2AC v Anything 

 
 
 Case 
Overview (in the order of the two contentions):  
 
Contention 1 is shortages. Lack of water supply causing droughts NOW (Sullivan).
Droughts lead to ag collapse and spills over globally. Ag collapse wrecks food supply
which is key to prevent widespread famine – that’s Richards. Droughts also increase
risk of infectious diseases. Semiconductor access dependent on water access; if the US
can export semiconductors the existential risk is extinction that’s Dewey and LeBoeuf.
Current water allocation methods fall short of required levels and result in our
impacts. The affs method of a federally-led water market system encourages
investment and allows water to be allocated properly (1AC Killsek) 
Contention 2 is Modeling. Global water shortages are escalating and go nuclear (that’s
Cribb). Water shortage in Taiwan allows China to dominate semiconductor industry
and attract global scientists. This causes Chinese tech supremacy that’s Hao 19.
Taiwan tech collapse ends silicon shield and brings about Chinese aggression –
existential risk. On the modeling advantage, the aff is a blueprint for global efficiency
which solves modeling Heard 21.  
Solvency from the 1AC
1. Institutional model – the AFF’s a blueprint for global efficiency measures AND
crowds out worse market models 
Heard et al. 21, S. Heard is Director of MarketLab, The Nature Conservancy; M. Fienup is Executive
Director of the Center for Economic Research and Forecasting, and Assistant Professor, California
Lutheran University; E. J. Remson is Senior Project Director of the California Water Program, The Nature
Conservancy, “The First SGMA Groundwater Market Is Trading: The Importance of Good Design and the
Risks of Getting It Wrong,” California Agriculture, 03/31/2021, pp. 1–7  
Creating a functioning market is not easy. There is  no off-the-shelf solution, and there is a lot to get
right. The most important — and difficult — elements to get right are the rules and structure, which must be
tailored to local conditions. Capping and monitoring  pumping, generating buy-in from diverse stakeholders and
guarding against cheating and adverse impacts, such as the drying of shallow drinking water wells or of groundwater-
dependent ecosystems (GDEs), are also essential. Even with careful design, markets can fall short or cause adverse impacts.
And, as the new reality of pumping restrictions sets in, powerful pumpers, largely unregulated before SGMA, will attempt to bend market rules
in their favor. We have lived this experience. Since 2016, we have been in the trenches, developing the Fox Canyon groundwater market for three coastal basins, an area known as Fox Canyon, in Ventura County. The first
market to be implemented under SGMA, the Fox Canyon groundwater market began trading in early 2020 in the Oxnard basin, which has nearly 200 agricultural wells representing 77,000 acre-feet of pumping. Ventura County is
one of the nation's most productive agricultural counties, with $2 billion in agricultural revenue, the majority of which is generated in Fox Canyon (County of Ventura 2019). Water users there are largely groundwater-dependent,
and decades of overpumping landed two of the region's basins on the list of 21 SGMA-designated “critically overdrafted basins.” The Fox Canyon groundwater market operates in a large area of Ventura County that includes over
55,000 acres of high-value agricultural land and 500 active agricultural wells. A primary driver of the market is the scarcity of water. Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (FCGMA) is a Special Act District created by the
California legislature in 1982 to address seawater intrusion in three coastal basins in Ventura County. FCGMA was officially designated as the groundwater sustainability agency (GSA) for the three basins with the passage of the
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) in 2014. Fox Canyon growers are facing pumping cuts of 40% or more under SGMA. Area growers called for a groundwater market as a tool that would give them flexibility while
complying with pumping cuts of 40% or more under SGMA. What began as an open, robust stakeholder process chartered by the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (FCGMA), led by California Lutheran University (CLU)
and supported by The Nature Conservancy (TNC), grew into a multiyear effort to create a model groundwater market under SGMA. Enabling conditions Our experience developing the Fox Canyon groundwater market, and the
experiences of those involved in similar efforts in other basins in the United States and overseas, indicate that groundwater markets can be a useful tool for achieving basin sustainability, but they are not a good fit for every basin
or groundwater sustainability agency (GSA). A number of enabling conditions are necessary to ensure that a groundwater market functions effectively. The Fox Canyon groundwater market benefitted from the four enabling
conditions (water scarcity, fixed allocations, agricultural stakeholder support, and capacity and funding) described below. Water scarcity Without significant scarcity, a market will not function and is likely not needed. A primary
driver of the Fox Canyon groundwater market is the degree of scarcity that agricultural users are experiencing as they implement the SGMA-mandated reduction in pumping. SGMA's requirement that a basin's sustainable yield be
determined fixes the maximum amount of groundwater available for the diverse needs of all pumpers in that basin, essentially serving as a cap on total extractions. If the demand for groundwater exceeds the sustainable yield of
the basin, reductions in individual pumping are likely required, as they were in Fox Canyon. Fixed allocations Clearly defined individual fixed allocations are the first step in the development of a cap-and-trade market; they
determine the unit of trade and establish how many units each market participant has to either extract or trade. The sum of the fixed allocations equals the total extraction allowed for the basin in a given year. FCGMA chose to
move from an existing system of pumping allocations that varied by crop type, known as indexed, or efficiency, allocations, to an allocation system based on historical pumping for each well. Water-market participants are assigned
pumping allocations in units of 1 acre-foot, to be used or traded during the current water year. Agricultural stakeholder support Agricultural stakeholder support for a groundwater market is essential, as farmers represent the
largest consumers of groundwater in California. The idea for the Fox Canyon groundwater market originated among a small group of local growers in early 2014, as they were facing the prospect of reduced groundwater supplies as
the result of California's drought. Growers recognized that the heterogeneity in both the season and the water demand of the region's crops (ranging from berries, flowers and vegetables to citrus and avocado orchards) created
opportunities for a water market (see Fargher 2011). With the help of the Farm Bureau of Ventura County, they brought their ideas to FCGMA's staff and board of directors. Agricultural stakeholders in FCGMA's jurisdiction are
 The creation of a water market is a considerable undertaking that requires significant
well-organized, and the leadership provided by this group was critical. Capacity and funding 
funding and dedicated capacity from GSA staff, participants and partners. During the development of the Fox Canyon groundwater market, TNC
secured a Conservation Innovation Grant from the federal Natural Resources Conservation Service, with the support of FCGMA, CLU, the Farm
Bureau of Ventura County and local growers. The primary motivation for pursuing the grant was to help
implement a sound groundwater sustainability
plan (GSP) with an embedded groundwater
market that would provide for the needs of both nature and agriculture and that would hopefully serve
as a model for others to follow. The grant provided over $1 million to design and test the market, and to cover the
installation of telemetric monitoring hardware to automatically collect pumping data. Without the infusion of funds from the grant, the Fox
Canyon groundwater market may not have endured the resource-intensive development and testing phases. What good looks
like Establishing
a functioning water market involves far  more than creating a trading platform. At a
minimum, a successful water market requires clear  objectives, rules to achieve those objectives and
a governance system with resources and the capacity to establish and enforce the rules . For nearly 2 years, a
range of stakeholders worked collaboratively to develop the Fox Canyon groundwater market's goals and objectives, rules and operational
mechanisms. These were carefully tailored to fit local conditions and the needs of local stakeholders, which is a big part of good design. Well-
designed markets in other jurisdictions may look different in some aspects. The diversity of the crops in Fox Canyon — flowers, vegetables, berries, citrus, avocado — creates diversity in
water demand, which suits a groundwater market. Solid groundwater sustainability plan A GSA wishing to create a water market should create its GSP with the market in mind. A well-designed water market can help achieve the
goals of a GSP, but a poorly designed market may undermine the plan. Likewise, superior market design cannot mitigate a GSP's shortcomings. FCGMA created its GSP and water market in parallel. That required significant agency
capacity and resources but allowed for iteration between the GSP and the market design so that critical elements of the GSP, such as the sustainable yield and pumping allocations, could support a functioning water market.
Methods to achieve pumping reductions that are overly complex or are not clearly quantifiable on a well-by-well basis may not be compatible with a market. For example, some Fox Canyon growers proposed a rule to allow
“borrowing from the future” (pumping beyond a current year's allocation, to be offset by further reductions in future years), but borrowing would undermine the basic structure and function of the market by destroying the price
signal upon which individual water-use decisions are made. Without proper attention, plan elements may exclude the possibility of a market. A solid GSP should also establish what is not traded. Specifically, water within the
sustainable yield should provide for human consumption and GDEs; communities and nature should not be required to rely on groundwater markets to meet their water needs. Environmental groups, disadvantaged communities
(DACs) and environmental justice organizations throughout California are right to be concerned that water-market activity may be dominated by those with the greatest financial resources or political power, that local groundwater
allocations may be allocated disproportionately to these powerful groups and that adverse impacts, such as drying of DACs' shallow drinking water wells or loss of GDEs, may result. These are real risks, and the remedy is a strong

Benefits of well-designed markets A well-designed groundwater market,

GSP that balances economic, environmental and social benefits to ensure compliance with SGMA. 

in which the price of water is allowed to reflect its true value, has  multiple benefits. Notably, a
functioning market is a cost-effective tool for achieving SGMA's mandate of sustainable
management, driving the reallocation of pumping within  a basin to the highest-value uses. The ability to
trade motivates users to conserve scarce groundwater, invest in water use efficiency and develop new
water supplies, like recharged wastewater — all of which contribute to basin sustainability. The largest
benefits typically occur in regions with  both water scarcity and variable water demand, seasonal fluctuations
in water availability, a large number of interconnected water users with varying demands and degrees of flexibility, agricultural water users
who are exposed to the risks that accompany national and global markets, and increasing demands for urban and environmental water
(Fargher 2011). Markets benefit their users by allowing greater flexibility than command-and-
control schemes do. For example, growers can generate revenue when fallowing fields and avoid penalties for pumping beyond their
allocation by purchasing additional water on the market. In the Fox Canyon groundwater market's first year of trading, a grower avoided nearly
$350,000 in surcharges by purchasing the water for less than 15% of that figure. Municipal and industrial users can turn to
markets to purchase additional supplies and to sell surplus  supplies, like recharged wastewater, to recoup capital
costs. Water trading has proven successful in  supporting agricultural productivity in a number of settings, from
Australia and South America to the Western United States (Fargher 2011; Hearne and Easter 1997). A well-designed market can
also benefit sensitive resources. Special rules can avoid undesirable impacts in areas that need
protection against overpumping. In Fox Canyon, pumping was reduced in one of the most vulnerable areas — a pumping trough — without
top-down regulatory restrictions that differentially impacted pumpers in a sensitive area. Other sensitive areas can also be spatially delineated,
such as groundwater-dependent ecosystems (GDEs) and shallow drinking water wells for rural and disadvantaged communities (DACs). Water
markets have enhanced municipal water security and maximized environmental benefits in areas as diverse as Australia and the Western
United States (Fargher 2011; Garrick et al. 2009; Garrick et al. 2011). Open, public process An open process and robust stakeholder input on the creation of a water market are
essential in building trust, customizing the structure of the market and market rules and ensuring that stakeholders use the market. FCGMA established a formal stakeholder group, called the Water Market Group, with biweekly
meetings that were open to the public, encouraging input on the market design. CLU facilitated the meetings, which typically had 40 to 50 participants, including growers and representatives from water utilities, municipalities with
The meetings focused on learning how water markets function, setting goals for the
nearly a half-million residents, mutual water companies and environmental organizations. 
Fox Canyon groundwater market and establishing trading rules. To help build local knowledge on how water markets work, CLU invited guest
speakers with market experience from around the world to address the group. The group also gathered data, case studies and other
publications on water markets, and it posted this information on a shared website. A
key theme that emerged
from the presentations and literature review was the importance of creating a water market that
was transparent, fair, easy to understand and low-cost. Biweekly meetings facilitated by CLU brought together growers and representatives from water utilities,
municipalities, mutual water companies, and environmental organizations. A solid agreement emerged that the market needed to be transparent, fair, easy to understand, and low cost. After meeting for 7 months, the group
unanimously agreed on the outline for the structure and operational mechanisms of a permanent water market as well as on a set of goals and rules to be used in a series of pilot water markets. The group presented these rules to
FCGMA's staff and board of directors, and they became the basis for the agency's ordinances that authorized the water market. A series of pilots tested these rules before the market was opened to all agricultural pumpers in the
Oxnard basin in February 2020. The group will re-engage, as needed, to address any issues identified and to recommend changes to the rules as the market evolves over time. Protections against market power Well-designed
markets provide all market participants with equal access to trade and equal opportunity to gain from market activity. This necessitates keeping transaction costs low and creating a fair market that is free of manipulation.
Influential parties may attempt to manipulate the price of water and to extract all of the economic gains from trade. They may even seek to exclude others from participating in the market fully. For example, during an early pilot of
the Fox Canyon groundwater market, a packer/shipper sought to learn the identities of all growers in the market in order to restrict their participation. Rules and structures designed by the Water Market Group, including a single,
central exchange and anonymized trading, succeeded in preventing unfair influence. Equal access to the Fox Canyon groundwater market was addressed by implementing a formal, centralized market structure that uses a private
exchange administrator, that is, a private organization that is independent of the GSA. Stakeholders felt strongly that the exchange administrator should be independent of the GSA and also that it should be local and nonprofit and
not have a financial or other stake in the reallocation of groundwater pumping. The goal of a fair market was addressed by establishing an anonymized market and blind, algorithmic matching. Bids and offers are submitted and
matched, and transfers of pumping are executed and reported to the GSA, all without market participants ever knowing who the counterparties are. And yet the process is transparent and accountable. Mitigation of adverse third-
party impacts Well-designed markets must anticipate and mitigate the risks of adverse third-party impacts. Market transfers can inadvertently create areas of concentrated pumping in the basin that can result in lowered water
levels and a decline in water quality, which, in turn, may adversely impact surface water flows, GDEs and other local pumpers. The drinking water supplies of DACs may be particularly vulnerable. Mitigation starts with a basin's
allocation system, for example, ensuring adequate water for GDEs and DACs. Once allocations have been established, foresight is required to anticipate when a particular transfer of allocation might adversely impact third parties.
Specific market rules are required to prevent these unintended impacts. It may also be necessary for market rules to adapt over time to address unintended impacts. Special management areas (SMAs) are delineated geographic
areas established by the GSP to address the risk that trading may negatively impact groundwater quality or levels. Rules can be implemented to restrict the volume or direction of water transfers within an SMA. SMAs have broad
applications and can be used to address adverse impacts to surface water flows, GDEs and DACs. The Fox Canyon groundwater market includes two SMAs; one is an area of seawater intrusion, the other is a local pumping trough.
The Fox Canyon groundwater market's rules stipulate that pumpers in an SMA may purchase additional water only from another pumper within the SMA but that they may sell either to a pumper within the same SMA or to a
pumper outside of both SMAs. The goal of these directional restrictions is to ensure that transfers of pumping allocation do not result in a net increase in pumping within an SMA. In practice, the use of this tool has resulted in a
market transfer of pumping out of one SMA into a healthier part of the basin. Directional trading is one of a number of approaches used to protect SMAs. Exchange rates, or trading ratios, whereby one unit of pumping outside an
SMA is traded for less than a unit of pumping within an SMA, have also been used in other markets. Accurate, reliable monitoring of extraction Accurate water-use data is critical to achieving sustainable groundwater management.
Errors in the measurement of water use have been shown to produce large economic losses for farmers and to undermine policies to limit adverse impacts on the environment and other water users. Choosing monitoring
technology involves trade-offs, notably between implementation cost and accuracy; one of the least costly options, satellite remote sensing, has been shown to produce large measurement errors (Foster et al. 2020). Accurate
water monitoring is a first-order concern to ensure functioning groundwater markets. Meters, in place on Fox Canyon groundwater wells since the 1980s, track water use, left. To prevent cheating and ensure accurate data
collection, Fox Canyon growers opted for universal telemetric sensors that attach to meters and stream pumping data real-time, funded by a grant from the Natural Resources Conservation Service, right. A water market also needs
accurate water-use data to ensure that participants trade only unused water allocations and that no exceedances of pumping allocations result from trading. Accurate monitoring is a first-order concern for water market
participants. Any underreporting of water use, or other form of cheating, devalues allocations available for trade on the market and undermines progress toward achieving a basin's sustainable yield, potentially resulting in further
cuts down the road. In Fox Canyon, growers were deeply concerned that pumping be accurately measured and so they proposed universal telemetric monitoring of groundwater extraction with automated reporting. Fox Canyon
pumpers now use cellular-based telemetry attached to individual meters; this system broadcasts pumping data to a cloud-based data portal. The portal automatically submits monthly pumping totals to the GSA. Hardware
approved for use in Fox Canyon also includes validation measures designed to prevent cheating. In the early 2000s, FCGMA's staff and board of directors had discussed a requirement that all agricultural wells employ electronic
monitoring and automated reporting, using early telemetry hardware, but protest from the agricultural community was so strong that the plan was abandoned. The new Fox Canyon groundwater market altered incentives, making
Water markets are complex. They involve an
universal telemetric monitoring of extractions not just politically feasible but imperative to agricultural water users. Market testing: learning and adaptation 

almost dizzying interaction of individuals, institutions, actions and reactions. Critical

questions arise for those implementing
markets: How will progress be evaluated? Does the market work as intended? What are
the unintended consequences? Does the market structure adapt to  new information as it becomes
available? Answering these questions requires a humble approach: starting simple, testing early and often and creating a market structure that
allows for adaptation over time. During the design phase, the Water Market Group recommended testing the market, with a definitive starting and ending point, to ensure that the market functioned as
intended. The goal was to test the rules and any intended market outcomes while also allowing FCGMA and market participants to discover and address any unintended consequences of trading. A series of sequential pilots was
implemented. The phases included a demonstration project for the telemetric monitoring and automated reporting system, stress testing of the market rules and the electronic trading platform and trading between pumpers in the
largest basin. Numerous issues were identified and addressed prior to full market implementation. Had these issues not been addressed early, they may have forever undermined participants' faith in the market and its ability to

Why markets fail The benefits of water trading can be reduced by a number of factors, including regulatory
function. 

uncertainty, such as changes to rules or allocations that undermine participants' ability to trade (Grainger and Costello 2014); high
transaction costs (Crase et al. 2000; Donoso 2006); the use of market power by one or more participants to restrict access to the market or to
manipulate the price of water (Ansink and Houba 2012; Brozović 2016; Bruno and Sexton 2020) and adverse impacts to third parties (Heaney et
al. 2006). As the most important and most common sources of friction in markets, transaction costs and market power warrant special consideration. Transaction costs, which in extreme
situations can be greater than the cost of the water itself, include the costs of bringing together willing buyers and sellers of water, negotiating the price and other terms of a trade, validating
ownership of the water use right, legalizing the contract, enforcing contract provisions and gaining regulatory approval for a transfer (Crase et al. 2000; Donoso 2006). A participant exerting
market power might benefit from driving the price artificially low (if they plan to buy) or artificially high (if they plan to sell). Even a small degree of exerted market power can cause sizeable
impacts (Bruno and Sexton 2020). It can deter potential users, either directly or indirectly, from participating and can increase the risk of the market languishing or even

Trust in and the perceived fairness of a market are particularly important. In a number of markets

collapsing. 

involving agricultural water users, farmers have been shown to forego participation, despite direct

financial benefits, due to a lack of trust. Historical mistrust of regulators and other actors, along with fear that the benefits and
responsibilities are not equally distributed, are primary causes of an unwillingness to participate (Breetz et al. 2005). A call to action Groundwater
markets existed in California, and elsewhere, long before SGMA. But with SGMA's new mandate to achieve basin sustainability across large parts of the state, interest in groundwater markets
is growing. According to California's Department of Water Resources, 20 of 46 GSPs submitted to date include a groundwater market as a strategy or management action. Markets are complex

If
by their very nature and have steep learning curves. We have learned firsthand the importance of careful design, how much there is to get right and how much work is involved.  

markets are to be a successful tool in complying with SGMA, GSAs will need support and accountability. If not, too much will be
left hanging in the balance. Specifically, we recommend: A standardized framework. Without the support of
a guiding, standardized framework on “what good looks like,” the risks of market failure and adverse
impacts are too high. Currently, GSAs may develop markets as they wish; there are no required elements, like stakeholder involvement
or accurate measurement. The standardized framework should articulate the  essential elements of a well-
functioning market under SGMA — in a broadly applicable, rather than prescriptive, way — so that  any GSA could
use it to tailor the design of a market to its basin's conditions. One possible framework might be an accreditation program
administered by an independent body composed of experts in market design. 
They say that there will be no resource wars but
a) Nations fight resource wars all the time to try to exploit other nations (Iraq and
Kuwait fought over control of natural resources + ability to export said
resources
They misinterpret our China advantage: it’s not that there will be a resource war, but
that because of the collapse of the silicon shield (i.e. Taiwan’s tech adv) there will be
war. Not with resources

They say no disease bc of COVID but COVID is a specific example – it’s not highly
deadly. More deadly diseases + new diseases cause extinction

Disease causes extinction- strains rapidly develop, long range transportation speeds
up infection, US is key superspreader- that’s Bar Yam
Doesn’t assume droughts- disease thrives in warm waters, air quality, west niles prove
That’s NCEH 20

They say we extend state but we extend free markets … against the state on a
fundamental level.

They say that there’s no reason chips are key for tech competition but Taiwan’s silicon
shield is predicated on chips … any water collapse tech (i.e. tech chips in general not
just a specific type)

We’re not advocating control over indigenous land … the US controls various water
resources (including access to the ocean) and water is necessary for human life (and
human production).

They say that the US is the biggest polluter but it just compares country’s Carbon
Footprint not industries in general.
 Set Col
1. Framework---weigh the implementation of the plan against a competitive
alternative.
a. Fairness---moots 8 minute of the 1AC in favor of an academic vacuum.
b. Clash---eliminates incentivizes for nuanced research AND shifts convo away
from the predicable res. outweighs a single round AND refinement is a prereq

2. Util is good
a. Magnitude – killing everyone kills progress
b. Disease turns structural violence – magnifies suffering and makes progress and
culture impossible

3a. Perm do each – do the aff and the alt on parallel tracks

3.Perm do both- plan solves sustainable capitalism, pragmatic prerequisite

4. Case outweighs and turns the alt- no timeframe for settler colonialist violence BUT
disease and food shortages are definitely bad for native communities

1. 5. Alt fails – we take tangible action to solve issues present in the status quo – the
perm has to solve

6. Progress possible — specifically true in the realm of water.

Cunilio 16 — third-generation attorney and was born and raised in suburban Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. In 2011, she graduated cum laude from the University of Colorado Boulder having
majored in Political Science. (Kathleen; Published: April 14, 2016; “EPA’s New Rule Eases Tribe’s Ability
to Apply for Treatment As a State Status Under the Clean Water Act”; University of Denver Water Law
Review; Accessed: June 22, 2021; http://duwaterlawreview.com/epas-new-rule-eases-tribes-ability-to-
apply-for-treatment-as-a-state-status-under-the-clean-water-act/)//CYang

The EPA’s new ruledemonstrates important progress in Indian Country for two reasons. First, by treating tribal
nations similarly to states recognizes inherent tribal sovereignty. The EPA’s new rule reflects the federal government’s
modern trend of treating tribes similarly to a state government in delegating administrative authority. This delegation of authority is a product
of the Self-Determination Era, which commenced with President Richard Nixon’s 1970 speech to the Congress on Indian Affairs.[22] The
federal government helps in promoting and recognizing tribal self-governance through government-to-
government partnerships.[23] The Self-Determination Era refers to somewhat of an American Indian “nation-building” movement, which
included establishing tribal governments, courts, police forces, and schools.

Second, the Revised Interpretation is important because only about forty of the 300 Indian Tribes with reservations
have obtained the EPA’s approval for TAS status.[24] This is not to say that tribes cannot regulate their waters without TAS
approval, but the EPA’s recognition provides further funding and certification programs to help legitimize and
strengthen tribal water management. Tribes generally lack a tax base upon which to develop water management, but with TAS
recognition, tribes receive money for water management projects. Thus, allowing tribes with ‘checkerboard’ reservations (that is reservations
with large swaths of both member and nonmember land) to bypass the Montana test will make it easier for tribes to receive funding from the
federal government for maintaining and improving reservation water quality.

Overall, alleviating
this administrative barrier will make it easier for tribes to implement CWA programs
targeted at reservation water quality. It will save tribes both time and resources in their TAS applications, as
well as relieve the EPA of identifying on a case-by-case basis whether an individual tribe can meet the Montana test. Moreover, this rule should
encourage more American Indian tribes to apply for TAS status in order to successfully implement CWA programs.[25] This
is an
important step because clean water is paramount to Indian tribes, not just for sustenance, but also for spiritual,
medicinal, and cultural reasons.[26] For example, the most recent tribe to receive TAS status, the Santa Ana
Pueblo, views the water within their New Mexico reservation as important for maintaining its own cultural
heritage.

7. The aff’s market strategy is good AND outweighs any risk of a link – alt fails
Boyer ‘21 – Ph.D., O.C., FRSC. Professeur émérite / Emeritus Professor, Université de Montréal;
Former Bell Canada Professor of Industrial Economics, Université de Montréal; Former Jarislowsky-
SSHRC-NSERC Professor of International Competition, École Polytechnique de Montréal. ("Beyond ESG:
Reforming Capitalism and Social-Democracy," Cirano, 2021,
https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2021s-03.pdf, Accessed 6-28-2021, LASA-SC)

In both cases,
the goal is optimal environmental protection, and the best instruments and mechanisms for
achieving it are primarily associated with free markets. These instruments and mechanisms make it possible to clearly
define the concept of optimal protection (equilibrium) and to achieve this level of protection efficiently—i.e. by devoting the right level of social
resources to it.26 2.2 Protecting and Sharing Water. Water
is probably the resource with the greatest importance to
humanity. From a relatively abundant resource in ancient times, water has become a scarce resource with the
explosive growth of the world’s population and the phenomenal development of the world’s economies .
To the extent that the distribution of water resources differs from the distribution of the population and water intensive economic activities,
there is a need to trade or even market water if we are to balance availability and needs. In a publication to
be released in 2021, 27 Maria Kouyoumijian and I focus on two main sets of issues related to water economics. First, the need to
improve water management with efficient instruments and institutions based on competitive markets,
including appropriate pricing and well-regulated trade. Socially responsible management of water resources has become a
global challenge and represents a major opportunity for development and wealth creation for all. Second, the need to use all
available means to inform all stakeholders of the increasing value and cost of water: users, including
individuals, households and businesses; public and private managers and operators of natural
freshwater resources; commercial and industrial water and ancillary service providers; operators of
water and wastewater treatment plants or centres; and developers of technologies and equipment for
the exploitation, transportation, and management of water resources . The greatest danger on the horizon is that,
through a lack of understanding, leadership, and open communication, the international community of developed and developing countries will
lag in designing and implementing the governance mechanisms needed to manage our freshwater resources, however abundant or scarce.
Time is running out. The global water crisis is imminent and as critical as climate change if not more, but
far fewer resources are devoted to it. Clearly, water is both a human right and an economic commodity
with very special characteristics: Its consumption momentarily destroys the good (the glass of water I drink is
unavailable to anyone else, so water is a private good in the economic sense of the term), but the water consumed regenerates
and eventually finds its way back into nature to be consumed again and again in an unending cycle .
Identifying and delivering the right balance between these two necessarily complementary visions, water as a human right and water as a
commodity with special characteristics, involves untangling a Gordian knot that humanity must address today. It
is precisely because
access to water is a human right that appropriate markets and commercial arrangements (pricing and
control) must be designed to make this right a reality for all, rather than just a pipe dream. We must ask
questions that some still find extremely disconcerting: If water is considered a shared endowment, how can we keep it from being over-
exploited and over-consumed (the tragedy of the commons)? If water is assigned its due value, how can we avoid the opposite problem, in
which it is underused because some rights holders withhold it from the market (tragedy of the anticommons)? How much should users pay for
water (and wastewater treatment)? How to determine the “right” price? How is water scarcity managed in practice? How can trade facilitate
the transformation of a water-poor country into a country capable of managing its local water in a sustainable if not self-sufficient manner?
Boyer and Kouyoumijian explore market instruments that can be developed and applied to water resources. This
may be the most
audacious challenge of all, as the creation of competitive water markets could be a first step toward a
more prosperous era for everyone: individuals and the agricultural, industrial, and residential sectors of
the economy. At the forefront are water management technologies that can support the value chain, including dikes and dams,
transportation, and desalination plants. Consumers of commodities, including water, respond to prices: Lower
prices lead to higher demand. When water is free, there is no reason to conserve or minimize the
amount of water used. Where water is scarce, providing water for free is a recipe for ensuring that
demand exceeds supply. Maintaining water markets can be difficult. Potable water distribution and wastewater collection systems are
natural monopolies because it is not possible to build several parallel networks of pipes, as competition would require.28 However,
monopolies, whether private or public, do not work well. They are rarely efficient, effective, or sensitive to the wishes of their customers and
may overcharge because there is no competition to set a market price. But going to the other extreme, setting the price of water at zero or
artificially low, also causes distortions. If
there is no market to set the price, adequate regulation can ensure that
the price reflects the opportunity cost and is thus the best possible approximation to the dynamics of
supply and demand. Whatever the case may be, the regulation of drinking water must be independent and
free of conflicts of interest. In an ideal system, operation of water treatment plants and pipelines will be separated from systems
oversight, which in turn will be separated from creation of the rules and standards with which the system must comply . We know how
to do all of that. But many books and documentaries, as well as political organizations, NGOs and
lobbies, present an apocalyptic and ultimately dystopian vision of the use of market and commercial
mechanisms (pricing and markets) to help alleviate the impending global water shortage. To these
authors and leaders, this recourse to market mechanisms and the commodification of water is nothing
less than the embodiment of evil, designed to enslave the whole world. In Canada, for example, Maude Barlow and
the militants of the Council of Canadians have taken it upon themselves to block any opening to market mechanisms by wrapping themselves in
the flag and using (exploiting) many young children in their advertising campaigns, asserting that the right to water is certainly a universal
human right, but not access to OUR Canadian water. As one of the members put it: “Water is best used where God put it.”29 Fortunately for
Canadians, God put a lot of water in Canada! They are oblivious to the fact that we are all increasingly in the same
boat in the face of water shortages, and that the division should not be between those who have a
surplus of water and those who suffer from shortages, but rather between those who advocate a
reasoned use and an incentive-based protection of water resources associated with effective and
equitable sharing (trade) and those who deny the reality of the urgent needs of humanity beyond
their borders while proffering hollow platitudes. The political lobbying of this self-righteous coalition borders on extreme
forms of policy collusion and cronyism. It has no other solution to offer than to repeat clichés and falsehoods about
competition and markets, caricaturing their limitations as reflecting their true nature, in order to
virtually take over the water resources and in so doing create a tragedy of the anticommons that hurts
citizens both here and abroad.
8. Private actor fiat is a voter – it kills clash, aff research, and advocacy since it lacks
reciprocity, is infinitely regressive, and there’s no lit base. Alt text must include actor-
reciprocity and fairness

8. Vague alts bad- shifts out of offense, VI for clash.

9--Floating PIKS are a voter – steals the 1AC – wrecks clash and education by
eliminating any ability to weigh offense.
10 – Ks that inherit aff offense (1NC Yazzie) steal 1AC offense – wrecks clash education
by eliminating ability to weigh offense.

10. No transition, alt is violent.

Huburt Buch-Hansen 14. PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen
Business School. October 2014. “Capitalist diversity and de-growth trajectories to steady-state
economies,” Ecological Economics, Volume 106. Pages 167–173.

A major focus area in the diversity literature is institutional change , including the processes through which countries that used to fit the
categories of state-led or coordinated capitalisms have – to various extents and without losing their distinctive character – moved in a (neo)liberal direction (Schmidt, 2002 and Streeck, 2011).

Major institutional changes, such as those involved in the movement from one type of capitalism towards another generally occur in the wake
of systemic crises, i.e. deep economic crises that cannot be resolved within the framework of existing institutional arrangements (Kotz, 2009). Yet countless
studies have concluded that even such institutional “paradigm shifts” almost never involve a clean
break with the past. One reason for this is path dependence, i.e. the phenomenon that once a particular institutional
path has been established, ‘patterns of political mobilization, the institutional “rules of the game,” and
even citizens' basic way of thinking about the political world’ tend to generate self-reinforcing dynamics
that make reversals of the path difficult (Pierson, 2004: 10). Ideas and culture contribute to make profound
institutional changes difficult. Once particular ideas have become hegemonic (or “common sense”), they serve to
prevent policy-making in terms of different ideas. Societal power relationships are important in this context. The ideas that prevail and become
institutionalised are those that can be sustained by material resources and thus tend to be those supported by powerful members of the political elites and the capitalist class (e.g., van
Apeldoorn, 2002). Changes in prevailing ideas are thus often preceded by major disruptions of existing power relations — disruptions that in turn often occur in the context of the

even in the wake of such disruptions, institutional

aforementioned systemic crises (Buch-Hansen, 2012 and Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Yet

change is likely to either take the form of bricolage involving ‘the rearrangement or recombination of
institutional principles and practices in new and creative ways’ or of translation, denoting ‘the blending
of new elements into already existing institutional arrangements’ ( Campbell, 2010: 98–99). Through processes of bricolage and
translation, institutions are changed considerably yet ‘still resemble their predecessors to a significant degree in so far as they are
made up of institutional principles and practices that entrepreneurs have inherited from the past’ ( Campbell, 2010: 99; see also Carstensen, 2011).

Space col is possible but only thru sustained growth through 2030.
Tangermann, ’17 (Victor Tangermann is a Toronto-based staff writer – he received a BA in Philosophy and International Development Studies from
McGill University, 10-17-2017, "A timeline for humanity's colonization of space," https://futurism.com/a-timeline-for-humanitys-colonization-of-space, Accessed: 7-
2-2021)//ILake-HG recut *edited for gendered language with strikethrough and brackets
Humans have long desired to explore the vast realms of space. Today, we are finally poised to send people out into the cosmos. Indeed, a number of
private and public space companies are gearing up for Space Race 2.0 — a (very expensive) competition that inches us
closer to uncovering answers about our universe and exploring new realms of our own humanity. Though they are still in the race, shifting priorities and
limited budgets have undermined NASA’s lead in exploring the solar system and beyond. In the meantime, private entities like SpaceX and
Virgin Galactic are flush with cash, and they are stepping up to try and engineer better, bigger, and faster rockets. And this is a
good thing because, if humans are to find life on other planets, or perhaps a new planet for ourselves, more work needs to be done. Engineers and scientists

need to develop life support systems, find reliable sources of water and fuel, overcome the negative effects living in space
has on the body, and find a faster way to travel. There is still much to be done, but sending the average person to the Moon and beyond no longer seems

so far out of reach. Yet, when will it finally happen? When will humans finally roam across an alien world? Here’s a comprehensive timeline of our future beyond Earth. Late 2017: Heavy Falcon Launch

SpaceX plans to launch the Falcon Heavy for the first time before the end of 2017. Because the rocket can be reused, the Falcon Heavy
rocket can deliver its payload into space at only a third of the cost of the next closest operational vehicle, the Delta IV
Heavy. This lower upfront cost means that more organizations can carry out experiments in outer space. One of these experiments is the
Planetary Society’s LightSail 2 solar sail that will launch on board a Heavy Falcon in early 2018. SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy rocket lives up to its
name. 27 rocket engines weigh down the 70-meter (229-foot), 1.4-metric-ton (3.1-million-pound) rocket. That’s a lot of extra weight, but the payload makes it worthwhile — the rocket can launch 63,800 kg (140,660 lbs) of
equipment, cargo, and passengers into orbit around Earth. That’s more than double the weight that the Space Shuttle can haul to the same altitude. 2018: Preparing For Space Tourism In 2018, SpaceX plans to launch more than
ever before, sending 30 rockets into orbit (up from 20 in 2017). More attempts give the company more data to show how it can perfect its technology to launch rockets cheaply and securely. Eventually, this inexpensive and safe
spaceflight will make space tourism finally viable. In fact, just this year, SpaceX announced that they would be sending two humans to orbit the Moon in 2018. Image Credit: Virgin Galactic Virgin Galactic is gearing up to launch its
first astronauts into space before the end of February 2018. Before it launches with passengers on board, though, the spacecraft will have to undergo a series of test flights. The space plane, called the VSS Unity, completed its fifth
‘glide flight’ (distinct from the vertical trajectory of traditional space rockets) earlier in 2017. In the first months of 2018, it will be taking flights closer to the Karaman line, the official border between the Earth’s atmosphere and
outer space located 100 km (62 miles) above the Earth’s surface. Image Credit: Planetary Society Around that same time in early 2018, scientists will test the LightSail 2, a device that moves through space by harnessing the power
of solar photons — no fuel tanks or thrusters required. The LightSail 2, a citizen-funded spacecraft and created by the Planetary Society (the largest nonprofit organization that promotes the exploration of outer space), would be a
proof of concept that solar sailing could propel spacecraft deeper into space. The unmanned [uninhabited], light-propelled spacecraft will hitch a ride on SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy rocket before taking its test flight at an altitude of 720
km (447.4 miles). 2019: Space Tourism And Observation Image Credit: Blue Origin Blue Origin, the spaceflight services company started by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, recently announced that it intends to take tourists to space
before April 2019. In groups of six, passengers will board an 18-meter (60-foot) rocket to the edge of space, around 100 km (62 miles) from the Earth’s surface. Once there, they will experience zero-gravity flight. Three independent
parachutes and a retro-thrust system ensure that passengers will gently sail back to Earth. This experience does not come cheap — a ticket to board the New Glenn to reach Earth orbit is rumored to cost anywhere between
$150,000 and $250,000. And, yet, there’s little question that people will want to sign up — Virgin Galactic, a competing space tourism project, reportedly already has 700 people signed up. In 2019, Blue Origin plans to add two- and
three-stage rockets to its arsenal. They are fully reusable, up to 99 meters (326 feet) tall, and can deliver payloads at a relatively low cost, competing with SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy rockets. Image Credit: NASA NASA also intends to
launch its James Webb Telescope in the first quarter of 2019. The telescope will observe the solar system in the infrared to see every phase of the solar system’s maturation; it will ultimately be 100 times more powerful than the
Hubble Space Telescope, thanks to its array of 18 hexagonal mirror segments. With a combined mirror diameter of 6.5 meters (the Hubble measures in at only 2.4), the James Webb Telescope will be able to detect events such as
the formation of galaxies dating back to the time of the Big Bang. It will also have a special focus on discovering new planets that could be capable of supporting life. 2020-2025: “Earth Reliant” And Beyond From finding evidence of
liquid water to detecting organic matter in the soil of the Red Planet’s surface, the Curiosity rover has answered some fundamental questions about what it’s like on Mars. However, that information has also sparked more
questions about what other elements may be present. To this end, in an effort to establish whether oxygen is present in the Martian atmosphere, and at what concentration, Curiosity’s successor, the Mars 2020 rover, will be

Information about oxygen concentration will be important if

saddled with a host of sensors and instruments that will allow it to answer this question.

humans are ever able to visit the Red Planet themselves, which could be possible as early as 2030. There are
other things that need to happen if we’re going to colonize other planets. NASA has established three phases that we need to complete before this is possible. In the first, which NASA calls “Earth Reliant,” we continue to test the
feasibility of living in space and conduct more research aboard the ISS. In the second (“Proving Ground”), operations around the Moon will be used to establish ways to return humans to the Earth safely. With those stages
complete, we will finally reach the third stage (“Earth Independent”) in which humans establish a self-sufficient colony on Mars. Image Credit: NASA Just over 50 years after humans first touched the lunar surface, NASA is gearing
up to launch another manned [inhabited] spacecraft to go beyond the Moon. The astronauts will be on board a ship called the Orion, which will lift off using NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS), a modular heavy launch vehicle. SLS is
similar to SpaceX’s Heavy Falcon and has a maximum payload of 70 to 130 metric tons (150,000 to 290,000 lbs). First, though, the spacecraft will do a few test runs without any humans on board. The first mission, Exploration
Mission-1, is slated for late 2018. The SLS will launch the unmanned [uninhabited] craft, travel to the Moon, enter orbit about 100 km (62 miles) above the lunar surface, and use gravity to propel itself into deep, unexplored space.
The goal of this mission is to see if the craft can help humans survive a trip to distant planets. The second mission (Exploration Mission-2), planned for August 2021, will be NASA’s first manned [inhabited] test flight beyond the
Moon. “During this mission, we have a number of tests designed to demonstrate critical functions, including mission planning, system performance, crew interfaces, and navigation and guidance in deep space,” Bill Hill, the deputy
associated administrator of Exploration Systems Development at NASA Headquarters said in a 2016 NASA blog. To gain enough momentum to make the trip around the Moon, the spacecraft will have to make multiple orbits
around Earth, occasionally igniting its thrusters. During its stable orbit of the Moon, the Orion will gather data and test the spacecraft’s capabilities for interplanetary flight. 2022: Making Mars Habitable While NASA spends the
2020s exploring how to best keep humans healthy in space, SpaceX plans to start putting down the infrastructure for humans to colonize it. SpaceX anticipates completing its first 54.6-million-km (33.9-million-mile) trip to Mars in
2022. Image Credit: SpaceX In his update earlier this year, Elon Musk revealed plans for a rocket that is far bigger and more powerful than NASA’s Space Launch System and even his agency’s own Falcon Heavy — the BFR. A rocket
that big would have enough space for fuel to take humans to Mars, or even allow for Earth-based city-to-city travel. With a maximum payload of 150 tons, the enormous 106-meter (347.7-feet) rocket would break the current
record for biggest payload (including cargo, fuel, and passengers) launched into orbit, while providing the lowest cost for each additional launch. To reach the Moon, the BFR would launch from the Earth’s surface, transfer
propellant from fuel depots previously stationed in Earth’s orbit, accelerate in orbit, pick up an injection of fuel for the remaining distance to the lunar surface on the way, and land. SpaceX plans to refuel the rocket once it is in
orbit in order to extend its range and payload capacity so that it can return safely to Earth. Tests have already shown that it’s possible to refuel rockets in space. NASA conducted the Robotic Refueling Mission in 2011, and it
successfully completed a robot-actuated propellant transfer on an exposed platform of the International Space Station. Image Credit: SpaceX By 2022, SpaceX expects to land at least two cargo ships on Mars in order to establish a
habitat for humans. The primary goal of those initial missions is to find a reliable source of water on the Martian surface. 2024: Manned [inhabited] Missions On The BFR Image Credit: SpaceX Two years after those cargo ships
establish an infrastructure, SpaceX plans to send humans to inhabit a colony on Mars. The passengers aboard the BFR’s 40-cabin Mars transit module will be the first to make the unprecedented trip. This is, Musk would probably
admit, an aggressive timeline. And it may not work in SpaceX’s favor: Due to planetary alignments and other factors such as solar power requirements and fuel limitations, the launch window of Earth-Mars travel is only a few
weeks, according to Wired. And that’s assuming that all the other pieces fall perfectly into place — neither the BFR nor its predecessor, the Falcon Heavy, has yet had a successful launch. Should the BFR mission make it to Mars, it

2030: A
will contain the materials to construct a propellant production plant as part of its Martian colony. The plan would suck carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and turn it into deep-cryo CO4 fuel using solar power. 2025-

Year In Space Image Credit: NASA SpaceX might be ready to send humans to live in space by the early 2020s, but NASA is a little more cautious. The

government space agency is planning to put astronauts into orbit for a year to find out if humans are indeed ready to live on a different planet. In
March 2016, NASA astronaut Scott Kelly completed a similar year-long mission aboard the ISS to test the effects of zero gravity on the human body and what that will mean for future space travel to Mars. Unlike Kelly’s mission,

however, NASA’s 2021 mission will put astronauts in orbit around the Moon. They’ll be in a “deep-space gateway” — a small ISS-like station that will serve as a testing
ground for future deep space missions, including later missions to Mars. It will be built over five earlier missions, four of them with humans aboard. The effects of spending a year in lunar orbit on the human body, caused by factors

Five years after SpaceX’s manned [inhabited] missions

such as different day-night cycles and solar radiation, are still unknown. 2030s: NASA Sends Humans To Mars

NASA plans to send its own spacecraft to the Red Planet. Using data and samples from the Curiosity and Mars 2020 rovers, NASA will first establish
to Mars,

how humans could sustain themselves on the Martian surface before sending manned [inhabited]
spacecraft from its deep-space gateway to do so.
14. Every second of delayed colonization sentences 10^14 humans to death.
Bostrom ‘03 [Nick; Professor at the University of Oxford; 2003; "Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity
Cost of Delayed Technological Development"; Utilitas Vol. 15, No. 3;
https://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html; accessed 12-1-2020; Recut-SM]

The rate of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations
based on the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic
supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization.[1] This estimate assumes that all the lost
entropy could have been used for productive purposes, although no currently known technological mechanisms are even
remotely capable of doing that. Since the estimate is meant to be a lower bound, this radically unconservative assumption is undesirable.

We can, however, get a lower bound more straightforwardly by simply counting the number or stars in our
galactic supercluster and multiplying this number with the amount of computing power that the
resources of each star could be used to generate using technologies for whose feasibility a strong case
has already been made. We can then divide this total with the estimated amount of computing power
needed to simulate one human life.
As a rough approximation, let us say the Virgo Supercluster contains 10^13 stars. One estimate of the computing power extractable from a star
and with an associated planet-sized computational structure, using advanced molecular nanotechnology[2], is 10^42 operations per second.[3]
A typical estimate of the human brain’s processing power is roughly 10^17 operations per second or less.[4] Not much more seems to be
needed to simulate the relevant parts of the environment in sufficient detail to enable the simulated minds to have experiences
indistinguishable from typical current human experiences.[5] Given these estimates, it follows that the
potential for approximately
10^38 human lives is lost every century that colonization of our local supercluster is delayed; or
equivalently, about 10^29 potential human lives per second.

While this estimate is conservative in that it assumes only computational mechanisms whose implementation has been at least outlined in the
literature, it
is useful to have an even more conservative estimate that does not assume a non-biological
instantiation of the potential persons. Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around an average star.
Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological humans. This corresponds to a loss of
potential equal to about 10^14 potential human lives per second of delayed colonization.

What matters for present purposes is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge. Even with the
most conservative estimate, assuming a biological implementation of all persons, the potential for one hundred
trillion potential human beings is lost for every second of postponement of colonization of our
supercluster.[6]