Journal of Business Ethics (2019) 159:281–299

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3808-3

ORIGINAL PAPER

Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any

Difference?
Christian Hauser1

Received: 22 April 2017 / Accepted: 30 January 2018 / Published online: 10 February 2018
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Abstract
Corruption continues to represent a tenacious challenge to internationally active companies. According to prevailing inter-
national anti-corruption standards, a company can be held criminally liable if it does not put all necessary and reasonable
organizational measures in place to prevent corruption. The regular training of employees is considered one of the most
effective ways to prevent corruption. Employee training is considered helpful in efforts to minimize the risk of employees
becoming involved in corrupt behavior. With this idea in mind and building on the fraud triangle model and neutralization
theory, this paper examines whether business professionals who have undergone anti-corruption training are more likely
to reject prevailing justifications of corrupt practices than are those who have not undergone such training. The empirical
analysis in this paper is based on regression models using data obtained from a unique dataset that includes 200 business
professionals. The findings provide evidence that training is positively linked to the likelihood of rejecting justifications of
corruption. However, the research also suggests that methods of training must become more specific in order to tackle chal-
lenging questions regarding the gray areas of ethics and compliance.

Keywords  Internationalization · Corruption · Corruption prevention · Business ethics · Ethics training

JEL Classification  D73 · L22 · M14 · M16 · M53

Introduction declining despite increasing declarations by both govern-

Corruption in international business has been repeatedly
recognized as widespread (Rose-Ackerman 2004; Hauser
and Kronthaler 2013). Corruption does not appear to be
Christian Hauser is Professor of Business Economics and
International Management at the University of Applied Sciences
HTW Chur, Switzerland. He is a member of the topical platform
Ethics of the Swiss Academy of Engineering Sciences (SATW),
member of the United Nations Principles for Responsible
Management Education (PRME) Working Group on Anti-
Corruption and head of the first PRME Business Integrity Action
Center in Europe. His research interests include international
entrepreneurship, SME and private sector development, corporate
responsibility and business integrity.
* Christian Hauser
christian.hauser@htwchur.ch
http://www.htwchur.ch/en_integrity
1
PRME Business Integrity Action Center, University
of Applied Sciences HTW Chur, Comercialstrasse 22,
7000 Chur, Switzerland
ments and internationally active companies that the fight
against it as a high priority (McKinney and Moore 2008;
Transparency International 2016). In fact, the perception
that corruption is an unavoidable part of doing business is
apparently still prevalent (Becker et al. 2013). Despite this
widespread opinion, according to prevailing international
anti-corruption standards, a company can be held crimi-
nally liable if it does not establish all necessary and reason-
able organizational control measures to prevent corruption
(Hauser and Hogenacker 2014). Thus, to reduce their legal
exposure, internationally active companies must install suit-
able control measures in order to effectively deter corrup-
tion (van Montfort et al. 2013; Warren et al. 2014). Thus
far, no single definition of corruption has managed to gain
complete acceptance (Gordon and Miyake 2001; Ashforth
et al. 2008; Zyglidopoulos 2016). In a colloquial sense, cor-
ruption involves any misuse of power to gain an unjustified
private advantage. This broad definition encompasses sev-
eral different aspects, including bribery, illegal gratuities,
economic extortion, and conflicts of interest (Wells 2017).

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282
One challenging issue companies face is the lack of control
measures guaranteeing detection of all corrupt behaviors
(Kaptein 2015). Hence, Anand et al. (2005) argue that com-
panies should place more emphasis on strategies that prevent
corruption.
Although many governments worldwide have strength-
ened their anti-corruption efforts in recent years by redefin-
ing and reinforcing criminal laws regarding corruption as
well as by strengthening the enforcement of such laws, the
discussion continues as to whether corruption is necessar-
ily and similarly unethical in all cultures or whether it is
an unethical act by definition (Velasquez 2004). For exam-
ple, until recently, engaging in corrupt practices abroad was
not only tolerated by most member countries of the OECD,
but even received indirect government support through tax
deductibility (Hauser and Hogenacker 2014). The percep-
tion of corruption that is currently dominant is mainly based
on the ideas of Western cultures, which are primarily rule-
based and characterized by a clear-cut separation between
the private and the public spheres (Velasquez 2004). By
contrast, cultures that are primarily relationship-based are
grounded in a different conception of society and the state
(Hofstede 2001; Hooker 2009). Hence, it is hardly surpris-
ing that the now-dominant international anti-corruption
framework is controversial (Nuijten and Anders 2007). In
spite of this ongoing discussion, an increasing number of
individuals and companies have been prosecuted by Ger-
man and Swiss authorities for carrying out corrupt business
practices abroad. Transparency International (2015) clas-
sifies Germany and Switzerland as two of four countries
globally that actively enforce the OECD anti-bribery con-
vention. The noticeable increase in police pressure to detect
suspected corrupt behavior increases the likelihood of such
behavior being detected and pursued from a legal standpoint.
From 2011 to 2014, the German and Swiss law enforcement
authorities started 98 and 87 investigations and trials with
corrupt practices committed abroad as underlying issue,
respectively. Furthermore, in the two countries, 74 and 20
final sentences, settlements or other orders in which sanc-
tions were imposed were announced, respectively (Transpar-
ency International 2015).
Regular anti-corruption training is supposed to be an
effective way to prevent corruption. Employee training is
considered helpful in efforts to minimize the risk of employ-
ees becoming involved in corrupt behavior (West and Ber-
man 2004; Valentine and Fleischman 2004; Adam and
Rachman-Moore 2004; Kaptein 2009). Despite the expected
contribution of training to the fight against corruption and
the costs related to the development and provision of train-
ing, both researchers and practitioners still have a limited
understanding of the effectiveness of anti-corruption training
efforts (Gilman and Stout 2008; van Montfort et al. 2013;
Trevino et  al. 2014). Of the limited number of existing
13
studies on the effectiveness of training, most focus on uneth-
ical or illegal business practices in general rather than on
corruption in particular. Furthermore, the sample population
in the extant studies is mainly based on students rather than
on business professionals (Bloodgood et al. 2010; Kaptein
2015; Maesschalck and de Schrijver 2016). In this paper, we
address this research gap by empirically examining whether
anti-corruption training is an effective measure to curb psy-
chological antecedents of corrupt behavior among business
professionals.
The extant literature has identified various cognitive
and psychological factors that could favor corrupt behavior
(Anand et al. 2005; Murphy and Dacin 2011). On the one
hand, corruption might occur when business professionals
are unaware that their business practices are unethical or ille-
gal (Bannenberg 2002; Rabl and Kühlmann 2008; Ashforth
et al. 2008). Recent studies indicate that future decision mak-
ers and legal professionals are typically uninformed regard-
ing corruption and its legal consequences (IBA et al. 2010;
Becker et al. 2013). Control measures addressing this issue
must raise awareness that corruption is considered unethical
and illegal business conduct. On the other hand, corruption
might occur when business professionals are aware that the
behavior in question is corrupt but seems justifiable using
a neutralization technique (Murphy and Dacin 2011). Neu-
tralization is a psychological method that allows individuals
to (temporarily) override certain values within themselves
when they are planning to commit, are committing, or have
committed an unethical or illegal act. Otherwise, these
values, such as the moral obligation to obey the prevailing
laws and regulations, would prohibit them from performing
such acts (Sykes and Matza 1957). Recent research in social
psychology and neuroscience indicates a strong connection
between ethical decision-making and emotions (Salvador
and Folger 2009). When the motive and opportunity to
engage in unethical or illegal business practices, such as cor-
ruption, are present, business professionals either decide to
refrain from such behavior due to the experience of negative
emotions or decide to engage in such activities due to their
ability to justify the act and thus avoid negative emotions
(Ashforth and Anand 2003; Murphy 2012). The use of cog-
nitive defense mechanisms, such as neutralization, involves
reframing—consciously or unconsciously—the meaning
of the unethical or illegal acts to preserve an individual’s
self-concept as a person of integrity and to protect his/her
salutary social identity (Maruna and Copes 2005). The use
of neutralization techniques causes the unethical or illegal
act to be considered justifiable from the perspective of the
perpetrator or at least helps the perpetrator to soothe his/her
conscience while he/she still considers the act to be mor-
ally or legally questionable. Hence, whether neutralization
helps to avoid negative emotions does not depend on reality
but on denial, self-deception, and the self-serving stories or
Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any Difference? 283
myths that individuals and groups have created (Ashforth
and Anand 2003; Maruna and Copes 2005).
To deter corruption, an effective control measure must
challenge the prevailing justifications of corruption (Anand
et al. 2005). If the control measure is successful, business
professionals who see little or no value in anti-corruption
efforts also might shy away from engaging in corrupt busi-
ness practices because they do not want to be prosecuted
or fired or have their career progression stymied. Hence,
research needs to better understand not only how individu-
als apply techniques of neutralization but also whether con-
trol measures, such as anti-corruption training, are able to
curb the use of these neutralization techniques (Murphy and
Dacin 2011). We respond to the call for further research in
this field by empirically examining whether business pro-
fessionals who have undergone anti-corruption training are
more likely to reject the prevailing justifications of corrup-
tion than are those who have not undergone such training.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section outlines the relevant literature. Building on
the extant literature and the conceptual frameworks of the
fraud triangle model and neutralization theory, hypotheses
are proposed with regard to the link between the participa-
tion in anti-corruption training and the likelihood of refusing
to accept the prevailing justifications of corrupt practices.
“Data Analysis” section describes the data and related meas-
urement issues as well as descriptive statistics and the esti-
mation strategy. “Regression Results” section includes the
obtained results. Finally, concluding remarks, limitations,
and directions for future research are discussed in “Discus-
sion and Conclusions” section.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
In recent years, the issues of corruption and its prevention
have become progressively more discussed among both
researchers and practitioners. A growing body of conceptual
and empirical literature from various disciplines focuses on
the phenomenon of corruption (Rabl and Kühlmann 2009;
Becker et al. 2013). In the economics literature, substan-
tial advances have been made in understanding corruption
at a macroeconomic level (Svensson 2003), but research
focusing on the level of the individual who might engage in
corrupt behavior remains an emerging area of investigation
(Rabl and Kühlmann 2008; Köbis et al. 2015). Thus far,
no single and complete definition of corruption is univer-
sally accepted by scholars and practitioners or is applicable
in every cultural and societal context (Gordon and Miyake
2001; Ashforth et al. 2008; Zyglidopoulos 2016). Instead,
there are many different interpretations of the concept of
corruption. In a colloquial sense, corruption involves any
misuse of power to gain an unjustified private advantage.
Such a broad definition encompasses several different fac-
tors and is necessarily difficult to operationalize for legal,
business, or research purposes. In the extant literature, brib-
ery, illegal gratuities, economic extortion, and conflicts of
interest are considered to be the main forms of corruption
schemes (Wells 2017). Bribery is the offering, giving, or
even promising of any monetary or non-monetary advantage
with the intent to unduly induce a discretionary decision
(Pacini et al. 2002; Hauser and Hogenacker 2014). Com-
mon forms of monetary or non-monetary advantages include
direct under-the-table payments in cash, disproportionate
gifts, or hospitality including travel and entertainment, and
donations or contributions to bogus nonprofit organizations.
Illegal gratuities are similar in nature to bribery, except that
the monetary or non-monetary advantage is given to reward
a favorable discretionary decision rather than induce it.
The other side of offering, giving, or promising a monetary
or non-monetary advantage is demanding such an advan-
tage through coercion or threats. This is called economic
extortion. The refusal to give into such extortion demands
typically causes some disadvantage, hindrance, damage, or
harm. A conflict of interest occurs when an individual with
discretionary decision power has an undisclosed personal
economic interest in the decision that adversely affects the
third party who entrusted that individual with the discre-
tionary decision power (Wells 2017). Despite the fact that
many corrupt business practices, including the bribing of
foreign public officials, have been declared unethical and
illegal business practices, they continue to represent a tena-
cious challenge to internationally active companies. Many
of these companies report that they are expected to make
informal under-the-table payments or gifts in the course of
their business operations (Argandoña 1997; Svensson 2003;
Hauser and Kronthaler 2013).
To align themselves with the prevailing international
anti-corruption standards, companies must establish all nec-
essary and reasonable organizational measures to prevent
corrupt behavior (van Montfort et al. 2013; Warren et al.
2014). Companies have various control measures at their
disposal to deter corruption in their international operations;
these include measures that are designed and implemented
on purpose as well as measures that emerge unintention-
ally through social interactions (Pfister 2009; Verma et al.
2016). Lange (2008) develops a comprehensive conceptual
framework that integrates several corruption control mech-
anisms and incentive alignments. Regular anti-corruption
training of employees is considered one of the most effective
ways to prevent corruption (Ruiz et al. 2015; Verma et al.
2016). Employee training is considered helpful in efforts to
minimize the risk of employees becoming involved in cor-
rupt behavior (West and Berman 2004; Valentine and Fleis-
chman 2004; Adam and Rachman-Moore 2004; Kaptein
2009). Training is believed to help ensure that employees
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284
explicitly know and understand the firm’s anti-corruption
policy and what behavior is expected from them (Adam and
Rachman-Moore 2004; Bryane 2005; Hauser and Hogen-
acker 2014). Despite the growing body of literature related
to corruption and its prevention, empirical research focusing
on the effectiveness of organizational control measures to
prevent corruption in general and of anti-corruption train-
ing in particular remains rather limited (Pelletier and Bligh
2006; McKinney and Moore 2008; Waples et al. 2009; Gil-
man and Stout 2008; Kaptein 2015; Ruiz et al. 2015). Some
existing empirical studies on ethics and compliance edu-
cation and training find that these measures are positively
related to their intended outcomes (e.g., West and Berman
2004; Valentine and Fleischman 2004; Lau 2010; May et al.
2014; Verma et al. 2016). However, other studies do not con-
firm this correlation due to inconclusive results (e.g., Ritter
2006; Mayhew and Murphy 2009; van Montfort et al. 2013;
Jonson et al. 2016). These mixed empirical findings could
be explained by differences in the types of training that are
evaluated, the intended outcomes that are measured or the
surveyed populations (e.g., students or business profession-
als from the private or public sector) (Weber 1990; Waples
et al. 2009; Maesschalck and de Schrijver 2016). Bearing
in mind these differences that limit the possibility for com-
parison between the studies, researchers and practitioners
need to know more about the link between anti-corruption
training and the psychological antecedents of corrupt behav-
ior (Murphy and Dacin 2011). We aim to contribute to this
ongoing academic debate by empirically examining whether
business professionals who have undergone training on cor-
ruption avoidance are more likely to reject the prevailing jus-
tifications of corrupt practices than are those who have not
undergone such training. The conceptual framework under-
lying our analysis draws on the fraud triangle model, which
is based on the scholarly work of Cressey (1950, 1953), and
the neutralization theory, which builds on the scholarly work
of Sykes and Matza (1957).
Theoretical Foundation
The Fraud Triangle Model
The fraud triangle model has gained widespread acceptance
as a conceptual framework that explains which factors must
be present for business professionals to engage in unethical
or illegal behavior, including corruption. The fraud triangle
model is composed of three factors that together lead to a
possible engagement in corrupt practices. These three fac-
tors are motivation, opportunity and rationalization (Dorm-
iney et al. 2012).
The first factor, motivation, highlights the fact that
business professionals must have a motive to engage in
corrupt activities. This motive could take the form of a
13
non-shareable problem, an incentive to engage in corrupt
behavior or a combination thereof. These motives can be
financial in nature, or they can involve any other perceived
type of needs (Cressey 1953; Kassem and Higson 2012).
The two main sources of such a problem or incentive are
private personnel and job related. The private personnel
source involves problems that arise in private life such as
financial pressures caused by issues such as an excessive
lifestyle, over-indebtedness, or addiction to gambling. The
job-related source includes pressures related to working
life such as aggressive bonus schemes that might incentiv-
ize business professionals to engage in corrupt activities in
order to achieve unrealistically high business targets or meet
tight deadlines (Rae and Subramaniam 2008; Albrecht et al.
2008).
The second factor in the fraud triangle, opportunity, refers
to the fact that business professionals must have an oppor-
tunity to engage in corrupt activities. Opportunity refers to
the chance or perceived chance they must have to achieve
their goals or relieve their pressure by secretly engaging in
corruption (Cressey 1953). Two aspects influence the level
of opportunity to engage in corrupt activities. First, some
workplace functions are more exposed to job-related oppor-
tunities to engage in corrupt behavior; for example, some
functions have work-related contact with clients, suppliers,
investors or public official, whereas other workplace func-
tions lack any job-related external contacts (Kassem and
Higson 2012). A second aspect that effects the perception of
opportunity is the company’s internal control systems. Cor-
rupt behavior is more likely to occur in companies with weak
control measures, including unclear policies or an equivocal
tone from the top with regard to acceptable business prac-
tices (Schuchter and Levi 2013), because the fear of being
caught and sanctioned has an important influence on the
perceived opportunity to secretly breach prevailing norms
and rules (Albrecht et al. 2008; Kassem and Higson 2012).
The third factor in the fraud triangle, rationalization,
describes the fact that business professionals must been
able to neutralize or justify their engagement in corrupt
activities (Cressey 1953; Hogan et al. 2008; Huang et al.
2016). Rationalization is an attempt to overcome or reduce
the negative emotions that accompany corrupt behav-
ior (Zyglidopoulos et al. 2009). Negative emotions are an
important factor in corruption prevention because individu-
als wish to avoid them (Salvador and Folger 2009). First,
individuals want to avoid these emotions because they want
to remain within their moral comfort zone and maintain a
positive self-image. Second, they are afraid of being judged
or shunned by others when they are called to account for
their behavior (Murphy and Dacin 2011; Dorminey et al.
2012). Thus, individuals seek to neutralize their involvement
in corrupt practices, at least internally, before and/or after
the act. Some scholars distinguish between neutralization
Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any Difference? 285
and rationalization, arguing that the former occurs before an
unethical or illegal behavior has been executed, whereas the
latter occurs after such a behavior (Fointiat 1998). However,
most scholars argue that rationalization techniques can be
used as both ex post and ex ante justifications and thus use
the terms rationalization, neutralization, and justification
interchangeably (Cromwell and Thurman 2003; Ashforth
and Anand 2003; Maruna and Copes 2005; Murphy and
Dacin 2011).
According to the fraud triangle model, all three factors—
motivation, opportunity, and rationalization—must be pre-
sent for a business professional to engage in corrupt behavior
(den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein 2008; Dorminey et al. 2012;
Mayhew and Murphy 2014). If just one of the factors is
not present, a business professional is considered to be very
unlikely to engage in corruption (Schuchter and Levi 2013).
Thus, for corruption control measures to be effective, they
must address at least one of the factors: motivation, opportu-
nity, or rationalization (Fritsche 2005). The extant literature
on fraud detection and prevention focuses mainly on moti-
vation and opportunity, while research on rationalization is
still rather limited (Hogan et al. 2008; Murphy and Dacin
2011). However, control measures against corruption should
aim not only to tackle motivation and opportunity but also
to deactivate those linguistic devices that enable the ration-
alization of corrupt behavior (Fritsche 2005).
Neutralization Theory
Neutralization theory builds on the scholarly work of Sykes
and Matza (1957) and is the most well-received concep-
tual framework for explaining how individuals are able to
overcome or reduce the negative emotions that accompany
performing unethical or illegal behavior such as corruption
(Copes 2014).
According to neutralization theory, when business pro-
fessionals contemplate engaging in corrupt behavior, they
use linguistic devices to neutralize the negative emotions
associated with their actions. This allows them to engage
in corrupt practices without damaging their positive self-
image or societal reputation. The individual remains essen-
tially committed to the prevailing social norms and rules
while engaging in corruption without experiencing the nega-
tive emotions that would otherwise be associated with such
behavior (Cromwell and Thurman 2003; McKercher et al.
2008; Dorminey et al. 2012). Originally, a set of five major
neutralization techniques was postulated: denial of responsi-
bility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of
the condemners, and an appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes and
Matza 1957). In recent decades, scholars have applied neu-
tralization theory to examine various types of white-collar
crime, including corruption (Smallridge and Roberts 2013).
The findings suggest that the use of neutralization techniques
is situation specific because particular justifications appear
to be better adapted to certain unethical or illegal behav-
iors than to others (Scott and Lyman 1968; McKercher
et al. 2008; Copes and Cardwell 2014). Consequently, this
amplification of scope has resulted in the identification of
additional techniques of neutralization including the meta-
phor of the ledger, denial of the necessity of the law, and
the diffusion of guilt via a claim of normality (Maruna and
Copes 2005; Smallridge and Roberts 2013). This short list
of justifications is by no means exhaustive, nor is it meant
to be. Scholars continue to expand the inventory of neu-
tralization techniques because different justifications may be
applied depending on the type of unethical or illegal behav-
ior (Maruna and Copes 2005). The different neutralization
techniques are essentially complementary and are used in
different combinations. Some of them, such as the appeal
to higher loyalties, may go beyond neutralizing the negative
emotions associated with corrupt behavior to actually valu-
ing such actions (Ashforth and Anand 2003). Individuals do
not spontaneously create justifications in a given situation;
they learn these neutralization techniques by interacting with
peers and then apply them when it seems opportune and use-
ful to do so (Copes and Cardwell 2014).
Taken together, the fraud triangle model and neutrali-
zation theory imply that if individuals are aware that their
behavior is unethical or illegal, they will experience negative
emotions associated with being engaged in such behavior
(Murphy and Dacin 2011). Confronted with the motive and
the opportunity to engage in corrupt behavior, individuals
will base their decision on whether involving themselves in
corruption seems justifiable. Regardless of whether a person
has motive and opportunity, if he/she concludes that engag-
ing in corrupt activities is not justifiable, then he/she will not
engage in corruption due to the negative emotions associated
with that behavior. However, if he/she concludes that cor-
ruption seems justifiable, then he/she is able to neutralize the
negative emotions surrounding his/her involvement in cor-
rupt activities. Thus, individuals can engage in corruption
while avoiding negative emotions (Murphy and Dacin 2011).
Content and Purpose of Anti‑corruption Training
Based on the conceptual model drawing on the fraud triangle
model and neutralization theory, an effective anti-corruption
measure that aims at curbing psychological antecedents of
corrupt behavior must reduce the ability to justify corrupt
practices. Companies increasingly use regular anti-corrup-
tion training of employees to prevent corruption (Hauser and
Hogenacker 2014). The existing training instruments primar-
ily serve to inform participants about the prevailing inter-
national anti-corruption standards and their application at
the national level. In addition, participants are familiarized
with the company’s anti-corruption policies as well as with
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286
the applicable in-house compliance rules and regulations.
Furthermore, the company’s compliance organization and
the relevant compliance programs are presented, and avail-
able tools for executing compliance-sensitive business pro-
cesses are introduced. The use of these tools should ensure
that compliance guidelines and regulations are obeyed in
the course of daily business. Moreover, short case studies
on corruption are discussed according to established instruc-
tions. Through engaging in such training, companies want
to ensure that employees explicitly know and understand
what business practices are unethical or illegal. In particular,
business professionals should internalize the concept that
corrupt business practices are not justifiable and will not
be tolerated. Furthermore, they should know that even if
they still consider such behavior acceptable, others will not
believe their fabricated justification for engaging in it. If
anti-corruption training is effective concerning this cognitive
understanding, business professionals who participated in
anti-corruption training should be less inclined to accept pre-
vailing justifications of corruption compared with business
professionals who have not. Thus, building on the evaluation
approach of McKinney and Moore (2008), we propose the
following proposition:
P  Business professionals who have undergone anti-corrup-
tion training are more likely to reject the prevailing justi-
fications of corrupt practices than are those who have not
undergone such training.
Prevailing justifications of corruption
Building on Sykes and Matza (1957) concept of neutrali-
zation and incorporating more recent amplifications of the
theory (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Anand et al. 2005; Rabl
and Kühlmann 2009; Murphy and Dacin 2011), the justifica-
tion of corruption, i.e., the tendency to rationalize or neutral-
ize corrupt behavior, can be achieved via several methods.
Based on the proposition developed above, we expect that
business professionals who have undergone anti-corruption
training have a higher likelihood of rejecting the prevailing
justifications of corruption than those who have not under-
gone such training.
First, business professionals can neutralize their engage-
ment in corruption based on the notion that there is a good
cause for eschewing ethical behavior, e.g., if loyalty to a
certain group or purpose is valued more than strict adher-
ence to the rules. In this case, individuals argue that general
norms and rules have to be sacrificed to serve a more impor-
tant cause (Sykes and Matza 1957). For example, a business
professional engaging in corruption might argue that he/she
is not engaging in the act for himself/herself but for the good
of the company (Rabl and Kühlmann 2009). Based on this
13
neutralization technique and our proposition, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H1  Business professionals who have undergone anti-cor-
ruption training are more likely to reject a good cause as a
justification for corrupt practices than are those who have
not undergone such training.
Second, business professionals can justify their involve-
ment in corrupt practices by weighing their behavior using
a utilitarian calculus (Rabl and Kühlmann 2009; Murphy
and Dacin 2011). For example, if a business deal involves
corruption but safeguards jobs, then engaging in corrupt
behavior might be argued as a justifiable choice. In this
case, individuals assert that they are entitled to act corruptly
because their behavior does more good than harm. Thus,
regarding balance, it is justifiable to engage in corrupt activi-
ties because the benefits that are gained outweigh the costs
(Murphy and Dacin 2011). Building on this neutralization
technique and our proposition, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H2  Business professionals who have undergone anti-corrup-
tion training are more likely to reject the safeguard of jobs as
a justification for corrupt practices than are those who have
not undergone such training.
Third, business professionals can neutralize their corrupt
behavior by claiming that no one really suffers any harm or
loss due to the corrupt action in question despite the fact that
it is considered unethical or illegal (Sykes and Matza 1957).
This can easily occur when the victim is absent, unknown
or abstract, which regularly occurs in cases of corruption
(Ashforth and Anand 2003; Rabl and Kühlmann 2009). Indi-
viduals using this technique might admit that their behav-
ior is inappropriate in general, but they would argue that
the specific situation in question is a justifiable exception
because no one sustained real damage (Anand et al. 2005).
Based on this neutralization technique and our proposition,
we propose the following hypothesis:
H3  Business professionals who have undergone anti-cor-
ruption training are more likely to reject no harm as a jus-
tification for corrupt practices than are those who have not
undergone such training.
Fourth, business professionals can neutralize their
involvement in corrupt behavior by claiming that the behav-
ior is essential to their survival. Using the defense of neces-
sity, individuals are able to justify their corrupt behavior
as the lesser of two evils (Coleman 2006; Smallridge and
Roberts 2013). Based on this neutralization technique and
our proposition, we propose the following hypothesis:
Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any Difference? 287
H4  Business professionals who have undergone anti-cor-
ruption training are more likely to reject danger to health or
life as a justification for corrupt practices than are those who
have not undergone such training.
Fifth, business professionals can neutralize their cor-
rupt behavior by diffusing the guilt through a claim of
normality. In this case, a business professional argues that
everyone else is engaging in the behavior, and therefore, it
has to be acceptable or even necessary to level the playing
field among competitors (Cromwell and Thurman 2003;
Coleman 2006; McKinney and Moore 2008). Based on
this neutralization technique and our proposition, we pro-
pose the following hypothesis:
H5  Business professionals who have undergone anti-cor-
ruption training are more likely to reject the claim that com-
petitors are also engaging in the behavior as a justification
for corrupt practices than are those who have not undergone
such training.
Sixth, business professionals can neutralize their
involvement in corrupt business practices by denying the
legitimacy of the prevailing anti-corruption standards
based on cultural values and traditions (Anand et al. 2005;
Hauser and Hogenacker 2014). In this case, a business
professional argues that since the behaviors considered
to be corrupt are a result of culturally derived value sys-
tems, they cannot be really unethical or illegal (Coleman
2006; Rabl 2012). Based on this neutralization technique
and our proposition, we propose the following hypothesis:
H6  Business professionals who have undergone anti-corrup-
tion training are more likely to reject cultural conventions as
a justification for corrupt practices than are those who have
not undergone such training.
Seventh, business professionals can neutralize their
involvement in corrupt activities by claiming that their
administrative and bureaucratic environment forces them
to engage in corrupt acts in order to circumvent bureau-
cratic obstacles (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Rabl and
Kühlmann 2009). Based on this neutralization technique
and our proposition, we propose the following hypothesis:
H7  Business professionals who have undergone anti-corrup-
tion training are more likely to reject bureaucratic obstacles
as a justification for corrupt practices than are those who
have not undergone such training.
Data Analysis
Sample, Measurement Issues, and Descriptive
Results
To analyze the association between participation in anti-
corruption training and the likelihood of accepting or
rejecting the prevailing neutralization techniques for cor-
rupt practices, we use data collected through an online
survey that was conducted between June 2012 and Febru-
ary 2013. Prior to the data collection, we ensured the sus-
tainability of the questionnaire by employing well-tested
scales. To this end, we collaborated with proven experts
in survey design and methodology as well as recognized
experts in the field of corruption prevention. Furthermore,
a pilot study was conducted on a reduced sample during
the planning stages of the survey. Appropriate changes
have been made in the questionnaire to address the issues
identified at that stage. Due to the absence of a compre-
hensive sampling frame of internationally oriented busi-
ness professionals from German-speaking countries, we
applied simple random sampling and snowball sampling
methods. The sampling approach involved the use of head-
hunters and companies as multipliers. For the analysis, we
obtained 200 complete responses. The validated online
questionnaire comprised questions concerning participa-
tion in anti-corruption training and items regarding justi-
fications of corrupt behavior. Furthermore, it contained
questions regarding the sociodemographic and workplace-
related characteristics of the respondents.
Dependent Variables
The attitude toward the neutralization of corruption, i.e.,
the tendency to justify or rationalize corrupt behavior, was
assessed by seven survey items based on Sykes and Matza
(1957) concept of neutralization as a cognitive strategy for
reducing the guilt and social stigma associated with engag-
ing in corruption. The item design is based on Smallridge
and Roberts (2013). Each neutralization technique is
represented by a single statement. Regarding the use of
single-item measures in management research, Fuchs and
Diamantopoulos (2009) discuss conceptual issues and pro-
pose application guidelines. Each of these items represents
a common type of neutralization of corrupt activities (e.g.,
“to make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in
business operations is justified if competitors are doing
the same”). Respondents were asked to rate the degree
to which they approve of each given justification of cor-
rupt behavior on a seven-point Likert-type scale. The neu-
tralization scale is scored so that low scores indicate low
13
 C. Hauser
288
neutralization (1 = “strongly disagree”) and high scores
indicate high neutralization (7 = “strongly agree”). With
one exception, all answers are highly skewed toward the
lower end of the distribution, which might raise concerns
regarding the normality of the residuals. This finding
might be concerning as non-normality of the residuals can
lead to biased significance tests (Smallridge and Roberts
2013). Thus, we decided to perform ordered logit regres-
sions on transformed versions of each variable. We con-
structed a variable for each neutralization technique that
incorporates ordered categorical information with regard
to i = 3 levels of agreement. To this end, we subsume
the scaling points 1, 2, and 3 of each item into the first
category reflecting low neutralization (1 = “disagree”).
Furthermore, we group all observations with a scaling
point of 4 as a medium level reflecting a somewhat indif-
ferent attitude toward the level of approval (2 = “neither/
nor”). Analogously, the scaling points 5, 6, and 7 were
subsumed into the third level signifying high neutraliza-
tion (3 = “agree”).
Furthermore, we created a full neutralization scale, repre-
senting the combination of all the neutralization techniques
represented in the study. All of the scale variables have a
desirable alpha score with the exception of “danger to health
or life.” Thus, this scale was entered into the analysis only
as a stand-alone variable. The Cronbach’s alpha of .919 for
the full neutralization scale suggests that the scale is inter-
nally consistent. We conducted two separate analyses. One
analysis utilized neutralization techniques entered into the
analysis as stand-alone variables, and one analysis was per-
formed with the complete neutralization scale. The signifi-
cant variables encountered in the regression models with the
stand-alone variable parallel those of the regression analysis
using the full neutralization scale, verifying the robustness
of our analysis. To conduct a more differentiated analysis,
we report the results of the ordered logit regressions with
the neutralization techniques as stand-alone variables in the
paper.
Independent Variable
Respondents were asked whether their companies offer train-
ing on the topic of corruption prevention. A follow-up ques-
tion was then targeted toward the respondent’s attendance
of this anti-corruption training. Based on this information,
we created our main explanatory variable, which is a binary
indicator taking the value of one if the respondent took part
in at least one anti-corruption training and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
To control for observable differences, we incorporated
various control variables into our estimation models. The
13
previous literature has identified several factors that could
stimulate or impede the effectiveness of a given anti-corrup-
tion training, including factors at the level of the individual
participating in the training and factors at the level of the
organization in which the training is conduced (Alvarez
et al. 2004; van Montfort et al. 2013). The former category
includes sociodemographic characteristics such as level of
education, work experience, or type of position held. The
latter category includes firm-specific characteristics such as
the business sector and location of the firm’s headquarters.
Table 1 presents a comprehensive overview of the definition
for each variable included in the analysis.
Table 2 presents selected descriptive statistics regarding
our main explanatory variable and the control variables.
We observe that 23% of all respondents participated
at least once in an anti-corruption training session. The
majority of the surveyed participants hold a top manage-
ment position within their firm (52%) and possesses inter-
national experience (76%). The average work experience of
the respondents in our sample is approximately 22 years.
These figures demonstrate that the sample consists of highly
experienced, internationally oriented business professionals.
We now turn to the first descriptive analysis of our propo-
sition: business professionals who have undergone training
on corruption avoidance are more likely to reject the pre-
vailing neutralization techniques for corrupt practices than
are those who have not undergone such training. Table 3
provides an assessment of all seven justifications with regard
to informal under-the-table payments or gifts, for which we
divide our sample into all observations (Total, column (1))
and according to whether or not the respondent participated
in training on corruption avoidance (columns (2) and (3)).
For each neutralization technique, we provide the mean of
the original variable, scored 1–7, and the corresponding
share with respect to the three-level categorical measure.
Looking at the means of the seven-point Likert-type scale
variables in the total sample, we observe a general empirical
pattern. With one exception, all answers are highly skewed
toward the lower end of the distribution, which provides
evidence that the acceptance of justifications of corrupt prac-
tices is, on average, low among all business professionals in
the sample. However, the distribution of the scaling points
of the neutralization technique “danger to health or life” is
bimodal in shape. Figure 1 provides an additional assess-
ment of the shapes of the individual distributions.
In all cases but one, the cross-tabulation of all neutraliza-
tion techniques according to whether or not the respondent
participated in anti-corruption training reveals significant
negative associations between participation and the level of
acceptance of the prevailing justifications of corrupt prac-
tices. In other words, respondents who have undergone anti-
corruption training are generally more likely to reject the
prevailing justifications of corrupt practices than are those
Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any Difference? 289

Table 1  Names and descriptions of variables

Name of variable Description

Good cause
Safeguard jobs
No harm
Danger to health or life
Competitors
Cultural convention
Bureaucratic obstacles
Training
Professional ­qualification1–3
Occupational ­status1–2
Organizational ­level1–5
Working experience
International experience
Industry1–4
Country1–3
To make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in business operations is justified if this serves a good cause
[1 = disagree; 2 = neither/nor; 3 = agree]
To make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in business operations is justified if this safeguards jobs
[1 = disagree; 2 = neither/nor; 3 = agree]
To make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in business operations is justified if this does not harm anyone
[1 = disagree; 2 = neither/nor; 3 = agree]
To make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in business operations is justified if there is danger to health or
life [1 = disagree; 2 = neither/nor; 3 = agree]
To make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in business operations is justified if competitors are doing the
same [1 = disagree; 2 = neither/nor; 3 = agree]
To make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in business operations is justified if this is conform to the
cultural conventions of the respective country [1 = disagree; 2 = neither/nor; 3 = agree]
To make informal under-the-table payments or gifts in business operations is justified if one is able to circumvent
bureaucratic obstacles through it [1 = disagree; 2 = neither/nor; 3 = agree]
Participation in training on corruption avoidance [1 = yes; 0 = no]
N = 3 dummy variables for the highest professional qualification achieved [reference category: other]
N = 2 dummy variables for occupational status [reference category: dependent employed]
N = 5 dummy variables for the position in company hierarchy [reference category: top management]
Working experience [in years]
Work-related international experience [1 = yes; 0 = no]
N = 4 dummy variables for branch of industry [reference category: other]
N = 5 dummy variables for country where headquarter is based [reference category: Switzerland]

who have not undergone such training. For example, the
average level of agreement with respect to the neutraliza-
tion technique “no harm” is 1.3 based on the seven-point
Likert-type scale for respondents who participated in anti-
corruption training, but it is 2.4 for respondents without
anti-corruption training. This mean difference of 1.1 scaling
points is statistically significant from zero (based on a two-
tailed t test). Moreover, the corresponding standard devia-
tion of the value for those respondents who have undergone
anti-corruption training is more than twice as small as the
standard deviation of the respective value for those who have
not undergone anti-corruption training. This means that the
values of those business professionals with anti-corruption
training are clustered more closely around a very low level
of agreement then the values of respondents without anti-
corruption training.
Examining the three-level categorical measure, we make
observations, including that 96% of all trained business
professionals reject the neutralization technique “no harm”
compared to 72% of non-trained business professionals. A
simple test of independence with regard to the observed fre-
2
quencies leads to a χ(2) -statistic of 11.3, which is significant
at the 1% level, suggesting a strong association between the
participation in training on corruption avoidance and the
level of acceptance of the prevailing justifications of cor-
rupt practices. This empirical pattern holds for all neutrali-
zation techniques except the justification “danger to health
or life,” where the null hypothesis of independence cannot
be rejected.
Estimation Strategy
Notably, the Chi-square test is not directional. Thus far, we
can only claim evidence of a relationship between having
undergone anti-corruption training and the acceptance of
the prevailing justifications of corrupt behavior for six out
of seven neutralization techniques. To evaluate the issue fur-
ther, we carry out ordered logit regressions with the seven
three-level categorical measures (“disagree,” “neither/nor,”
and “agree”) as dependent variables. It should be noted that
we also estimated OLS regressions with the seven-level
measures and other coding strategies to test the robustness
of our results. These yielded consistent results.
Our main independent variable of interest is the binary
indicator of whether or not the respondent has undergone
anti-corruption training. As control variables, we include
the respondent-specific sociodemographic characteristics
and the firm-specific characteristics depicted in Table 1.
� procedure chooses to estimate β to
The ordered �logit
maximize ln pi  , which is the sum of the estimated
∑
probabilities of the observed response level i over all
observations in the sample. The procedure estimates an
underlying score Sj(x′β) for each observation j as a linear
function of the observed covariates x and the estimated

13
 C. Hauser
290

Table 2  Descriptive statistics Table 3  Acceptance of prevailing justifications of corruption—uni-

variate comparison
Mean (SD)
Neutralization techniques Total Training
Training 23.0 (41.9)
Yes No
Respondent-specific characteristics
Professional qualification (1) (2) (3)
 Bachelor/Master Degree 63.5 (48.1)
Good cause
 PhD/Habilitation 9.5 (28.7)
Meana 2.2 1.6 2.3**b
 Other 27.0 (44.5) (SD) (1.7) (1.2) (1.8)
Occupational status Disagree 78.5 91.1 74.8
 Dependent employed 75.5 (43.1) Neither/nor 10.5 4.4 12.3
 Self-employed 24.5 (43.1) Agree 11.0 4.4 12.9
Organizational level Pearson χ2(2) statistic: 5.5*
 Top management 51.5 (50.1) Safeguard jobs
 Middle management 12.0 (32.6) Meana 2.1 1.5 2.3***b
 Lower management 7.5 (26.4) (SD) (1.7) (1.2) (1.8)
 Specialist position 19.5 (40.1) Disagree 79.0 93.3 74.8
 Assistant position 9.5 (29.4) Neither/nor 9.5 2.2 11.6
Working experience (in years) 21.8 (11.9) Agree 11.5 4.4 13.5
International experience 76.0 (43.1) Pearson χ2(2) statistic: 7.3**
Firm-specific characteristics No harm
Industry Meana 2.1 1.3 2.4***b
 Manufacturing sector 31.5 (46.6) (SD) (1.8) (0.8) (1.9)
 Trade 13.5 (43.3) Disagree 77.0 95.6 71.6
 IT/communication 11.5 (32.0) Neither/nor 10.0 2.2 12.3
 Other 43.5 (49.7) Agree 13.0 2.2 16.1
Country Pearson χ2(2) statistic: 11.3***
 Germany 43.5 (49.6) Danger to health or life
 Switzerland 45.5 (50.0) Meana 3.8 3.8 3.8b
(SD) (2.4) (0.4) (0.19)
 Other 11.0 (31.4)
Disagree 45.0 46.7 44.5
Number of observations 200
Neither/nor 11.0 8.9 11.6
Own calculations. Numbers are in percent where not indicated other- Agree 44.0 44.4 43.9
wise Pearson χ2(2) statistic: 0.3
Competitors
Meana 2.0 1.4 2.2***b
coefficients β, and it calculates an additional set of i − 1 (SD) (1.7) (1.0) (1.8)
cut-points κ. The corresponding probability of observing Disagree 80.5 91.1 77.4
level i = 1, 2, 3 can then be calculated as: Neither/nor 9.5 6.7 10.3
( ) 1 Agree 10.0 2.2 12.3
p1j = Pr Sj + uj ≤ 𝜅1 = , Pearson χ2(2) statistic: 4.8*
1 + eSj−𝜅1
Cultural convention
Meana 2.9 2.2 3.1***b
1 1
(SD) (2.0) (1.5) (2.0)
( )
p2j = Pr 𝜅1 < Sj + uj ≤ 𝜅2 = − ,
1 + eSj−𝜅2 1 + eSj−𝜅1 Disagree 65.0 80.0 60.6
Neither/nor 12.0 8.9 12.9
( ) 1 Agree 23.0 11.1 26.5
p3j = Pr Sj + uj > 𝜅2 = 1 − ,
1 + eSj−𝜅2 Pearson χ2(2) statistic: 6.0**
where uj is an error term assumed to follow a logistic Bureaucratic obstacles
distribution. Meana 2.0 1.4 2.1***b
(SD) (1.6) (0.8) (1.7)
Disagree 84.5 95.6 81.3
Neither/nor 7.5 4.4 8.4
Agree 8.0 0.0 10.3

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Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any Difference? 291

Table 3  (continued) Regression Results

Neutralization techniques Total Training
Table 4 reports the results from all seven regressions. Except
Yes No
for the coefficient on the neutralization technique “danger
(1) (2) (3) to health and life,” the coefficients of our main independent
Pearson χ2(2) statistic: 6.2** variable Training are all negative and statistically significant
Number of Observations 200 45 155 from zero. Therefore, in six out of seven cases, we observe
that participants in anti-corruption training have a signifi-
Own calculations. Numbers are in percent where not indicated other- cantly lower acceptance level of the prevailing justifications
wise
of corrupt behavior than those respondents who did not par-
We recoded the scaling points 1, 2, and 3 into the category “disa-
gree,” the scaling point 4 depicts “neither/nor,” and the scaling points
ticipate in any anti-corruption training, even after controlling
5, 6, and 7 are grouped into the category “agree” for additional covariates. This empirical pattern therefore
***/**/*Depict significance level of 1/5/10% provides support for hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5, H6, and
a
 Variables range from 1 (= strongly disagree) to 7 (= strongly agree) H7. However, hypothesis H4 is not supported by our data.
b
 Mean comparisons are based on a two-tailed t test Based on the coefficients of our model, we are also able to
calculate the corresponding probabilities of observing level
i = 1, 2, 3 and to compare these levels with those prob-
abilities from our univariate comparison. Table 5 displays

Fig. 1  Acceptance of prevailing justifications of corruption

13
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292

Table 4  Acceptance of prevailing justifications of corruption—ordered logistic regressions

Good cause Safeguard jobs No harm Danger to Competitors Cultural convention Bureaucratic obstacles
health or
life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Training − 1.345** − 1.707** − 2.126*** − .231 − 1.208** − .98** − 1.69**

(.626) (.696) (.785) (.374) (.612) (.453) (.801)
Professional qualification .111 .569 .033 .267 .631 .008 .299
(Ref.: Other): Bachelor/ (.429) (.462) (.426) (.411) (.483) (.384) (.499)
Master degree
PhD/habilitation − 1.609 − .851 − 1.377 .115 .907 − .575 − 32.982
(1.151) (1.147) (1.137) (.355) (.819) (.695) (8828824)
Occupational status (Ref.: .526 1.067** .36 .763 .825 − .041 .709
Dependent employed): (.522) (.542) (.495) (.585) (.526) (.434) (.593)
Self-employed
Organizational level (Ref.: .479 .881 1.088 .317 .771 .204 .457
Top management): Mid- (.695) (.723) (.674) (.499) (.702) (.54) (.779)
dle management
Lower management 1.252 .945 .734 .316 − .361 − .442 .384
(.842) (.904) (.885) (.623) (1.17) (.732) (1.044)
Specialist position − .21 − .263 − .099 .216 .681 − .709 − .019
(.705) (.723) (.677) (.501) (.703) (.561) (.77)
Assistant position .918 .468 − .566 .205 .964 − .251 .094
(.851) (.883) (1.018) (.676) (.892) (.704) (1.011)
Working experience (in − .019 − .033 .008 − .018 .028 − .01 − .016
years) (.019) (.021) (.02) (.015) (.02) (.017) (.023)
International experience − .681* − .557 − .461 .077 − .161 − .338 − .4
(.399) (.412) (.404) (.343) (.426) (.351) (.452)
Industry (Ref: Other): .623 .145 .061 .236 .206 .352 .266
manufacturing industry (.454) (.471) (.46) (.351) (.469) (.38) (.514)
Trade .295 .293 .345 .222 .164 .295 − .388
(.547) (.517) (.519) (.45) (.542) (.461) (.645)
IT/communication − .55 − .757 − .863 − 1.012* − .399 − .505 − .499
(.833) (.836) (.843) (.519) (.73) (.581) (.85)
Country (Ref: Switzer- − .577 − .114 − .614 .658* .093 .254 − .152
land): Germany (.503) (.478) (.491) (.361) (.494) (.392) (.536)
Other − .519 − 1.282 − 1.699 .664 − 1.504 − .517 − .826
(.838) (1.127) (1.1) (.515) (1.086) (.631) (1.12)
κ1 .448 .694 .625 .066 2.745 − .087 1.067
κ2 1.322 1.490 1.423 .545 3.582 .544 1.861
Log-likelihood − 122.264 − 117.455 − 121.39 − 183.816 − 116.986 − 165.687 − 98.082
Number of observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 200

Own calculations. Standard errors of coefficients are depicted in parentheses

***/**/*Depict significance level of 1/5/10%

the estimated probabilities based on the models estimated
in Table 4.
We observe that the estimated probabilities between our
univariate comparison (Table 3) and those from the ordered
logit model are very similar in quantity. Except for the neu-
tralization techniques “cultural convention” and “danger to
health or life,” the predicted probabilities of the category
“disagree” are between 91 and 96% for those business pro-
fessionals who participated in anti-corruption training. In
these two cases, “cultural convention” and “danger to health
or life,” the predicted probabilities of the category “disa-
gree” are significantly lower, yielding at 80.1 and 46.0%,
respectively.
Excluding the neutralization technique “danger to health
or life,” the probability that trained business profession-
als reject the prevailing justifications is, on average, 17.7
percentage points higher compared to the probability of
untrained business professional rejecting them.
Based on the regression results, we are therefore able to
support, with one exception, the proposition that business

13
Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any Difference? 293

Table 5  Acceptance of prevailing justifications of corruption—multi- Discussion and Conclusions

variate analysis
Neutralization techniques ­ odela
Ordered logit m Bearing in mind the prevailing international standard
Training
against corruption, internationally active companies need
to establish both a tone at the highest levels and a corpo-
Yes No Diff.b
rate culture that clearly demonstrate that corrupt behavior
Good cause is not justifiable and will not be tolerated, even if the com-
Disagree 91.0 75.0 16.0 pany seems to benefit from such behavior. It needs to be
Neither/nor 4.9 12.1 clearly and persuasively stated that the company conducts
Agree 4.1 12.9 its business in compliance with the prevailing laws and
Safeguard jobs regulations and in accordance with high ethical standards
Disagree 93.1 74.9 18.2 and that these business principles are held in higher regard
Neither/nor 3.5 11.1 than the short-term successful achievement of operational
Agree 3.3 14.0 or financial goals (Rabl and Kühlmann 2008). The regu-
No harm lar training of employees is considered one of the most
Disagree 95.6 72.0 23.6 effective ways to prevent corruption. Employee training
Neither/nor 2.3 12.0 is considered helpful in efforts to minimize the risk of
Agree 2.0 15.9 employees becoming involved in corrupt behavior. Consid-
Danger to health or life ering this concept, this paper used regression analysis to
Disagree 46.0 44.6 1.4 examine whether business professionals who have under-
Neither/nor 11.0 11.0 gone anti-corruption training differ from those who have
Agree 42.9 44.4 not undergone such training with regard to the acceptance
Competitors of the prevailing justifications of corruption. The findings
Disagree 91.4 77.1 14.3 broadly provide evidence that the two groups show sig-
Neither/nor 4.6 11.1 nificantly different likelihoods of refusing to accept the
Agree 4.0 11.8 prevailing justifications of corrupt behavior. With regard
Cultural convention to six out of seven prevailing neutralization techniques,
Disagree 80.1 60.6 19.5 trained business professionals exhibit a significantly lower
Neither/nor 8.0 13.2 tendency to justify corrupt behavior, which means they
Agree 11.9 26.2 also exhibit significantly reduced inclination toward the
Bureaucratic obstacles neutralization of corruption, i.e., to potentially use neu-
Disagree 95.7 81.2 14.5 tralization as a cognitive strategy for reducing the guilt
Neither/nor 2.3 9.0 and social stigma associated with engaging in corruption.
Agree 2.0 9.8 Thus, the research provides evidence that anti-corruption
training is an effective measure for curbing the psycho-
Own calculations. Numbers are in percent where not indicated other-
wise
logical antecedents of corrupt behavior among business
a
 Assume, for example, that an individual j who has undergone anti-
professionals.
corruption training has characteristics xj such that Sj(xjβ)  =  1.213. However, the findings also suggest that methods of
Then we can infer from our model that the estimated probability training must become more specific in order to tackle
individual j rejects the neutralization technique “Good cause” (p1j) is challenging questions regarding the gray areas of ethics
Pr(uj ≤ 0.448 − 1.213) = 1/(1 + e−1.213−0.448) = 0.827. The remaining
two probabilities can be calculated accordingly for the individual j
and compliance. Despite the broad consistency between
b the results presented here, two justifications of corruption
 Percent points
stand out in the analysis: “danger to health or life” and
“cultural convention.”
The first neutralization technique that shows a specific
professionals who have undergone training on corruption pattern is “danger to health or life.” The distribution of the
avoidance are more likely to reject the prevailing justifi- scaling points for this neutralization technique is bimodal
cations of corrupt practices than are those who have not in shape, which means that the population is divided in
undergone such training. The results are not only statisti- half regarding this justification of corruption. Further-
cally significant but also significant in practical terms. On more, we do not observe a significant difference between
average, participants in anti-corruption training have an trained and untrained business professionals in their likeli-
almost 18 percentage point higher likelihood of refusing hood of refusing or accepting this justification. Regardless
to accept the prevailing justifications of corruption.

13
 C. Hauser
294
of whether they have undergone anti-corruption training,
business professionals seem to be puzzled by the ques-
tion of whether the endangerment of health or life of a
human being is a permitted exemption to the rule that cor-
rupt behavior is not acceptable under any circumstances.
Assessing this justification for corruption requires a thor-
ough appreciation of two conflicting ethical values that
are both important.
In the majority of the companies conducting anti-cor-
ruption training, the knowledge transfer regarding how to
address corruption is based on passive forms of learning
by means of face-to-face training sessions or through the
help of Web-based learning programs (Hauser and Nieffer
2018). These training methods very strongly appeal to the
cognitive level of the participants. This learning approach
assumes that knowledge and competences can be acquired
by memorizing facts and routines (Reinmann-Rothmeier and
Mandl 2001; Röhrich 2008). The existing training tools are
primarily used to inform the participants of the prevailing
legal and regulatory framework and to familiarize them with
the company’s policies and control measures for preventing
corruption. However, the current training instruments do not
normally stimulate and encourage in-depth reflections on
ethical dilemmas related to corruption and corporate integ-
rity (Hauser and Nieffer 2018). To some extent, this might
explain why the surveyed business professionals are hesitant
with regard to the assessment of the justification “danger to
health or life.”
However, internationally oriented business professionals
sometimes travel to or work in regions where their safety
might be seriously affected and where they might be con-
fronted by challenging ethical dilemmas (Thorne LeClair
and Ferrell 2000). To effectively support their executives
and employees in addressing such demanding questions
regarding the gray areas of ethics and compliance, compa-
nies should implement training approaches that focus on
understanding, dialog and critical reflection rather than on
memorizing facts and routines (Palmer and Zakhem 2001;
Valentine and Fleischman 2004). Such approaches would
enable employees to make value-based decisions in ethi-
cally ambiguous situations. Furthermore, companies need
to define and clearly communicate how executives and
employees should proceed in situations in which they are
forced to engage in corruption because their life or health
is seriously being threatened. From an ethical perspective,
situations in which health or life are seriously at stake are
permitted exemptions to the rule that corrupt behavior is
not acceptable under any circumstances. However, such an
incident needs to be reported immediately to the relevant
departments of the company, which should keep a written
record of the incidence.
The second neutralization technique that needs specific
consideration is “cultural convention.” In this case, we
13
observe the expected significant difference between trained
and untrained business professionals regarding the likeli-
hood of refusing to accept this justification. However, the
level of refusal is considerably low in both groups. Only
80.1% of the trained business professionals and 60.6% of
the untrained ones reject this justification of corruption,
which suggests that the notion that corruption is a particu-
lar cultural element of various societies around the globe
and therefore somehow acceptable is relatively widespread
(Rabl 2012; Routley 2013). Based on this line of reason-
ing, corruption is argued to be a Western concept that is not
applicable to certain cultures, such as societies with a tra-
ditional gift culture where valuables are exchanged with an
implicit rather than explicit agreement for future beneficial
rewards (Steidlmeier 1999; Argandoña 2005). It is argued
that in these societies, gifts, invitations, and other gratuities
are part of the business etiquette and do not have the nega-
tive connotation of corruption (Watson 2003). Thus, to do
business in societies that are based on the informal exchange
of rewards, adapting to the prevailing sociocultural practices,
even if they are seen as corrupt behavior from a Western
perspective, is assumed to be necessary (Argandoña 2005;
Hauser and Hogenacker 2014).
Furthermore, it could be argued that there are so many
different customs and conventions between the different
countries that some of the behaviors that might be defined
as corruption from one country’s perspective may be socially
accepted and customary in other countries and cannot be
defined as corrupt at all. For example, in the USA, the ser-
vice fee is not included in the price quoted on a menu. Thus,
many service workers, particularly at sit-down restaurants,
depend on gratuities (tips) as a principal part of their wage
because they receive less than the minimum wage. Thus,
paying a (voluntary) gratuity is customary in the USA even
if it is not mandatory (Azar 2003; Lin and Namasivayam
2011). By contrast, in other countries, the service charge is
included in the official menu price, and the service person-
nel receive a decent salary directly from the restaurant for
whom they work. Thus, there is no need or common prac-
tice to tip unless there is a desire to remunerate outstanding
service (Conlin et al. 2003; Whaley et al. 2014). Similarly,
it could be argued that in some countries, as in the West, the
official charges for public services such as customs clear-
ance or a government license to build a factory include an
amount to compensate the public official who is clearing the
goods or granting the license via a decent salary. Deviating
from that pattern, official charges in other countries might
not include the costs of the salary of public officials, or the
government might not pass the designated amount properly.
Thus, companies are asked to compensate the public official
directly. While the example of paying tips to the service
personnel in the USA is commonly not considered to be a
bribe or illegal gratuity, the example of the public official
Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti‑corruption Training Make Any Difference? 295
is more puzzling. Based on Shaw (2016), business profes-
sionals and companies need to consider different factors to
reach a conscientious decision as to whether such behavior
is legitimate. First, is the action in accordance with the law?
In some countries, public officials may be forbidden by law
from receiving any gratuities from companies they deal with.
Second, is giving gratuities to public officials really common
and acknowledged business practice in the respective coun-
try? Claiming normality could only be a pretext for inap-
propriate behavior, even if it is widespread. Third, what is
the intention of the gratuity? Normally, gratuities are tokens
of appreciation for services performed in the past. However,
in the case of repeated interactions, gratuities can be given
with the purpose to unduly influence upcoming decisions
or to obtain favorable treatment in the future. Fourth, what
is the function of the public official receiving the gratuity?
Giving gratuities to public officials with a high degree of
discretionary decision-making authority may easily be inter-
preted as an attempt to influence their actions. Fifth, what is
the (economic) significance of the gratuity for the recipient?
A gratuity should be proportioned to the means of the person
at the receiving end. The higher the importance of the gratu-
ity the more likely it will influence the behavior of the public
official. Sixth, what are the circumstances under which the
gratuities are provided to public officials? When the giving
of gratuities to public officials can be and is disclosed pub-
licly, it is more likely be to a widely accepted part of normal
business etiquette in the respective country. Thus, before
business professionals or companies make their decision,
they should ask themselves, whether they would be willing
to read a front-page newspaper article featuring their actions.
Scholars rejecting the claims of cultural relativism argue
that this line of reasoning supports the normalization of cor-
rupt behavior in companies (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Rabl
2012). They note that there is no evidence supporting the
suggestion that corruption is taken as an esteemed inherent
quality of any society’s culture despite its high occurrence.
On the contrary, the very idea of corruption denotes unethi-
cal, often illegal, behaviors regardless of a society’s tradition
and culture (Steidlmeier 1999; Hooker 2009). Thus, it is
noted that attributing corruption to culture is just an attempt
by those engaging in corrupt behavior to justify corruption
(Routley 2013). Furthermore, linking corruption to culture is
seen as inherently fatalistic because it undermines hope for
societal reform and sustains corrupt political and economic
systems (Miller et al. 2001). From a legal perspective, it
needs to be acknowledged that according to the prevailing
international standard against corruption, companies cannot
escape legal liability by claiming that corruption is a particu-
lar cultural element in a given country, even if they operate
in countries in which corruption is systemic. Hence, com-
panies from OECD countries should more actively counter-
act the still widespread notion that attributes corruption to
culture. An appropriate way to achieve this goal would be to
address the topic explicitly in anti-corruption training and to
make clear that corrupt behavior is not justifiable and will
not be tolerated, even if it is considered part of prevailing
sociocultural practices.
This study draws on the conceptual frameworks of the
fraud triangle model and neutralization theory. The fraud
triangle model primarily applies to individuals who may
want to engage in corruption and/or are moved to do so out
of various self-serving motivations. However, the framework
does not explicitly address individuals who observe corrupt
business practices but feel uncomfortable with them or indi-
viduals who may not wish to engage in such behavior but
feel pressured to do so by others in the company (Ashforth
and Anand 2003). Even if these attitudes are not explic-
itly covered by the framework, the findings of this study
suggest that training might foster the stance favoring the
rejection of corruption among these individuals because they
are explicitly taught that such practices are not justifiable
and will not be tolerated by the company. Thus, they might
be encouraged to resist the pressure to engage in corrupt
behavior even if others in the company are doing it. Further-
more, they might be encouraged and motivated to openly
or anonymously speak against corrupt practices when they
witness such activities in their business life. However, these
are initial considerations that require further investigation.
It should be noted that there are some limitations to
this study that must be kept in mind when considering the
results and that open the way for future research. First, the
usual limitations of cross-sectional research designs apply
to this study. Therefore, our models only provide associa-
tions and do not permit causal inference. This issue could be
addressed in further research by applying a pretest–posttest
design. However, implementing such a design might prove
difficult in the context of professional training targeting
senior business professionals. Second, the dataset does not
include information on further characteristics of the train-
ing sessions such as specific teaching methods, duration,
or timing in relation to the study. Further research could
explore which types of training are especially effective in
curbing the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior
among business professionals. In particular, it would be
valuable to analyze whether training sessions that utilize
an action-oriented approach such as “Giving Voice to Val-
ues” (Gentile 2017) would have a different impact when
compared to a basically information presentation approach.
Third, the findings indicate that business professionals who
have undergone anti-corruption training are more likely to
disprove various common justifications for corrupt behavior
choices. However, although the survey design may suggest
a level of intellectual understanding of the weaknesses in
the justifications, it does not necessarily indicate whether
trained business professionals are more likely to act on that
13
 C. Hauser
296
understanding. Further research should address this issue
by investigating whether trained business professionals
have gone beyond cognitive understanding to both motiva-
tion and confidence/comfort in acting on their understand-
ing. Fourth, since this study questions business profession-
als from German-speaking countries, namely, Germany
and Switzerland, one should be careful about generalizing
the findings to other countries and other cultural environ-
ments. Both Germany and Switzerland have a traditionally
strong export sector along with well-established, credible
anti-corruption legislation and enforcement. Therefore, it is
possible that if the study were conducted in other countries,
the findings might differ (Bierstaker et al. 2010; Albrecht
et al. 2008). Thus, further research is needed to examine
whether the results are transferable to other cultural environ-
ments. An additional promising avenue for future research is
to analyze how anti-corruption has to be adapted to culture
preferences in order to strengthen its effectiveness in curbing
the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior among
business professionals.
Finally, good employee training is time consuming and
expensive. This expense limits companies, particularly
SMEs, from doing other things that might be more valuable.
To determine the optimal level of training, we tried to assess
whether business professionals who underwent more than
one anti-corruption training sessions are more likely to reject
the prevailing justifications of corrupt practices compared
with those who have participated only once in a training. The
results indicate that there is less acceptance of prevailing
justifications among those who participated in more than one
training session. However, given the relatively small sample
size in each subgroup, this result needs to be interpreted with
care. Thus, we decided not to deepen this discussion in this
paper. However, assessing how much training is best repre-
sents a promising opportunity for further research.
Acknowledgements  Much of this paper was written while I was a vis-
iting scholar at Boston College’s Carroll School of Management and
Bentley University’s Hoffman Center for Business Ethics. I would like
to thank both schools for their generous hospitality, as well as Marta
Geletkanycz, W. Michael Hoffman, Sandra Waddock, and two anony-
mous referees for helpful suggestions and comments on earlier versions
of the paper. I am grateful to Jens Hogenacker and Martin Messing-
schlager for their econometric assistance as well as to colleagues at
HTW Chur and University of Siegen for their contribution and input
into the development of the underlying research project. Funding from
the Swiss Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI) is grate-
fully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
Funding  This study was co-funded by Swiss Commission for Technol-
ogy and Innovation (CTI).
Compliance with Ethical Standards  crime (6th ed.). New York: Worth Publishers.
Conflict of interest  Christian Hauser declares that he has no conflict
of interest.
13
Ethical Approval  This article does not contain any studies with animals
performed by any of the authors.
Informed Consent  Informed consent was obtained from all individual
participants included in the study.
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