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Combating Corruption in Bangladesh: Role of the Anti Corruption

Commission

Chapter · June 2010

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Tarana Begum
Nurul Huda Sakib
Jahangirnagar University
Jahangirnagar University
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 charged with doing certain
things, that is a responsible
functionary or office holder, is
Co by monetary or other
m rewards, such as the
ba expectation of a job in the
future, induced to take actions
tin which favor whoever provides
g the reward and thereby
I Co damages the group or
organization to which the
n rr functionary belongs (more
t
up specifically, the government
r
tio and other socio- economic
o
institutions)’.9 According to
d n Inge Amundsen corruption is
u in usually understood as
c
Ba involving some “corrupted”
ti politicians and public
o ng
administrators. Corruption is
n la when a civil servant, official,
de bureaucrat or politicians
(anyone elected or appointed
sh:
to a position of public
Ro authority, with power to
le allocate (scarce) public
of resources in the name of the
the state or the government) is
An abusing this official position for
ti personal or group gain. The
Co corrupt act is when this person
demands or accepts money or
rru
some other form of reward,
pti
for himself or for his family,
on friends and allies.10
Co Vito Tanzi, describes
m corruption in a different
mi manner. He provides a
hypothetical scenario
ssi illustrating situations of
on
Tarana
Begum
Nurul
Huda
Sakib
Corruption appears in all societies in world for five successive years (2001-
innumerable forms. However, reportedly 2005). Rather than unitedly addressing a
corruption has been severe in most of national problem like this, the two major
the developing countries like Bangladesh. political parties/alliances of the country
As for instance, according to consider the issues on partisan lines. As
Transparency International (TI), such the anti-corruption bodies could not
Bangladesh earned the distinction of be made effective. However the sudden
becoming the most corrupt country in the political change of 11th January 2007 when
a military backed government captured
state power the scenario started
changing. Since then, a lot of
institutional steps were taken to make
the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC)
effective to act as watchdog against
corruption. The broad objective of this
study is to define corruption from
various perspectives and examine the
role of the ACC in combating corruption
in Bangladesh.
History reveals that corruption in one
form or another has existed for ages.
Corruption was practiced in ancient Greek
civilization as rulers and kings spent
public money for their own interests.
Plato treated corruption broadly to
serve as a guide for institutional
reforms other than as moral indictments
of individuals, peoples and cultures.1 The
notion of corruption was emphasized by
Aristotle as he made distinctions
between political constitutions which are
‘right’ or ‘just’ because they serve the
common interest, and those which are
‘wrong’ or ‘perversions of the right
forms’, because they consider only the
personal interests of the rulers.2 These
tendencies persisted within early
modern republics as Machiavelli, the
period’s most perceptive student of
corruption, understood it primarily as a
moral condition, measured by the
distance between a people’s collective
character and moral standards of
everyday conduct as defined by their
Christian context.3 For Rousseau
corruption was the centerpiece of a
philosophical anthropology that traced
the corrosion of a natural moral empathy
among humans and the emergence of
bourgeois egoism.4
All these definitions based on moral
perspective, however, fail to include all
the features of corruption. According to
many theorists corruption is closely
connected with bureaucratic
administration, political system and
economy of a particular state. Among
the moralists, Nye, defined corruption
as ‘any behavior which deviates from
the formal duties of a public role
because of private (personal, close
family, private clique) pecuniary or
status gains; or violates rules against the
exercise of certain types of private
gains. This includes such behaviors as
bribery, nepotism (bestowal of
patronage by reason of ascriptive
relationships rather than merit)’.5 On
the other hand, functionalists judge
corruption from the role it plays in
socio-economic development. Their
claim that corruption flourishes as a
substitute for the market system offers
an acceptable alternative to violence
and increases public participation in
public policy.6
The genesis and impact of corruption is
quite different in politics and in
economics. From the economic point of
view Rose-Ackerman, in her definition
of corruption has emphasized the
market mechanism and its impact on
the voting process and the decision-
making system in large organizations.7
On the other hand ‘…illegitimate use of
public power for private benefit’,
violation of responsibility, illegal or
unethical use of governmental authority
as a result of considerations of personal
or political gain and illegal use of
organizational power for personal gain,
are some of the dimensions covered in
the definitions constructed by the
political scientists.8 Basically their
definitions cover a wider area. They
include legitimacy of state, political
ideology and civil society of a country in
measuring corruption. In this sense Carl
Friedrich argues that ‘The pattern of
corruption may be said to exist
whenever a power holder who is
corruption. “An employee who uses his
official position to favor
acquaintances–say to help them get a
valuable license, a government contract,
or a government job–may be
compensated with an immediate or
explicit payment (clearly a bribe).
Alternatively, he may be compensated, at
a much later time, with a generous
gift to his daughter when she gets
married, or with a good job offer for
his son when he completes his studies. In
other words, there may not be any
direct, explicit, and immediate
compensation for the favor. The
payment may be delayed in time and,
when made, it may appear completely
unconnected with the favor received.”11
Considering all these discussions a
comprehensive definition of corruption
can be as follows. Corruption is a social,
political and economic problem which
includes two or more actors. Here
individuals or institutions preserve
their own interest from their respective
position with the exercise of power and
resources and avoiding legal framework,
which circumvent group interest.
Corruption is a process from a
communication-perspective and it
indicates a type of exchange relation. Of
course, somebody has to initiate the
exchange, and at least one other actor
has to be induced or influenced to
engage in the relation, so that one of the
two parties can potentially have a more
active role in the interaction. Criminal
law in some countries distinguishes
these types as “active” and “passive”
corruption. The briber is viewed as the
“active” party and the public official as
Corruption Scenario in Bangladesh
The rank of Bangladesh in corruption
since 2001 is presented in the following
table.
Table 1:
Banglades
h’s Rank in
Score List
from 2001
- 2008
Year Rank
“passive”.
Some of the basic characteristics of
corruption can be identified through
the following concepts. Bribery is the
payment (in money or kind) that is
given or taken in a corrupt relationship.
Embezzlement is theft of public
resources by public officials, which is
another form of misappropriation of
public funds. Fraud is an economic
crime that involves some kind of
trickery, swindle or deceit. It is fraud for
instance when state agencies and state
representatives are engaged in illegal
trade networks, counterfeit and
racketing, and when forgery, smuggling
and other organized economic crime are
propped up by “official” sanction and
involvement. Extortion is money and
other resources extracted by the use of
coercion, violence or the threats to use
force. “Protection” or “security” money
can be extorted in the classical, infamous
mafia style. Favoritism is a mechanism
of power abuse implying
“privatization” and a highly biased
distribution of state resources, no matter
how these resources have been
accumulated in the first place. Nepotism
is a special form of favoritism, in which
an office holder (ruler) prefers his
proper kinfolk and family members.
Corrupt payments to win major contracts
concessions and privatizing of companies
are generally the preserves of large
scale business and high-level officials.
These deals are by definition the
preserve of top officials and frequently
involve multinational corporations
operating alone or in consortia with
local partners.
2001 1st
2002 1st
2003 1st
2004 1st
2005 1st (with Chad)
2006 3rd (Along with Chad, Congo, and Su
2007 7th
2008 10th
Source:
Transparency
International
Bangladesh (Based
on TI Report
Authors prepare
 herself.)
The World Bank also identified
Bangladesh as the 12th and 17th among
the most corrupt countries in 2004 and
2005 respectively in the corruption
index of the governance indicators.
Furthermore, the World Economic
Forum identified Bangladesh as the
most corrupt country among 125 in the
corruption sub-index of the Global
Competitiveness Report for 2006-07. In
one survey 76% of the respondents
identified corruption, 71% democracy
and 64% human rights as major
concerns in Bangladesh.12 In reality very
few institutions are free of corrupt
practices and these are causing huge
financial loss for the government. More
importantly because of corruption and
mismanagement in police
administration, judiciary, health sector,
education, etc., people begin to lose
their trust on government day by day.
Corruption is broadly considered to be
a key deterrent for development in
Bangladesh.
It has been observed that all regimes in
Bangladesh are susceptible to political
corruption. According to Senturia
political corruption is, ‘when any
powerful political leader gains his/her
personal interest with the misuse of
power’.13 Here misuse of power means
an unlawful act. It is formed when
human beings become greedy. In that
sense we can define political corruption
as ‘abuse of power’.
development.15 General Ershad usurped
power by declaring ‘Jehad’ (war) against
corruption, but through Upazila (Sub
district) system he allegedly extended
corruption at the grassroots level. Since
1991 all the popularly elected
governments were also accused of
indulging in corruption and corrupt
practices of different sorts.
Bureaucratic corruption can be defined
as ‘administrative’, ‘petty’, ‘low level’ or
‘street corruption’ which takes place at
the implementation stage, where the
public meets public officials in daily
business and services like hospitals,
schools, local licensing authorities,
police, taxing authorities and so on.
According to Gould bureaucratic
corruption is ‘the institutionalized
personal abuse of public resources by
civil servants’.16 We can define it as
“systematic corruption” or “collective
corruption”. Bribe is the major force of
bureaucratic corruption and it works as
“speed money”. Those who want to get
wealth very quickly and do not want to
follow rules and regulations, offer bribe
to governmental officials. Basically
bureaucrats retain power with intent to
monopolistic attitude over the public
and to gain their own personal interests.
In this regard Jacob Van Klavenren
mentions that “a corrupt administrator
looks at his/her office as a business,
from where he/she can earn extra
money”.17

Political corruption in this region can be

traced back to British colonial rule and
Pakistan period. According to Planning
Commission, during (1949-50) ~ (1969-
70) almost 3112 crore taka of
government property was transferred
from East Pakistan to West Pakistan
with the help of a dominant corrupt
cycle.14 After independence, corruption
became one of the major concerns. The
followers of the ruling party got job
opportunities in government controlled
industries and some of them became
very rich by illegal business. After army
take over in August 1975, corruption
and misuse of power resulted in the
wastage of almost 40% of the total
resources earmarked for
Bureaucratic corruption was very much
evident in Pakistan. A number of civil
servants belonging to the Civil Service
of Pakistan (CSP), had been dismissed
from their services on corruption
charges. Information obtained from
the Ministry of Finance show that in
Bangladesh over a period of twenty-
two years (1971-1993), taka 18,000
crore were lost in the public sector due
to misappropriation of public funds and
theft.18 TIB shows that 64.1 percent
government officials were involved in
corruption. Among them high officials
were involved in the maximum
proportion (26.9%) followed by the
subordinate staff (25.7%).19
The Official Secrets Act of 1923 is used
as a convenient tool to deny
information, which works as a
safeguard for corrupt officials. TIB
identified that due to lack of
transparent assessment criteria for
examinations, there is scope of
irregularities and corruption in the
recruitment process through rampant
transaction of bribes in the Public
Service Commission (PSC).20 This
process motivates the civil servants to
get involved in the same process of
corruption when they start their
career. As a result, the cost for the poor
to get services, which they were
supposed to receive free or almost free
of charge, turn out to be very
expensive. A recent report of the UNDP
titled "Corruption and Good
Governance" found that bureaucratic
corruption and inefficiency are taking a
heavy toll on the Bangladesh economy,
causing hundreds of millions of dollars'
worth of loss in terms of unrealized
investment and income. The report
pointed out: "If Bangladesh were to
improve the integrity and efficiency of
its bureaucracy, its investment would
rise by more than five percent and its
yearly GDP rate would rise by over half
a percent".21
When corruption is systemic in public
sector, firms that do business with
government agencies, can seldom
escape participating in bribery. The
ban and stigma on corruption
necessitates a collusion or conspiracy
between individuals or at least a
certain closeness and confidentiality.
Corruption has thus been defined as a
secret social exchange, and the private
gains have been emphasized. The
money or benefit so collected through
corruption is ‘privatized’ to various
degrees. It may be extracted for the
benefit of an individual who will share
nothing or a very little with his/her
equals, or it may be extracted for the
benefit of a particular group with some
coherence and unity.22
Causes and Consequences of
Corruption in Bangladesh
Corruption is generally connected with
the activities of the state and especially
with the monopoly and discretionary
power of the state. Therefore, Robart
Klitgaurd a leading expert in this field
has enumerated the causes of
corruption in a simple equation. 23 That
is C=M+D-A. According to this equation,
corruption is a form when bureaucrats
use their discretionary power in
decision making and create a
monopolistic system. Because of
discretion and monopoly of the
bureaucrat, administrative
accountability does not come into
force. The UNDP takes into account
other dimensions which are also
important to balance monopoly and
discretion. The UNDP sourcebook
proposes the following formula.24
Corruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) –
(Accountability + Transparency +
Integrity). This suggests that the
absence of ATI (as a consequence of
weak governance) in addition to
Monopoly and Discretion results in
corruption. Hence corruption is
principally a failure of governance. In
this regard Vito Tanzi mentions some
particular aspects of governmental
activities which create a fertile ground
for corruption.25
Direct Cause
 Complex Regulation and
Spending Decisions.
Provision for goods and
Financing of Parties.
Other Discretionary Decision. of these conditions exist, besides
population explosion, weak public
opinion and unequal distribution of
wealth. All these sociological problems
also encourage corruption.
Our observation is that poverty is a
major cause of corruption as well as a
barrier in Bangladesh. Almost 42.1%
people live below the poverty lines who
struggle every day to upgrade their
living standard and are forced to take
opportunity to make money whether it
is a corrupt way or not. It is found that
corruption is perceived as most severe
in Chad, Bangladesh, Turkmenistan,
Myanmar and Haiti, which are the
poorest countries in the world.
Persons related with public and private
administration can misuse their power
and deprive mass people from public
services because most of the victims are
illiterate, as they do not understand the
complex rules and regulations of public
administration. The monopoly and
discretionary power of the politicians
and the bureaucrats also cause
corruption in Bangladesh. Public
officials along with the politicians use
their authority and exercise illegitimate
power over the public. TIB report in
2000 shows that, out of 1948 cases of
corruption monopoly power was being
used by the public servants in 662 cases
on a large scale and 371 cases on a
smaller scale.26
One survey shows that almost 50%
household of the country think that lack
of accountability is the main reason for
corruption. Recently, the speaker of the
parliament at a roundtable, said that
over 1000 audit reports were prepared
by the office of the Comptroller and
Auditor General (CAG) since its
inception in 1973, but only 300 of them
were discussed in the public accounts
committee (PAC) of the parliament as
over 700 audit reports are kept lying in
the PAC.27 Until 1/11 2007, there was
hardly any practice for monitoring
These are mostly symptoms rather than
causes of corruption. We consider them
as correlates of corruption since
corruption is likely to occur when any
poverty, war (effect of war), illiteracy,
assets of the Ministers or submission of
statements of wealth by high
government officials.
The complex rules and regulations in
Bangladesh create opportunity and
avenues for corruption. Moreover
political culture of this country is
characterized by mistrust,
unfaithfulness and misdeeds among the
political parties and such a conflicting
political culture installs corruption. The
salary of the employers of the public
sector is low compared to that in the
private sector. This instigates the public
servants to involve in corruption in
order to meet the ever increasing price
hike of essential goods.
Corruption hits the poorest and weakest
badly as they cannot afford to pay bribes
or offer other forms of remuneration in
order to safeguard their rights. This
means that they are rejected by health
services, they do not get into schools or
receive fair treatment in the judicial
system and that they are excluded from
political influence. The poorest are also
affected as corruption has adverse
impact on the economy, employment
possibilities and environment. According
to Vito Tanzi corruption28 reduces
investment and as a consequence,
reduces the rate of growth. Corruption
impedes Bangladesh's efforts to reduce its
massive poverty. In World Bank’s Survey
in 2004 Bangladesh was placed at the
lower end of the scale of 100 countries as
most firms reported that they made off-
the- record payments to get things done.
Such payments cumulatively result in 2-
3% points of foregone GDP annually.
The World Bank’s World Development
Report 200429 stated that almost all
Bangladeshi companies are subject to
illegal payments and the volume of such
payments is almost 3% of their total
sales.
A major feature of the Bangladesh
economy is prolonged low investment
both in public and private sectors.
Recently published UNCTAD survey
shows that Bangladesh has a lot of
potentials for business through foreign
investment but because of corruption
and an inefficient, corrupt bureaucracy,
it has not been realized. It is found that
as a result of massive anti-corruption
drives during the term of the recent
caretaker government, private investment
increased marginally from 19.3% of GDP
in FY2008 to 19.6% FY2009. But
investment in public sector has steadily
declined from 6.2% of GDP in FY2005 to
4.6% in FY2009.30 It is also found that
from independence to date Bangladesh
got $35 billion as grant, 75% of which
was embezzled through corruption. In
2006, the World Bank demanded return
of the 6 crore 80 lac taka allocated
against three different projects on
grounds of corruption. Most of all
corruption is destroying citizens’ faith in
their government as lack of transparency,
monopolistic power, and administrative
complexity make people suffer.
Institutional Background of Anti
Corruption Drives
At the end of WW II an organization by
the name "Enforcement Branch" was
created in 1943 under the Food
Department to monitor and check
pervasive corruption in the food
rationing system amid famine like
situation in the Sub-Continent. When
the measure proved to be futile the
branch was placed under the CID and
the Anti-Corruption Act 1947 was
enacted. In the year 1957 the branch
was reorganized as Bureau of Anti-
Corruption. Since its inception until
1983 the organization functioned as a
branch of the Police although the
control of the organization changed
along with changes in the system of
the government. However, through a
notification issued by the Chief
Martial Law Administrator’s Office on
19 October 1983 a separate
employment charter was provided to
the Bureau curtailing its dependency
on the police for manpower. From
1991 it was totally under the control of
the Prime Minister’s Office as a
directorate. The Bureau had sanctioned
strength of 968 members. But the
Bureau could not function properly
because of cumbersome laws, weak
enquiry report, inefficiency of the
Bureau’s personnel, stay-orders from
the Higher Courts, inordinate delay in
obtaining permission from the
government, foot-dragging by the
defense lawyer etc. Subsequently, the
Bureau was abolished and the ACC was
constituted under the ACC Act on 9
May 2004.
The ACC started its journey with
twenty thousand unsolved cases
inherited from the Bureau. Hence,
initially the ACC had to meet numerous
challenges. Once the ACC was
established, the Bureau became functus
officio. The Commission was under
pressure to regularize all 1231
employees of the non defunct Bureau,
although some of the staff were
accused of corruption. This tussle
continued for 18 months and the
organizational structure, roster
manpower remained unsettled. During
this period, millions of taka were spent
for hiring consultants, but with no
significant output.
There were some loopholes in the
ordinance through which the
commission was created. Firstly, the
bill made it clear that, for appointing a
commissioner five member screening
committee is to be constituted. The
persons selected should have at least
twenty years of experience in law,
education, administration, judicial
service or in defense services. The
weakness of the ordinance is that,
emphasis was given only on
experience rather than specifying the
area of experience. Secondly, there is
no exclusive court or judge for
adjudication of anti-corruption cases.
As a result, judicial procedures were to
be undertaken by special judges whose
appointment, transfer, increment and
up- gradation were determined by the
law ministry. Thirdly, Article twenty
three of the bill showed that, there was
no time limit to take action against an
incriminated person. In matter of
delays in taking action against a person
or if the charge was dismissed by the
court, there was no provision in the
bill to demand trial by a higher court.
Fourthly, ACC had the right to inquire
into some criminal activities under two
laws; one is under the protection law
and the other is under the Penal Code.
Many of the penalizing criminal
activities were scheduled under Penal
Code. For example, any false statement
given as witness under the law or any
use of such false statement for illegal
purpose or criminal activities, the
matter may be brought before the ACC.
Further, offences relating to passport,
money laundering and foreign
investment related criminal activities
Box
Organogram
had not been taken into consideration
in the schedule of the bill. Fifthly, Apart
from the legal procedures there were
also unlawful and dishonest motives of
some politicians who made the
Commission inactive from inside.
As mentioned earlier the CTG after 11
January, 2007 took initiatives to
reconstitute the ACC and to make it
effective. A seven member Advisory
Council Committee was formed
through a gazette notification of the
cabinet division. However the question
of its legitimacy was raised in the court
and the court consolidated the status of
ACC through its verdict. An official
notification mentioned that the statutes
of the ACC would be determined as
‘independent, self- governing and
impartial’ instead of ‘independent and
impartial’ in relation to Section 3(2) of
the ACC Act 2004. Besides,
investigation of money laundering has
also been given to the ACC. Thus, the
Act proves that both public and private
servants can be taken into account. The
Commission issued Anti-corruption
Rules 2007, which enhanced its power
one step further to combat corruption
in the country. Another significant
milestone for the Commission was -
Bangladesh’s accession to the UN
Convention against Corruption, on
February 27, 2007.
To support the mission and tasks of the
Commission an organogram consisting of
1264 has been sanctioned. This consists
of the Chairman and two commissioners;
one secretary, six Director Generals, 19
Directors, and the rest are subordinate
investigating officers and clerical/
supporting staff as can be seen in the
following box.
Source: w w w .a cc .o r g . b d
(Accessed: 01.09.2008).
An
Evaluation
Source:
www.acc.org.bd.
Accessed June 31,
 2009 Stat
us
As part of anti-corruption movement the
dur
military backed caretaker government
ing
issued the Emergency Power Ordinance 200
(EPO) on 25th June 2007. Although the 7-
Commission was reformed to make it 08
'free' and 'independent', the government
Status
formed another body namely National
Number of FIR Lodged by ACC
Coordination Committee (NCC) for
Number of Inquiry in Progress
Combating Corruption and Crime
Number of Wealth Statements Asked For
comprising civil and military officials.
Number of Investigation in Progress
The NCC and its taskforces prepared
Number of Charge Sheet in Progress
lists of graft suspects and conducted
Number of Writ Petition
primary investigation against a number of
Number of Criminal Miscellaneous Cases
former ministers, Members of
Number of Stayed Cases in HCD due Wr
Parliament, businessmen and others. The
Number of Stayed Cases due Criminal Mis
ACC published lists in phases and issued
Number of Appeals in which the Stay Or
notices on them to submit their wealth stayed by the Appellate Division and the
statements. From 1/11, 2007 to 1/11, disposed off
2008 the caretaker government’s anti-
corruption drives were the following 31:
Published List of Corrupt Persons - 222;
Arrested- 80; Under Trial (ACC Cases-
24, NBR –13 & Police -35) - 72; Trial
Completed (ACC Cases-18, NBR –12 &
Police -14)- 44.
According to ACC statistics, 239 out of
256 graft suspects were served with
notices to submit wealth statements.
Around 141 cases were filed against
former ministers, state ministers and
lawmakers including chiefs of the two
main political parties -the BNP and the
Awami League (AL). Besides ACC,
National Board of Revenue (NBR) also
filed cases for tax dodging, and some
individuals filed extortion cases against
some high-profile political personalities
including the chief of the AL. Bank
accounts of these accused persons were
asked to freeze. The government also
set up nine special courts on the
national parliament complex to deal
with the graft cases filed by the ACC
and the NBR. Some of the cases were
brought under the Emergency Power
Rules (EPR). The prosecution status
during 2007-08 can be seen from the
following table.
Ta
ble
2:
Pro
sec
uti
on
The ACC gave final reports on 240 graft
cases, exonerating a total of 403 people
from various charges. Considering the
above data, it is quite evident that the
Commission showed much better
performance than the earlier Bureau –
the BAC. Undeniably the entire nation
was amused by the courage of the
Commission’s institutional initiative.
The arrests of these corrupt politicians
led many to believe that a new political
age was imminent. Unfortunaly, as the
government's self-imposed deadline of
election was coming closer, this
strategy started to fadeout. Many of the
politicians were released from prison.
The well-publicized anti-graft
campaign which was meant to be the
foundation of CTG's reform lost its
accomplishments. Now the question is-
whether the role of ACC is dynamic or
not? What are its problems?
The effectiveness and success of a
public organization depends on the
degree of faith amongst the people. In
case of the Commission it seems to be
losing its strength in the process of
combating corruption. From a legal
point of view, the Commission is still
weak to perform a positive role. As per
article 25 and 30 the organizational
set-up of the Commission and its
budget shall be determined by the
government. It means that any
government can interfere in the ACC
activities. Besides, the ACC is now
under the Cabinet Division, which also
raises the question of its
independence.
There were several weaknesses in the
proceedings for preparing cases of the
ACC. According to one legal expert, "As
a result of the High Court verdict all the
notices the ACC has issued asking
people to submit wealth statement will
be cancelled. The ACC notice was not
served in accordance with the ACC Act.
The commission could have issued the
notice after certain formalities,
including primary enquiry and
investigation, but it could not produce
any document regarding any such
enquiry and investigation.”32 As a
result of these shortcomings many of
the ACC efforts are now being
challenged in the higher courts
apparently for not maintaining
procedures properly in serving notices
for wealth statements and conducting
investigations. In many cases the anti-
graft watchdog also had to accept some
wealth statements even after the
submission deadline expired following
order from the higher court. These
events have made the ACC activities
sluggish.
The anti-corruption drive could not
progress properly due to lack of field-
level experience and poor coordination
as well as understanding among those
involved. Even the taskforce members
from the defenses, who played a key
role in probing corruption allegations,
reported difficulties in ensuring quality
investigation and mentioned that lack
of skill or expertise hampered the
process. According to the chief
coordinator of the NCC, "Many of us
involved in the process of enquiry and
investigation lack experience. The task
force members [under the coordination
committee] from the army, navy and air
force also do not have that kind of
experience in investigation. This has
specially affected the pace of progress of
investigation. We are dealing with high
profile people, many of whom were
involved in corporate corruption. To tell
you the truth, none of our departments
has any experience of [probing]
corporate corruption.”33 As a result, the
rate of executing suspects reduced.
Bringing the cases under EPR was
challenged in the higher courts as the
time of the incidents taking place was
much earlier than proclamation of the
state of emergency. This added to the
slowness of the legal proceedings.
The Commission initiated a drive against
institutional corruption. It was almost
impossible to collect all the pieces of
evidence for a standard investigation as
the task given to a single person was
huge in comparison with the timeline.
The Commission could not even look into
70,000 allegations submitted by
individuals since its inception due to
excess workload.
According to law, the Commission is
mandated as independent, self-governed
and neutral entity. It consists of three
Commissioners; of them one as the
chairman and all appointed by the
President on the recommendation of
the Selection Committee for a period of
four years from the date of their
appointment. From November 2004 to
till now (almost five years) any chairman
One of the main reasons for dissolving
the earlier Bureau was immense
corruption of the officials who were
closely related with investigation.
Unfortunately a number of former
members from defunct Bureau were
included in the ACC. Thus the
transparency, effectiveness and
institutionalization of the new ACC
became questionable.
The ACC published a verdict list
consisting of top politicians and their
relatives. Undoubtedly it was a
courageous progress. But most of them
got bail from the high court and thereby
the institutional value was under doubt.
Recently the government has
withdrawn 62 political cases out of 112
reviewed cases filed under the penal
code and the Anti- Corruption
Commission Act. The politicians opine
that during the caretaker government
the ACC was used to harass political
leaders.
The politicization of state institutions
results in administrative and policy
choices for partisan advantage. It
renders institutional managers and civil
servants unwilling to resist the
pervasive culture of corruption. It is
observed that, changes in the
governance structure in the past have
led to various changes in the structure
of the BAC. At one point it was brought
under the control of the President and
at another point it was shifted to the
PM’s Office. A close examination of
certain cases indicates that obtaining
permission for carrying out an
investigation from the PM’s office
requires 4 to 9 years. In addition,
several functions of the BAC were
activated through ordinance at various
points in time. Despite many attempts
to make it an effective agent for
combating corruption, the BAC was
and commissioner could not complete
their tenure of four years. In fact two
former chairmen had resigned only
because of political pressure. If such is
the case, there will be hardly any
difference between the ACC and the
defunct Bureau.
ineffective due to negligence of officials
at the inquiry/investigation stage,
unnecessary time taken in conducting
inquiry/investigation and lack of proper
planning at the inquiry/investigation
level. Moreover disruptive transfer of
officials involved in investigation, delay
in obtaining permission for carrying out
investigation, stay or suspension order
of the court, submission of weak charge-
sheet and lack of witnesses also created
obstacles for effective functioning of the
BAC. In addition incapability of the
inquiry/investigation officials and lack
of proper training had been another
phenomenon. It was observed that from
1994 to 1999, only 90 BAC officials had
received training.
For the reason that prior permission has
to be obtained from the PM, no charges
are usually brought against any person
affiliated with the ruling party. Thus the
Bureau could not take independent
action on charges brought against the
members of the ruling party. According to
data received until April 12, 2001, the
Bureau filed 151 cases against prominent
people including Ministers, MPs, former
Secretaries, Additional Secretaries and a
few senior officials of autonomous bodies.
After completing inquiries and obtaining
the permission of the concerned
government authority, cases were filed.
Charge-sheets for the filed cases had been
submitted at the concerned courts. No
cases however completed trial. All
political cases filed during the years 1991
to 2000 were at either inquiry or
investigation and trial stage. It is worth
noticing that when a new party assumes
office charges are brought against the
Ministers/MPs of the previous
government. From a TIB survey it is
revealed that 64.3% of the respondents
think that government uses or wants to
use the institution as a weapon for
repression of the opposition.34 As a result
of this trend the Bureau was basically
known as “a weapon for repression of the
opposition”. The Bureau also lacked
authority to take action against senior
officials. If there was a case filed against
an official considered for promotion,
improper pressure was brought to the
Bureau to write a note stating that there
was no basis for the case filed and that
there was no possibility of proving the
case.
The ACC was named as an ‘Independent’
Anti-corruption Commission, but it was
still under the PM’s Office. As a result of
this, the consequences of all corruption
cases remained the same, because, like
the Bureau, the so-called independent
ACC was politically-motivated and was
used for political purposes. It is evident
that the CTG also used the ACC as a tool
to repress politicians. The aim of the
CTG was to embark on political reforms,
but soon, the reforms of the political
party had been diverted into "minus
two" formula. As a result the ACC was
used to suppress politics and politician
instead of curbing corruption.
Political culture in Bangladesh is
characterised by mistrust,
misperception and disagreement.
Following example will describe the
scenario of mistrust and intolerance
among the political parties in
Bangladesh. In 2001, when Bangladesh
according to TIB report, became the
most corrupt country achieving lowest
CPI score, then the ruling party did not
accept the report. They blamed the
opposition for it and branded it as a
misleading report. On the other hand
the opposition blamed the ruling party
for this discredit. Next year, in 2002
when Bangladesh again became the top
most
corrupt country under the changed
administration, same sort of
mudslinging went on. The political
parties therefore are always ready to
blame each other rather than curbing
corruption.
Conclusion
No society is totally free of corruption,
but with appropriate institutional and
legislative measures, corruption can be
kept within acceptable limits. This
requires a systematic, comprehensive
and long-term approach. In order to
perform successfully the institutions
charged with combating corruption
must be given adequate freedom,
necessary resources and logistic
facilities. The following institutional
steps can be taken to make the ACC
effective.
The ACC must be independent politically
as well as operationally from outside
influence in order to enable it to
pursue corruption allegations at all
levels. For reducing corruption to the
minimum it needs to be accorded a
constitutional status like PSC or the
Election Commission and the constitution
should be amended towards this goal.
Moreover the ACC needs to operate on
the basis of solid and comprehensive
legal frameworks and new laws should
be adopted as necessary. Its manpower
should be increased to deal with large
number of cases and clear the back log.
The ACC must have adequate powers of
investigation, i.e. to question witnesses,
access to documents, as well as the
possibility to prosecute where required.
The ACC also needs to develop a
coherent and holistic strategy for
combating corruption, focusing on
prevention, investigation and
awareness raising. To make the ACC
more responsive to the public, its
activities should be conducted in a
transparent manner. Management of
finance and staff should also strictly
follow the standard rules and regulations.
One of the main reasons of closure of the
Bureau was endless corruption of its own
staff. It is observed that, after the
formation of the ACC many of them could
manage absorption and regular
appointment. As such the recruitment
process in the ACC is to be proper
and without any bias. The officials need
appropriate training so that morality
bound and promise-determined
manpower is created.
Simultaneously other institutional
aspects of governance need to be
strengthened. The judiciary should be
free from executive intervention so that
legal process can establish rule of law.
The accountability structure of the
officials should be strengthened so that
stringent actions can be taken against
those who nurse corrupt process. To
keep corruption at bay, procurement
systems must be based on transparency,
competition, and objectivity. Civil society
organizations can come forward and
mobilize people’s resistance movements
p.130
3. Mark, E. Warren, op: cit. p. 7
4. Ibid. p. 8
5. Nye, J. S., “Corruption and Political
Development : A Cost-Benefit
Analysis”, M. U. Ekpo (ed.),
Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Toward a Search for Causes and
Consequences, Washington, D. C.:
University Press of America, 1979, pp.
257-266
6. Leff, H. N., “Economic Development
through Bureaucratic Corruption”, M.
U. Ekpo (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption
in Sub- Saharan Africa: Toward a Search
for Causes and Consequences,
Washington D. C. : University Press of
America, 1979. pp. 234-247
7. Rose-Ackerman, S., Corruption: A Study in
Political Economy, New York: Academic
Press, 1978, pp. 1-10
8. Akhter, Muhammed, Yeahia, Electoral
Corruption in Bangladesh, Burlington,
USA, Singapore, Sydney, Ashgate, 2001

against all sorts of corruption. All 9. Fredrick, C. J., The Pathology of Politics
Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and
government employees, ministers,
Propaganda, New York: Harper & Row,
Members of Parliament and politicians 1978, p. 127
should declare their assets every year
whether it is in their own names or in
the names of family members. All
outdated laws preventing the people’s
rights to information, including the
Official Secrets Act 1923, must be
abolished and the Right to Information
(RTI) must be practiced to ensure
transparency and free flow of
information. Appointment of sector-
wise ombudsmen as per article 77 of
the constitution can make a difference in
ensuring accountability, especially in the
key sectors of public service. Application
of e-governance in all sectors will reduce
paper work and will introduce
automation that will result in a more
transparent system. The ultimate source
of strength in anti-corruption movement
is the people and as such their
awareness and participation in the form
of a social movement with active
support of all the stakeholders,
especially the media are the demand of
the time.
Notes and References
1. Mark, E. Warren, “What does Corruption
Mean in a Democracy”, American Journal
of Political Science, Vol- 48, Issue-2,
April-2004, pp. 3-24
2. Barker, Ernest (Trans.), The Politics of
Aristotle, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1948,
10. Amundsen, I., “Corruption: Definitions and Concepts”, Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, Draft- 17,
January, 2000
11. Tanzi, V., “Corruption Around the World- Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4, December, 1998
12. USAID, “Bangladesh: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices”, National Survey Covering Democracy and Governance Issues, 2004
13. Joseph, J. Senturia, “Political Corruption”, R. A. Edwin Selingam and others (Eds), Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vols. III and IV, London,
1931, p. 448
14. Rabby, A. M. M., “Natures, Characteristics and Trends of Corruption in Bangladesh”, Journal of Bangladesh Public Administration Training
Centre, Dhaka, Vol.-5, Krattik 1407, p. 20
15. Kochanek, S. A., Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh, Dhaka: UPL, 1993
16. Gould, D.J., “Administrative Corruption: Incidence, Causes, and Remedial Strategies”, A. Farazmand (ed), Handbook of Comparative and
Development Public Administration, New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1991, pp. 467-480
17. Alam, M. S., “Corruption in Administration”, (in Bangla), Bangla Bazar Patrika (a vernacular Daily Newspaper), January 28-29, 1996
18. Ibid
19. Transparency International Bangladesh, “Corruption Database Report”, 2005
20. Karim, R. and Sharmin, R., “Bangladesh Public Service Commission: A Diagnostic Study”, Transparency International Bangladesh, 22
March, 2007
21. Mustafa, S., "Corruption Costs Millions, says UNDP”, Financial Express, 31 July, 1997
22. Franda, M., Bangladesh: The First Decade, New Delhi: South Asian Publisher, 1982
23. Klitgaard, R., & Ronald, M., Corruption Cites, Washington D. C.: World Bank Institute, Abaroa and H Lindesy Press, 2000, p. 24
24. http://intra.undp.org/bdp/anticorruption/sourcebook_ati.htm
25. Tanzi, V., “Corruption Around the World- Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4, December, 1998,
pp. 568-572
26. Zahid, S. H., “Corruption—Ranking and Reality”, Financial Express, 24 October, 2005
27. Transparency International Bangladesh, “Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey”, 2002
28. Tanzi, V., op.cit p 583
29. Chetwynd, Chetwynd, and Spector, ‘Corruption and Poverty: A Review of Recent Literature’, Management Systems International,
January, 2003
30. Hossain, M., “Fighting Corruption a Tall Order for the Government”, The Financial Express, 12th April, Dhaka, pp. 1-4
31. The Daily Star, January 11, 2008
32. The Daily Star, February 14, 2009
33. Manik, A. J. Hossain, E., “Petty corruption ails people despite year-long drive-Crackdown targeted large-scale individual graft only”, The
Daily Star, February 14, 2009
34. Transparency International Bangladesh, Bureau of Anti Corruption Fact Finding Report, December, 2001, pp. xiv-xvii.
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