Fudai Daimyo and the Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu

Author(s): Conrad Totman

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (May, 1975), pp. 581-591
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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VOL. XXXIV, No. 3 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES MAY 1975

Fudai Daimyoand the Collapse

of the TokugawaBakufu
CONRAD TOTMAN

TN Treasures among Men; the Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawalapan (Yale, 1974),

1 Harold Bolithohas discussedtheroleof thefu-daidaimyoin thefunctioning and
collapseof theTokugawa polity,arguingin finethattheirconductduringthe i86o's
was dictatedby theirconcernforthe securityof theirhan. This concern,he argues,
led themto refuseto assistthebakufuevenin itsmomentof supremecrisis.He sees
thisoutcomeas the finalexpressionof an enduringsituationin whichthe interests
of fudaidaimyowerein permanentconflict withthe interests of thebakufu.
It can be readilyacknowledgedat the outset that structuraltensionbetween
bakufuand fudaidomanialinterests was a visibleand significantfactorin theToku-
gawa politicalprocess,butin the i86o's thefudaipositioninvolvedconsiderably more
than a simpleconcernforfeudaldomanialinterests Most obviously
thus identified.
fudai daimyohad much good reasonto concludethattheirown han interests were
inextricably tied to the continuedwell-beingof the Tokugawa bakufu,and accord-
inglya partof theirpositionsprangfromconcernwithTokugawa survival.It was
a concernbased noton someinnocentsenseof loyaltybuton complexconsiderations
of principleand interest.In his preface(xiii) Bolithoobservesthatthe positionof
the fudai daimyo"was ambivalent-ofthe Bakufu,but not of it; of the powerful
barons,but also not of them."Unfortunately his book is devotednot to theelucida-
tion of this propositionbut to its repudiation.His real thesisis the much simpler
one thatthefudai wereof the baronsand not of the bakufu.The positiontakenin
the preface,however,servesbetterto illuminatefudaibehaviorin the i86o's.
The fudaidaimyopositionin thei86o'swas also shapedsignificantly bytheradical
new problemsthattheirsocietywas facingbecause of the Westernimperialiston-
slaughtand the domesticturmoilprecipitatedthereby.As Bolithosays (223), the
Japanese"were consciousof theirweaknessand disunityand verysharplyaware of
the opportunities such disarraypresentedto enemies."He then argues,however
(224), that this awarenessgenerateddebate which,"althoughdissembledbehind
a varietyof moralisticslogans,"was reallydebatebetweenthosewho proposedto
centralizepower under the bakufu and those who proposedto have the bakufu
"renounceitsprerogatives and sharethemwithall thedaimyo."By moralistic slogans
Bolithohas in mind,I suppose,suchphrasesas Kobu gattai,sonnojio, fukokuky5hei,
and the rhetoricof Tokugawa loyalism.Certainlythesephrases,whichwere central
to the vocabularyof politicaldebate,were moralistic, and certainlytheywere used
oftenenoughforpurposesof privateadvantage,but theyalso servedas genuineex-
pressionsof genuineconcernsin the searchfora solutionto the problemsof weak-
ness and disunity.The conflicts of the i86o's do not reduceto a simplecontestbe-
tween centralizersand decentralizers because decentralization was not seen as a
of Historyat Northwestern
ConradTotmanis Professor University.
581

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582 CONRAD TOTMAN
solutionto the problem.The conflicts aroseoverthe issueof how bestto unify,and
of course all participantsin the debate had to keep one eye on how this or that
strategy of unificationwould affecttheirown interests as theyperceivedthose.
In attempting to analyzefudaidaimyobehaviorduringthe i86o's it is helpfulto
keep in mind both theirambivalentattitudetowardthe bakufuand the influence
of the contemporary nationalcrisis.Doing so enablesus, first, to perceivemoresuc-
cessfullyhow in both theiractionsand theirrhetorictheysoughtto reconciletheir
obligationsas both responsibledomanial lords and responsiblemembersof the
bakufuand thelargerJapanesepolity. Secondit helpsus to proposea solutionto the
centralpuzzle of I867: how it was thatduring67/II theselordscould inundatetheir
lordYoshinobuwithstatements of loyaltyand a monthlaterrefuseto hurryoffto do
battleon his behalfwhen summoned.
The information on fudai daimyo politicalbehaviorduring the i86o's can be
brokendown into two generalcategories:the wordsand deeds of thosefudai who
were bakufuofficials and the wordsand deeds of thosewho were not.1The words
and deedsof officials weremostcommonlycontributions to particularpoliticalissues,
and theirevaluationrequiresconsiderableawarenessof the immediatecontext.I
expectto commentat greaterlengthon thesemattersin a monographcurrently in
preparation;suffice now to say thatthoseofficials who were fudai daimyoshowed
about as high a degreeof concernfor Tokugawa well-beingduringthe i86o's as
did officialsof lowerrank.They bothresistedas besttheycould the I862 assaulton
bakufuhegemony;bothwere involvedin the attemptat conservative reconstruction
that was pursuedduringthe threefollowingyears; and both participatedactively
in the bakufu'sradicalreformeffort of I866-67. That thiswas the case is not really
surprising.It is commonenough for people who are managingan institution to
acquire a senseof personalcommitment to thatinstitution,the quid pro quo being
too obviousto belabor.
It is true,as Bolithosays (240), thatin its last yearsthe bakufuhad difficulty
recruiting regularfudaidaimyoforoffice. That, however,also appearsto have been
trueat loweroffice levels,and thereasonsseemeasyenoughto identify. The benefits
of officewere droppingsharply;the hazards risingequally fast.The combination
of bakufuimpoverishment and reformspasmswiped out many of the perquisites
of officethat had once made it attractiveto Tokugawa vassals of all levels.The
necessityof accommodatingforeigndemandsmade it difficult for bakufuofficials
to retainthe goodwillof theirvassals,amongwhomsonno joi sentiments oftenwere
strong.Then therepeatedpoliticalimbrogliosof the i86o's increaseddramatically the
likelihoodthatanyonewho agreed to ho,ldresponsibleofficewould sooneror later
have cause to regretit. If he werelucky,he would merelybe denounced,dismissed,
detained,and deprivedof income.If he wereunlucky,he could expectto be menaced,
maimed,or even murdered.In an effective regimeloyaltyand self-interest are sym-
bioticphenomenafor office-holders, but afterI858 theyrapidlybecame conflictive
phenomenaforbakufuofficials at all levelsfromgate guard to greatc-ouncillor. In

1 In this paper I footnote statementsbased upon k5hon (DNISK) (unpublishedmanuscriptcollec-

specific single references but not generalizations tion,Shiry6hensanjo,Tokyo University)and are
based upon assemblages of discrete data. The latter most of the
noted in the largerstudyunderlying
derive mostly from entries in Ishin shiry5 koyo argumentsadvancedhere.
(ISK) (Tokyo, I967) and Dai Nihon ishinshiryo

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FUDAI DAIMYO 583
consequenceduringthe i86o's the bakufuhad difficulty findingmen to staffits cen-
tral administration.
The role of fudai as daimyois more surelyfoundin an examinationof those
whose personalpositiondid not fostera senseof day to day identification withthe
regime.How did non-office holdingfudai behave duringthe i86o's? The informa-
tion I have foundon thistopicis farfromexhaustive,and its meaningis farfrom
crystalclear.But it does seemto revealtheambivalenceone would expect,giventhe
fudailord'sdual characterand also theseveredifficulties of choicetheyfacedbecause
of the contemporary politicalcrisis.And, more interestingly,it also permitsus to
postulatethatout of crisisin I866-67 thefudai lordsbegan to discovera new vision
of theirown place in theirsociety'sfuture,and thispostulatein turnenablesus to
view theirconductat year'send in a way thatmakes it appearbothconsistentand
credible.
The principalmattersin whichfudai attitudesmanifestedthemselvesare these:
theproblemof sankinkatairevision;theproblemof theKanto insurrection of i864;
the problemof the second Choshu expeditionin I865-66; the problemof the Keio
reform, and theproblemof the I867 Restoration crisis.

Sankinkktai reform
The firstmajor issue on whichfudailordsseem to have expresseda groupposi-
tion duringthe i86o's was the bakufu'sbasic reformof the sankink5tai systemin
I862. In thatreformthe alternateyearattendanceschedulewas changedto one in
whichdaimyowereto visitEdo fora scheduled3-monthperiodonce in threeyears.
Shortlyafterthe reformwas announced,thefudai preparedgroupstatements, prob-
ably at the behestof seniorbakufu officials,indicatingthat althoughthe revised
sankink5tairegulations permitted theywishedto remain
themto returnto theirfiefs,
in Edo duringthe shogun'scomingvisitto Kyoto in orderto avoid an excessive
reductionin the armed forcesthereand so assurethe city'stranquillitydespitethe
presenceof foreigners Then matchingdeedsto words,theydid just that,by
nearby.2
and largestayingin Edo or going to Kyotoor elsewhereas per bakufuinstructions.
Consequentlythe daimyoexodusfromEdo in I862 was primarilya tozama exodus,
althougha good manyfudailordssenttheirfamilymembersback to theirfiefs.3
Bakufuofficialsalmostto a man had opposedthisreform, and in followingyears
to
theyclung thedreamof reestablishing theold schedule.After theshogunreturned
to Edo in I863, the bakufuorderedthe daimyoof the northeast, mostlytozama,to
come to Edo "to discussmatters."The greaterlordsbegged off,but a numberof
lesserlords,includingthe two fudai who had been summoned,did come by sum-
mer'send. A contemporary orderto daimyostillin Edo, predominantly fudai,in-

2 DNISK I520 n.p. [ISK IV:I78:2:a]. DNISK
I54I n.p. [ISK IV:202:2:a] Hayakawa Junzaburv,
ed., Kanbu tsuki I, 282 (Tokyo, I9I3). The
DNISK citations require explanation.In I969
when I was at Tokyo University readingin the
volumes(kan) of DNISK coveringthe period to
I865, the volumeswere unpaginated.To facilitate
the location of entries,the footnotesused here
include a correlationwith the relevantentryin
ISK, which is in effecta publishedten-volume
summaryof contentsof DNISK. Thus the corre-
lationISK IV:I78:2:a means,in reverseorder,the
first source listed (Goseijimuki gokaikaku no
todome) underthe secondfull topicentry("gan-
noma etc. etc.") on page I78 of volumefour.Lo-
catingthe sametopicentryin the indicatedDNISK
kan, one can thenusuallylocatethe selectionfrom
the sourcecitedwithoutdifficulty.
3DNISK 1524 n.p. [ISK IV: i82:2:a,b,l].

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584 CONRAD TOTMAN
structedthemto staytheredespitepriorrequestsand arrangements to depart,and
thatorder seems to have been effective.4
During the followingtwo yearsthe fudai attitudetowardsankin k5tai became
somewhatmoreambiguous.On 64/5/26,just aftertheshogunreturnedto Edo from
his second tripto Kyoto,daimyoin the hall of geese (gannoma), almostall fudai
lords,petitionedthebakufuto revisethesankinkataisystemso as to have threeyear
cyclesthat included a full year at Edo ratherthan the 3-monthvisitof the I862
It is not clear who promotedthispetitionor why,althoughseveralex-
regulations.5
officialswere on the hall of geese roster.The petitionmay, of course,have been
simplyan attemptby thesedaimyoto avoid a morecompleterestoration of the old
system,but if theyweresimplyopposedto the reestablishment of sankinkotai,why
did theynot take theirstand with the greatdaimyoin resoluteoppositionto any
revivalof thesystem?It seemsmorereasonableto see it as an attemptto modifythe
contemporary bakufupreparationforfullrevisionof the systemwhilestillcooperat-
ing with the bakufuin an attemptto reimposea valued constrainton the great
lords.It was a compromisebetweentheirinterests in han solvencyon the one hand
and bakufustrength and nationalcohesionon theother.
Whateverthe intentof that petition,the bakufuwent ahead later in the year
anywayand orderedthe restoration of the fullsankin kt&aisystem.The firstorder
boreno fruit,and a laterappeal to thegreatfudailordsof theantechamber(tamari-
noma) also producedno immediateresults.During i865, however,daimyodid begin
to respond,and the limiteddata availableindicatesthatsmall han were more obe-
dientthangreatonesand fudaihan moreobedientthantozama.
A year later the patternstill held. During I865 the bakufuhad triedto spare
the greatwesterntozama daimyothe necessityof overtlydefyingEdo by granting
thema year'sdelayin attendanceat Edo. During i866 thatdelayexpired,but those
lords stayedaway anyway,with only Okayama and Hiroshima apparentlyeven
botheringto notifyEdo of theirintentto do so. Also between66/3 and 6 three
other tozama and two shimpan lords unilaterally"delayed" their sankin katai
duty,and five othertozama han tried to withdrawimportantpeople fromEdo.
On 5/19 in a move to offsettheselosses,the bakufugave specialordersto nineteen
daimyo,mostlyminorfudai lords,to remainin Edo duringthe shogun'sabsence,
eventhoughtheywerescheduledto returnto theirfiefsfortheyear.As faras I know
theseorderswere obeyed,but shortlyafterwardthe war with Chdshuierupted,and
afterthat no seriousefforts to enforceany sankink&taischedulesappear to have
been made.
In sum, the sankin k5taireformwas exploitedmostfullyby greattozama lords
and leastfullyby minorfudailords,suggestinga differential readinessto tryto func-
tionas independentdomanialbarons.Consideringthatovera thirdof thefudailords
did not even have castlesin the littleheadquarterstown of theirlittlefiefs,this
is notverysurprising. Whereasmanyminortozama han could relyupon thesupport
of powerfulrelatives, few minorfudaihan had reallypowerfulrelatives.Their situa-
tion was moreakin to,thatof landed hatamoto,and not surprisingly theirbehavior
was too.
4 DNISK I765 n.p. [ISK IV:467:2:b,c,d,e,h]. 5 DNISK 2005 n.p. [ISK V:28o:4:b]. Leadersof
DNISK I770 n.p. [ISK IV:477:4:c]. Kanbu tsuki Utsunomiyaand Tsuchiuraappear to have been
I, 494-495, 575-579. activein thispetition.

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FUDAI DAIMYO 585
The Kanto insurrection
and the secondChoshuiexpedition
The difficulty of the fudai positionwas demonstrated by theirresponseto the
eruptionof agitation,insurgency, and civil strifein and around Mito duringI864.
During the firsthalfof I864 organizedgroupsof people,mostlyfromMito but in-
cludingmen fromelsewhere, rovedabouttheKanta tryingto expandtheirband and
mobilize forcesto drive the foreigners out of Yokohama as per officialCourt and
bakufu policy of the moment.In theireffortsthese groups attemptedto extract
contributions and cooperationfromsome fudai han headquarters,coercinga few
of themin the process. It responseto thisgrowinginsurgency thebakufuordered
fudaito deployforcesof suppression. In generaltheydid so, but somewere hesitant
about doing it, and correspondence on these mattersindicatesthat two factors
underlaymuchof thehesitation.
In some fudai han, notablyUtsunomiyaand Tsuchiura,the level of intra-han
vassal sympathyforthe insurgents'sonno joi principleswas great,and because any
move against the insurgentsappeared to sabotage the stated nationalpurposeof
expellingthe foreigners, it threatened to tearthe han apart.Otherfudaihan such as
Takasaki were unwilling,given Mito's size, proximity, and place in nationalaffairs,
to take any actionthatcould be construedas anti-Mito,and so theyprocrastinated
untilthe bakufuhad extractedfromMito leaders,agreementto denounceand quell
the insurgents.In short,contemporary issues of national politicsand local geo-
politicalconsiderations made it difficult forsome fudai to act in concertwith Edo,
butin theend theydid so.
Because the Kant5 insurrection was a regionalaffairin an area occupiedmostly
by fudai lords,therewas no directtoizama participation and so no way to compare
fudai and tozama attitudes.It is truethatbakufuleadersfearedCh5shfu, Okayama,
and Tottoriintervention on the side of the insurgents, but thatnevermaterialized.
It is also truethatat a criticaljuncturein the insurrection desperatebakufuleaders
soughtmilitaryaid fromthe greatlordsof the northeastand the aid was not forth-
coming,butthatmayhave beenso simplybecausethecrisispassedshortly afterwards
and Edo, feelingno further need forthataid, made no further calls forit.
The followingyear,however,the bakufu attemptedto mobilize han forcesfor
the secondChasha expedition,and thateffortdid reveala substantialfudai-tozama
difference. By the end of I865 elevenfudai but only threerelativelysmall tozama
han had acceptedtheirassignments fordutyat Edo, Osaka, or elsewherein therear.
Looking at thoselordswho were instructed beforetheoutbreakof hostilities to field
forcesdirectlyagainstChoshui,of the twelvetozama so instructed, onlythe daimyo
of Kumamoto sentsignificant numbersand theircooperationwas minimal.Of the
approximately thirteenfudai initiallyorderedto the front,about nine participated
and fourdid not.
Most fudai lordshad no troopsat the frontbecause theyhad not been ordered
to put men there.One can suggestthe probablereasonsfor this situation.First,
bakufuleadersknew thatfudai han forceswere not veryeffective and preferred to
use the far largerand more modernizedforcesof greattozama han. Secondly,as
in the Kanto insurrection, theywere adheringto the customarypracticeof trying
to wage war by relyingprimarilyon the militarymightof the greaterhan in the
area of hostilities,
whichmeantthegreattozama of thesouthwest.

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586 CONRAD TOTMAN
It must also be pointedout, however,thateven if the bakufuhad called upon
fucdailordsto aid at the front,the call likelywould have receiveda verymixed re-
sponse.For one thing,thereis a greatdeal of evidenceindicatingthat by i865-66
many,manyfudaihan wereveryshortof manpowerand severely pressedforincome,
and any such bakufucall would surelyhave yieldedfarfewermen thananticipated.
And it would have been about as uselessan armyas one could devise.For another
thing,thefudaihan were stillcaughtup in the issuesof nationalpolitics.Some han
leaders,such as thoseof Shimabara,decidedin the end thatso manyhan members
saw an assaultupon Ch'ashfias an assaultupon the ethicallyunassailableprinciples
of sonndjoi thatany move againstCh6shuiwould onlytear theirhan apart.In all
likelihooda bakufuawarenessof theseproblemsalso encouragedleadersto minimize
theirdependenceon fudaiaid.
During thewar itselfas defeatfollowedupon defeat,thebakufusentout hurried
ordersto a numberof han, mostlyfudai,to despatchforcespromptlyto Osaka or
thefront.As withthenortheastern daimyoduringtheKanto insurrection, it appears
that the responsewas largelynegative.In part this too may be a reflection of the
rapidityof developmentsthat led the bakufuto lose interestin the ordersshortly
afterdespatchingthem.It seemslikely,however,thatas news of the combatsitua-
tion reachedhan leaders,theymay verywell have realized the suicidalfutility of
sendingtheirown ill-armedmen to the frayand would not have cooperated,even
if bakufuleadershad reiterated theirorders.
There is not space hereto examinethe combatexperienceof thefudai han; that
too I intendto do in futureat some length.Sufficeto say thatthoseHikone and
Takata forceswho foughtat the Hiroshima frontmet Ch6shfiforceswho out-
gunned them,outmaneuvered them,sometimesmay have outnumberedthem,and
badlymauled them.The outcomeof battletellsus verylittleabout priorhan orien-
examinedwithinthelargercontemporary
tation,but if it is carefully context, it does
help explainthepostwarbehaviorof bothbakufuand fudaihan.
The war againstChashuiofferedpainfullessonsto the fudai lordsand theirad-
visors.One lessonwas thattheymustmodernizetheirforcesor avoid war, and in
the postwarmonthsmanyfudai han orderedmodernriflesand began tryingto re-
organizetheirbands of samurai.It appears,however,thattheirefforts yieldedvery
littlefruit.The han were too poor to pay formuch modern weaponry, and probably
han vassalswere highlyresistantto the changesin militarytechniquesthatreform
involved.At any rate,despitethe flurryof efforts made in the monthsafterthe
Chashfivictory, thereis verylittleevidencethatfudaihan were,even by theend of
I867, capable of fieldingparticularly forces.Their militarysituationwas
effective
probablyreflected accuracyin repeatedbakufuadmonitionsto them
with sufficient
to get theirforcesintoshape and in the bakufu'sprimaryrelianceon its own forces
in theshowdownat year'send.
Han militarystrengthening may have been essential,but it evidentlywas beyond
mostfudai capability.Anotherequally depressinglessonof the war was thatsmall
han could not reasonablyhope to survivethe collapse of the bakufu and surely
could not surviveif they supportedit in a losing venture.In the war Choshui
had overrun Kokura, Hamada, some bakufu land in Iwami province,and a
cornerof Hiroshima han. After the war Choshuikept Kokura, Hamada, and
the bakufu land, returningonly the cornerof Hiroshima for reasons of inter-

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FUDAI DAIMYO 587
domanial diplomacy.In a postwar effortto improve the disruptedbalance of
powerin westernJapan,the bakufuturnedoverto nearbydaimyothe lands it had
formerly administered in Kyuishui.However,Ch6shui'spositionstillremainedmuch
strongerthan before,and rumorsthatreachedEdo by earlyI867 said unidentified
daimyowere sendinghostagesto Ch5shuias insuranceagainstthe appearanceof a
new hegemon.6Though the rumorsmay have been untrue,theywere a measureof
whathad come to seem credible.
In sum thewar withChoshuiprofoundly complicatedthe situationof fudaiand
otherminorhan. It demonstrated withbrutalclaritytheirvulnerability,
theirinability
to overcomethatvulnerability themselves,theirconsequentneed forthebakufuor an
equally benignhegemon,but the extremeriskinvolvedin supportingthe faltering
regimeor anyoneelse who mightlose in a fight.It was a developmentthatcould
only intensify differencesof opinionin the han, fostera searchfornew solutions,
and pendingthe discoveryof any such solutions,encouragecautionand attemptsto
avoidinvolvement. In I864 thesymbioticdimensionsof thefudaidaimyo'straditional
dual statusas domaniallordand Tokugawa vassalhad seemedsufficiently pursuasive
to justifyfightingat Edo's behest,butthei866 war changedthat.Whereaspreviously
it had appearedthebakufucould protectfudaifeudalautonomy,afterthewar there
appearedto be no way thata fudailord'sfeudalautonomycould likelybe securedin
the eventof war. Neitherneutrality nor supportforthebakufuseemedparticularly
promising.It was a situationthatbeggedfora new visionof thefuture.

Fudai lordsand the Keio reform

It was in this situation,in which the futureas traditionally
perceivedby fudai
lordsseemedso bleak,thatthe bakufulauncheda major programof reform, and it
appearsthatthisreformmay have presentedto the fudai lordsjust thatsought-for
new visionof thefuture,a visionthatseemedto hold out forthemmorehope than
anythingelse operatingon thepoliticalscene.7
During I867 thefudai-bakufu relationship distantone.
was a quiet and relatively
Shortlyafterthe war with Choshfumanyof the lordshad gone to theirhan as in-
structedby bakufuleaders,but duringI867 manyappear to have returnedto Edo.
What theywere doing or thinkingis not clear; theirsilenceis striking.It was
perhapsthebestevidencethatfundamental rethinking was in progress.
Whateverthe case, duringthesequiet monthsbakufuleaderscarriedout major
reformswhichby theirnaturewerejust as mucha threatto thefeudalautonomyof
fudaihan as was theincipientCh,oshfi expansion.From earlyin theyearkeybakufu
leaderswere discussingthe impositionof regulartaxeson at leastthe morevulner-
able and amenabledaimyo,whetheridentified as "ludai daimyo"or "daimyounder
100,000koku."8 Moreover,in the courseof the yeartheyeliminatedtheinstitutional
basis for the fudai daimyo monopolyof high bakufu officebut nonethelesskept
bakufu officesecurelyin the hands of Tokugawa vassals. In future,it appeared,
6 Katsube Masanaga, Matsumoto Sannosuke, pretationhere because it seems to fit otherdata
OguchiYu6jir6,comp.,Katsu Kaisha zensha v. I8, on daimyo behaviorin I867 and in later years
p. 393 (Tokyo, I972). betterthan other interpretations.Perhapsif some
7I have encounteredno directevidenceto sup- scholarslook forevidence,it will turnup.
port this view. My researchhas not focusedon 8Katsu Kaisha zenshfiv. i8, p. 39I. Hayakawa
non-officeholdingludai motivation,and so I have Junzabur6, publ., Yodo Inaba ke monjo,pp. 489-
had no cause to look forany. I presentthisinter- 490 (Tokyo, I1926).

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588 CONRAD TOTMAN
one would not have to be a daimyoto riseto thehighestlevelsof bakufuoffice, but
one would have to be a Tokugawa vassal.They also formedan armythatpromised
to free the b-akufuof any dependenceon fudai han manpowerand so end the
daimyo obligationto maintain those expensive,obsolete,and inefficient forces.
And finallytheyset up in the Kant5 area,and began to place in the Kinai, admin-
istrativeofficesthatcould serveeventuallyto take over the fiefadministrative bur-
densof daimyoin thoseareas.
The reformin its totalitysuggestedveryclearlythatthe bakufuwas thinkingof
attackingtheheartof fudaifeudalautonomyeven as it was engagedin makingitself
independentof them.Key leadersin thiseffort were themselves fudai daimyo,and,
to my knowledge,nonoffice holdingfudai lordsraisedno oppositionto the reform
as it progressed.Rathertheycontinuedto speak out in supportof the bakufu.Spe-
cificallyafterthe lords of Satsuma,Uwajima, Fukui, and Tosa assertedthat the
Court had not approvedthe second Ch6shiuexpedition,the lords of Takamatsu,
lino, Hikone, Matsuyama(Iyo), Kuwana, Oshi, Okazaki, Himeji, Nagaoka, and
Yoshida jointlyrepliedin 67/7 thatthe Courthad veryclearlyauthorizedit.9Then
whenYoshinobuin 67/lO acceptedtheTosa Restoration proposal,his actionprecipi-
tated,as we notebelow,an unprecedented outpouringoffudaihan protest. Insofaras
a fudai daimyopositionis ascertainableat that time,it appearsthatat least some
fudai feltit importantto preservebakufuclaimsto the rightto punishobstreperous
han, and thatmany saw the implicationsof the Tosa proposalas more dangerous
to whatevertheyvalued thanweretheimplications of theongoingbakufureform.
Since the Tosa proposalin no way suggestedany incursionintodomanialfeudal
autonomyand the Tokugawa reformdid, the fudai responsesuggeststhat these
lordsmay have seen the trendof bakufuunification as preferableto whateverthe
Tosa scheme would involve.The bakufu patternmight well end theirroles as
autonomouslords,but that mightbe a welcomedevelopment, leavingthe men in
the positionof tax-paying estateownerswith relatively favorableconnectionsto the
leadersand leadingpositionsof society.They would be freedof the costsof main-
tainingtheirown armies,unburdenedof the responsibilities of han government,
and sparedthe difficulty of tryingto herd all theirvassalsand rear-vassals through
impossiblycomplicatedtimes.It was on balance perhapsjust what theywanted,
namely,a plan foreventualnationalunification thatsecuredtheiradvantages,freed
themof burdens,and promisedin theend to respectand benefittheImperialthrone
and so meetthesonno concernsof so manyof theirvassalsand advisors.Four years
later the daimyoin generalwere to accept quite gracefullythe abolitionof their
han; it shouldnot be surprising if the weakestand mostvulnerableof daimyohad
alreadybegun to consider the surrender of feudalautonomythe preferred solution
in I867. Afterall, if the war of i868 preparedsome daimyoforthischange,so the
war of i866 could well have been theeffective catalystforothers.
Fudai lordsand tozama Restoration
That fudai lordsmay have been adoptingthisview of affairsis suggestedby the
formof theirreactionto Yoshinobu'sacceptanceof the Tosa proposal.The specific
9 DNISK 2922, p. 70-7I. Most DNISK volumes and rearof pages,and so page citationsgivenhere
were paginatedwhen I returnedto use them in includebothsides.
1972, but in my notesI did not distinguish
front

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FUDAI DAIMYO 589
development thatprecipitated
a distinctive
fudairesponsewas theissuanceof an Im-
perialordersummoningthemto Kyotofora conference of daimyo.The daimyoin
generalrefusedto acceptthe order,most of themon the usual expedientgrounds
of illness,the samegroundtheyhad used a yearearlierwhen theCourthad ordered
themto assembleto debateaffairsof state.In addition,however,manyfudai went
farbeyondthesestatements quite unnecessarilyto make clear theirgroundsforre-
fusingto obeythe Court.
To elaboratethismatter,at Edo on II/3 the daimyoof Kii, Tokugawa Mochi-
tsugu,and someof his vassalsmetand discussedthesituationwithofficials of several
han,mostlyfudaiof the hall of emperors(teikannoma).In boththisdiscussionand
succeedingcommunications the Kii men betrayedgreat frustration that theirlord
was unable to influenceaffairsbecauseof the way matterswere being decided.To
improvethissituation,theyproposedthatthegroupworkout a unifiedposition,go
with it to Kyoto,and by thisactionresolvethe disastroussplitthathad developed
betweenthe bakufu'sleadersin Kyoto and Edo. This group,as well as officials of
fudai han in the halls of geese and willows (gannoma and yanaginoma)who met
menof Kii on II/4 and II/5, to theTokugawato
agreedin thenameof loyalty
refusethe recently-received Imperialorderto go westand to assertinsteadtheirat-
tachment to theTokugawa house.10
Then at Otsu on II/II a few fudai lords,notablythoseof Hikone and Ogaki,
jointlystatedthatin orderto preservethe properlord-vassalrelationships thatwere
basic to Imperial rule, they would only respond to instructions relayedby the
Tokugawa family.Four dayslaterthelordof Sh5nai and fiveotherinfluential fudai
daimyoin Edo wroteYoshinobuthatthoughthey,as fudai lords,weredaimyo,yet
theywere also Tokugawa vassals,just like thoseof underio,ooo koku,and so they
werereadyto surrender theirdaimyostatusand becomegokeninratherthanaccept
Imperialorders.They informedYoshinobuthathe was to notifythe Courtof their
view.'1On the same day at Edo twentytwo or morelordsof thehall of chrysanthe-
mums (kikunoma) wroteroju7Inaba Masakuni thereaskingto be excusedfromthe
Imperialorderto go to Kyoto,and theyalso sentYoshinobua statementmaking
it clear thattheytoo took ordersonly fromtheirlord. In succeedingdays a large
numberof otherfudai lordswroteas groups(teikannomaand gannoma) or singly
thaton one groundor another,usuallybecause theywere Tokugawa vassalswith
generations of gratitudeto express,theycould not obey the Courtorderdespitere-
peatedadmonishments by Yoshinobu.12
By late67/II it was clearthatfu-daihan leaders,havingperhapsforthefirsttime
in Tokugawa civil historyreallycoordinatedtheirpoliticalefforts,would not easily
acceptthe Tosa Restoration.At the veryleast theywould avoid chargesof having
betrayedYoshinobu,and the immediateeffectof theirstatements, of course,was to
justifyinaction.If that were the limitsof theirintent,however,it would have
sufficed forthemmerelyto plead illness.Insteadtheyhad gone much fartherthan
10DNISK 2992, p. 23- originalseparatepaginationby kan.The Roman
I1 DNISK 2997, p. I5I. Kitahara Masanaga, numeralsput in parentheseshere identify the kan
ShichinenshiII (VI), 44-46 (Tokyo, I904). Shi- by number,each bound volume being numbered
busawa Eiichi, Tokugawa Yoshinobu-kdden IV, separately.
p. 139 (Tokyo, 1917). The Shichinenshiversion 12DNISK 2997, p. 6I-63; 300I, p. 24-25;
uses the term kika ratherthan gokenin.Shichi- 3003, p. 68-74; 3004, p. 7-II. ShichinenshiII
nenshi is bound in two volumes but retainsthe (VI), p. 47.

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590 CONRAD TOTMAN
that,spellingout theirsocial locationand sense of relationships in a mannerthat
identified theirfuturenot withtheirpettyfeudaldomainsbut withthe Tokugawa
house. It seemsunlikelythattheycould have referredto themselvesas gokeninif
theystillthoughtof thisas a titleforpettyvassals,ratherthanforthosewho could
aspire,thanksto the Keio reform,to a significant role in buildinga new national
order.It seems most likelythat theyidentifiedthemselvesthus because the Tosa
proposal,which was essentiallythe thrice-tried, vision of k&bu
thrice-discredited
gattai,was unattractiveto themand becausetheysaw theirbestchanceforthefuture
in a policyof stiffeningYoshinobu'sspinein hopes it would lead him to rejectthe
Tosa plan and presson insteadwiththe Keio reform.Such an outcomewould se-
cure theirown interests,securethe Tokugawa, unifythe nation,and honortheEm-
peror.It would avoid the pitfallsof beingpettydaimyoin a councildominatedby
greatlordlyneighbors,and perhapsit would even avoid the greaterdangerof civil
war.
And what was Yoshinobu'sresponseto this extraordinary displayof loyalism?
At thisjuncturewhat he did was to draw up a briefstatement on II/27 and send
it on to Inaba Masakuniat Edo, who on I2/5. forwardedcopiesto thefudai.In this
statementYoshinobuinstructed themto obeythe Courtorderto proceedto Kyoto
forthe daimyoassemblythatthe Tosa proposalenvisaged.13 He had rejectedtheir
offerof supportand castthemlooseto fendforthemselves in thejungleof domanial
powerpolitics.
Historyhad overrunthe fudai lords. Yoshinobuhad failed to grasp the hand
when it was offered;on I2/9 the Satsuma coup d'etatwas implementedat Kyoto,
and as the monthadvanced,developments in boththe Kinai and Kanto raisedthe
spectorof civil war, surelythe most fearfulspectortheselords and theiradvisors
could envisage.On 12/23 bakufuleadersat Edo finallyinstructed representatives of
the fudai han to despatchall possibletroopswestwardat once.'4 That orderswept
away thepromiseof theKeio reformand presentedfudaileaderswiththeobnoxious
choiceof late I866: to fightand riskall or to be neutraland hope forscraps.The
lessonsof Hamada and Kokura could not have escaped theirminds,and thistime,
moreover, Yoshinobu'srelationshipto theCourtwas radicallychangedfortheworse.
Denied the hope of peacefulevolutionfromimpoverished, over-burdened feudal
lordsto tax-paying estateowningaristocrats in a new Tokugawa-centered national
order,theyhad to choosebetweenneutrality-inaction and loyalty-action. Their forces
could notfight;therisksinvolvedin followingtheerraticYoshinobuwereapparent;
the dangersof incurringImperialdispleasureand therebylegitimizingtheirown
destruction were obvious.The choicewas not hard to make, and withindays they
began replyingto the noticeof I2/23. Some objectedto the orderson groundsof
povertyor otherduty.Some asked relieffromtheseotherdutiesin orderto have
men forthe westwardmarch.Some said theycould send only a few men forone
reason or another.Some in effecthedged the futureby confessingtheyhad only
begunto adoptmodernarms.Hotta of Sakura objectedto the orderitselfby assert-
ing thatdefenseof the Kanto, not the Kinai, was crucialto Tokugawa well-being
and that it was unwise to send forceswestwardabruptlyand in an unorganized
13 DNISK 3023, p. 67-80, 125ff. ShibusawaIV,
orderto MatsudairaKatamorion I2/5 notto lobby
i63 and subsequently at Courtabout the Choshuimatter.
IshinshiV, 67 (Tokyo, I939)
seemto have confusedthisorderwithYoshinobu's 14 DNISK 3062, p. 96-97.

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FUDAI DAIMYO 591
manner.'5Their words then and theiractionsin followingweeks were consistent.
They could not fight;theywould not fight;theydid not fight.
And so, as Bolithopointsout at some length,in the end the fudai han hedged
theirbets as best theycould, and bakufuleadershad to do withouttheirsupport.
The symbioticdimensionof the fudai'sdual role as domaniallord and Tokugawa
vassal that had helped hold the Tokugawa ordertogetherfor over two centuries
had been destroyed by thecrisisof the i86o's and nothingcould bringit back.Or to
say it differently,
the historicdemandsof the i86o's, culminatingin the military
debacleof i866,had made theold feudalallianceof bakufuand fudai han obsolete.
A new symbiosis, a new moremodernallianceof bureaucratand landed aristocrat
had begun to emergein I867, but it nevermatured.Whipsawedby internalweak-
ness and externalchallenges,bakufuleadersof the Kei6 reformwere unableto sus-
tain theirmomentum.At year'send theyfalteredand then triedto overcomethe
obstaclesbyfallingback on thefudaiof theold feudalalliance.But thatarrangement
had lostits worthto thosemen,and so theyheld aloof.The Tokugawa could have
had theirsupporton the new basis, not the old; time would not flowbackward.
And so othermen forgedthemodernallianceof bureaucratand aristocrat and called
it Meiji Japan.

15DNISK 3062, p. 98ff.

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