The Adelphi Papers

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A strategy for middle powers

To cite this article: (1995) A strategy for middle powers, The Adelphi Papers, 35:295, 56-69,
DOI: 10.1080/05679329508449307

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05679329508449307

Published online: 02 May 2008.

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 VI. A STRATEGY FOR MIDDLE POWERS

In these uncertain strategic circumstances, the middle powers in the

region are likely to view their own interests as best served by
preserving an equilibrium among the great powers. Acharya notes:
The ASEAN states' preferred approach to regional order seems
to lie in the maintenance of a regional balance of power, under-
pinned by the superior and forward-deployed military resources
of the US and capable of deterring Chinese and Japanese re-
gional ambitions.'
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He considers that multilateralism cannot be a substitute for old-

fashioned balance-of-power mechanisms which, in the ASEAN
states' view, remain critical to the prospects for regional order in
the post-Cold War era.
The middle powers are likely to feel threatened by the domina-
tion of the Asia-Pacific region by any one great power, and to regard
some measure of checks or balances on each by the other as the
condition of their own security and freedom of manoeuvre.2 Of
course, those middle powers that are allies of the United States will
not regard the competition of the great powers as if they were
indifferent to the outcome. But their assessments must also include
the recognition that any of the great powers is capable of contribut-
ing positively (or negatively) to the equilibrium or balance of the
region.3 This will demand a new strategic approach. Thus the
ASEAN members are seeking to engage those major powers that
they believe could conceivably pose a threat to regional order, and to
encourage - through participation in the dialogue process - contin-
ued US involvement in regional security. Were any of the great
powers to reject the dialogue process, ASEAN states would perceive
it as a significant deterioration in regional security.
Traditionally, most of the middle powers in Asia have depended
on alliance or alignment with one or other of the great powers (for
example, South Korea with the United States, Pakistan with China,
Vietnam with the USSR). The ASEAN countries have developed a
sense of regional association that has reflected a desire not to be
aligned, although in practice they have looked to the US to provide
a security umbrella.4 In the past, the ASEAN countries have seen
the US presence as a major security guarantee against any potential
threat to South-east Asia from the major regional powers. In this
sense, there has been a difference between the northern middle pow-
ers (South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Pakistan), which were close to

56
 great-power predominance and therefore sought both alignment
with a great-power protector and a large defence capability of their
own, and the southern countries (ASEAN), which spent compara-
tively less on their own defence and professed neutrality, but relied
on the strong forward military presence of the US.5
South-east Asia was less threatened by external great powers
than the middle powers to the north which abutted on potentially
expansionist great powers. For a long time, of course, the common
strategic interests of the middle powers in avoiding great-power
pressure were obscured by the Cold War and the ideological division
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of Asia. China's war with Vietnam in 1979, however, was one of the
clearest examples of how national differences between adjoining
middle and great powers transcended so-called common ideological
relations.
This is now changing, although elements of the old alliance
system remain. As Asia moves towards a non-ideological state sys-
tem, and a sense of confidence emerges about the region's economic
strength, the Asian middle powers are cautiously exploring the pros-
pects for some sort of multilateral relationship with the great pow-
ers. This is reinforced by a greater sense of willingness on the part of
the great powers (especially the US, Japan and China) to contem-
plate multilateral dialogue. Multilateral security mechanisms, such
as the ARF, and the development of 'second track' bodies such as
the CSCAP, reflect a growing sense of confidence that the region can
cooperate in the area of security discussions - even if only in a low-
key and tentative way.6 Over time, the enlargement of ASEAN to
include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar is also likely to
reinforce confidence among the middle powers in regional resilience
and encourage greater security cooperation. This sense of confi-
dence, however, does not extend to any concept of a collective
security arrangement as an alternative to relying on the balance of
power to keep the peace, or even to any idea of a regional security
community in which there would be strict rules to prevent the use of
force and competitive arms acquisitions, while institutional proc-
esses would be established for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Such multilateral security forums as do exist at present owe their
origins to ASEAN and in the more dangerous parts of Asia, namely
North-east and South Asia, little real progress has been made to-
wards cooperative security of any sort. Rather, the strategy of mid-
dle powers in these areas of confrontation (for example, the Koreas,
Taiwan, Pakistan) is to rely increasingly on capable military forces
of their own and (as with Pakistan and North Korea) to develop an

57
 independent nuclear deterrent. In South-east Asia, too, despite
ASEAN's leadership role in establishing an Asia-wide security dia-
logue, considerable emphasis is being placed on self-reliance and the
acquisition of modern conventional forces. For nearly all the middle
powers these trends reflect not only the desire for a prudent self-
defence capacity in an environment of considerable strategic uncer-
tainty, but also an acknowledgement that common and cooperative
security mechanisms capable of constraining the great powers are a
long way off.
One of the defining characteristics of a middle (or medium)
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power - as the concept is used here - is that it will seek to have a

credible minimum of defence autonomy or self-reliance. There are,
of course, serious difficulties in providing an entirely satisfactory
definition of what is (or is not) a middle power. Carsten Holbraad
notes that whichever criteria are used for distinguishing middle-
ranking powers from those above and below them, the category is
likely to include a range of highly heterogeneous powers.7 If a line
is drawn in arranging powers according to their military forces,
middle powers may be defined as states that are weaker than the
great powers, but significantly stronger than the small states with
which they normally interact and that are incapable of defending
themselves in any serious way.8 Hill has devised a more compre-
hensive definition:
The medium power regards itself as of sufficient weight and
substance to be in charge of its own destiny; and it realises
that its uniqueness is complicated enough, and different
enough, even from its closest friends, to ensure that, in some
crises at any rate, coincidence of interest will not be enough to
engage help on their side. Thus, the medium power will try to
create and keep under national control enough means of power
to initiate and sustain coercive actions whose outcome will be
the preservation of its vital interests.9
Thus, the distinguishing characteristic in a medium power's de-
fence aspirations is as much autonomy as possible and a strategic
policy that uses both the balance of power and concepts of national
defence deterrence. Clearly, the definition of what is a middle power
will vary with the strategic characteristics of the region being stud-
ied. In the case of Asia, the definition of middle power will embrace
countries of lesser capability than, say, Europe, but of greater capa-
bility than in other regions of the developing world. The important
distinguishing element of middle powers is their idea of defence

58
 self-reliance to handle credible levels of external threat with one's
own combat forces. This strategic concept does not exclude external
supply in some selected areas - intelligence, spare parts and mis-
siles, logistic support - but does not envisage foreign combat support.
Most middle powers in Asia have developed a strategy of defence
self-reliance and are building up their armed forces; alliance rela-
tionships are less central than they were in the Cold-War period. At
the same time the middle powers are cautiously interested in ex-
ploring the prospects for security dialogue and some form of multi-
lateral security framework, although this might not lead in the
foreseeable future to any formal institutional structure or arrange-
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ment. The tendencies towards multilateralism are stronger in South-

east Asia than elsewhere in the region. In South Asia, the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not
reached anything like the stage of regional cooperation of ASEAN: it
does not discuss regional security issues at all, except for drugs.
North-east Asia is beginning to make tentative steps towards secu-
rity dialogue as the powers there become rather less dependent on
old alignments and alliances. Because of its strategic importance,
and the density of military forces arrayed there, North-east Asia
seems likely to develop its own subregional security forum in the
longer term.10
Rather than being subordinate to shifts in the great-power bal-
ance, the middle powers might be able to develop a system of coun-
tervailing security interests, to take advantage of the very fluidity of
a five-power balance and attempt to influence its outcome. A situa-
tion of moderate rivalry between the great powers provides the best
conditions for the middle powers. Exposed neither to the threatening
tendencies of a great-power concert nor to the dividing influence of a
keen rivalry or confrontation, they can have considerable scope for
manoeuvre.11 The middle powers are not only vitally interested in
their self-preservation, but they also wish to avoid a situation in Asia
in which the dynamics of great-power competition could increase the
chances of conflict to the detriment of their own security. It is in the
vital interests of the middle powers that the inevitable redistribution
of power that will occur in Asia over the next one or two decades is
not resolved by tests of great-power strength. The middle powers in
Asia should aim to have a decisive part in shaping the nature of
international relations in their region and in providing for autono-
mous local defence.
Some commentators believe that the prospects for peace in Asia
are not good and that increased arms expenditure may well lead to

59
 an arms race in any case.12 Whilst there is certainly a risk of a
competitive military scramble, other analysts have remarked cor-
rectly that there is no arms race yet in the region.13 No country is
seeking strategic dominance over its neighbour, there are no intense
rivalries that are likely to erupt into war, the quantities of weapons
being purchased are relatively moderate, and there is no evidence
so far of the intention to purchase equipment with capabilities
beyond national defence requirements, or for power projection.
Even so, there are worrisome trends. Economic success is leading
to a certain militarisation in Asia. Sustained economic growth re-
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leases resources for defence purposes. Defence spending has been

forging ahead in Asia, supported by strong economic growth. And
when overall growth is 6-8% a year, as it is in many countries, real
defence spending can be doubled - without placing any additional
demands on the economy - about every ten years. In general, it is not
true to say that the defence burden, as a proportion of GNP, is
increasing in Asia but the real level of defence spending is increasing
comparatively quickly throughout most of the region.14

Table 2: Defence Spending in Asia, Europe and North America

($US billion, constant 1993 prices)

NATO
Europe US/Canada Asia

1985 190.1 349.5 102.6

1993 177.4 307.6 147.8

(-6.7%) (-12%) (+44.1%)

Source: Tables prepared for, but not printed in, The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London:
Brassey's for the IISS, 1994).

Table 2 shows some basic trends in comparative defence spend-

ing, using constant 1993 prices. It shows that defence expenditure
in Asia has grown by 44% in real terms between 1985 and 1993,
whereas defence spending in North America and North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) Europe has fallen. Moreover, there

60
 has been a large shift in defence outlays between these three re-
gions: in 1985, Asia spent 54% as much as NATO Europe, whereas
by 1993 the proportion was 83%. This trend suggests that by the
year 2000 Asia will have outstripped NATO Europe in terms of the
amount of money it spends on defence. It already spends three times
as much as the Middle East on defence. Of course, not too much
should be made of comparisons of defence spending between major
regions of the world: they are not in a competitive position. But the
rapid growth in Asian defence spending is a matter for concern in
itself because it is occurring independently of the collapse of the
USSR and without any palpable military threats.
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Nearly all the middle powers in Asia are sustaining compara-

tively large increases in defence spending: they have recorded an
average real increase between 1985 and 1993 of almost 23%. The
largest increases have been in countries such as South Korea, Singa-
pore and Taiwan which have experienced exceptionally strong eco-
nomic growth.
The explanation therefore lies with other variables within the
region itself. As Desmond Ball has noted, some of the most signifi-
cant factors are entirely non-military, such as the availability of
economic resources arising from strong economic growth and the
perceptions of prestige deriving from the acquisition of high-tech-
nology platforms (such as advanced fighter aircraft).15 The Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies argues that in East Asia many
states have major security worries and there is a distinct trend
towards a gradual proliferation of locally produced arms and the
transfer of technology that enhances the ability of regional coun-
tries to build the next generation of weapons themselves.16 North-
east Asia's vibrant economies, and rapidly growing standards of
education and technology, are increasingly able to sustain advanced
weapons systems and a modern defence industry. The trend is
basically similar in South-east Asia, albeit on a smaller scale. Am-
munition and small arms are produced by Indonesia, North and
South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and
Thailand. Military ships and aircraft are produced by most of these
countries and armoured vehicles by North and South Korea and
Taiwan, which also produces tactical missiles.17
The sense of risk is enhanced by the fact that throughout the
region there are territorial and political disputes. The most danger-
ous areas are in North-east Asia between the two Koreas, in South
Asia between India and Pakistan, and in South-east Asia where
regional states are wary of China and are still nervous about each

61
 other's intentions. Each of these danger spots involves middle pow-
ers that are developing their military capabilities to a significant
extent. This is being done in an atmosphere of some considerable
uncertainty and with a lack of transparency. Few countries in the
region (except for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Thai-
land) produce defence white papers or other official documents that
provide any information about their defence plans, and even in these
instances that information is incomplete.
The trend towards self-reliance in defence also means that a range
of much more advanced conventional weapons is being acquired and
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that whilst some of these are defensive (such as intelligence, surveil-

lance, reconnaissance, and command-and-control systems, mine
countermeasure forces and patrol vessels) others are more evidently
offensive (for example, maritime strike aircraft, submarines and
stand-off tactical missiles). Increasingly, middle powers will be able
to afford a reasonably comprehensive range of these defensive and
offensive capabilities, albeit in limited numbers. Such expanded
capabilities widen the range of military options available and in-
crease the scale and intensity of combat that can be sustained. As
noted earlier, this means that middle powers will not be soft targets
to tangle with in the sorts of low-level, subregional conflicts that are
most credible in Asia.
Table 3 shows the basic orders of battle of middle powers com-
pared with the great and small powers in Asia. Whilst most Asian
countries have traditionally relied on relatively large armies for
their defence (and for counter-insurgency warfare), the trend now is
to acquire modern naval and air forces capable of providing a more
comprehensive defence that includes 200-mile exclusive economic
zones, offshore territories, and archipelagic waters. China, India and
Japan are likely to extend their areas of naval and air operations over
the next 10-15 years (see Appendix). This will provide for a more
complex operating environment with greater scope for misunder-
standings and errors of judgement, particularly if regional security
cooperation regimes or rules of behaviour are not negotiated.
Another area of concern is the potential for middle powers to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan is acquiring a nuclear
weapons capability and North Korea was actively planning one until
recently. North Korea will continue to have a latent nuclear weapons
capability. North Korea and Pakistan have ballistic missile delivery
systems. North Korea has the No-Dong intermediate-range ballistic
missile with an estimated range of 1,000-1,300km (as well as a
longer-range missile, the Taepo-Dong) and Pakistan is believed to

62
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Table 3: Comparison of Military Forces in Asia

Ground Main Principal

Force Battle Combat Surface
Divisions Tanks Aircraft Combatants Submarines

Great Powers
China 88 7,500-8,000 4,970 55 48
Japan 13 1,160 440 62 17
India 35 3,400 799 25 15
Russia (Pacific ) 341 9,000 965 50 35

U.S. (Pacific) 3 130-150 850 68 32

Middle Powers
Korea, South 22 1,900 447 40 2
Korea, North 26 3,700 770 3 25
Taiwan 12 509 459 33 4
Vietnam 53 1,300 190 7 -
Thailand 13 200 212 9 -
Malaysia 5 - 92 4 -
Singapore 3 - 155 6 -
Philippines 8 - 51 1 -
Indonesia 2 • 103 132 2
CD Pakistan 21 1,950+ 434 9 6
CO
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en Table 3: Comparison of Military Forces in Asia (continued)

Ground Main Principal

Force Battle Combat Surface
Divisions Tanks Aircraft Combatants Submarines

Small Powers

Brunei 3 (batt) - 2 -

Myanmar 10 26 91 -
Cambodia 7 150 21 -

Laos 5 30 31 -

Bangladesh 6 140 69 4

Sri Lanka 3 25 27 -
Nepal 6 (brigade) - - -

Mongolia 4 650 15 -

Source: The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994).

Note:Strategic forces are not included. Ground force divisions include armoured, mechanised, infantry, and light infantry. Combat aircraft include
those in airforces and in naval aviation (both land and sea based). Russian forces include those for the Far East and Transbaykal military districts.
US forces include those based in the West Coast, Alaska, Hawaii, South Korea and Japan: they also include estimates for aircraft carrier-based
aviation. Indonesian army divisions are for the Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD) only; the Military Area Command (KODAM) has another 70 lightly
equipped battalions for local security.
1
Russian divisions typically are manned only at 1/4 to 1/3 the level of US divisions.
2
Plus 16 Parchim-class light frigates (ex-GDR Navy) being delivered in 1994-5.
 have acquired components of Chinese M-ll short-range ballistic
missiles. By 2010 North Korea should be capable of fielding a
missile capable of reaching all of North-east and most of South-east
Asia. The middle powers South Korea and Taiwan have also shown
an interest in nuclear weapons in the past. As China presses ahead
over the next decade with developing a truly intercontinental nuclear
force this will encourage India, and therefore Pakistan, to develop
their nuclear capacities. Japan seems likely to opt, as a minimum
policy, for the US technology that will provide protection against
limited nuclear strikes (theatre missile defence). Any Japanese inter-
est in acquiring a nuclear force of its own would risk causing
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proliferation in the region among middle powers.

A number of countries in Asia have active chemical weapons
programmes and over the next decade several of them could develop
a biological warfare capacity.18 The technology to produce chemical
and biological weapons is within the reach of any country with
substantial petrochemical, plastics or pesticide industries. The in-
creasing sophistication of the regional industrial and scientific base
will allow middle powers who have disputes with neighbouring
states to support such developments. These concerns underline the
importance for the region of an effective and durable Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and early action to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention. The Missile Technology Control Regime is also a cru-
cial part of the arms-control measures that seek to limit proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Thus, in
the area of such weapons, global rather than regional solutions seem
likely to remain the most fruitful approach for arms control in Asia.
One of the most interesting regional initiatives is the desire of the
ASEAN countries to proclaim a SEANWFZ, which would border
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). This would provide
for a large nuclear-weapon-free zone between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans but - as with SPNFZ - it would have to provide for the
unhampered transit of nuclear weapons if it is to be acceptable to the
major nuclear weapons states. In North-east Asia and South Asia the
outlook for similar regional nuclear arms-control mechanisms is not
so favourable because of the acute rivalries that continue to prevail.
In this situation of considerable strategic uncertainty, the middle
powers - led by ASEAN - are casting around for some sort of
security dialogue and mutual reassurance. There is a clear recogni-
tion, however, that multilateral cooperative security arrangements
for the region as a whole will not be attainable in the foreseeable

65
 future. There is no interest at present in any measures to constrain
force development plans or to bring about formal multilateral de-
fence cooperation. '9
Multilateral institutions are weak in Asia and there is a reluc-
tance to consider formal confidence-building measures and military
transparency along the lines of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These are seen as intrusive, techni-
cal arms-control measures that were appropriate to Europe but
which do not reflect either the more complex security situation in
Asia or the Asian way of doing business.20 The latter is more infor-
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mal and consensual, less concerned with detailed technical issues

and transparency, and more interested in a comprehensive political
process for security than traditional European and American dispute
settlement approaches to arms control.21 Unlike Europe, Asia has an
extensive recent history of the use of force (the Korean War, the
Malaysian emergency, the Vietnam wars, the Indo-Pakistan con-
flicts, the Sino-Vietnam conflict, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambo-
dia), which inhibits the quick fostering of any security regime.
Political trust will have to be built gradually and at a pace that is
comfortable to all participants in the ARF. Examples of flexible,
non-threatening, practical proposals for security cooperation that
can contribute to mutual reassurance and trust-building in the region
include:22

• exchanges of limited military information in such areas as mili-

tary budgets, doctrine, orders of battle and future force acquisi-
tions;
• publishing unclassified information on regional security devel-
opments;
• meetings of defence planners and military officials to discuss
security issues of common concern;
• developing a maritime information database relating to such is-
sues as maritime traffic, piracy, smuggling, environmental pollu-
tion, and hydrographic and oceanographic information;
• having observers at major military exercises, exchanges of de-
fence personnel at staff colleges, joint training programmes, regu-
lar meetings of chiefs of staff and other high-level officers;
• regional cooperation on how to approach and handle peacekeep-
ing with a view to developing cooperative training programmes;
• maintaining a regional arms register that would build on the UN
Register of Conventional Arms and establish greater understand-
ing of regional trends in arms acquisition;

66
 • notification of major military deployments to reduce the scope
for incidents or miscalculation that could escalate into undesir-
able security threats; a multilateral agreement on the avoidance
of naval incidents.

Approaches to confidence-building and greater openness that have

been developed in Europe (such as the 'open skies' policy and the
use of national technical means of verification) raise many sensitive
issues in security relations between states in Asia. The kind of topics
identified above might be more acceptable to governments in the
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region in the years ahead. But they will have to be considered in a

gradual and phased way with careful attention to what is achievable
and practical in policy terms.
It might then be possible at a later date to consider more formal-
ised and more structured regional cooperative security relationships.
It will be especially important though for decision-makers in the
region to develop habits of dialogue and to institutionalise preventive
approaches to conflict. In this way negative perceptions of security
can be broken down and norms of cooperation can be developed.
The ARF, APEC and CSCAP will be useful vehicles on which to
develop this phased approach to cooperative security. But it will not
be easy because of the lack of cooperative behaviour norms and the
sheer strategic diversity of the region. Moreover, as the local great
powers gather strength and the arms build-up continues throughout
the region, there is the sense that an opportunity exists that should
be exploited before it is too late.
It is thus quite clear that laying the foundation for security in the
region will require more than just continued economic growth and
the spread of its political and social benefits. If a regional power
balance is to be attained - other than through the raw redistribution
of power alone - then a system for practical regional cooperative
security must be encouraged. For the middle powers in particular,
relying on a redistribution of power where disequilibrium may
replace equilibrium is not a comfortable prospect. No middle power
in the region can be sanguine about the changing regional balance
of power.23 Even though the middle powers are now more able to
resist great-power military pressure and manipulation than in the
past, the fact remains that uncertainty and miscalculation are the
enemies of middle-power security because of the comparative small-
ness of their forces. Countries with modest forces cannot afford to
make major mistakes when it comes to assessing the hierarchy of
power in international affairs.

67
 This sense of uncertainty is compounded when old alignments or
alliances are crumbling and there is no real prospect of a collective
security framework or regional security community emerging in the
foreseeable future. Most middle powers in Asia, therefore, will hold
to a strategy that continues to build up fairly robust defence capa-
bilities of their own. They will also seek, as a longer-term strategy,
to participate in regional security dialogue and practical (albeit
limited) military cooperation as a way of institutionalising regional
security cooperation. As already mentioned, the dialogue process is
making considerable progress under the auspices of ASEAN and the
ARF and it is beginning to include North-east Asian countries, such
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as South Korea, as well as China and Japan, the two major local
players. However, it excludes South Asia. And, so far, it has pro-
duced no concrete results in multilateral security mechanisms.
Progress in this area will not be easy given the very disparate nature
of the Asian region, the range of security issues that require resolu-
tion, and the fact that there is very little tradition of security coop-
eration on a multilateral basis. 24
One strategy that some of the middle powers could consider is to
develop a forum for examining ways of maintaining a non-threaten-
ing power balance in the region. Such an informal institution might
do no more than encourage dialogue and consultation on these im-
portant security issues. An important role for such a forum would be
to share information and views on the policies and intentions of
powers in the region, as well as their military capabilities and
activities. Another aspect would be to exchange ideas on defence
planning and force structuring problems that the middle powers have
in common. This process has already started among the ASEAN
countries and between some of the ASEAN countries and Australia.
It is easier for such discussions to occur between middle powers in
geographically contiguous zones because they share the same basic
strategic environment.
The outcome of such middle-power dialogue might be a sense of
a community of strategic interests, not in the sense of a formalised
defence community, but rather in the context of shared strategic
planning problems and a concern to resist great-power encroach-
ment. Such a loose-knit community of strategic interests would
embody the aspiration for regional peace and security and might
serve to mitigate the factors making for international tensions in the
area: but in no sense would it be a principal source of security for its
members. Effective independent military capabilities will continue
to be essential in middle-power security planning as long as armed

68
 force remains a significant factor in international affairs. Ulti-
mately, armed force can only be resisted by armed force.
In the final analysis, however, it is only through strengthened
multilateral institutions that the smaller states of Asia will be able to
face the twenty-first century with greater confidence, and that great
powers like China can be encouraged to work within a peaceful
regional order. There can be no doubt that the development of
inclusive regional security processes must be encouraged. In this
way, the middle powers can contribute to managing change in the
regional order and feel more comfortable with the evolving roles of
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the great powers.

The emergence of a more fluid and self-contained balance of
power in Asia will require the middle powers in the region to pay
more attention to their strategic relationships with one another, as
well as to the great powers. There is an historic opportunity for the
middle powers to develop a sense of strategic partnership and to
ensure that they do not become merely the objects of great-power
dominance in the years ahead.

69