The Late Ottomans’ path to allliance with Germany in 1914, Revisited

E. Tufan

1998

INTRODUCTION

The Ottomans’ alliance with Germany, concluded on 2 August 1914, was the

paramount factor that propelled the Ottoman Empire to enter the First World War in

October 1914. The Ottoman entry into the Great War was the single most important

event in the history of the modern Near East. It led to the destruction of the Ottoman

Empire and to the emergence of an entirely new political structure in the region.

It is generally conceded that the Ottoman decision prolonged the war by two

years. Germany would have found herself obliged from the beginning to conduct a

defensive campaign had the Ottomans stayed neutral: Austria would have been

destroyed bit by bit if the Russians, who invaded Eastern Prussia, and the Serbs, who

were advancing on Hungary, had joined forces with the Romanians, Greeks,

Bulgarians, and Italians. More significantly, if Russia had at her disposition the free

passage of the Straits, she could have imported easily all the war material of which she

was in need, and Bolshevism might never have come into existence. It could therefore

be argued that the Ottoman decision was a major factor in the making of the modern

world because the prolongation of the war significantly contributed to the success of

the 1917 Russian Revolution and hence to the political alignments of the twentieth

century.

1
 The Ottoman decision also had far reaching effects on the unity of the British

Empire. In November 1914 the Ottoman sultan as the Caliph declared jihad. Men from

the 130th Baluchis refused to fight the Turks, soldiers from the north-west Frontier who

traditionally placed faith before “king-emperor” deserted, some worked for Turko-

German intelligence during 1915 and 1916 and cultivated insurrection against the

British in their homeland.1 The brunt of casualties inflicted at Gallipoli fell on the

ANZAC troops. This raised questions on the nature of these two dominions' future

affinity with the mother country. The treatment of the Ottoman sultan in his capacity

as Caliph in the aftermath of the war had further repercussions in India and led to

founding of the Khilafat movement in 1919. The movement facilitated Gandhi to

galvanise, albeit temporarily, a united Muslim-Hindu front against the Raj and was an

important milestone in the subcontinent’s route to eventual independence. When the

Turkish nationalist army appeared to threaten the British force occupying Chanak, in

1922, Lloyd George asked the Empire for help. Only New Zealand and Newfoundland

responded wholeheartedly. The Chanak crisis, an end product of Turkish engagement

in the war, was to be a major turning point in the history of the British Empire. The

British Empire as a result of the Chanak crisis ceased to be de facto diplomatic unit.2

Despite its importance and extensive consequences the reasons for the

Ottomans’ alliance with Germany, which propelled the Ottoman Empire into the war,

remain controversial. The alliance has been variously presented as: the result of the

machinations of the Liman von Sander's military mission;3 the natural outcome of

1
L. James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London: Abacus, 1995), p. 360.

2
D. Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience, from 1765 to the Present (London: Harper Collins,
1996), pp. 279-80.

3
This view is strongly defended by H. Howard. See, H. Howard, The Partition of Turkey; A Diplomatic
History 1913-1923 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p. 83 ff.

2
continuous German influence;4 principally Austrian pressure, it being object of

Austria to control Ottoman ambitions in the Balkans by tying the Porte into the Triple

Alliance;5 it has been blamed on the Ottoman generalissimo, Enver,6 who is often

presented as the Germanophile dictator who had the final word;7 it has often been

presented as an “accident” or “stroke of fate” or as a “product of drift.”8

The aim of this study is to clarify apparent discrepancies. The paper is

structured in three chapters, an epilogue and conclusion. The first chapter sets the

declining empire’s evolving relationship with the European great powers; it

scrutinises the growing involvement of a recently united Germany in Ottoman affairs;

and inspects the Young Turks as a reaction to decline and changing international

developments. The second chapter examines the international repercussions to the

new regime; the incapacity of the new regime to rejuvenate in increasing international

isolation, and the Porte’s feeble attempts to seek an alliance with Britain. The third

chapter explores the new totalitarian regime’s reaction to Balkan losses; its frantic

attempts at reinvigoration; its desperate searches for an alliance and the appearance of

increasing German involvement. The period between the signing of the German

alliance and the actual Ottoman entry into the war is summarised in the epilogue.

4
This is the view of L. Albertini. He propounds “Through the Baghdad Railway and the control of the
army Germany had acquired a predominant position in Turkey. Even without the Liman von Sanders
mission, the Turks would still have been attracted towards Berlin.” See L. Albertini, The Origins of the
War of 1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), Vol. 3, pp. 606-7.

5
See, for example, M. E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923 (London: Longman,
1987). p. 266 and F. G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the
Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), passim.

6
Mehmed Enver [Bey, later Paşa] (1881-1922). A Harbiye graduate. He became a CUP member in 1906
and achieved fame with the 1908 revolution. Appointed Minister of War in 1914, he left Turkey at the end
of the war in 1918. Killed while fighting the Bolsheviks in Turkestan in 1922.

7
This is the view propounded by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, the pre-eminent authority on Enver’s life. See
his substantial biography Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya, Enver Paşa (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1985) 3
volumes.

8
See, for example, Y. T. Kurat, “How Turkey drifted into the World War 1” in K. Bourne and D. C. Watt,
Studies in International History (Harlow: Longman, 1967), pp. 291-315.

3
4
CHAPTER I

Abdülhamid to Young Turks: Continuity and Change

i) Abdülhamid’s juggling act

Since failing to conquer Vienna in 1683 and the treaty of Karlowitz of 1699 the

Ottoman Empire had been on the decline. M. S. Anderson, a recognised authority on

the Eastern Question, propounds that in 1774 the Empire “was still stagnant and

archaic. Its chances of survival now seemed to many observers very small.”9 Yet the

house of Osman held sway well into the twentieth century and outlived the Habsburg,

Hohenzollern and Romanov dynasties. Attempts at reform, which brought about great

institutional changes, doubtless helped to prolong its life; but there can be little doubt

that it was the failure to reach agreement by the Great Powers on how to divide the

wavering Empire recognised as “the sick man of Europe” was the main reason for its

longevity. It was preserved, primarily, through the existing balance among the

European Powers.

As the Ottomans progressively declined, in relative terms, through the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Great Powers’ political, strategic, economic

and cultural interests within the Empire witnessed a steady growth. Throughout the

nineteenth century the periodic crisis of the Eastern Question produced rivalry and

tension in the political relations among the Powers. Each Power had its particular

concerns in the Empire as well as its particular areas of concern, but so long as the

Powers respected each other’s special areas of interest significant disturbances were

avoided. However, when such encroachments occurred, whether through direct Great

Power action, or indirectly, resulting from the actions of client Balkan national

9
M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. xxi.

5
groupings or of the Ottoman government or its vassal rulers, the ongoing Eastern

Question entered a new phase. The Anglo-Russian conflicts in the Straits; Austro-

Russian confrontations in the Balkans; Anglo-French friction over Egypt and the

Crimean War served such turning points.

Russia was seen and recognised as the traditional enemy of the Empire. It was

well understood that one of the main objectives of Russian policy was to capture

Istanbul and control the Straits. Austria was no longer viewed as the enemy she was.

She generally acted as counterbalance to Russia as the interests of both countries

conflicted in the Balkans. Britain had come to be the Empire's traditional protégé. For

strategic reasons of her own she had opposed Russian encroachment on the Ottoman

Empire. This was, to a lesser extent, also true of France. Nevertheless, Britain’s

acquisition of Cyprus in 1878 and her imposition of a veiled protectorate over Egypt

in 1882, and France’s occupation of Tunisia in 1881 were indicative of these powers

developing disposition toward the vacillating Empire.

The new balance of power in Europe marked by the defeat of France and the

emergence of Germany as a Great Power facilitated Sultan Abdülhamid10 to

experiment new options in foreign relations. Germany had the potential to be an

alternative factor in countering the Russian threat by other means than British and

French support. By the 1890s, due to Bismarck's fall and Germany's increasing

strength and ambition as a world power, the German card became even more cogent.

The most widespread ideological force in the Ottoman Empire during Abdülhamid's

reign was Islam. Popular Islamic sentiment translated into a movement to establish

contacts with all the oppressed Muslims of the world; including those in British India
10
Abdülhamid II (1842-1918). Reigned from September 1876 to April 1909. Succeeded his brother Murad
V. Promulgated the Ottoman Constitution on 23 December 1876, proroguing Parliament on 13 February
1878. Thereafter ruled for next thirty years. Forced to restore constitution by Young Turks in July 1908,
he tried to exploit the insurrection of 1909 in order to regain his old power. As a result deposed and
removed to Selanik. Brought back to Istanbul in 1912.

6
and Egypt, Russian Central Asia, and French Algeria and Tunisia with the aim of

forming a union of Muslims to help defend them and their ways against western

encroachment.11 Germany, unlike Britain, Russia and France did not colonise Muslim

territory and therefore was not suspect in Muslim eyes as an imperial power. The

German Emperor12 became the first European ruler to visit the Sultan in 1889. A

second visit followed in 1898 and the Kaiser presented himself to the Muslim world

as the champion of Islam against its enemies. Simultaneously, some nationalist groups

in Germany, particularly the Pan-German League began to talk openly of the need for

expanding German influence in the Ottoman Empire.13

Notably, geopolitical and economic factors further brought the two empires

together. The Berlin to Baghdad railway project was the largest of economic

concessions which gave Germans an economic stake in Turkey. Financing problems,

which were in turn largely caused by political objections from the Russian, French

and British governments, as well as very difficult terrain, led to long delays and

pauses in the construction work. On the eve of the war the whole line was still in a

badly truncated state.14

A major factor, which propitiated the strengthening of the ties, was the

Sultan's request for the Germans to increase their involvement in training the Ottoman

army. As early as 1830s several Prussian officers, among them the future Field-

Marshall von Moltke, had worked as advisors or instructors in the Ottoman army. The

11
S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 259.

12
Wilhelm (1859-1941), First cousin of George V. In 1888 succeeded his father as German Emperor
(Kaiser). Abdicated in November 1918. In exile in Holland from 1918 until his death.

13
U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1968), p.5.

14
E. M. Earle, Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (London:
Macmillan, 1923), passim.

7
arrival of a group of officers under Generalmajor Otto Kaehler in 1882 expanded

German association in military affairs. Following Kaehler's death in 1885, the group

had been taken over by Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Colmar von der Goltz, who worked

with great energy and enthusiasm during the next ten years, advising the Turks on

general staff matters, military organisation and training procedures. As significant as

the presence of military experts in the Empire was the secondment of young Turkish

officers to German regiments for extended training. Mahmut Şevket15 and İzzet16 were

among the early trainees who subsequently became distinguished Paşas.17

What has often been portrayed as planned German penetration was, doubtless,

facilitated by wily Abdülhamid in order to oblige Germany to intervene favourably on

Turkey's behalf in political crises and wars. German participation in the affairs of the

Empire further complicated the Eastern Question, but Germany was not made to

commit herself to the defence and integrity of the Empire. He also never tried to go

beyond the policy of playing off the Powers against each other by offering to become

Germany's full ally. That would have required, if nothing else, a strong army, since

Germany was not likely to form an alliance with a liability; and Abdülhamid, despite

high military spending and his commitments to army reform, saw a strong army as a

threat to it own position. The army, which Abdülhamid alienated, was to be the

principal factor behind the Young Turk revolution in 1908. The new regime, which

15
Mahmud Şevket Paşa (1856-1913). A Caucasian born in Iraq. Soldier, minister and Grand Vizier.
Harbiye graduate (1882); spent nine years in Germany. Vali of Kosova during the Young Turk revolution.
He was the most powerful figure in Empire after crushing the April 1909 insurrection. Shot dead while
Grand Vizier.

16
Ahmed İzzet Paşa (1864-1937). Soldier, War Minister and Grand Vizier. Born in Manastir, graduated
from Harbiye in 1884. Spent three years in Germany (1891-94), where he worked with Liman von
Sanders.

17
U. Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire” in M. Kent (ed.) The Great Powers and
the End of the Ottoman Empire (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1996), pp. 114-6.

8
the revolution brought about, was to pursue a new phase in Ottoman foreign relations,

with the search for a European ally.

ii) The Young Turks and false hopes

The Young Turk revolution was the culmination of the ideological infiltration of the

Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) into the discontented officer corps of the

Ottoman Macedonian Third Army.

The first organised opposition to Hamidian autocracy was formed in 1889 by

four medical students.18 They took Italian Carbonari as their model, and formed

themselves into numbered cells. The same year a centre was set up in Paris by self-

exiled Ahmed Rıza. This group called itself the Committee of Union and Progress in

1895.19 In France they were referred to as Jeunes Turcs. Its various publications were

smuggled into the Empire through the extensive network of post offices ran by foreign

concessions gained through the Capitulations. In 1899 the group was joined by some

members of the Imperial family itself: Damad Celaleddin Paşa, son of a Vizier and

grandson, by his mother, of Sultan Mahmud II; his wife, a daughter of Abdulmecid

and a sister of Abdülhamid; and his two sons Sabehaddin and Lutfullah. The family's

departure was a heavy blow to the Sultan. Prince Sabehaddin emerged as the chief

personal and, later ideological rival of Ahmed Rıza. A congress was convened on 4

February 1902 to restore and confirm the unity of the movement. It was at this
18
The founders were İbrahim Temo, an Albanian from Ohrid, Mehmed Reşid, a Circassian from the
Caucasus, Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak Sukuti, two Kurds from Arabkir and Diyarbakir.

19
Ahmed Rıza Bey (1859-1930), who was a friend of Clemenceau and a member of the Positiviste
Society founded by August Comte, preferred the name “Nizam ve Terakki” to conform exactly to the
Positivist slogan “Ordre et Progrès”. However, this was considered as rather foreign by the group, which
preferred the name “Ittihad ve Terakki “ [Union and Progress]. See E. R. Ramsaur, The Young Turks:
Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1957).

9
meeting İsmail Kemal20 put forward the view that “by propaganda and publications

alone a revolution cannot be made. It is therefore necessary to work to ensure the

participation of the armed forces in the revolutionary movement.”21

It was the pursuing endeavours that enabled the CUP to infiltrate into the army

which was mistrusted by the Sultan and was starved of money and equipment. The

centre of the movement henceforth shifted from the exiles to the officers in the

Empire, where new groups were being formed in Anatolia and Macedonia.

By 1907 the European Great Powers had bifurcated into two opposing camps.

The Triple Alliance, on one side, consisted of Germany, the Dual Monarchy and,

somewhat dubiously, Italy. The Entente, on the other, comprised of France, Russia

and Britain. The roots of the Entente lay in the Franco-Russian agreement, which had

been signed in 1893. It aimed to provide a bulwark against the burgeoning German

stance in Europe. France would not again find herself fighting the Germans alone as

in 1870. It took the mounting menace of German naval power and increasingly daring

German diplomacy for Britain to begin to abandon her “splendid isolation” in

European diplomacy. In April 1904 France and Britain signed the entente cordiale,

thus putting an end to their global disagreements. The completion of the Triple

Entente between Britain, France and Russia three years later, by a comparable

compromise in Anglo-Russian disputes in Persia, marked the hardening of Europe

into two rival camps.

20
İsmail Kemal (1844-1920). Liberal deputy and Albanian nationalist. Forced to flee to Europe in 1900.
Later tried to assume control of 1909 insurrection. Opted for independent Albania and led the liberal
faction. Left behind memoirs which have made him famous in Europe.

21
S. Story (ed.), The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1920), p. 308.

10
 The Ottoman Empire could not but be affected by the rapprochement between

Russia and Britain. In the memorandum of 15 March the British Foreign Secretary

1907, Grey,22 expressed that:

Good relations with Russia meant that our old policy of closing the Straits
against her, and throwing our weight against her at any conference of the
Powers must be abandoned. It was this policy which, in my opinion, had been
the root of the difficulties between the two countries for generations.23

It was in this prevailing atmosphere of reconciliation that Edward VII and Nicholas II

met, in May 1908, in Reval (Talinn), where an important item on the agenda was

reforms the in Macedonia - the ethnically, religiously and culturally variegated

Ottoman province which was in perpetual turmoil.

The recent intervention of the Powers in the Macedonian problem had further

contributed to the discontent of the officer corps of the Ottoman Macedonian Third

Army. It was feared that the next step might be a European-imposed partition of the

province among the Balkan states, and it was believed that the Reval meeting had

been concerned with such partition. The constitution was presented to, and accepted

by, the populace as a general remedy to their discontent. It was conceived that its

proclamation would solve the problems of terrorism associated with demands for

separation.

In a co-ordinated campaign, junior officers who were members of the CUP

(among them Enver and Niyazi24) took to the hills and demanded the restoration of the
22
Edward Grey (1862-1933). Third Baronet, 1882. Liberal MP, 1885-1916. Foreign Secretary, 1905-
1916. Created Viscount Grey of Falladon, 1916.

23
Memorandum Sir Edward Grey (send to Sir A. Nicolson in the form of a dispatch. No. 117), Foreign
Office, 15 March 1907, G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), British Documents on the Origins of
the War, 1898-1914, (London: Metheun, 1926-1938), (hereafter cited as BD), vol. iv, no. 257, p. 279.

24
Resneli Niyazi (1873-1912). Gained reputation during the war with Greece in 1897. Became a
prominent hero of the Young Turk Revolution. Despite his Albanian origins, appears to have been a
strong proponent of Ottomanism.
11
constitution. On 23 July 1908 the constitution of 1876, shelved by Sultan

Abdülhamid, was reinstated by the Young Turks. The various nationalities of the

Empire were overjoyed. As an example of the general feeling “…the President of the

Bulgarian Committee and the Greek Archbishop embraced on the suggestion of the

Mutesarrif.”25 Halidé Edib, witnessed that “Men and woman in a common wave of

enthusiasm moved on, radiating something extraordinary, laughing, weeping in such

intense emotion that human deficiency and ugliness were for the time completely

obliterated...”26 Indeed by mid-August, terrorist activity had entirely ceased in

Macedonia.

The power base of the CUP was in Selanik (Thessaloniki). But they needed

spokesmen to be send to Istanbul. No single person stood as leader. The most

experienced CUP member in Macedonia was Dr. Nazım,27 director of the Selanik

Municipal Hospital and the chief contact between the Young Turk conspirators and

the exiles in Paris. He always chose to remain out of the public eye. Eventually three

civilian bureaucrats were sent: Cavid28, Rahmi29, and Talât.30 In Istanbul the deputation

had the Sultan Abdülhamid (now a constitutional monarch) replace pro-German

25
Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, July 26, 1908. K. Bourne & D. C. Watt (eds.),
British Documents on Foreign Affairs. vol. 19,. Doc. 128, p. 509.

26
H. Edib, Memoirs of Halidé Edib (London: John Murray, 1926), p. 258.

27
Dr Nazım (1870-1926), an enterprising revolutionary, and a lifelong member of the CUP. He was
hanged in 1926 after being accused of complicity in a plot to assassinate Atatürk.

28
Mehmed Cavid Bey (1875-1926) a member of the Dönme (crypto-Jewish) sect, CUP member from its
early days in Selanik; writer, politician and economist. Served as Minister of Finance in several cabinets,
while the CUP was in power. He was hanged in 1926 after a trumped up charge in the conspiracy to
assassinate Atatürk in 1926.

29
Mustafa Rahmi Bey (1874-1947), Born into a well-known family in Selanik, he was elected Deputy for
Smyrna as Unionist candidate in 1908, and later during the First World War, was Governor of Izmir
province. At the end of the war he was among the deportees to Malta. He retired from politics when he
returned to Turkey.

30
Mehmed Talât [Bey, later Paşa] (1874-1921). The prime mover of the CUP. Deputy for Edirne, later
Minister, and (in 1917) Grand Vizier. He left Turkey in 1918 and assassinated in Berlin by an Armenian in
1921.

12
Grand Vizier Ferid Paşa with British protégé and anglophile Kamil Paşa31 as Grand

Vizier for the third time in July 1908. Four further members of the inner committee

later joined the deputation including Enver and Cemal32. This inner core resolved that

it would remain as a pressure group and influence decision making.

The long-term ambitions of the Young Turks were more than just the

reinstitution of the constitution. They wanted to reinvigorate and transform the

moribund Empire so as to make it be accepted as an equal by the Great Powers and to

have them reduce, and eventually, abandon their Capitulatory privileges33 and rights of

interference. Such transformation necessarily meant the development of the army and

the navy, which would by implication contain the Balkan states and also increase the

Empire's standing with the Powers.

The Young Turks of 1908 were Liberals in the tradition of nineteenth century

Europe and took their inspiration from France and, particularly, from Britain. German

influence had been totally dependant on Abdülhamid's patronage. As the change of

Grand Vizier manifested the political climate was ripe for the expansion of British

influence in the Empire. Immediately after the revolution Grey adopted a policy of

conciliation towards the new regime with the intention of winning it over to Britain.

In a letter to Sir Gerrard Lowther, the new British Ambassador in Istanbul, Grey

stated that the “new regime would not be embarrassed by any British demands” and

concluded “...if reforms are being developed from inside we shall use all our influence

31
Kamil Paşa (1832-1913). Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire four times; born in Cyprus. Graduated at
the military academy in Egypt. Joined the civil service and held office across the Empire. Known for
adopting a pro-British political stance.

32
Ahmed Cemal [Bey, later Paşa] (1872-1922). A graduate of War Academy. After the 1908 Revolution
served in several important capacities including the governate of important provinces such as Adana,
Baghdad and Syria. Became a minister of Marine in 1914 and left Turkey with Enver and Talât in 1918.
He was assassinated by an Armenian in Tblisi, Georgia in 1922.

33
Fiscal, judicial and economic privileges traditionally enjoyed by the Power's subjects within the Empire.
These privileges were seen as not only an affront to national independence, but also a major obstacle to
the Empire's economic and industrial development.

13
to prevent their being interfered with from outside.”34 British policy soon manifested

itself in the Porte's pro-British policy and it tended to be guided by advice from the

Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Istanbul. British prestige was further to be

enhanced after October 1908, by Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Bulgaria's declaration of independence and Greece’s declaration of

enossis with Crete.

34
Sir Edward Grey to Sir Gerard Lowther, Private, Falladon, 23 August, 1908, BD, vol. v, no. 208, p.
266.

14
CHAPTER II

Snub, turmoil, war, isolation, and war again

i) Resumption of Old Great Power attitudes

The development of an Ottoman constitutional monarchy was hampered by a

succession of foreign crises. News of the Young Turk Revolution caused alarm in

Vienna. Ever since the Berlin Treaty of 1878 the Dual Monarchy had treated the

nominally Ottoman provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a virtual colony. The change

in Ottoman political climate was the fundamental reason for the meeting in Buchlau

on 15 September between the Austrian foreign minister, Aehrenthal, and the Russian

foreign minister, Izvolski.

Aehrenthal was anxious to annex the two provinces before the Ottomans could

assert their full suzerainty by embracing these provinces in the parliamentary system,

which was part of their scheme of national regeneration. Izvolski, itching for some

dramatic personal success, offered to support Austria-Hungary in exchange for a

reciprocal support for Russian claims to the right of passage for her warships through

the Straits.35 Aehrenthal also encouraged Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria also to violate

the Berlin Treaty and proclaim its independence from the Empire, when they met in

Budapest in 23 September, a week after the Buchlau meeting. Ferdinand, who for

years had been chafing under the limitations of Ottoman sovereignty declared

Bulgaria's independence and assumed the title of tsar on 5 October. The following day

Aehrenthal announced the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina as a fait accompli.

35
No record was kept of the six hours conversation, which led to this agreement and each partner later
interpreted to suit himself.

15
 The Power’s stance towards the new regime left the Young Turks embittered.

Feeling against the Dual Monarchy ran high and Germany's standing in Istanbul was

further jeopardised. Berlin was felt to be at least partially responsible for the

objectionable policies of her main ally. There was also some suspicion as to the

Russian role in the declaration of Bulgarian independence. On 5 October, Grey

informed the Turkish Ambassador that Britain would not recognise the actions of

Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary until she knew the opinions of the other signatories

(particularly Turkey's) of the Berlin Treaty. He advised the Young Turks against war,

and promised to give all possible support to Turkey's claim for compensation.36 Von

Marchall, the German ambassador in Istanbul, was informed by the Grand Vizier of

Grey’s stance. He suggested to the German Foreign Office that the Porte should be

advised “to ask the Powers to confirm Turkey in her European possessions…and to

suggest an indemnity both for the railway and the tribute from Eastern Roumelia.”37

On 10 October Von Marchall reported from Istanbul that according to his

impressions: “Secret negotiations have been in progress for some days between

Kiamil Pacha and Sir Gerard Lowther for an Anglo-Turkish treaty. There is other

evidence of this. My British colleague goes daily to the Porte and remains an hour

with Kiamil Pacha…”38

Meanwhile the whole affair infuriated Kaiser Wilhelm. His comments to a

telegram dated 7 October was:

36
Grey to Lowther, 5 October, 1908. Cited in F. Ahmad, "Great Britain's relations with the Young Turks,"
The Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 2, Part. 4, 1966. p. 308.

37
Baron von Marchall, in Constantinople, to the German Foreign Office, 6 October, 1908. E. T. S.
Dugdale (ed.), German Diplomatic Records 1871-1914 (Hereafter cited as GDR). Vol. 3, pp. 304-5.

38
GDR ,vol. 3, p. 306.

16
 …Aehrenthal’s stupidity has brought us into the dilemma of not being able to
protect and stand by the Turks who are our friends, seeing that my own ally
has injured them. And now I must look upon England taking my place in
Turkey…Thus my policy, so carefully built up for 20 years is thrown away.39

Although there appears to be no evidence of Von Marchall’s reported negotiations in

the British records40 there can be little doubt that the whole episode made the young

regime feel let down and isolated. It triggered their long quest to find an ally. Britain

was the Young Turks' ideological mentor and her reputation remained untarnished

during the crisis.

Consequently two inner core members of the CUP, Ahmed Rıza and Nazım

Bey, in the second week of November 1908, went to see Sir Edward Grey aiming to

seek an Anglo-Ottoman Alliance. They put forward to Grey that the Young Turks

aimed at changing the character of the Ottoman Empire. Referring to Britain's existing

alliance with Japan in the Far East they suggested that Turkey was the Japan of the

Near East and that there already existed, in force, the Cyprus Convention.41 Grey

assured them of British sympathy in the good work they were doing in Turkey and

offered them to lend “men to organise customs, police, and so forth”. But he

explained there could be no close Anglo-Ottoman partnership since, except in the Far

East, Britain stood firmly outside the alliance system.42

The annexation crisis rocked European diplomacy for six months, and

throughout the period the Ottoman Government perennially stressed its wish for

fraternity with Britain. British diplomacy in return helped to postpone settlement of a

39
Kaiser’s comments to Cipher Telegram, Prince Von Bülow, at Norderney, to Baron von Jenisch, in the
Emperor’s suite at Rominten, 7 October 1908. GDR ,vol. 3, p. 305-6.

40
See BD, vol. v, p. 419.

41
Grey to Lowther, Private, London, 13 November 1908. Cited in F. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 309.

42
Ibid.

17
revised Straits Convention. Britain also played an important part in the deal between

the Turks and the Russians regarding Ottoman recognition of Bulgarian

independence: the Russians renounced forty instalments of the 1878 war indemnity.

Moreover, a British naval mission, headed by Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, was sent

to reform the Ottoman navy. An agreement was eventually reached with Austria-

Hungary following a successful trade boycott, on 26 February. Turkey recognised the

annexation for a compensation of £ 2.4 million (200.5 million kuruş) and the

Monarchy’s evacuation of the Sancak of Novipazar.

The reality of the facts was that the advent of the constitutional government

coincided with a resumption of the old depressing round of territorial losses. The

discontent arising from the crises caused political turmoil in Istanbul. The CUP and the

different factions of the opposing Liberal Union were in conflict. Kamil Paşa, in the

midst of these conflicts and resentments, tried to play off the different groups to build

his own power. Initially the CUP refrained from opposing him. He appeared to be the

best alternative and his deposition would alienate Britain. But Kamil interpreted this as

CUP's weakness and attempted to use the situation to appoint his own men to the war

and navy ministries. The CUP than showed its real power and secured an Assembly

vote of no confidence, caused his downfall and had him replaced by a CUP man,

Huseyin Hilmi, on 13 February 1909.43

The deposition of Kamil was likely to cause British resentment. In an attempt

to avoid such eventuality, the new Grand Vizier personally told Lowther that his policy

towards England would remain unchanged, and that he would still count on the support

and advice of H. M. G.44 But Lowther was not convinced and after Kamil's fall he lost

43
S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, op. cit., p. 279.

44
Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 15 Feb 1909. Cited in F. Ahmad, Great Britain's relations with the
Young Turks, op. cit., p. 311.

18
all sympathy with the CUP and probably connived with the opposition to bring about

its fall. The predictable reaction against the new regime exploded with the

counterrevolution of 13 April 1909 (known as 31 Mart vakasi due to the version of the

solar calendar used at the time). The CUP sought and received the aid of Mahmud

Şevket Paşa, Commander of the Third Army, to organise an army of 25,000 in Selanik

and march into Istanbul to quench the uprising and to re-establish the constitution.

Abdülhamid, suspected of affecting the counterrevolution was deposed and replaced

by his brother Mehmet. The higher ranks of the Ottoman army, such as Mahmut

Şevket, were by and large apolitical but by training and tradition they looked to

Germany for support and sympathy.

This fact coupled with the diplomatic blunders of the British Embassy in

Istanbul enabled Wilhelmstrasse to gradually restore its position in Istanbul. By May,

following the suppression of the mutinies in the capital, the regime manifested its new,

much more friendly, attitude towards Germany by proposing greater German

involvement in the reorganisation of the Ottoman army and inviting Baron von der

Goltz, by now a colonel-general and army inspector in the Reich, to come back to

Turkey for that purpose.

In May 1909 Mahmud Şevket Paşa was confirmed as Inspector-General of the

First, Second and Third Armies. Early in 1910 he entered Hakkı Paşa's45 cabinet as

Minister of War. During Hakkı's Grand Vizierate Anglo-Ottoman relations remained

somewhat distant. This was mainly due to Britain's standing in the Persian Gulf and

Lower Mesopotamia. The Young Turks refrained from clashing with Britain regarding

the ambiguous status of Egypt, where the Sultan was still the sovereign and the Porte

was in receipt of an annual tribute. But unlike that of Egypt, there were delegates in
45
İbrahim Hakkı Paşa (1863-1918). He was the Ottoman Ambassador in Rome when he was recalled
and offered the post of Grand Viziership on 29 December 1909.

19
Istanbul from the Mesopotamian provinces; these delegates formed a powerful lobby

against British penetration. Another reason for the manifestly cool relations was

Britain's support for France in the 1910 loan negotiations in which France, having

clearly failed to become the Young Turks' favourite power, evidently sought to

establish a control over Ottoman's finances. The Ottomans were asked to place a

substantial order for French artillery and naval equipment, and to accept the financial

supervision of French functionaries. The Porte was rescued from this uneasy

predicament in late 1910, when German and Austrian financiers agreed to take the

loan.46 The British attitude was indicative, once again, of her willingness to sacrifice

the Ottoman Empire for the sake of maintaining a strong Triple Entente.

Between 1909 and 1911 the CUP, first through alliances with senior officers

and elder statesmen, then through its own men in and behind the government was the

dominant political force in the Empire.

ii) The Young Turks’ policy of centralisation, its repercussions and war

The counterrevolution substantially altered the nature of the Young Turk regime. An

open policy of centralisation and Turkish hegemony began to be pursued. This in turn

provoked resentment and opposition in various regions of the Empire. Armenian

Dashnaks started causing trouble in the northeast. Simultaneously rebellions broke out

in two Arab provinces: under Sheikh Mohammed al-Idrisi in the Asir region south of

Jeddah, and under the Iman Yahya Hamid-al-Din in the Yemen. These military

emergencies necessitated deployment of further 30,000 troops in Arabia drawn from

46
B. Fulton, “France and the End of the Ottoman Empire” in M. Kent, op. cit., p. 157.

20
hitherto docile provinces. The majority of the troops sailed to the Red Sea from

Tripoli; leaving the Sultan's last directly held North African possessions, in the

summer of 1911, very thinly garrisoned.47

A further damaging development in its consequences was the unrest in the

Albanian provinces. The Albanian leadership, in the main, had supported the Young

Turk movement (Niyazi Bey, one of the heroes of the revolution was an Albanian), but

the post counterrevolution policies of the Young Turks were inherently incompatible

with the autonomy envisaged by Albanian nationalists. The Albanian revolt when it

came in the winter and spring of 1910 was as much a campaign against the new efforts

at efficiency and centralisation as it was a national movement. The new tax regulations

and enforced conscription produced resentment. The laws against vagabonds and

national societies transformed the resentment into rebellion. Montenegro began to

shield and arm the Albanians and also pleaded their case in Europe. In August 1911

the Ottoman government eventually gave in to the rebel demands of general amnesty,

compensation for all confiscated weapons and property, suspension of all conscription

and taxes for two years, and the use of all officials conversant in Albanian.48

Nevertheless, by June 1912 Albania was again in open revolt. But by this time the

Turko-Italian war in Libya was in full swing and the Italians were assisting the rebels

as well as provoking Montenegro.

A major international repercussion of the Bosnian annexation crisis was the

reappearance of open conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans.

Deeply distrustful of Austria-Hungary, Russia attempted to form a front against further

possible aggressive moves on the part of the Dual monarchy. In October 1909 Victor

47
Ş. S. Aydemir, Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa, (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1985), vol. II, p.
219.

48
S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, op. cit., p. 288.

21
Emmanuel and Nicholas II, accompanied by their foreign ministers, met at Raccognici,

where it was agreed that a policy of co-operation would be pursued in Balkan affairs.

The Russian government also agreed to support Italian claims in North Africa in return

for aid in the Straits question. When the Agadir crisis opened the way to the French

protectorate over Morocco, it impelled Italy, in view of the favourable circumstances

on the ground to go to war with Turkey and move upon Tripoli, following a 24-hour

ultimatum, on 27 September 1911. Italy, the least of the Great Powers, thus became the

first major state to engage in open war with the Empire since the Congress of Berlin.

By violating the Porte’s de facto integrity she initiated the set of events which would

place the Empire in unrelenting turmoil for the next decade.

The Porte once again found itself isolated. The necessity of an alliance was

evidently clear. Italy was formally Germany's ally in the Dreibund and hence despite

her sympathetic stance could not offer help. An approach to the Entente was therefore

the logical path to pursue. The immediate consequence of the Italian war was the

replacement of Hakkı with Said Paşa49 on 29 September. The new administration,

through anglophile Cavid, appealed for British intervention. Only one senior minister,

Winston S. Churchill50 supported a favourable British action. Churchill had personally

met Cavid and Talat when they hosted his visit to Istanbul in 1909.51 He also became

particularly friendly with Enver during German manoeuvres in 1910.52 Arguing that

the Ottoman Empire was more valuable to Britain than Italy Churchill pointed to Grey
49
Mehmed Said Paşa (1838-1914), Grand Vizier eight times between 1879 and 1912. Earlier he had
served as First Secretary to Abdülhamid.

50
Winston Spencer Churchill (1874-1965), grandson of duke of Marlborough and of American tycoon,
Jerome. First Lord of the Admiralty, 1912-15; chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster 1915; commanded a
battalion in France, 1915-16; Minister for Munitions, 1917-18; Secretary for War , 1918-21; Chancellor of
the Exchequer, 1924-29; Prime Minister, 1940-45 and 1951-54.

51
W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911- 1918, (London: Macmillan, 1941) Abridged and Revised,
p.277, note 1.

52
Y. H. Bayur, Türk Ínkilabi Tarihi, (Istanbul, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1940-67), vol. 2, pt. 1, p.177.

22
that “Turkey is the greatest land weapon which the Germans could use against us.”53

On 31 October the Ottoman Ambassador in London proposed a permanent alliance

with Britain alone or within the Triple Entente.

Nous serions donc disposés à entrer en pourparlers pour la conclusion d’une

alliance avec la Grande-Bretagne seule, ou à participer éventuellement a
l’Entente existant actuellement entr’elle et les autres Puissances.54

At a time when the war could have spilled into Europe, it was perhaps unrealistic to

expect Grey to sign an alliance with Turkey. However the idea was not rejected

outright. Grey's reply to the Porte was:

HMG have declared and observed an attitude of strict neutrality in the state of
war...This attitude is one from which HMG cannot departure during the
existence of hostilities…HMG would be happy as soon as the relations
between the two belligerents have been restored to a normal and pacific
footing, to discuss and examine with the Imperial Ottoman Government the
measures which might be adopted for establishing on a firm and durable basis
a thoroughly good understanding between the Ottoman Empire and this
country.55

Rather myopically, and partially to appease the vociferous Arab lobby in the

parliament, the Empire continued to struggle and exhaust her resources. The conflict

also drained to the field some of the young and able officers, among them Enver and

53
M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 3: 1914-1916, The Challenge of War (London: Heinemann,
1971), p. 189.

54
F. O. 43250/11/44 Communication from Tewfik Pasha. 31 October 1911. BD, vol.. ix (i), p.779.

55
F.O. 43250/43250/11/40. Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey. Foreign Office, 2 November 1911. BD,
vol. ix (i), p.780.

23
Mustafa Kemal. In the political turmoil the war generated the Grand Vizier Hakkı

resigned and the CUP's influence continually declined as the fighting dragged on.

On 5 November Italy, probably to forestall any European mediation, formally

proclaimed the annexation of the Ottoman territories of Tripoli, Cyrenaica and the

inland province of Fezzan; and named these territories, Libya. In reality the war had

reached stalemate and the Italians only just held the coastal strip while the Ottomans,

aided by the local Sanussi tribesman, began an effective guerrilla resistance from the

interior. In response the Italians began to send arms and ammunition to Montenegro

and Albania and encouraged new adventures against the Empire. The deadlock further

obligated the Italians to broaden the scope of the war. On 18-19 April the forts of the

Dardanelles were bombarded. But this plan soon had to be aborted. There were two

reasons for this: the Turkish guns placed strategically was proving effective; and the

Powers’ dissatisfaction with the closure of the Straits. Thwarted at Dardanelles the

Italians proceeded to occupy the Dodecanese in May.

Meanwhile strong opposition to CUP was fomenting. The liberal

parliamentary opposition was crushed by dissolving the old chamber and packing the

new one through a shamelessly dishonest election (out of a total of 275 only six

members of opposition managed to slip in).56 As the situation appeared to suggest that,

with an obedient parliament, they were in full control, the CUP finally transferred

their headquarters from Selanik to Istanbul. The CUP's actions not only alarmed the

opposition but also many in the army who had supported it to prevent just the kind of

autocratic control that it had wielded and who feared it was using its victory to destroy

many of the achievements gained in 1909. Consequently, in May-June 1912, a group

of officers formed their group of Halâskâr Zabitan (Saviour Officers). Their

56
B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 222.

24
objective, working with the Liberal Union, was to remove an illegal government and

parliament, hold new and free elections and return to constitutional normality.

By the end of June the situation in Albania was causing serious alarm, and

there was further criticism of the CUP government headed by Said Paşa. First Mahmud

Şevket, the War Minister, resigned, on 9 July. Then after a show strength by the

Halâskâr Zabitan the government fell on 17 July 1912. A new cabinet was eventually

formed under the Grand Viziership of Gazi Muhtar Paşa.57 The choice of the Grand

Vizier was left to the Sultan. The Halâskâr Zabitan insisted on the appointment Nazım

Paşa58 to the War Ministry, and Kamil Paşa to the presidency of the High Council of

State.59

Further ensuing political squabbles were soon overshadowed with the growing

possibility of a new threat from the Empire's Balkan neighbours. The ensuing war with

Italy stimulated the territorial ambitions of the Balkan states and it appeared that the

moment was opportune. The circumstances looked even more favourable when the

Gazi Muhtar Government dismissed - apparently to prove that Turkey did not credit

the threatening news of war - approximately 100,000 trained soldiers stationed on her

European frontiers on 27 August.60 It was also naively believed that as the present

government consisted of personal followers of Kamil, the faithful friend of Britain,

Britain would not allow Turkey to be attacked.

57
Gazi Muhtar Paşa (1839-1918), a hero of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, for some time president of
the Chamber of Notables and a scholar who was considered above politics.

58
Hüseyin Nazım Paşa (1854-1913). Educated in the War academy and St-Cyr in France. Exiled to
Baghdad by Abdülhamid. In 1908 given II Army at Edirne. Used by Liberals to weaken Committee's
influence in the army. Commander of Istanbul garrison (1909). Minister of War (1912-13) after overthrow
of CUP. Shot dead in 1913.

59
Y. H. Bayur, op. cit., vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 289 ff.

60
A. Kabacali (ed.), Talât Paşa'nın Anıları (Memoirs of Talât Paşa) fourth edition. (Istanbul: Iletisim
Yayinlari, 1994), p.24. As Talât was an opponent of the Gazi Muhtar Government the figures could be
exaggerated. According to A. Emin the figure was 67,000, see A. Emin, Turkey in the World War (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 54. Aydemir gives the figure as 75-80,000, see Ş. S Aydemir, op.
cit., vol. II, p. 295.

25
iii) The Balkan Debacle and continuing isolation

Russia meanwhile was continuing with endeavours to form a front against Austria-

Hungary. With a view to forming a Balkan alliance, in the hope that it would be a

counterweight against Austria-Hungary, Russian representatives A. Nekliudov in Sofia

and N. Hartwig in Belgrade worked actively in joining Serbia and Bulgaria in a mutual

assistance pact. When Nukliudov visited Sazanov in October 1911, seeking approval

of the negotiations, Sazanov’s response was: “…this is perfect…Bulgaria closely

allied to Serbia; five hundred thousand bayonets to guard the Balkans…this would bar

the road for ever to German penetration, Austrian invasion!”61 Although it appeared on

surface to be directed against Austria-Hungary, in a secret annex, provisions were

made for a war with the Ottoman Empire. All the territories to be annexed by each

power were described, with the exception of a disputed area that was to be left to the

arbitration of the Tsar. The pact was signed on 13 March 1912. Bulgaria signed a

similar convention with Greece on 12 May, and in September Montenegro joined in.

The Balkan League was completed.

On 6 October 1912 Montenegro, already in conflict with the Porte over her

support for the uprising in Albania, broke off diplomatic relations and two days later

declared war. She was soon followed by the other states. An impromptu peace was

made with Italy at Ouchy, near Lausanne on 15 October 1912. It was agreed that the

Ottomans would evacuate Libya. In return Italy would leave the Dodecanese, accept an

Ottoman agent to represent the Muslims now placed under Italian control. Italy also

61
A. Nukliudov, Diplomatic Reminiscences 1911-1917 (London: Metheun, 1920), pp. 45-6.

26
assumed the burden of the Libyan provinces' share of the Ottoman public debt and

promised to help the Porte to gain European agreement on the abolition of the

Capitulations.62

The Empire was hardly in a position to fight a Balkan combination. Political

dissent in the officer corps had destroyed morale and unity. Moreover, Mahmud

Şevket's resignation as minister of war had been followed by a general replacement of

most of the officers on the General Staff, and the new departmental chiefs had not yet

been able to familiarise themselves with the mobilisation and war plans that had been

prepared. The plan for the eventuality of a combined Balkan attack was to pull the

army to Albania and Thrace and wait until reinforcements arrived from the Asian

provinces. But the designer of the plan, İzzet Paşa, was now serving in Yemen. He was

still de jure Chief of Staff of the Ottoman army, but he was 3,000 miles away. At a

most critical juncture the Ottoman army was led by proxy.63 This state of affairs was no

doubt a major contributing factor in the impending debacle. Rather clumsily, while

outnumbered, the Ottoman forces fought at each fort. Before reinforcements and some

of the able officers from Libya could arrive the military outcome of the war was

already decided. Within a few weeks the Ottoman armies were forced to pull back to

the Çatalca lines outside Istanbul. To the west, only a few fortress towns still held out:

Yanya (Janina), Ishkodra (Scutari) and Edirne (Adrianople).

In an attempt to woo British sympathy, Kamil was once again brought to Grand

Viziership at the end of October. He immediately sought British help. The sagacious

veteran politician wrote to Grey, with some prescience, on 7 November, explaining

that it would be detrimental for Britain if Turkey was to abandon a pro-British policy

62
S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, op. cit., p. 293.

63
Ş. S. Aydemir, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 298-9.

27
in order to follow the policy of another power. Reiterating the fact that “Britain rules a

hundred million Muslims strongly attached by religion to the Caliphate,” Kamil went

on to elucidate that:

...the stronger and more powerful Turkey is, the more will Britain benefit;
whereas the weaker Turkey is, the more Britain will suffer in those interests of
hers on which it is not necessary to enlarge.64

Grey's primary concern, however, was to prevent the possible enlargement of the

conflict. Being involved in Balkan turmoil on behalf Turkey was out of question. Help

was not arriving but the Çatalca line held and was being reinforced by fresh troops

from the Asian provinces. The Ottomans agreed to an armistice on 3 December and

peace negotiations opened in London on 16 December. Due to Turks' insistence on

retaining all four cities that were still holding out there ensued a deadlock in the

negotiations. Edirne, the first European capital of the Ottoman Empire (1361-1453),

was particularly a sensitive issue. Grey's stance on the matter was that Edirne should

be ceded as “…Turks cannot save it by continuing the war and may lose other things

that are not lost already.”65

By 22 January it appeared that Kamil Paşa's Liberal Union government had

given way and agreed to relinquish all territory west of Midye-Enez line. The

relinquished territory was to include Edirne. It was this news which prompted the

CUP, led by Enver, to take power by a coup d'état in Istanbul on 23 January. A small

party of officers forced their way into the cabinet room and forced Kamil Paşa to write

his resignation, shooting during the initial struggle, apparently by mistake, the Minister
64
Kiamil Pasha to Sir Edward Grey, 7 November 1912, F. O. 800/79.

65
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, 17 January 1913, F.O. 2417/1/13/44. BD, vol. ix (ii), no. 515, p.
417.

28
of War Nazım Paşa.66 The CUP had made their preparations in the army, the police,

and the government offices. They were now firmly in power again, and secured the

appointment of Mahmud Şevket Paşa as Grand Vizier.67 Kamil Paşa, meanwhile, left

for Egypt. The chief dragoman of the British Embassy in Istanbul, Gerald Fitzmaurice,

secured his safe-conduct.68

The new administration insisted on retaining Edirne. With the Bulgarians

refusing the territorial proposals on 30 January, fighting resumed on all fronts on 3

February 1913. Yanya fell to the Greeks on 6 March; Edirne to the Bulgarians on 26

March and Ishkodra starved to surrender on 23 April. In the reconvened peace

conference in London, resumed on 30 May, the Empire surrendered all territory west

of Midye-Enez line. All rights in Crete were surrendered and the status of Albania and

the Aegean Islands were left to the decision of the Powers.

There is little doubt that the British Embassy in Istanbul and the administration

in Egypt wanted to restore Kamil Paşa, tried and tested British protégé. With the

probable aim of initiating a coup he was smuggled into Istanbul at the end of May. He

was initially arrested by Cemal69 but later released apparently through Lowther's

pressure, after which he was hastily whisked away again. Following this event on 11

June Mahmud Şevket was assassinated. The mystery behind his murder was never

solved; but Cemal had no doubts that the British chief dragoman Fitzmaurice was

behind the incident.70 Cemal immediately put the capital under martial law. Many

members of the Liberal Union, who was blamed for the murder, were arrested and sent

66
H. K. Bayur, Sadrazam Kâmil Paşa: Siyasi Hayatı (Ankara: Sanat Basimevi, 1954), pp. 386 ff.

67
Ş. S. Aydemir, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 381-6.

68
A. Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray, 1992), p. 217 n. 26.

69
Cemal Paşa, Hatırat (Memoirs) fifth edition. (Istanbul: Arma Yayinlari, 1996), p. 32.

70
Ibid., p. 33.

29
into exile. A court martial convicted and sentenced to death several Liberal Union

leaders, among them Prince Sabehaddin (in absentia). Now at last the CUP Young

Turks seized unopposed power. Power lay with the triumvirate of Talât, Enver and

Cemal. Said Halim Paşa71 was appointed as the Grand Vizier and committee members

were assigned to key cabinet positions.

At the beginning of this turmoil Tevfik Paşa, the Ottoman Ambassador in

London once more approached the Foreign Office for an alliance on 1 June 1913. The

CUP were more convinced than ever that only an alliance with Britain and the Entente

could guarantee the survival of what remained of the Empire. Tevfik reminded Grey

of the Empire's proposal of October 1911 and of the Foreign Minister's readiness to

discuss it once relations between Italy and Turkey were pacific. Turkey was once

more, with friendly advice, turned down.72

Rekindling of the Balkan turmoil further facilitated consolidation of CUP's

power. The conflicting objectives of the Balkan countries had previously been

suppressed by necessity. With Turks vanquished, dissension now developed in sharing

out of the booty. Bulgaria's attempt to achieve a fait accompli by a lightning military

action was met with a counter-offensive by Serbia and Greece in which Montenegro,

Romania (anxious to receive compensation from the Ottoman defeat) took part.

Ottoman forces, led by Enver also took advantage and recaptured Edirne. During this

“Second Balkan War”, which lasted from 29 June to 10 August 1913, tsar Ferdinand

was ultimately forced to abandon his dream of achieving Bulgarian supremacy in the

Balkans. The peace Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913 partitioned Macedonia

71
Mehmed Said Halim Paşa (1863-1921). Grandson of Mehmed Ali of Egypt and a member of Egyptian
ruling family. In 1888 appointed to Ottoman Council of State. Came back to Istanbul after the Revolution,
appointed to senate. Sent to Europe by CUP during Libyan War to rally support for the Turks. Resigned
in 1917 after the failure of Islamist policy of which he was one of the chief representatives. In 1919
arrested and exiled to Malta. Assassinated by Armenians in Rome in 1921.

72
Ş. S. Aydemir, op. cit., vol. II, p. 505.

30
between Serbia and Greece, which also gained Selanik and Western Thrace and Crete.

Sancak of Novipazar, which had been evacuated by the Austrians after the annexation

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was divided between Serbia and Montenegro thus giving

them a common border. Romania gained southern Dobrudja. Bulgaria received land in

Struma valley and an eighty-mile section of the Aegean coastline including the port of

Dedeagaç. An independent state of Albania was established. The Ottomans regained

Edirne; the fate of the Aegean islands were left to arbitration of the powers at a later

date. Reoccupation of Edirne, in spite of Great Power opposition, popularised the new

regime. The CUP's right to rule unopposed was accepted and confirmed without

further discussion.

31
CHAPTER III

Dictatorship of the Triumvirate and last gamble before the abyss

i) Absolutism, attempts at reinvigoration and approaches to the Entente

The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars had convinced the CUP that the integrity of the

Empire could only be maintained by the Turks themselves. No tangible support had

been received from Germany just as there was no support from Britain. German policy

during the Balkan Wars had not been appreciably affected by the German association

with the equipment and training of the Ottoman army since the 1880s nor attempts at

exploitation of this by the German Embassy in Istanbul.

The CUP attributed the Balkan failures to the continuing fact of Ottoman

isolation in European politics. The recent conflict had demonstrated that continued

isolation would secure total disaster in another major conflict. There was urgent need

for reforms to facilitate recovery.73 The most urgent need was the modernisation of the

army. Soon after the First Balkan War debacle Mahmud Şevket Paşa had already

approached Germany for greater involvement in the reform of the Ottoman army.

Enver, also impressed by Prussian militarism, further pursued the initiation. On 15

June Kaiser William II asked General Otto Liman von Sanders74 whether he would lead

a new military mission to Istanbul. Having accepted the appointment he arrived in

73
A. Kabacali (ed.), Talât Paşa'nın Anıları, op. cit., p.29.

74
Otto Liman von Sanders (1855-1929). Came to Turkey as head of the German military mission. Just
before his arrival he was ennobled and added the name of his late wife (von Sanders) to his family
name. He came from his father’s side from a converted Jewish family, a rare case among Prussian
generals. In January 1914 appointed Commander of the First Army. Led the Fifth Army on the
Dardanelles from April 1915.

32
Istanbul on 14 December 1913.75 What made the Mission become a critical issue in

European politics was Liman's appointment as the commander of the Ottoman First

Army Corps which provided the garrison of the Istanbul area. The German domination

of the Straits, which had become Russia's lifeline, was unacceptable to Russia. Grey at

first accepted the Russian view of the dangers inherent in the Liman mission.76

Nevertheless he later came to feel that the matter was not important as Sazonov had

made out. Grey wrote, after reluctantly supporting Russia in a note of protest presented

at Istanbul on 13 December: “I don't believe the thing is worth all the fuss that

Sazonov makes about it...but as long as he does make a fuss it will be very important

and very embarrassing to us; for we can't turn our backs upon Russia.”77 Grey found

reason to be cautious when he learned that Admiral Limpus,78 not Liman von Sanders

commanded the Straits. Lois Mallet, who had recently succeeded Lowther as the

British ambassador in Istanbul, confirmed to Grey that “The admiral has the absolute

command of the Turkish fleet in time of peace…He can do anything except break the

law or exceed the budget.”79 A compromise was eventually reached in January 1914.

Liman was promoted to the rank of a full General of Cavalry in the German army.

According to the November agreement the Turks were obliged to assign an Ottoman

rank one degree higher than the German one. This automatically made him an Ottoman

Field-Marshall and by implication too senior to command Istanbul garrison. He thus

became the Inspector-General of the Ottoman army.80 The animosity shown over the
75
O. Liman von Sanders, Türkiye'de 5 yıl (Five years in Turkey). (Istanbul: Burcak Yayinevi, 1968), pp.
11, 14.

76
Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O’Beirne. 27 November 1913, BD, vol. x (i), no. 381, p. 342.

77
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 2 January 1914, BD, vol. x (i), no. 457, p. 407.

78
Arthur Henry Limpus (1863-1931). Entered Navy, 1876. Rear Admiral, 1910. Naval advisor to the
Ottoman Government, 1912-14. Admiral -Superintendent, Malta Dockyard, 1914-16. Knighted, 1916.

79
Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. Constatinople, 10 December 1913, BD, vol. x (i), no. 414, p.367.

80
O. Liman von Sanders, op. cit., p.19.

33
affair was interpreted by Ottoman leaders as so much opposition to Turkey's assuming

charge of her own national defence. It provoked a spirit of corresponding opposition in

military circles and gave Enver, now a national hero, a pretext for seizing the Ministry

of War in January 1914.81

The British naval mission led by Rear Admiral Limpus matched the German

military mission in size and status. Cemal, now the Marine Minister, was strongly

committed to seeking more and more British aid for refurbishing the Ottoman fleet. It

was due to his endeavours Armstrong Whitworth and Vickers received contracts to

build new naval dockyards. Armstrong also undertook to complete a dreadnought, in

addition to one launched in September 1913. To balance the German and British

predominance in the armed forces, French officers were employed to modernise the

gendarmerie and to introduce new organisation and methods into the Ministry of

Finance.82 Contrary to what is usually suggested, Germany was far from dominating

the Empire. The Young Turks followed a careful policy of balancing the political,

economic, and military influence of Britain, France and Germany.

Once in full power in 1913 the CUP began a frantic push at modernisation in

every conceivable field. These reforms, as it appeared to intellectuals and the mass of

the population of the Empire, were absolutely essential if the Empire was to survive.

These reforms could only be concluded if the Empire was secure form further

encroachments. All shades of opinion within the CUP, therefore, were in agreement

that the most urgent item on the Empire's agenda was to secure a European ally.

Britain had always been the first choice, but the Ottomans were consistently rebuffed.

81
A. Emin, Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 57.

82
Cemal Paşa, op. cit., pp. 90-8.

34
One reason for this was Britain's concerns of the opinions of her allies France and

Turkey's traditional enemy Russia.

The persistent anti-Armenian activity in the Empire’s eastern provinces had

provided Russia an incentive to intervene in Ottoman affairs. Eventually a Russo-

Turkish convention was signed in February 1914 which gave Russia a certain authority

in supervising Armenian reforms.83 With this agreement there appeared to be an

improvement in Russo-Turkish relations. A noticeable offshoot of the rapprochement

was the founding of the “Ottoman-Russian Society” with the aim of achieving

ideological, economical and political understanding in March 1914.84 It was in this

milieu that an Ottoman mission led by Talât, now Minister of the Interior, and the

former War Minister, İzzet Paşa, was despatched to Livadia in Crimea in May 1914.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov,85 came from St. Petersburg for the occasion.

M. de Giers, the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul, was also present. If Sazanov is to be

believed Giers warned him “not to believe a word of anything Talaat might say”.86 In

the last day of their visit Talat approached Sazanov: “I have to make you a very serious

proposal: would the Russian Government care to conclude an alliance with Turkey?”87

Sazanov did not reject the idea in principle. He later informed his ambassadors in

Paris, London, Vienna and Berlin that at the audience Talât Bey had made it

unmistakably clear that Turkey wished for the closest possible links with Russia.

Sazonov emphasised that Talât twice used the word “alliance” to which he (Sazonov)
83
A. Bodger, “Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire” in M. Kent (ed.), op. cit., p. 96.

84
S. Özel, “Balkan ve Birinci Dünya Savaşları arasındakı dönemde Osmanlı Devleti Rusya İlişkileri” in Í.
Ü. Fakültesi Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, vol. 12 (Istanbul: Cantay Kitabevi, 1998). pp. 240.

85
Sergei Dimitrievitch Sazanov (1886-1927). Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-15. Supported
home rule for Poland and consequently dismissed by the Tsar in November 1915.

86
S.Sazanov, Fateful Years, 1909-1916: the reminiscences of Sergei Sazanov (Lonon: Jonathan Cape,
1928), p. 133.
87

Ibid., p.137.

35
had replied “that this question naturally needed to be examined but that we were ready

from now on to work for a mutual rapprochement.”88 In the larger perspective,

however, the idea of an alliance with the Ottomans was incompatible with the current

concepts of Russian policy, which had long been coveting the Straits. A

rapprochement with the Porte would necessarily have implied the abandonment of

such schemes. The end result of the Ottoman initiation was unsurprisingly a rebuff.

The Ottoman approach to Russia was not isolated. In June 1914, it was

followed up in France. Since February 1914, Franko-Ottoman relations progressively

improved to such an extent that on 25 April, the first series of a 500 million-franc loan

was awarded and the Ottoman Bank floated on the Paris Bourse with the tacit consent

of the Deutsche Bank. France had received concessions for more than 2,000 miles of

railway in Asiatic Turkey following the agreement of February, with Germany.89 In

July Cemal went to France to review the French fleet. He held meetings with French

foreign minister Viviani and later, after Viviani's departure on a presidential trip to

Russia, with the Foreign Ministry official, de Margerie. He proposed alliance with

France and the Entente and requested a pro-Ottoman policy regarding the status of the

Aegean Islands. The response was polite but not positive. On 18 July Cemal left Paris

for Istanbul and discussed his impressions with the cabinet members on his return. 90

On 13 February 1914 the Powers had ruled on the status of the Aegean

Islands, occupied by Greece during the First Balkan War, in favour of Greece. The

Porte refused to accept this decision. The overtures to the two Entente powers had

taken place against a background of an increasingly bitter dispute with the Greeks. In

88
F. Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975), p.
354.

89
Y. H. Bayur, op. cit., vol. 2, pt. 3, p. 424 ff.

90
Cemal Paşa, op. cit., pp. 111-6.

36
the autumn of 1913 endeavours at an alliance with Bulgaria had also been carried out

in order to facilitate a third Balkan War.91 Germany had proved to be reluctant to

support the notion of a Turko-Bulgarian alliance and had indicated that an

understanding with Greece was a better arrangement. Since the Balkan Wars, the

Germans had grown sceptical about the strength and preparedness of the Ottoman

army and its potential value as an ally.92 The Aegean islands if controlled by Greece,

in the eyes of the Turks, could serve as a base for subversion of the Greek population

of western Asia Minor. The Turks pressed for an exchange of populations. By June,

the dispute worsened and it appeared that the CUP was contemplating the expulsion

of the Greeks living on the coast. When Greece responded with an ultimatum, war

appeared probable.93

Further tensions were noticeable in German-Ottoman relations due to the

ongoing affairs of the Baghdad railway enterprise. The Germans were demanding

modifications in the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903, which would cost Turkey

£100,000 a year immediately, and, on completion of the line, a further annual

£100,000. By 20 July the relating negotiations were at an impasse and reaching an

agreement with Turkish ministers appeared to be doomed to failure.94 This affair was a

follow up to an incident which occurred a month previously when the Finance

Minister, Cavid, informed the German Ambassador, Wangenheim,95 that:

91
See Y. H. Bayur, op. cit., vol. 2, pt. 4, pp. 525 ff.

92
U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 14.

93
F. A. K. Yasamee “Ottoman empire” in Wilson K. (ed.), Decisions for War, 1914 (London: UCL Press
Ltd., 1995), p. 235.

94
H. S. W. Corrigon, “German-Turkish relations and the outbreak of war in 1914: A Re-assessment”,
Past & Present, vol. 36, 1967, p. 144.

95
Hans Freihrer von Wangenheim, 1859-1915. Attaché, St-Petersburg, 1887-8. Served in diplomatic
capacity in Copenhagen, Madrid, Luxembourg and Lisbon. First Secretary in Istanbul, 1899-1904.
Councillor Mexico, 1904-8; Athens, 1908-12. Ambassador in Istanbul from May 1912 until his death in
October 1915.

37
 Germany could not expect to be treated the same as France. The latter had,
through granting of the loan, saved Turkey from a desperate situation, while
Germany, the power on which Turkey had place all her hopes, had failed
completely, not only financially but also politically.96

Such was the Ottoman Empire's stance during the immediate aftermath of the

assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, in

Sarajevo - a city that was founded and named by the Ottomans, on 28 June - the 525th

anniversary of the Ottoman victory in the Battle of Kosovo.

ii) The July Crisis and Alliance with Germany

The immediate preoccupation of the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the “July

crisis” in which dark clouds were forming over the future of Europe, was its

relationship with Greece over the Aegean islands. She was in need of a European

alliance and had recently been rebuffed first by Russia and now by France, without

which there was no possibility of an alliance with Britain.

As the July crisis developed it appeared increasingly possible that the conflict

between Austria-Hungary and Serbia might result in a war. This could provide the

Empire with an opportunity to tear up the Treaty of Bucharest, rectify the dictated

settlement in the Balkans and, specifically, resolve the ongoing dispute with Greece.

Furthermore, the two dreadnoughts being built in the Tyneside, Reşadiye and Sultan

Osman, were to be ready at the beginning of August; thus enabling naval superiority

96
Cf. H. S. W. Corrigon, op. cit., p. 145.

38
over the Greeks in the Aegean. Naval superiority against the Russians would also be

maintained in the Black Sea. There thus was an increasing interest in the prospect of

an armed clash. On 21 July Wangenheim sent a telegram to Berlin reporting how in

total unanimity Said Halim, Talat and Enver, in his presence told Pavlaccini, the

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Istanbul, that Turkey would join the Triple Alliance

without reservation if Austria would teach Serbia a hard lesson.97 The developing

Austro-Serbian conflict thus provided the Porte with an opportunity to open

negotiations with Germany for an alliance, at a time when Cemal's initiations in Paris

failed.

The Ottomans thus initiated the alliance overtures. The proposals were

presented by Enver to the German Ambassador, Wangenheim, on 22 July 1914. Enver

was quite open in explaining to the Ambassador why the Young Turks were seeking

an ally. He explained that the domestic reforms planned by the CUP could be carried

out only if the Ottoman Empire were “secured against attacks from abroad,” that is, if

it won “the support of one of the groups of Great Powers.”98 The Kaiser’s reaction to,

initially reluctant, Wangenheim’s resulting communication to Berlin was:

She makes a direct offer of herself!!! A refusal or snub would amount to her
going over to Russia-Gallia, and our influence would be gone once for all!
Wangenheim must express himself to the Turks in relation to a connection with
the Triple Alliance with unmistakably plain compliance and receive their
desires and report them! Under no circumstances at all can we afford to turn
them away.99

97
Y. H. Bayur, op. cit., vol. 2, Pt. 4, p. 628.

98
U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 19.

99
Cf. H. Howard, op. cit., p. 84.

39
The negotiations concerning the scope and nature of the proposed Ottoman alignment

with Germany, and by implication the Triplice, hence commenced. Doubtless, this

sudden change in Berlin's policy was due to the immanent threat of war. Furthermore,

the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had caused great enthusiasm in Istanbul. When

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Pavlaccini, had read it to the Grand Vizier on 24 July,

the Grand Vizier's comment had been that: “the decidedness of the Austrian

Government's attitude even exceeded his expectations”, and that, if a general

conflagration were to result, Turkey could not do otherwise “than join the Triplice in

company with Bulgaria”.100 It was hoped that the changed circumstances would now

facilitate the recently sought alliance with Bulgaria.

The alliance negotiations started in earnest on 28 July. It was only at this

juncture, while the details of the treaty were being worked out Liman von Sanders

became aware of the impending alliance and became involved with the military

clauses of the treaty.101 Liman was specifically told by the Kaiser at the beginning of

his appointment that his task was to reform the military and was not to be involved in

politics or pursue German business interests.102

The Kaiser, meanwhile, well aware of the Ottomans’ potential value in an

Islamic uprising against the British was accordingly envisaging the course of events to

come. On 30 July, two days before Germany declared war on Russia, he expressed his

strategy for general revolution against Britain. In a marginal note to a communication

received from Portalès, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, he stated:

100
Cf. L. Albertini, op. cit., vol. iii, p.613.

101
Liman von Sanders, op. cit., p. 37.

102
Ibid., p. 14.

40
 England must…have the mask of Christian peaceableness torn publicly off her
face…Our conculs in Turkey and India, agents, etc., must inflame the whole
Muhammedan world to wild revolt …at least England shall lose India.103

On 31 July, the Kaiser informed the Austro-Hungarian military attaché in strictest

confidence that he was about to conclude an alliance with Turkey “which would

oblige the Turks to advance against Russia with five army corps under the chief

command of Liman von Sanders.”104 The alliance was signed on 2 August 1914.

Article 1 stipulated that the parties remain neutral in the present conflict between

Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Article 2 obliged the Ottoman’s to intervene on

Germany's side in case of war with Russia in relation to Austro-Serbian conflict.

Article 3 stipulated that in case of war, Germany would leave the military mission at

the Empire's disposal. Article 4 obliged Germany to defend Turkey if threatened by

Russia. The treaty further stipulated that the agreement is valid until 31 December

1918 and that it was to remain strictly secret.105 The Ottomans had thus finally

achieved an alliance with a Great Power.

103
Cf. F. Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), p. 121.

104
Cf. H. Howard, op. cit., p. 86.

105
Cf. M. S. Anderson (ed.), The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923: Documents of Modern
History (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), p. 157.

41
Epilogue

The alliance was signed just as the hostilities had begun. As Cemal propounds in his

memoirs, “the Empire was bound by the treaty, the ink of which was not yet dry, to

immediately intervene in the conflict.”106 It soon became apparent, however, that the

Empire was reluctant to immediately commit itself on the side of the Central Powers.

Instead, the Ottoman Empire was to follow a policy of uneasy neutrality, which

continued until the end of October. Taking advantage of the Powers’ distraction and

while professing neutrality the Porte at last abolished the much-detested Capitulations

on 9 September 1914.107

In the intervening period of almost three months, during which the treaty was

kept secret, the Ottoman forces were mobilised and the Straits were closed. But

Ottoman preparedness for major war was a long way off, and there were

disagreements in the cabinet on the issue of actual belligerency. With the stalemate on

the western European front, however, Germany intensified her pressure for Ottoman

military action. Churchill's decision to requisition the Reşadiye and the Sultan Osman

dreadnoughts “for the Royal Navy” when “the addition of the two Turkish

dreadnoughts to the British Fleet seemed vital to national safety”108 in early August,

was very deeply felt and widely resented. The convenient offer of two German ships

Goeben and Breslau, to the Ottoman fleet complete with officers and crews and

106
Cemal Paşa, op. cit., p. 126.

107
J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956 vol. II
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Norstand Co., 1956), p. 2.

108
W. S. Churchill, op. cit., p.278.

42
sufficient provision of armaments and funds greatly increased Germany’s leverage.109

Ottoman government could not further delay the declaration of war.

Enver finally ordered the fleet, under the command of the German admiral

Souchon,110 to commence hostilities in the Black Sea. On 29 October 1914 the fleet led

by Goeben and Breslau (now called Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli) bombarded

Russian ports. Several cabinet members, including Cavid, resigned when they learned

of the attack, but the die was cast. Formal declarations of war on the empire by Russia,

Britain and France followed in November.

109
See, U. Trumpener, “German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-evaluation”, The Journal
of Modern History, Vol. 32, 1960, pp. 145-9.

110
Wilhelm Souchon, 1864-1933. Rear-Admiral commanding the German Mediterranean Squadron 1913-
14. In September 1914 was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Navy.
43
CONCLUSION

The emergence of Germany as a world power in the last quarter of the nineteenth-

century provided the manipulative Abdülhamid with a new card to exploit in his

expedient scheme of playing one power against another. This state of affairs was also

compatible with the Kaiser’s projections for Germany’s increased global influence.

Although Britain’s stance toward protecting the integrity of the Empire had

been waning she together with France was the role model for the Young Turks. By

sentiment and political conviction The Young Turks of 1908 looked up to Britain, the

mother of parliaments.

Given the alignment of the Great Powers after 1907 and the geopolitics of the

Empire, the Porte, conscious of isolation, was obliged to seek an alliance with either of

the two power blocks. As of the annexation crisis, Britain was perennially approached

for an alliance, only to be rebuffed each time. The defeats suffered in the Italian and

the Balkan wars very clearly reiterated the necessity of having a strong European

alliance if further encroachments were to be averted. The approaches by Talât to

Russia and Cemal to France in 1914 were made, ultimately, to secure that elusive

British alliance. The bogey of isolation was once again in the horizon with the very

real prospects of a renewed war with Greece. At a time when the reversal of recent

losses appeared possible and when approaches to the Entente proved futile, the Porte

had no choice but to turn to Germany. The Empire had recently been defeated and

possessed doubtful capabilities. The timing of the signing of the alliance coincided

with the onset of the hostilities. The Empire’s potential to incite Muslims under the

Entente rule to revolt and its geopolitical standing made it expedient for Germany to

44
welcome the Porte’s overtures. Had the July crisis not taken a turn for the worse the

Empire would no doubt have been snubbed yet again.

The alliance was therefore not the natural conclusion of a long period of

collaboration between the two empires. Even during the Abdülhamid era Germany's

role did not go further than being a counterweight against traditional powers with

interests in the Empire. Rather than being the culmination of intricately prepared

German plans, it was an impromptu arrangement which resulted from Ottoman

approaches.

The alliance was certainly not the outcome of dutiful endeavours by German

generals, bankers or engineers. At the beginning of 1914, far from bringing the two

empires together, the attitudes taken by German bankers and the whole saga of the

Berlin to Baghdad railway was driving the two empires apart. The German military

mission, usually portrayed as omnipotent, was in fact counterbalanced with equal

numbers of British naval officers under the command of Admiral Limpus; there was

also substantial French involvement in the reform of the Ottoman gendarmerie. Liman

von Sanders had no political status and not at any time did he command or control the

military establishment.

Enver had spent time, in a military capacity, in Germany and was impressed

with German militarism. But the fact that he went along with his colleagues in

endeavours to secure an alliance with the Entente, until the very end, indicates that he

was guided by rational calculations of Ottoman interest. Enver's close association with

the Germans was, therefore, incidental to rather than being the root cause of the

Ottoman-German alliance of 2 August 1914.

The Dual Monarchy's Involvement in the alliance affair, with the exception of

her central involvement in developments of the July crisis, appears to have been

45
marginal. Britain seems to have snubbed the Ottomans due to her envisaged

commitments to her allies, and her underestimation of the Empire’s potential value. By

perennially rejecting Ottoman initiations Britain, more than any other power, appears

to be responsible for the Ottomans' eventual venture with Germany. The British

diplomacy can perhaps be justified in view of the ultimate Entente victory in the

impending war. But in view of the immensely detrimental repercussions this

diplomacy eventually had on her empire the justification can at best be tenuous.

46
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