Electoral Laws in India

Soham Sarkar

Amity Law School, Noida

Sohamsrkr10@gmail.com

15 May, 2020.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 Introduction

The history of electoral laws in India date back to the Act of 1919 but it has its origin in the
Act of 1861 itself. As a result of the First Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, non-official representation
on the Governor’s and Governor General’s Council was provided, and as a result of this
decision the Act of 1861 was formed. The Act provided that there should be appointment of
other members which are not less than six and not more than 12. The time for this should be
two years. Amongst this half of the members are needed to be non-official . The people on this
council were not be included on the basis of the Principle of Democracy, rather were the Rulers
of the Princely States or their Dewans who were just faithful to the Britishers.

After this came the Indian Councils Act of 1894, which like the Act before this failed to impress
the people especially the rising, Indian National Congress which was in its early stages. As for
the Supreme Council, this act increased the number to not less than 10 and not higher than 16
and "prescribed the manner in which such regulations should be carried into effect"1. ML
Schwann, a Member of Parliament from Manchester, was unsure whether the electoral system
would be effectively put in place in practice because even the word election was not stated in
the Act. He then submitted an amendment specifying that, “no reform of the Indian councils
which does not embody the elective principle will prove satisfactory to the Indian people or
compatible with good Government”2. Lord Curzon stated, "In reply I should like to point out
that our Bill does not exclude some such principles, be it the method of election, or selection
or delegation"3.

The 1909 Indian Councils Act, which was better known as the Morley Minto Reforms of 1909
enhanced the legislative councils of both the governor general and the provincial councils4.
They introduced for the first time, the system of voting, although indirect, for the process of
forming a portion of non-official representatives. Every Legislative Council consisted of three
groups of members: the elected, the official and the appointed non-commissioned members.
However, the theory has been limited by so many constraints, stoppage and distortions. The
franchise was highly narrow based such that the elective theory lost its true meaning and
purpose

1
Clause 1, sub-sec. I & 4 of the Act of 1892.
2
Keith A. B., Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1942, vol.ll, p. 63.
3
Ibid, p. 64
4
See Resolution no.42I3 of the Government of India dated !5'h Nov., I909.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

Although the election was not indirect, the non-official leaders of the local councils were
granted the right to have the representatives who were of the public in general to be elected to
the provincial council. Similarly, non-official members of the provincial councils were
empowered to have the representatives who were of the general public to be elected to the to
the Imperial Legislative Council. The relationship between the common man and the
representative was thus distant and, therefore, ineffective and meaningless. There had been
"absolutely no connection between the supposed primary voter and the man who sits as his
representative on the Legislative Council, and the vote of the supposed primary voter has no
effect upon the proceedings of the Legislative Council"5. With the addition of territorial
representation, recognition of the elections was granted to a class, an electorate who was
distinct and a community. Accordingly, the electorate was divided into three groups, as
follows:

• General electorate was made up of non-official members of who were in Regional

Legislative Bodies or who were in the District Legislative Bodies ;
• Electoral class including the electoral districts of Land holders and the Muslim
electorate ;
• Distinct voters that included universities, Presidency Corporations Chambers of
Commerce, Planting, Port Trusts & Trade Interests, etc.

This model was extremely puzzling which was often "confusing" for the class and the special
electorate. In general, the beginning of caste based electoral system is considered to be very
mischievous and notorious which an out-of-the-box example of notorious British Colonialism
in India. Though these reforms were a betterment over the Act of 1892, they did not fulfil the
need of the people. The Councils have not been true representatives of the people as a whole.
Close franchise and the process of election which was indirect have been able to give the
members a feeling of responsibility towards the people. Mr. Montagu then came to India in
1917-18 and then published a report called as the Montagu Chelmsford report which was on
the need for constitutional reforms in India. In the meantime, another Franchise Committee
was appointed which was to study the issues of franchise and election. The recommendations
of that were made by the Franchise Committee was the basis for the elections under the 1919
Act. The new central legislature was made up of two chambers: the Council of States and the
Central Legislative Assembly. Under the rules made by the Government of India, the Council

5
Government of India, Report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms, Calcutta, 1918, p. 54.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

of States was to have 60 members, among which 34 were elected-20 by the general electorate,
3 by the European Chambers of Commerce and 11 by the communal electorate (10 by the
Muslims and 1 by the Sikhs). The Assembly consisted of 143 members, of whom 103 were
elected – 51 by general electoral districts, 32 by municipal districts (30 by Muslims and 2 by
Sikhs) and 20 by special electoral districts (7 by landholders, 9 by Europeans and 4 by Indian
Commerce). The Franchise Committee had suggested such a system for the Indian Legislative
Assembly because according to it, the election which were direct although much better were
practically not possible at the moment. The constitutions, it stated, based on the provinces
divided into different franchise would be too large and unwieldy, and a narrower franchise
would not have any logic and would also not have any political desirability. India therefore
selected the method of direct elections to all houses that were in the the Central Legislature.
Similarly, the majority of the members of the Legislative Councils, taken together, made up
77.8% of the total number6. But we cannot call any of the Central Legislatures to democratic
in nature or that they represent the people in any manner. Although it was direct, it remained
very low and narrow. Until 1919, there had been no system of direct election except for the
Muslim and people who were Land Holder in the Central Legislature. Representatives have
always come through the method of election which was indirect in nature. However, in the
1919 Act, the system which was of indirect elections was changed to direct elections. A full
chapter on franchises and elections was introduced in the Act of 1919. Section 64(i) of the
Government of India Act of 1919 says about the conduct of the election. It says that the ,
"subject to the provisions of this Act may be made by Rules under this Act as to .... "7.

• The qualifications of the electors, the constitution of the electoral divisions, the method
of election of the Council of States and the Legislative Assembly (including the number
of members to be elected by the municipal and other electorates) and any incidental or
ancillary issues there;
• Qualifications for being or being nominated or elected as a member of the Council of
States or of the Legislative Assembly;
• Final decision on doubts or disputes as to the validity of an election; and
• The manner in which the rules are to be implemented.

6
India in I922-23, p.53.
7
Government of India Act, 1919, Calcutta, I920.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

However, Section 15 of the Electoral Rules of 1920 authorized the provincial governments to
issue regulations on the actual conduct of elections under the Act. The conduct of the elections
was therefore the responsibility of the provincial government, which not only issued an election
regulation, but also obtained an election with the help of its officials. Elections were held in
1920, 1923, 1926 and 1929 under the Act of 1919. The second Franchise Committee was
appointed by the British Cabinet in 1928 to examine the current franchise and election system
and to make recommendations to be incorporated into the Government of India Act of 1935.
The Franchise Committee then made some serious recommendations on the reform of the
electoral system and the machinery. The recommendations were duly accepted by the
Government of India and the Government of the Great Britain and incorporated into the
Government of India Act of 1935.

Another milestone in the history of elections in India is the Government of India Act of 1935,
which was only partially implemented-because only the provincial part of the Act came into
force. During the evolution of this Act, the question of the franchise attracted the attention of
several bodies. The Indian statutory commission, popularly known as the Simon Commission,
recommended in 1928, was in favor of enfranchising at least 10 % of the total population, or
20% of the adult population, and greatly increased the proportion of female voters8. The Indian
Franchise Sub-Committee at the Round Table Conference argued for a recommendation similar
to that of the Simon Commission. In 1931, the chairmanship of Lord Lothian considered the
question of adult suffrage. The Committee did not, however, show itself in favor of its adoption.
In view of the fact that adult franchise was considered administratively impossible and,
generally speaking, the line of the Round Table Conference Sub-Committee was in favor of
extending the franchise to ten to twenty per cent of the total population9. The Act of 1935 did
not envisage any change in the principles of the allocation of seats in the Legislative Assembly
and the Councils. Separate, communal electorates and 'weighting' have been retained. The
franchise was primarily based on property, education and income qualifications.

The electoral machinery remained practically the same as that of 1919. Elections were held for
the first time in 1937 under the Government of India Act of 1935. The elections brought to
light the different trends of Indian political opinion that existed in the country at the time. In
fact, they have revealed the ill results of numerous communal, special and separate

8
Report of the indian Statutory Commission, Vof_Jl; Cal, 1930, p.92, para 106
9
Report of the Indian Franchise Committee, 1932, p. 10.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

representations that have been intentionally introduced by the British over a long period of
time. It wasn't a democratic election at all. As B.N. Rau has beautifully put it:

'The system of communal electorate prevented the various

communities from developing a sense of political unity rising

above race of religion."

Elections in 1937 increased the problems that were being faced by the minorities. The election
to the lower house which was indirect in nature was "undemocratic corruption and intrigue."
The Indian demand to draft the constitution of the country was fulfilled only when India got its
Independence in 1947. With this I conclude the history of election in India.

Structure Of the Electoral System in India

The ilegislative iand iadministrative istructure iof ithe ielections iis iibased ion ithe iprovisions iof ithe
iConstitution iof iIndia, i1950, ithe iRepresentation iof ithe ipeople iAct, i1950, ithe iRepresentation iof
ithe iPeople iAct, i1951, ithe iIndian iPenal iCode, i1860, iand ithe iDelimitation iAct, i1972. iPursuant
ito iArticle i328 iof ithe iConstitution, iState igovernments ican ialso imake ilaws i(subject ito ithe
iprovisions iof ithe iCentral iLaws) ibut, ito idate, iState igovernments ihave ionly ienacted ilegislation
icreating ipositions iwhich icannot ibe iregarded ias iprofit-making ioffices iand iwhich, iif iheld iby ia
ilegislature, ido inot idisqualify iit ifrom ibecoming ia ilegislature.

The iIndian iPenal iCode iof i1860:

Some iactions iin irelation ito ithe ielections iare isaid ito ibe ias ioffences iunder ithe iIndian ipenal iCode
i1860 i(IPC). iThey iare i:

• Section i153A- iPromoting ienmity ietc ibetween idifferent igroups ion igrounds iof ireligion,
irace, iplace iof ibirth, iresidence, ilanguage ietc iand idoing iacts iprejudicial ito imaintenance
iof iharmony;
• Section i153B- iImputation iand iassertation iprejudicial ito inational iintegrity;
• Section i171B- iBribery;
• Section i171C- iUndue iinfluence iat ielections;
• Section i171D- iPersonation iat ian iElection;
• Section i171G- iMaking iFalse iStatements;

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 • Section i171H- iFalse iPayments;
• Section i171I- iFailure ito ikeep ielection iaccounts;

All these offences have been the part of the Indian Penal Code from before independence
with an exception of Section 153A and Section 153B which have been added in 1969 and
1972 respectively.

The Constitution of India:

• Articles 52-71, which set down the process for the election in the case of the President
of India and the Vice-President of India, are the most relevant provisions of the
Constitution concerning election.
• Articles 83 and 80 have laid down the structure, terms of the Rajya Sabha and the Lok
Sabha and their term for which they remain in the house.
• Article 84 sets down the minimum requirements for Member of Parliament. (a) has to
be a citizen of India and (b) have a minimum age of twenty-five years in case of Lok
Sabha and a minimum age of thirty-five years in case of Rajya Sabha. Other
requirements can also be made necessary from time to time.
• Article 101 says that person cannot be member of both the houses at the same time.
• Article 102 provides for disqualification of Members of Parliament, i.e. (a) holding a
business office under the jurisdiction of the Government; (b) being insolvent; (c) having
been found unsound by the court which is competent; and (d) having willingly obtained
the citizenship of another country. Many disqualifications are given by statute.
• Articles 168 to173 and 190 to 192 provide specific rules on membership requirements,
disqualification and other rules for the state legislatures.
• Art. 324 deals with the powers and composition of the Election Commission and has
gained significance and garnered attention at the present time. It specifies that the
President may nominate the Election Commissioner and Other members present in the
Commission
• Art. 326 provides that elections to both the house shall be held on the basis of universal
adult franchise. The minimum age to be considered and to be an adult has been changed
from 21 years to 18 years in 1988.
• Article 329 (i) forbids the courts from challenging the legitimacy of any law relating to
the delimitation of electoral districts or the allocation of seats; and (ii) provides that the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 election to Parliament or the State legislature can be challenged only by means of an
election petition submitted to the authority provided for by statute. The Election
Commission was the authority until 1966. In 1966, the jurisdiction was transferred to
the High Courts.10

The Representation of the People Act, 1951:

This is the most critical piece of legislation that sets out the nut-and-bolt elements of the process
for election.

• This sets out specific rules on qualifications and disqualification for candidates in the
timetable for elections.
• It gives detailed the information of the administrative body for the conduct of elections.
• It gives power to the government to requisition premises, cars, etc. for elections.
• Functions of agents and the candidates to whom they belong.
• The process to count the votes or polling and the announcement of polls;
• The prohibition of electoral offences;
• The condition when election may be suspended and when re-registration of parties
needed
• The deposit for standing in the elections,
• The prohibition to impersonate and
• The reduction of electoral expenses.

The Representation of the People Act, 1950:

The main provisions of these Act are-

• The seats in the lower house are divided according to state. The electoral district of
Lower House cannot be split between states.
• The constituencies in Lok Sabha are single member constituencies.
• The President determines the constituencies of the Legislative Council.
• A person who is not below the age of 18 years on the qualifying and ordinarily a resident
of the constituency and not in any way disqualified by law is entitled to vote. The
electoral rolls are required to be updated timely by the Electoral Registration Officers.
It can be done either on the application by a person or suo-motto.

10
Section 80A to the R.P. Act 1950.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 The System of Election in India:

There iare iwide inumber iof ivoting isystems iin ithe iworld, ibut ithey ican ibe iprimarily idivided iunder
ithree iheads:

1. The iMajoritarian iSystems

2. The iProportional iRepresentation iSystem i
3. The iSemi- iProportional iRepresentation iSystem

In iIndia, iwe ihave ibeen ifollowing ithe iMajoritarian iSystem iwhich ihas ibeen i ibetter iknown ias i
i“First ipast ithe iPost iSystems” i(FPTPs) iin ithis ithe iterritories iin ithe ination iare idivided iinto isingle
imember iconstituencies. iIn ithis ievery ivoter ihas ione ivote iand ithe iperson ihaving ithe imost
inumber iof ivotes iirrespective iof ithe iproportions iof ithe ivote iwins.

This irule igives irise ito icertain iunprecedent iconsequences:

• A icandidate iwho ireceives inot imore ithan ififty ipercent ivote ifrom ian ielectorate i(at itimes
ias ifew ias i25 ito i30 iper icent) iis iselected. iHis iability ito ibe iface iof ithe ielectoral idistrict iis
idoubtful.
• This ischeme iis inot ifair ito iminor iparties ithat iobtain imuch iless irepresentation ithan ithe
ishare iof itheir ivotes i(at itimes ino ishare iat iall).
• On ithe iother iside, ia iparty ithat ienjoys ieven iunderwhelming igeneral isupport ihas ifar imore
irepresentation ithan ithe iproportion iof iits ivotes.
• When ithere iare itwo ior ithree iequally istrong iparties, isuch ias ithe iConservative iand iLabor
iParties iin ithe iUnited iKingdom ior ithe iRepublicans iand iDemocrats iin ithe iUnited iStates,
iboth iparties ithat ialternately itake iadvantage iof ithis istructure, iunfair ias iit imay ibe, iand
iform istable igovernments; ibut iwhere ithe ipolitical istage iis icontrolled iby ia isingle iparty,
ias iin ipre-1989 iIndia, ithe isystem ileads ito ia ivirtual ione-party irule.

This ischeme ihowever ihas icertain iadvantages:

• It iforms ia istable igovernment, iunlike ithe iinstable igovernments iexperienced iby imany
icountries iunder ithe iProportional iRepresentation iSystem-such ias iFrance ibefore i1958 ior
iItaly iafter iWorld iWar iII, iwhere igovernments ihave ion iaverage ilasted iless ithan isix
imonths.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 • This iavoids ithe irapid iincrease iin inumber iof ipolitical iparties, ias iin iIsrael, iwhere ia ifew
ismall igroups idictate ito ithe itwo imain iparties.

Why idid iIndia iimplement ithis imethod iwhile ia ivast imajority iof iestablished idemocracies iuse
isome ikind iof iproportional irepresentation isystem?

There iare ifew ireasons ifor ithis-

• At ifirst iwe ican isee ithat ithe iorigins iof iour ipolitical isystem ilie iin ithe iAnglo-Saxon
itradition.

Second, ithe idrafters iof iour iConstitution ipredicted ithat, ilike ithe iUnited iKingdom iand ithe iUnited
iStates, iwe iwill ialso ipossibly iestablish ia istable itwo-party isystem. iThis ihope idid inot imaterialize
ipartly ibecause iof ithe ilack iof idemocratic ivalues i(not ito imention iour inostalgic iand isentimental
ireverence ifor iour iancient igram ipanchayats, iwhich iDr.

• Ambedkar rightly called 'pathetic'), the servile mindset of turning to those in authority,
which was further underpinned by dire poverty. The ruling party has used the
framework to reinforce and maintain its grip by all means. The opposition parties have
also called for a reform in the electoral structure.

Two iother imajoritarian isystems iare iin ioperation: ithe iDouble iBallot isystem iin iFrance iand ithe
iPreferential iVoting iSystem iin iAustralia. iThey iboth ioffer imuch ifairer iresults ibut iare inot isuited
ito iIndian iconditions. iThe iFrench idouble-vote isystem iwould ialmost idouble ithe iexpenditure ion
imoney ias iwell ias ion ilabour, iwhich, iwhile iideal ifor ia ismall irich icountry ilike iFrance, iwould ibe
iinexpensive ifor ia icontinent-large icountries ilike iIndia. iIn ia icountry ilike iIndia iwith ibarely i74%
iliteracy i(as ilow ias i63% iBihar), ithe iAustralian isystem ifocused ion ipreferential ivoting, iwhich
iallows ivoters ito ishow itheir ipreference ifor icandidates ion ithe iballot iby iwriting ia inumber iagainst
ieach icandidate, iis iinconceivable. iOne idoes inot iknow ihow imuch ithe icensus ifigure iof 74%11 of
literacy corresponds to reality. Moreover, a large proportion of Indian population lives in
villages where illiteracy is much more prevalent. While Australia has a high literacy rate of
99% , the preferential voting system is successful there but the same voting system would be a
malarkey in India with a literacy rate of 74%.

Nor is a full-fledged proportional representation (PR) method an unmixed blessing. The key
drawbacks are as follows:

11
https://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/literacy_and_level_of_education.aspx

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 • It is a complicated method for the estimation of seats.
• A system of election which does not have any face in which an elector elects for a party
and not an candidate from a district that he knows.
• A full stranglehold of the party on candidates who are unacceptable in a fully
democratic environment.

Opposition iparties iand iintellectuals iwere ialso icalling ifor ia isystem iclose ito ithat iwas iused iin i
ielections ito ithe ilower ichamber iof ithe iGerman iParliament i(called ithe iBundestag), iwhich iis ia
ivariation iof ithe iPR isystems iand iFPTP iSystems. iThe inumber iof ielectoral idistricts iis iequal ito
ihalf ithe itotal inumber iof iseats iand ithus ieach ielectoral idistrict ihas itwo iseats. iOne iseat iis ifilled iby
ithe imethod iof iFPTP, ithe iother iby ithe imethod iof iPR. iAccordingly, ithe iballot ipaper ihas itwo
isections, ione ishowing ithe inames iof ithe iindividual icandidates iand ithe iother ishowing ithe inames
iof ithe iparties. iThe ivoter ineeds ito igive itwo ivotes, ione ifor ithe icandidate iand ithe iother ifor ithe
iparty. iHe iwould inot ineed ito ivote ifor ithe icandidate's iparty ifor iwhich ihe ivoted iin ithe ifirst iportion
iof ithe iballot ipaper. iThe ivotes ifor ithe iparties ishall ibe ipooled itogether iand ithe iquota iof iseats iwon
iby ieach iparty iby ithe iPR ishall ibe ifilled ifrom ithe ilist iof iparty icandidates isubmitted iby ithe iparty
iprior ito ithe ielection.

There iare itwo islight ichallenges ito ithe imethod. iFirst, ithe ielectoral idistricts iare ibecoming ivery
ilarge-twice ithe isize iof ithe ientire iFPTP ischeme. iThis ileads ito iincreased ispending ion icandidates
iwith ivery inegative iimplications. iIn ithe ielections ito ithe iLok iSabha, ieach ielectoral idistrict iwould
ihave ithe isize iof itwo idistricts. iSecond, ihalf iof ithe imembers ichosen ion ithe ibasis iof ithe iPR iare
ifaceless ipeople ion ithe iparty ilists.

The iTarkunde iCommission, iformed iin i1977, ithen iproposed ian iadjustment ito ithe iGerman
isystem. iThe iCommittee isuggested ithat ithere ishould ibe ia isingle ielectoral idistrict ias iat ipresent
iand ithat ithe ielections ishould ibe iheld iin ithe isame iway ias iat ipresent i(by ithe iFPTP imethod). iFor
ielectoral idistricts iwhere ia icandidate iwins imore ithan i50% iof ithe ivotes icast, ihe iwill ibe ideclared
ielected. iWhere ino icandidate ireceives imore ithan i50% iof ithe ivotes, ithe ivotes iof ithese
iconstituencies ishould ibe ipooled itogether iin ia iparty-wise imanner iand ithe iPR isystem ishould ibe
ifilled. iAs iin ithe iGerman isystem, ino iparty ishould ibe iqualified ifor ia iseat iunder ithe iPR isystem
iunless ithe iparty ihas ireceived iat ileast i5 i% iof ithe itotal ivotes.

The ialternative imethod ihas ithree ibenefits iover ithe iGerman isystem:

• The irepresentation iwould ibe imuch iless iskewed ithan iunder iour icurrent istructure.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 • Both icandidates ichosen iunder ithe iFPTP iapproach imust ihave ithe iapproval iof iat ileast
i50% iof ithe ivoters iand iwill ithus ibe imore irepresentative iof ithe ielectorate ithan iunder ithe
icurrent isystem.
• There iwill ibe ino iincrease iin ithe isize iof ithe ielectoral idistricts iresulting iin ia ireduction iin
idirect icontact iwith ithe ivoters iand ian iincrease iin ielection iexpenses iwhich iwill ilead ito
iother iundesirable iconsequences. iA iminimum iof ifive iper icent ivote ifor ia ishare iof ithe iPR
ipool iof iseats, ias iin iGermany, iwould iprevent ithe ispread iof iminor iparties.

There iis, ihowever, ia irisk iof ia isystem idegenerating iinto ia icent iper icent iPR isystem iif ino
iparticular icandidate ireceives imore ithan i50 iper icent iof ithe ivotes iin ihis ior iher ielectoral idistrict;
ior ia icent iper icent iFPTP isystem iif ia icandidate iin ieach ielectoral idistrict ireceives imore ithan i50
iper icent iof ithe ivotes iin ihis ior iher isecond iballot. iAs iin ithe iFrench imethod.

Voter-Turnout Trends:

The turnout of voters have fluctuated over the past sixteen years. The lowest ever turnout was
recorded was of 45.67% which was in the year 1951 which was the first ever General Elections
held in India. From thereon the turnouts has been as, 47.74% in 1957; 55.42% in 1962, 61.33%
in 1967; 55.29% in 1971; 60.49% in 1977; 56.92% in 1980; 64.01% in 1984-85; 61.95% in
1989; 55.88% in 1991-1992; 57.94% in 1996; 61.97% in 1998; 59.99% in 1999; 57.98% in
2004; 58.19% in 2009; 66.44% in 2014 and 67.11 in 2019.

As is evident from the above data the general voter turnout can be considered as low. The
lowest turnout was in the year 1951 which can be due to the fact that it was the first ever general
election and the general awareness about the election was less and mostly people were unaware
about the concepts of democracy and the benefits of election. But even after the first election
the picture has not been very bright. There has been a general deviation of +- 5% in the voter
turnout from the elections since the year 1962 with the only sudden surge being in the year
1984-1985, this could be attributed to the fact that it was the year in which the first and only
women Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi was assassinated. She was immensely
popular among the masses and her assassination led the people to sympathise with the congress
and elect Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to be her heir. Under Mr Gandhi, India had many reforms, one of
which was the Introduction of Universal Adult Franchise which led to the lowering of the
voting age to 18years. After that the general voting trend has been generally similar. The
highest voting turnout was in recent election of 2019 with a voting turnout of 67.11%. This
voting turnout was mainly attributed to the immense popularity of the current Narendra Modi

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

government and general increased awareness of the youth due to the Social Media. Moreover,
even before this election strides were being made by the BJP Government in the area of
quashing of the triple talaq amongst the Muslim community. This led to an increased sense of
freedom amidst the women. The view of current government on the Kashmir Issue was also
one of the major factor to instil the feeling amongst masses to go out and vote and a result of
which strides were made by the BJP government in Kashmir after the re-election with the
removal of the Special Status granted to Kashmir under Article 370.

Though the voting turnout was at an all time high yet it is considerably low and it is very
shameful that the “largest democracy in the world” has not been able to garner even 70% voter
turnout even after 70 years of being a “Democratic” Country. This can be attributed to the
following reasons –

• The Urban People or so called working middle class, who constitute

a huge percentage of the voting share consider the day of election to
be a holiday. This sense of not going to vote and relaxing is very
disturbing when one considers the fact that India is the largest
democracy in the world and a large part of the mass does not cares to
express its opinion.
• The people have a feeling that one vote does not counts. The people
should be made aware that every vote counts and if all the people
start to think the same way then no one will turn out to vote and
election would just be a farce.
• Another significant portion of the voters live in the rural areas. These
comprise of mostly uneducated people. The only way to increase the
voting turnout in these areas is to increase literacy rate of the people
of the area.
• Many areas in India are still such that the Women are not allowed to
go out.
• There are many cases of election booths being bombed and death of
civilians. This causes the rise of a sense of fear among the people.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711

 Conclusion

Democracy can have its true meaning only when the large mass of people turnout to vote
because as the 16th President of United States of America has stated that , “ Government of the
people, by the people and for the people” ( this was said by him in his Gettysburg Address) .
This clearly means that people are the true essence of democracy. Therefore, to make India
democracy in true sense the voting turnout needs to be increased. In my view following steps
can be taken to increase the voter turnout-

• The voters belonging to the urban working middle class can be given the incentive that
who ever votes can get an extra day of paid leave this could further be added in the
corporate bodies Corporate Social Responsibility.
• The voters need to be educated that every vote matters. The students can be educated
how a single vote can make difference.
• For the people living in rural areas the literacy needs to be increased and government
should organise drives to educate the people.
• The National Commission of Women can take steps to ensure the safety of women and
carry out gender sensitization drives to generate awareness about voting among women.
• The government should deploy more security and ensure safety of the boots in every
way possible.

In my view, the process of election can also be reformed and both the elections to the Lok
Sabha and the State Legislatures could be made to take place at the same time. This will
decrease the expenditure needed in conducting the election and it can cause to form a stable
government in every state and ensure that there is no fall of government in the next five years,
as is in the case of most Coalition Governments.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687711