Athens, 21 December 2015

NATIONAL AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
POSTGRADUATE PROGRAMME IN SEE STUDIES

Serb and Croat Nationalisms:

Roots and Prospects

Supervisor: Prof. Pantelis Lekkas

Students: Can Karaoglu – Chapter 1

Aris Chiotelis – Chapter 2
Georgios Manassis – Chapter 3
 Contents
Introduction.........................................................................Pogreška! Knjižna oznaka nije definirana.
1. Chapter 1: From the 6-7th century to 1939.................................................................................3
1.1. Emergence of the Slavs................................................................................................................3

1.2. The Ottoman Suzerainity.............................................................................................................4

1.3. The Outset of New Ideas and Concepts: The 18th Century.........................................................5

1.4. Initials of Serb and Croat Nationalisms: From the Early 19th Century to the First Yugoslav
State 6

1.5. 1918-1939: The South Slavic Experiment...................................................................................8

2. Chapter 2 :From 1939-Tito’s Death, 1980..................................................................................9

2.1. The World War II aftermath for Yugoslavia................................................................................9

2.2. The Antifascist Struggle, The Civil War and the ethnic tension..................................................9

2.3. The Tito era, state building and Industrialization.......................................................................11

2.4. The question of Socialist State became the Party’s search for the nation...................................13

2.5. Nationalists as factions of the Party in the absence of ethnic National movements...................14

2.6. Language and History “bonding and tearing apart”...................................................................14

3. Chapter 3: Tito has gone – The Renaissance of Nationalism..................................................16

3.1 Abstract......................................................................................................................................16

3.2 Intellectuals Rise First – Victimization – Rewriting History: the spark of the nationalistic
sentiment...............................................................................................................................................16

3.3 Milosevic’s Populism – Slogans – Memories – Ethnosymbolism (Smith, 2004).......................17

3.4 The Reaction of Croatian Nationalistic Sentiment.....................................................................18

3.5 The Outbreak of the Wars – Racism Prevails............................................................................19

3.6 The War is Over – The ‘’Civicalization’’ of the Nationalism....................................................19

Conclusion:...............................................................................................................................................20
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................21

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Introduction

The aim of the essay is to provide a concrete insight of the historical evolution,
dissemination and the appeal it made to the corresponding masses of Serb and Croat nationalisms
in reference to the theories embedded thus far by the respective scholars of the field. The first
chapter focuses on the narratives and the trajectory that the nationalistic discursive elements
came fore, explained in a compact way hence the social and historical context provided predates
to the first footsteps of Slavs on the Balkans to the new age of revolutionary nationalism across
Europe.
The Second Chapter tries to comprehend the complex era of post-world war II in
Yugoslavia, the prospects and the history of the creation of the Yugoslav nation. In emphasizes
in political discourse, real politics and ideology in a time that the admixture of nationalism and
socialism is first emerging with powerful and unpredicted implications for everyone involved.
The third chapter puts emphasis on how ethnic nationalism experienced a triumph under the
authoritarian rule of Milosevic and Tudjman stretching through our times.

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1. Chapter 1: From the 6-7th century to 1939 (Can Karaoglu)

1.1. Emergence of the Slavs

Initial appearance of the Slavic tribes over Balkan Peninsula coincides with the 6th-7th
century. Under different tribal formations the four main branches - Croats, Serbs, Slovenes and
Bulgarians - of newly settled émigrés had been remotely separated. Slavs formed a primitive
economy by attaching certain responsibilities to their fellow members of the village, reproducing
their daily substances in an equal foot in their territory named as zupa. The head was being called
as the zupan. (Schevill, 1991) Our concern however will gather around Croats and Serbs
respectively and specifically delineating their allegiances of early times of their existence as a
community.
First and foremost, Serbs constitute a core importance on Balkan peninsula
notwithstanding as their amendments of glory prima facie may be disregarded as anachronistic.
The outstanding work of ‘Stavrianos’ is actually shedding light to the historical references
thoroughly being made in the name of turning inexorable exhaustion to a meta-historical
continuity by nationalistic enactments (Anderson, 2006). An unforgettable figure is ‘Stephen
Nemanja’ of Serbs who served to unite all disassociated kin of theirs in 11th century following
the acceptance of Orthodox sect of Christianity. Referring to the given trajectory, it had been
argued that these achievements had coined to an embryonic stance which can be argued as a head
start to the nationness of Serbs. (Stavrianos, 1958) Ever-lasting national rhetoric of the glorious
kingdom of ‘Stephen Dushan’, his alleged efforts to engender a Serbian cultural proper akin to
the Greek premises had been all spelled out. 13th-14th centuries markedly embedded to the
historicity of Serbian literary by the exclusiveness of a Serbian patriarchate with almighty ‘St.
Sava’, a civil code opted for being implicitly Serbian. (Schevill, 1991)
Herein also lay the foundations of the grievances that Serbian national rhetoric will be
providing ostensibly as Renan put: ‘’ Where national memories are concerned, grieves are more
value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort.’’ He mentions a sort of
collective deploration of an entity which share the agony and readily standing to be mobilized

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upon the defined solidarity of the nation. (Renan, 1947-61)1. The entry of Ottomans to the
Balkans and the Porte, instilling Sultan’s central authority over the glorious Medieval Kingdom
of Serbs which once ruled by the King Dushan is followed by the demarcation of Kosovo by
Ottoman army in the year of 1389, thereby abolished the last cause of Serbian unity, putting the
Serbian peasant masses under Ottoman local subjugation till the independence of infant Serbian
state in the late 19th century. Consequently, these events will be securing the archaic and
mythical basis for what Serbian literati will be striving for the stimulation of nation-building
process at ‘the age of nationalism’’. (Stavrianos, 1958)
Croat legacy, on the other hand, embarked on a much different trajectory than the Serbian
one. The perpetuating rupture between two communities has been sown by the religious
commitment of Croats to the Catholic sect of Christianity which produced stark ties attuned with
the Western historical and social developments whereby disbanding the fate of two communities.
12th century marks the death of the infamous King Zvonimir and replacement of the dynasty
with a Hungarian one which will be pertinent until the late 1910s. Nonetheless, Croat nobility
preserved their identity by abiding their local rights thus providing a base for future national
associations (Hupchick, 2002).

1.2. The Ottoman Suzerainity

From the 15th century onwards, Balkan Peninsula had been subjected to Ottoman
dominance. Erstwhile tribal formations were no more and both Serbs and Croats were
inseminated by multitudinous geographical, cultural, social and economic substances. Until the
period of the late 18th century both communities were deprived of a national awareness and
incorporated by the unevenness that ‘Danube’ line brought up, a division that pinpoints the
difference between their communal pathways (Stavrianos, 1958).
Eventual installation of the Ottoman presence on the Balkans conjured up a northward
migration of Serbs to the lands of Habsburg, an occurrence which would have oriented these
immigrants with the intellectual novelties of the forthcoming decade, made them to espouse the
soul of the time relatedly leading the way for cultural ascendancy alongside the revelations on
literary expressions, whereas their counterparts under Ottoman rule fell under an enduring apathy
of backwardness. (Stavrianos, 1958).
Various aspects had been determinant on Serbian communal deeds. One of the most
critical was the Orthodox Church. The church is one of the main institution that Serbian

1
Acquired from one of the ‘Routledge’ publications, translated and annotated by ‘Martin Thom’.

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peasantry knowingly identify themselves and their social counterparts. The instrumental value of
church on bestowing a distinct group realization to Serbian peasantry had been quiet accurate
(Kitromilides, 1989). Even for a brief period, a Serbian Patriarchate established in 16th century,
in the city of ‘Pec’ which is an inclusive institution of Serbian culture, gradually replaced by the
Greek-dominant church of Constantinople (Stavrianos, 1958). Other uniting aspect can be found
embedded to the core of Serbian village life named as ‘zadruga’, a close circuit, self-attaining
entity consist of family members, a demotic reproduction of Serbian cultural and social life
which might be cogitated as a more crucial attendant of giving the way to the enchantment of
national idea. (Glenny, 2012). Nevertheless, Serbs continued dwell within the traditional milieu
of the time.

1.3. The Outset of New Ideas and Concepts: The 18th Century

18th century Balkans was destined to be shaken with long established discrepancies of
Ottoman rule, adding the gravity of new ideas and social cleavages that those pre-empt a vast
novelty of claims within the context of newly condensed associations, spurring both internally
and externally.
Several disruptions stemming from the downfall of Ottoman central authority had been
crushed the peasantry - which were relatively successful to eke out of a living throughout the
period - caused a sway of local bandits whom will be the leading groupings of the upraise,
making the core of national movements for the century onwards. (Stavrianos, 1958)
Further, seeds of a new intellectual class had been sown throughout the century whom
will be the leading protagonists of the new age and bearers of the ideas across the Balkans,
disseminating the knowledge, putting a consistent effort to capitalize the efficiency of the most
adequate vernaculars as a medium and a new way to mobilize the masses under the banner of
newly bred ideologies of ethnicity and nationalism, producing pretentions upon the ideas of
Herder and Fichte (Kedourie, 1960). The century points the nature of the ‘Enlightenment’, the
rise of cultural reorientation of the elites and a myriad intent of downing the education from
heavens to earth from the hands of the earthly messengers of linguists, nationalists, indigenous
merchants and new cadres of Serbs and Croats, from Novi Sad to Southern Hungary, will be the
champions of national march (Stavrianos, 1958).

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 1.4. Initials of Serb and Croat Nationalisms: From the Early 19th Century to the First
Yugoslav State

19th century aspired as an era, an apogee of nation-making, consistently shaken by

revolutionary events and movements throughout the years, provided us a Europe which makes us
renounce our early pretentions (Hobsbawn, 1992). By the width of all those happenings, many
aspects were evident which could not be eschewed easily to reach a possible comprehension over
the given trajectory of Serb and Croat nationalisms in 19th century and onwards.
Newly emerging Croatian national consciousness is a pioneering concept of the century
in respect of creating a completely novel dimension of the case. The ‘Illyrian’ movement which
can be underlined as the forefather of ‘Yugoslav’ national identity had formed and scrutinized
within the very context of the century hinged to the Napoleonic penetration of the lands by the
year 1809 led to the institutionalization of the values of newly embedded secular and national
ideas thus setting off the first phase of de-traditionalization (Hupchick, 2002). 1830s and 1840s
onwards, idea of a South Slavic unity made a great appeal towards intellectuals of both Serbs and
Croats which resulted by deeds of breaking up with the Church Slavonic which is plainly
incomprehensible to ordinary peasant masses and to create a catalyst in respect of enticing South
Slav masses into newly established institutional, national and secular ideas. (Anderson, 2006).
‘The Literary Agreement’ of 1850 was a breakthrough on meeting the nationalistic
criterion of bearing a full-fledged language which can construct the necessary bond with the past,
the people and the literati of newly incited ideals. As a protagonist of Illyrian movement and
Croatian, Gaj was the most prominent linguistic on this matter to be mentioned here as he led the
notion of language as a sole pointer of one nations essence (Greenberg, 2004) Given the
trajectory, regardless of the rising ideas such as Pan-Slavism or Pan-Serb movement of the
century, Strossmayer as a bishop raised the idea of religious affiliation and solidarity between
Serbs and Croats by the aim of contributing to unity upon a common, archaic category, can be
seen as a remarkable contribution to South Slavic embeddedness. (Ramet, 2006) Habsburg South
Slavs were mostly fabricated their ideas around South Slavic unity also regarding to their
defensive stance taken against aggressive Hungarian nationalism. The movement was
predominant in cultural realm, aimed to sprang up a ‘high culture’, by the helping hand of
disseminating the very idea through papers and periodicals, stimulating the national sentiment
and legitimacy by orienting poems and epic songs with the glory of archaic times whilst

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engendering a burgeoning condition for the future debates and political nationalism of both Serbs
and Croats. (Wachtel, 1998)
On the other side, a radical figure named as ‘Ante Starčević’ coined on a highly ethnic
rationale can be reasoned within a milieu which Balkans became the central scene of partition
and power politics, left asunder under the fists of newly emerging and long established states and
empires. Alongside his party lines, he had created fundamental ideological means and a path to
follow for the future radical admirers which will call themselves as ‘Ustasa’, causing a sway by
the racist coats of arms in the startling age of massacre.2 (Gallagher, 2001)
Serbian nationalism was another accelerating trend over the century and upheld certain
advantages comparing to the Croat national and political nurturing. 19th century was the kernel
of Serbian nationalism, starting with the 1804 revolt as a peasant reaction against decaying
Ottoman institutions -which cannot be defined on a national basis- thus becoming an act that
casted out the old ways of administration and paved the way for ‘indigenous dynasties’ which
will be establishing their perseverance and legitimacy by reintroducing old symbols of alleged
glories. (Stavrianos, 1958) The traditional rivalry between ‘Karadjordje’ and ‘Obrenovich’
dynasties will be lasting till the beginning of 20th century, in fact reflecting a pendulum of
influence had been oscillated between intellectuals of Vojvodina Serbs and dynastic centrism,
can be regarded as a point of maturity concerning national organizations and policies within the
borders of Serbian historicity. (Glenny, 2012).
The period witnessed to vital attempts of nation building by the newly assigned clergy of
intellectuals in terms of creating and vitalizing the language of the nation-state as one of the core
configurations, regulating the functions of the institutions in accordance to the new foundations.
‘Vuk Karadzic’ has to be mentioned as a man who carried all the efforts to a higher dimension by
being the leading figure of creating a new Serbian language based on the cognition of an ordinary
peasant. Initial works of Serbian grammar and dictionary had been forged by his initiative by the
beginning of 19th century hence shedding a light onto the future agitation of linguistics, aimed in
depth to construct a sporadic bond within the boundaries of kinship which had been dispersed
upon other ideological fractions throughout history (Wachtel, 1998).
Furthermore, expansionist policies and ideals whereby gauged by the adaptation of state
policies to such claims was strictly evident throughout the period. Irredentism, ethnic based
territorial aspirations took the form of a formal state nationalism and were consistently being
highlighted as a perpetual aspect of mobilization and political culture of the Serbian state of
nature. The year 1830 marks for the dynasty to install its territorial delimitation as a basis for the
2
Special thanks to our fellow collegue ‘Djordje Mihajlovic’ for his valuable inquiry and flattering contribution.

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future aspirations and policies of expansion (Stavrianos, 1958) The policy map of ‘Greater
Serbia’ capitalized by the path-breaking work of ‘Garasanin’ in 1844, armed Serbian policy
makers with ethnic and irredentist lenses through their reign. (Ramet, 2006). On the other side,
Serbs of Vojvodina as intellectuals and newly emerging middle strata of Serbian kin deeply
supported the modernization process which Serbian society had undergone during the second
half of the 19th century. Militarization and prospects of homogenizing the society enhanced the
national zealousness across the Serbian community providing the necessary bondage between
nationalist agenda and the masses thus generating a social context tended by the aspects of de-
traditionalization of Serbs. (Glenny, 2012) Heroic figures of the past conformed in national
agenda, contributed the proactive nature of irredentism by pouring a glorious past and natural
territorial rights throughout the period. (Gallagher, 2001) After achieving the independence by
the Treaty Of Berlin, 1878, national ideals gained another momentum in reference to state’s
dominant role following the urbanization, de-traditionalization attempts that were supported by
intellectuals and bureaucratic counterparts of whose well-being and career paths strictly abided
by the growing influence of state and nationalization of the masses. These elements bulked up
the irredentist ideals of unification of all Serbs and the territorial ideals mainly vested upon
Bosnia, Kosovo and Northern Macedonia. By the year 1903 that the coup took place, resulted by
the detachment of ‘Obrenovich’ dynasty from the throne once and for all, national sentiments
were growing steadfastly through the elite ranks. (Roudometof, 2000) Austrian annexation of
Bosnia in 1908 was a crucial event startling the formal agenda of Serbs by tearing an
indispensable part of ‘natural Serbia’ which can be directly related to the ‘victimization’ and
traumatic side of Serbian nationalism that responses and chain reactions were highly evident for
both the First World War and for the future rhetoric deemed to be used. (Ramet & Adamovic,
1995)

1.5. 1918-1939: The South Slavic Experiment

The proclamation of the first South Slavic state came along with clashes and debates
which will be an enduring asset of Yugoslavian history. The idea of South Slavic unity was
inherent to 1830s and 1840s thus stretched out retrospectively to the 1920s. A imminent debate
between federalist and centralists took place along national and ideological lines. (Stavrianos,
1958)

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 Serbs on one side ought to be acquainted by the role of ‘Piedmont of Italy’, sorting out
the problems of disunity by accumulating the masses around Serbian core both politically and
culturally, putting their otherness on line to emphasize ethnic and linguistic superiority. Croats
and additionally Slovenes on the other hand were clinging to a South Slavic notion of entity thus
triggering a ‘high Yugoslav culture’ as a cement of nation-building, leveling the Slavic
communities on the same ideological and cultural line. Serbian scholar Cvijic unlike his Serbian
identity, forged the necessary grounds for the Yugoslav ideology thereby securing a ever-lasting
intellectual spot over internalizing the Serb-Croat-Slovene triadic relation as a widely accepted
narrative. Nevertheless, highly nationalized political agenda of Serbian policy makers staggered
the process and refrained newly established state for being able to politicize a Yugoslavian
culture both in higher and lower grounds. (Wachtel, 1998)

2. Chapter 2 :From 1939-Tito’s Death, 1980

2.1. The World War II aftermath for Yugoslavia

From the start of the WWII there is a great amount of transformation in almost every aspect
of the former society of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia- in 1941- until the emergence of the
Democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) -in 1944 Treaty of Vis.

The emergence of the new state entity of SFRY is defined by the turning points of the civil
war during WWII. The clear political aspirations (even if not fully ideoligized yet) from the
Yugoslavia’s Partisans to form a united Yugoslavia and their vision of the Unity of South Slavs
as an Imagined Community (Anderson,2006).When combined with their ambition to form a
Multinational Federal State, lead to their eventual political and military superiority. The other
defining factor, being the astute inability of the “official” partisans-at the begging of WWII- the
Chetniks or “Royals “of the exiled government to form a coherence, both in terms of political
action and support, military importance and legitimacy thought the multiethnic population. Their
inability to be an effective partisan’s movement against the Nazi occupation, and their
anticommunist tendencies lead them eventually in coalition with the German and Italian
occupation armies lead to the landslide victory of Tito in 1945 elections and the rise of the
SFRY.

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 2.2. The Antifascist Struggle, The Civil War and the ethnic tension

Trying to describe the multiple fractions and tension inside this short period of time is a
difficult task but we will try nonetheless. After the 1941 invasion, the annexed territories of
Serbia were under German control, a Croatian proxy state is established and recognized by Axis
powers and includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other parts of the country are occupied
by Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy.

The exiled official government, recognized the semi-organized remnants of the Royal
Yugoslavian Army (mostly Serbians) under the command of Draza Mikhailovich as the official
partisan movement. Their genuine (Serbian) nationalistic sentiment and the repulse to the
communist partisan movement led them to the open collaboration with the German, in fear of
reprisals in the Serbian population. This fact also helps to the eventual expulsion of the Chetniks
from the national Yugoslavian “myths” and “heroes”. In terms of nationalistic aspiration the
“Greater Serbia” combined with their Orthodox identity diversifies them inside the partisan
movement and motivates them to the attacks in Bosniaks and Bosniak Muslims.

At the same time Pavelic’s proxy NDH state was overzealous of their masters ideological and
practical views on nation building, thus we see a formidable effort to(that surprised even the
Italian and German Fascists) to “clean” the national territory of the “other”. The Croatian
“Ustasa” regiments fueled by the Independent State of Croatia (NDH)-which includes Bosnia-
Herzegovina- as a fulfillment of the “Great Croatia” dream ,are out to perform atrocities to the
Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia leading to hundreds of thousands dead.
The ethnic cleansing plan was to deport the 1/3 of the population, “nationalize” other 1/3 and
simply exterminate the rest 1/3.

As quoted in the article of Ognyanova:

“This plan is very well represented in the statement of the Minister of Education and Religion,
Dr. Mile Budak: “We shall kill some of the Serbs,” he announced at a banquet at Gospic on 6
June 1941, “we shall expel others, and the remainder will be forced to embrace the Roman
Catholic faith. These last will in due course be absorbed by the Croat segment of the population”
(Ognyanova, 2000)

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 The astute militant nationalistic rhetoric of the Ustasa find a positive ear in the Bishop of
the Old Croatian Catholic Church (Batakovic 1997, Ognyanova 2000 , Lampe, 1996) and in parts
of the Muslim population to whom they refer as “Pure Croatians”. The unexpected outcome is
the strengthening of the peasant movement in both Serb and Bosniak population and the rise of
the ranks inside the communist partisans (Hudson 2003, Banac 1988).

The peculiar thing about the ascent to power of the later named Yugoslav partisans, is the
history behind the national question in the communist movement. From the late 1930’s till the
early 1940’s the KPJ is in a constant reconstruction of the answer to the national question (Banac
1984 p338-339). From the “self-determination” theory and the USSR external policy, through the
knot of the new Balkan nation-states emergence, the communists had never seen themselves as a
national movement. A deceive turn in this discourse is the “Popular Front” rhetoric and strategy
that was formed after the German aggressive towards the USSR pushing toward a democratic
versus fascist discourse rather than a bourgeoisie versus socialist. That turn forced the communist
partisans of the region to adjust the struggle toward social liberation closer and towards the
national liberation fronts and the importance of the nation to revolutionary cause. (Banac, 1988)
Their strategy after that consists of a greater sensitivity towards ethnic issues, autonomy and
independence proclamations at least within the imperialistic block. Tito’s “independent” spirit
towards both the Allies and USSR agreements promotes a leftist Macro-nationalistic vision for
the area, “Yugoslavism” as Pan-south Slavism. Drawn from the combination of a pan-Slavic
rhetoric, Yugoslavism of the past and the Marxist interpretation of self-determination, and off
course the real-politics for the Yugoslavian issue (Banac, 1988).

The anti-fascist committees AVNOJ and its Croatian branch, that are created in 1943 on
top of the remnants of the first Yugoslavia act as political body with state-like administrative
capacities. After the formal recognition from the Allies as the official partisan movement in
Tehran Conference (1943) and the financial support, the National Liberation Partisans form the
biggest and most well-armed group in the region. These are paving the way for the easy
transition from the end of the war to a nation-state creation once again. Determining moment is
the Treaty of Vis that recognized Yugoslavia as a state while not determining whether it’s a
democracy or a monarchy. The utilitarian usage of the anti-fascist victory and the nationalistic
sentiment combined with the military and political superiority of the Yugoslav Partisans gave
birth to the biggest state in the Balkans.

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 As Susan Woodward observes: “Nationalist anti-imperialism of the nineteenth century had
… been revived as a shared bond among Yugoslav peoples, although it had now taken the form
of anti-fascism under Communist party leadership.”(Woodward, 1995).

2.2. The Tito era, state building and Industrialization

The Federal State and the national question: Brotherhood and Unity

The statehood issues and the underling ethnic tension of the previous years, the political
change and the rise of power of the KPJ, has had a tremendous affect in the emerging new state.
The KPJ promises for autonomy in the past years in almost all the ethnic claims and their
program including the federalization of Yugoslavia gives them no choice to recognize in the
constitution the existence of six federal republics and two autonomous regions. All these come
into a considerable contradiction with the hegemonic stance characterized with its, genuine
mistrust in non-centralized forms of government inside the communist movement. (Coppieters,
2002)

Tito “independence” is only a tactical position in what had been later called a USSR
chauvinism, not a genuine misbelief in Stalinist state hood and the centralization of power thus
the 1946 Constitution is a copy of the 1936 USSR constitution(Batakovic 1995). But as the
situation evolved in the region, new circumstances, needed new tactics. In the early years of
Titoist Yugoslavia state building and modernization is in the first priorities, as Lenin had said:
“Communism is government by the Soviets plus the electrification of the whole land.... Only when
the economy has been electrified and modern heavy industry has become the technical basis of
industry, agriculture and transportation, only then will we succeed at last.”(Lenin, 1920)

But as it has been described more elegantly by Gellner, the whole process of
industrialization is connected to a sheer force of mobility and social rearrangement that
transforms culture because it’s “needed” and tries to reconstruct identities (Gellner, 1983).

The realization from the Titoist KPJ that a sheer transformation in the economy of the
country was needed led to a very radical program of socialist reforms that included not only
economy, but education, public administration, and of course the political system and the public
sphere as a whole. The 1948 Tito-Stalin split did not slow that process down, on the contrary it
fueled it. Now the KPJ is unrestricted and renamed in 1952 as the League of Communists ,and
will steadily start to evolve it’s new and unique way towards socialism , the theory of “self-

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management” (Coppieters, 2002)introduced by the major party intellectual Kardelj in 1950 has
made party policy leading as described by Lilly : “…party leaders now moved beyond criticizing
Stalinist revisionism to articulate openly and officially their own interpretation of Marxist theory
for the Yugoslav case based on workers' self-management, the separation of party and state, and
the guiding (but not ruling) role of the Communist party.”(Lilly, 2000)
The new situation refuels the promotion of new intellectual class, provides the basis of
democratization at least within the party ranks, and starts a reform of the judicial system and
opens a great discussion about the fate of Yugoslavian socialism and Yugoslavia itself.

2.3. The question of Socialist State became the Party’s search for the nation

Socialism and Nationalism an arranged marriage

Even in the early years of Tito’s rise to power he tried to play a role in the reconstruction
of the national identity and the shaping of the new nation’s history. It is said the he often
conducted lectures in universities himself, argued and instructed academics about what the “real”
national history is. Trying to disprove the Gellner’s claim we argue that the nation building
process was a not a cause for irritation but for exploitation, at least for the Titoist Marxism.
Gellner argues the following as a wrong interpretation of nationalism common occurring in
Marxists:

“The awakening message was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was
delivered to nations. It is now necessary for revolutionary activists to persuade the wrongful
recipient to hand over the message, and the zeal it engenders, to the rightful and intended
recipient. The unwillingness of both the rightful and the usurping recipient to fall in with this
requirement causes the activist great irritation.” (Gellner, 1983 p.130)

Titoist Marxist’s could comprehend nationalism as a powerful ideology and as such they
tried to reap the benefits out of its powerful ability for mass mobilization and social change. This
is partially an anachronistic approach as the individuals are not always aware of this process of
ideological marriage, but evaluation of the discourse of the various internal debates of the League
of Communist it’s incredibly clear that nationalism is not condemned in its essence but actually
actively promoted.

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 But Socialist Nationalism cannot be ethnic by definition (Ballinger, 2011), as it’s a
community of people bound together by a territorial claim and a communist future. But the major
nationalistic movements of the area might have been modern in terms of politicizing religion and
de-traditionalizing the state but in the same time they were ethnic in both rhetoric and sentiment.
Thus they had to be crushed without re-igniting ethnic tensions and civil war. In that perspective
socialism and its class defined comradeship in addition to the memory of the assistance of the
Catholic Church to the Ustasa, and the bad name of the Serbian Church as speaker of the first
Yugoslavian regime came very much in handy. As traditional intellectuals came from the arms of
the clergy and the former state bourgeoisie, and thus were “meant” to have many and
contradictory opinion in matters cultural, political, and ideological surely also the same in
matters of nationalism.
The first issues that Tito “fixes” by blood, are the major issues with the Nazi
collaborators and his political rivals. The purges mostly target anti-communists and clergy
(mostly Catholic) but also intellectuals that openly supported pro-Serbian, Pro-Croatian national
sentiments.
The Purges are the beginning of a cleansing process toward an ideological and political -
not ethnic- homogeneity and the creation of a Yugoslavian nationalistic discourse. Through
exclusion of the “others” from the public sphere, educational system and national history a nation
is begging to emerge.
As the young communist state was making its first steps, the most defining issues were the
industrialization and the creation on a modern educated working force, thus creating a “new”
national sentiment only this time towards socialism. (Gellner, 1983)

2.4. Nationalists as factions of the Party in the absence of ethnic National movements

The period of time thought the early 1950’s till the 1974 constitution can be split into two
major conflicts inside the League Of Communists ,first the issue of the state with the Federalist
versus Centralist dispute and secondly the struggle towards socialism the with known
comiformist issue and the Praxis group.(Banac ,1983)

It seems that in the communist era, intellectuals only appear inside the party and define by
their relation to the official party line. Prominent figures as Kardelj founder of “self-
determination” and the constitution of 1974, Milovan Djilas, to Aleksandar Ranković as Pro-
centralist Serbian party member, Croatia's nationalistic leadership (1971) and the reform-oriented

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Serbian "anarcho-liberals" with the Serbian Bourgeois Hegemony fears, are all seen in relation to
the official political stance of Tito in any aspect.(Batakovic ,1995)

2.5. Language and History “bonding and tearing apart”

The unifying factor of Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serb language and the deep at the time
realization of the need for a common written language between the four nations
(Serbs,Croats,Montenegran,Bosnian) had its major breakthrough in 1954 with the Novi Sad
agreement that recognized its existence.

Major historian and linguists tried to enforce the agreement by systematic research and
publication.As Banac explains:

“SINCE 1948, THIS VERSION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY was

maintained in institutional historiography without regard to Communist party membership. The
Yugoslav historical establishment, represented by a generation of historians born before 1918,
such as Vaso Cubrilovic, Dragoslav Jankovic, and Jorjo Tadic in Serbia; Vaso Bogdanov, Ferdo
Culinovic, and Jaroslav gidak in Croatia; Bogo Grafenauer and Fran Zwitter in Slovenia; and
Anto Babic and Branislav Djurdjev in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was preoccupied, with exceptions,
with the pre-1918 period. Although they occasionally disagreed, their disagreements were not
subversive of the Titoist historical interpretation, which was further serviced by a somewhat
younger establishment of historians specializing in the history of the KPJ (Pero Damjanovic,
Jovan Marjanovic, Pero Moraca, and Vlado Strugar). Both establishments, after accounting for
disparities in age and interest, generally cohered in a series of joint projects, beginning with
bibliographic guides on historical publications (published for the world congresses of historians
in 1955, 1965, and 1975), two volumes of the "History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia" (1953,
1959), and in various encyclopedia projects, notably the two editions of the "Encyclopedia of
Yugoslavia" (1955-1971, 1980-1991).” (Banac, October 1992)

As the quest national history and language continues it is becoming more and more
obvious that the national issue was indeed the transference of the party politics in every aspect of
the public sphere. The late 1960’s Croatian Spring, pushing for more Croatian autonomy is the
“spark” reinforces the discourse about nationalism and forces the national issue again on public
sphere (Banac, October 1992). The strict and fueled by a federal perspective of Titoist Federal

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government does not appeals to the Serbian nationalistic sentiment thus strengthening the
academic at least opposition that some years later writes the well-known memorandum of the
Serbian academy. For the moment the tension is absolved with a carrot and stick solution, strict
enforced federal policy to the Croatian intelligentsia that fueled the riots, but pushing forward the
1974 Constitution that clearly irritates the Serbian nationalists inside the party. (Batakovic, 1995)

This controversial approach is usually misunderstood in the bibliography stressing that in

a way Tito resigned over his control to over the push of nationalisms. It’s a valid argument but a
clear answer is not presented thus far in any case. (Banac, October 1992) (Batakovic, 1997)

The new 1974 Constitution tries to find balance thought the “dissolution of the state”,
merging a democratization process with a complex combination of satisfactory feelings for
anyone but the Serbs. It’s an approach that tries find Balance through Nationalism in the question
of the multi-ethnic state. Creating possibly more confusion than clarity. Serbian nationalism will
later use the “victimization” of the 1974 constitution as a centralist argument that will erupt
major tensions and war in the region.(Ramet,2006) Croatian nationalism will keep its head down
till the end of the 80’s but will carry the vigorous persecution as a national memory. (Batakovic,
1997) (Batakovic, 1995)

3. Chapter 3: Tito has gone – The Renaissance of Nationalism

3.1 Abstract

The period between Tito’s death (1980) and the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars (1991) could
be characterized as the Renaissance of Nationalism or as the period of Renationalism. The same
principles that were born, expressed and prevailed during the first and second period of
nationalisms in the Yugoslav area, and were suppressed by the “over-nationalist” Tito, falling
into hibernation, were the same principles that reborn the nationalism in the post-Tito’s period.
The competitive nations of Serbs and Croats, acted and reacted, in an acute manner that resulted
in the worst bloodshed in Europe after the WWII. Another factor that should be taken into
account, concerning this period, is the confirmation of the theories of the great nationalism
intellectuals (Smith, Kedourie). They described the principles of nationalism, regarding past
periods and different places, managed to systematize this overarching phenomenon in such a
depth that it could almost be predictable. The engagement of the Great Powers resulted in the end

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of bloodshed and paved the way to the Europeanization and Democratization of the pro-
communist nation states.

3.2 Intellectuals Rise First – Victimization – Rewriting History: the spark of the nationalistic
sentiment

The role of the intellectuals was significant. From the early 1990’s they begun to pose
arguments that broke the political status-quo (Ramet, 2006: 322), in a, still, unfriendly
environment. Branko Petranovic claimed that Mihailovitc, the Chetnik, rival of Tito during the
WWII, was a significant anti facist (Ramet, 2006: 322). That was only a little piece of evidence
concerning the rewriting of history. In 1983 many Serbians attended the funeral of the nation’s
leader, Rankovics   who was an opponent of Titos decentralization and the intellectual father of
Slobodan Milosevic (Cohen, 2002: 98). 
Another political movement that tried to break the taboos, was the writing of the
contentious Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, in 1986. That was
maybe the key moment in the breakup of Yugoslavia (Yale,2002: 18). and a contributor to the
Yugoslav wars (Laura Silber and Allan Little, 1995: 31). Studying the memorandum, all the
statements pave the way to the oncoming socio-political incidents: The separatism and
nationalism are a consequence of the negative for the Serbs Constitution of 1974. The ethnic
nations of Yugoslavia are constantly diverged. Serbs’ language and culture are endangered. The
political situation, especially in Kosovo, is critical due to the unstoppable persecution of Serbs.
Yugoslavia is not a democratic state. Croats, Slovenians and Albanians follow the doctrine ‘’a
weak Serbia, a strong Yugoslavia’’. Serbia suffered bloody defeats in the past but managed to
gain its statehood and establish a civil democracy. After all the historic sacrifices the Serbs do
not own their state and this is the worst defeat. Serbian minorities in Kosovo and Croatia suffer
from discrimination. The integrity of the Serbian nation and its culture in Yugoslavia is critical
for its existence and progress. The Cyrillic script is in the brink of extinction (Serbian Academy
of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Memorandum, 1986, n.d.)
Ernest Renan argued that ‘’wrong understanding of one’s own history is part of one’s
nation being’’. The State Council of Education in 1993 in Serbia entered new textbooks were the
re-writing of history and the accusation of the enemy nations, served the present political
situation (Todorova, 2004: 327). Through “education”, children learnt not only about the glorious
past of their ancestors but also their nation’s “imagined enemy’’ (Todorova, 2004: 329).

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Kedourie’s argument about the relation between the education and nationalism is here. The aim
of the education is not to transfer academic knowledge to the students but the nation’s political
views· the obedience of the youth’s will towards the will of the nation (Kedourie, 1961).
In this defined and finite territory of Yugoslavia have been consecrated a grade ‘’amount’’
of historical memories, incompatible ethnic and religious identities (Todorova, 2004: 2). The
Yugoslav area could be likened as a gas cylinder, which due to the overpressure inside the
cylinder and the extreme environmental conditions (the will of the great powers to be engaged in
the accelerated tension), was close to the limits of a fatal explosion. Milosevic just lighted the fire
and the explosion’s mushroom covered Yugoslavia.

3.3 Milosevic’s Populism – Slogans – Memories – Ethnosymbolism (Smith, 2004)

The initial disapproval of the Memorandum, by Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan

Karadzic, who followed the official opinion of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, didn’t
augur the nationalistic delirium that would follow (Lampe, 2000: 347) (Glenny, 2012: 627).
After he was elected as the president for the SKJ’s Serbian branch Central Committee, on 21
February 1986, he became the most significant representative of the growing Serbian
nationalism. He was the leader of the anti-bureaucratic revolution from 1986-1989, which
initially seemed to serve the fight against the bureaucratic and the corruptive structure throughout
the federal government. In reality Milosevic was implementing his plan for the total control of
the political life, of all the federal republics and provinces (Robert Thomas, 1999: 44-51).
The most crowded and intensive rally, among the ‘’rallies of truth’’ was held in
Gazimentan of Kosovo, on 28 June 1989 when. Milosevic was, then, the president of Socialist
Republic of Serbia. This speech was held as a part of the 600 th anniversary of the battle of
Kosovo. Milosevic combined history, memory and continuity, comparing who fought against the
Turks in Kosovo in 1389, with the Serbs that fought for their national survival in Kosovo. His
speech was a total recall of the Memorandum. The symbolism of the four Cs (the Cyrillic letter
S) that formed the symmetrical cross was the acronym for the slogan: ‘’Samo Sloga Srbina
Spasava [Only Unity Can Save the Serbs]’’ (Glenny 1996: 15). This was the symbol of
Milosevic centralism against the multi-irredentism movements of Croats, Albanians of Kosovo
and Slovenians. In general Milosevic argued that both the Battle of Kosovo and the Yugoslav
Constitution of 1974 were defeats of Serbian national consciousness. According to the

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international criminal Tribunal Milosevic reference to the possibility of armed battles in the
future of Serbia’s national development, was an indication of Yugoslavs collapse and bloodshed.
Last but not least, the participation of the Orthodox Church in the speech and its great
support to Milosevic’s nationalistic ideas, should not be disregarded. The orthodox bishop from
Dalmatia in Croatia, gave a keynote speech in which he compared Dalmatia to Kosovo and
concluded that both had made the same promise to Milosevic, meaning that these region will be
conquered someday by Serbians (Independent, 1989)

3.4 The Reaction of Croatian Nationalistic Sentiment

The Croatian nationalist movement, was led by the former communist general and
historian Franco Tudjman (MacDonald, 2002: 99). He took part in the Croatian Spring
embracing the Croatian nationalistic movement by the 1960. (MacDonald, 2002: 100). Croatian
diaspora favored him by donating millions of dollars for the independence of Croatia
(MacDonald, 2002: 100). Tudjman founded the Civilian Democratic Union “HDZ’’ in 1989,
gathering intellectuals and sympathizers from diaspora (MacDonald, 2002: 100)
In 1990 the majority of the 600.000 Serbs were urbanized and generally leaved peacefully
within the Croatian society. Tudjman failed to provoke that despite the fact that the Serb minority
in the cities could be easily manipulated, the poor peasants of Knin would become the gates of
hell (Glenny 1996: 3)
Tudjman’s first movements towards the total secession from the Serbian dominance, was
the extinction of the Cyrillic script and the cleansing of the country’s administration from the
Serbian bureaucracy (Glenny 1996: 12,13). The paradoxical outcome was the reaction of the
peasants of Knin. Only the 5 per cent of them used the Cyrillic Script, but the pressure of Tujman
for the exclusive use of Latin script caused the severe reaction of Serbs (Glenny 1996: 12). In
this occasion ethnic memories prevailed over the high culture.
The use of symbols of Ustasa was also a sign that concerned the Serbs, reminding them
the massacre of the WWII (memories – victimization) (Glenny 1996: 14).
Additional to Tudjman’s secessionist views, the expansionism was also present. Miloevic
and Tudjman had both decided to share the Bosniac territory, during their meeting of
1991(Glenny 2012: 633) The propaganda from both sides was a general truth. The total war was
inevitable.

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 3.5. The Outbreak of the Wars – Racism Prevails

On July 1991 the war broke out. Hundreds of thousands of people died (200.000 civilians).
The ethno-cleansing and racist atrocities prevailed, caused by all sides. During the Bosnian war,
the siege of Sarajevo resulted in approximately 200.000 refugees, almost the half of the
population of this city was displaced. Concerning the whole region of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
about 2.500.000 civilians were feed from their home. It was the most severe refugee crisis, in
Europe, by the end of WWII (UNHCR REFUGEE AGENCY, 2012).

3.6. The War is Over – The ‘’Civicalization’’ of the Nationalism

The war ended earlier for Croats, in 1995 and four years later for Serbs. The democratic
transition was a difficult and nationalistically painful procedure, especially for Serbs. The
prospect of Europeanization led to the civic turn of nationalisms. Croatia managed to enter the
EU as a full member state in 2013. The dream of Serbia’s accession is still far away but the,
integration procedure through the Copenhagen criteria (democracy, respect of minorities, human
rights, rule of law) do not allow to any ethnic nationalistic movements to prevail. The u-turn
towards the civic nationalism is also obvious by the smooth secession of Montenegro in 2008.
The prospect of Europeanization was not the only reason for the change of direction.
Even during the war there were voices of change. The passionate statement of Belgrade actor
Boro Todorovic to the independent television station YUTEL on 2 November 1991, proves that
there were people, even during the war, who did not want to follow this insane struggle: ‘’You
won’t teach me to hate anyone, and to tell you the truth, the more you call on me and remind me
of my nationality the less I feel I belong to it. The more you appeal to my patriotism, the less
patriotic I feel because of you.’’(Glenny 1996: xiii)
Nowadays we can still watch on TV people in Croatia to erase etiquettes of Cyrillic script,
on the roads or Serb football fans street-fighting with Croat fans. Fortunately these attitudes are
not approved by the official governments.
Have those nationalistic sentiments disappeared from people’s hearts or they have fallen
again in hibernation, waiting for an intellectual to arise them?

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Conclusions

The very foundations of Serb and Croat national consciousness can be traced back to the
18th century, albeit the ethnic symbolism which had been revised throughout the era of thriving
nationalism as old as the emergence of the communities. Serbians had the support of an
institutionalized and politicized culture to amass peasants towards their ethnic oriented, holistic
and central agenda whereas Croats culturally affiliated more than they sided by the advantageous
stance of upholding their national discourses via efficient devices. Nevertheless, both
nationalisms had captured by the wave of modernization, secularization qua Enlightenment,
markedly in an uneven nature, hence adopted ethnic based agendas in different shapes and
predispositions.
Understanding the blend of ideologies as socialism and nationalism provides invaluable
tools to the understanding of the contemporary, ethnic reigniting of tensions and the historical
complexity of the Former Yugoslavian nationalisms. Serbs and Croats are defined nationalisms
are defined by power politics and the struggle of hegemony in the region as much as they are
define by common social and cultural traditions and language.
In the post-Tito Yugoslavia, Real Politics played a critical role. The leading politicians
used the principles of the nationalism in order to manipulate their people. Milosevic could be
regarded as one of the best students of the nationalism theorists. Tudjman initially used
nationalistic ‘’weapons’’: the disappearance of Cyrillic script and the ‘’hunting’’ of Serb
intellectuals and scholars. Unfortunately for him he failed to manipulate the peasants. The output
of this intensive nationalistic struggle was the most fatal war conflict in Europe by the WWII.

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