Community and Government in disaster preparation:

Case of Davao City, Philippines

Adrian M. Tamayo
University of Mindanao
Davao City, Philippines

Abstract

The challenge to reduce loss of lives and property during disaster has become the prime
objective in developing community-based disaster management. Climate change has brought
imminent danger of typhoon to a once typhoon-free Davao City.

The City is found to develop an effective rapid deployment rescue and emergency responses.
However, the public seemed not to synchronized with the readiness of the structure. The public
know of the availability of resources, human and capital, in disaster response. However, local
participation of the community members to disaster preparation in the village level was low
resulting to low to moderate readiness. This results to burgeoning of responsibility of the village
chair on pre, during and post disaster.

Older members of the community are found to be biased against disaster preparation. These are
the individuals who are standing down for they cannot remember a disaster of horrendous effect
that befall the city. This further exacerbates the problem. Older individuals have special needs
which information are needed for the crafting of disaster plan; without the older and educated
individuals participating in the community, preparation won’t be inclusive.

Keywords: Disaster management, structure and organization, community

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2781826

 INTRODUCTION

Disaster preparedness shunned away from establishment-based preparation to

community-based vulnerability reduction with local empowerment (Allen, 2006) as a key
feature. As a process, community-based disaster preparation and management include
participatory hazard assessment (Van Aalst, Cannon, & Burton, 2008), support creation and
mobilization. The local initiatives are then incorporated into local adaptation strategies (Rojas,
2006) in order to bridge the gap between scientific and local knowledge.

Philippines is home to many typhoons that traverses its lands with more than 20 hits in a
year. The frequency and the strength of the typhoons affected the lives of the local communities
such that adaptation and vulnerability to disasters are becoming part of the daily existence
(Allen, 2003). Inundated with poverty and environmental risks, people’s lives were seen as
courting a disaster rather than avoiding it (Pelling, 2003).

Brooks (2003) hinted that the adaptive capacity of humans and the utilization of effective
adaptation strategies require understanding the type of hazard and the timescales to which these
are understood and protractedly mapped up, which means that the best people to respond to
disasters are the people in the community themselves.

Critical factors like integration and expansion of social dimensions like health and
behavioral sciences inflates the prescriptive reasoning on disaster preparation motivation (Paton,
2003). Researches further their quest into understanding how humans behave during disasters
and on the subsequent emergencies, the rescue and relief response (Fritz & Williams, 1957).
Others predicted that people would loot and display sorts of anti-social behavior, though
Quarantelli, (1994) admitted that this seldom occurs in highly urbanized areas.

Davao City is a highly urbanized city located in the Southern part of the Philippines; its
population is estimated at 1.6 million. It maintains the Davao Central 911, a rescue and
emergency unit. Davao used to be a typhoon-free city until it experienced a signal number 1
when Southern Philippines was hit by Typhoon Pablo (international name typhoon Bopha).

Given the experience of the City, how do the public perceive their local government
towards disaster response, and how do they assess their personal readiness towards natural
disaster. On this, this study was conducted to determine how ready the people of Davao are for
natural disasters.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2781826

 METHOD AND DESIGN

On November 20-28, 2012, a total of 1400 respondents were surveyed in Davao City.
The survey aimed to obtain information using a sample to make inferences on disaster
preparedness in Davao City (Kelley et al., 2003). A systematic sampling was implemented in
order to allow individuals obtaining equal chance to be included in the sample set. A 3% margin
of error was employed and 95% confidence level was used.
A questionnaire was crafted to simulate readiness to a type of disaster as well as
determine the system and procedure of response that the community would use during disaster
and after it. However, the survey would only reveal snippets of the readiness at a given time, that
is, prior to Typhoon Pablo

RESULTS

The respondents were asked on their preparedness for disasters like fire, floods,
earthquake, big waves, strong winds and typhoons. There were 52 in 100 individuals who are
indicating readiness against typhoon while 49 in 100 are swaying responses from ready to not
ready. The low to moderate level of readiness may have occurred due to varied understanding of
the climate change issues (Gravino, Luga & Lupo, 2016) which has altered the longest-time
claim that Davao is typhoon-free (Digal, 2007).
In response to a possible disaster brought by strong winds, 50 in 100 individuals fortified
the structures of their houses to stand against lash of strong winds given the quality of traditional
housing (Diacon, 1992). It was also found that 30 in 100 are waiting to be reminded to be ready
for disaster while 19 in 100 do not mind about the disaster.
The behavioral response towards typhoon disasters result from the regular trajectory of
the more than 20 typhoons that Philippines hitting the northern part of the country (Samonte &
Roxas, 2008) until typhoon Sendong (international name Washi) caused massive destruction in
Cagayan de Oro and Iligan Cities both in Southern Philippines in 2011. The typhoon caused
more than a thousand dead and millions worth of damage to infrastructure and agriculture
amounting to 1.08 billion pesos in 2011 (Asia News Monitor, 2011). On the following year,
typhoon Pablo hit the southeastern part of Mindanao in which cost 14 billion pesos damage to
agriculture and infrastructure and claimed 740 lives (Xinhua News Agency, 2012).
An earthquake is one disaster which they are not ready for. Only 44 in 100 individuals
are prepared for an onslaught and aftershock of tremors; 24 individuals are totally not ready,
while 32 have some kind of preparations.
Experience with earthquake determines the level of preparedness of the individuals (Oral
et al., 2015). To this, people of davao are not particularly accentuated with. The most recent with
a magnitude 3 occurred in 2007 without causing damage (Businessworld, 2007; Francisco,
2007). Again, the awareness of a disaster indicates preparation for a disaster; hence, the low
occurrence and mild earthquakes in Davao region pose no urgent change in the behavior among
the individuals.
In addition, 46 in 100 individuals are ready for fire-related disasters and big waves; 48 in
100 are ready for floods. In 2006, some families along the coastlines are displaced by big waves
(Businessworld, 2006) which was noted to be a response to the threat of huge wages to life of
individuals.

Table 1
Preparedness of Davaoeno to disaster
Very
Disaster Ready Somewhat ready Not ready
Fire 45.80 30.48 23.41
Floods 47.50 33.43 18.80
Earthquake 43.85 31.99 23.92
Big waves 45.58 32.20 21.90
Strong winds 50.36 30.48 18.88
Typhoon 51.81 29.76 18.08

It appeared that Davao City readies itself for a typhoon and its accompanying strong
winds and the consequential floods. This could be impressed as response to climate-change-
related-disaster but not for earthquake. The people’s awareness on climate change is beginning to
earn social inertia. Long before, Davao is a typhoon-free city until the climate change made
people realize of its impacts such as evident in the typhoons Sendong and Pablo.
 One thing that the people of Davao are very sure of is the capacity of the city government
towards disaster. Individuals vouch for the quick response to disaster (83%) of the government
personnel. The public is impressed and certain with the immediate and effective dispatch of the
local government to protect its citizens (Col, 2007). The local government, as must be seen by
the public, should be reliable in delivering effective emergency response. There could be no
other government agency more effective and logical in any emergency management (Waugh,
1994) than the local government.

The critical importance of transportation in response to disaster highlights the necessity

of having vehicles that could rapidly evacuate large population (Wolshon, 2005). In Davao
City, 82% believed that vehicles are ready for use during emergencies. The public’s behavior on
disaster risks (Lindell & Prater, 2007) is meted out with assurance of the reliability of the
transportation system that would reduce if not zero out casualties during disaster of any kind that
will hit Davao.

The people of Davao also believed that the city is ready for disaster because it has the
fund that will be used in giving relief to affected individuals (Businessworld, 2011). Donations
from the public sector are also relied upon (The Philippine News Agency, 2011). The readiness
of the public towards disaster is supported by their belief that there is sufficient fund to be used
for disaster, and that there are equipment that can be used during disaster response. It was noted
that 81% of the public believes that the fund is more than enough for relief operations and the
eventual rehabilitation and reconstruction of homes and communities wantonly destroyed by any
disaster.

Table 2
The perceived readiness of the City to respond to disaster
Very Somewhat Not
Readiness to respond ready ready ready
Equipment for use 79.49 18.44 1.87
Emergency fund 80.94 16.93 2.02
Vehicles/transport 82.10 14.99 2.74
Capacity for quick
response 83.19 14.41 2.31

Lastly, 79.49 % believed that the City is very ready for any disaster because it has the
equipment used for search and rescue operations. Literatures are highly suggestive that a
compromised disaster response may be brought about by equipment problems (Waeckerle, 1991;
Perry & Lindell, 2003).

During disaster, individuals rely on definite and reliable structures to protect them. In
times of critical environment, these structures are expected to be flexible in order to manage
diversity of resources (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) and respond to behaviors manifesting among
affected public (Tierney, Bevc & Kuligowski, 2006).
Given this, the people of Davao were asked on the readiness of their leaders who would
manage disaster response and rehabilitation. When asked on how do they evaluate the readiness
of the city leaders, a very significant number believed that the City Mayor is very ready for
disaster (92.24%), the Vice Mayor is also seen as very ready (91.15%), their Barangay Captain
(Village Chair) as well (83.87%).
The police force readiness to respond to disaster is also seen at premium (83.11%) as well
as the fire department (82.13%) in cases of fire catastrophe. The top-down organizational
structure is evident in the perspectives of the public, however, the interrelationships among and
between levels of public offices and safety agencies impress the idea of an incident command
(Bigley & Roberts, 2001).
The incident command system follows hierarchical arrangements of job positions defined
by a requirement of specialization and training. This network-centric (Von Lubitz, Beakley &
Patricelli, 2008) interrelationship of public offices and safety agencies allows a flexible, forceful
response that reduces obfuscation of information during disasters (Comfort, 2005) and exhibits
effective priority missions.

Table 3
Organization readiness
Leaders %
Mayor 92.24
Vice mayor 91.15
Brgy capt 83.87
Police force 83.11
Fire dept 82.13
Brgy kag 72.26
Church leaders 72.04
Leaders of village association 74.71
 The members of the barangay council are perceived as very ready for disasters (72.26%),
as well as the church leaders (72.04%). While the leaders of barangay associations are seen as
relatively more ready than the barangay council and the church, 74.71% perceived that they are
very ready. The public is expecting ready actions from the heads of the local government and
from the leaders of their community.
When disaster strikes, everyone affected would be at the same level ground, and it is
expected that the first responder is usually the community affected by it (Walia, 2008). In an
unanticipated and anticipated disaster, the most familiar with the environment usually takes the
first response (Jul, 2007).
If it happens in Davao City, the public expects their village chair to be on top of the
operation for rescue or relief distribution (37.18%), the Mayor’s help comes second (23.27%),
and the Davao Central 911 on third (18.51%). The barangay councilmen’s help is the fourth
(7.85%) expected aid, followed by the Vice Mayor’s aid (6.48%). The Police force is also
expected to display timely response (4.53%), the national social welfare for post-disaster help
(2.67%) and that of local social welfare office (1.44%) as the two of the least expected to display
immediate help.
In the Philippines, the barangay chairman takes on multiple roles in the community as
head watchman, mediator of conflict, overseer of local infrastructure development among others.
The role of the village chief is maintained during disaster whether the chief has the training or
none at all. The village chief acts as the head of the rescue, conduit of information, and acts as
guide for rescue operations.
During rescue, when equipment, transportation and logistics are available, the mayor
takes charge of the operation. The Central 911 takes the tactical operation while the mayor
manages the macro operation such as implementation of the needed rescue priorities,
rehabilitation and reconstruction which will require the support of local legislation to declare
state of emergency for an immediate release of a 30% calamity fund1. The fund is usually
released to social welfare offices.

1
http://www.gov.ph/crisis-response/briefer-state-of-calamity/
 Table 4
Ranking of institutions or leaders the public expect to respond during
disaster
Institutions % Rank
Barangay chairman 37.18 1
Mayor 23.27 2
911 18.51 3
Brgy. Kagawad 7.85 4
Vice mayor 6.48 5
Police 4.53 6
National Social welfare 2.67 7
Local social welfare 1.44 8

The findings are most important and much useful for disaster preparation to post-disaster
relief and rehabilitation efforts. To make the rescue, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, the
barangay captain must be taken into the layers of communication and in the folds of
coordination.
Two personal factors were found to characterize level of disaster readiness of the public;
these are age and education level.
It was found that individuals aged 30 to 56 years old manifest complacency towards
disaster preparation. This behavioral display can be traced from the general experience of Davao
as a typhoon-free region for half a century and its experience of earthquakes were not causing
damage to infrastructures. The older population may not have remembered a disaster experience.
This may be a case, yet due to changes in the climate, natural disasters are hitting the natural-
disaster-free geographic areas like Davao and the ageing population is counted as vulnerable
groups. Note that lessons from disaster preparation reveal that increasing age impedes overall
preparedness (Al-Rousan, Rubenstein & Wallace, 2014) if preparation is done using ordinary
model. Older population needs special attention for their social, health and psychological
conditions and their cooperation improves the total preparation of the local government against
any disaster. Levels of education attained by individuals also influence disaster preparedness.
Those with elementary and college education displays low readiness towards disaster. The
decline in the readiness could be due to the learning and actual experience of the individuals.
Disaster education and drills conducted in schools across levels are aimed at enhancing
responsiveness and decision-making during disaster. Formal learning inducts individuals to how
and what disaster preparedness is all about, however, the urgency of learning these might be
reduced if no personal learning would take place (Shaw et al., 2004). The personal learning is
usually a product of personal experience and litmus test of the knowledge relative to disasters.

Table 5
Ordinal regression estimates to characterize readiness by set of demographic
variable
Variables
Outcome Category Estimate Wald p-value
Very much ready -23.92 61.41 0.00
(3.05)
Disaster preparedness not much ready -22.07 52.54 0.00
(3.05)
little readiness -19.86 42.52 0.00
Predictors (3.05)
Category
18-29 years old -2.31 3.65 0.06
(1.21)
30-35 years old -2.38 4.06 0.04
(1.18)
36-42 years old -2.42 4.18 0.04
Age (1.18)
43-49 years old -2.44 4.15 0.04
(1.2)
50-56 years old -2.71 4.91 0.03
(1.22)
57-63 years old -2.23 2.9 0.09
(1.31)
Category
Elementary -18.61 1028.5 0.00
(0.58)
High school -18.59 1119.49 0.00
Education (0.56)
Some College -18.45 1097.81 0.00
(0.56)
College -18.75 965.14 0.00
(0.6)
Cox & Snell 0.04
Nagelkerke 0.04
McFadden 0.03
Link function Logit
 SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

The changing climate has brought to the fore the need of equipping the community for
disaster response. However, effective response is built upon the premise that the individuals in
the community have basic knowledge in the overall disaster planning, implementation and
rehabilitation. In Davao City, this was evident in a network-centric model where highly-trained
safety and rehabilitation agencies are conscripted in an incident command with the Mayor of the
City at the helm.
The flexibility and effectiveness of the incident command system for disaster have its
positive and negative impacts. The public know of the availability of resources, human and
capital, ready for disaster. On the other hand, the structure of the incident system caused
overburden to the officials of the barangays (villages) with the village chair imitating the role of
the Mayor in the incident command. However, the village chair only acts as conduit of
information for rescue operation which decision is done by the Mayor. In addition, the village
chair acts as guide for rescue operation units given the knowledge of the community.
On the other hand, the enduring burden to the village chief is the ability to bring together,
as a community, disaster preparation. The community-based disaster management is beset by
biases of the older and educated members of the community. These are the individuals who are
standing down as they rely on their memory that no disaster of tremendous effect that occurred in
the community. This further exacerbates the problem because older individuals have special
needs which information are needed for the crafting of disaster plan; without the older and
educated individuals participating in the community, preparation as a whole won’t be inclusive.

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