time as
opposed to another? For us, different times are different because they have different qualitative
aspects, yet, before the creation of the world, when there was nothing around to characterize one
time as distinct from another, there is nothing to characterize one time over another as the time
for creation to take place. Al-Ghazālī argues that such a response is evidence of mental laziness.
Even we can choose between two alternatives which appear to be identical in every respect
except position. He gives the example of a hungry man being confronted by only two dates,
where he is able to take just one. Since, they are to all intents and purposes identical, it would
seem to follow that if the philosophers are right he must just stand there and starve since there is
no difference between them. Ibn Rushd criticizes this analogy, since, it is not really about a
choice as to which date to eat but about a choice between eating and not eating. What Al-Ghazālī
is trying to do is establish some scope for divine action and decision-making which represents
God as a real agent and not just as a cipher for natural events which would take place anyway.
Ibn Rushd comments that the difficulty lies in distinguishing between the divine will and
knowledge. Since, the omniscient God knows exactly how the universe should be organized to
produce the optimal arrangement; Ibn Rushd insists that there is no point in thinking of a gap in
time existing between that conception and its instantiation. An omnipotent God does not need to
wait for the appropriate moment to create the universe since nothing exists which could oblige
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him to wait, and he does not require time to bring about the creation. Ibn Rushd argues that given
God’s nature, we cannot think of his acting in any different way from that represented by the
organization of the world. This does not imply a lack of freedom or ability to choose, but is
merely a reflection of God’s perfect nature. Al-Ghazālī followed the Ash‘arites in being so
concerned to emphasize the power and ubiquity of God that he refused to accept that the ordinary
world really consists of stable material objects between which there are relationships of natural
necessity. Ibn Rushd claims that this theory leads to a denial of the possibility of knowledge of
the world. Since, Al-Ghazālī accepts causality as a practical guide to our everyday lives, one
might wonder what point Ibn Rushd is trying to make here. The point is that the nexus between a
term and its causal properties is not merely contingent, but is really one of meaning. Al-Ghazālī
gives the example of a decapitated person acting just like an ordinary human being, except for
the absence of a head. No such event has ever taken place, but if God wills it could happen,
because God is omnipotent and we can imagine such a possibility. If God wants to activate a
headless person, he could do so. This shows that the connection between having a head and
being an active human being is merely contingent, without necessity. Ibn Rushd wonders
whether this change to our conceptual scheme is possible. There are some properties which are
significant aspects of the meaning of the thing of which they are the properties, and there is a
necessary relationship between what a thing is and what it does. The advantage of Ibn Rushd’s
response is that it provides an account of how naming is possible. We can set about naming
things because we can identify relatively stable entities with law like patterns of behaviour with
other things. We may often go awry in our naming, but if we could not be sure that on the whole
our names correspond with stable and fixed essences, naming itself would be an empty
procedure. Along with his insistence that the deity is a real agent, Al-Ghazālī was concerned to
provide God with real knowledge of the everyday events of the world he created. Ibn Sīnā
argued that God is limited to knowing only very general and abstract features of the world, since
any other sort of knowledge would diminish him as an eternal and immaterial being. Al-Ghazālī
objects that the God, who is acceptable to Islam, must know the everyday events of our world.
Ibn Rushd suggests that on the contrary, this would make God into someone very like his
creatures and would provide him with knowledge that is beneath his dignity. God’s knowledge is
superior and unique because he is not limited to receiving information from the world, as is the
case with finite creatures like human beings. He is the creator of the objects in the world, and He
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knows them in a more perfect and completes way than we can hope to attain. This suggests that
God cannot know individuals as such. The best knowledge is abstract and universal, and this is
the sort of knowledge which God can be thought to enjoy. One might expect Ibn Rushd to share
Ibn Sīnā’s view that God’s knowledge is limited to universal judgments, but he does not adopt
this line, arguing rather that God’s knowledge is neither universal nor individual, although it is
more like the latter than the former. Our knowledge is the result of what God has brought about,
whereas God’s knowledge is produced by that which, He Himself has brought about, a reality
which, He has constructed. The organization of the universe is a reflection of God’s thought, and
through thinking about his Own Being, He is at the same time thinking about the organization of
the world which mirrors that essence. He cannot really be identical with contingent and
accidental phenomena, yet, His essence is not totally unconnected with such phenomena. They
represent contingent aspects of the necessary and essential relationships which, He has
established. To take an example, God knows which physical laws govern the universe, but he
does not need to observe any moving objects to understand the principles of movement. Such
observations are only appropriate objects of knowledge of sentient creatures with sensory
apparatus and are far beneath the dignity of the Creator. Ibn Rushd argues that this is not to
diminish God’s knowledge, but rather emphasizes the distinctness of the God from His creatures
and their ways of finding things out. Another charge that Al-Ghazālī brought against philosophy
was that it fails to allow the physical resurrection of human beings and the provision of physical
rewards and punishments appropriate to their behaviour during their lives. He has in mind here
the Aristotelian notion of the soul, which makes the idea of an afterlife difficult to grasp. This is
because the soul is the form of the living being, an aspect of the being itself, and there is no point
in talking about the matter existing without the form when we are considering living creatures.
Persons are combinations of soul and body, and in the absence of the latter there are no persons.
Ibn Rushd appears to argue that as we become more involved with immortal and eternal
knowledge, and with universal and abstract principles, our mind becomes identical to a degree
with those objects of knowledge. So, once we have perfected ourselves intellectually and known
everything that there is to know about the formal structure of reality, there is no longer really any
‘us’ around to do the knowing. Ibn Rushd regards our progress in knowledge as equivalent to a
lessening of our ties with our material and individual human characteristics, with the radical
result that if anything survives death, it must be the species and not the individual. Temporal and
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finite creatures are destructible, but as members of a species we are permanent, although only the
species itself is entirely free from destruction. This seems even more incompatible with the
traditional religious view of the afterlife than the position which Al-Ghazālī attacks. Ibn Rushd
follows this with a political account of the function of the religious language, describing the
afterlife as providing ordinary believers with a motive for virtuous action and dissuading them
from immorality. He does not entirely rule out the possibility of the sort of physical afterlife on
which Al-Ghazālī insists, but it is clear from his work that he regards such a possibility as wildly
unlikely. The only meaning which can be given to such a notion is political, and there is nothing
irreligious about such an interpretation, according to Ibn Rushd. It is difficult for unsophisticated
believers to understand that it is worthwhile to act well and avoid evil, or that their actions have a
wider reference than the immediate community of acquaintances, so any religion which is able to
motivate them must address them in ways that they comprehend and in a language which strikes
an emotional chord. Richly descriptive accounts of the afterlife, of God seeing everything which
happens and of his creation of the world out of nothing, help adherence by the majority to the
principles of religion and are the only sort of language which most members of the community
can understand. The arguments which Ibn Rushd presents for hedging in the notion of the
immortality of the individual soul would not mean much to the unsophisticated believer, while
the more intellectually alert are expected by Ibn Rushd to understand how that notion fits in with
the basic principles of Islam. Ibn Rushd presents a firm critique of the Ash‘arite theory of moral
language, which interprets rightness and wrongness entirely in conformity with the commands of
God. The purpose of that theory is to emphasize the power and authority of God over everything,
even over the meaning of ethical terms. What we ought to do then is simply equivalent to God’s
commands, and we ought to do it because God has commanded it, so that everything we need to
know about moral behaviour is encapsulated in Islam. Ibn Rushd argued that on the contrary, a
distinction should be drawn between moral notions and Divine commands. Here he follows an
Aristotelian approach. Since, everything has a nature, and this nature defines its end, we as
things also have natures and ends at which our behaviour is directed. The purpose of a plant is to
grow and the aim of a saw is to cut, but what is the purpose of a human being? One of our
ultimate aims is to be happy and to avoid actions which lead to unhappiness. It is not difficult
here to align Islamic and Aristotelian principles: moral virtue leads to happiness since, if we do
what we should in accordance with our nature, we will be able to achieve happiness. This
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happiness may be interpreted in a number of ways, either as a mixture of social and religious
activities or as an entirely intellectual ideal. However, the latter is possible only for a very few.
Neither religion nor philosophy would approve of it as the ultimate aim for the majority of the
community. There is an essential social dimension to human happiness which makes the
identification of happiness with correct moral and religious behaviour much easier to establish. It
is conceivable that someone would try to live completely apart from the community to
concentrate upon entirely intellectual pursuits, but this way of living is inferior to a life in which
there is a concentration upon intellectual thought combined with integration within the practices
of a particular society. One might expect that a thinker such as Ibn Rushd, who was working
within an Islamic context, would identify happiness and misery with some aspect of the afterlife,
but as we have seen, he was unable to accept the traditional view of the afterlife as us. What the
notion of the afterlife is supposed to achieve is an understanding that the scope of personal action
is wider than might immediately appear to be the case. Without religious language and imagery,
ordinary believers may find it difficult to grasp that our moral actions affect not only ourselves
but the happiness of the whole community, not just at a particular time or in a particular place
but as a species. When we behave badly we damage our own chances of human flourishing, and
this affects our personal opportunities for achieving happiness and growing as people. It also
affects our relationships with other people, resulting in the weakening of society. While it is
possibly true that the misery consequent upon evil-doing may not follow us personally after our
death, it may well follow the community. The importance of the notion of an afterlife is that it
points to the wider terms of reference in which moral action has life. In his commentary
on Plato’s Republic, Ibn Rushd modifies Plato in terms of his own Aristotelian views and applies
the text to the contemporary state. He uses Plato’s idea of the transformation and deterioration of
the ideal state into four imperfect states to illustrate aspects of past and contemporary political
organization in the Islamic world. He takes mischievous pleasure in comparing the theologians
of his own time, the Mutakallimīn, to Plato’s sophists. He describes the theologians as a genuine
danger to the state and to the purity of Islam, and suggests to the ruler that a ban on the
publicizing of their activities is advisable. In this and many of his other works, Ibn Rushd
stresses the importance of a careful understanding of the relationship between religion and
philosophy in the state. Revelation is superior to philosophy in that it makes its message more
widely available than is possible for philosophy. The prophet can do things which the
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philosopher cannot such as teaching the masses, understanding the future, establishing religious
laws and contributing to the happiness of the whole of humanity. Through divine revelation or
inspiration, the prophet establishes laws which make it possible for people to attain an
understanding of how they should behave. The credentials of the prophet are to be established by
political skill. Miracles are irrelevant here; only legislative abilities count. The philosopher has
all the theoretical knowledge which the prophet has, but only the latter can embody this
knowledge in a law and persuade the general public that this is a law which must be obeyed.
What the prophet has is practical knowledge as well as the theoretical knowledge which he
shares with the philosopher, and so, the content of the prophetic law (Sharī’ah) is no different
from the content of the philosophical law (Nāmūs). The prophet is much better at putting this
content across to the community, and can transform abstract ideas about human happiness into
political ideas and social norms which then are capable of regulating the life of the community.
However, it is worth emphasizing that the only advantage which religion has over reason is that
the former involves a practical form of knowledge which is not necessarily possessed by the
latter. The issue of the relationship between philosophy and religion fascinated the Islamic
philosophers, and Ibn Rushd was no exception in this respect. He tried to refine this issue time
and again throughout his works. The role of the philosopher in the state was a topic of continual
interest for Ibn Rushd. He noticed that Aristotle seemed to hesitate between the view that the
prime constituent of the good life is intellectual thought and the alternative, based upon a broader
collection of virtues. These two alternatives have very different implications, especially within
the context of a religious philosophy. The identification of a more social notion of happiness as
living in accordance with a general mixture of virtues would make happiness more generally
available to the public, since it would mean that the unsophisticated but dutiful believers could
achieve a high level of perfection in their life. The idea that intellectual excellence is the highest
form of human wellbeing or happiness implies that the great majority of the community, unable
or disinclined to concentrate completely on intellectual issues, is thereby deprived of the very
best form of life. No religion, such as Islam, with its claims to universality could tolerate such a
confining restriction on human happiness. Ibn Rushd thinks he can avoid this dilemma. The basis
to his solution is the argument that religion and philosophy are not incompatible. Islam is a
rational system of beliefs and it requires its adherents to attend to rational arguments concerning
how they are to behave and think. The rational arguments are there in the Qur’ān and other
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places for those who can follow them, and for those who cannot there are other forms of
presentation of the truth which are easier to understand. This might seem a patronizing way to
describe the faith of the ordinary believer, but Ibn Rushd suggests that if we look at examples
from law and medicine we shall see how acceptable it is. Lawyers may study in detail the
principles behind legislation, yet, most of the community just follows the law without thinking
deeply about its rationale. Those who work in medical fields have a good understanding of how
the body works and how different forms of treatment affect the health of the individual. The
ordinary person does not understand much of this, and just goes along with what they are told by
the medical experts. There is nothing wrong with this; there is no necessity for everyone in the
community to be either a lawyer or a doctor. Different people have different attitudes to the law
and medicine, some based upon real understanding and some based upon casual acquaintance,
and these differences do not interfere with the everyone’s ability in the community to live in an
organized and healthy society. Any religion with claims to general acceptability must present its
message in a suitable form for the particular audience it is addressing. Ibn Rushd argues that
Islam is an especially excellent religion because it has the ability to present the important issues
to the greatest variety of people. Some people will be attracted to Islam and strengthened in their
faith if the philosophical arguments for being a Muslim are pursued and developed. Others,
perhaps the majority, cannot really understand such arguments but can understand simpler
arguments and parables which describe in simple terms what is wrong with other religions and
why Islam is superior to them. Still others will not even be able to grasp such simple arguments
and so must be persuaded by rhetorical devices, which include a grain of logical force but mainly
consist of persuasive imagery and exhortation. The way in which Ibn Rushd makes this
distinction has led some commentators to think that his real view is that philosophy alone reveals
the truth, and religion is only suitable for the intellectually weak who have to be satisfied with
stories and doctrines which are, strictly speaking, false. Such a disingenuous interpretation is not
required, however. Ibn Rushd is trying to highlight the fact that there are a variety of ways of
coming to know something, some of which are surer than others, but all of which are acceptable.
Once the object of knowledge is acquired then it is known, however that knowledge has been
achieved. We know religious truths in different ways, but we really do know exactly the same
thing. One of the excellences of Islam, according to Ibn Rushd, is its accessibility to a wide range
of adherents. In many of his works, and especially in his Faṣl al-Maqāl (The Decisive Treatise),
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he argues that the highest form of demonstrative reasoning cannot clash with the principles of
religion. He claims here that philosophers are best able to understand properly the allegorical
passages in the Qur’ān on the basis of their logical training, and that there is no religious
stipulation that all such passages have to be interpreted literally. Where demonstrative reasoning
appears to conflict with the sense of Scripture, then those capable of demonstration (the
philosophers) know that the passages must be interpreted allegorically so as to cohere with the
demonstrative truths. Philosophers should be careful when they do this not to offend the religious
sensibilities of the less sophisticated, in sharp contrast with the practice of the theologians. The
latter frequently interpret such passages so crudely that they either throw doubt on religion itself,
or threaten the pursuit of philosophy by raising doubts in people’s minds concerning the
orthodoxy of the conclusions reached by the philosophers. Language should be seen as a
sophisticated vehicle for communicating information to different categories of audience.
Religion is a means for the easy comprehension of the majority of the people, and where a
hidden meaning exists it is up to the philosophers to discover it and keep it to themselves, while
the rest of the community must accept the literalness of Scripture. Ibn Rushd is in a difficult
position when trying to respond to Al-Ghazālī’s attacks upon philosophy. Since, the former tried
at the same time to distance himself from the sort of Neoplatonic approach to theoretical issues,
which Ibn Sīnā advocated of, and it was Ibn Sīnā who was the direct object of Al-Ghazālī’s
criticism/critique. One of the most significant methodological disputes between Ibn Rushd and
Ibn Sīnā lies in their differing analyses of the relationship between essence and existence, and
this has an important influence upon Ibn Rushd’s approach to meaning. Ibn Sīnā held that a state
of affairs is possible if and only if something else acts to bring it into existence, with the sole
exception of the God. Ibn Rushd characterizes this view, quite correctly, as one in which possible
states of affairs are nonexistent in themselves, until their existence is brought about by some
cause. The possible is that whose essence does not include its existence and so must depend upon
a cause which makes its actuality necessary, but only necessary relative to that cause. In this
modal system there are really only two kinds of being, that necessary through another and that
necessary in itself (that is, God), so that the realm of the possible becomes identical with both the
actual and the necessary. Both Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sīnā maintain that there is a logical distinction
between essence and existence, but the former accuses the latter of conflating the order of
thought with the order of things, the logical order with the ontological order. Ibn Sīnā does
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indeed start with the logical distinction between essence and existence and then proceeds via his
theory of emanation to show how existence comes to essence from the necessarily acting
Necessary Being. The occasionalism of Al-Ghazālī is like the theory of emanation of Ibn Sīnā, in
that both doctrines interpret the contingent world as radically dependent upon something else.
The account of essence and existence provided by Ibn Sīnā is perfectly acceptable to Al-Ghazālī,
with the proviso that direct divine intervention is required to bring existence to the essences. Ibn
Sīnā divides up the world into existing things and essences, into what we can think about and
what really exists, and into things which are necessary through another and are possible in
themselves. These distinctions throw doubt on the sort of realism and emphasis upon substance
that is so important for Ibn Rushd and his form of Aristotelianism. This latter is based upon a
model of the world as one entity, as a single order of nature with no impenetrable barriers to
human understanding and investigation. This leads Ibn Rushd to argue that although a logical
distinction can be drawn between the existence and essence of a thing, there is nonetheless a
necessary relationship between existence and essence. Without such a relationship, one could
conceive of all sorts of things happening to essences without regard to how they are actually
instantiated -the sorts of thought—experiments thatAl-Ghazālī advocates of—which Ibn Rushd
argues seriously misrepresents the nature of philosophy. The meaning of the name of a thing is
intimately connected with the way in which it is instantiated, and it is a radical error in the
philosophy of language to separate essence and existence. To understand Ibn Rushd’s account of
a variety of paths to the truth, we have to grasp his theory of meaning. He emphasizes the
importance of notions such as equivocation and ambiguity in language because he thinks it is
important to be able to explain how names can be used in similar ways in different contexts. Ibn
Rushd agrees with Aristotle that there can be no priority or posteriority within the same genus,
and so he develops an account of meaning which is based upon the pros hen rather than the
genus-species relation. If the latter were used, meaning would come out as univocal and Al-
Ghazālī would be entirely justified in expecting the philosophers to account for God and his
activity in the same sort of language as we use to describe ourselves. If meaning is expressed in
terms of pros hen equivocals (Bi NisbaIlā Shay’ Wāḥid), then we can look for some similarity in
the objects which form the basis to the sharing of the name, but we do not have to insist that
exactly the same name be used in its different contexts with precisely the same meaning. We can
also insist that the different contexts in which a name is used have to be taken into account when
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we come to ask for the meaning of the name. For Al-Ghazālī, abstract terms have a meaning
which is independent of their reference in the external world. The meaning of such terms is
equivalent to the series of pictures or images in which the events they describe are characterized
in particular ways. All that we have to do to conceive of God miraculously creating something
out of nothing is to imagine it happening, and so it is possible. Ibn Rushd argues that, on the
contrary, it is not enough to have a series of images in one’s mind to establish the
meaningfulness of that combination of images. A meaningful use of language is possible only
through the connection of linguistic terms and ideas with a framework in which they make sense,
and such a framework is connected to the varying uses of the terms and to the way in which the
world is. The concept which Ibn Rushd wants his account of language to characterize is that of a
point of view or standpoint. In Ibn Rushd’s thought there is a continual contrast between
different standpoints, not just a distinction between God’s point of view and the human point of
view, but also a differentiation of the standpoints of the whole of humanity based upon their
forms of reasoning. For example, in the Faṣl al-Maqāl he talks about demonstrative, dialectical,
rhetorical and sophistical people, all of whom are using similar language to discuss what is
important to them, namely their faith, morality, the life hereafter and so on. This language is not
identical regardless of the way in which it is used, nor is it completely equivocal. There are
connections between different applications of the same name, and these connections are strong
enough for it to make sense to say that these uses are of the same name. So we can talk about
there being a variety of routes to the same destination, a variety of views based upon the same
ideas and beliefs, and a variety of ways of living, which together add up to a morally and
religiously desirable form of life. Ibn Rushd extends the use of the notion of Ijmā’ (consensus)
from its theological role of establishing what is acceptable within Islam to an even more
important role, that of establishing what words mean. If there is agreement in the community that
particular scriptural passages are clear, then they are clear and that is the end of the matter. If it is
felt by some that there is ambiguity in some passages, then there is ambiguity which has to be
resolved in some way if practice is not to suffer. Those who feel that there is ambiguity have to
try to resolve that ambiguity in a way which enables them to follow the route to salvation.
4.2.5 The Polemics between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd on Philosophy
In eleventh century Persia, Abū Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī, an Islamic jurist and theologian who had at
one time professed a deep interest in philosophy, set about criticizing the Greek-inspired
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philosophers, particularly Ibn Sīnā and Al-Fārābī, some of whose tenets he judged to be contrary
to the teachings contained in the Quranic Revelation and thus to have a pernicious influence on
Islamic thought and faith. In his book Tahāfut al-Falāsafah (The Incoherence of the
Philosophers), written in 1095, he attempted—as the title suggests—to refute what he considered
to be the errors of these philosophers, using their own demonstrative methods and
argumentation. Because of his profound learning and his knowledge of the art of argumentation,
his work had such a profound impact on the world of his time that the philosophical tradition of
Eastern Islam underwent a severe decline and eventually died.
Philosophy continued in the West, however; and some eighty years later, Abū al-Walīd Ibn
Rushd, a peripatetic philosopher, who also combined the functions of judge in Cordova and of
personal physician to the Almohad sovereigns, responded to Ghazālī’s attacks in a book entitled
Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), where he alternately cited Al-
Ghazālī’s views and his own. Ibn Rushd’s reply was the ultimate endeavor of this philosophical
system to reassert itself in the midst of growing opposition and to prove its legitimacy within the
Islamic framework; for at that time philosophers were under the accusation of heresy, an
accusation which threatened them with the penalty of death. Ibn Rushd himself went through a
period of disgrace, and many of his original works were publicly burned. With him, the great
philosophical tradition that had come to full bloom in the eleventh and twelfth centuries is
generally considered to have reached its end. Nonetheless, it left a legacy which was absorbed
and molded by the science of Kalām—the predominant school of thought from then on, and by
some of the most eminent Sufis, such as Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī.
As an illustration of al-Ghazālī’s contention against philosophy, it will be interesting to look at
certain of the specific arguments to which Ibn Rushd replied. A comparison of their respective
claims may well show that each is right in his own domain and that their disagreements are not
as great as might appear at first sight. Firstly, however, let us place philosophy in general and Ibn
Rushd in particular within the context of the Islamic tradition.
In its highest reaches, Islamic philosophy deals with the dimension of Al-Ḥaqīqah, or essential
truth, and thus, the source of all other truth. Taking certainty for their point of departure, the
philosophers aim to achieve through reasoning a greater understanding of God, the Revelation,
and the nature of the universe. Their intention is not to create doubt and confusion but to acquire
mental enlightenment through discovery of the truth; and, ideally, philosophy becomes the
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wisdom of the sages in the sense that it is as much practical as theoretical knowledge, involving
the totality of man and not only his rational faculty:
Philosophy is the knowledge of the reality of things within man’s possibility,
because the philosopher’s end in his theoretical knowledge is to gain truth and in his
practical knowledge to behave in accordance with truth.
What made it possible for philosophy to develop as a science was the Qur’ān’s commendation
of wisdom, Ḥikmah, and the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) injunctions to seek it:
He giveth wisdom unto whom He will, and unto him to whom wisdom is given, much
good hath been given.
The acquisition of Ḥikmah is incumbent upon thee: verily the good resides in
Ḥikmah.
However, theologians took Ḥikmah to mean the science of Kalām, whose supremacy they
wished to assert over any other form of knowledge, and this brought them into frequent conflict
with the philosophers. As for Ibn Rushd, they could blame him not only for being a philosopher
but also for being too rationalistic in a strict Aristotelian sense, and thus, too remote from the
tenets of Islamic faith, since pure rationalism seems not to rely on any power outside itself; this
was perceived as a threat to the Muslim community since believers might eventually be induced
thereby to reject the revealed truth. Perhaps Ibn Rushd was overly given to reason; but in all
fairness, it should be mentioned that such a judgment is no doubt largely based on his
commentaries on Aristotle’s works, which does not reflect his actual thoughts and ideas but,
rather writings produced at the bidding of the Almohad Caliph, Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, who was
himself fond of philosophy.
Furthermore, one of Ibn Rushd’s greatest concerns was to reconcile philosophy with religion,
for he was convinced that both dealt with the same and only truth; he devoted a whole treatise,
the Faṣl al-Maqāl (The Decisive Speech), to this purpose. “Philosophy is the friend and milk-
sister of religion,” he says, while attempting to demonstrate the legitimacy of, and even the
necessity for, philosophy as a science commanded by divine Law:
That the Law summons to reflection on beings, and to the pursuit of knowledge about them by
the intellect, is clear from several verses of the Book of God, Blessed and Exalted, such as the
saying of the Exalted, ‘Reflect, ye who have vision’: this is textual authority for the obligation
to use intellectual reasoning.
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However, when the preceding Quranic phrase is examined, it is found to be cited out of context;
Ibn Rushd was probably unable to resist turning some verses of the Qur’ān to the advantage of
philosophy, but he was certainly neither the first nor the last to use such a stratagem in defense
of his arguments. Be that as it may, such examples should not detract from the validity of his
conclusion on the intrinsic worth of philosophy:
Now since this religion is true and summons to the study which leads to knowledge
of the Truth, we the Muslim community know definitely that demonstrative study
does not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with what Scripture has given us; for truth
does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it.”
According to Ibn Rushd, however, this science is not for everyone; it must not be divulged to the
common people, whose intelligence cannot apprehend the higher truths of philosophy, but should
be strictly reserved to the elite or the men of learning, who tread “the path of study,” seeking “to
know the truth,” who are “versed in profound knowledge and to whom God has permitted the
sight of the true realities,” and who have the “obligation to make a thorough study of the
principles of religion.” Moreover, no one can enter the philosophers’ circle without first
receiving a sound intellectual education and acquiring a solid basis of virtue to guard against the
pitfall of heresy: “One can attain knowledge only after the attainment of virtue.” By introducing
such measures, Ibn Rushd shows that he wants to protect the community, thereby offering
reassurance to his opponents. Furthermore, he does not argue that philosophy has answers to
everything, for he is well aware of the limits of reasoning, when it comes to knowledge conferred
by revelation:
We have to refer to the Law of God everything which the human mind is unable to
grasp. For the knowledge which results from revelation comes only as a perfection
of the sciences of the intellect; that is, any knowledge which the weakness of the
human mind is, unable to grasp is best owed upon man by God through revelation.
Finally, he deplores the fact, that instead of mutual understanding between philosophers and
theologians, there should have been so much dissension, and bitter opposition to philosophy by
theologians, since both are:
..companions by nature and lovers by essence and instinct … But God directs all
men a right and helps everyone to love Him; He unites their hearts in the fear of
Him, and removes from them hatred and loathing by His grace and His mercy!
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These words can only come from a believer; there is no reason to question the sincerity of Ibn
Rushd’s Islamic faith, even if some scholars have stated that in his “exoteric” treatises he is
veiling his real thoughts; philosophy in a traditional world, such as that of twelfth century
Cordova, was not divorced from religion in the manner of modern philosophy.
As a philosopher, Ibn Rushd cannot accept the assertions of the theologian, and he replies by
directing scathing attacks against Al-Ghazālī; at the same time, he rises in defense of what he
considers to be true philosophy, so as to clear it from any suspicion of heterodoxy.
Evidently and according to common sense, there are occurrences in the natural world which
bring about others; nature follows physical laws which make it possible for the human mind to
attain knowledge of the world. Therefore, Al-Ghazālī’s claim cannot be valid, because “to deny
the existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible things is sophistry.” Moreover,
referring to the example of fire, Ibn Rushd contends that if this element’s specific function is
denied, this amounts to denying the definition contained in the word “fire”; in that case, fire
would lose its name and have no reality by which it could be recognized:
If a thing had not its specific nature, it would not have a special name nor a
definition … One need not therefore deny fire its burning power so long as fire
keeps its name and definition.
According to this demonstration, Al-Ghazālī’s denial of cause and effect results logically in the
denial of his own affirmation, because if reason is not allowed to deduce causal relationships
between two successive events, then it cannot operate according to its nature and so loses its
power of forming valid concepts and hence any chance of attaining knowledge. If it is denied its
function, it will no longer have either its definition or its reality; therefore, Ibn Rushd maintains
that Al-Ghazālī’s claim has no foundation:
“Now intelligence is nothing but the perception of things with their causes, and
in this it distinguishes itself from all the other faculties of apprehension, and he
who denies causes must deny the intellect. Logic implies the existence of
causes and effects, and knowledge of these effects can only be rendered perfect
through knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause implies the denial of
knowledge, and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be
really known, and that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion,
that neither proof nor definition exist, and that the essential attributes which
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compose definitions are void. The man who denies the necessity of any item of
knowledge must admit that even this, his own affirmation, is not necessary
knowledge.”
The existence of voluntary agents is of course self-evident; but for Ibn Rushd an agent is
anything that can exert an influence on an object, even without intervention of the will, as is the
case with an inanimate body such as fire. Therefore, to affirm that natural causes can only be
considered natural in a figurative sense is an egregious error or, as he puts it, “fallacy on fallacy”.
If a man were to die in a fire, he pertinently points out, no one would think of saying that the fire
burned him “metaphorically.”
Moreover, if it were indeed true that we form judgments from habit alone and not from
reasonable deduction, we could never be certain of anything, concerning either this world or the
divine realm; constant doubt would thus be our lot since we should have no means of
discernment:
Everything would be the case only by supposition, and there would be no
wisdom in the world from which it might be inferred that its agent was
wise.
For Ibn Rushd, it is essential to perceive that the world has a logical structure, because he
believes that knowledge of God can be attained through the observation of nature; the existence
of order and harmony in the world and its laws bears witness to the perfect nature of the Being
who manifested it. Therefore, if all natural events were caused by an unpredictable and arbitrary
divine will, there would no longer, even for the twinkling of an eye, be any permanent
knowledge of anything, since we suppose such an agent to rule existents like a tyrannical prince
who has the highest power … of whom no standard or custom is known to which reference
might be made.
At the same time as responding systematically to each of Al-Ghazālī’s arguments, Ibn Rushd is
attempting to reassure his readers of the essential orthodoxy of philosophy. He claims that Al-
Ghazālī misjudges it and “ascribes to the philosophers’ theories which they do not hold.” It is
wrong for instance to think that philosophy sees the world as eternal and uncreated, for in
reality it is undergoing “everlasting production:” The philosopher’s theory, indeed, is that the
world has an agent acting from eternity and everlasting, i.e. converting the world eternally from
non-being into being.
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This concept of “non-being” is very close to the theologians’ “nihil,” from which, according to
them, the world was created; moreover, the eternal transformation of the world out of non-being
into being sounds very much like Al-Ghazālī’s assertion that God intervenes constantly in
nature. Nonetheless, one important difference remains with respect to the dogma on creation,
namely, that Ibn Rushd does not state that the world came into existence at a definite point in
time. Therefore, his theory is one of emanation rather than of creation, and this cannot find
acceptance by the theologians. However, he affirms elsewhere that the world was indeed
created, not through any arbitrariness of the Divine Will, but rather as a necessary act:
Creation is an act of God. He created the world providentially, not by
chance. The world is well ordered and is in a state of the most perfect
regularity, which proves the existence of a wise Creator. Causality is
presupposed.
On the question of miracles, Ibn Rushd is more emphatic; for him these are events which cannot
be apprehended by reason but which must be acknowledged as authentically divine in origin, and
for him the greatest of miracles is the Qur’ān, “the existence of which is not an interruption of
the course of nature assumed by tradition…but its miraculous nature is established by way of
perception and consideration for every man. This miracle is far superior to all others.” In another
treatise, he explains his reason for believing that the Qur’ān is miraculous:
The Laws of doctrine and practice contained in it are not of a sort that could
possibly be discovered by a learning process, but only by inspiration.
Since, the Qur’ān does not interfere with natural laws, Ibn Rushd has no trouble explaining its
miraculous nature; but he confesses himself impotent in the face of other kinds of miracles, and
he relinquishes reason as he passes in at the door of Revelation, for there are barriers which he
admits it cannot cross:
As to the objection which Al-Ghazālī ascribes to the philosophers over the miracle
of Abraham, such things are only asserted by heretical Muslims. The learned
among the philosophers do not permit discussion or disputation about the
principles of religion, and he who does such a thing, according to them, needs a
severe lesson…Of religious principles it must be said that they are divine things
which surpass human understanding, but must be acknowledged although their
causes are unknown.
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With respect to the miracle of Abraham, it seems that Ibn Rushd could have argued convincingly
that if it were not in fire’s nature to burn, God would not have ordered it to be “coolness and
peace for Abraham;” by such an example, taken directly from the Qur’ān, he could have refuted
Al-Ghazālī. Now it is perhaps over the question of miracles more than any other problem that the
philosopher’s weakness becomes apparent. Since reason is unable to demonstrate miraculous
occurrences, it simply abandons any attempt to explain them; but in fact the extra-ordinary
nature of miracles does not necessarily preclude knowledge of their causes.
Finally, although the argumentation on either side is more complex than has been presented here,
the foregoing debate between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd could be reduced to a simple question
of difference in perspectives, or rather in approaches, each of which is valid in its own domain.
In order to affirm the absolute Oneness and Incomparability of God, as manifested in the Qur’ān,
Al-Ghazālī stresses the discontinuity of all that is “other” than Him; this accounts for his
rejection of natural causality as necessary, since to accept it would allow the world to have an
existence seemingly independent from God. Given His attribute of Omnipotence, God cannot
logically be prevented from intervening in the world at every instant: “There is no objection to
admitting that anything may be possible for God”, therefore the world’s organization is not
inherent to it but is divinely ordained.
If Al-Ghazālī’s arguments reach the threshold of absurdity at times, it is because he is attempting
to demonstrate the indemonstrable, with the inevitable result that logic is to some extent
sacrificed in the process. As a theologian, moreover, he is bound by dogmatic restrictions, since
he has to expound the orthodox views of Islam, as strictly defined by tradition, and which must
be accessible to the majority of believers. Yet, it cannot be denied that he succeeds in making a
forceful point in as much as he sees beyond the apparent reality of the physical world to the
profound reality lying at its origin, whereas Ibn Rushd considers the physical world to be as real
as the divine realm.
Al-Ghazālī’s reasoning takes for its point of departure the highest order of reality, while on the
contrary Ibn Rushd—as an Aristotelian philosopher—takes his starting point in the material
world. Believing that the nature of God can be demonstrated according to physical laws, he seeks
to attain knowledge of the Divine by firmly grasping material reality, then by reasoning through
analogy, with the assumption that the same types of connection are to be found in higher levels
of existence. Despite the justifications, he offers for his method, it is understandable that this way
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of proceeding should have appeared dangerous to the theologians. In fact, Ibn Rushd’s views
have led some scholars to the erroneous view that he was undertaking to defend science against
religion; but, he could not have had this in mind, since his whole purpose was to attain to
knowledge of God through knowledge of nature. As he himself admitted, the art of philosophy
could be a threat to right belief if it were put into the wrong hands and pursued inadequately; but,
for the wise, it could only be a door opening on to a greater knowledge of reality, and hence of
truth. Therefore, philosophy could not really be in conflict with theology, since, both expounded
the same truth seen in different lights, the Islamic revelation being vast enough to allow for
several visions of a reality which is ultimately one.
4.2.5 Let Us Sum Up
Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rushd, better known as Averroes in the west, lived during a unique
period in the Western intellectual history, in which interest in philosophy and theology was
waning in the Muslim world and just beginning to flourish in the Latin Christendom. It had been
just fifteen years before his birth that the great critic Al-Ghazālī given a severe blow to Greek
philosophy and Muslim Neoplatonic philosophy.
Ibn Rushd contended the claim of many Muslim theologians that the philosophers were out of
the fold of Islam. He also challenged the Ash‘arite, Sufi, Mu’tazilite and literalist conceptions of
the attributes and the actions of God, wrote a treatise by the title Al-Kashf ‘an Manāhij al-
‘Ādilah fī ‘Aqā’id al-Millah.
Metaphysics, for Ibn Rushd, does not simply deal with God or theology; rather it concerns itself
with different classes of being and the analogical idea of being. It is, thus, a science that
distinguishes inferior classes of being from real being. Ibn Rushd, the adamant Aristotelian, puts
his own slant on Aristotle’s metaphysics.
The most important original philosophical work of ibn Rushd is Tahāfat al-Tahāfat (The
Incoherence of the Incoherence) in which he tried to defend Aristotelian philosophy against the
claims made by Al-Ghazālī in Tahāfat al-Falāsafah. Ibn Rushd’s rebuttal was bi-pronged:
 First, he contended that Al-Ghazālī’s arguments were mistaken, arguing that the Qur’an
actually commanded the devout Muslims to study philosophy.
 Second, he contended that he actually agreed with Al-Ghazālī in regard to a number of
the latter’s criticism of Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Rushd argued that the system of Ibn Sīnā was
distortion of Aristotelianism, and as a result, Al-Ghazālī was effectively aiming at the
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wrong target.
Ibn Rushd, thus, argued that his own system is “a reconstruction of the true philosophy, that of
Aristotle himself, against the false that of the neo-platonic philosophers/Falāsifa, who distorted
the thinking of Aristotle”.
In Faṣl al-Maqāl, Ibn Rushd argues for the legality of philosophical investigation under Islamic
Law, and that there is no inherent contradiction between philosophy and religion.
1. Give an account of Ibn Rushd’s life and works.
2. Describe the emergence of Ibn Rushd as a philosopher.
3. Give an account of the polemics between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd.
4. What are the points of contrast between Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd in interpretation of
Aristotle?
4. Majid Fakhr, Ibn Rushd
5. Oliver Leaman, Ibn Rushd and his Philosophy
6. Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy
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Lesson 4.3: Contribution of Ibn Taymiyyah
Lesson Structure
4.3.1 Introduction
4.3.2 Objectives
4.3.3 An Overview of Ibn Taymiyyah’s Life and Books
4.3.4 Ibn Taymiyyah on ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Philosophy
4.3.5 Let Us Sum Up
4.3.1 Introduction
The Islamic philosophical cum theological tradition includes the reading and critical assessment
of not just purely Islamic traditions but also of the other previous traditions coming from Greeks
and others. In the medieval Islamic lands these traditions found some ardent recipients and
passionate supporters; and some true original critiques as well like Al-Ghazālī and Ibn
Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah throughout his critique of Greek philosophy and its Muslim
supporters tried to point out basic flaws of this system of thinking in addition to prove the self
sufficiency of Islamic tradition in proving its theological claims.
4.3.2 Objectives
 To introduce Ibn Taymiyyah as a philosopher and a Mutakallim;
 Looking into the contribution of ibn Taymiyyah towards Islamic philosophy and
theology;
 Ibn Taymiyyah’s critical analysis of Greek philosophy and various other Islamic
schools of Kalām;
 Ibn Taymiyyah’s critical evaluation of the methodology of the Muslim Mutakallimīn.
4.3.3. Ibn Taymiyyah’s Life Sketch and Major Works
Ibn Taymiyyah was born in Harran, a town in modern Turkey on the 10th of Rabī‘ al-Awwal
661 A.H, and remained there until he was seven years old. Then, his father, ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ibn
Taymiyyah took him to Damascus, and he was given the best upbringing possible there. The
signs of excellence, dedication, and sharpness were clear in him from an early age. A trust
worthy friend who knew him told that when he was still in the midst of his youth and would
walk to the library, a Jew who lived on the road leading to the library would stop him in his
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path. The Jew would ask him about various issues, and would be impressed with Ibn
Taymiyyah’s swift reply, intelligence and brightness. Eventually, whenever Ibn Taymiyyah
would come across him, he would provide him with bits of information that would confirm to
the man the falsehood he was upon. This went on until he accepted Islam and became a fully
practicing Muslim, as related by Imām al-Bazzār in his treatise Al-A‘lāmal ‘Ulliyah fī Manāqib
ibn Taymiyyah. He memorized the entire Qur’ān as a youth, and proceeded to study and
memorize Ḥadīth, Fiqh, and the Arabic language. This was in addition to his strict adherence to
attending the circles of knowledge and his listening to the narration of Ḥadīth and Āthār
(traditions/events of the classical Muslims). He learned many books from numerous scholars of
high caliber. As for the great texts of Islam such as the ‘Musnad’ of Aḥmad, the Ṣaḥīḥ of Imām
Al-Bukhārī and Imām Muslim, the Jāmi‘ of Al-Tirmidhī, the ‘Sunan’ of Abū Dāwūd, Al-
Nasā’ī, Ibn Mājah and Al-Dāraquṭnī―he had each of them recited to him in their entirety
numerous times. The first book that he memorized in Ḥadīth was Al-Ḥumaydī’s Al-Jam‘ Bayn
al-Ṣaḥiḥayn.’ There was rarely a book in the sciences of Islam except that he would come
across it, and Allah had blessed him with an ability to quickly memorize and rarely forget. He
would hardly come across or hear something except that it would remain in his memory, either
in wording or meaning. It was as if knowledge had become infused in his flesh, blood, and
entire body. He did not merely take pieces of knowledge here and there. Rather, he had
complete understanding and comprehension, and was amongst the most outstanding people in
virtue and excellence. Such was his acumen in the Islamic religious sciences that his followers
considered him as the ‘Reviver/Mujaddid of the Religion’. He had achieved excellence in the
sciences of the Qur’ān in addition to his ability to derive the smallest and most minute benefits
from it, his knowledge of the statements of the scholars in explaining it, his way of using these
statements as evidence, as well as the ability Allah gave him to reveal its wonders, the beauty of
His legislations, its rare and amazing gems, its linguistic miracles, and its clear grace. His class
would last for a good portion of the day, and he did not have a designated person to recite for
him predetermined verses that he would prepare for. Rather, any random person who was
attending his class would recite what was easy for him, and Ibn Taymiyyah would then explain
whatever was recited. He would usually not stop except that those in attendance would know
that were it not for the lack of time, he would have delved into what he was explaining from
many, many more aspects. However, he would stop in order to allow his listeners to rest. For
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example, he delivered a Tafsīr (interpretation/exegesis) of the verse, “Say: ‘He is Allah, One”
that took up an entire huge volume. Also, his Tafsīr of the Qur’ānic phrase, “The Beneficent
ascended the Throne” filled around 35 volumes. He had gained unequivocal expertise in the
knowledge of the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him), his statements,
actions, life events, battles, armies, the miracles/Mu‘jizāt that Allah granted him, his knowledge
of what is authentically narrated from him as opposed to what is unauthentic, as well as the
statements, actions, events, and legal verdicts of the Companions (may Allah be Pleased with
them), their struggle for the sake of this Religion, and the virtues that they were granted in
exclusion to the rest of the Ummah. He would never mention a Ḥadīth or Fatwa/legal verdict
without a proper reference and used to provide the full details regarding the status and
authenticity of that particular reference or Hadith as well. During his first trial in Egypt, he was
taken and jailed such that he was prevented from having access to his books. At this juncture,
he authored many books, small and large, and mentioned in them a great number of Aḥādīth,
narrations, statements of the Companions, names of the scholars of Ḥadīth, authors, and their
works, and he attributed each of these to their proper sources, specifically by name. And Allah
had blessed him with the ability to know the differences of opinion amongst the scholars, their
statements, and their Ijtihād (using one’s intellect to derive verdicts/opinions regarding a
particular issue in light of the Qur’ān, Ḥadīth and Ijmā/consensus) in various matters, and what
was recorded of the strong, weak, accepted, and rejected opinions of each scholar of each era.
He had deep insight into which of their opinions were the most correct and closest to the truth,
and was even able to ascribe to each scholar in what location he had come to each opinion. This
was to the point that if he were asked about any of this, it was as if every single saying of the
Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him), his Companions, and the scholars–from the first of
them to the last of them–was a projected image in his mind, with him picking what he wanted
and leaving what he wanted. He was a prolific writer and his works are considered to be five
hundred in number of which well-known titles are:
 Al-Jam‘ Bayn al-‘Aql wa al-Naql
 Minhāj al-Istiqām ahwaal-I‘tidāl
 Al-Radd ‘Alā al-Naṣāra
 Tafsīr Sūrah al-Ikhlās
 Al-Sārim al-Maslūl ‘Alā Shātim al-Rasūl
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 Al-Furqān al-Mubīn Bayn at-Ṭalāq wal-Yamīn
 Al-Furqan Bayn Awliyā’ al-Raḥmān wa Awliya Al-Shayṭān
 ‘Iqtidā’ al-Ṣirāt al-Mustaqīm fī Mukhālafat Asḥāb al-Jahīm
 Al-Kalim al-Ṭayyib
 Ithbāt al-Kamāl
 Al-Radd ‘Alā Ta’sīs al-Taqdīs
 Naqd Aqwāl al-Mubtadi’īn
 Sharḥ al-‘Aqīdah al-Asbahāniyyah
 Al-Durr al-Multaqit ‘Alā Aḥkam al-Ṭalāq
 Raf’ al-Malām ‘an al-A’immah al-A‘lām
 Al-Istighāthah wa al-Tawassul
 Al-Masā’il al-Hamawiyyah
As for his Fatāwā (sing., Fatwa/verdict) and the answers he gave to various questions,
seventeen volumes of them were compiled and arranged according to Fiqh topics in Egypt, and
this is a well-known and famous collection. Also, his companions compiled more than 40,000
issues that he answered. It was very rare that an event would occur that he was asked about in
which he would not reply in the quick and immediate style that he was famous for. This answer
would then be turned into a book that anyone else would require a long time sifting through
many references to put together, and even then, they would still not match his expertise and
efficiency in answering. Shaykh Tāj al-Dīn Muḥammad bin al-Dawrī narrates that he attended
one of Ibn Taymiyyah’s classes in which a Jew had asked him about something related to the
Qadr/predestination: “The Jew had presented his question in the form of a poem consisting of
eight lines. So, when Ibn Taymiyyah looked at it, he thought to himself for a moment and
proceeded to write a reply. He kept writing, and we thought that he would come out with a
scattered, unorganized response. When he finished, his companions looked over what he had
written to find that it was a 184-line poem interspersed within the poem presented by the
questioner. His knowledge was so clearly evident in this poem that if one wanted to explain just
this poem, he would need to write two large volumes in doing so.” As for his classes, says Ibn al-
Dawrī, “ he would not prepare anything specifically to present. Rather, he would sit after praying
two Rak’āt (two rounds of prayers/Namāz) would praise Allah, invoke blessings and peace upon
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His Messenger (peace be upon him) in a manner so sweet and pleasant that I never heard from
anyone else, and would then proceed to speak. Allah would open upon him such knowledge,
gems, hidden benefits, details, narrations, extraction of evidences from verses and
Aḥādīth/traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) statements of the scholars and comparison
between them, as well as an ability to supplement what he was saying with old Arabic poetry
(and he would sometimes even mention the name of the poem’s composer).”
Al-Bazzār says, “I saw him at such times, and he looked like one in the presence of someone
preoccupying him from anything else. When he did this, he would have such an amazing
presence that it would shake our hearts and grab our attention. And he would never mention the
Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) without invoking peace and blessings on him, and by
Allah I never saw anyone who revered the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) or was
keener in imitating him and supporting what he came with than Ibn Taymiyyah. Whenever he
came across a hadith in a particular issue and was sure that it was not abrogated by any other
text, he would act upon it and would judge and issue Fatāwā accordingly, and would not turn to
the statement of any other person, no matter who he was. Ibn Taymiyyah would say: “Every
person requires proof for his statement, and his statement is not itself a proof, except Allah and
His Messenger (peace be upon him).” Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah was unparalleled in his religiosity,
piety and scholarship.
Ibn Taymiyyah died in the year 728 A.H and his funeral is reported to have been attended by an
enormously large number of people including the political and state officials, pious and learned
men, students, businessmen and the commoners.
4.3.4 Ibn Taymiyyah on ‘Ilm al-Kalām and Philosophy
The Mu‘tazilah, who emerged in the second century Ḥijrah, stressed to make revelation
subservient to the rationality and articulated their whole philosophy around it. They were
strongly criticized by the traditional and orthodox scholars, from among some like Ash‘ariyyah
and Maturīdiyyah dealt with them in their language and used rationality to defend the belief
system of Orthodox Islam. The series of disputes and debates on various issues among such
various groups eventually led to the emergence and development of a new science called as ‘Ilm
al-Kalām or theology and those engaged with it were called as Mutakallimīn or Mutakallimūn.
Meanwhile, Muslims came under direct influence of the Greek philosophy and some Muslim
scholars/intellectuals began to propagate Greek Philosophy in the Islamic tune. Thus, a hot
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cauldron of debatable issues emerged engaging the Mutakallimūn, the literalists (those stuck to
the literal meaning of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth), the philosophers etc. Ibn Taymiyyah out rightly
rejected the Philosophers as heretics and also observed the errors of the people of Mutakallimūn
especially Ash‘ariyyah in this regard and he responded extensively on this matter and aided the
Mutakallimūn against the philosophy by correcting the errors and showing them the correct way
to counter the arguments of the philosophers and refuting their arguments and assumptions.
Ibn Taymiyyah was educated in the Ḥanbalī school of Fiqh and he soon reached beyond the
confines of this school. He was fully versed in the opinions of the four schools which led him to
the assumption that blind adherence to one school of thought will bring Muslims in conflict with
the letter and spirit of the Islamic Law based on the Qur’ān and Sunnah. Similarly, he had
acquired a deep understanding of the mystical and philosophical texts; particularly he focused his
study on the works of Ibn al-‘Arabī and Ibn Sīnā as an example of deviation from the mystical
and philosophical tradition of Islam. Both of these trends had exerted strong influence on the
Muslim scholars and the common masses alike. Ibn Taymiyyah placed revelation as the primary
source of knowledge about God and regarding the individuals religious duty aimed towards him.
The human intellect (‘Aql) and its powers must be subservient to the revelation. According to Ibn
Taymiyyah the only proper use of human intellect is to understand the religion the way it was
understood by the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his companion and then to defend it against
the fallacies of deviant sects. When discussing the nature of God, he argued, one must accept the
descriptions provided by the texts of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and then apply the orthodox
position without asking about the ‘howness’ of the particular attributes of God. This means one
should believe in all the attributes of the God as described by the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, without
investigating into the nature of these attributes because of the inability of the human
mind/intellect to comprehend God. As an example, every Muslim has to believe that God is
mounted on the throne beyond the heavens without asking how is it possible?
This same attitude is held for all of God's attributes such as his sight, his hearing or his hand.
This view is very much opposed to the philosophical view of God as First Cause and as being
devoid of attributes. Thus, the philosophical argument that the oneness of God precludes a
multiplicity of attributes was not acceptable to Ibn Taymiyyah, because God says that ‘He is one
and that He has various attributes.’ This denial of the attributes of God based on rationalism was
adopted by the Mu‘tazilah, of whom Ibn Taymiyyah was especially critical. Even, the more
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orthodox views of the Ash‘ariyyah, who accepted seven attributes basic to God, were criticized
by Ibn Taymiyyah. However, he did not go so far as to declare these two groups heretical, for
they deviated only in their interpretation of God’s nature. But, he did not spare the label of
apostate for the philosophers like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā who, in addition to the denial of God's
attributes, also denied the createdness of the world and believed in the emanation of the universe
from God. Ibn Taymiyyah attacked the idea of emanation not only in its philosophical but also in
its mystical context, as adopted by the Sufis. He felt that the beliefs and practices of the Sufis
were far more dangerous than were the ideas of the philosophers. The latter were a small elite
group that had little direct effect on the masses. The Sufis, however, were widespread and had a
large popular following. However, Ibn Taymiyyah saw a link between the ideas of the
philosophers and those of the Sufis, even though apparently they had little in common. Those
who followed the Greek Philosophers, such as Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, did not have any proof at
all that the universe is eternal. And they knew this. However, when they saw the Mutakallimūn,
like Jahmiyyah, Mu‘tazilah, Ash‘ariyyah, Karāmiyyah, Hishāmiyyah etc, adducing the proof of
Ḥudūth al-Ajsām (createdness of bodies) to prove the universe had a beginning, and saw them
being forced to hold a particular view regarding Allah's actions―[no actions can be established
with Allah's essence to avoid what they call Ḥawādith, events]―holding this in order to remain
consistent with their proof which depended upon their principle that an endless chain of events is
impossible in the past, the likes of Ibn Sīnā ridiculed them. The Mutakallimūn had two
approaches:
First: The Jahmiyyah and Mu‘tazilah held that whilst Allah existed eternally, speech and action
was impossible for Him, and then all of a sudden it became possible for Him without any reason
or explanation, and thus, was the heavens and earth created, and it was created without any
action (or speech) being established with Allah Himself. This was to avoid invalidating their
proof that the universe is originated because it possesses incidental attributes. So, if Allah
“created” the universe, as in, the attribute of creating is established with Allah's essence, as in an
attribute ascribed to Him, this means Allah too would be created since whatever is not devoid of
incidental attributes is itself originated, according to their principles. Thus, the “speech of Allah”
is only the speech Allah creates in the creation, not that He has an attribute of speech (this is
what led them to say the Qur'an is created) and likewise the attributes of Allah and actions of
Allah are merely what is manifested in the creation, not that they are established with His
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essence. This was the approach of the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah in trying to hold a consistent
position after adopting this proof which was in fact pioneered by the Hellenized Sabeans and
brought into the Ummah through Al-Ja‘d bin Dirham and Al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān.
Second: The Ash'arites, whilst they held that Allah existed eternally with His attributes (those
that they do affirm), there were no manifestation of these attributes at all until the creation of this
universe. Allah was totally devoid of action (and as for speech, they only consider it a meaning
in the self). Thus, Allah was Al-Khāliq (the creator), yet, never ever created anything for that
period in eternity before creating this universe and Allah was Al-Razzāq (the Provider) yet, never
provided every for that period in eternity, and likewise, Allah was Al-Raḥmān Al-Raḥīm (the
Benevolent, the Merciful), yet, no mercy, and He was Al-Qādir (the Powerful), yet, no power
manifested and so on for all the names and attributes. Faced with explaining how the creation
came to be whilst avoiding the ascription of actions (Af‘āl) to His essence to avoid invalidating
their intellectual proof which they took from the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah, they said that whilst
Allah wished it in eternity with His eternal Irādah (wish) and with His eternal Qudrah, the
Murād and Maqdūr (that which is wished and determined to be) was impossible to occur for a
period in eternity and then it changed from impossibility (Imtinā’) to possibility (Imkān)- without
any reason or cause to change it from impossibility to possibility (they had to maintain this in
order to avoid falsifying their proof). In other words, Allah eternally had all His attributes whose
effects never manifested, ever, prior to creating the heavens and earth, and then all of a sudden
they did (to create this universe) for no apparent reason. So, these Philosophers stood looking,
bewildered at these people, smirking, and assuming that the Mutakallimūn have given them an
opening to argue for their belief that the universe is eternal, even though they have not
demonstrated any independent proof for their claim. But, by attacking the position of
Mutakallimūn they could support and bolster their position, which is, that Allah’s existence
makes the universe’s existence absolutely necessary, and thus, Allah and the universe are like
simultaneous cause and effect. And since, the Mutakallimūn, by using their (philosophers’)
conceptual tools, had agreed with the philosophers that no actions can be established with
Allah’s essence that arise from His will and power, then the philosophers would argue that it is
more sound in reason to believe that Allah’s existence necessitates the existence of the creation,
just like an inextricably linked cause and effect than to believe that something can change from
impossibility (Imtinā’) to possibility (Imkān) [i.e. the creation coming to existence through the
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action of Allah] without any newly-arising reason or cause whatsoever to necessitate that. So, the
Philosophers now argued that since they considered it absurd that action for an agent (or the
result, product of the action) can suddenly become permissible after being impossible without
any reason or cause necessitating or explaining that, then it is sounder to affirm that the agent has
eternally been doing and acting, instead of what the Mutakallimūn were forced to hold as their
view, being forced into that by their proof of Ḥudūth al-Ajsām (origination/createdness of
bodies). Now, this view of the Philosophers is not the same view as Ahl al-Sunnah
(Orthodox/major section of the Ummah), who say that Allah has eternally been the One, Who
speaks and acts if, as and when He wills, which means when He wills, He creates and when He
wills, He speaks and when He wills, He acts, which is unlike the saying of the
Philosophers who, like the Mutakallimūn, deny that Allah speaks and acts as and when He wills.
And thus, when they say Allah has eternally been acting, they mean it upon what they are
already upon of denying Allah’s attributes and actions. Thus, action is a matter of permanence
with His essence (devoid of choice, will and the individual actions arising from them). The
consequence is that the universe, therefore, is an absolute must, and it must exist simultaneous
with the existence of Allah, without Allah preceding it in reality, and without the universe being
preceded by non-existence, because Allah and the universe are like cause and effect. If the
perfect cause is there, the effect must exist simultaneously. The thing to bear in mind all along is
that because the Mutakallimūn (Jahmiyyah, Mu‘tazilah, Karrāmiyyah, Rāfiḍī Mujassimah,
Ash‘ariyyah, Māturīdiyyah) all founded their speech about Allah upon the conceptual tools and
language of the Greek Philosophers themselves, having used it to devise their proof, they were
forced to converge (to varying degrees) with the views of the Philosophers in their version of
theism, as in how they described Allah. And thus, what they were all united upon, in opposition
to what was brought by the revealed books and sent messengers, is that Allah does not have
actions tied to His will and power, as in He does not and cannot act by His choice. As a result,
the Philosophers took to a certain explanation that ‘Allah and the universe are like cause and
effect, if the cause is present the effect must be simultaneously present, and since, Allah is
eternally acting, the universe is eternal along with Him’ and the Mutakallimūn took to a certain
explanation that ‘speech and action was impossible for Allah for a period, then it became
possible, or that Allah had attributes in eternity but, whose manifestations were impossible and
then they became possible, yet, without them being able to explain what changed the situation
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from one of impossibility to one of possibility.’ This flaw was picked upon by the Philosophers
to ridicule and to claim that their view is stronger and makes more sense. Then to support their
arguments they simply argued to Mutakallimūn that whatever explanation (Ta’wīl) they
(Mutakallimūn) were imparting to the texts of the attributes then the philosophers would do
likewise with the texts to prove the eternity of the heavens and earth by maintaining that the
heavens and the earth were made of matter that was eternal, existing along with Allah’s
existence, just like cause and effect. Ibn Taymiyyah stepped in to rescue Mutakallimūn through
his efforts against the Philosophers, and he gave them a helping hand to get them out of their
own folly and their predicament. So, Ibn Taymiyyah strongly rejected the arguments of the
Philosophers, in light of the texts of the Book and the Sunnah, and depicted that they were going
astray and their arguments more futile because, they departed from the Book and the Sunnah.
4.3.5 Let Us Sum Up
Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah, known as Ibn Taymiyyah, was a medieval Sunni Muslim
theologian, juris-consult, logician and reformer. In 1298 C.E Ibn Taymiyyah wrote an
explanation of the unclear verses of the Qur’ān (Āyāt al-Mutashabihāt), the title called as Al-
‘Aqīdah al-Ḥamawiyyah al-Kubrā, discussing the divine attributes of Allah; whereby strongly
disagreeing with the theological position of the Ash‘arites, caused considerable controversy.
In the Kalāmī/theological discourse, Ibn Taymiyyah holds a distinct position of being an original
thinker and critique of the Greek philosophy and its influences. During this course authoring
some of the most ever important titles like Dar’ al-Ta‘ārudh al-‘Aql wa al-Naql, al-Radd ‘al al-
Manṭaqiyīn and likes for making the case for the reconciliation between the revelation and
reason; at the same time denying the problems and fallacies essentially found in the Greek
philosophy.
1. Give a brief account of Ibn Taymiyyah’s life and works?
2. Discuss ibn Taymiyyah’s critique on Greek Philosophy?
3. Explain the critical analysis of Muslim philosophers by Ibn Taymiyyah?
4. Give a detailed account of Ibn Taymiyyah’s contribution towards ‘Ilm al Kalām and Muslim
Philosophy?
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2. M. SayedShaikh, Studies in Muslim Philosophy
3. Mohammad Haneef Nadwi, ‘Aqaliyat ibn Taymiyyah
4. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, ‘Ilm al Kalam and Muslim Philosophy
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Lesson 04: Contribution of Iqbal
Lesson Structure
4.4.1 Introduction
4.4.2 Objectives
4.4.3 An Overview of Muhammad Iqbal’s Life and Career
4.4.4 Iqbal’s Philosophy of Khudī
4.4.5 Let Us Sum Up
4.4.1 Introduction
Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938 C.E) widely known as Allāma Iqbal , was a poet, philosopher,
politician as well as an academician and a scholar. He is regarded as having inspired the Pakistan
Movement, hence called as the spiritual father of Pakistan. He is considered as one of the most
important figures in Urdu literature, with literary works in both the Urdu and Persian languages.
Though Iqbal is best known as an eminent poet, he is also highly acclaimed as Muslim
philosopher thinker of modern times. Along with his Urdu and Persian poetry, his Urdu and
English lectures have been very influential in shaping modern Muslim discourses in Indian sub-
continent related to cultural, social, political and religious issues.
4.4.2 Objectives
This chapter aims at understanding:
1. The life sketch of Allāma Iqbal.
2. Iqbal’s notion of Khudi.
4.4.3 Early Life and Career
Sir Muhammad Iqbal, also spelled Muhammad Iqbal (born November 9, 1877, Sialkot
Punjab, India [now in Pakistan]—died April 21, 1938, Lahore, Punjab) was a poet and
philosopher, known for his influential efforts to direct his fellow Muslims in British administered
India toward the establishment of a separate Muslim state, an aspiration that was eventually
realized in the country of Pakistan. He was knighted (given the title “sir”) in 1922. Iqbal was
born at Sialkot, India (now in Pakistan), of a pious family of small merchants and was educated
at Government College, Lahore. In Europe from 1905 to 1908, he earned his degree in
philosophy from the University of Cambridge, qualified as a barrister in London, and received a
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doctorate from the University of Munich. His thesis, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia,
revealed some aspects of Islamic mysticism formerly unknown in Europe. On his return from
Europe, he gained his livelihood by the practicing of law, but his fame came from his Persian
and Urdu poetry, which was written in the classical style for public recitation. Through poetic
symposia and in a milieu in which memorizing verse was customary, his poetry became widely
known, even among the illiterate. Almost all the cultured Indian and Pakistani Muslims of his
and later generations have had the habit of quoting Iqbal. Before he visited Europe, his poetry
affirmed Indian nationalism, as in Nayā Shawālā (The New Altar), but time away from India
caused him to shift his perspective. He came to criticize nationalism for a twofold reason: in
Europe it had led to destructive racism and imperialism, and in India it was not founded on an
adequate degree of common purpose. In a speech, he delivered at Aligarh in 1910, under the title
Islam as a Social and Political Ideal, he indicated the new Pan-Islamic direction of his hopes.
The recurrent themes of Iqbal’s poetry are a memory of the vanished glories of Islam, a
complaint about its present decadence, and a call to unity and reform. Reform can be achieved by
strengthening the individual through three successive stages: obedience to the law of Islam, self-
control, and acceptance of the idea that everyone is potentially a vicegerent of God (Nāʾib or
Muʾmin). Furthermore, the life of action is to be preferred to ascetic resignation. Three
significant poems from this period, Shikwah (The Complaint), Jawāb-i shikwah (The Answer to
the Complaint), and Khizr-i Rāh (“Khizr, the Guide”), were published later in 1924 in the Urdu
collection Bāng-i Darā (“The Call of the Bell”). In those works, Iqbal gave intense expression to
the anguish of Muslim powerlessness. Khizr, the Qur’ānic prophet who asks the most difficult
questions, is pictured bringing from God the baffling problems of the early 20th century.
What thing is the State? or why
Must labour and capital so bloodily disagree?
Asia’s time- honored cloak grows ragged and wears out…
For whom this new ordeal, or by whose hand prepared?
He rose to fame in 1915 with the publication of his long Persian poem Asrār-i Khūdī (The
Secrets of the Self). He wrote in Persian because he sought to address his appeal to the entire
Muslim world. In this work he presents a theory of the self that is a strong condemnation of the
self- negating quietism (i.e., the belief that perfection and spiritual peace are attained by passive
absorption in contemplation of God and divine things) of classical Islamic mysticism;
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his criticism shocked many and excited controversy. Iqbal and his admirers steadily maintained
that creative self-affirmation is a fundamental Muslim virtue; his critics said he imposed themes
from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche on Islam. The dialectical quality of his
thinking was expressed by the next long Persian poem, Rumūz-i Bekhūdī. Written as a
counterpoint to the individualism preached in the Asrār-i Khūdī, this poem called for self-
surrender.
Lo, like a candle wrestling with the night over my own self I pour my
flooding tears.
I spent my self, that there might be more light, More loveliness, more joy for
other men.
The Muslim community, as Iqbal conceived it, ought effectively to teach and to encourage
generous service to the ideals of brotherhood and justice. The mystery of selflessness was the
hidden strength of Islam. Ultimately, the only satisfactory mode of active self-realization was the
sacrifice of the self in the service of causes greater than the self. The paradigm was the life of the
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the devoted service of the first believers. The
second poem completes Iqbal’s conception of the final destiny of the self. Later, he published
three more Persian volumes. Payām-i Mashriq (1923; Message of the East), written in response
to Wolfgang von Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan (1819; Divan of West and East), affirmed the
universal validity of Islam. In 1927, Zabūr-iʿAjam (Persian Psalms) appeared, about which A.J.
Arberry, its translator into English, wrote that “Iqbal displayed here an altogether extraordinary
talent for the most delicate and delightful of all Persian styles, the Ghazal,” or ode. Jāvīd Nāmah
(The Song of Eternity: 1932) is considered Iqbal’s masterpiece. Its theme reminiscent of Dante’s
Divine Comedy, is the ascent of the poet, guided by the great 13th-century Persian mystic Jalāl
al-Dīn Rūmī, through all the realms of thought and experience to the final encounter. Iqbal’s
later publications of poetry in Urdu were Bāl-i Jibrīl (1935; Gabriel’s Wing), Zarb-i Kalīm
(1937; The Blow of Moses), and the posthumous Armughān-i Ḥijāz (1938; The Gift of the
Hejaz), which contained verses in both Urdu and Persian. He is considered the greatest poet in
Urdu of the 20th century. Expanse of Iqbal’s poetry combines a wide variety of thought that
serves to be the beacon of light for a diverse cross section of society. Be they believers of
Waḥdat-al-Wujūd or Waḥdat-al-Shuhūd, people of political or apolitical following, clergymen or
statesmen, priests or freedom fighters, academicians or students, or peasants or landlords, Iqbal’s
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thought gives voice to their conscience. Of all, the fine philosophical thoughts that Iqbal gave,
Khudī has come to be known as the pride of his philosophy. Khudī, to Iqbal, is the inseparable
soul and spirit of humanity. It is this very concept which when awakened in someone, not only
does it revolutionize the person but through this it provides the human society with the true
essence and meaning of existence. Iqbal comprehended well that Allah had created man and
blessed him with Khudī so that he is fit for the role of being His vicegerent. Allah created man to
be superior thus, angels were commanded to prostrate before him. This act not only honoured the
humanity but also portrayed the rank of human before Allah. Man’s dignity and honour was
eternally guarded when Allah ordered him to bow and prostrate in front of no one but Him. His
self-respect was guarded by ordering him to bow to God only so that he might not be placing his
sacred forehead on every doorstep. In this way human was equipped with the protective shield of
Khudī. It is noteworthy here that God does not declare Shirk as loathsome act because a partner
is associated with Him rather Allah deplores polytheism (Shirk) because human was made
superior creature, yet he prefers an inferior existence as being worthy of worship. And thus Iblīs
(Satan) arrogance led him astray, when he objected to the lofty status accorded to man and
disobeyed Allah, by openly declaring enmity with man. He coaxed human with deviousness and
betrayed human in such a way that man once forgot his status and claimed to be God and at the
other instance prostrated before his own fabricated idols. Allah has sent Prophets and
Messengers to guard and remind human about Khudī, his dignity, self-realization and self-
respect. The last messenger of God, Mohammad (peace be upon him), completed this periodic
and progressive taming. After clearly conveying the recognition of right and wrong, God
arranged for the protection of this divine message by appointing infallible leaders one after
another. After completion of this process in the form of Islam and departure of the last Prophet
(peace be upon him), world once again came short of recognizing the true leaders and those who
stood with the truth were hardly any. Thus, religion came in the fire line of tyrant leaders and
ignorant masses. Islam not only lost its axis but also adopted such path whose destination instead
of God was long desires and the disaster at the end. The so-called Islam, brought up in the laps of
profane governments defamed the face of humanity. History for foremost time witnessed the
oppression and barbarism in the name of Islam. Holy fire that got put off with the birth of
Prophet(s) got itself ignited in the houses of Muslims, courtesy of incapable leaders. Thus, only
the taste of Islam left which was just a bunch of rituals where Pilgrimage, Prayer, Fasting and
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Eid were nothing more than a few habits. There was a famine of enjoining the good and
forbidding the evil in the society. Islam had been transformed into a dress which could be
changed according to mood. The dodgy scholars further aggravated the situation by doing
conjecture in the name of Ijtihād and modification in the name of interpretation. This is how
Islam kept on selling like a priceless commodity and a slave in the houses of own and others.
Glorious honour and dignity of Islam and Muslims was, thus, lost. In spite of all this, the
Ultimate Truth provided with the abundant resources of righteousness through His just and
genuine representatives who satiated the insatiable thirst for the knowledge, of all the people as
per their capacities. Iqbal was successful enough to identify and reach to these divinely guided
sources of light and direction. Universality of Iqbal’s philosophy guides those in need of
awakening. His beliefs and his poetry is the center of global approbation and thus, scholars
decided to dig deep into his works and extract the vital idea of his writings; the theme of his
deliberation and the reasons behind his revolutionary philosophy of Khudī and of Iqbal’s
philosophy of revolution has emerged from his dynamic concepts of God, universe, history,
individual and society. Rejecting the metaphysics based on the static concepts of God, universe,
history, individual and society, he made a re-statement of metaphysics which emphasized
dynamism and activism. He negated Greek philosophies and contradicted them with arguments
from the Qurā’n. He emphasized that Muslim philosophy focused on action rather than ideas. By
creating an organic relationship between religion and knowledge and between thought and
intuition and the latter’s highest stage of Waḥy, he leads on to accept the religious experience as
a scientific way of acquiring knowledge, like other social sciences. It was the graft of this very
revolution in Iqbal’s thought which endowed his homeland with the concept of Pakistan and
procured the excellent leadership of Qā’id-i-A‘ẓam, M. A. Jinnah. Iqbal’s metaphysics is based
on Absolute Existence or the dynamic concept of God. Iqbal does not accept Aristotle’s concept
of God being The Unmoved Mover. Aristotle thought that God can be adjudged as the source of
all movement only by being considered the unmoved Mover. According to him if God be
considered as dynamic some other center for movement will have to be formulated. Hence, he
hypothesized that God is the first cause of the long series of movements and changes, but is
stationary Himself. Iqbal’s greatest work of all times was Asrār-i Khudī translated by professor
R.A. Nicholson as the Secrets of Self. The book reflected an attempt to understand the “self.”
According to Iqbal, man is the caretaker of all possibilities of life; the self in an individual is
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speculative and also possesses a sharp insight that sees the whole. It sees not merely the
observable part of an object but the whole of it are of God’s existence everywhere in the universe
even in man himself. God says to us: On earth and in you, there are signs for firm believers. Can
you not see? Your real existence is your own self. If you want to understand God you have to
understand yourself first. To understand and then awaken yourself, you have to pass through
strenuous stages; and the most difficult task for you is to fight against yourself. Although, it
looks odd to fight against one’s own self, this fight is actually self-control, for which Iqbal says:
Self-control in individuals builds families; in countries, it builds empires. Iqbal first presented
the concept of individuality in his Persian Mathnawī “Asrār-i-Khudī”. His concept of Ego was
different from many other philosophers. Hegel and other people who believed in Pantheism were
of the opinion that the highest aim of man is to lose his individual identity and merge himself in
the Absolute, like the drop which slips into the ocean and ceases to exist as an individual
identity. This view was strongly rejected by Iqbal and said, “The end of Ego’s quest is not
emancipation from the limitations of individuality, and it is on the other hand a more precise
definition of it”. He was of the view that the proper orientation of human experience “is not the
drop slipping in to the sea but the realization and bold affirmation. ... Of the reality and
permanence of human ego in a profounder personality.” According to Iqbal, the struggle toward
the achievement of a profounder individuality is not limited to man alone. He is of opinion that
this struggle is present in all living organisms. Philosopher Bergson and the educationist Nunn
shared the same thought with Iqbal. They, like Iqbal, believed that all living organisms are
struggling to achieve a more complex and perfect individuality. They all believed that “Only that
truly exists which can say “I am”. Iqbal presented the following idea in Asrār-i-Khudī in these
verses:
Since, the life of the universe comes from the strength of self-life is proportional
to this strength, When a drop of water gets the self’s lesson by heart It makes its
worthless existence a pearl. As the grass discovered the power of growth in its
self-aspiration clove the breast of the garden. Because the earth has a being that
is firm, the captive moon goes round it perpetually. The being of the sun is
stronger than that of earth. Therefore, is the earth bewitched by the sun’s eye
when life gathers strength from the self, The river of life expands into an ocean
but among all creatures, man is the most conscious of his own reality.
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Iqbal strongly rejected the ideas of Plato and Socrates because they rejected sense perception,
which according to them gives mere opinion and no real knowledge. Iqbal holds that the
development of an active individuality is impossible except in contact with a dynamic and
concrete environment. In the words of Qur’ān, man is the “trustee of a free personality which he
accepted at his peril” and his unceasing reward consists in his “gradual growth in self-
possession”. The development of Ego requires that a person should throw himself open to all
kinds of challenging experiences. If he tries to with draw from the world of strife, his
individuality will shrink and wither and his talents will remain unrealized. Thus, according to
this view, the highest aim of education should be to strengthen the individuality of all persons
so that they may realize their full possibilities/potentialities. The self is not a ghost in you but it
is you in real, it is your very existence, of which you are unaware. Your awareness about your
‘self’ is the discovery of self in you, and for that purpose you have to undergo a long fight
against external forces. These external forces determine your actions along as you are unaware
of the power of your “self.” Once you are free of the grip of external forces you are the master
of your destiny. There are different methods of achieving this, including meditation and
prayers. The two philosophies of revolution and the secret of self, as given by Iqbal, paved way
for a new school of thought. Iqbal was a philosopher and a reformer. He provided a new school
of thought to the misguided and dejected Muslims of the subcontinent seeking independence.
He managed to provoke thinking in a new dimension. He incited ego, inflated the value of self
and enhanced the personal respect of individuals. He was Iqbal, the poet of the east.
4.4.4 Iqbal’s Philosophy of Khudi
Throughout history, prophets, sages, saints and philosophers have appeared to remind human
beings of their true nature -a nature that consists of a temporal as well as a heavenly element.
They have attempted to rekindle in the human beings the Divine Spark which is an integral part
of their makeup. Speaking of this Divine Spark, the Qur’an notes that when Allah created the
first human being, He breathed His own spirit into this new creation (Al-Ḥijr 15:29 and Al-
Sajdah 32:9). Consequently, human nature is not ‘‘human,’’ it is a ‘‘humanness’’ that has an
element of the Divine in it. But after having been created ‘‘in the best conformation’’ (Al-Ṭīn
95:4), the human being was reduced ‘‘to the lowest of the low’’ (Al-Ṭīn 95:5). The question now
arises as to whether the human individual can again rise to the original noble heights at which
he/she was created. In the twentieth century, no Muslim thinker has delved into the depths of this
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issue more perceptively than the great poet- philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938). Iqbal
formulated his philosophy of Khudī in order to express his ideas on this subject. The following
quatrain illustrates the motive underlying his spiritual and intellectual endeavors as well as the
essential core of his philosophy:
Why should I ask the sages about my beginning?
It is my ultimate destiny that I am really concerned about.
Elevate your Khudī to such heights that before every decree,
God Himself asks you: ‘‘Tell me, what is your wish?’’
Iqbal’s philosophy essentially revolves around the issue of the progression of human being, or
the rise of the ‘‘self’’ or ‘‘ego’’ the Iqbalian Khudī in the direction of attaining exalted heights
―the heights at which Almighty Allah (peace be upon him) Himself begins to take the wishes,
hopes, and aspirations of the human being into account before formulating His decree.
Iqbal argues that Khudī is the root of all existence, an entity which may appear to be perishable
but which can attain immortality. The human ego or ‘‘I’’ has the potential of achieving
permanence as an element in the constitution of the universe provided that it adopts a certain
mode of life. The ego can evolve, progress, and succeed as well as degenerate, atrophy, and fail.
The Qur’an puts these two possibilities as follows:
The one who causes this (self) to grow in purity has indeed attained success; and the
one who is negligent of this (self) has indeed utterly failed. (Al-Shams 91:9-10).
The human ego has the ability to grow by absorbing the elements of the universe, of which it
appears to be an insignificant part, as well as the ability to incorporate the attributes of Allah
(SWT). Muslim Sufis have advised: Imbibe in yourselves the attributes of Allah. If the human
ego is able to do this, it would become worthy of being the vicegerent of God on earth. Iqbal
argues that the human ego has a central place in the universe, while it is, at the same time,
intimately linked with the Ultimate Ego, or God Himself. Iqbal notes:
... throughout the entire gamut of being, runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood
until it reaches perfection in man. That is why, the Qur’an declares the Ultimate Ego
to be nearer to man than his own neck-vein.
In order to reach these noble heights of perfection, the ego has to pass through three stages which
Iqbal describes in Asrār-i Khudī. These three stages can be seen as the different spiritual phases
through which the ego has to pass in its journey of spiritual ascension:
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• Iṭā‘at, or obedience to the Divine Law;
• Dhabt-i Nafs, or self-control, which is the highest form of self-consciousness or ego-hood;
• Niyābat-i Ilāhī, or the vicegerency of God.
Even though these three stages in the spiritual progression of the human ego
superficially resemble Nietzsche’s three stages of the metamorphosis of the spirit, they
are not the same. In fact, Iqbal himself deemed it ‘‘necessary to warn the reader of Asrār-i
Khudīthat Nietzsche does not at all believe in the spiritual fact which I have described as
Khudī....’’. The fact that Nietzsche does not even accept the reality of the human ego is
itself the most pressing evidence that the three stages in the development of the
Iqbalian Khudī are not identical with the three stages in the development of the
Nietzschean spirit. Nietzsche argues that the human ‘‘I’’ is a fiction and Iqbal accepts the
argument that this is indeed the case if the issue is viewed from a purely intellectual
standpoint. This position of Nietzsche echoes the Kantian argument in The Critique of Pure
Reason that the notions of God, immortality, and freedom cannot be proven on intellectual
grounds, however useful such notions may be for practical purposes. But, Iqbal goes on to
note that the existence of the ‘‘I’’ cannot be rejected just because it cannot be proven on
intellectual grounds because the human ego is not a purely intellectual entity―its existence is
also rooted in inner experiences. Bradley (1846-1924) has also noted that when one moves
beyond the constraints of purely intellectual thought, and views the issue from the perspective
of ‘‘inner experience,’’ the ‘‘I’’ is no longer a fiction but an indubitable fact. Iqbal notes that
Leibnitz, in asserting that the ‘‘I’’ is an ultimate fact, was closer to the truth than either Kant or
Nietzsche. But, Leibnitz regarded the human ego as something closed or windowless. Iqbal,
however, notes that this assertion is contradicted by our experience in which the ‘‘I’’ can grow
and evolve through the process of education. In light of this, the most pressing question for Iqbal
is not whether the human ego is a reality or not - it most certainly is a reality- but whether this
weak, created, and dependent ego or ‘‘I’’ can survive the shock of death and thus become a
permanent element in the constitution of universe. As Iqbal argues in Asrār-i Khudī, the human
ego can attain immortality if it adopts a certain way of life through which it can come into
contact with the Ultimate Source of existence, the Ultimate Ego.
Since, attaining permanence depends upon perfecting the self and bringing it in accord with
the Divine Will, Iqbal appropriately exhorts that one should ‘‘know’’ his or her inner self.
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‘‘Know thyself’’ is an exhortation that has been made numerous times before by many others;
the problem is not in the exhortation itself but in its approach. According to Iqbal, all
distinctly philosophical problems have ultimate solution in the self, but, unfortunately, it is this
very self which is still ignored. The reason underlying the ignorance of the self is the fact that the
self is thought of as being a material entity. But, the human being is not only a material being,
he/she also possesses a non-material component. Iqbal says that:
The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we
call the external world; it is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to
the ultimate aim and ideal to such setting.
In other words, there is an element in the composition of the human being that manifests itself
and experiences reality quite differently from the bodily element of the human composition–his
non-corporeal element is the human soul. Together, the body and soul exist as a unit. Thus, the
Iqbalian ‘‘self’’ is an entity in which the body and the soul have to work together. Both have to
grow together and have to work harmoniously, if the personality of an individual is to be
strengthened. The body and the soul are indispensable for the needs of each other, as Iqbal notes:
The body is not a thing situated in an absolute void; it is a system of events or acts.
The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts. This does not
obliterate the distinction of soul and body; it only brings them closer to each other.
The characteristic of the ego is spontaneity; the acts composing the body repeat
themselves. The body is accumulated action or habit of the soul; and as such
undetachable from it.
Iqbal expresses the same point in a couplet
To name body and soul separately is the requirement of speech.
But to see (or know) body and soul as separate entities is heresy.
According to Iqbal, the soul is that element in the constitution of the human being that can be
explained only in the sense that it is a Divine Spark in the human being:
The ambiance of the Divine Light is shrouded within this very (body of) clay,
O you heedless person! You are much more than a sentient being!
Modern secular thought has lost all cognizance of this Divine Spark. The ignorance of this
spiritual reality has led to the degeneration of the human being to sub-human levels of existence,
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notwithstanding the many scientific, technological, and economic accomplishments. Le Compte
Du Noüy ends his book Human Destiny with these words:
And let him [man] above all never forget that the divine spark is in him, and in him
alone, and that he is free to disregard it, or to come closer to God by showing
eagerness to work with Him and for Him.
When the human being forgets this Spark of Divinity within, he/she falls prey to the false sense
of personal liberty―a liberty which, in reality, is the worst form of slavery. Having lost sight of
the Divine Spark within, the human being inevitably loses sight of all higher moral and ethical
principles and, as a consequence, his/her life becomes totally subservient to the animal or
baser/carnal desires. As a result, of neglecting the awareness and realization of the Divinity
within, the Divine Spark fades away and eventually it is extinguished altogether. This leads to an
unbalanced life in which the individual exists only as an animal, a Homo sapiens, and loses all
sense of his/her humanity. The following observation by Le Compte Du Noüy takes on added
significance in light of these facts:
Man must liberate himself from a bondage which is normal for animals and therefore
evil for him. The soul of man demands a complete mastery over the flesh. The Age
of Enlightenment, the subsequent Industrial Revolution, and the succeeding era of
Marx, Darwin, and Freud, as well as of others like them, appear to be milestones in
the evolution of human thought. But, these and other such milestones signify
progress and development in only a limited sense-the progress and development of
technological and mechanical culture. In spite of the claims that humanity has
‘‘progressed’’ immensely during the modern age, the reality is that moral and
spiritual development have been virtually static while technological and mechanical
development has been proceeding vigorously. As a matter of fact, much of the
technological and material advancement has taken place at the expense of moral and
spiritual values. The modern secular society has become spellbound by all this
material development, without recognizing the inherent destructive tendency vis-a-
vis moral and spiritual values that this development entails. All ‘‘progress’’ has
come to be measured in purely materialist and Darwinian terms but, this definition of
‘‘progress’’ has nothing to do with ethics and spirituality.
Professor R.M. MecIver notes in his book Society:
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We should not define social evolution as though it meant or implied progress. How
far we find a correspondence between the direction of social evolution and the
direction prescribed by our particular concept of social progress is another matter.
We may properly enquire into the relationship between the two. But, it is possible to
do so only if we define social evolution in ethically neutral terms.
Having rendered the human being incapable of moral self-assessment, modern secular thought
has become the greatest hurdle to human spiritual progress, because it makes the human being
unconscious of the true nature of human reality as well as the true nature of the reality of the
universe. The fatal flaw, the greatest misfortune of modern secular science, philosophy, and art is
that they have become totally lopsided -totally focused on the material dimension of reality and
oblivious to its spiritual dimension. Consequently, it is no surprise that not only has the human
being not progressed spiritually during the modern period, but more tragically the human being’s
moral and spiritual faculties have become numb and practically dysfunctional. However, even
though the spiritual faculties have become dormant, they are not dead altogether. These faculties
are waiting for the time when human beings would recognize the importance of these inner
capacities and decide to re-appropriate them so that they can play their rightful role in the
reconstruction of humanity. For the time being though, modern thought has come to rely
exclusively on science (or a philosophy that is the handmaiden of science) in its search for
‘‘objective’’ knowledge. But, as a matter of fact, neither science nor philosophy is by itself
capable of reaching the truly ‘‘objective’’ knowledge regarding the actual nature of reality and
the actual reality of the human being. Speaking about the limitations of science in the human
quest for knowledge, Iqbal notes:
Natural Science deals with matter, with life, and with mind; but the moment you ask
the question how matter, life, and mind are mutually related, you begin to see the
sectional character of the various sciences that deal with them and the inability of
these sciences, taken singly, to furnish a complete answer to your question. In fact,
the various natural sciences are like so many vultures falling on the dead body of
Nature, and each running away with a piece of its flesh.... Natural Science is by
nature sectional; it cannot, if it is true to its own nature and function, set up its theory
as a complete view of Reality.
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Whereas the limitation of science is that, it is by nature ‘‘sectional,’’ the limitation of philosophy
is of a similar nature:
Philosophy is an intellectual view of things; and, as such, does not care to go beyond
a concept which can reduce all the rich variety of experience to a system. It sees
Reality from a distance as it were.
Because of the obvious limitations of science and philosophy, it is equally obvious that the
human being cannot truly realize his/her humanity if the individual is left to depend upon his/her
physical and mental capabilities alone. In other words, the human ago, the Iqbalian Khudī,
cannot fulfill its true potential if the individual avails him/herself only of the resources of science
and philosophy. For Iqbal, it is only religion that can provide us with the intimate and holistic
knowledge of Reality―the type of knowledge that is an essential prerequisite for the realization
of our humanity. Iqbal argues:
[Philosophy] is theory... [Religion] is living experience, association, intimacy. In
order to achieve this intimacy thought must rise higher than itself, and find its
fulfillment in an attitude of mind which religion describes as prayer―one of the last
words on the lips of the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him).
This attitude of mind, though only in its most developed and highest form, is the theistic
counterpart of Nietzsche’s atheistic will to power. Of course, the will is essential if one is to
overcome the temptations of an immoral life, as demanded by religion. However, the will
without the support of belief in something higher and more sublime cannot withstand the pull
towards carnality and corruption.
Khudī requires the coupling of will to power and belief, eventually realizing itself in the form of
Yāqīn or a deep inner conviction. In fact, it is undaunted conviction that serves as the pivotal
point for the ‘‘self’’ to act and react to the sensual temptations of life. However, this conviction
will not actualize itself unless the individual understands that his/her life has a purpose, and that
this purpose has an individual as well as a collective dimension. The evolution and ascension of
the ego is not merely a detached, personal, and individual event -this spiritual development has a
collective dimension too that cannot be ignored. Iqbal notes that a great deal of sacrifice and
benevolence is required on the part of a person in order to bring the individual, self-preserving
ego in harmony with the collective ego. Consequently, the guiding principle in life cannot be one
of conflict between the ‘‘self’’ and other ‘‘selves’’ if the dynamic process of the development of
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Khudī is to take place. This process can only unfold if there is conscious realization of the
tension between the individual and collective dimensions, a consciousness which in turn enables
the individual personality to balance this tension. Iqbal defines ‘‘personality’’ as being this
very state of tension, which, if not maintained, will cause indolence to set in, short-circuiting
Khudī’s process of development. The process of self-realization requires tension to be present, as
tension is the well-spring of dynamism. The human being’s complete freedom from the
limitations of the material world―and from materialism itself―is contingent upon the
maintenance of this tension. In essence, the human being’s aspiration to achieve perfection
necessarily requires the achievement of a balance between the individual ego and the collective
ego. In Iqbal’s words:
The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment
and the environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of
mutual invasion. It is present in it as directive energy and is formed and disciplined
by its own experiences.
This constant interaction between the individual ego and the environment provides the ideal
opportunity for self-evaluation. As the individual interacts with her/his environment, he/she must
be constantly assessing his/her own ‘‘self’’ not only on an individual basis but also in relation to
other ‘‘selves’’ in the environment. But one should not lose sight of the fact that the initial
emphasis is on the individual ego. Only that individual ego which has attained a degree of self-
realization and self-understanding will be able to genuinely understand and constructively
engage with other individual egos. This is another way of saying that only that ego which has
learned self-respect, self- love, and self-affirmation will be able to extend respect and love to
other selves, and also affirm their dignity and autonomy. Iqbal’s philosophy of Khudī posits that
a mature and developed understanding of respect, love, and affirmation on the part of individual
ego requires respect, love, and affirmation for every other ‘‘self’’ because only that individual
ego which is genuinely integrated with its environment and constructively engaged with other
egos is really a conscious self.
In the context of Iqbal’s philosophy, then, the progress of the individual human being depends on
his/her relationship to the self, to the family, to the society, and ultimately to God. The gradual
realization of this intricate and delicate web of relations will lead the individual to realize his/her
fullest potential and significance. Ultimately, with the rise of ego-hood on Iqbalian terms, the
260
individual can become the architect of human destiny. It is worth repeating the quatrain that was
cited in the beginning regarding the motivation and essence of Iqbal’s intellectual and spiritual
quest:
Why should I ask the sages regarding my origin?
It is my ultimate destiny that I am really concerned about.
Elevate your Khudī to such heights that before every decree
God Himself asks you: Tell me, what is your wish?
4.4.5 Let Us Sum Up
Allāma Iqbal, the poet-philosopher of the East, has written primarily in Urdu and Persian; out of
his twelve thousand verses of poetry, about seven thousand are in Persian. In 1915, he published
his first collection of poetry Asrār-i-Khudī (the secrets of the self) in Persian. The poems
emphasis the spirit and self from a religious and spiritual perspective. In this work, Iqbal
expounds on his philosophy of Khudī or Self. Iqbal argues that Khudī is the root of all existence,
an entity which may appear to be perishable but which can attain immortality. The human ego or
‘‘I’’ has the potential of achieving permanence as an element in the constitution of the universe
provided that it adopts a certain mode of life. The ego can evolve, progress, and succeed as well
as degenerate, atrophy, and fail.
1. Give a brief account of the life sketch of Sir Muhammad Iqbal.
2. Explain the contribution of Iqbal towards the Urdu and Persian poetry.
3. Describe the concept of Khudī in Iqbal’s poetry.
4. Comment on the influences of Nietzsche and Rumi on Iqbal.
1. M. Munawwar, Dimensions of Iqbal
2. Abdul Rashid Bhat, Iqbal’s Approach to Islam: A Study
3. M. Munawwar, Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Islam
4. Nazir Qaiser, Iqbal and the Western Philosophers
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PG PROGRAMME

('ILM AL-KALAM AND MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY)

DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

Unit I Muslim Philosophy: An Introduction

i) Beginning of Intellectual Discussions among Early Muslims 8-21

ii) The Quranic Account of ‘Aql, Ḥikmah, Tadabbur, Tafakkur, 22-37

iii) Interaction with Greek Philosophy during the early Abbasid

iv) Institution of Bait al-Hikmah 51-61

Unit II ‘Ilm al-Kalam

i) Meaning and Origin 64-73

ii) Development and Significance 74-87

iii) Main Doctrines of Jabariyah and Qadariyah 88-98

iv) Main Doctrines of Mu'tazilah and Ashariah 99-111

Unit III Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers

ii) Al-Farabi 130-149

iii) Ibn Sina 150-164

iv) Ibn Miskaweh and Ibn Tufayl 165-193

Unit IV Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers

i) Imam Ghazzali 196-213

ii) Ibn Rushd 214-235

iii) Ibn Taimiyya 236-246

iv) Iqbal 247-261

Muslim Philosophy: An Introduction

i) Beginning of Intellectual Discussions among Early Muslims

ii)The Quranic Account of ‘Aql, Ḥikmah, Tadabbur, Tafakkur, and ‘Ilm

iv) Institution of Bait al-Hikmah

i) Meaning and Origin

ii) Development and Significance

iii) Main Doctrines of Jabariyah and Qadariyah

iv) Main Doctrines of Mu'tazilah and Ashariah

Contribution of Following Muslim Philosophers

iii) Ibn Sina

iv) Ibn Miskaweh and Ibn Tufayl

ii) Ibn Rushd

iii) Ibn Taimiyyah

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