Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

1969, Vol. 12, No. 2, 117-124

OPINION CHANGE IN THE ADVOCATE AS A FUNCTION

OF THE PERSUASIBILITY OF HIS AUDIENCE:
A CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF DISSONANCE 1
ELIZABETH NEL 2
University of California, Los Angeles
ROBERT HELMREICH 3 AND ELLIOT ARONSON
University of Texas at Austin

In a 2 X 3 factorial design subjects were enticed to make a video recording of

a strongly counterattitudinal statement (favoring legalization of marijuana) ;
one-half of the subjects were paid ?.SO and one-half were paid $5 for their
counterattitudinal behavior. The subjects were told that their video tape
would be used to attempt to change the attitudes of (a) a group opposed to
the legalization of marijuana, (6) a, group in favor of the legalization of
marijuana, or (c) a group with no opinion on the issue. As predicted, a
significant dissonance effect (more attitude change for low financial incentive)
was found when the audience was not committed on the issue. The results
were interpreted as supporting a view that dissonance is aroused as a function
of discrepancy between self-concept and the consequences of behavior.

In 1959 Festinger and Carlsmith pub- ing. The greater attitude change in the low
lished their then startling findings that in- money condition produces a negative relation-
dividuals who told a person that a dull task ship between attitude change and financial in-
was actually interesting for a $1 bribe were ducement to comply.
more likely to believe it than those who told A great deal of data has flowed over this
the same lie for a $20 bribe. The investigators particular research dam since then; the most
derived this prediction from the theory of accurate general conclusion one can draw
cognitive dissonance in the following way: A from all of these findings is that the cogni-
subject's cognition "I said X" was dissonant tive world is a far more complicated place
with his cognition "I believe not-X." The than Festinger and Carlsmith believed it to
more money he received for lying, the greater be in the good old days of 19S9. Some in-
the justification and hence the less the dis- vestigators replicate the dissonance predicted,
sonance. Thus, subjects in the $1 condition negative relationship (Cohen, 1962; Lepen-
experienced more dissonance than those in dorf, 1964), some find a positive or direct
the $20 condition. In order to reduce dis- relationship (Collins, 1968a, 1968b; Elms &
sonance, these $1 subjects tended to convince Janis, 1965; Hornbeck, 1968; Rosenberg,
themselves that the task really was interest- 1965), and some report no relationship (Ash-
1 more & Collins, 1968; Ashmore, Collins,
The authors wish to thank Barry E. Collins
of the University of California, Los Angeles, for Hornbeck, & Whitney, 1968; Collins & Ash-
his collaboration and support during all phases of more, 1968; Collins & Helmreich, in press).
the research. The research was supported by Con- More recent experiments have helped to
tract N00014-67-A-0126-0001 of the Office of Naval clarify the situation by demonstrating a dis-
Research, Group Psychology Branch, Robert Helm-
reich, principal investigator; Elizabeth Nel's par- sonance effect under one set of conditions and
ticipation was supported by National Science Founda- a positive effect under a different set of con-
tion Grant GS1194, Barry E. Collins, principal ditions all within the same factorial design
investigator. The authors wish to thank Mrs.
Frederick George who ably served as Experimenter ]. (Carlsmith, Collins, & Helmreich, 1966;
2
Now at the University of Stellenbosch, Re- Helmreich & Collins, 1968). In the Carlsmith,
public of South Africa. Collins, and Helmreich (1966) experiment,
3
Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert
Helmreich, Department of Psychology, Mezes Hall subjects either made a 2-minute counter-
211, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712. attitudinal statement to a confederate in a
117
118 E. NEL, R. HELMREICH, AND E. AEONSON
direct face-to-face situation or wrote a IS-
minute anonymous, counterattitudinal essay.
In each of these conditions, subjects were
paid either $.50, $1.50, or $5.00 for making
the counterattitudinal statement. Where sub-
jects wrote anonymous essays there was a
positive or direct relation between financial
inducement and attitude change—the more
money subjects were paid, the greater the
opinion change. In the face-to-face situation,
the opposite effect was obtained—the less
money the subjects were paid, the greater
the opinion change.
Helmreich and Collins (1968) subsequently
produced a similar interaction with a simpler
manipulation which did not allow such wide
between-condition variation in the nature of
the counterattitudinal task. In all conditions
the subjects made an oral, counterattitudinal
statement. But in one condition, it was in
the form of an audio tape recording in
which they were allowed to remain anon-
ymous ; in other conditions, the statement was
recorded on video tape and subjects were
clearly identified by name. In the anonymous
condition, there was a nonsignificant positive
trend, while in the nonanonyinous conditions,
there was a dissonance effect.
What is the conceptual significance of these
manipulations? In other words, what is the
process involved in making a public, counter-
attitudinal statement that results in a dis-
sonance phenomenon? Subsequent investiga-
tion fails to support the notion that public
statements produce dissonance while private
ones do not. In several studies public, high-
commitment essays produce significant anti-
dissonance, positive relationships between
financial inducement and attitude change
(Collins, 1968a, 1968b; Hornbeck, 1968).
The public-anonymous variable, then, is not
in and of itself sufficient to explain the data.
In a recent attempt to refine and clarify
dissonance theory, Aronson (1968, 1969) has
suggested that the crucial determinant is
whether or not the counterattitudinal be-
havior threatens to diminish the individual's
self-concept. More specifically, according to
Aronson, in the clearest experiments per-
formed to test dissonance theory, dissonance
did not arise between just any two cognitions
—rather, dissonance arose between a cognition
about the self and a cognition about a be-
havior which violated this self-concept. Thus,
Aronson suggested that in the original
Festinger-Carlsmith experiment, it was inac-
curate to state that dissonance occurred be-
tween the cognitions (a) "I believe the task
is dull" and (b) "I said the task is interest-
ing." What was dissonant for most people
(i.e., those with a high self-concept) is the
cognition (a) "I am a good and decent
human being" and (b) "I have committed
an indecent act; I have misled another
person."
Collins (1969) made a similar point in
suggesting that dissonance occurs in situations
which threaten self-esteem or produce ob-
jective negative consequences for the self or
the audience.
Bramel (1968) argued that
Dissonance is a feeling of personal unworthiness (a
type of anxiety) traceable to rejection of oneself
by other people either in the present or in the past.
Any information which implies that one is in-
competent or immoral arouses dissonance. The reason
dissonance is greatest when the person feels per-
sonally responsible for his behavior is that re-
jection by other people is usually greatest when they
believe the person voluntarily acted in an inap-
propriate way [p. 365].
Each of these three interpretations of dis-
sonance theory stresses the dissonance-arous-
ing characteristics of discrepant cognitions
about the self. Support for the importance
of the self-concept in dissonance induction
can be found in the results of several recent
studies.
In the previously mentioned Helmreich and
Collins (1968) study, there were two con-
ditions in which subjects made public video
tapes advocating a counterattitudinal posi-
tion. In the condition designed to maximize
dissonance, the subject not only took the
counterattitudinal position publicly, but
agreed to stand by his position for a period of
several months. The second video condition
was designed to minimize dissonance; in this
"take-back" condition subjects made the
identical video tape but also made a second
tape explaining that their counterattitudinal
advocacy was only for the purpose of an
attitude-change experiment and could then
 OPINION CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF AUDIENCE PERSUASIBILITY 119

express their true opinions on the issue. showed more attitude change when given low
The authors predicted an inverse (dissonance) financial incentive for their compliance than
relationship between incentive and opinion those given larger incentives. On the other
change for the first condition. In the "take- hand, when decision freedom was reduced, a
back" condition they expected either a highly positive relationship between incentive and
attenuated dissonance effect or an incentive attitude change was found. It is easy to see
effect. how the self is not really involved unless the
The results, however, showed significant subject himself has chosen to participate. If
dissonance effects in both conditions. How the subject tells a lie because the experi-
can one interpret the dissonance effects in the menter implies that these are the rules of
take-back condition? It is possible that com- the game, the act probably does not threaten
mitting the negative (immoral) act of publicly his self-esteem. But if he himself chooses to
adopting a counterattitudinal position for in- tell the lie, then, again, dissonance arises be-
sufficient justification lowers the self-concept tween the cognition of a generally high self-
and that taking it back is not sufficient concept and the cognition that he chose to lie
to restore a positive self-concept because the to another person.
act itself cannot be undone. It is also pos- Although a number of alternative explana-
sible that the "harm had already been done" tions exist for all of these data, the self-con-
and the subjects felt they could not undo cept notion seems to merit more direct in-
the negative consequences for others that they vestigation. How can we further test the
produced with their initial counterattitudinal efficacy of this explanatory concept? One
act. reasonable strategy would be to use the self-
Two conditions in a study by Davis and concept formulation to predict a totally differ-
Jones (1960) are relevant to the discussion ent type of outcome within the framework of
of "taking back" a negative act. In this the counterattitudinal advocacy paradigm.
experiment, all subjects read a negative Specifically, since this notion rests upon the
evaluation of a stimulus person over a micro- assumption that choosing to mislead is the
phone presumably broadcasting to this in- major source of dissonance, under what con-
dividual. In the two crucial conditions, where ditions would this be most disastrous to the
the subjects perceived having chosen to eval- self? One important consideration involves
uate the stimulus person negatively, those the consequences of this advocacy on the
who did not anticipate personal interaction audience. If an individual makes a counter-
with the stimulus person evaluated him more attitudinal statement to an audience which is
negatively than those who expected to meet not persuasible, he should experience less
with him. The authors interpret this finding dissonance than if he made the same state-
as indicating that less dissonance is aroused ment to a completely naive and gullible
where the person anticipates being able to audience. For example, suppose a person who
undo his negative act through personal en- is opposed to the use of marijuana were asked
counter. In the light of the Helmreich and to make a statement advocating its use. Sup-
Collins data, it seems reasonable to assume pose further that he makes the statement to
that individuals feel far more capable of an audience consisting of members of the
undoing a wrong if they have the opportunity vice squad who are irrevocably committed to
to chat with the victim in a face-to-face, a position opposing the use of marijuana.
give-and-take encounter than in a situation Although the speaker might anticipate some
which involves one recorded disclaimer of audience hostility, there are no negative con-
responsibility. sequences for the audience in counteratti-
Another recent study by Linder, Cooper, tudinal advocacy in this kind of situation as
and Jones (1967) emphasized the importance (hey are unlikely to be changed by the com-
of choice in dissonance induction. Subjects in munication. Similarly, if the individual is
this study who felt free not to comply with a asked to make the same statement to a group
request for counterattitudinal advocacy of Haight-Ashbury potheads, there will not
120 E. NEL, R. HELMREICH, AND E. ARONSON
be a negative behavioral change in the audi-
ence. Since his audience consists of committed
users, nothing he says can make a difference.
On the other hand, if he is asked to make
the identical speech to a group of teenagers
who have no prior information about mari-
juana, it is expected that he will experience
much more dissonance than in the other
situations. His cognition that he is a good
and decent person is dissonant with his cogni-
tion that he has advocated an incorrect posi-
tion which is likely to have belief or be-
havioral consequences for his audience. To re-
duce dissonance, he should convince himself
that the advocated position is correct.
To summarize our reasoning in terms of
a concrete hypothesis: If individuals are
given high or low monetary inducements
for making a counterattitudinal state-
ment, they experience most dissonance if
there is a reasonable possibility that their
statement will have an effect upon the audi-
ence. Specifically: (a) When addressing an
audience of uncommitted individuals, subjects
undergo more attitude change in a low-induce-
ment condition than in a high-inducement
condition; (b) the strongest negative effect
will be in the uncommitted-audience condi-
tion. In other words, the slope of that line
should be more negative than the slope of
the other two lines—which for that matter,
might even be positive; (c) the condition
most likely to have a positive relationship
between attitude change and financial induce-
ment is the condition where the audience is
already committed to the position advocated.
METHOD
The experiment involved enticing subjects to
choose to make a video recording of counteratti-
tudinal statements advocating legalization of mari-
juana. The recording was made under one of two
inducement conditions and subjects were informed
that their statement would be played to one of
three audiences—one uncommitted on the issue, one
favoring the issue, and one opposing. This resulted
in six conditions comprising a 2 X 3 factorial design.
In order to separate the posttcst from the experi-
mental manipulation, the study was designed so
I hat subjects reporled to one experiment, were
"coincidentally" in terra pled and sent to a separate
situation, and then returned to the first experiment
to complete the posttest.
Subjects
Subjects were 42 female students in introductory
psychology at the University of Texas at Austin
who were randomly assigned to one of the six
experimental conditions. 4
Procedure
Pretest, Several weeks before the experiment all
students in two sections of introductory psychology
were given an attitude inventory assessing opinions
on a number of issues. The crucial pretest item was
"There should be no legal restrictions on the use of
marijuana for people over 21." Statements were
rated on a 19-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 19 (strongly agree) with 10 (neutral)
as the midpoint. More than 41% of the sample of
297 females strongly disagreed with the statement,
checking 1 on the scale. Subjects from this group
were called by telephone to take part in the experi-
ment for required course credit.
Cover story. Subjects reported individually to an
experimental cubicle where they were met by
Experimenter 1 who explained that the experiment
involved taking part in a value survey and filling
out a short opinion poll. Experimenter 1 explained
that the psychology department was interested in
developing a new test to measure values and was
testing this particular value survey by having
students take it under controlled conditions in the
laboratory. After this introduction, subjects began
filling out a mimeographed copy of the This I
Believe Test (Harvey, 1967).
After the subject had been working for about 10
minutes, Experimenter 2 knocked and entered the
cubicle. Experimenter 2 asked the subject to help
her out by making a video tape about marijuana
after she had completed her experiment, To avoid
arousing suspicion, Experimenter 2 explained that
this was not an experiment and that the subject
could not receive experimental credit for helping
but she could pay the subject since she had money
available from her research grant. (The rationale
given was that the girl scheduled to make the tape
could not come.) The amount of money to be paid
was not mentioned at this point to keep the post-
tester, Experimenter 1, blind as to the subject's condi-
tion. All subjects agreed to help and to come to
another experimental room. The subject then re-
turned to work. As soon as the subject completed the
value survey, Experimenter 1 handed her the opinion
poll which consisted of 18 of the original pretest
questions with the question concerning the legaliza-
4
Actually, 52 subjects were run. One refused to
make the recording. Nine others were run but
not included in the analysis when it was discovered
that their class had just seen a movie describing
the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study. These
subjects were evenly distributed across conditions.
No other subjects expressed any suspicions about the
authenticity of the procedures.
 OPINION CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF AUDIENCE PERSUASIBILITY
tion of marijuana on the second page.
Because it was vital to collect the posttest after
(he experimental manipulation, a second deception
was introduced at this point. The opinion poll was
collated in such a way that subjects received two
copies of the first page and no second page. Most
subjects realized that the poll was miscollated as
soon as they turned the page, and called this to
the experimenter's attention. If subjects filled out
the first page again, Experimenter 1 allowed them to
complete it and "noticed" the mistake while check-
ing the form. As soon as Experimenter 1 "noticed"
the miscollation, she asked the subject to excuse her
while she went to the other psychology laboratory
building to get a second page. When going out the
door, Experimenter 1 turned back and suggested that
the subject could save some time by helping Experi-
menter 2 while Experimenter 1 was getting a new
test. This seemed like a natural suggestion and a few
subjects spontaneously suggested this procedure.
Experimental manipulations. On the subject's ar-
rival at the second experimental room, Experi-
menter 2 explained that the research she was plan-
ning to conduct was on attitude change. The pro-
cedure then varied according to condition.
1. Subjects in the uncommitted-audience condition
were told:
We're preparing materials to be used in research
on the attitudes of a large group of students about
the use of marijuana. We've already asked them
once what their opinions are and our results show
that they really don't have any opinion about it
and that they don't even know very much about
it. In this experiment we are going to use the
video tape you make in an effort to persuade
them that there should be no legal restrictions on
the use of marijuana for people over 21. After
playing the tape to them, we're going to measure
their attitudes again to see if we could influence
them in any way and then we will explain the
true purpose of the experiment to them. As you
will see, there are five points here. [Experimenter 2
then handed the subject an outline.] They are not
full sentences and I want you to expand on them
in your own words. We could have hired an actress
to do it, but we want to have it sound like an
ordinary student. I was going to pay this girl
anyway and I'm willing to pay you $.50 [$S] for
helping me out. Are you sure you really want to
do it? [Freedom of choice was stressed here and
at this point one subject refused to comply.]
Thank you. Work on them for a few minutes,
add any additional arguments you like and write
down your own comments if you want to.
2. Subjects in the pro audience condition were given
the same information with the exception of the
second and third sentences which read:
We've already asked them once what their opinions
are and our results show that they are in favor of
the legalization of marijuana for people over 21.
In this experiment I'm going to use the tape
121
you make in an effort to persuade them even more
that there should be no legal restrictions on the
use of marijuana for people over 21.
3. Subjects in the con audience condition were given
the same information as those in the uncommitted
audience with the exception of the second sentence
which read: "We've already asked them once what
their opinions are and our results show that they
are against the legalization of marijuana for people
over 21."
Just before the video tape was made, subjects
were again reminded of the position of the in-
tended audience on the issue. They were asked to
begin the recording by identifying themselves by
name and giving their home town, class, and major
before presenting the arguments. The points on the
outline page given subjects were:
1. Should be no legal restrictions on the use of
marijuana for people over 21—mature in the eyes
of the law—can take responsibility for own actions.
Restricting rights of mature people violation of
concept of individual freedom in democratic
society.
2. Marijuana minor problem compared with
alcohol. Has received disproportionate share of
publicity regarding crime.
3. Relation of marijuana to psychosis—no scien-
tific proof.
4. Marijuana docs not lead to addiction, is less
habit-forming than ordinary tobacco, no with-
drawal symptoms.
5. Prohibition has negative effects—more exciting
for people, promotes blackmarketing, selective law
enforcement.
As soon as subjects had made the video tape, it
was played back to them and they were asked to
indicate how sincere and persuasive they seemed
to be. After this, they were thanked for their help
and sent back to Experimenter 1. Experimenter 1
then gave them the second page of the opinion poll
which contained the dependent variable embedded
among other questions.
After the dependent variable had been collected,
the subjects were questioned as to any suspicions
about the procedure and the true purpose of the
experiment was explained to them.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Means for attitude change are presented in
Figure 1. The associated analysis of variance
is shown in Table 1. The factorial analysis of
variance does not reach conventional levels of
significance, but some of the a priori com-
parisons parallel to those computed in Helm-
reich and Collins (1968) are significant. The
comparison between the $.50 and $5 uncom-
mitted-audience conditions is significant at
the .05 level (F = 5,34, df = 1/36). Subjects
122 E. NEL, R. HELMREICH, AND E. AKONSON
TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ATTITUDE CHANGE
Source MS di F
Incentive (A) 123.43 \ 2.94*
Audience (B) 21.88 2 <1
A XB 60.64 2 1.44
Error 41.98 36
50(i vs. $5 uncommitted audience 1 5.34**
50(1 uncommitted audience vs. all 1 5.49**
others
in the $.50 uncommitted-audience condition
showed a large amount of attitude change.
The mean change in this condition is 73% of
the change possible and this cell is significantly
different from all others (F = 5A9, dj=l/36,
p<.05). Thus the hypothesis that a dis-
sonance effect would be produced when sub-
jects addressed an uncommitted audience was
confirmed.
The predicted interactions with audience
conditions, while in line with the theoretical
predictions, do not reach conventional levels
of significance with the cell n of 7 subjects
per cell. As predicted, the steepest negative
effect is for subjects with an uncommitted
audience and subjects with an already com-
mitted preaudience not only show the most
attenuated dissonance effect, they show a tiny
positive effect. But the simple one degree of
freedom interaction comparing high and low
inducement and the uncommitted versus com-
mitted preaudience produces an F of 2.73.
(An F of approximately 2.86 is required for
the .10 level, two-tailed, or .OS, one-tailed.) 5
These results suggest that recent refine-
ments of dissonance theory (Aronson, 1968,
1969; Bramel, 1968; Collins, 1967) add sig-
nificantly to the predictive power of the
theory. The notions that discrepancy between
self-concept and behavior (according to Aron-
son) and aversive consequences of behavior
(according to Collins & Bramel) are key
sources of dissonance, lead in many cases to
6
As in an earlier study using the videorecording
paradigm (Helmreich & Collins, 1968), the video
tapes were rated by observers blind to experimental
condition. The results parallel the earlier study. No
significant differences in performance or quality of
the counterattitudinal act were found as a function
of incentive or intended audience.
50* $5.00
FIG. 1. Attitude change. (Higher scores represent
agreement with the counterattitudinal position.)
different predictions from those derived from
Festinger's (19S9) original statement of the
theory. In the present study, for example, the
prediction based on the Festinger formulation
would be an inverse relationship between
magnitude of incentive and attitude change
regardless of the nature of the audience.
Our interpretation places great stress on
the persuasibilitjr of the subject's audience—
a variable which can be manipulated directly.
There was a significant negative relationship
between incentive and attitude change only
when the purported audience for the counter-
attitudinal communication was uncommitted
on the issue. Presumably, in this uncom-
mitted condition, the audience will be most
persuasible and the subject's communication
can have the greatest harmful effect. Our
reasoning was that the anticipated evil results
of the subject's counterattitudinal advocacy
should be most damaging to the self-concept
when the behavior is elicited under conditions
of minimal justification and should lead to
dissonance reduction through internalization
of the advocated communication. It should
be noted that the marijuana issue is probably
particularly prone to the cognition that per-
suasion might harm a gullible, uncommitted
audience.
 OPINION CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF AUDIENCE PERSUASIBILITY
In the case of an audience holding a posi-
tion counter to the communication, the rigid-
ity of this commitment should influence the
amount of dissonance produced. If, for ex-
ample, an audience is only weakly committed
to a position counter to a communication and
is likely to be persuaded to change, then con-
siderable dissonance should be aroused in
subjects given low justification for their ad-
vocacy, while less dissonance should be pro-
duced by communicating to a strongly com-
mitted audience. But, when counterattitudinal
advocacy is to an audience already supporting
the viewpoint expressed, little dissonance
should be aroused regardless of the rigidity
of the audience's opinion. Hence, by manip-
ulating the supposed persuasibility of an audi-
ence opposed to a communication, the experi-
menter should be able to vary the amount
of dissonance induced, an outcome which can-
not be derived from the original formulation
of dissonance theory.
Chase (1969), in an extension of the pres-
ent study, found the greatest attitude change
when a counterattitudinal video tape on the
marijuana topic was made to be played to a
neutral audience, less when the purported
audience was opposed to the communication,
but persuasible and least when the audience
was opposed and rigid in this position.
These results clearly support our postulated
differential arousal of dissonance dependent
in the potential for harm of the counter-
attitudinal act.
The procedures in this study parallel closely
those conditions in earlier experiments (e.g.,
Carlsmith, Collins, & Helmreich, 1966; Helm-
reich & Collins, 1968; Linder, Cooper, &
Jones, 1967) in which high choice, public
compliance produced significant dissonance
effects. The crucial difference seems to be in
the consequences of the compliant behavior
and the concomitant effect on the individual's
self-concept. It thus appears that the present
results add a specific and manipulable con-
struct to the forced-compliance, dissonance
area. Subsequent research should attempt to
clarify the interactions of self-concept, an-
onymity, and choice in dissonance-arousing
situations.
123
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(Received August 12, 196S)

Manuscripts Accepted for Publication in the

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Structure of Natural Cognitions: William A. Scott*: Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder,
Colorado 80302.
Toward an Attribution Therapy: The Reduction of Fear, through Induced Congitive Emotional Misattribution:
Lee Ross,* Judith Rodin, and Philip G. Zimbardo: Department of Social Psychology, Mathematics Building,
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
Acting on an Attitude as a Function of Self-Percept and Inequity: Leslie Ann McArthur,* Charles A. Kiesler, and
Barry P. Cook: Department of Psychology, Yale University, 333 Cedar Street, New Haven, Connecticut
06519.
Extending the Equity Model: Perception of Inputs and Allocation of Reward as a Function of Duration and
Quantity of Performance: Gerald S. Leventhal* and James W. Michaels: Department of Psychology, North
Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina 27607.
Zeigarnik Effect, "Reversed Zeigarnik Effect," and Personality: Willem Claeys*: Florimond de Pauwstraat 31,
Brussels 7, Belgium.
Identification: The Acquisition of Evaluative Connotations: Donald R. Yelcn*: Department of Psychology,
Washburn University of Topeka, Topeka, Kansas 66621.
A Test of Three Interpretations of Attitudinal Verbal Reinforcement: Chester A. Insko* and Robert B. Cialdini:
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Davie Hall, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514.
Attitudinal Verbal Reinforcement as a Function of Informational Consistenc}': A Further Test of the Two-Factor
Theory: Robert B. Cialdini and Chester A. Insko*: Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514.
Self-Disclosure as an Exchange Process: Morgan Worthy,* Albert L. Gary, and Gay M. Kahn: Department of
Psychology, Georgia State College, 33 Gilmer Street S.E., Atlanta, Georgia 33303.
Effects of Ego-Involvement Conditions on Attitude Change to High and Low Credible Communications: Homer
H. Johnson* and John A. Scileppi: Department of Psychology, Loyola University, 6525 North Sheridan Road,
Chicago, Illinois 60626.
Attraction and Disagreement-Produced Arousal: John C. Stapert and Gerald L. Clore, Jr.*: Department of
Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801.
Sequential Effects as a Function of Explicit and Implicit Interpolation Attraction Response: Bonn Byrne,* John
Lamberth, John Palmer, and Oliver London: Department of Psychology, Purdue University, Lafayette,
Indiana 47907.
Tactical Self-Presentation after Success and Failure: David J. Schneider*: Department of Psychology, Appleton
Hall, Amherst College, Massachusetts Amherst, 01002.
Size of Church Membership and Members' Support of Church Behavior Settings: Allan W. Wicker*: Department
of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201.
Arousal of Ingroup-Outgroup Bias by a Chance Win or Loss: Jacob M. Rabble and Murray Herwitz*: Department
of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167.
Distribution of Initial Risk Levels and Group Decisions Involving Risk: Amiram Vinokur*: 319 East Jefferson,
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.

* Asterik indicates author for whom address is supplied.