2.

4
WELFARE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE

Jeff Johnson

A number of features of our food environment encourage consumers to think that

there is nothing terribly problematic in eating animals. The practice is widely accepted,
traditions are built around eating animals, we are encouraged to enjoy what we think
tastes good to us, etc. Sometimes, though, the practice of eating animals comes under
ethical scrutiny. From time to time, for example, undercover videos emerge that raise
awareness around what have become standard practices on farms.
These investigations reveal that animals have their beaks, tails, and testicles cut
off or seared off without any pain relief. For nearly their entire pregnancy, mother
pigs are kept in cages so small that they can’t turn around. Chickens who lay eggs
are kept in cages so small that they’re each afforded less than an iPad’s worth of
space in which to live out their lives.
When questions are raised about these practices, consumers are often told that
they ought not to worry too much, since producers who engage in them have an
interest in promoting the welfare of the animals. You can find a range of general
remarks about the industry’s commitment to animal welfare on industry sites.
Here’s an example from the United States Farmers and Ranchers Alliance:

Farmers and ranchers are committed to the safest and most appropriate care for
their animals. They care deeply about the health and safety of their animals
and take pride in them. They also know that consumers are concerned about
animal care … USFRA believes that farmers and ranchers work diligently to
keep their farm animals safe, healthy and comfortable.1

And here’s an example from the Animal Agriculture Alliance:

Animal care has always been important to livestock and poultry producers …
Producers take their ethical obligation to providing the best quality care to
164 Jeff Johnson

their animals very seriously. Science-based animal care guidelines are in place
across all sectors of the industry to help farmers, ranchers and processors
improve the lives of the animals that depend on them.2

In these quotes we find claims about how much producers care about their animals
and about how seriously they take what they see as their ethical obligation to
provide care. We also see an appeal to the idea that the ways producers engage
with animals is “science-based,” with the implication that the kinds of systems
producers favor in production are the result of careful research on how to best
“improve the lives” of animals.
These sorts of claims are designed to offer a kind of moral cover, both for con-
sumers and for the industry. While consumers might be surprised by what they
learn from undercover investigations, they’re meant to be assured that really
everything is alright because these practices are being done for the sake of the
animals. After all, they’re told, the people doing these things to animals care deeply
about them. And while consumers might feel challenged by the idea that extreme
confinement, for example, could be in the interest of an animal, they are told that
the housing systems producers choose for animals are consistent with guidelines
grounded in science, backed by the say-so of experts. Unless consumers know
something about the science, it’s hard to see how they could respond.
If this attempt to offer moral cover is successful, the industry comes out immune
from critique and consumers can feel at ease with practices they may have initially
found to be troubling.
Whether the attempt to give moral cover succeeds, however, depends on the
industry’s conception of welfare. If their conception of welfare aligns with that of
consumers, then consumers will have reason to feel at ease with what producers
do. But if these conceptions diverge, consumers may not be able to take moral
cover under the industry’s claims. A recent meta-analysis seems to suggest that
consumers take humane treatment (which includes concerns both about physiolo-
gical and psychological well-being) and natural living conditions (which provide
space and freedom for animals to engage in natural behaviors) to be central to
providing for good animal welfare on farms.3
So what does the industry understand by animal welfare?
In order to begin to respond to this question, it will help to attend to a specific
case in which the industry works to show that practices which may appear trou-
blesome at first ought to understood as being in keeping with an interest in animal
welfare. I focus for the purposes of this chapter on the use of gestation stalls in sow
confinement facilities.
Gestation stalls are metal cages used to confine sows during nearly the entire
duration of their four-month pregnancy. The dimensions of these stalls (typically
two feet by seven feet) are such that the sows confined in them can only take one
step forward and one step back. They can’t turn around or lie down comfortably.
Sows are transferred to other cages with similar dimensions before they give birth,
and they are then re-impregnated and returned to gestation stalls just a few weeks
 Welfare in animal agriculture 165

later. This cycle continues for the sow’s entire life, which on farms is typically
between two and three years.
There’s no question that on hearing of (or seeing) such extreme confinement for
so long, it’s easy to think something problematic is afoot. We need only ask what
we might think of subjecting our dogs or cats to such confinement to see the issues
that arise. Nevertheless, the industry endorses this kind of confinement—indeed,
it’s the norm on sow confinement facilities here in Minnesota. David Preisler,
Executive Director of the Minnesota Pork Producers Association, has indicated that
anywhere from 80%–90% of the sows in the state are confined to gestation stalls.4
It’s important to note that industry sanctioned research acknowledges what are
straightforwardly welfare issues with this sort of confinement. The American
Veterinary Medical Association’s policy statement on pregnant sow housing states
that, “[s]tall systems restrict normal behavioral expression.”5 In her piece “Making
Difficult Welfare Choices—Housing for Pregnant Sows,” the AVMA’s Gail Golab
is a bit more forthcoming:

Examples of individual housing include 2 ft by 7 ft gestation stalls (most

common by far) … Individual housing … presents challenges when it comes
to [promoting good mental health] … sows housed individually have less
opportunity to socialize and … the sow’s movement may be restricted and she
may not be able to behave in ways that would be considered “normal” in a
more natural environment—all potential welfare negatives.6

Despite these disadvantages, the industry understands the use of gestation stalls as
providing for the sow’s needs and even as offering welfare advantages over alter-
natives like group housing systems in which sows can interact with one another.
When it comes to the idea that gestation stalls satisfy the needs of sows, we find
some revealing remarks in the “Swine Welfare Fact Sheet”:

A typical gestation stall may have an inside dimension of 22 inches … by 7

feet long … Note that the body of a large sow weighing 660 lb. … will be
contained in a stall that is 17 inches wide …, 6.5 feet … long… Thus, a 2 by
7-foot stall … could easily meet the static space needs of a 660 lb. … sow.7

Because a 660 lb. sow is roughly 17 inches wide by 6.5 feet long, a cage that’s 22
inches wide and 7 feet long meets her “static space needs.” So it’s in this sense that in
confining a sow in a gestation stall producers think of themselves as meeting her
needs—gestation stalls offer sows enough space for their stationary bodies to occupy.
The American Veterinary Medical Association’s policy statement on pregnant
sow housing cites advantages of gestation stalls:

Gestation stall systems may minimize aggression and injury, reduce competi-
tion, and allow individual feeding and nutritional management, assisting in
control of body condition.8
166 Jeff Johnson

These advantages largely mirror those identified in the National Pork Board’s
position statement on gestation stalls.9 And they seem to be targeted at what we
might think of as welfare advantages. Being sure to get enough to eat and avoiding
conflict and confrontation certainly seem to be good for the animals. But in order
to bring out the reasons the industry sees these considerations as trumping what
seem like fairly substantial welfare disadvantages, we need to see more clearly why
the industry weighs these considerations so highly.
Let’s first consider the question of the importance of individual feeding and
nutritional management. Note that it’s said to be important as a way to control the
body condition of the sow. According to Ronald Bates, a swine researcher at
Michigan State University:

Correctly managing feed resources will optimize pig and sow performance and
maintain favorable feed costs per cwt of pork sold. Underfeeding or over-
feeding sows can unfavorably impact sow productivity and therefore adversely
affect cost of production.10

The purpose of controlling body condition in sow facilities, it appears, has to do

with maximizing productivity. When sows eat too much or too little or at the
wrong times, they may give birth to fewer piglets and they may not produce milk
for nursing in the ways the industry sees as optimal for sow performance.
Now consider the question of reducing competition. When sows are raised in
group housing and they’re fed without the help of individual feeders, sows will
compete for food. The winners of the competition will get more food and the
losers will go with less. Yuzhi Li, a swine researcher at the University of Minne-
sota, says of this conflict that it “results in the subordinate young sows becoming
fearful of further conflicts while attempting to obtain feed which may lead to
inadequate feed intake …”11 When we take this together with the issue about
controlling body condition, it becomes clear that these advantages of gestation stalls
are not so much valued because they are advantages for the sow herself. Industry
research points to these as important ways to ensure that sows are maximally
productive.
When it comes to the issue of the role of gestation stalls in minimizing aggres-
sion and injury, it seems we might have come to a consideration that takes the
interests of the sows themselves squarely into consideration. Aggression and injury,
after all, seem like bad things for a sow to have to endure.
Yuzhi Li notes that when sows are mixed in group housing systems, fights are
inevitable—sows will spend the first 24 hours or so fighting with one another in an
effort to establish a dominance hierarchy in the herd. After a week, though, stable
social groups form.12
There is no question that the injuries sows may endure in this brief period of
fighting aren’t good for the sows. But as we think about whether to count the
concern about aggression as robust evidence of a commitment to animal welfare on
the part of producers, we need to keep in mind that the alternative to this is nearly
 Welfare in animal agriculture 167

four months in gestations stalls with all the welfare disadvantages we might expect
(poor mental health, lack of ability to engage in natural behaviors, limited ability to
socialize, etc.). You might reasonably think that serious concern for the interests of
the sows would lead to the view that spending a day fighting would be worth it if
the sows also get to spend nearly four months able to move around in meaningful
ways and to interact in stable social groups with other sows.
So why don’t producers who decide to keep sows in gestation stalls come to this
same conclusion?
We learn from Yuzhi Li and Lee Johnston that “aggression between two and
three weeks after breeding can result in loss of embryos, which may cause repro-
ductive failure.”13 Li and Johnston report that the conception rate of sows can
decrease by up to 5% as a consequence of this sort of aggression. In a facility that
houses thousands of sows, this adds up to a big hit to productivity.
So though it first appeared that a concern about aggression and injury counted
primarily as a concern for the interests of the sows themselves, once again we find
that this advantage to gestation stalls over other housing systems has to do with
maximizing productivity.
The industry counts keeping sows in gestation stalls as a case of looking after the
welfare of the sows. A survey of the considerations the industry offers in favor of gesta-
tion stalls in sow production, though, helps to show that what it means for a producer to
take an interest in animal welfare is quite different from what we might expect.
The Animal Agriculture Alliance assures us that “[f]armers and ranchers know
that when animals are well cared for, they will be healthy and productive.”14 In
this very common refrain, we see the notion of welfare being connected up with
the notion of productivity. What close inspection reveals, however, is that here
attention to the welfare of the sows means attention to their productivity. Issues
about productivity seem to be decisive in assessing whether gestation stalls provide
for good welfare. It’s no surprise, then, that productivity is typically seen as an
indication of welfare.
We have some reason to think this focus generalizes across the industry. Bernard
Rollin, for example, observes:

by welfare, producers mean the presence of conditions relevant to the pur-

poses for which the animal is raised. The animal receives food, water, shelter,
protection from predators, and so on, all of which allow it to thrive in terms of
the producer’s purpose for the animal—being sold for food or producing
products sold for food. Even treatment or prevention of disease enters into this
view only in so far as it is relevant to the animal’s productivity …15

Productivity, however, has far more to do with the interests of the producers than
it does with the interests of the sows themselves. It’s thanks to the productivity of
the animals that producers are able to make money off of them.
We may think that the collapse of concerns for welfare into concerns about
productivity shows that when producers claim that they have an interest in animal
168 Jeff Johnson

welfare they are being deceptive. But this need not be so. Producers may share a
conception of well-being with Aristotle.
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good, i.e. [doing] well … for
whatever has a function and [characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function
…”16 A classic example of Aristotle’s thought here involves thinking of a cook’s
knife. The function of a cook’s knife is to cut food. Because of this, we can con-
clude that a bad knife (a knife that’s not doing well as a knife) is one that’s dull and
so cuts poorly. A good knife (a knife that’s doing well as a knife) will be the one
that is sharp and so cuts well. On such a view, sharpening a cook’s knife can be
seen as benefiting the knife, because it helps the knife perform its function well.
If we understand producers as seeing the function of animals on their farms to be
to produce meat, milk, or eggs, then we may be able to make sense of their claims
about how a focus on productivity amounts to looking after the welfare of their
animals. While the confinement of sows in gestation stalls, for example, puts pres-
sure on a range of physiological and psychological aspects of the sows, this practice
is designed to maximize productivity. Insofar as producers see productivity as the
function of animals on farms, in setting the conditions for optimum productivity,
producers may think of themselves as helping animals to perform their function
well. Since this is thought to be the good for the animals in question, producers
may see themselves as benefiting the animals after all.
It’s in this light that we may see producers as genuinely understanding them-
selves to have the welfare of animals in mind when they engage in standard prac-
tices on intensive farms. Whether consumers can take moral cover under the claim
that producers care about the welfare of their animals will then depend on whether
consumers share this way of seeing animals with producers. This way of seeing
animals, however, isn’t the only way of seeing animals available to us and there are
some compelling reasons to challenge it.
It’s true that as a matter of fact animals produce meat (a rather odd way of saying
that they grow), that they may produce milk (a rather odd way of saying that they
may lactate), and that they may produce eggs (a rather odd way of saying that they
may lay eggs). But these are not the only things they do.
The only straightforward sense in which the animals in question could be thought
of as having as their primary function the production of meat, milk, or eggs, is that
producers have an interest in those things the animals are able to do. That is, these
capacities are brought into focus because they are the capacities of interest to pro-
ducers, the capacities the animals have been bred for in the first place.
But the idea that we may benefit an animal by setting the conditions for her to
perform well some capacity we happen to have an interest in seems problematic.
Let’s suppose that I take in Bubs the cat so that I can watch him grow. That is,
let’s suppose watching him grow is my reason for bringing him into my life.
Because I don’t have any special interest in seeing him playing or otherwise
bounding around the house and especially because doing those things would
expend precious energy that could be directed to the business of growing, let’s
suppose I create a cage that immobilizes Bubs. It’s not so small that he becomes too
 Welfare in animal agriculture 169

sick to grow, but it’s not so big that he can expend extra energy on things like
moving around in meaningful ways (which, after all, would cost me more when it
comes to cat food). In doing this to Bubs, I set the conditions for him to perform
well the capacity of his that I have an interest in.
The idea that I’m benefiting Bubs in confining him as I do in such a case seems
strange. And it would collapse into absurdity if Bubs didn’t much like being in
such extreme confinement. If you came over and saw Bubs in his cage trying
desperately to get free, it wouldn’t do for me to claim that I’m benefiting him
despite appearances because I’m helping him to fulfill the purpose I had for him
when I took him in. The same goes, though, if in his cage Bubs had fallen limp,
resigned to a life in confinement.
Apart from the challenges in thinking it makes sense to target productivity as the
characteristic function of other animals, there are other concerns with this way of
seeing them.
Matthew Scully offers a reminder of a way in which how we see other animals can
become corrupted when we only see them through the lens of our own interests:

when you look at a rabbit and can see only a pest, or vermin, or a meal, or a
commodity, or a laboratory subject, you aren’t seeing the rabbit anymore.
You are seeing only yourself and the schemes and appetites we bring into the
world …17

And Stephen R. L. Clark reminds us of the cost of seeing animals so narrowly:

by stripping away the false perception that such creatures exist for us, we are
enabled to see them in their beauty …18

Scully and Clark raise worries that seeing other animals through the lens of our
interests keeps us from seeing them for who they are. This set of considerations has
a lot of power to bring out the way that a focus on productivity flattens our ability
to appreciate our fellow creatures. But it also offers a reason to take seriously some
work animal scientists have done around questions of animal welfare. Fraser and
Weary, for example, point out that productivity may well be a measure of proper
biological functioning of an animal, but it misses altogether concerns about their
emotions and feelings and about whether they have opportunities to engage in
natural behaviors.19 To miss those seems to miss what’s central to an ethical con-
cern for animal welfare.20
We’ve been exploring the possibility of offering producers the benefit of the
doubt when it comes to their conception of animal welfare. Perhaps they think
that they offer care for animals in the sense that they set the conditions for animals
to do their best in production. But we’ve also seen what I take to be a range of
serious issues with such a view. It turns out, though, that since this view requires
producers to have an interest in promoting the productivity of individual animals,
there is reason to worry whether producers can even hold this view.
170 Jeff Johnson

When it comes to housing animals on farms, producers routinely opt for systems
that maximize the productivity of a barn as a whole rather than the productivity of
individual animals. In egg production, for example, there is a point at which
increasing the amount of space hens are afforded will result in diminishing marginal
productivity. While the animal’s individual productivity will continue to increase a
bit, the extra space allowed the hen will displace other hens. The result of this
displacement is that the number of eggs produced in the barn as a whole will drop.
Agricultural economists Norwood and Lusk offer this assessment of the situation:

space allotment chosen by farmers does not maximize animal well-being, or

even individual animal productivity. When farmers are constrained by land,
labor, barn size, or even availability of capital, the economically optimal
stocking density will be more crowded than will suit the animals.21

A shift from thinking about an interest in individual animal productivity to an

interest in productivity of the operation as a whole seems to collapse from a con-
cern that could potentially be seen as a concern with some ethical dimension
(however misguided) to an overt concern for profit. Indeed, Norwood and Lusk
ask us to keep in mind that on farms “animals are a commodity and they are
treated well to the extent that it is profitable.”22
Whether consumers can take moral cover under the language the industry offers
about how much they care about the welfare of their animals depends centrally on
sharing with producers their conception of welfare. For my own part, I can’t. A
conception of animal welfare that’s so closely tied to the notion of productivity
and, ultimately, profit seems to me to have far more to do with the interests of
producers than it does with the interest of the animals themselves.
It is these considerations, then, that lead me to think it’s difficult to take moral
cover under the notion that producers do what they do out of an interest in animal
welfare.

Notes
1 “USFRA’s View on Animal Welfare,” United States Farmers and Ranchers Alliance,
accessed August 26, 2015, www.fooddialogues.com/foodsource/usfras-view-on-animal-
welfare.
2 “Animal Care and Modern Food Production,” Animal Agriculture Alliance, accessed
August 26, 2015, http://animalagalliance.org/images/upload/Animal%20Welfare%
20Brochure%202013%20-%20Final.pdf%20with%20bleed.pdf.
3 Beth Clarke et al., “A Systematic Review of Public Attitudes, Perceptions and Beha-
viours Towards Production Diseases Associated with Farm Animal Welfare,” Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29, no. 3 (2016): 455–478.
4 David Preisler, email, August 23, 2013.
5 “Pregnant Sow Housing,” American Veterinary Medical Association, accessed August
26, 2015, www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Pages/Pregnant-Sow-Housing.aspx.
6 Gail Golab, “Making Difficult Welfare Choices: Housing for Pregnant Sows,” American
Veterinary Medical Association, May 18, 2012, http://atwork.avma.org/2012/05/
18/making-difficult-welfare-choices-housing-for-pregnant-sows/.
 Welfare in animal agriculture 171

7 “Swine Welfare Fact Sheet,” National Pork Board, accessed August 2015, https://p
orkcdn.s3.amazonaws.com/sites/all/files/documents/Factsheets/WellBeing/SWINE
WELFARsowsandspace.pdf.
8 American Veterinary Medical Association, “Pregnant Sow Housing.”
9 “Position Statements on Sow Housing,” National Pork Board, accessed August 2015,
www.pork.org/position-statements-sow-housing/.
10 Ronald Bates, “Sow Body Condition Influences Productivity and Profitability,” Michi-
gan State University Extension, accessed August 26, 2015, http://msue.anr.msu.edu/
news/sow_body_condition_influences_productivity_and_profitability.
11 Yuzhi Li, “Controlling Aggression Among Group-Housed Gestating Sows,” University
of Minnesota Extension, accessed August 10, 2015, www.extension.umn.edu/agri
culture/swine/components/pdfs/controlling_aggression_among_group_housed_gesta
ting_sows.pdf.
12 Li, “Controlling Aggression Among Group-Housed Gestating Sows.”
13 Yuzhi Li and Lee Johnson, “Tips for Managing Pregnant Sows in Group Housing,”
Farm and Dairy, July 24, 2012, www.farmanddairy.com/news/experts-offer-eleven-tips-
for-managing-pregnant-sows-in-group-housing/39482.html.
14 Animal Agriculture Alliance, “Animal Care and Modern Food Production.”
15 Bernard Rollin, Farm Animal Welfare (Ames, IA: Iowa State Press, 2000), 29.
16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terrence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), 8.
17 Matthew Scully, Dominion (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 2002), 2–3.
18 Stephen R. L. Clark, “Vegetarianism and the Ethics of Virtue,” in Food for Thought: The
Debate Over Eating Meat, edited by Steve Sapontzis (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,
2004).
19 David Fraser and Daniel Weary, “Quality of Life for Farm Animals: Linking Science,
Ethics, and Animal Welfare,” in The Well-Being of Farm Animals, edited by John Benson
and Bernard Rollin (Ames, IA: Blackwell, 2004), 39–60.
20 Cf. I. J. H. Duncan, “Animal Welfare Defined in Terms of Feelings,” Acta Agriculturae
Scandinavica, Section A, Animal Science, Supplement 27 (1996): 29–35.
21 F. Bailey Norwood and Jayson Lusk, Compassion by the Pound (Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 102.
22 Norwood and Lusk, Compassion by the Pound, 102.

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172 Jeff Johnson

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