A History of Social Influence Research

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Handbook of the History of Social Psychology
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A History of Social Influence Research
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Radmila Prislin, William D. Crano
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15 A history of social influence research
Radmila Prislin and William D. Crano

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The study of social influence has been a defining feature of Nineteenth-century thought on social influence
social psychology since it helped to bring social psychology to
Ever-turbulent European history has inspired numerous inter-
the family of psychological sciences more than a century ago.
pretations and reinterpretations of social issues in response to
Social influence was incorporated in early definitions of social
conflicting social, economic, and political interests. The long
psychology (e.g., Allport, 1924; Gault, 1921; Sprowls, 1927),
19th century that, according to some, started in 1789 with the
and it is included in Gordon Allport’s (1954, p. 5) widely quoted
French Revolution and did not end until 1914 with the First
manifesto that social psychology seeks “to understand and
World War introduced psychology as an effective explanatory
explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals
force of society and social movements. Violence that marked
are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence
this century, from the Reign of Terror in France through the
of other human beings.” Thus, it could be argued that a history
1848 Revolution in Europe and the 1871 Paris Commune, was
of social influence research is a history of social psychology.
attributed to the mechanism of suggestion. A psychological
The goal of this chapter, however, is to provide not a history
construct par excellence, suggestion was thought to transform
of the entire field, but rather a focused historical overview
individuals from rational and controlled to irrational and
of research on how individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and behav-
uninhibited, ultimately leading them to engage in destructive
iors are affected by real or imagined normative pressure.
behaviors. Importantly, this suggestion-caused transformation
How individuals respond to pressure that originates from
from thinking, self-controlled individuals to irrational, out-of-
what others deem appropriate is essential for regulation of
control destroyers occurred as individuals joined the masses.
social life. It is not surprising, therefore, that understanding
Although conceptions of the irrationality of the masses date
social influence is a core necessity for understanding social
to antiquity with Plato’s argument against democracy, it was the
psychology.
French thinker Le Bon (1841–1931) and his compatriot Tarde
Whereas the power of the social to influence an individual
(1843–1904), along with their Italian counterpart Sighele
has not ceased to inspire research, connotations afforded to
(1868–1913), who formalized and widely popularized the view
that power have varied over time. Much like a psychological
of the mindless masses. Drawing on Sighele’s (1892) analysis
equivalent of nuclear energy, social influence has been demon-
of “the criminal crowd,” Le Bon (1895/1969), in his influential
ized or glorified depending on whether it was used to destroy
book The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, defined the
or to empower. Social influence research, perhaps more than
crowd as a gathering of individuals operating according to “the
any other research in social psychology, has been shaped
law of mental unity” (p. 26). Le Bon argued that unity arises
by broader historical events that changed the fundamental
through the process of suggestion. In the spirit of the time, Le
conceptualization of the influence process and outcome. As this
Bon linked suggestion to a hypnotic-like state of mind in which
chapter will illustrate, social influence has been conceptualized
individuals accept others’ ideas uncritically. This acceptance is
as pathological and destructive or functional and adaptive.
always irrational, as the crowd was thought to rob its members
These conceptualizations have reflected the field’s views about
of individuality and intellectual faculties, replacing them with
the nature of the social and the nature of the individual, both of
heightened emotionality. The irrationality of crowd favors the
which have evolved in the context of historical events.
acceptance of extreme, “absolute” ideas and leaves no room for
In this chapter, we review major developments in the study
measured, nuanced thought. Moreover, because crowds are
of social influence from the late 19th century to the present. We
devoid of reason, they are easily swayed by contradictory ideas.
relate social influence research to the prevailing theoretical
Crowds are easily moved to action—mostly destructive and
and methodological approaches in psychology as they evolved
irresponsible, though possibly heroic too. The abdication of
during this period. Finally, we situate this research in the
critical thought, which renders crowds suggestible, also makes
broader historical context by highlighting how relevant socio-
them controllable. Le Bon observed that crowds can be influ-
political and economic events have inspired questions about
enced through repetition of extreme ideas, seeming affirmation
social influence and informed models of social influence.
of crowd interests, and appeals to prestige. In so doing, he
322 Prislin and Crano
offered a pioneering description of social influence techniques. adoptive country, Sidis believed in the power of education in
It is hard not to notice a certain cynicism in his recommendation preparing the masses for more informed, rational decision
of influence techniques to control the crowd, which he devalued making.
for being susceptible to those techniques. Not surprisingly,
Le Bon’s analysis of the crowd was embraced in political circles
Pioneering research on social influence:
antagonistic to the democratic social movements in France at
Demystifying suggestibility
the time, and to the idea of democracy in general.
While subscribing to the basic idea about suggestibility and Late 19th-century thought on suggestion was speculative,
the irrationality of crowds, Tarde (1893) limited these charac- descriptive, and quasibiological. It relied heavily on medical
teristics to physically interacting groups. As long as group and psychiatric analogies. Nonetheless, it is significant for the
members were physically dispersed, their “mental cohesion” history of social psychology because it influenced early theo-
would not be detrimental. In addition to physical separation, rizing about the nature of social groups (see Levine and
Tarde recommended membership in more than one group to Moreland, this volume), and provided impetus for the first
offset the suggestive power of the crowd. He also discussed empirical studies on social influence. Le Bon and Tarde were
principles of social influence. In his best known book, The not empiricists, and their evidence was limited to anecdotal and
Laws of Imitation, Tarde (1903) argued that influence (imita- historical examples. While at Harvard, Sidis (1896) conducted
tion) flowed top-down (the “law of descent”), in a rapid dissem- numerous studies on the “suggestion of ideas” in which he
ination (the “law of geometric progression”), and primarily exposed participants to series of letters and numbers varying in
within one’s own group (the “law of the internal before the frequency and order of presentation. In a free association task,
exotic”). His description of the principles of influence was participants who reported stimuli that had been presented most
detailed, but Tarde said less about the process of influence. His frequently and recently provided evidence for “the presence of
sketchy discussion linked the influence process to hypnotic suggestion in the average normal individual” (p. 34). Sidis did
somnambulism. Like Le Bon, Tarde and many other thinkers of not conduct empirical studies of what he called “social suggest-
the time relied on psychiatry for explanations of social psycho- ibility.” Rather, he illustrated this concept through anecdotes
logical processes. They were strongly influenced by the underscoring its pathological nature, arguing that the “integrity
Salpétrière School of psychiatry and its lead clinician Charcot, of personality is in inverse proportion of the number of aggre-
whose ideas about dissociation of consciousness helped to gated men” who influence each other (Sidis, 1896, p. 299).
explain crowd behavior.1 It took the French psychologist Alfred Binet (1857–1911),
Bringing similar ideas to the United States after leaving better known for his work on individual differences, to move
Russia and studying in France under Charcot, Sidis (1896) social influence from the dark alley of pathology to the bright
attributed suggestibility to a dissociation of the inferior nervous thoroughfare of the laboratory. Binet argued that “there is not a
system, which regulates reflexive, automatic actions, from the single fact of our mental life which may not be artificially
superior nervous system, responsible for controlled, inhibitory reproduced by the method of experiment” (Binet & Féré, 1890,
actions. In a somewhat more optimistic view of suggestibility, p. 173). Drawing on approaches to suggestion as an ordinary
Sidis differentiated between its “normal,” temporary form, rather than a pathological phenomenon (e.g., Bernheim, 1888),
which he considered a fundamental attribute of human nature Binet affirmed his interest in the everyday forms of influence
leading to sociability, and the “abnormal,” stable form that was that occur, for example, between students and teachers. In
responsible for social ills ranging from mental epidemics to collaboration with Henri, he published a series of studies on
revolts and mass movements. In contrast to Le Bon and Tarde, suggestibilité naturelle. In one of the studies, Binet and Henri
who considered individuals in a crowd exclusively as targets of (1894) asked groups of four children to match the length of the
influence, Sidis (1919) argued for bidirectionality of influence standard line presented on a card to one of the three lines
such that “everyone influences and is influenced in his turn” presented on a separate card. One of the three comparison lines
(p. 100). He offered a quasi-mathematical model of influence matched the standard, whereas two others differed from the
relating size of a crowd to its capacity to influence (energy). standard and from each other. The children were asked to
Sidis argued that establishing these relations was of vital announce their judgments publicly. After a few noneventful
concern to social psychology in general and social pathology in trials in which one of the comparison lines always matched the
particular. This position reflected a close tie between social standard, the children were shown comparison lines that
psychology on one hand and social pathology and abnormal differed from the standard. This removal of an obvious match to
psychology on the other; a tie reflected in the fact that a major the standard opened the gate for social influence. Binet and
outlet for social psychological research from 1921 to 1965 was Henri reported that when one child called out an incorrect
the Journal of Abnormal [Psychology] and Social Psychology. match, most others went along with the incorrect answer.
Although Sidis launched his theorizing from the same (sug- Binet and Henri did not link the process underlying the effect
gestibility) springboard as Le Bon, he arrived at a different to the “hysteric split of personality,” a “loss of personality,” or
conclusion regarding the implications of widespread mass similarly exotic phenomena from the pathology textbooks in
suggestibility for the political system. In the spirit of his vogue at the time. Rather, they argued that the effect had to do
15. Social influence research 323
with a mundane but powerful need for certainty. In support of psychology as an experimental, behavioristic, individual-based
this explanation, they demonstrated that older (and presumably science.
more certain) children were less influenced than younger
(and presumably less certain) children, and that the percentage
Social influence on performance: Early research on
of influenced children increased when they were asked to
how the social energizes the individual (behavior)
make judgments based on memory rather than in a direct
comparison of lines. In another of these studies, Binet and The studies at the close of the 19th century set the stage for two
Henri had the experimenter ask children if they were certain lines of research on social influence: One concerned the manner
that their initial estimates of the lines were correct. In response, in which the social context informed an individual’s behavior in
some children changed their estimates. Speculating about the course of social interaction; another concerned the effects of
possible reasons, Binet and Henri offered a pioneering catego- the mere presence of others on individual behavior. It was the
rization of influence as either intellectual (influence intellectu- latter approach that initially received more attention, likely in
elle) or emotional (influence émotionnelle, p. 346). This series response to the growing needs of the rapidly industrializing
of studies was later expanded in a book that discussed influence western societies for an efficient means of educating the work-
in terms of individual differences in suggestibility (Binet, force. Nowhere was the need emphasized more than in the
1900), which received a favorable review in the United States newly unified Germany, whose emperor Wilhelm II directly
(Seashore, 1901). called for the reform of the educational system (see Jahoda,
At approximately the same time, Féré (1887) published a 2007). The burning issue of the day was the efficacy of class-
book that introduced experiments on the phenomenon that room instruction—could students learn as much in a classroom
would later become known as social facilitation. Still working surrounded by other students as they could alone?
within the prevailing concept of suggestion, Féré compared the Who better to answer the question than the newly emerging
effect of verbal suggestions to the effect of “suggestion by science of psychology? Two of Wundt’s students, Oswald Külpe
gestures.” In a typical study, Féré used a dynamometer to and Ernst Meumann, teamed up with two teachers, Friedrich
measure the pressure exerted by the hand grip of a participant Schmidt and August Mayer, to attack the problem. In what
who worked alone and with minimal instructions to hold the became known as “German experimental pedagogy,” they
device. Then the participant was asked to hold the dynamom- employed the state-of-the art method of experimentation to
eter “with all his might.” Finally, the participant performed the compare students’ performances under varying conditions of
same task, only this time in the presence of another person also physical isolation or in the presence of other students, sometimes
holding a dynamometer. Féré reported that whereas verbal introducing competition in the latter condition. Addressing the
instruction to hold the dynamometer with all one’s might full spectrum of the curriculum from arithmetic and composition
augmented normal dynamometric force by a few degrees, the to dictation and memorization, they came to the conclusion
presence of another person engaged in the same activity welcomed by all with vested interest in cost-effective educa-
increased the force twofold. tion—with some exceptions, children learned faster and better in
Extending Féré’s study, which he considered “the most the classroom (group) than in isolation (individually) (Mayer,
important work done in the field of Dynamogeny,” Triplett 1903; Meumann, 1904; Schmidt, 1904). Although the reasons
(1898, p. 531) introduced the element of competition in his for the group superiority remained elusive, they were thought to
research. He compared the speed with which a child turned a reside in students’ enhanced “will” in the presence of others.
fishing reel when alone against the child’s speed when This line of research was deemed so important that it merited a
competing against another child. Reasoning that the two condi- review in the prestigious journal Science (Burnham, 1910).
tions were identical in terms of alternative hypotheses devel- Building on this work, Moede (1914, 1920) examined the
oped in other competitive endeavors such as bicycle or boat effects of the presence of others on the basic psychological
racing (e.g., “shelter from the wind, encouragement, brain functions of sensory thresholds, attention, and memory. His
worry, hypnotic suggestions, and automatic movement”), he interests in social influence were both practical—Moede is
observed that the only factor that could account for different considered a founding father of industrial psychology—and
performance was “the bodily presence of another contestant . . . theoretical. His theoretical platform of crowd psychology paid
[that] serves to liberate latent energy not ordinarily available” homage to Le Bon; however, his systematic, experimental
(p. 533). Ingenious in its design, the study’s findings proved approach to social influence, in which he varied the size and the
inconclusive: Half the children in the study performed faster nature of others’ presence, was utterly modern. By experimen-
when competing with others, but the other half was slower or tally creating rudimentary crowds, in the form of others’ phys-
not affected at all. ical presence, Moede hoped to elucidate in the laboratory the
A half century later, Triplett’s study was afforded the status processes responsible for crowding effects. His theory-driven,
of the first social psychological experiment (G. Allport, 1954). systematic research represents one of the first programmatic
Yet, neither his nor Féré’s research was mentioned in the first approaches to a social psychological phenomenon.
two social psychology textbooks (McDougall, 1908; Ross; Yet, it was not Moede, but Floyd Allport (1890–1978), that
1908), nor in Floyd Allport’s (1919) manifesto for social elevated experimental research on social influence, and through
it, experimental research on social psychological phenomena in quality and the latter the quantity of work. This research continued
general, to the status of science. Allport (1919, 1924) acknowl- at Syracuse University, where Allport founded the first doctoral
edged “experimental pedagogy” and Moede’s research as illus- program in social psychology and, like Galton and Wundt before
trative of the potential of social psychology as a science. His him, instituted there the culture of tireless data collection (see
agenda, however, went beyond the narrow focus of the two Crano and Lac, this volume). His students collected data both in
lines of inquiry. Allport situated the general study of psycho- the laboratory and in the field, observing conformity to traffic,
logical phenomena in the social context, conceptualizing the factory, and religious rules. In a post-hoc account of his findings,
social as (physical presence of) other individuals. This concep- Allport (1934) proposed his J-curve theory of conforming
tualization, radically different from many that dominated the behavior, according to which most individuals exhibited
field at the time, left culture, social history, social structure, and maximum conformity to any pertinent rule, with fewer and fewer
similar issues out of the domain of social psychology. Yet it had individuals engaging in behaviors that increasingly departed
the huge advantage of being amenable to experimentation. With from the rule. Criticized as tautological and challenged by nonco-
his conceptualization of the social, Allport brought social operative findings (Murphy, Murphy, & Newcomb, 1937), the
psychological research to the family of psychological studies theory faded away without leaving much of a trace.2
whose primary focus was on effects that were local, proximal, Research on the effects of coacting others, which dominated
short-term, and decomposable (Danziger, 2000). European and Northern American social psychology of the
In making social psychology a science, Allport first had to early 20th century (Dashiell, 1935), became prominent else-
dispose of constructs of the past. Thundering against the where as foreign graduates from Harvard returned to their
“fallacy of the group” reflected in the popular construct of the native countries (e.g., Sengupta & Sinha, 1926). It soon was
group (crowd, social) mind, Allport (1919; see also Gault, extended to the effects of competitive and cooperative relations
1921; Thomas, 1904) blamed the construct for keeping social with others as these were of both “practical and . . . method-
psychology in the dark ages while general psychology was ological importance” (Whittemore, 1924, p. 236). Much of this
marching forward as a science. Leading the charge against the research was conducted with the goal of improving industrial
group mind as a supraindividual entity, Allport essentially efficiency on the factory floor as well as in the classroom
threw out the baby (group) with the bath water (group mind). (Hurlock, 1927). A noteworthy contribution to this line of
Arguing that the group does not exist as “an elementary fact” research came from Russia where Bekhterev (1928/1932,
(p. 297) and therefore cannot serve as an explanatory factor, 1908/1998) was leading efforts to establish the relative merits
Allport envisioned social psychology as a science that focuses of different relationships in interacting groups in reaching veri-
on the individual as a unit of analysis, behaviorism as a theo- fiably accurate judgments and other indicators of the quality
retical orientation, and experimentation as a method of inquiry. and the quantity of performance.3 As a founder of “objective
This orientation resonated not only with the currents in general psychology” who considered psychology a branch of biology,
psychology but also with the Zeitgeist in American society. Bekhterev believed that social influence, like any other psycho-
Advocating individualism at a time of industrial conflict and logical phenomenon, could be reduced to the elemental level of
political conservatism in the United States of the early 20th (un)modifiable reflexes.
century proved helpful in the development, promotion, and ulti- Early empirical research on social influence focused on the
mate acceptance of Allport’s vision of social psychology effects of mere presence of others as audience or coactors on
(Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991). various indicators of performance. Only rarely did early studies
For all his contribution to establishing social psychology as examine social influence among interacting individuals or indi-
a science, Floyd Allport struggled with his initial position that viduals in consequential social relationships. This socially
the group does not exist as “an elementary fact” (Allport, 1919, impoverished context likely was dictated by pragmatic as much
p. 297). In his later work he softened his position, stating that as by theoretical reasons. Operationalizations of the social as
by the time he published Institutional Behavior (Allport, 1933) the mere presence of others were easy. Their simplicity not only
he “had come through my period of ‘pure individual deter- was elegant but had a scientific “aura” of a variable amenable to
minism’ . . . a view which sociologists had rightly criticized as manipulation in the tradition of the physical (“hard”) sciences.
slighting social reality” (Allport, 1974, p. 16). Moreover, it fit the prevailing behavioristic orientation in which
Allport’s research on social influence is exemplary of his social factors were treated as stimuli and performance factors as
vision of social psychology as a study of “those responses of the responses. The behaviorists’ aversion of the nonobservable kept
individual which are conditioned by . . . the behavior of others” all discussion of underlying processes rudimentary. For all its
(1919, pp. 300–301). Allport conducted this research at the claim to scientific status, however, behaviorism could not
suggestion of his mentor at Harvard, Hugo Münsterberg, a account for a growing accumulation of inconsistent findings.
German-born expatriate who was well informed about previous Rather than resolving inconsistencies, the field largely lost
research on social influence conducted in his country of origin. interest in the audience effect and research on social influence
Comparing the performance of individuals when working in moved to different themes.
isolation with those working in the presence of coworkers, It would take more than a half century—and Robert Zajonc’s
Allport (1920) concluded that the former condition favored the ingenuity—to solve the mystery of inconsistent audience
effects. Ironically, his solution would strip away the social simplistic notion of the individual as a passive target of social
nature of the phenomenon even further, to its hormonal and stimuli. Championing the Gestalt approach that would come to
biochemical roots. Zajonc (1965) argued that the mere presence dominate social psychology, Sherif (1935) wrote in his debut
of others, either as spectators or as coactors, increased physio- article:
logical arousal, which in turn enhanced enactment of a domi-
nant response. When the dominant response was the correct Social psychology has studied individual differences in
one, as in well-learned or simple activities, the result was social response to a social environment, but it has never recognized
facilitation of performance. In contrast, when the dominant that each one of us perceives this environment in terms of his
own personal habits in perceiving; and that cultural groups
response was incorrect, as in not-yet-learned or complex activi-

may differ from one another in behavior, because of funda-
ties, the result was social inhibition. Far from being exclusively
mental differences in their ways of perceiving social situation
human, social facilitation and social inhibition are observable . . . The individual acquires a certain set of norms from child-
in other animal species, including cockroaches. hood . . . These norms determine to a considerable extent . . .
which aspects of a field of stimulation he will accentuate and
The role of social influence in structuring reality: which he will ignore.
(p. 5, emphasis in original)4
Sherif’s research on norm formation
Muzafer Sherif (né Muzafer Serif Basoglu, 1906–1988) earned Thus, far from passively reacting to the social context, Sherif’s
his place in social psychology’s hall of fame by making vital homunculus was actively engaged with the social environment
contributions to several lines of research. The first evidence of to make sense of the world.
his creative genius came from his approach to social influence, Because norms serve as the standards of reference for
which he redirected from the apparent blind alley of social facil- orienting to the world, Sherif (1936) considered it vital for
itation to the open spaces of norm formation. He offered a novel social psychology to explain their formation, maintenance, and
theoretical approach to the study of social influence and demon- change. Drawing on Durkheim’s account of the formation of
strated conclusively that social psychology need not denounce representations collectives, and the Chicago School’s socio-
the group to be a science. Along with Lewin, Newcomb, and logical analysis of small group functioning in the interstitial
Murphy, Sherif redefined social psychology in the 1930s. areas of large cities, Sherif reasoned that people facing an unfa-
Sherif’s personal experience, the sociopolitical milieu, and miliar, unstructured environment do not succumb to chaos.5
the broader scientific thought of the time likely converged to Instead, they impose structure to make sense of the situation by
shape his approach to social influence. Sherif (1935, 1936, developing a common norm. They do so through a process of
1961) repeatedly referred to all these factors as inspiration for social interaction whereby each person influences and is influ-
his thinking about social psychological phenomena (see also enced by others who face the same uncertain context. Thus,
Gorman, 1981). He was born into a prominent Turkish family Sherif considered social influence an active process of orienta-
and raised during the dramatic transition of his native country tion in the world rather than a frightening imposition of the
from a fallen empire to a modern republic. As a graduate student group on a hapless individual who is forced (consciously or
at Harvard and later at Columbia, Sherif witnessed how rugged unconsciously) into following social dictates.
individualism in the economy had led to the Great Depression, To study norm formation experimentally, Sherif needed an
giving rise to the New Deal. While Roosevelt was implementing unstructured situation that was open to multiple interpretations,
large-scale social programs in the United States, the Nazis were and whose validity could not be evaluated against an estab-
on the march in Europe. These historical events brought social lished, external criterion, or prior experience. A perceptual illu-
issues and group processes to the forefront of public interest and sion, the autokinetic effect, provided just such a situation. This
scientific inquiry. It was during this historical period that anthro- illusion refers to the seeming movement of a stationary pinpoint
pological studies began to document the cultural relativism of of light in an otherwise dark environment void of any identifi-
many psychological phenomena. When Bartlett (1932) famously able physical features. Whereas everyone sees the light moving,
demonstrated the powerful role of culture in remembering, people differ in their estimates of how far it travels. Sherif
psychology took notice. Even elemental psychological processes recorded wide differences in the estimates his participants gave
had to be situated in the social context. Nowhere was this intel- individually. When they approached the task collectively, with
lectual Zeitgeist more present than at Columbia University each individual calling estimates aloud over a number of trials,
where Sherif, Newcomb, and other students in the 1930s were they gradually converged toward a consensual estimate of the
exposed to a healthy interchange of ideas among social psychol- light’s movement. Apparently, along with their own primitive
ogists, anthropologists, and psychoanalysts. As a result, most of perceptual inputs, in the absence of any other useful features,
them conceived social psychology more broadly than did Floyd participants relied on each other’s judgments to establish what
Allport, incorporating not only short-term but also long-term was real in the situation.
effects of the social environment on individuals. The norm that emerged in the autokinetic experiments was
In addition to subscribing to a much broader conception of not an average of the individual estimates, nor was it identical
social psychology, Sherif parted ways with behaviorism and its with the initial estimates of any one of the individuals involved.
Once formed, the convergent norm survived even without the lived. The young Newcomb grew up embracing the values that
immediate physical presence of the individuals who formed it. oriented him toward learning and education as instruments of
It endured in new settings in which participants moved to other social progress. Upon graduating from Columbia University, he
groups, where they proved resistant to new estimates inconsis- accepted a position at the newly established Bennington College
tent with those of the initially formed norm. Sherif took these for women. He was eager to put to action John Dewey’s then
findings as evidence that the norm represented a genuine accep- revolutionary ideas about education as experimentation and
tance of the consensual judgment rather than acquiescence to discovery. At Bennington, Newcomb found colleagues who
implicit social demands. This interpretation received additional shared both his disdain for delivering preordained knowledge
support in subsequent studies demonstrating that participants to students and his enthusiasm for teaching by engaging
adhered to a norm as much as a year after they initially formed students in critical analysis. The educational discourse at
it in interaction with others (Rohner, Baron, Hoffman, & Bennington included not only the classics but also the study of
Swander, 1954). Participants even adhered to a norm that they social issues provoked by the still raging Great Depression.
observed being formed by a group of confederates; and the This liberal intellectual milieu challenged not only the tradi-
norm persisted even when the norm-forming group was tional ways of academia but also the conservative orientation
removed from the setting and could not possibly monitor the that entering students of privilege brought to Bennington.
observer’s compliance or deviation (Hood & Sherif, 1962). Newcomb’s genius was in recognizing that the clash provided
It is important to recognize that norms evolve and can an extraordinary opportunity to study the natural evolution of
survive their creators. When an extreme norm was created by a social influence. Reasoning that his students’ conservative
group of confederates who subsequently left the group one by orientation would be tested by the new social context they
one as each new member joined in, it survived up to five gener- entered, Newcomb assessed the political and economic atti-
ations after the last confederate had left the group (Jacobs & tudes of each student cohort each year for four years. In support
Campbell, 1961). As would be expected, in the absence of any of his hypothesis that social attitudes evolve within a social
additional support, the original norm gradually erodes with context, Newcomb (1943) found a consistent, gradual change
every new group member, to be replaced eventually with the away from conservatism as his students progressed through the
typical norm found in the control group. college. This change was more marked than the comparative
As these studies illustrate, Sherif interpreted social influence change observed at several other colleges, suggesting the
in terms of orientation and stabilization of behavior in an Bennington effect rose above and beyond the general social
unstructured situation over a period of time rather than as a trend. A wealth of data about students’ individual characteris-
result of susceptibility to social pressure. In this approach, tics and relationships revealed that the change in political
social influence is a process of a rational orientation to the orientation was predicated on their social networks: It was
world in which individuals integrate their perceptions with pronounced among students who accepted Bennington as their
those of others to model reality and, in turn, to serve as models reference group, but not among those who maintained close ties
of reality for others. The outcome of this information-weighting to their families. Students who changed maintained their liberal
process can be highly functional. It can equip individuals with orientation throughout their lives. They did so by selectively
tools for navigating the complexities of life. entering into relationships that supported their views and struc-
Sherif and his collaborators (1954/1961) demonstrated the turing their social environments in ways that facilitated expres-
adaptive nature of norms in their famous Robbers Cave study. sion of their positions (Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991;
That study, whose echoes reverberate well beyond the social Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks, & Warwick, 1967).
influence domain, showed that when previously unacquainted The Bennington study was the first to highlight the recip-
boys were brought together in a summer camp, they spontane- rocal causation between social relationships and social influ-
ously developed norms that defined a range of acceptable ence. Social relations shape and are shaped by the process of
behaviors in the novel camp setting. These norms enabled the social influence: People are as much agents as recipients of
boys to solve problems and achieve desired goals in a mutually (outside) environmental influences. This approach erased
cooperative way. the simplistic stimulus–response (social context–individual)
distinction of behaviorism. Along with Sherif, Newcomb took
social influence from the realm of the reactive, instantaneous,
Social influence over the life span: Newcomb’s
and irrational to the world of the dynamic, evolving, and
Bennington study
rational. Newcomb’s approach resonated with the emerging
Another giant who made lasting contributions to social group-focused, Gestalt orientation in social psychology. At a
psychology, Theodore Newcomb (1903–1984) was born into a more general level, his approach resonated with the activism of
family whose roots reached back to the early settlers of the the historic period in which American society met the momen-
United States. His family’s progressive orientation, traced back tous challenges of the Great Depression with large-scale
to his abolitionist ancestors, was espoused by his parents, both governmental programs. Newcomb believed in social
of whom had graduate degrees. This often left the family at psychology as a science whose ultimate goal was, or should be,
odds with neighbors in the rural Ohio community in which they the betterment of the human condition. Although his belief
came to be shared by many who worked in the field between anywhere to be had” (p. 16). In the absence of social support,
two world wars and shortly afterwards, few adopted his meth- disagreeing individuals not only yielded to the majority but also
odological approach (see Crano & Lac, this volume). The showed an increased galvanic skin response, which signaled
Bennington study still stands as a unique example of a large- distress (Smith, 1936). Yet the first indication that there is more
scale, longitudinal research of a social psychological phenom- than one way out of disagreement with the majority came early.
enon as it evolved over the span of a half century. Anticipating Asch’s masterful analysis of the complexity of
reactions to social influence, Barry (1931) reported substantial
individual differences in yielding to the majority. Not only did
Majority influence on the minority: Asch’s research
his participants vary in their behavioral responses, they also

on independence and conformity
reported a host of reasons that presumably guided their
Solomon Asch (1907–1996) was first among equals in the responses to the majority pressure. Indeed, Luchins (1944)
social influence hall of fame. He was born in Poland, which at warned that “to lump all (responses) under one heading of
the time was part of the Russian empire. His family immigrated ‘following’ . . . is to lose sight of the important differences
to the United States in 1920 in one of the many waves of Jewish among them” (p. 111).
migration from Russia. Along with Sherif and Newcomb, Asch Articulating these positions, Asch (1956) argued that “a
is a member of the great trio of Columbia University graduates theory of social influence should not be a theory of submission
whose work has left a lasting mark on social psychology. In to social pressure” (p. 3). He launched his research program on
addition to his groundbreaking research on social influence, “independence and conformity” using a procedure that now has
Asch made seminal contributions to the literature on impres- become part of the popular discourse: It required participants to
sion formation (see Eiser, this volume) and persuasion (see match one of the three comparison lines to a stimulus line over
Briñol and Petty, this volume). a series of judgment trials. The task was so simple and the
Asch’s first position at Brooklyn College brought him into correct answer so obvious that when judging in isolation,
contact with Max Wertheimer, whose Gestalt orientation participants were nearly perfectly accurate. This simple percep-
strongly influenced Asch’s approach not only to social influ- tual task turned into an epistemological nightmare when
ence but to social psychology in general. Asch’s next position at attempted in a social context in which several trained confeder-
Swarthmore, where he spent most of his career, brought him as ates gave the unanimous but wrong answer on specified judg-
colleagues Wolfgang Köhler and Hans Wallach. Interactions ment trials. Most participants went along with the incorrect
with these prominent members of the Gestalt school left an majority on at least some of the trials, and some on all of the
enduring mark on Asch. Thus, although he did not spend trials. Only a few remained independent.
his formative years in Europe, Asch nonetheless absorbed Regardless of their judgments, all participants were
much of the great European intellectual heritage. The Gestalt concerned about their disagreement with the majority. Asch’s
orientation permeated his entire body of work, resulting in a extensive post-experimental interviews with the participants
social psychology whose scientific rigor did not strip human provided some insight into their experience. Most participants,
behavior of its humanity or complexity. Without resorting to including the staunchest independents, felt doubt about their
the Faustian bargain that required sacrificing the soul (of accuracy. On the other hand, even the most pliable participants
human complexity) in exchange for scientific purity, Asch at times questioned the accuracy of the majority. Feeling right
conducted elegant studies that captured and contextualized the or wrong, therefore, did not translate directly to (non)indepen-
richness of human experience, thereby setting a high standard dent judgments. Asch emphasized that this finding would have
for the field. been lost had he recorded only “behavior” (judgments). His
Asch’s (1951, 1952) foundational work on social influence argument that participants’ thoughts and feelings were just as
started as an attempt to contextualize Sherif’s findings. He important as their behavior (judgments) reflected the Gestalt
suspected the social input to an individual’s judgment, so orientation, which would come to dominate social psychology
remarkable in Sherif’s studies in which participants lacked any through its cognitive orientation.
objective anchor for their judgments, would be substantially Asch’s finding about the extent to which an almost inescap-
reduced by the factual nature of the object of judgment. Some ably correct judgment could be turned into an incorrect judg-
supportive evidence for this assumption came from earlier ment when advocated by the majority surprised not only him
studies showing that the relative power of groups in influencing but the field as a whole. In contrast to many who oversimplified
individuals’ judgments varied as a function of the subjective the finding as evidence of human frailty, Asch took it as evidence
versus factual nature of the object of judgment (Moore; 1921; of the essential sociability of human beings. In retrospect, he
Wheeler & Jordan, 1929). These earlier studies took group argued, the finding that most participants had grave concerns
influence on a disagreeing individual for granted and sought about their disagreement with the majority and occasionally
only to quantify it. For example, Moore (1921) wrote that group yielded “assures me that the people studied were sensitive to the
opinion carries “such a weight of authority that even the most forces around them, that they responded with feeling; and—if
eccentric individual seeks some form of [group] support for his this expression be permitted—that they were human in the good
opinions, and is completely at a loss when no such support is sense of this term . . . I do not at all take these to be signs of
moral blemish. Rather, I would be concerned if they could not The master trio of social influence researchers, Sherif,
respond in these ways” (Asch, 1990, pp. 54–55). Newcomb, and Asch, established social influence as a basic and
Asch’s view of human sociability was elaborated in his adaptive social psychological process. Their three lines of
masterfully written text Social Psychology, first published in research converged on the conclusion that social influence
1952 and reprinted in 1987. In the text, Asch (1952) argued that operates to create socially shared reality, a prerequisite for any
the most fundamental problem of social psychology is the socially coordinated action. When faced with an unstructured
process by which veridical social perception is achieved: “In situation that lacks firm standards of judgment, or a novel situ-
society we become dependent on others for understanding, ation that introduces standards of judgment different from their
feeling, and extension of the sense of reality. But this relation own, people presumably approach the challenge rationally,
places a particular demand upon the participants in social creatively combining all available sources of information in an
action. If our dependence and trust are to have a solid ground, if adaptive reaction (Crano, 1970). The adaptive nature of reac-
we are to reach valid consensus, each must contribute out of his tions to social influence is evident in people’s responsiveness to
understanding and feeling” (p. 450). a multitude of operating factors, both internal and external.
Asch (1990) credited Campbell as the one who “alone Thus, for the pioneer researchers, social influence was a basic
among American psychologists . . . has grasped and scrutinizes social psychological process operating primarily to orient indi-
here a theme central to my thought: that there is an inescapable viduals to the world and to facilitate their coordination of
moral dimension to human existence” (p. 53).6 Campbell (1961, actions toward mutually shared goals.
1990) interpreted Asch’s participants’ reactions as rational
attempts to arrive at a socially shared understanding of reality,
Theorizing about the motivational underpinnings of
a necessity for coordinated social action. He theorized that in
reactions to social influence
the process, participants creatively combined readily available
perceptual information and socially supplied information, inter- The 1950s was a decade of theorizing about the motivational
preting them in the context of their prior relevant experience. It underpinnings of reactions to social influence. The authors
was precisely their prior experience of near-invariable agree- who followed in the early researchers’ footsteps accepted
ment with others in judging simple physical stimuli that was the idea about the crucial role of social influence in orienting
responsible for the conundrum they were forced to confront and individuals in the world. Subsequent researchers argued,
resolve. What Asch put to test, according to Campbell, was not however, that the epistemological motive, though paramount,
so much the strength of his participants’ character but their life- was not the only one operating in the social influence arena.
time of trust in others’ judgment. Campbell argued that what the They postulated, in addition, the existence of a relational
participants brought to the laboratory was as important as what motive. Although their specifics about the relational motive
they encountered in it. History mattered. varied, what emerged during this period was a dual-motive
Campbell’s theorizing did not lend itself to test within the approach to social influence, in which responses to influence
prevailing ahistorical model in social psychology. It was were seen as motivated by a need for socially shared reality,
contrary to the assumption implicit in much of social psycho- and also by concerns about their social implications. It is
logical research—that an individual arrives at the laboratory as probably more than a historical coincidence that the relational
a tabula rasa to be inscribed by directly perceived information implications were emphasized by scientists who were the
or socially supplied information. Yet Campbell’s reasoning can intellectual offspring of Kurt Lewin. Some (e.g., Festinger)
account for substantially lower levels of conformity found in studied under Lewin and others were second-generation
replications of Asch’s research conducted in different historical Lewinians (e.g., Deutsch, Gerard, Kelley, Raven), exposed to
periods (Bond & Smith, 1996; Lalancette & Standing, 1990; his influence through his students at the Center for Group
Perrin & Spencer, 1981), and for variations in conformity across Dynamics, founded by Lewin at MIT and later moved to the
cultures (Bond & Smith, 1996). It appears that Asch’s findings, University of Michigan.
at least partially, may have reflected the historical period and the Historically, the first distinction between the two types
cultural norms of the time. Asch conducted his research during of pressure toward uniformity in a group was offered by
the McCarthy political witch-hunt era in the US. With its insis- Festinger (1950). His theory of informal social communication
tence on blind loyalty without regard for evidence, McCarthyism postulated that the pressure to promote group locomotion
did not leave academe untouched. Even if Asch’s participants toward a goal and the pressure to arrive at the valid notion
were not aware that a loyalty oath was a job requirement in of social reality instigate communication, which ultimately
many institutions of higher education, they nonetheless had creates uniformity within the group. Building on this idea and
different standards of conduct compared with their contempo- Deutsch’s (1949) theory of cooperation and competition,
rary counterparts. It stands to reason that those standards guided Deutsch and Gerard (1955) postulated that people agree with
them as they navigated through the Rashomon of the Asch study, others for normative and informational reasons. In what became
trying as desperately as viewers of Kurosawa’s movie to under- a cornerstone of dual motive approaches to social influence,
stand whose version of reality was correct. Eventually, this they theorized that normative social influence involves
likely led most participants occasionally to yield to the majority. conforming to the positive expectations of another person, a
group, or oneself. In contrast, informational social influence responding, and in doing so, showed how social features
involves accepting the information others supply as evidence external to the persuasive message itself could affect conforming
about reality. and independent responses. Echoing Festinger, he postulated
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) inferred the nature of influence that motivations to secure rewards and avoid punishments
from the characteristics of the stimulus situation or the would elicit compliance. Compliant judgments supposedly
resulting behavioral response. For example, in an Asch-type emerge under a highly circumscribed set of conditions that
judgment task, they found greater agreement with others involve surveillance by the controlling agents. Compliant judg-
when the stimulus lines were removed after a brief presentation ments are imitative and public but their expression cannot serve
(vs. when the lines were constantly present). Presumably, the as a source of satisfaction. Rather it is the social effect of their
limited exposure to the judgment stimuli made participants expression that keeps them alive. In contrast, the motivation to
uncertain and increased their informational dependence on establish a relationship with the influencing agent should result
others. They also speculated that normative pressures operated in identification. Judgmental responses based on identification
more strongly when participants interacted face to face in supposedly do not depend on surveillance—they are thought to
the Asch task than in the privacy of their own cubicles in hold as long as the referent other is salient and valued. These
the laboratory. Stronger agreement in the former situation judgments are genuinely accepted and their expression serves
was taken as evidence of the working of normative social as a source of satisfaction. Yet, because they are primarily
influence. grounded in identification with the influencing agent, their
Subsequently developed models elaborated the nature of the specific content is largely irrelevant. Only when judgments are
normative motive. In their taxonomy of the bases of social adopted because they are congruent with the existing value
power, French and Raven (1959) listed five relational reasons system is their content intrinsically rewarding. This internaliza-
for agreeing with others. In asymmetrical relationships in which tion presumably occurs when the influencing agent is perceived
others have the power to satisfy one’s hedonic needs, a person as a credible source of information. Internalized attitudes are
agrees to secure reward, avoid punishments, or both. These expressed in the context in which the issue is relevant, regard-
incentives serve as the bases for agents’ reward and coercion less of surveillance or the salience of the relationship with the
power. In a different type of asymmetrical relationship that is influencing agent.
accepted rather than imposed, a person may go along with These theoretical frameworks offered a number of relational
others to establish a relationship with them or to identify with motives for responding to social influence and linked them to
them. Here, relationship incentives are reflected in agents’ different judgmental responses. Normative concerns were
referent power. In addition, a person may go along with others generally thought to result in agreeing with others. Although
in a position of legitimate authority afforded them within a Deutsch and Gerard (1955) allowed that “normative social
socially prescribed hierarchy of roles, or because the others influence can be exerted to help make an individual be an indi-
possess superior knowledge on a task. In these cases, relation- vidual and not merely a mirror or puppet of the group,” they
ship incentives are reflected in agents’ legitimate power and concluded that research “results are not particularly optimistic
expert power, respectively. for those who place a high value on the ability of an individual
Although important in its own right, establishing relational to resist group pressures which run counter to his individual
reasons for agreeing went beyond the development of a nomen- judgments” (p. 635). Normative influence, in other words, was
clature of motives. In French and Raven’s model, different equated with social control over the individual. Yet initial
motives were linked with different types of responding. theorizing about the nature of the individual’s agreement with
Although Festinger (1953) credited Lewin (1951)7 and French the group allowed for a continuum that could vary from a
(1944) with introducing the idea, it was he who first elaborated superficial, public compliance to genuine, private acceptance.
the distinction between public compliance with a source of Subsequently, however, normative influence was equated
influence and the private acceptance of influence. Festinger with yielding exclusively in public settings but not in private
(1953) postulated that to the extent that an individual strived to settings in which judgments do not have social consequences.
maintain a relationship, he or she would not only publicly There likely were multiple reasons for this simplification. The
comply but also privately accept social influence. In contrast, to still prevailing notion that individuality stands in contrast to
the extent to which an individual was restrained to a relation- sociality could not accommodate a genuine acceptance of
ship with a threat of punishment, he or she would publicly normative influence as force for internalized beliefs. Moreover,
comply but privately resist social influence. In an expansion of the extant methodological tools could not convincingly
Festinger’s binary distinction half a century later, Nail and his document relational reasons for agreeing beyond those related
colleagues constructed complex descriptive models meant to to social control (coercion and reward). At the broader,
include “all of the influence types that are generally recognized societal level, the Cold War era provided daily examples of the
as theoretically significant and conceptually distinct” (Nail, power of social control over publicly voiced individual opin-
MacDonald, & Levy, 2000, p. 454). ions. Thus, theoretical, methodological, and societal factors
Kelman (1958, 1961) offered a more nuanced model linking conspired to limit the operation of normative concerns to public
relational reasons for agreeing with different types of settings.
Empirical research in the post-Asch period: behavior as pathological, Milgram examined how far ordinary,
Conformity, polarization, and obedience psychologically healthy individuals would go in following an
authority’s orders to harm another individual. In an ostensive
Asch’s findings inspired an explosion of research on social
learning experiment in which they acted as “teachers,” partici-
influence. The 1950s and 1960s saw social psychologists hard
pants were ordered to give increasingly powerful electrical
at work “trying to come to terms with the apparently hard-to-
shocks to a confederate acting as a learner every time the learner
believe possibility that social reality may be more convincing
failed to perform a learning task correctly. Against all predic-
than sensory reality” (Riecken, 1961, p. 486). During this
tions, including those by experts in human behavior, most of the
period, research on social influence became the study of
participants were willing to administer the alleged punishment

conformity or yielding to social pressure. Interestingly, its anti-
that, if real, would have seriously harmed, perhaps even killed,
dote became conceptualized as deviance, replacing Asch’s
the hapless “learner.” Yet, while obeying the authority, partici-
“individuality” (e.g., Berg & Bass, 1961). Once the field settled
pants experienced their own anguish. Much like Asch’s partici-
on the conformity–deviance conceptualization of social influ-
pants, they struggled to reconcile social pressure with their own
ence, it channeled its efforts toward establishing situational
standards—but nonetheless succumbed to the pressure.
(Allen, 1965), personal (e.g., Allen & Crutchfield, 1963), and
Milgram’s research reverberated beyond professional circles
group-related moderators (e.g., Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969;
to become part of the cultural discourse about the dangers of
Kinoshita, 1964).
social influence. Within the profession, it generated soul-
Stoner’s discovery of the group polarization phenomenon in
searching about the mission of social psychology and ethical
1961 (Stoner, as cited in Marquis, 1962) gives credence to the
standards in social psychological experimentation. As a result
notion that discoveries happen when circumstances empower
of this discussion, and likely in response to the nonconformity
ingenuity. The early 1960s, when Stoner was working on his
of the late 1960s, the pendulum swung and social influence
master’s thesis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
researchers turned their attention in the opposite direction.
was the “era of conformity.” Stoner discovered that conformity
Heeding Asch’s advice to explore the full range of responses to
did not require disagreement. Even upon learning that they are
social influence, researchers began exploring nonconformity,
among like-minded others, people yield to social influence to
documenting that it is qualitatively different from, rather than
become “radicalized” (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). In what
the mirror image of, conformity (e.g., Allen, 1975). Though it
would become known as group polarization, social influence
may seem but a step from defying social pressure to counter-
among those of the same mind polarizes each individual posi-
acting it, it took a new force in social psychology to make the
tion and ultimately, the group norm. The phenomenon, which
quantum leap from research on majority influence to research
appeared to defy F. Allport’s individual determinism, captured
on minority influence.
the imagination of the field. Two theoretical accounts, devel-
oped along the Deutsch and Gerard dualism between informa-
Minority influence on the majority: Moscovici’s
tional and normative bases of social influence, set the
research on social innovation
informational value of socially shared persuasive arguments
(Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977) against the self-enhancing value Serge Moscovici was born in Romania in 1925. Shortly after
of polarized normative positions (Myers & Lamm, 1976). An the Second World War, he emigrated to France where he studied
avalanche of studies generated impressive evidence in support psychology and philosophy. Along with Henri Tajfel (see
of each explanation, but none decisively favored one over the Dovidio et al., this volume), he played a crucial role in the
other. With a tacit acknowledgement that both informational postwar reconstruction of social psychology in Europe. He
and normative processes may operate to produce group polar- provided intellectual guidance and organizational leadership
ization, the field gradually lost interest in the phenomenon that helped to channel American efforts to revitalize social
(Isenberg, 1986). psychology in postwar Western Europe (Moscovici &
In what likely is the single best-known study on social influ- Marková, 2006). Although Western Europe in that period had
ence, Stanley Milgram (1963, 1964) explored behavioral rather few social psychologists, it had a rich intellectual heritage on
than opinion conformity. Arguing that social psychology must which to draw. The founding fathers of postwar European social
examine “behavioral contents . . . that are of interest in their psychology drew on this heritage to theorize about the social
own right and are not simply trivial substitutes for psychologi- dimension of human psychological functioning. For example,
cally meaningful forms of behavior,” Milgram (1964, p. 138) Moscovici (1980) derived his concept of social representations
explored the extent to which an individual could be socially from Durkheim’s (1895–1914/1972) collectivistic approach to
influenced to engage in antisocial acts. Milgram brought to his social behavior, which in turn was influenced by Wundt’s
laboratory a phenomenon that captured world attention in the Völkerpsychologie (Danziger, 1983). The emphasis on the
early 1960s. When Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi known as “the social in Moscovici’s and Tajfel’s theorizing would become a
architect of the Holocaust” was brought to trial, he defended his hallmark of European social psychological thought.
actions by arguing that he was only “following orders.” In the 1970s, Moscovici was at the forefront of a quest for
Questioning the public (and expert) verdict about Eichmann’s social psychology with a distinct European flavor (Israel &
Tajfel, 1972; Jaspars, Moscovici, Schönbach, & Tajfel, 1974). (Levine, 1989; Levine & Kerr, 2007). The resultant movement
The goal was to replace then prevailing American ideas with toward the majority represents a superficial compliance whose
theoretical models that would reflect European cultural and maintenance requires (implicit or explicit) threat and constant
historical complexity. Moscovici argued that American histor- surveillance. In contrast, disagreement with a minority presum-
ical and geographical reality inspired theorizing that could not ably motivates attempts to understand the merits of the
account for European experiences. Illustrating how an overem- conflicting positions. This elaboration of diverse positions may
phasis on conformity in theorizing about social influence origi- cause change—if not on the focal issue of minority advocacy,
nated from uniquely American experiences, he pointed out that then on related issues. Over time, the tension created by this
the first European settlers to North America were (religious, indirect change may become sufficient to spill over to the focal
political) minorities who acted on their dissent by leaving their issue. This change represents conversion or a genuine accep-
countries of origin. The vastness of the American territory tance of the minority position. Although genuinely accepted,
enabled them to continue practicing their original way of the adopted minority position is likely to be kept private to
expressing dissent. Whenever they found a group unacceptable, avoid association with the (disparaged) minority or its position.
they could leave it rather than challenge it. The silence of the converts eventually ends when sufficient
Americans’ conflict avoidant tendency could be seen as ulti- social support frees them to express their newly adopted posi-
mately breeding conformity. As Hirschman (1970) observed, tions publicly.
“The curious conformism of Americans, noted by observers
ever since de Tocqueville, may also be explained in this fashion.
Toward the first centennial: Comparisons of majority
Why raise your voice in contradiction and get yourself into
and minority influence
trouble as long as you can always remove yourself entirely
from any given environment should it become too unpleasant” Moscovici’s innovative theorizing revitalized the field of social
(p. 109). The option of leaving an “unpleasant environment” influence, inspiring vigorous examination of minority and
was far less available in a more populated and socially and majority effects in the laboratories in Europe and the US.
linguistically complex Europe. Historically, Europeans had to Although his theory received only partial support in empirical
resort to social change when “unpleasant environments” tests (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone,
became too unpleasant. 1994), its heuristic effect in inspiring further thought on social
The issue of social change became global in the 1960s when influence has been immense. On the west side of the Atlantic,
the Civil Rights movement, opposition to the war in Vietnam, Moscovici’s contention about the qualitatively different nature
the global anticolonial movement, and student protests shook of minority and majority influence was contested, resulting in
campuses from Paris to Prague to Berkeley. These events upset models that postulated a unitary influence process (Latané &
the world order, highlighting the capacity of groups without Wolf, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1985). According to these
apparent power or material resources to exert influence and models, minority and majority influence are governed by the
successfully challenge the status quo. Moscovici articulated same principles and mediated by the same processes. Rather
the implications of the turbulent 1960s in a coherent theory than qualitative, the crucial difference between majority and
that changed how social psychologists thought about social minority influence is purely quantitative. According to social
influence. impact theory (Latané & Wolf, 1981), in addition to numerical
Moscovici (1976; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972) argued that size, an influence source’s strength and immediacy determine
the American functionalist approach to social influence could its potential impact on targets. Thus, although numerically
not account for social change because it assumed an asymmet- inferior, minorities sufficiently strong and in close physical
rical relationship between disagreeing groups. In this relation- proximity to their targets may nonetheless effect substantial
ship, a dissenting group (minority) depends on the normative influence.
group (majority) for satisfaction of its informational and social The revitalizing effect of Moscovici’s theorizing on social
needs. In this rendition of reality, influence flows exclusively influence research (e.g., Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990; Mugny,
from the group with resources (majority) to the group without 1982) validates Nemeth’s (1986) contention that even when
them (minority) and ultimately serves to maintain the status minorities do not succeed in converting others to their position,
quo. In contrast, Moscovici’s genetic model postulates a they can exert significant influence. They do so by broadening
symmetrical relationship between disagreeing groups, such that the scope of ideas their targets consider when trying to solve a
minorities and majorities exert mutual influence while negoti- problem. The presumed facilitative effect of minorities on
ating their differences.8 The outcome may be conformity that divergent thought and the contrastive effect of majorities on
preserves the status quo—but it also is possible that a minority convergent thought carry an unmistakable message about the
might prevail, resulting in social change. The model postulates inherent value of dissent. Not surprisingly, this pragmatic
qualitative differences in responses to majority influence, which value-in-minorities idea emerged at the time when the American
maintains the status quo, and minority influence, which intro- workforce in general, and its academia in particular, were
duces innovation. Responses to majority influence are presum- becoming increasingly diverse (Nemeth, 1986). The beneficial
ably motivated by concerns that opposition will be sanctioned effect of minorities on divergent thought in work settings
(De Dreu & Beersma, 2001) implies that there are just as strong often emerges from the process of mutual social influence that
pragmatic reasons for workforce diversification as there are gives all ingroup members the chance to be effective in the
social justice reasons. group, even those in the minority (David & Turner, 2001).
Nearing its centennial, research on social influence turned to By situating the meaning of social advocacy in the arena of
comparing majority and minority influence with the goal of group membership, identity approaches focus on the motiva-
establishing the boundary conditions for their efficacy. Much of tional complexities that drive reactions to such advocacy. These
this research has adopted an information-processing approach, motives go beyond uncertainty reduction to include concerns
focusing on the informational value and processing of social about the formation and maintenance of a positive view of the
advocacy. This focus on cognitive responses channeled social self. Wood and her collaborators have demonstrated that in an
influence research toward the persuasion paradigm, which attempt to promote their favorable sense of the self, people
provides readily available methodological tools for assessing respond to the advocacy not only of positively valued reference
cognitive responses and operationalizing social conditions. groups (ingroups) but also of negatively valued reference
These responses are examined in their own right or as media- groups (outgroups). In the latter case, however, social influence
tors of attitude changes effected by social advocacy and inter- is evident in a distancing from and a self-promoting interpreta-
preted within the framework of the prevailing dual-mode tion of social advocacy (Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1998; Wood,
processing models (e.g., Alvaro & Crano, 1997; Baker & Petty, Pool, Leck, & Purvis, 1996).
1994; Erb, Bohner, Schmalzle, & Rank, 1998; Mackie, 1987; Although sometimes contrasted, the persuasion and social
Wood, 1999). Vigorous research in this tradition has established identity approaches can be profitably combined. In an integra-
numerous contingencies for processing social advocacy and tion of the two approaches, Crano and his collaborators devel-
establishing its effects. Under certain circumstances both oped a model that argues that an ingroup minority’s appeal
majority and minority advocacy may be thoroughly processed, typically is elaborated leniently and openmindedly, with little
but the latter appears to produce more lasting effects (see Martin contentiousness or source depreciation. Although this elabora-
& Hewstone, 2008). tion may not result in the immediate public acceptance of the
Within the information-processing research tradition, an minority position, consideration of the minority argument can
earlier interest in a range of responses to social influence has create pressures toward the minority view on the measures indi-
been largely replaced with an analysis of cognitive response to rectly related to the appeal. Over time, consistency pressures
social influence. Also, earlier operationalizations of social may cause change on the focal issue of the minority advocacy
conditions in terms of social interaction have been replaced (Alvaro & Crano, 1997; Crano, 2001; Crano & Chen, 1998;
with information describing the size or type of group member- Crano & Seyranian, 2009). The leniency model, therefore, can
ship. In what could be labeled a minimalist approach to social account for the indirect and delayed nature of minority influ-
influence, social conditions and social responses are reduced to ence by taking account of the identity-based leniency toward
information to be processed or generated. This reductionism is ingroup members and the cognitive dynamics in processing
likely complexly determined by factors ranging from theoret- social advocacy. The simultaneous consideration of group iden-
ical (i.e., cognitive orientation) to pragmatic (e.g., increasing tity and elaboration factors also is evident in Pérez and Mugny’s
demands on publishing productivity). As with many other (1996) conflict elaboration model, which holds that responses
contemporary trends, this one, too, has its historical roots. As to social advocacy are regulated by their implications for group
early as 1921, Moore operationalized membership in majority identity and the objective vs. subjective nature of standards for
(minority) groups by informing his participants about size of their correctness.
social support for their attitudinal positions. His information, These attempts to situate reactions to minority advocacy in
however, was accurate and reflected the outcomes of a survey the context of group identity are an illustration of the social
conducted before the main study. nature of attitudinal phenomena. Although a product of social
As a counterbalance to research on the informational value of interaction, attitudes are only tangentially discussed in terms of
social advocacy, several lines of research have focused on its social influence processes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This may
normative implications. The primary role of group membership be a reflection of a larger schism between group-oriented social
in understanding social influence is a core assumption of social influence research and individual-oriented attitudes and persua-
identity theory (Tajfel, 1981, 1982) and its offspring, social cate- sion research. The schism followed an early period during
gorization theory (Turner, 1991). A tour de force in social which attitudes were almost invariably conceptualized in terms
psychology in the late 20th century, the identity approach postu- of group-shared norms (Faris, 1925; Herskovits, 1936; Young,
lates membership in the same social category as a sine qua non 1931), likely under the theoretical influence of the collectivistic
for influence. Ingroups exert their authority through the process perspective of Peirce (1903/1997), Dewey (1922/1930), Mead
of referent informational influence, and thus, agreement with (1934), and other American pragmatists. This location of atti-
ingroup members enhances one’s subjective certainty and trans- tudes within groups seemingly contrasted efforts to establish
forms shared attitudes into objective truth. Disagreement with social psychology as a science that uses the individual as a unit
ingroup members increases one’s subjective uncertainty, thus of analysis (Allport, 1919). Consequently, attitudes were
motivating attempts to resolve the discrepancy. Such resolution defined in strictly individualistic terms without reference to
social influence as, for example “a mental and neural state of prefer to behave consistently across situations (Freedman &
readiness to respond, organized through experience, exerting a Fraser, 1966). Thus, if one has agreed to do someone a small
directive and/or dynamic influence upon the individual’s favor and this favor was received with politeness or reinforce-
response to all objects and situations with which it is related” ment (Crano & Sivacek, 1982), a similar response is likely to a
(Allport, 1935, p. 810). This divorce of attitudes from social larger request. Commitment also appears responsible for the
(influence) phenomena was subsequently reinforced by the success of the low-ball technique (Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett,
cognitive orientation that has dominated the field for almost a & Miller, 1978), in which, for example, a commitment to buy a
half century. This theoretical reason, compounded by method- product for a small price is made, but the “deal” is then with-
ological difficulties associated with studying attitudes in the drawn and a more expensive cost proposed. After initial
group context, as well as by mundane reasons associated with commitment, probably of acquiescing to the greater cost is
the disciplinary constraints of academic departments (Eagly & enhanced relative to those from whom no commitment was
Chaiken, 1993), likely conspired to keep research on attitudes induced.
and research on social influence separate. The mirror of the FITD, the door in the face (DITF), appeals
to the principle of reciprocity. In DITF research, respondents
who are asked to provide an extraordinarily large favor (and
Normative Social Influence
who refuse) are more amenable to a lesser request than
In an important counterbalance to the approaches concerned those who were not approached initially (Cialdini et al., 1975).
with cognitive processing of social advocacy, the focus theory Results of this variety often are attributed to reciprocity;
of normative conduct is concerned primarily with social backing down from the initial (overly large) request and substi-
behavior (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). The theory differ- tuting a lesser one appears to be a concession that requires a
entiates the injunctive norm, which reflects perceptions of what concession in return, if Gouldner’s (1960) reciprocity norm
most others approve, from the descriptive norm, which reflects holds. In these circumstances, acquiescence to requests that
perceptions of what most other actually practice. Although ordinarily would be denied often is found. The “free sample”
related, these two types of norm are conceptually and motiva- technique takes advantage of both reciprocity and commitment;
tionally distinct. Whereas injunctive social norms motivate if reciprocity obtains, then receiving a free sample obligates the
behavior via social evaluation, descriptive social norms moti- sampler to reciprocate, typically by buying the product sampled.
vate behavior via social information about what is adaptive and Reciprocity provides a useful and parsimonious explanation of
effective conduct in a given environment. When these norms results of this type.
are discordant, the norm that is more salient exerts more influ- The principles of social proof, liking, and authority are all
ence on subsequent behavior (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). An source-related cues to appropriate action. Those concerned with
important implication of the salience effect is that interventions emitting socially correct actions will be susceptible to appeals
aiming to change a socially undesirable behavior (e.g., littering) that imply that most others act in a specific manner. In addition,
should focus on the injunctive prescription for a desirable attractive or liked influence sources, and those in authority,
behavior (e.g., not littering) rather than emphasize descriptions have been shown to have positive effects on social influence
of the undesirable acts (Cialdini, 2003; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, (see Fenis & Stroebe, 2010).
Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). Interestingly, these norms Cialdini and his colleagues’ research that focuses on behav-
appear functional even though (or perhaps because) people ioral outcomes of social influence stands out in terms of not
typically underestimate the extent to which their behavior is only its conceptual approach but also its methodological diver-
affected by the normative information (Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, sity. In a Lewinian, full-cycle approach to social influence, this
Goldstein, and Griskevicius, 2008). research is often inspired by natural observations that guide
subsequent controlled experimentation in the laboratory and
field, the outcomes of which are then validated through further
Tactics of compliance
natural observations, only to start a new cycle of research
In addition to his work on normative social influence, Cialdini’s (Cialdini, 1995). The ease with which these researchers move
important contribution lies in his categorization of principles between the field and the laboratory to study social influence in
underlying compliance or acting on a request. The many tactics the context of important social issues (e.g., energy conserva-
that may be used to elicit compliance are presumably based on tion, recycling), whereas still unusual, is likely to become more
six fundamental principles governing human behavior: recipro- normative as researchers are increasingly called to demonstrate
cation, consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity the value of their explorations to the wider society.
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998). These principles help organize the
many practical social influence tactics identified in recent years.
Conclusions and new directions
The foot-in-the-door (FITD) effect, for example, which
elicits greater acquiescence to a large request after the influence The study of social influence that introduced social psychology
target has agreed to a less onerous appeal, appears attributable to the family of psychological sciences more than a century
to a commitment/consistency principle, which holds that people ago still very much defines social psychology. The lasting
fascination with the power of social forces in shaping people’s (individual). Moreover, these unidirectional effects have been
judgments and behaviors is evident in a century of intense constrained even further to one-time, one-type (typically cogni-
research activity. Some of the uncovered phenomena have tive) responses. This approach, however useful in understanding
seized the attention of experts and laypeople alike. The names some basic influence processes, is of limited value in under-
of Asch and Milgram may not register in the popular discourse, standing real-world influence phenomena. These phenomena
but their findings have long become popular topics of conversa- currently challenge the field to conceptualize social influence in
tion. It is not just the seeming non-obviousness of their findings terms of multidirectional effects that evolve over time (Mason,
that has captured the imagination of the public. Equally, if not Dyer, & Norton, 2009; Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, &
more, important is the apparent diagnosticity of social influence Hinsz, 1990; Vallacher & Nowak, 2009).
findings for the nature of the social—and for the fundamental The explanatory potential of a more dynamic approach is
nature of personhood. illustrated in a line of research on the feedback effects of social
As this review illustrates, theorizing about social influence is influence attempts on their sources. The gain–loss asymmetry
firmly grounded in the context of historical events. These events model of social change brought about by successful minority
have greatly informed theorizing about the nature of the social influence postulates more intense reactions to loss of majority
and its influence on the individual. This was evident in early status than to its gain (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). Tests of
theories developed by those who stood on the sidelines of the model involved participants who, in the course of face-to-
19th-century European revolutionary movements as they tried face interactions with members of a small group (confederates),
to account for the brutality of the period. These observers attrib- were elevated from minority to majority or demoted from
uted the brutality to the almost magical power of social influ- majority to minority. In support of the model, former majorities
ence to transform rational individuals in control of their showed a dramatic disidentification from the group in which
impulses to irrational crowds controlled by mostly violent they lost their initial status. Former minorities, however, failed to
impulses. This aura of destructiveness of social influence identify with the group that elevated them to the coveted majority
persisted and became the usual suspect in social psychological position. Yet their initial less-than-enthusiastic reaction changed
accounts of imperfections of human functioning. Yet, when over time. As they became increasingly assured about stability of
circumstances called for a different framing, the field responded. their newly won position, former minorities (new majorities)
It was not by chance or sheer ingenuity that early researchers gradually strengthened their identification with the group (Prislin
discovered the facilitative effects of social influence on perfor- & Christensen, 2005). The latter result illustrates how models
mance. These discoveries came during the historical period that do not include the time component risk a myopic picture of
when rapidly industrializing societies searched for efficient social influence. This position is further reinforced by research
ways to educate their workforces. Half a century later, when on the delayed change effects in response to a minority advocacy
that workforce diversified, social influence researchers uncov- (Crano & Seyranian, 2007), especially when it comes from
ered the potentially beneficial effects of minorities on innova- newcomers to the group (Levine & Choi, 2010).
tion. In short, historical circumstances that have highlighted the Another challenge to contemporary models of social influ-
importance of the social factor in individual functioning have ence is to account for motivational complexity in responding to
largely shaped research on social influence, channeling its prac- influence as well as exerting influence. Although still in their
titioners’ interests toward specific phenomena and theoretical early stages of development, emerging models appear to assume
accounts. Social influence is enmeshed in the very fiber of that responding to and exerting influence are regulated by the
social psychology, which itself is enmeshed in the contempo- same set of basic motives (Prislin & Wood, 2005; Wood, 2000).
rary world—and this is as it should be in a discipline devoted to A recently proposed normative conflict model (Packer, 2008)
understanding the complex interplay of people, their groups, illustrates how a motive traditionally discussed as a regulator of
and their beliefs. responding to social influence may also prompt exerting social
The historically situated nature of social influence research influence. Specifically, the model postulates that the same social
also is evident in more recent developments that point to new identity concerns may motivate not only yielding to group
directions for the field. The world has not ceased to challenge norms but also attempts to change group norms, depending on
the field to understand its ever-complex evolution. In the after- their perceived utility for the valued group. Motives regulating
math of social change brought about by the fall of communism social influence dynamics also are regulated by social influence
and the end of the Cold War, the world is still in search of a new dynamics. The reciprocal nature of this exchange is nicely
order. Social change has proved to involve much more than a illustrated in research showing how social identification not
replacement of one dominant force with another. Understanding only motivates but also responds to social interactions within a
it from the social psychological perspective requires expanding group (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). These interactions,
the existing conceptual and methodological apparatus. With the especially over an extended period of time, may motivate not
exception of the social impact model (Latané & Bourgeois, only traditionally examined influence attempts at conversion
2001; Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990), traditional conceptu- but also preservation of the status quo (Levine & Kaarbo,
alizations have limited social influence to unidirectional effects, 2001), restoration of social justice (Moscovici & Pérez, 2007),
constraining influence flow from the source (group) to the target or increased tolerance (Prislin & Filson, 2009). Thus, the
complexity of goals that motivate social influence in the real frame of reference when a person judges unstructured stimuli
world has begun to inform research on social influence, thus alone.
expanding its explanatory power and applied value. 6. Asch critically observed that the field neglected this proposition out
Whereas one line of contemporary research is trying to of fear that it would undermine its status as a science. He left social
psychology to spend the second part of his career studying percep-
incorporate macro-level factors, another emerging line is
tion. In so doing, he set a precedent that, ironically, would be
turning to neurophysiological substrates of social influence.
followed by Leon Festinger, another great contributor to the field,
Relying on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), renowned as much for his scientific rigor as for the brilliance of his
recent studies have attempted to localize brain activity while ideas.
responding to social influence (Berns, Chappelow, Zink, 7. Studying under Lewin, Festinger became familiar with his ideas
Pagnoni, & Martin-Skurski, 2005; Berthoz, Armory, Blair, & long before they were formalized in Lewin’s few publications.
Dolan, 2002; Mason et al., 2009). This functional localization 8. In the interest of historical accuracy, it should be mentioned that in
holds promise to shed new light on old questions about the what might have been the first experiment on minority influence,
nature of responding to social influence. For example, an fMRI Asch (1952) reversed his procedure to examine the effect of a sole
study of responses to majority pressure established that expo- confederate’s incorrect judgments on a group of naïve participants.
sure to confederates’ erroneous responses to a mental rotation The minority confederate had an effect, but not on the participants’
line judgments. Rather, he made the naïve participants laugh, thus
task altered activity in brain regions implicated in mental rota-
turning the experiment into a study of the rejection of “deviance”
tion. Thus, yielding to erroneous judgments may suggest a
(see also Schachter, 1951).
genuine change at the level of perception rather than a strategic
verbal response (Berns et al., 2005). Although still in its infancy,
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