Philippine Law Review on Jurisdiction, Immunity and Retroactivity

PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
1. Generality - If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court

because of the unique characteristic of his person (e.g. he is a foreigner,
military, ambassador, President), the applicable principle is generality. If the
accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court due to the unique characteristic
of the place where the crime was committed (e.g. foreign vessel, embassy or
high sea), the applicable principle is territoriality.
Consular officers are immune from criminal prosecution of acts

performed in the exercise of function (1967 Convention on Consular Relation).
Immunity does not cover slander(Liang vs. People, GR No. 125865, January
28, 2000), or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide for not being
function-related. A Chinese diplomat, who killed another Chinese diplomat in
Cebu, is immune from criminal prosecution (The Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations). Unlike consular officers, diplomatic agents are vested
with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits (Minucher vs.
Hon. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).
The presidential immunity is subject the following conditions: (1) the

immunity has been asserted during the period of his incumbency and tenure;
and (2) the act constituting the crime is committed in the performance of his
duties.This immunity will assure the exercise of presidential functions free
from any hindrance, considering that the Chief Executive is a job demands
undivided attention (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001).
It is submitted that a Vice-President even during his tenure could not

invoke immunity from criminal prosecution for plunder on the following
reasons: (1) plunder are not his official conducts as Vice-President; (2) the job
of the Vice-President unlike the head of the executive department does not
demands undivided attention; (3) and the implementation principal penalty of
imprisonment for plunder is not inconsistent with the constitutional provision
on non-removal of impeachable officer except through impeachment since he
can function as Vice-President while serving sentence in prison.However,
accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from office, is not
implementable since the enforcement thereof will offend the constitutional
provision on non-removal of impeachable officer.
An incumbent Senator is not immune from suit for being a protector or

coddler of trading of dangerous drugs under RA No. 9165. Legislator’s
immunity is confined to parliamentary privilege from arrest while the Congress
is in session in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment
and parliamentary immunity from prosecution for libel in connection with any
Congressional speech or debate.
2. Territoriality - The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the

territory of the USA to which the premises belong through possession or
ownership. A person who committed a crime within the premises of an
embassy will be prosecuted under the law of Philippines because of the
principle of territoriality (Reagan vs. Commission on Internal Revenue, 30
SCRA 968).
Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the flag state of foreign
merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea of another state has
jurisdiction over crimes committed therein. However, a coastal state such as
the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over any crime committed on board
such ship in the following cases: (1) if its consequences extend to the coastal
State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the
1|Page
territorial sea; (3) if the ship master or a diplomatic or consular officer of the
flag State requested assistance from the local authorities; or (4) if it is for the
suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
Murder or serious physical injuries committed in a foreign vessel

anchored in a Philippine port against a passenger thereof is within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine court since this crime disturb the peace of the
country.
Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also jurisdiction over
crime committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal because the
Baseline Law (RA No. 9522) declares that the Philippines exercise sovereignty
and jurisdiction over it.
Under the principle of territoriality, the court has jurisdiction over

concubinage involving illicit relationship maintained in the Philippines; but it
has no jurisdiction over bigamy involving subsequent marriage contracted in
Taiwan.
3. Extraterritoriality – Under the flag state rule, the Philippines has

jurisdiction over hijacking of PAL airplane in an American territory since it its
registered in the Philippines but not over murder committed in vessel
registered in Panama while on high seas although it is owned by a Filipino.
Under the protective principle, the court has jurisdiction over forgery of
Philippine money committed in Taiwan whether by a Filipino or an alien but
not over forgery of US dollars committed therein. Under the extraterritoriality
rule, the court has jurisdiction over plunder, direct bribery and falsification of
document by a public officer in a Philippines consular premises stationed in
America but not corruption of public officer and falsification of document
committed by private individual as principal by inducement. Under the
universality principle, the court has jurisdiction over piracy committed on high
seas for being a universal crime but not over murder qualified by the
circumstance of taking advantage of the calamity brought about by piracy on
high seas. The 12-mile territorial water of Taiwan or Sabah may be considered
as high seas; hence, piracy committed therein can be prosecuted in the
Philippines (People vs. Lol-Lo and Saraw, G.R. No. L-17958, February 27,
1922).
4. Prospectivity -If the court in trying an accused, who committed a

crime prior to the passage of the law, should give retroactive effect to the law
provided that: (1) it is favorable to the accused and (2) the accused is not a
habitual delinquent (Article 22 of RPC). If the law repeals a previous law or
provision defining a crime, the applicable principle is not Article 22 of RPC but
nullum crimen poena sine lege. Since the intention of the new law is to
decriminalize an act punishable by the repealed law, the accused should be
acquitted or released if the already convicted, even though he is a habitual
delinquent.
Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27 of

RPC and 30 years under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592if the
convict has undergone preventive imprisonment, is a lighter penalty than life
imprisonment, which has no duration. Amendatory law, which prescribes
reclusion perpetua instead of life imprisonment, shall be given a retroactive
effect for being favorable to the accused (People vs. Morilla, GR No. 189833,
February 5, 2014).
2|Page
5. Decriminalization - RA No. 10158 has decriminalized vagrancy by

omitting portions of Article 202 of RPC involving this crime. Vagrants are
victims of poverty and that the law on vagrancy serves to oppress the very
people that the government sought to protect. RA No. 10655 has decriminalized
premature marriage by repealing Article 351 of RPC. This provision is
discriminatory because it is not applicable to men. Moreover, Article 351,
which was sought to prevent a possible confusion as to who is the father of the
child born within the period of 301 days after the dissolution of the marriage, is
not anymore necessary since paternity and filiation can now be easily
determined through modern technology.
6. Repeal –RA No. 10655 has repealed Article 351 of RPC on premature
marriage without reenactment. This is a total repeal in which the intention of
the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable of old law. Atotal repeal
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation
of the old penal law prior to its repeal (Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000). RA
8353 expressly repealed Article 336 of RPC on rape but re-enacted it
redefining this crimeunder Article 266-A. This is a partial repealin which the
intention of the new law is not to decriminalize an act punishable of old law
but to introduce changes. The effect of the new law is amendatory. This partial
repeal of Article 336 does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try and
punish offender for rape committed prior to RA No. 8353 (U.S. vs. Cana, 12
Phil. 241). RA No. 8353 shall be given prospective effect since it is not
favorable to the accused.
7. Mistake of fact - Authorities, who manned a checkpoint because of

information that there are armed rebels on board a vehicle, have the duty to
validate the information, identify them, and to make a bloodless arrest unless
they were placed in real mortal danger. If they shot the suspected vehicle,
which did not stop after have been flagged down and killed the occupants
therein, who turned out be unarmed civilians, they are liable for multiple
homicides. The mistake of fact principle is not applicable since there is
negligence or bad faith on their part (Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
120744-46, June 25, 2012).
The accused shot with a firearm and killed by mistake a thief in the
toilet, who turned out to be his girlfriend. Invasion of property is considered as
unlawful aggression under Article 12 of the RPC because of the self-help
doctrine under the Civil Code (People vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April
20, 1983). Even though there is no actual invasion of property, unlawful
aggression as an element of defense of property will be considered as present
because of the mistake of fact principle. However, the means employed by him
firing shots through the toilet door is not reasonable; and hence, he is only
entitled to privilege migrating circumstance of incomplete defense of property
(US vs. Apego, G.R. No. L-7929, November 18, 1912).
8. Proximate cause - There had been an interval of 22 days between the

date of the stabbing and the date when victim was rushed to hospital,
exhibiting symptoms of tetanus infection. Since infection is severe, he died the
next day. The incubation period of severe tetanus infection is less than 14 days.
Hence, he could not have been infected at the time of the stabbing since that
incident occurred 22 days before the symptoms manifested. The infection was
an efficient intervening cause breaking the connection between the physical
injuries and death. Hence, the crime committed is physical injuries (Villacorta
vs. People, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011). If the victim was infected by
tetanus at the time of stabbing, and the infection is the proximate cause of
3|Page
death, the crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204,
May 16, 1947).
Suicide is not a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC; hence, a

pregnant woman who attempted to commit suicide is not liable for abortion
due to the consequent death of the infant. Vexatious act (e.g. pouring gasoline)
made as part of fun making is not felony within the contemplation of Article 4.
The accused is not liable for homicide. However, such act is considered as
culpable, and thus, he is liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
(People vs. Pugay, No 74324, November 17, 1988). Vexatious act made out of
hate (such as putting a robber snake inside the bag of the victim) is unjust
vexation, which is a felony within the contemplation of Article 4. The accused is
liable for homicide if the victim died due to heart attack caused by seeing a
snake in his bag.
Practicing medicine without license is an offense punishable under special

law but not afelony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC. Hence, a quack
doctor, who killed his patient while treating him, is only liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide (People vs. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March
26, 2001).
If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the

carnapped motor vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or
carnapping in the aggravated form. If the victim accidentally killed is not the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed
are simple carnapping and homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as
that of theft and robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, Nov. 21, 2001).
Although not punishable under RPC, it can be treated as a felony within the
meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See: Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January
25, 2012). Hence, the accused is liable for homicide, which is the direct and
natural consequence of simple carnapping.
In case of aberatiu ictus and error in personae, the SC did not appreciate
evident premeditation since the victim, who was actually killed, is not
contemplated in the premeditation of the accused (People vs. Trinidad, G.R.
NO. L-38930, June 28, 1988; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967). However,
praeter intentionem and evident premeditation can be independently
appreciated. there is no incompatibility between evident premeditation and no
intention to commit so grave a wrong since the latter is based on the state of
mind of the offender while the former manner of committing the crime (Reyes;
People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536).
If accused employed means to render the victim defenseless, treachery

shall be appreciated even if the killing is due to error in personae (People vs.
Del Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. L-32995, April 30, 1984) or aberratio ictus (People
vs. Mabug-at, G.R. No. 25459, August 10, 1926, En Banc) or with the
circumstance of praeter intentionem (People vs. Cagoco, G.R. No. 38511,
October 6, 1933)
If a person in committing threat, murder, rape or robbery creates in the

mind of the victim an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to
try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such
a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries or death (US vs. Valdez,
G.R. No. 16486, March 22, 1921; People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January
17, 1975; People vs. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997; People vs.
Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969).
4|Page
9. Impossible crime - The crime committed is impossible crime if the

offense sought to be committed is factually or legally impossible. Killing a dead
person is impossible crime because of legal impossibility. Putting the hand
inside an empty pocket with intention to steal a wallet is impossible crime
because of factual impossibility (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
October 21, 1992).
Gender is an element of all crimes against chastity except acts of

lasciviousness. In seduction and consented acts of lasciviousness, and
abduction, the offender must be a man, while the victim must be a woman.
The offender in adultery must be a married woman, while in concubinage a
married man. If the element of gender is not present in a crime against
chastity, it is impossible to commit this crime (e.g. it is impossible to commit
abduction against a person, who is gay). Despite the impossibility of its
commission, the accused is not liable for impossible crime. To be held liable
for impossible crime, the act which is impossible to commit must constitutes
crime against person or property.However, abduction is a crime against
chastity. But the accused may be held liable for illegal detention.
A person, who has sexual intercourse with a woman not knowing that
she was already dead,is liable for impossible crime since rape is now a crime
against person. However, if he is aware that the woman is already dead, he is
not liable for impossible crime since criminal intent or propensity to rape,
which is the basis of penalizing impossible crime, is wanting.
If the gender element in rape through sexual intercourse is not present,

the offender is not liable for impossible crime. Although it is impossible to
commit rape through sexual intercourse where the victim is a gay, such acts
constitute acts of lasciviousness.
If the check is unfunded, stealing the checkand presenting it for payment

with the bank constitute impossible crime. It is factually impossible to
accomplish the crime of qualified theft since the check is unfunded(Jacinto vs.
People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009). If the check is funded, stealing the
check and presenting it for payment with the bank is not impossible crime.
Even if the accused failed to encash the same due to external cause such as
apprehension by police or stop payment, he will be held liable for consummated
theft. In theft, taking property with intent to gain consummates the crime.
Actual gain is not an element thereof. Thus, failure to gain will not prevent the
consummation of the crime (See: People vs. Seranilla, G.R. No. L-54090, May 9,
1988);
Kidnapping for ransom consummates at the precise moment when the

victim was abducted. Receiving ransom payment is not an element of this
crime. What is important is that the victim was kidnapped for purpose of
ransom. Since the crime is already consummated, there is no basis to say that
it is impossible to commit this crime (People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 95322, March 1,
1993). Moreover, kidnapping is a crime against liberty and not against person
or property.
Firing a gun at the unoccupied bedroom with intention to kill a victim

constitutes impossible crime because it is factually impossible to kill a victim,
who was not in the bedroom (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
October 21, 1992). But throwing grenade at the unoccupied bedroom, where
5|Page
the victim is supposed to be sleeping, constitutes arson if the bedroom was

burned as a consequence.
“A” discharged shotgun at “B” from a distance of 300 yards; but because
of the limited range of the firepower of the shotgun, it would be impossible for
“A” to harm “B”. “A” is liable of discharge of firearm and not impossible crime.
Where the offender unlawful entered the house and took a watch that turned
out to be his own, he is liable for trespass to dwelling and not impossible
crime (Criminal Law Conspectus by Justice Florenz Regalado). If the accused
administered abortive drugs upon his girlfriend whom he believed to be
pregnant, which turned out not to be true, but the woman became ill for more
than 30 days, the accused will be liable for serious physical injuries and not
impossible crime of abortion (Criminal Law Reviewer by Gregorio).
10. Indeterminate offense - Climbing on top of the naked victim,

touching her genitalia and mashing her breastsaresusceptible of double
interpretation (People v. Lamahang). His intention is either to rape or seduce
her. Hence, the accused cannot be held liable for attempted rape because
intent to have sex is not clear. He is only liable for acts of lasciviousness (Cruz
vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014).
Inflicting non-mortal woundupon the victim by shooting him constitutes

physical injuries if the accused did not further shoot him to inflict mortal
wounds. The crime is not attempted homicide because failure to shoot him
further shows lack of intent to kill. Moreover, spontaneous desistance from
further shooting to victim to inflict mortal wounds is a defense in attempted
homicide(Pentecostes, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 167766, April 7, 2010). But
inflicting mortal woundupon the victim constitutes frustrated homicide even if
the accused desisted from further shooting him. The fact that the wounds are
mortal indicates intent to kill. Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further
shooting is not a defense in frustrated homicide (People vs. Abella, G.R. No.
198400, October 07, 2013).
11. Battered woman syndrome -The essence of this defense of

“Battered Woman Syndrome” as a defense is that battered woman, who suffers
from physical and psychological or emotional distress, is acting under an
irresistible impulse to defend herself although at the time of commission of the
crime the battererhad not yet committed unlawful aggression. That is why
“Battered Woman Syndrome” is a defense notwithstanding the absence of any
of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense such as unlawful
aggression (Section 26 of RA No. 9262). This Syndrome refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women
living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse(Section 3).
The three phases of the Battered Woman Syndrome are: (1) the tension-
building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving or
non-violent phase (People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
The basis of the irresistible impulse to make a defense against the batterer is
the woman’s experiencing two battering episodes.
The elements of Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense are as follows:

(1) the woman is subjected to cumulative abuse by the victim, with whom she
has marital, sexual or dating relationship; and (2) the cumulative abuse or
battery is the act of inflicting physical harm resulting to physical and
psychological or emotional distress. Since the abuse must be cumulative, there
must be at least two episodes involving the infliction of physical harm. If the
6|Page
first episode is infliction of physical harm and the second episode is verbal
abuse, the accused cannot avail Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense.
12. Imbecility and minority –In exempting circumstance of imbecility,

what is important is the mental ageof the accused. An idiot, whose mental age
is 2 years, and imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old (People vs. Butiong,
G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011) are exempt from criminal liability. A
feebleminded, whose mental age is 12 years old, is not exempt from criminal
liability since he is not an imbecile (People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July
23, 1997) but he is entitled to mitigating circumstance of mental illness (People
vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950). In exempting
circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important is
the chronological or actual age of the accused. If the actual age of the accused
is 18 years and mental age is 9, the exempting circumstance of minority and
imbecility shall not be appreciated (People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June
04, 2014).
13. Insanity - The presumption, under Article 800 of the Civil Code, is
that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence
(People vs. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010, Justice Velasco). There
are two tests (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950) to
determine whether the mental condition of the accused is exempting or
mitigating:
a. Test of cognition – Under the test of cognition, the mental

condition of the accused is an exempting circumstance of insanity if there
was a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act
(People vs. Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757, October 05, 2011); or mitigating
circumstance of mental illness if there was only a partial deprivation of
intelligence (People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L- 33211, June 29, 1981). After
satisfying his lust, accused threatened the victim. This implies that accused
knew what he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret.
It also indicated that the crime was committed during one of his lucid
intervals. Accused is not exempt from liability for failure to pass the
cognition test (People vs. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5. 2009, Justice
Velasco).
b. Test of volition – Under the test of volition, the mental condition

of the accused is a mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there is
complete or partial deprivation of freedom. In sum, if a sex maniac or
homicidal maniac had merely passed the volition test but not the cognition
test, he will only be given the benefit of mitigating circumstance of illness.
Diminution of freedom is enough to mitigate the liability of the offender
suffering from illness (See: People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991,
G.R. No. 54135, November 21, 1991). Thus, kleptomania is a mitigating
circumstance of mental illness.
Irresistible homicidal impulse in People vs. Bonoan G.R. No. 45130,

February 17, 1937, which is an exempting circumstance is not anymore
controlling. Irresistible homicidal impulse, which is based on the volition
test, is only a mitigating circumstance. To exempt a person from criminal
liability due to insanity, the controlling rule is cognition testand not the
volition test(People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004). In
several Supreme Court cases, the pleas of insanity of accused who are
suffering from schizophrenia or psychosis were rejected because of failure to
7|Page
pass the cognition test. (People vs. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, February 6,
1998; People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029, March 24, 1993).
14. Child in conflict with the law -The rights and privileges of a child
in conflict with the law are as follows:
1. If the accused is 15 years of age or below, minority is an exempting

circumstance (Section 6 of RA No. 9344). Lack of discernment is conclusively
presumed. If the child is above 15 years of age, minority is an exempting
circumstance if he acted without discernment, or privilege mitigating
circumstance if he acted with discernment. This privilege mitigating
circumstance shall be appreciated even if minority was not proved during the
trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented on appeal (People vs.
Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013) and even if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death (People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).
2. Ifthe accused is 15 years of age or below but above 12 years, shallbe

considered as a neglected child. Neglected child shall be mandatorily placed in
a youth care facility or BahayPag-asa in the following instances: (a) If the child
commits serious crimes such as parricide, murder, infanticide, rape,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide or rape, robbery with
homicide or rape, destructive arson, or carnapping where the driver or
occupant is killed or raped or offenses involving dangerous drugs punishable
by more than 12 years of imprisonment; and (b) In case of repetition of offenses
and the child was previously subjected to a intervention program and his best
interest requires involuntarily commitment.
In case of commission of serious crime, a petition for involuntarily

commitment shall be filed by social worker in court. In case of repetitionof
offenses, his parents or guardians shall execute a written authorization for the
voluntary commitment. However, if the child has no parents or guardians or if
they refuse or fail to execute such authorization, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed social worker in court; but
the child may be subjected to intensive intervention program supervised by the
local social officer instead of involuntary commitment (Section 20-A and 20-B
of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630).
3.If the child is found guilty, the court shall place him under suspended
sentence, without need of application instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction (Section 38 of RA 9344). The law makes no distinction as to the
nature of offense by the child. The Senate debate discloses that the suspension
is applicable to heinous crime (People vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16,
2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).
An accused, who is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission

of the crime, is a child in conflict with the law. He will not be deprived of
privileges under the law even though he reaches age of majority at time of
rendition of judgment. Exception: While Section 38 of RA 9344 provides
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child is already 18 years
of age at the time of conviction. However, Section 40 limits the suspension of
sentence until the child reaches the age of 21 (People vs. Gambao, GR No.
172707, October 01, 2013; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21,
2015).
3.If the accused is an adult, application for probation must be filed

within the period of perfecting an appeal (Section 4 of PD No. 968 or Probation
8|Page
Law). However, the accused is a child in conflict with the law, application for
probation may be filed at any time (Section 42 of RA No. 9344). In sum, it can
be filed even beyond the period of perfecting an appeal or even during the
pendency of an appeal.
Under Section 9 of PD 968, one, who is sentenced to suffer a penalty (or

maximum indeterminate penalty) of more than 6 years, is not qualified to apply
for probation. However, under Section 70 of RA No. 9165, a first time minor
offender can apply for probation for the crime of possession or use of dangerous
drug even if the penalty is higher than 6 years of imprisonment. But Section 70
of RA 9165 is not applicable sale of dangerous drugs. Section 24 of RA No.
9165 disqualifies drug traffickers and pushers for applying for probations
although the accused is a minor. The law considers the users and possessors
of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators
(Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008).
4. The child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order
of the court, be made to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities in
accordance with Section 51 of RA No. 9344 (People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563,
December 14, 2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).
5.A convict is entitled to a full or 4/5 credit of his preventive

imprisonment (Article 29 of RPC). However, if the convict is a child in conflict
with the law, he shall be credited in the services of his sentence the full time
spent in actual commitment and detention (Section 41, RA 9344; Atizado vs.
People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010).
15. Status offense –Status offenses such as curfew violation refers to

offenses which discriminate only against a child, while an adult does not suffer
any penalty for committing similar acts (Section 3 of RA No. 9344). In sum, a
status offense is a crime where minority of the offender is an element. A child
shall not be punished for committing a status offense (Section 57). Under
Section 57-A, local ordinances on status offenses shall be for the protection of
children. For committing status offense, children recorded as a child at risk
shall be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay
hall to be released to the custody of their parents instead of being penalized.
16. Exempting circumstance of relationship - The absolutory cause of

relationship under Article 332 of RPCapplies to theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply to theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification. It includes step-relationship and in-laws relationship. There are
two views on whether death of his wife dissolves the relationship by affinity of
the husband with his mother-in-law for purpose of absolutory cause. The first
holds that relationship by affinity terminates after the death of the deceased
spouse, while the second maintains that relationship continues. The principle
of pro reocalls for the adoption of the continuing affinity view because it is more
favorable to the accused (Intestate estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No.
181409, February 11, 2010).The term “spouses” in Article 332 embraces
common-law spouses. The basis of this ruling is the rule on co-ownership over
properties by common-law spouses (People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR,
September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603).
17. Voluntary confession - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution

had begun presenting its evidence cannot be considered voluntary since it was
made only after the accused realized that the evidence already presented by the
9|Page
prosecution is enough to cause his conviction (People vs. Montinola, G.R. No.
131856-57, July 9, 2001).
18. Allegation - It is now a requirement that the aggravating or

qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint
or information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in its
judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial (Sombilon, Jr. vs.
People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009). This procedural rule has a
retroactive application because of pre reo (People vs. Dadulla, G. R. No.
172321, February 9, 2011).
19. Nighttime - Nighttime is aggravating if the accused took advantage

of the darkness of the night (People vs. Banhaon, G.R. No. 131117, June 15,
2004) or silence of the night e.g. the accused take advantage of the fact that the
victims and neighbors were sleeping (People vs. Ventura and Ventura, G.R. No.
148145-46, July 5, 2004).
20. Band - In robbery, band is a special aggravating circumstance under

Article 295 of RPC. In robbery with homicide or rape, band is an ordinary
aggravating circumstance under Article 14.
21. Exploitation of minor –Thespecial aggravating circumstance of

exploitation of minorunder RA No. 9344is present if the accused makes use,
takes advantage of, or profits from the use of children, or abuses his authority
over the child or takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the child with abuse
of confidence or induce, threaten or instigate the commission of the crime. The
concept of exploitation of children is comprehensive enough to cover the
circumstance of with the aid of minor under 15 years of age under RPC.
22. Conspiracy - It is immaterial whether appellant acted as a principal

or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and his participation therein have
been established. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the
conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime (People vs. Siongco, G.R.
No. 186472, July 5, 2010).
To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have

performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to
commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof (People vs. Ebet, G.R.
No. 181635 November 15, 2010). A conspirator, who ran away from the scene
of the crime prior to the commission of robbery with homicide by his co-
conspirator, is not liable because the former dissociated himself from the
conspiracy.
Conspirators are all liable for robbery although not all profited and
gained from the robbery. When a conspirator committed homicide by reason of
or on the occasion of the robbery, his co-conspirators are liable for special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, unless they endeavored to prevent the
killing (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De
Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03,
2013) or they cannot prevent the killing since they are not aware thereof
(People vs. Corbes, G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997). This rule is applicable
to special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (People vs. Anticamaray, GR
No. 178771, June 08, 2011) or robbery with rape (People v. Suyu, G.R. No.
170191, August 16, 2006; People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490 June 22,
1995).
10 | P a g e
If there is conspiracy to commit rape, each of conspirators is responsible

not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the
rape committed by the other as well (People vs. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180,
March 21, 2012).
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary application

of the provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy. Hence, such rule may
be applied supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held
liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 on the basis of conspiracy. (Ladonga vs.
People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005). The principle of conspiracy may
be applied to RA No. 9262. Thus, a person (such as mother-in-law), who has
no marital, sexual or dating relationship with the victim, can be held liable for
violence against woman on the basis of conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No.
168852, September 30, 2008)
If there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No.

3019 is imputable to the private individual although there are not similarly
situated in relation to the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides
penalty for public officer or private person for crime under Section 3. Hence, a
private individual can be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The
Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even if the
public officer, with whom the private individual allegedly conspired, died, the
latter can still be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes
the criminal liability but not the crime. Hence, if there is proof of the crime and
conspiracy between the dead public officer and private individual, the latter
can still be convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go, GR NO.
168539, March 25, 2014). However, if the public officer with whom the private
individual allegedly conspired is acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted
(Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
Mayor, treasurer and planning coordinator approved the overpayments

in favor of a private individual for the construction of public market. The public
officers caused undue injury to the government through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. The private
individual, who was overpaid, is also liable on the basis of conspiracy and Go
vs. Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan (Santillano vs. People, G.R. Nos.
175045-46, March 03, 2010, Justice Velasco; Uyboco vs. People, G.R. No.
211703, December 10, 2014,Justice Velasco).
23. Accomplice - Lending weapon such a gun to a killer for purpose of

killing a specific person such as Pedro is an act of accomplice. But if the killer
used the weapon in killing a different person such as Juan, the lender is not
liable as an accomplice. To be held liable as an accomplice, it is important that
that he knows and concurs in the criminal design of the principal (community
of design) and participates before or during the commission of the crime by
supplying moral or material aid in an efficacious way. In this case, the lender
concurred in the killing of Pedro but not Juan. Hence, he is not liable as an
accomplice. If the killer used another weapon such as knife instead of the gun
borrowed in killing Pedro, the lender is not liable as an accomplice. Although
the lender concurred in the killing of Pedro, he did not supply the killer
material or moral aid in an efficacious way since the weapon used is not the
one borrowed from him.
24. Fencing – In fencing, the property, which the accused possesses

with intent to gain, must be derived from the proceeds of theft or robbery (Ong
vs. People, GR No. 190475, April 10, 2013). The concept of carnapping is the
11 | P a g e
same as that of theft or robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, November 21,
2001). Thus, carnapping can be considered as within the contemplation of the
word “theft” or “robbery” in PD No. 1612 (Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184,
January 25, 2012). If the property is derived from the proceeds of malversation
or estafa, fencing is not committed. But the accused can be held liable as an
accessory if he profited or assisted other to profit from this misappropriated
property.
Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is

committed is the accused should have known that the property is stolen taken
into consideration the attending circumstances such as (1) the price of the
property is so cheap; (2) expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight
in a street; (3) accused knew that the car he bought was not properly
documented (Dimat vs. People, supra); or (4) new tires are being peddled in the
streets by an unknown seller (Ong vs. People, supra). Furthermore, mere
possession of stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (Section 6
of PD No. 1612).
25. Obstruction of justice – Obstruction of justice can only be

committed by a person other than the one being investigated or tried in a
criminal proceeding. Although this is not expressly required in PD No. 1829 to
make one liable for obstruction of justice, a principal himself cannot be held
liable for obstruction of justice (Angeles vs. Gaite, G.R No. 165276, November
25, 2009).
The criminal actor, who threwthe body of murdered victim into the river
to destroy the corpus delicti, is liable for murder qualified by the circumstance
of employment of means to afford impunity.The one who assisted in in
throwing the body is liable as an accessory to murder for destroying the body of
the crime to prevent its discovery (People vs. Devaras, G.R. Nos. 100938-39,
December 15, 1993)or a principal in the crime of obstruction of justice for
destroying it to impair its availability as evidence in a criminal proceeding.
The accused cannot be prosecuted both as an accessory for murder and

as principal for obstruction of justice. The penalty prescribed for obstruction of
justice under PD No. 1829 is prision correccional in its maximum period
unless other law prescribed a higher penalty. Thus, the offender may be
prosecuted for murder as accessory with the penalty of prision mayor or for
obstruction of justice as principal also with the penalty of prision mayor, since
this penalty is higher than that prescribed under PD No. 1829. The intention of
the law in prescribing a fixed penalty or that provided by other law such as
RPC, whichever is higher, is not to prosecute the offender for obstruction of
justice and for other crime arising from the same act such as destroying the
body of the crime.
After the discoveryof illegal possession of lumber, the accused unlawfully

took the truckused to commit the crime from the authorities. He is not liable as
an accessory since he did not conceal the instrument of the crime for the
purpose of preventing the discovery thereof. Crime was already discovered
when the concealment was made. However, he is liable for obstruction of
justice for concealing the truck to impair its availability as evidence in the
criminal proceeding for illegal possession of lumber (Padiernos vs. People, G.R.
No. 181111, August 17, 2015).
To be held liable as an accessory, the person harbored, concealed, or

assisted to escape must be principal of the crime and the crime committed
12 | P a g e
must be treason, parricide, murder,or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or other crime where act was committed with abuse of public function
or the principal is a habitual delinquent. To be held liable as a principal in
obstruction of justice, the one harbored, concealed, or assisted to escape is any
person(such as principal or accomplice)and the crime committed is “any
offense under existing law.”
The exempting circumstance of relationship under Article 20 of RPC can

be appreciated in favor of an accessory to a felony but not in favor of an
accused in the crime of obstruction of justice since he is being prosecuted as
principal and not as an accessory.
Light felony is punishable except when the accused is merely an

accessory (Article 16 of RPC) or when it is at the attempted or frustrated stage
unless it is a crime against property or person (Article 7). However, obstruction
of justice can be committed even though the crime under investigation is a
light felony.
An accused can be convicted as an accessory to a felony although the

principal was not convicted because the latter was at large, unidentified or
dead (Vino vs. People, G.R. No. 84163, October 19, 1989). The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from
each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal (People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No.
171222, February 18, 2015).
26. Credit of preventive imprisonment –Credit for preventive

imprisonment is full if the detention prisoner executed detainee’s
manifestation, which is a written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the
assistant of a counsel, stating his willingness to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon a convicted prisoner for the purpose of availing the full
credit of the period of his preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment is 4/5 if the detention prisoner

executed detainee’s waiver, which is a written declaration of a detained
prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon a prisoner convicted by final judgment.
There is no credit if the accused is recidivist; has been convicted

previously twice or more times of any crime; or has failed to surrender
voluntarily before a court of law upon being summoned for the execution of his
sentence (Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592).
If the offender is a child, the applicable rule for crediting the period of
commitment and detention is not Article 29 of RPC but Section 41, RA 9344,
which provides that the full time spent in actual commitment and detention of
juvenile delinquent shall be credited in the services of his sentence.
27. Immediate release – If the period of preventive imprisonment is

equal to the imposable maximum imprisonment of the offense charged, the
detention prisoner shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the case, except for the following: 1) recidivist; 2) habitual
delinquent; 3) escapee; and 4) person charged with heinous crimes. Such period
shall include good conduct time allowance (Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA
No. 10592).
13 | P a g e
28. Special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) –If detention prisoner or
convicted prisoner escapes during the calamity, and subsequently surrenders
within 48 hours from the time the President announces the passing away of
such calamity, he is entitled to 1/5 special time allowance for loyalty (STAL)
under Article 98 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592; if the convicted prisoner
did not surrender within the period, he is liable for evasion of sentence under
Article 158 of RPC punishable by penalty equivalent to one-fifth of the time still
remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall
exceed six months; if the detention prisoner did not surrender within the
period, he is not liable for evasion of sentence. Only convicted prisoner can
commit evasion of service of sentence because a detention prisoner is not
serving sentence, which he can evade.
In case of the prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement

notwithstanding the existence of a calamity, he is entitled to 2/5 STAL (Article
98 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592). A prisoner who did not escape
despite of the calamity manifests a higher degree of loyalty to the penal system
than those who evaded their sentence but thereafter gives themselves up upon
the passing away of the calamity.Hence, prisoners, who did not escape, are
entitled to a higher special time allowance.
However, prisoner is not entitled to STAL if he has committed other

offense or any act in violation of the law.
29. Special complex crime –Raping the victim or inserting instrument

in her anal orifice after treacherously inflicting mortal wounds is not a special
complex crime of rape with homicide because the original design of the victim
is kill and not to rape the victim. The crime committed is murder qualified by
treachery and rape shall be regarded either as ignominy or cruelty (People vs.
Laspardas, G.R. No. L-46146, Oct. 23, 1979) or sexual assault shall be treated
as cruelty (People vs. Bernabe, G.R. No. 185726, October 16, 2009).
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,

regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the accused is liable for a special complex crime of kidnapping
with homicide (People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29, 2000;
People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998; People vs. Larranaga,
138874-75, February 3, 2004; People vs. Montanir, GR No. 187534, April 04,
2011; People vs. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014). However, if the
derivation of liberty is just incidental to the transportation of the victim to the
place where he will be executed, the crime is murder. Kidnapping with
homicide is not committed because of lack of intent to deprive liberty (People
vs. Estacio Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009).
The phrase “by reason of the rape” obviously conveys the notion that

the killing is due to the rape, which is the crime the offender originally designed
to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. In contrast,
the phrase “on the occasion of the rape” as shown by Senate deliberations
refers to a killing that occurs immediately before or after,or during the
commission itself of the rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person
other than the rape victim (People vs. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11,
2012; People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011).
Ordinarily, homicide means killing another person. In sum, the person

responsible for the death of the victim must be the offender. But in the case of
14 | P a g e
People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969, the victim himself, who
jumped from boat, is responsible for his own death, and yet, the SC convicted
the accused of robbery with homicide. In other words, death caused by the
victim himself is considered as homicide, which is a component of robbery with
homicide. Hence, suicide or death caused by the victim herself can be
considered as homicide as a component of special complex crime of rape with
homicide.
In robbery with homicide, all other felonies such as rape, intentional

mutilation, usurpation of authority, or direct assault with attempted homicide
are integrated into this special complex crime. This special complex crime is
committed as long as death results by reason or on occasion or robbery
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime(People vs. De Leon, GR No.
179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016).
In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a

bystander (People vs. Barut, G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979), a responding
police (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967) or one of the
robbers (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009;People vs.
Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016).
In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that victim is killed by the

responding policeand not by the robber (People vs. Ombao, G.R. No. L-30492,
February 26, 1981). But in attempted robbery with homicide, the offender must
be guilty of both crimes. Hence, attempted robbery with homicide is not
committed where the victim was killed by a co-passenger and not by the robber
(People vs. Manalili, G.R. No. 121671, August 14, 1998).
If the taking of property is not committed by means of violence or

intimidation, Article 294 of RPC is not applicable. Taking without violence or
intimidation constitutes theft. If after the taking of property by means of
violence or intimidation, the robber killed a responding police officer, the
former is liable for robbery with homicide (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177,
May 24, 1967). If after the taking of the roasters without violence or
intimidation, the thief killed responding police officer, he is liable for theft and
direct assault with homicide (People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February
22, 1974). If after the snatching of the complainant’s bag without violence or
intimidation, a co-robber crashed the getaway motorcycle and died, the
accused is only liable for theft (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 200922, July
18, 2012).
After consummation of robbery, passengers reported the matter to the

police authorities. During the manhunt operation, one of the police officers was
killed by a robbery. The crime committed is not robbery with homicide since
the connection between the two crimes was “not a direct connection" (People vs.
Quemeggen, G.R. No. 178205, July 27, 2009).
In simple robbery under Article 294 of RPC, violence and intimidation is

employed to take property. In occupation of real property under Article 312,
violence or intimidation is employed to occupy the real property. If the accused
has already occupied the house of the complainant, and he used violence or
intimidation to prevent the said owner from reoccupying the property, the
crime committed is not occupation of real property. The accused may be held
liable of grave threat, grave coercion or discharge of firearm depending upon
the circumstance of the case.
15 | P a g e
Breaking the window of a house and taking property inside without

entering constitutes theft. Breaking the window is not a circumstance that will
qualify the taking into robbery by using force upon thins since this crime
requires that the breaking of window is a means to enter the building (People
vs. Adorno, CA 40 O.G. 567; People vs. Jaranilla. G.R. No. L-28547, February
22, 1974). Breaking the window to commit theft is an ordinary aggravating
circumstance.
Using picklock to open a locked cabinet and taking property therein is

not robbery by using force upon thing. To constitute robbery by using force
upon thing, the picklock must be used to open the building and not merely a
lockedfurniture (US vs. Macamay, G.R. No. 11952, September 25, 1917).
Entrusted key is not a false key in robbery by using force upon thing.
In Sebastian case, when the elements of both robbery by means of

violence and intimidation and robbery by using force upon thing are present,
the accused shall be held liable of the former since the controlling qualification
is the violence and intimidation. However, the penalty for robbery in inhabited
house if the robber is armed is graver than simple robbery. Hence, by hurting
the victim, the offender shall be penalized with a lighter penalty. Since
Sebastian principle defies logic and reason, People vs. Napolis, G.R. No. L-
28865, February 28, 1972 abandoned it. Under the present rule, when the
elements of both robbery by means of violence and intimidation and robbery by
using force upon thing are present, the crime is a complex one under Article 48
of said Code. Hence, the penalty for robbery in inhabited house shall be
imposed in its maximum period (People vs. Disney, G.R. No. L-41336, February
18, 1983; Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015). If the entry
into the dwelling is without force upon thing, and the property was taken by
means of violence or intimidation, the crime committed is robbery by means of
violence or intimidation with aggravating circumstance of disregard of dwelling
(People vs. Tejero, G.R. No. 128892 June 21, 1999; People vs. Evangelio, G.R.
No. 181902, August 31, 2011). When the elements of both robbery with
homicide and robbery by using force upon thing (unlawful entry) are present,
the former shall absorb the latter. In sum, robbery by using force upon thing
shall be integrated into the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
(People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta, G.R.
No. 202124, April 05, 2016). But aggravating circumstances of disregard of
dwelling and unlawful entry shall be both appreciated (People vs. Lamosa, G.R.
No. 74291-93, May 23, 1989).
30. Compound crime - The single act of rolling the hand grenade on the
floor of the gymnasium which resulted in the death of victims constituted a
compound crime of multiple murders (People vs. Mores, GR No. 189846, June
26, 2013). Wherethe use of grenade render the victim defenseless, “use of
explosives” shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance because this is the
principal mode of attack. Thus, treachery will be relegated merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance (People vs. Comadre, et al., G.R. No. 153559, June 8,
2004). The single act of running over the victims with a van constitutes
compound crime of multiple murders (People vs. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No.
199892, December 10, 2012).
Single act of pressing the trigger of Thompson or armalite is treated as

several acts as many as there are bullets fired from gun. Because of special
mechanism of Thompson, the single act of pressing its trigger will cause the
continuous firing of bullets. Thus, accused is liable as many homicides as
16 | P a g e
there are victims (People vs. Desierto, (C.A.) 45 O.G. 4542; People vs. Sanchez,
G.R. No. 131116, August, 27, 1999; People vs. Tabaco, G.R. Nos. 100382-
100385 March 19, 1997; People v. Vargas, Jr., G.R. No. 86728, April 6, 1990;
People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312 July 5, 1999).
The body of the information charged the accused of compound crime

with murder and attempted murder since two victims were hit by a single shot.
The evidence shows that murder and attempted murder are separate crimes
since the two victims were hit by several shot. Under the variance rule, if the
crime alleged in the information varies with the crime proven with evidence, the
accused shall be convicted of the crime alleged or proven whichever the lesser.
Thus, accused shall be convicted of complex crime, which is lesser compared to
two crimes (People vs. Bernardo, GR No. 198789, June 03, 2013).
Several acts in killing several victims do not constitute a compound

crime. Article 48 requires a single act constituting two or more crimes (People
vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975). Exceptions: Several acts in
killing several victims under a single criminal impulse (People vs. Lawas, L-
7618-20, June 30, 1955) or under single criminal purpose (People vs. Abella,
G.R. No. L-32205 August 31, 1979) shall be considered as a single act. Hence,
it is a compound crime.
The “single criminal impulse rule” under the Lawas doctrine is more of an
exception than the general rule (People vs. Remollino, G.R. No. L-14008,
September 30, 1960). Article 48 on compound crime speaks of single act, but
not single criminal impulse (People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-26222, July 21,
1967). In Lawas case, the SC was merely forced to apply Article 48 because of
the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused
(People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012). Thus, the Lawas
doctrine should not be applied if there is conspiracy since the number of
victims actually killed by each conspirator is not anymore material if there is
conspiracy (People vs. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, Justice
Velasco).
The “single criminal purpose rule” under the Abella case was adopted in
consideration of the plight of the prisoners; hence, it is only applicable if
killings were commit by prisoners against their fellow prisoners (People vs.
Pincalin, G.R. No. L-38755, January 22, 1981; People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No.
184500, September 11, 2012
31. Complex crime proper - Stabbing after the rape is a separate crime
of frustrated homicide. This is not a complex crime proper since the latter is
not necessary to commit the former (People vs. Isla, G.R. No. 199875,
November 21, 2012).
If the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim, the crime
committed is rape. Forcible abduction (People vs. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705,
July 30, 1993; People vs. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002) or illegal
detention (People vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004), which is
incidental to the commission of rape, is absorbed. The doctrine of absorption
rather than Article 48 of RPC is applicable since forcible abduction or illegal
detention is an indispensable means to commit rape.
If forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit rape, this is a

complex crime proper under Article 48 of RPC. However, if multiple rapes were
committed, forcible abduction will be considered as a necessary means to
17 | P a g e
commit the first rape but not the subsequent rape. Hence, with respect to the
first rape, the crime committed is complex crime of rape though forcible
abduction while the subsequent rapes will be treated as separate crimes
(People vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February 6, 1971; People vs. Garcia, G.R.
No. 141125, February 28, 2002, En Banc; People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100,
July 18, 2014).
As a rule, forcible abduction is an indispensable means to commit rape;

hence, the latter absorbs the former. However, if the victim was brought in a
house or motel or in a place with considerable distance from the place where
she was abducted, forcible abduction will be considered as a necessary means
to commit rape; hence, the crime committed is complex crime proper.
If the accused abducted the victim without clear showing of lewd design,
the crime committed is kidnapping since it will appear that the intention of the
accused is to deprive victim of his liberty. If as a consequence of illegal
detention, the victim was rape, the crime committed is a special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape. This is the crime committed regardless of the number
of rapes. Multiple rapes will be considered as a component of this special
complex crime (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011;
People vs. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011). If as a consequence of
illegal detention, the victim was rape and then killed, the crime committed is a
special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide. Rape will be considered as
a component of this special complex crime (People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75,
February 3, 2004, En Banc).
The difference between rape through forcible abduction and kidnapping

with rape lies on the criminal intention of the accused at the precise moment of
abduction. If the abduction is committed with lewd design, the crime
committed is rape through forcible abduction. On the other hand, if the
abduction is committed without lewd design, the crime committed is
kidnapping with rape (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27,
2011). Even if the victim was detained for one week and in the course thereof,
she was rape, the crime committed is rape through forcible abduction if the
abduction is committed with lewd design (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100,
July 18, 2014).
If the accused was molesting the victim immediately upon abduction,

that is proof that abduction is committed with lewd design (People vs. Jose,
supra). After eating the food given by accused, the victim became dizzy and
thereafter, she passed out. When she regained consciousness, she notices that
she and accused are naked inside a room. She was raped and detained for 6
days. The crime committed is rape through forcible abduction (People vs.
Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
32. Doctrine of absorption - If murder, kidnapping or arson committed

in furtherance of rebellion, they will be divested of their character as common
crimes and will assume the political complexion of rebellion. Hence, rebellion
absorbs these crimes (People vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956;
People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; Enrile vs. Salazar,
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990). Doctrine of absorption is applicable to coup
d’etat for being a political crime because the purpose of coup plotter is to seize
or diminish state power (Gonzales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 8, 2006,
concurring opinion by Justice Callejo).
18 | P a g e
Membership in CPP-NPA alone will not establish political motivation

behind the killing for purpose of convicting the killers for rebellion (People vs.
Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, November 29, 1995; People vs. Solongan, G.R. No.
137182, April 24, 2003). But membership in a liquidation squad and killing a
government officer is sufficient to establish political motivation (People v.
Dasig,G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993).
Doctrine of absorption is not applicable to sedition. There is neither law

nor jurisprudence which can allow the absorption of murder and kidnapping
by sedition. The absorption principle in the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo
cannot properly be invoked as authority since those two cases involved
rebellion and not sedition (People vs. Hadji, G.R. No. L-12686, October 24,
1963). Moreover, public and tumultuous uprising for political or social
purpose, which is the essence of sedition, does not require killings, burning of
properties and extortions.
RA No. 6968 eliminated the phrases "engaging in war against the forces
of the government", "committing serious violence" and “destroying property” in
Article 135 of RPC. These modes of committing rebellion deleted by RA No.
6968 were used by the SC in justifying the doctrine of absorption. The
amendment of Article 135 does not affect the accepted concept of rebellion and
these “overt acts of violence” are deemed “subsumed” in the provision on public
and armed uprising, which is an element of rebellion in Article 134 (Regalado).
Hence, the doctrine of absorption is still good. The incidents in Lovedioro case,
and Solongan case happened after RA No. 6968, and yet, the SC is still
applying the doctrine of absorption.
If the principal intention of the offenders is to rob the victims, and the
deprivation of their liberty is just incidental to the prevention of the responding
police officers from arresting them, the crime committed is robbery, which
absorbed kidnapping and serious illegal detention (People vs. Astor, G.R. Nos.
L-71765-66, 29 April 1987).If the accused committed robbery, but thereafter,
they detained the victims to demand additional money, and later forestall their
capture by the police, the crime committed is complex crime of robbery through
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The detention was availed of as a
means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. The detention was not
merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate
as a means of extortion for an additional amount. Hence, the Astor principle is
not applicable (People vs. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990). If the
accused committed robbery by band, but thereafter, they took one of the
victims and detained him for seven days in another place for purpose of
demanding ransom, they are liable of separate crimes of robbery by band and
kidnapping for ransom (People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012).
33. Delito continuado - In order that continuous crime may exist, there
should be: (1) plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; (2)
unity of criminal intent and purpose and (3) unity of penal provision infringed
upon or violated (Santiago vs. Garchitorena , GR NO. 109266, December 2,
1993). The following are delito continuado: (1) several acts of taking roasters
owned by different owner under a single criminal impulse to take them all in
violation of a single penal provision, and that is Article 308 of RPC (Note: This
is also called single larceny rule; People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547,
February 22, 1974); and (2)several acts of taking away by force the valuables of
the employees working in Energex gasoline station committed under a single
criminal intent to commit robbery in that place in violation of a single penal
19 | P a g e
provision, and that is Article 294 of RPC (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943,
June 26, 2009).
Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for
purpose of changing position. The three penetrations motivated by a single
criminal intent to satisfy his lust in violation of single penal provision (Article
266-A of RPC) constitute a continued crime of rape (People vs. Aaron, G.R. Nos.
136300-02, September 24, 2002). Accused inserted his penis thrice into the
private part of victim for purpose of resting for five minutes. He satisfied his
lust every time he would withdraw his penis to rest. Since the three
penetrations were motivated by separate three criminal impulse to satisfy his
lust, three separate crimes of rape are committed (People vs. Lucena, GR No.
190632, February 26, 2014).
There is no delito continuado where the accused when he committed the

first threat against the victim has no foreknowledge that he will chance upon
the second and third victims to commit the second and third threat. Without
such foreknowledge, three threats could not be said to have been committed
under a single criminal impulse, which is the basis of applying delito
continuado principle. Several threats can only be considered as continued
crime if the offender threatened three individuals at the same place and at the
same time (Paera vs. People, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011).
34. Penalty - Two degrees higher than reclusion temporal prescribed for

qualified theft shall be death penalty. Since death penalty was not specifically
prescribed for qualified theft, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties for death shall be imposed pursuant to Article 74 of RPC.
However, the period of imprisonment should be fixed at forty (40) years
of reclusion perpetua. Otherwise, there would be no difference at all
between reclusion perpetua imposed as the penalty next higher in degree
and reclusion perpetua imposed as the penalty fixed by law (Celestial vs.
People, G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015, Justice Velasco).
Accused was found guilty of parricide punishable by the penalty of

reclusion perpetua to death. Applying rules for application of indivisible
penalties (Article 63), the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be applied
if there are two mitigating circumstance. The penalty cannot be lowered to
reclusion temporal, no matter how many mitigating circumstances are
present. The special mitigating circumstance is found in rules for application of
divisible penalties (Article 64), which is not applicable because the penalty is
not divisible (People vs. Takbobo, G.R. No. No. 102984, June 30, 1993). The
Takbobo principle is also applicable if the penalty prescribed by law for the
crime committed is a single indivisible penalty such as reclusion perpetua.
If there are three mitigating circumstance and one aggravating

circumstance, special mitigating circumstance for purpose of graduating the
penalty shall not be appreciated. Although there are two remaining mitigating
circumstances after applying the off-set rule, the penalty shall not be lowered
by one degree because the appreciation of special mitigating circumstance
requires that there is no aggravating circumstance.
If the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion temporal (e.g. penalty for

homicide) and there is one mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
imposed in its minimum period. In such case, the indeterminate minimum
penalty shall be fixed anywhere within the full range of prision mayor (6 years
and 1 day to 12 years), which is the penalty next lower in degree, while the
20 | P a g e
indeterminate maximum penalty shall be fixed anywhere within the range of

reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months). Hence, the court may sentence the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of: 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14
years of reclusion temporal as maximum (People vs. Placer, G.R. No. 181753,
October 09, 2013).
Only ordinary aggravating and mitigating circumstances are subject to

the offset rule. Privileged mitigating circumstance of minority cannot be offset
by ordinary aggravating circumstance (Aballe vs. People, G.R. No. L-64086,
March 15, 1990). If privileged mitigating circumstance and ordinary
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of felony, the former shall
be taken into account in graduating penalty; the latter in applying the
graduated penalty in its maximum period (People vs. Lumandong, GR NO.
132745, March 9, 2000, En Banc). Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating
circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance (People
vs. Macariola, G.R. No. L-40757 January 24, 1983). The circumstance of
treachery, which qualifies the killing into murder, cannot be offset by a generic
mitigating circumstance voluntary surrender (People vs. Abletes and Pamero,
GR NO. L-33304, July 31, 1974).
If the penalty for possession of dangerous drugs is 12 years and 1 day to

20 years of imprisonment, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum of which shall not exceed 20 years while
the minimum shall not be less than 12 years and 1 day. Thus, the court can
sentence the accused to suffer 15 years of imprisonment as minimum to 18
years as maximum. The court cannot impose a straight penalty of 12 years and
1 day since the application of indeterminate sentence law is mandatory
(Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011; Escalante vs.
People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013).
RPC is not generally applicable to malum prohibitum. However, when a

special law, which punishes malum prohibitum, adopts the technical
nomenclature of the penalties in RPC, the provisions under this Code shall
apply (People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994) such as: (1) Article 68
on the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority; (2) Article 64 on
application of penalty in its minimum period if there is a confession; and (3)
Article 160 on special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism.
RA No. 7080 and RA No. 10591 adoptthe nomenclature of the penalties

in RPC. Hence, minority, confession (Jacaban vs. People, GR No. 184355,
March 23, 2015; Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007) or
quasi-recidivisim shall be considered in plunder and illegal possession of loose
firearm.
Under Section 98 of RA No. 9165, the provisions of RPC shall not apply
except in the case of minor offenders. Hence, if the accused is a minor,
privilege mitigating circumstance of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No.
186227, July 20, 2011; People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24,
2012Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011, Justice
Velasco), confession or quasi-recidivisim(People vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060,
January 27, 1997) shall be considered in crime involving dangerous drugs. In
this case, life imprisonment shall be considered as reclusion perpetua. If the
accused is an adult, these circumstances shall not be appreciated.
21 | P a g e
If the special law (such as RA No. 6235 on hijacking and RA No. 3019 on
corruption) did not adopt the technical nomenclature of penalties in RPC, the
latter shall not apply. Mitigating circumstance of confession shall not be
appreciated since the penalty not borrowed from RPC cannot be applied in its
minimum period. The crime has not attempted or frustrated stage since
penalty not borrowed from RPC cannot be graduated one or two degrees lower.
If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine, he shall be
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at
the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court (Article 39
of RPC as amended by RA No. 10159).
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Thus, convict could
serve simultaneously arresto mayor and fine, prision correccional and
perpetual absolute disqualification, or reclusion perpetua and civil interdiction.
In sum, while lingering in prison, convict could pay fine, return the property
confiscated, be disallowed to cast his vote or to act function as a public officer.
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
successively if the nature of the penalties will not permit simultaneous service.
Convict must serve multiple penalties successively: (1) where the penalties to
be served are destierro and imprisonment; and (2) where the penalties to be
served are imprisonment. However, the successive service of sentences is
subject to the three-fold rule and 40-year limitation rule.
The three fold rule is to be taken into account not in the imposition of
the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People
vs. Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33, December 23, 1957; Mejorada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987). Thus, the court cannot
dismiss criminal cases in excess of three on the basis of three-fold rule.
35. Modes of criminal extinction – The modes of extinguishing criminal

liability are: death of the offender; service of the sentence; amnesty or absolute
pardon; prescription of crime, or penalty; marriage between the offender and
the offended in crimes against chastity (Article 89 of RPC) or in rape; or
forgiveness in marital rape (Article 266-C); and probation (PD No. 968 as
amended by RA No. 10707.
Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of RPC as a

mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his
reelection (Oliveros vs. Villalulz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1974). But a re-
elected public official could not be removed for administrative offense
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of his misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992).
However, the doctrine of condonation of administrative offense by reason of
reelection has been abandoned for being inconsistent to Section 1, Article X1 of
the 1987 Constitution on public office is a public trust and public
accountability (Morales vs. CA and Binay, GR No. 217126-27, November 10,
2015).
Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability but it can

extinguish the old contract, which may be the basis of criminal liability. In
estafa through misappropriation, “receiving the property in trust” is an element
22 | P a g e
thereof. In sum, contract is an ingredient of this crime. Novation may convert

the contract of trust into creditor-debtor situation, or put doubt on the true
nature of the original transaction (People vs. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February
5, 1964). In these situations, the accused will be acquitted for failure to prove
the element of “receipt of property in trust.” Thus, novation is a defense in
estafa through misappropriation where the contract of agency is converted into
sale (Degaños vs. People, GR No. 162826, October 14, 2013). However, partial
payment and promise to pay the balance of obligation under contract of agency
will not convert it into sale. There is no novation since the obligation of the
accused in making a partial payment is not incompatible to the obligation to
give the proceeds of sale of the property under the contract of agency (Degaños
vs. People, supra).
Novation cannot be used as a defense in case where the existence of

contract is not an element. In theft case, there was no contractual relationship
or bilateral agreement which can be modified or altered by the parties (People
vs. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924, April 29, 1968, En Banc).In estafa through
falsification of public documents, the liability of the offender cannot be
extinguished by mere novation (Milla vs. People, G.R. No. 188726, January 25,
2012).
Death of an accused pending appeal shall extinguish his criminal liability

and civil liability arising from crime (Article 89 of RPC); but not his civil liability
arising from a source other than crime (e.g. quasi-delict, contract, quasi-
contract or law). Civil liability arising from a source other than crime is not
deemed included in the institution of criminal action. Hence, the private
complainant must file a separate civil action against either the executor or
administrator, or the estate of the accused. During the pendency of the
criminal case, the statute of limitations on this surviving civil liability is
deemed interrupted (People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994).
However, in violation of BP Blg. 22, civil liability arising from a source other
than crimeis mandatorily included in the institution of criminal action. Hence,
the court, despite the death of the accused pending appeal, must determine his
civil liability arising from contract (Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No. 182210,
October 05, 2015). In sum, the private complainant is not required to file a
separate civil action based on contract involving a dishonored check.
Person, who was pardoned for the crime punishable by reclusion

perpetua, cannot run in the Senatorial race if the terms of the pardon has not
expressly restored his right to hold public office (Article 36 of RPC) or expressly
remitted the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification (Article
41). GMA pardoned President Estrada with express restoration of his civil and
political rights. Hence, he is eligible to run as Mayor (Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R.
No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
The State and private complainant should not be blame for failure to
institute the case immediately after the commission of the crime if they are
ignorant or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a crime.
Under "blameless ignorance" doctrine (Section 2 of Act 3326 and Article 91 of
RPC), the prescription runs only upon discovery of the crime by offended party
or State through a person in authority or his agent. Considering that during
the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions involving cronies such as behest loan, it would be unreasonable to
expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to
1986 (Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65,
September 11, 2013). Hence, the prescriptive period for violation of RA No.
23 | P a g e
3019 commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee
made an exhaustive investigation (Presidential Ad hoc fact-finding committee
vs. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011).
Prescription runs only upon discovery of the crime by offended party or

person in authority or his agent. For purpose of prescription of crime, the
offended party includes the person to whom the offender is civilly liable. Thus,
the widow of the murdered victim is an offended party (Garcia vs. CA, G.R. No.
119063, January 27, 1997). Discovery of crime by a mere witness, who is not
an offended party, will not commence the running of prescription.
The 10-year prescriptive period for falsification of document shall

commence to run on the date of recording of the falsified deed of sale in the
Registry of Deeds because of the constructive notice rule under the Torren
system (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 74226, July 27, 1989). The 15-year
prescriptive period for bigamy shall commence to run on the date of actual
discovery of the bigamous marriage and not from the registration of bigamous
marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar. The law on Civil Registry and the
Family Code, which governed registration of marriage, do not provide a rule on
constructive notice (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, June 14,
1994).
As a rule, period of prescription commence to run from the date of

discovery of its commission. However, if the crime is not yet actionable at the
time of its commission, period of prescription will commence to run from the
time it becomes actionable. In false testimony, the period of prescription
commences to run from the date of the finality of judgment of a case in which
the offender testified falsely. Prior to the date of finality, the crime is not yet
actionable (People vs. Maneja, G.R. No. 47684, June 10, 1941). In violation of
BP Blg. 22, the crime is consummated upon the dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001).
However, in violation of BP 22, the four-year period of prescription for such
crime commences to run from the date of the expiration of the five-day period
from receipt of notice of dishonor by the drawer. Prior to that date, the crime
is not yet actionable (People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13,
2012). It would be absurd to consider the prescriptive period for false
testimony or violation of BP Blg. 22 as already running before it becomes
actionable, and yet, the complainant could not cause its interruption because
he is not yet allowed to file a complaint.
If the crime is punishable bythe Revised Penal Code or a special law, the
institution of judicial proceeding(e.g. filing of complaint or information in court)
or executive proceeding (e.g. filing of complaint for preliminary investigation)
interrupts the running of prescription such as the filing of complaint: (1) for
violation of BP Blg. 22 in the prosecutor’s office - People vs. Pangilinan, G.R.
No. 152662, June 13, 2012;Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No.
167571, November 25, 2008; (2) for violation of Revised Securities Act in
Securities and Exchange Commission - SEC vs. Interport Resources
Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008; or (3) violation of RA No. 3019
in the Ombudsman - Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and
174764-65, September 11, 2013.
The PCGG has no power to investigate cronies of Marcos for violation of

RA No. 3019 not involving ill-gotten wealth. Such investigation for being voidab
initiowould not interrupt the running of prescription (People vs. Romualdez and
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009).
24 | P a g e
Ifthe crime is punishable by an ordinance, only the institution of judicial

proceeding shall interrupt itstwo-month prescriptive period. The provision in the
Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription by
institution criminal action is not applicable to violation of ordinance because it
is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Hence, the filing of complaint
involving violation of ordinance for preliminary investigation will not interrupt
the running of the prescription (Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr.,
GR No. 169588, October 7, 2013).
36. Probation -Probation shall suspend the execution of principal

penalty of imprisonment, and accessory penalty of disqualification(Villareal vs.
People, G.R. No. 151258, December 01, 2014) but not the implementation of
the civil aspect of the judgment (Budlong, vs. Palisok, GR No. 60151, June 24,
1983).
When a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is

appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition
of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for
probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should
he seek a review of the modified decision which already imposes a
probationable penalty (Section 4 of PD 968 as amended by RA No. 10707). In
Colinares vs. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, the accused, who
was convicted by the lower court of a non-probationable offense of frustrated
homicide, but on appeal was found guilty of a probationable offense of
attempted homicide, may apply for probation. In Villareal vs. People, G.R. No.
151258, December 1, 2014, accused was convicted of homicide, a non-
probationable crime, by the trial court. However, the SC found them liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, which is a probationable crime,
because of lack of dolo. They can still apply for probation.
Under PD No. 968 as amended, crimes against public disorder are non-
probationable. However, under RA No. 10707, crimes against public disorder
such as alarm and scandal and direct assault are now probationable.
The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of

imprisonment of not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all
other cases, said period shall not exceed six years. When the sentence
imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall not be less than nor to be
more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment (Section
14 of PD No. 968).
37. Direct assault – Simple assault (such as punching) upon an agent of

a person in authority (e.g. police officer) while engaged in the performance of
duty constitutes simple resistance and not direct assault because there is no
intent to defy the law and its representative at all hazard, which is an element
thereof (U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, February 1, 1918; U.S. vs. Agustin,
G.R. No. 13083, December 11, 1917; People vs. Lapitan, G.R. No. 38226,
November 17, 1933). But serious assault upon agent of a person in authority
while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes direct assault (U.S. vs.
Cox, G.R. No. 1406, January 6, 1904; U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649,
September 6, 1910).
25 | P a g e
Simple assault (such as punching) upon a person in authority (e.g. mayor

or chief of police) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes
qualified direct assault. The law does not distinguish between serious and
simple “laying of hands” upon a person in authority as a qualifying
circumstance. Hence, a simple laying of hands upon a person in authority
constitutes qualified direct assault. The Tabiana principle is only applicable if
the victim is an agent of a person in authority (U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No.
13658, November 9, 1918).
If the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual

performance of duties at the time of the assault, the motive for the assault is
immaterial. Direct assault is committed even if the motive (such as non-
payment of loan) was totally foreign to victim’s official function (Sarcepuedes
vs. People, G.R. No. L-3857, October 22, 1951).
The phrase "on occasion of such performance" used in Article 148 of RPC
means "by reasonof the past performance of official duty because the purpose of
the law is to allow them to discharge their duties without fear of being
assaulted by reason thereof (People vs. Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31,
1974). Attacking a judge on the street by reason of past performance of duty
(such as citing the accused in contempt) constitutes qualified direct assault
(U.S. vs. vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16, 1911). But attacking a retired
judge by reason of past performance of duty is not direct assault since he is not
anymore a person in authority at the time of the assault. Note: The mandatory
retirement age of a judge is 70 year.
The status of lawyer as persons in authority remains even the assault is

committed outside the court room as long as it is perpetrated by reason of the
performance of their professional duties (Records of the Batasan, Volume Four,
1984-1985 of BP Blg. 873, which amended Article 152 of RPC).
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of a person in authority,

who is a victim of direct assault, is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent
of person in authority, who is a victim of direct assault, is liable for indirect
direct assault. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of
person in authority, who is a victim of simple resistance, is liable for physical
injuries.
38. Evasion - In evasion of service of sentence, the accused must be a

convicted prisoner and not merely a detention prisoner. In delivery of prisoner
from jail, the person, who escaped through the help of the accused, is either a
detention prisoner or convicted prisoner. In infidelity in the custody of
prisoner, the person, who escaped in connivance with or consent of or through
negligence of the accused-custodian, is either a detention prisoner or convicted
prisoner. Evasion in the service of sentence and delivery of prisoner from jail
are committed by means of dolo. Infidelity in the custody or prisoner is
committed by means of dolo or culpa; if this crime is committed by means of
dolo, it is called conniving with or consenting to evasion; if committed by
means of culpa, it is called evasion through negligence.
Brother of a detention prisoner and convicted prisoner bribed the clerk of

court to falsify release order and their custodians to release his brothers.
Convicted prisoner but not the detention prisoner is liable for evasion of service
of sentence. Brother and clerk of court are liable for delivery of prisoner from
jail with respect to the escape of detention prisoner and convicted prisoner.
26 | P a g e
Custodians are liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoners with respect to
the escape of detention prisoner and convicted prisoner. Brother is liable for
two counts of corruption of public officer. Clerk of court and custodians are
liable for direct bribery. Clerk of court and brother are liable for falsification of
document as principal by direct participation and as principal by inducement,
respectively.
39. Bribery - Plaintiff gave money to the judge, who in consideration

thereof subsequently rendered an unjust decision in favor of the former. The
judge is liable of direct bribery and rendering unjust decision, while the
plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. But if the plaintiff gave money
to the judge, who subsequently rendered a decision against the former, the
crime committed by the judge is indirect bribery while the plaintiff is liable of
corruption of public officer. The judge is not liable of direct bribery since
rendering a decision against the corruptor indicates that the former did not
receive the money in consideration of rendering a decision in favor of the latter.
It seems that the plaintiff merely gave the money to the judge by reason of his
position as such.
40. Abortion and infanticide – If the fetus is killed inside the womb of
his mother, the crime is abortion regardless of whether he is viable or not
(People vs. Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008; People vs. Salufrania,
G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988). If the victim is killed outside the womb of
the mother, the crime is: (1) abortion if the victim is not viable e.g. intrauterine
life is only 6 months (People vs. Detablan, 40 O.G. No. 9, p. 30; People vs.
Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008); or (2) infanticide, if the victim is
viable e.g. his intrauterine life is more than 6 months and his life is less than 3
day old; or (3) murder if the victim is viable and his life is 3 day old or more.
If the accused maltreated his wife and as a consequence, his wife and
unborn child died, the crime committed is compound crime of parricide and
unintentional abortion (People vs. Robinos, G.R. No. 138453, May 29, 2002;
People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 95851, March 01, 1995). If the accused
maltreated his pregnant wife and as a consequence, his wife died, and his child
was expelled, and died thereafter within 3 days, the crime committed is
compound crime of parricide and infanticide. If the accused maltreated his
pregnant wife and as a consequence, his wife died, and his child was expelled,
and died thereafter on the third day, the crime committed is compound crime
of double parricides.
In abortion and infanticide, concealment of dishonor is a special

mitigating circumstance that can be appreciated in favor of the mother and
maternal grandparents but not in favor of the father or fraternal grandparents.
41. Parricide - In parricide, if the victim is his parent or child, the

relationship can either be legitimate or illegitimate; if the victim is the spouse,
grandparent or grandchild, the relationship must be legitimate (People vs.
Gamez, GR No. 202847, October 23, 2013). Relationship in parricide is by
blood except where the victim is spouse (Regalado). The qualifying
circumstance of relationship in parricide is personal. Hence, it can be
appreciated against the wife but not against a co-conspirator, who is not
related to her husband, the victim (People vs. Bucsit G.R. No. 17865, March
15, 1922).
42. Death under exceptional circumstance -Death under exceptional

circumstance is a not crime but a defense (People vs. Puedan, G.R. No.
27 | P a g e
139576, September 2, 2002), or an absolutory cause (People vs. Talisic, G.R.

No. 97961, September 05, 1997) since instead of imposing the penalty for
parricide, murder or homicide, the accused shall only suffer destierro, which is
just a measure designed to protect accused from acts of reprisal principally by
relatives of the victim (People vs. Araquel, G.R. No. L-12629, December 9,
1959). Hence, death under exceptional circumstance is not a felony within the
contemplation of Article 4 (People vs. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14,
1987) and aggression under exceptional circumstance is not an unlawful
aggression within the contemplation of self-defense (US vs. Merced, G.R. No.
14170, November 23, 1918).
Killing his wife after surprising her in the act of committing homosexual
intercourse with another woman is not death under exceptional circumstance.
“Sexual intercourse” mentioned in Article 247 is different from homosexual
intercourse. Killing his mistress after surprising in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with a man is not death under exceptional circumstance(U.S. vs.
Versola, G.R. No. 10759, January 25, 1916). The offender in Article 247 must
be a “legally married person.” Killing his wife under the circumstance indicating
that she had just finished having sexual intercourse with another man is not
death under exceptional circumstance. He did not catch his wife in the very act
of sexual intercourse, but after such act (People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 46310,
October 31, 1939).
43. Death in a tumultuous affray -The elements of death caused in a

tumultuous affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they
did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally (Note: If there is conspiracy, this element is
not present; conspirators are liable for homicide or murder; People vs. Corpuz,
G.R. No. L-36234 February 10, 1981); (c) that these several persons quarrelled
and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that
someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased (Not: If the killers are identified, this element
is not present; since they are identified, they are liable for homicide or murder;
Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015); and (f) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified.
44. Rape - If the relationship between the accused and the victim of rape
is uncle and niece, the Information must alleged that the offender is “a relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree” because there are
niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil degree. However, a
sister-brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree.
Consequently, it is not necessary that the Information should specifically state
that the accused is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of
the victim (People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, January 28, 2008,Justice
Velasco).
Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of rape

(People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 5, 2013) but it is an ingredient of the
qualifying circumstance of mental disability, which must be alleged in the
information (People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014; People vs.
Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012).
In qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in rape and

special aggravating circumstance in sexual abuse under RA No. 7610, the
guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. He must
28 | P a g e
be legally appointed was first (People vs. Flores G.R. No. 188315, August 25,
2010).
If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the latter is

absorbed by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29,
2002). But the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape through sexual
assault. Inserting lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the
victim and raping her constitutes two counts of rape by sexual assault and
rape through sexual intercourse (People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435,
January 29, 2014). Inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim and into
her genital orifice constitutes rape through sexual assault and organ rape (In
People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013).
If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of

lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the latter because of the
variance rule. Acts of lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which is necessarily
included in the charge of rape. If the crime charged is rape through sexual
intercourse, but the crime proven is rape through sexual assault, the accused
cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance rule is not applicable since rape
through sexual assault is not necessarily included in the charge of rape
through sexual intercourse. The elements of these two crimes are materially
and substantially different. In such case, the accused will be convicted of acts
of lasciviousness, which is necessarily included in the charge of rape through
sexual intercourse (People vs. Pareja, GR No. 202122, January 15, 2014;
People vs. Cuaycong, G.R. No. 196051, October 02, 2013; People vs. CA, G.R.
No. 183652, February 25, 2015).
Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A of RPC uses
the term “man” in defining rape without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship
with his victim. Under Article 266-C of RPC, in case it is the legal husband who
is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action. RA No. 8353 has eradicated the archaic
notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of
sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed (People vs.
Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014),
Rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which cannot be

prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence,
pardon by the offended party of the offender in the crime of rape will not
extinguish the offender's criminal liability (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No.
188897, June 06, 2011).
45. Perjury - Person cannot be held liable for perjury involving a

complaint affidavit for theft based on the execution of affidavit of desistance.
There is no perjury solely on the basis of two contradictory statements. There
must be further evidence that will show which of the two sworn statements is
false (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902).
In a verified answer, accused denied the allegation in the complaint for

collection on his loan obligation. He is not liable for perjury since verification is
not required in answer in a civil case. He cannot be prosecuted for perjury on
the basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified pleading, which is not
mandated by law to be verified (Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, G.R.
No. 93178, September 15, 1993; Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, G.R. No. L-48088,
July 31, 1978).
29 | P a g e
The fact that subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in RPC

does not mean that the direct induction of a person by another to commit
perjury has ceased to be a crime, because said crime is fully within the scope
of provision on principal by inducement (People vs. Pudol, G.R. No. 45618,
October 18, 1938).
Making untruthful statement (failure to disclose previous criminal

conviction) in a sworn application for the patrolman examination constitutes
perjury (People vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 255). Making untruthful statement (failure
to disclose pending criminal case) in unsworn PDS constitutes falsification of
document (Sevilla vs. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014). If there are
several mistakes the PDS including those which are not important, accused
cannot be convicted of falsification of document since it appears that failure to
disclose pending criminal case is not deliberate. Hence, accused is only liable
for reckless imprudence resulting in falsification (Sevilla vs. People, supra).
Making it appears that a person participated in an act or proceeding

where in fact he did not is not the actusreus in perjury. Hence, a mayor, who
made it appear that affiants swore and signed the affidavit before him where in
fact they did not, is liable of falsification of document and not perjury
(Lonzanida vs. People, G.R. Nos. 160243-52, July 20, 2009).
46. Falsification - Falsification of a public document is consummated

upon the execution of the false document. What is punished in falsification of
public document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the
destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. The fact that accused did
not benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by the falsified
resolution is not a defense (Goma vs. CA, G.R. No. 168437, January 08,
2009,Justice Velasco).
When the offender commits falsification of public, official or commercial

document as a necessary means to commit malversation (People vs. Barbas,
G.R. No. L-41265, July 27, 1934), estafa (Ilumin vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
85667, February 23, 1995; Intestate Estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No.
181409, February 11, 2010; Ambito vs. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13,
2009, Tanenggee vs. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013) or theft (People
vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001), the crime committed is complex
crime proper under Article 48 of RPC.
When the offender commits falsification of public, official or commercial

document as a means to conceal malversation (People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R.
Nos. L-33252-54, January 20, 1978; People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 39047,
October 31, 1933, En Banc), estafa (People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 139610,
August 12, 2002; People vs. Benito, G.R. No. 36979, November 23, 1932) or
theft, the crimes are separate. This is not complex crime proper since one is
not a necessary means to commit another. Other view: If falsification is
committed for purpose of enabling the accused to commit malversation (People
vs. Silvanna, G.R. No. L-43120, July 27, 1935; Zafra vs. People, G.R. No.
176317, July 23, 2014) or estafa (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 06,
20140) with less risk of being detected, the accused is liable for complex crime
proper.
If the falsification of a private document (demand letter, letter of

guarantee) is committed as a means to commit estafa, the crime committed is
falsification only. Under the common element doctrine, the use of damage as
30 | P a g e
an element in falsification of private document precludes the re-use thereof to

complete the elements of estafa. Hence, estafa is not committed because the
element of damage is not present(Batulanon vs. People, G.R. No. 139857,
September 15, 2006); U.S. vs Chan Tiao, G.R. No. 12609, October 30, 1917;
People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-34516, November 10, 1931). There is no complex
crime of estafa through falsification of private document.
If a person commits falsification of private document to conceal

malversation or estafa, the crime is estafa only. Under the common element
doctrine, the use of damage as an element in estafa precludes the re-use
thereof to complete the elements of falsification. Hence, estafa is not committed
because the element of damage is not present (See: People vs. Beng, 40 O.G.
1913).
47. Malversation - For purpose of malversation, national officer shall be

considered as an accountable officer if he has custody or control of public
property by reason of the duties of his office (Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The Local Government Code expanded the concept of accountable
local officer. Local officer shall be considered as an accountable officer if he has
possession or custody of local government funds because of the nature of their
functions such a treasure or has participated in the use or application of
thereof (Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015) such as a
mayor, whose signature is needed to disburse municipal funds (Manuel vs.
Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 08, 2012).
48. Estafa –In offenses against property (theft or estafa), if the subject
matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable (e.g. money), an error in the
designation of the offended party is fatal. However, if the subject matter of the
offense is specific and identifiable (e.g. check or jewelry), an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial (Senador vs. People, G.R. No.
201620, March 06, 2013, Justice Velasco). In oral defamation, a crime against
honor, the identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were
directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person
injured is material (People vs. Uba, 106 Phil. 332).
Demand is not an element of estafa through misappropriation. Demand

is only important if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation because
failure to account for the property in trust upon demand is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. In this connection, verbally inquired about the
money entrusted to the accused is tantamount to a demand (Asejo vs. People,
G.R. No. 157433, July 24, 2007, Justice Velasco). On the other hand, demand
is not necessary where there is direct evidence of misappropriation (People vs.
Arambulo, G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015). This rule on demand is applicable
to malversation (Munib vs. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 07, 2009,
Justice Velasco).
Where the borrower is importers acquiring goods for resale, goods sold in
retail are often within his custody until they are purchased. This is covered by
trust receipt agreement. Failure to return the unsold good or deliver the
proceeds of sale to the bank is estafa in relation to PD No. 115 (Trust Receipt
Law). Where the borrower is engaged in construction, the materials are often
placed under custody of his clients, who can only be compelled to return the
materials if they fail to pay. Since the bank and the contractor know that the
return of the materials is not possible, this is not covered by trust receipt
agreement. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is
obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods. The
31 | P a g e
accused is not liable for estafa because of the constitutional provision of non-
imprisonment for nonpayment of debts (Yang vs. People, G.R. No. 195117,
August 14, 2013, Justice Velasco).
In order to constitute estafa through issuance of bouncing check, the

postdating or issuing a check must be the efficient cause of the defraudation.
In sum, the offender must be able to obtain property from the offended party by
reason of the issuance of the check (People vs. Reyes, GR No. 157943,
September 4, 2013). Issuance of bouncing check to cover pre-existing
obligation is not estafa.
To be guilty of this crime the accused must have used the check in order
to defraud the complainant. However, prima facie evidence of deceit exists by
law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor (People vs. Reyes, supra). But receipt of notice of dishonor is not an
element of this crime.
In other forms of swindling under Article 316, (1) and (2) of RPC, offender
made false representation involving real property and act of ownership such as
selling it, which causes damage to third person. In paragraph 1, the accused
represents that he owned the property, while in paragraph 2, he expressly
represents in the deed of conveyance that the property is “free from
encumbrance” (Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015)
or "comolibre". These words "comolibre" in the Spanish Penal Code are deemed
incorporated in the RPC (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2003).
49. Theft - If the property is not accessible to the employee, taking it is

simple theft (Viray vs. People, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013, Justice
Velasco). On the other hand, if the property is accessible to the employee,
taking it is qualified theft because of the circumstance of abuse of confidence
(Yongco vs. People,G.R. No. 209373, July 30, 2014, Justice Velasco).
To "take" under theft the Revised Penal Code does not require
asportation or carrying away (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17,
2015). It is not an indispensable requisite of theft that a pickpocket should
carry, more or less far away, a wallet taken from its owner (People vs. Mercado,
G.R. Nos. L-45471 and L-45472, June 15, 1938).
The term "personal property" in RPC should be interpreted in the context

of the Civil Code. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible,
corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft.
Business may be appropriated under Bulk Sales Law. Thus, the business of
providing telecommunication and the telephone service is a personal property
(Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009). Since asportation is
not an element of theft, a personal property can to be the object of theft as
along as it is capable of appropriation although it is not capable of
"asportation" (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015). Intangible
property is not capable of asportation, and yet, it can be an object of theft since
is capable of asportation.
If the property is tangible, taking is deemed complete from the moment

the offender gains possession over the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004). If
the property is intangible, taking includes controlling the destination of this
property stolen to deprive the owner of the property (e.g. the use of a meter
32 | P a g e
tampering, use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, and the use of a jumper

to divert electricity). Using device to control the destination of international
telephone call under the telecommunication system of PLDT without its
consent to earn by charging user of the phone at the expense of PLDT is taking
the property of PLDT of providing telecommunication service (Laurel vs.
Abrogar, supra).
If the bulky goods are taken by the accused inside a compound (such as
SM), theft is consummated even if the accused failed to bring out the stolen
goods from the compound, which makes him unable to freely dispose it.
Inability to dispose the stolen property is not an element of theft. Unlawful
taking is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage.
Without unlawful taking, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
Thus, theft cannot have a frustrated stage (Valenzuela vs. People, G. R. No.
160188, June 21, 2007). If the accused is charged with frustrated theft, he
could not be convicted of the crime charged because theft has no frustrated
stage. Neither could he be convicted of consummated theft since it was not
alleged in the information. But he could be convicted of attempted theft
because this is a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of
frustrated theft (Canceran vs. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 01, 2015).
Misappropriation of personal property received by the accused with

consent of the owner is theft or carnapping if his possession is physical or de
facto, or estafa through misappropriation if it is legal or de jure.
If the accused received the car from the owner for repair the possession
is physical, and thus, misappropriation thereof is carnapping (Santos vs.
People, G.R. No. 77429 January 29, 1990).If the accused received the property
to bring it to a goldsmith for examination and to immediately return it back to
the owner, his possession is physical, and thus, misappropriation thereof is
theft (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921). If the accused
received the property with authority to sell it (Guzman vs. CA, 99 Phil. 703), or
money with authority to use it to buy palays (Carganillo vs. People, G.R. No.
182424, September 22, 2014), or with full freedom and discretion on how to
use it to facilitate its remittance to BIR as payment of tax and reduce the
amount due (Velayo vs. People, G.R. No. 204025, November 26, 2014), his
possession is juridical. Thus, failure of the agent to return it is estafa (Guzman
v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703; Tria vs. People, G.R. No. 204755, September
17, 2014).
A franchise holder must personally operate the motor vehicle. That is the
reason why government regulation prohibits operator of motor vehicle from
leasing it. In the eye of the law the driver of taxi or passenger jeepneyunder
boundary arrangement was only an employee of the owner rather than a
lessee. For being an employee, his possession of the jeepney is physical (People
v. Isaac G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955), and thus, misappropriation thereof is
carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004)
As a rule, the possession of the employee such as bank teller, collector or

cash custodian is only physical possession. Hence, misappropriation of
property is qualified theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the property is
accessible to the employee (People v. Locson, G.R. No. L-35681, October 18,
1932; Matrido vs. People, G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009; Benabaye vs.
People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015; Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No.
109595, April 27, 2000; Balerta vs. People, G.R. No. 205144, November 26,
2014). However, if the employee is an officer of the companywith discretion on
33 | P a g e
how to use property or fund of the company,his possession is juridical; hence,

misappropriation thereof is estafa. Thus, the following officers are liable for
estafa through misappropriation (1) a corporate officer with discretion option
on how to use bending machine without the participation of the
corporation(Aigle vs. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012); (2) bank President
with discretion on how to administer fund (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015,
August 6, 2014), and (3) Liaison Officer of a pawnshop with discretion on how
to secure or renew licenses and permits (Gamboa vs. People, G.R. No. 188052,
April 21, 2014).
In robbery with intimidation of persons, the intimidation consists in

creating fear in the mind of a person in view of a risk or evil that may be
impending, real or imagined. Such fear of injury to person or property must
continue to operate in the mind of the victim at the time of the delivery of the
money. Threat of prosecution and confiscation of the logs by DENR officers is
an intimidation within the meaning of robbery (Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 150873, February 10, 2009).
Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same
to the local authorities or to its owner, is liable for theft. If the finder
surrenders the property found to a policeman, who fails to deliver it the owner,
the policeman is liable for theft. He acquired the position occupied by the
actual finder. Appropriating the property is of the same character of that made
by one who originally found the same (People vs. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786,
March 31, 1923).
50. Arson – Destructive arson is characterized as heinous crime; while

simple arson under PD No. 1613 is a crime manifesting a lesser degree of
perversity. Simple arson contemplates the malicious burning of property not
included in Article 320 of the RPC (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July
31, 2013). Burning of inhabited house or dwelling or personal property is
simple arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 because it is not included in
Article 320 of RPC.
If the main objective is to kill the victim in a building, and fire is resorted
to as the means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed is murder only.
Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs arson since the latter is an inherent
means to commit the former (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27,
1994). Single act of burning the building to kill two persons constitutes
compound crime of double murders (People vs. Gaffud, G.R. No. 168050,
September 19, 2008).
One has deliberately set fire to a building is presumed to have intended

to burn the building (People vs. De Leon, G. R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009).
Since intent to burn is presumed, intent to kill must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Failure to show intent to kill, the accused shall be convicted
of arson with homicide and not murder (People vs. Baluntong, G.R. No.
182061, March 15, 2010).
If the main objective is to burn the building, but death results by reason
or on the occasion of arson, the crime is arson with homicide, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed (People vs. Villacorta, 172468, October 15, 2008).
If the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so, and
arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be
34 | P a g e
convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson

(People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994).
51. Bigamy –X contracted three marriages. His first wife is already dead
when X contracted his third marriage. X is liable for bigamy involving the
second marriage on the basis of his first marriage. X is not liable for bigamy
involving the third marriage on the basis of the first marriage since the first
has already been extinguished by reason of death of the first wife when he
contracted the third. He is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on
the basis of the second marriage since the latter is null and void for being a
bigamous marriage.
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the
offended parties depending on the circumstances. But if the second spouse had
knowledge of the previous marriage of the accused, the former is liable as an
accomplice (Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015).
Contracting second marriage without previous declaration of nullity of

the first marriage consummates the crime of bigamy. Once the crime
consummates, criminal liability will attach to the accused and will not be
extinguished except through a mode mentioned in Article 89 of RPC as death,
pardon etc. After the consummation of bigamy or celebration of the second
marriage, the criminal liability shall not be extinguished by subsequent events
not mentioned in Article 89 such as subsequent declaration of nullity of first
marriage and second marriage (Jarillo vs. People, GR No. 164435, September
29, 2009).
Declaration of nullity of the first marriage subsequent to the

consummation of bigamy is not a defense whether the ground for nullity is
psychological incapacity (Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000)
or lack of license and affidavit of cohabitation (Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No.
159031, June 23, 2014) or even though the declaration is obtained before the
filing of the complaint for bigamy (People vs. Odtuhan, GR No. 191566, July
17, 2013). Exception: Declaration of nullity of first marriage on the ground of
lack of marriage ceremony previous or subsequent to the celebration of the
second marriage is a defense. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Hence, bigamy is not committed (Morigo vs. People, G.R.
No. 145226, February 06, 2004).
To avoid criminal liability, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage

must be made previous to the consummation of bigamy, which is required by
Article 40 of the Family Code (People vs. Teves, G.R. No. 188775, August 24,
2011).Even though the first marriage was contracted prior to the Family Code,
the rule is the same since Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be
applied retroactively (Jarillo vs. People, GR No. 164435, June 29, 2010).
Declaration of nullity of the second marriage subsequent to the

consummation of bigamy is not a defense. To hold otherwise would render the
State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and
to thus escape liability for bigamy (Tenebro vs. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004; Walter vs. People, GR No.
183805, July 03, 2013).
35 | P a g e
52. Illegal marriage – A priest, who performed a marriage ceremony

despite knowledge that the couple had no marriage license, is liable for illegal
marriage. The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting
parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband
and wife (Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014).
53. Libel - Under Article 360 of the RPC, the publisher, and editor of
newspaper, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof. The publisher and editors cannot
disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply
saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot
say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the
defamatory articles appeared. It is not a matter of whether or not they
conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law
simply so states that they are liable as if they were the author (Tulfo vs. People,
G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008, Justice Velasco).
Comment is not fair if there is reckless disregard of knowing whether the

defamatory imputation is false or not. Hence, the accused cannot use the fair
comment principle as a defense. In Erwin Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032,
September 16, 2008, Justice Velasco - Journalists bear the burden of writing
responsibly when practicing their profession, even when writing about public
figures or matters of public interest. The report made by Tulfo describing a
lawyer in the Bureau of Customs as corrupt cannot be considered as "fair" and
"true" since he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has
been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and
true reports," but merely wild accusations. He had written and published the
subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not.
Under Article 355 of RPC, a libel is committed by means of writing,

printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or “any similar means.” Libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a
new crime. Online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel
in Article 355 (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335, February 18.
2014).

The place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in
the internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is “printed
and first published”. To rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be
prevented by the amendment to Article 360, and that was the indiscriminate
laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, to
harass an accused. At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file the
civil or criminal complaint for internet libel in their respective places of
residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 5,
2010).
54. Incriminating an innocent person - As a general rule, planting of

evidence to incriminate an innocent person constitutes the crime of
incriminating an innocent person under Article 363 of RPC. However, if the
incriminatory evidence planted is dangerous drugs or unauthorized explosives,
loose firearm or ammunition, the crime committed is planting of evidence
36 | P a g e
under RA 9165 for the dangerous drug, PD 1866 as amended by RA 9516 for
the explosive and RA No. 10591 for loose firearm.
If unlawful arrest is committed to plant incriminatory evidence, the

crime committed is complex crime of incriminating innocent person through
unlawful arrest (People vs. Alagao, G.R. No. L-20721, April 30, 1966). If
incriminatory evidence is planted to justify an unlawful arrest, the crime
committed is complex crime of unlawful arrest through incriminating an
innocent person. But if the incriminatory evidence is dangerous drugs,
explosive or loose firearm, unlawful arrest and planting of evidence are
separate crimes. Complex crime is not committed since planting of evidence,
which is punishable under special law, cannot be made a component of a
complex crime.
Stealing property and planting the stolen property to impute to the

victim the crime of theft constitutes complex crime of incriminating an
innocent person through theft.
Planting of live bullet by NAIA personnel to extort money from a

passenger of an airline constitutes separate crime of planting of evidence and
consummated or attempted robbery.
55. BP 22 - Demand letter was given with the security guard without
proof that it reached accused and through registered mail which was returned
with the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05". Since there is proof that accused
received the notice of dishonor, he was acquitted However, he is still civilly
liable (San Mateo vs. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013).
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not required

where the drawer has no right to expect that the bank will honor the check.
Since bank account of accused was already closed even before the issuance of
the subject check, he had no right to expect the drawee bank to honor his
check. Hence, he is not entitled to be given a notice of dishonor (Lopez vs.
People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26, 2008, ).The crime involved in Lopez vs.
People is estafa through issuance of bouncing check. However, it is submitted
the Lopez principle can be applied to violation of BP 22.
Payment of check before the filing of information is a defense. The spirit

of B.P. Big 22, which is to protect the stability of the banking system, would
not be served by penalizing people who have corrected their mistakes and
restituted damages even before charges have been filed against them. In sum,
by making payment of the check before the filing of the information, the
purpose of the law has already been attained. Payment of check after the filing
of informationis not a defense. Since there is no showing of intention to
mitigate the bad effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no
equitable reason to preclude the prosecution of accused. In such a case, the
letter of the law should be applied to its full extent (Lim vs. People, G.R. No.
190834, November 26, 2014).
The essence of estafa through issuance of bouncing check is to punish

fraud and not to protect the integrity of the check. Damage and deceit are
elements of estafa, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing
fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the
accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability (Lim vs.
People, supra).
37 | P a g e
Suspension of payment order issued by SEC before the check was

presented for payment is a defense in BP Blg. 22. Considering that there was a
lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. Thus, the
accused has no obligation to fund the check and the complainant has no right
to present it for payment (Gidwani vs. People, GR No. 195064, January 15,
2014).Suspension of payment order issued by SEC after three months from
receipt of notice of dishonor is not a defense in BP Blg. 22. The accused has the
obligation to make good of the check after he received the letter prior to the
issuance of suspension order (Rosario vs. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26,
2008).

56. RA No. 7610 - The Family Code prohibits the infliction of corporal
punishment by teacher. A schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on
her minor student, who even fainted, is liable for child abuse under RA No.
7610 (Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014). Accused saw
the victim and his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused
struck minor-victim at the back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the
accused committed the act at the spur of the moment, they are perpetrated
without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as a human being, or
to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such intent, the crime committed is
not child abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight physical injuries (Bongalon
vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013).
Having sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child constitutes

child prostitution if committed for money, profit, or any other consideration
(People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001); or sexual
abuse is committed under coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group. In child prostitution, the victim is called child exploited in prostitution
while in sexual abuse the victim is called child subjected to other abuse
(Section 5 of RA No 7610). Coercion is either physical or psychological. Taking
advantage of ascendency as a swimming instructor over student is
psychological coercion (People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 7 1998).
The assurance of love, guarantee that she would not get pregnant by using the
"withdrawal method" and the promise of marriage were classified as
"psychological coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5 of RA
7610. Hence, accused is guilty of sexual abuse (Caballo vs. People, GR No.
198732, June 10, 2013).
If the child is 12 years old and above, and the acts of the accused
constitute sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 and rape through sexual assault or
acts of lasciviousness, he shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610 since this law
prescribed a grave penalty (Dimakuta vs. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20,
2015). However, if the acts constitute sexual abuse and rape through sexual
intercourse, he shall be prosecuted under RPC since this law prescribed a
graver penalty. He cannot be prosecuted for compound crime of rape and
sexual abuse because the latter is punishable under special law. He cannot be
prosecuted for both rape and sexual abuse because of the rule on double
jeopardy (People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012 and Alberto vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013).
If the child is under 12 years old, and the acts of the accused constitute
sexual abuse and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall be prosecuted
penalized as follows: (1) rape through sexual intercourse; (2) acts of
lasciviousness with the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
(Section 5 of RA No. 7610).Prior to RA No. 8353 (Rape Law), inserting finger
into genital orifice is acts of lasciviousness. Hence, reclusion temporal in its
38 | P a g e
medium period under RA No. 7610 should be imposed. Under RA No. 8353,
inserting finger into genital orifice is rape through sexual assault where the
penalty is prision mayor. To impose the lighter penalty under RPC as amended
by RA 8353 is unfair to the victim. It is not the intention of RA No. 8353 to
disallow the imposition of penalty under RA No. 7610 if the victim is child
subjected to sexual abuse, who isunder 12 years of age (People vs. Chingh,
G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011). If the crime is qualified rape through sexual
assault, the Chingcase is not applicable since RA No. 8353 prescribed a grave
penalty of reclusion temporal for it (People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897,
June 6, 2011).
57. Terrorism - Terrorism is committing a predicate crime which creates

a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among populace in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful e.g. demand by Al
Queda against the US not to interfere with the affairs of the Muslim (Section of
RA No. 9372). The predicate crimes of terrorism are: Piracy, highway robbery,
hijacking, rebellion, coup e’tat, murder, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, crimes involving destruction, arson, unlicensed firearm and
explosives, violation of Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
Control Act and violation of Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act.
58. Trafficking in person - Accompanying a child and offering her

sexual services in exchange for money constitutes child prostitution. The
accused who offered the victim to the one who raped her is not liable for rape
as principal indispensable cooperation since bringing the victim to the rapist is
not indispensable to the commission of the crime of rape (People vs. Dulay, GR
No. 193854, September 24, 2012). If the accused is regularly offering the sexual
service of the child in exchange for money, the crime committed is not anymore
child prostitution. Maintaining or hiring the child as purpose of prostitution
constitutes qualified trafficking in person because the former took advantage of
vulnerability of the latter as a child and as one who need money. Minority is
qualifying circumstance (People vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 03,
2014). Recruiting without license a person, child or adult, to work as a
prostitute abroad constitutes the crime of trafficking in person and illegal
recruitment. Syndicate is qualifying circumstance in both crimes. Even if the
accused is less than three, but the allegation and evidence shows that there
are at least three traffickers and recruiters, syndicated can be appreciated as
qualifying circumstance (People vs. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011;
People vs. Hashim, G.R. No. 194255, June 13, 2012).
59. Illegal recruitment - An employee may be held liable with his

employer, if the former actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. The employee cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not
aware that before working for her employer in the recruitment agency, she
should first be registered with the POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale
is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is not a defense (People vs.
Valenciano, G.R. No. 180926, December 10, 2008 Justice Velasco).
60. RA No. 9165 - Accused were caught by police authorities on board a

speedboat carrying shabu. Since it was not proven that the drugs came from
China or foreign country they were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs,
which is necessarily included in the charge of importation (People vs. Chan Liu,
G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015).
Where residue of dangerous drugs is found and there is a positive

confirmatory test result, the accused should be charged with use rather than
39 | P a g e
possession of dangerous drugs. This would be in keeping with the intent of the
law to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life (People vs. Matinez, G.R. No.
191366, December 13, 2010).
Positive confirmatory test is an element of use of dangerous drugs.

However, the absence of such test cannot be raised as an issue for the first
time on appeal (Ambre vs. People, G.R. No. 191532. August 15, 2012).
Possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs in a single occasion

constitutes a single offense of possession of dangerous drugs (David vs. People,
G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011).
For illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must

establish that the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous
drug without authority. However, mere possession of dangerous drug
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient
to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation (Asiatico
vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011).
Poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale to poseur buyer. The sale was

aborted when the police officers immediately placed accused under arrest. The
crime committed is attempted sale (People vs. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April
11, 2012).
Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust

operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable requirement in buy-bust
operations (People vs. Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012)
Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 on

inventory and photograph will not necessarily render the items seized or
confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the
letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved (People vs.
Ladip, GR No. 196146, March 12, 2014; People vs. Bis, GR No. 191360, March
10, 2014).
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-

bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and
submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the
court (People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014).
Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any crime

involving dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
61. RA No. 3019 - To apply the Arias rule for purposes of exonerating an
accused or respondent, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the
public officer in approving the release of public fund must be relying to a
reasonable extent on his subordinates (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967,
January 28, 2013); (2) that the documents involving the release of funds must
be so voluminous so as to preclude him from studying each one carefully
40 | P a g e
(Santillano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 03, 2010); (3) that the
public officer has no foreknowledge of existing anomaly (Escara vs. People, G.R.
No. 164921, July 8, 2005); and that there is not deviation from ordinary
procedure in the release of fund, which necessitate further investigation (Cruz
vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005; Rivera vs.
People, G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014).
City treasurer, city accountant and city administrator allowed the release
of cash advance in favor of a paymaster despite the fact that she has previous
unliquidated cash advances. They are liable because of conspiracy of silence or
inaction. Public officers’ omissions to question irregularities indicate a common
understanding and concurrence of sentiments respecting the commission of
the offense of causing undue injury to the government through gross
inexcusable negligence. This is called conspiracy by silence (Jaca vs. People,
G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013).
Under Section 3 (a) of RA No. 3019, a public officer, who persuades,

induces or influences another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, shall be punished for corruption. However, the deliberation
in the Senate regarding the bill on anti-graft shows that the mode of
committing the crime under Section 3 (a) is persuading, inducing or
influencing a public officer by another public officer to commit an offense or to
violate rules and regulations by means of consideration, reward, payment or
remuneration (Baviera vs. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, Oct. 12, 2006).
Section 3 (b) of RA No. 3019 is limited only to contracts or transactions

involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law. Preliminary investigation is not a contract or
transaction within the contemplated of Section 3 (b). Hence, requesting or
receiving money in connection with a preliminary investigation is not a
violation of this provision (Soriano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65952,
July 31, 1984; People vs. Sandiganbayan. and Justice Secretary Perez, G.R.
No. 188165, December 11, 2013).
Failure to file SALN as required by law is a violation of Section 8 of RA

No. 6713 and Section 7 of RA No. 3019 (Concerned Taxpayer vs. Doblada, A.M.
No. P-99-1342, June 8, 2005). Since both laws provide a penalty for failure to
file SALN, the offender should only be prosecuted and punished either under
one or the other.
62. Money laundering - Money laundering is committed by any person

who, knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves,
or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:(a) transacts said monetary
instrument or property;(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires,
possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;(c) conceals or
disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or
ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property;(d)
attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses referred to in
paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);(e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission
of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above;
and(f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the
offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.
Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that
a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to
41 | P a g e
the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so (Section 4 of RA No.

9160 as amended by RA No. 10365).
Unlawful activity refers to any act or omission or series or combination

thereof involving or having direct relation to the following: (1) piracy, murder,
distructive arson, kidnapping for ransom, crimes involving dangerous drugs;
(2) hijacking, carnapping, fencing, robbery, qualified theft, and estafa; (3)
bribery and corruption of public officers, frauds and Illegal exactions,
malversation, graft and corruption, and plunder; (4) forgeries and
counterfeiting; and (5) child pornography, photo-video voyeurism, child abuse,
crimes involving explosives and unlicensed firearm, trafficking in person, illegal
recruitment, terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism, and financing of
terrorism and; smuggling, and illegal gambling.
63. Plunder - The elements of plunder are:
First - That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in

connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons; (Note: Senator Pogi can be
held liable for plunder even if the principal offender, who masterminded the
plunder of pork barrel, is a private individual, the Pork-barrel Queen. What is
important is that Senator Pogi in connivance with Pork-barrel Queen acquired
ill-gotten wealth). On the other hand, Pork-barrel Queen can be held liable for
plunder on the basis of conspiracy.
Second - That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth

through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of

public funds or raids on the public treasury; (Example: Misuse of funds in the
amount P10 million by awarding contract to a close relative, who is not the
lowest bidder; Misuse of funds or fraud disposition of government asset to
P100 million by diverting the construction of road leading to his farm instead of
the poblacion).
Can the Senator use the defense in malversation that he is not

responsible for the misuse of his PDAP since it is the duty of the appropriate
implementing agency of the government to check that the recipient of the fund
is not bogus? No. Assuming that the duty to check that the recipient of the
Senator’s PDAP is not bogus belongs to the appropriate agency of the
government, the Senator is still liable since malversation can be committed
through culpa.
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,

percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer; (Example: Collecting or
receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of
P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the Jose Velarde account and
receiving bi-monthly collections from “jueteng”, a form of illegal gamblingin the
aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00 of which was deposited in the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation (People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No.
26558, September 12, 2007).
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets

belonging to government (Example: Ordering the GSIS and the SSS by
42 | P a g e
President Estrada to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation (People vs.

Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007);
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of

stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or

other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,

connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines;
Note: The word “combination” means at least two different predicate

crimes; while the term “series” means at least two predicate crimes of the same
kind (Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006).
Thus, a single predicate crime amounting to 50 million pesos is not plunder.
The intention of the lawmakers is that if there is only one predicate crime, the
offender has to be prosecuted under the particular crime, which is already
covered by existing laws. What is punishable under the law is "acts of plunder",
which means that there should be at least, two or more, predicate crimes (See
deliberation of the Bicameral Committee on Justice, May 7, 1991).
Third - That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00 (Joseph Ejercito
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
If a Senator, his assistant and private individuals conspires in acquiring

ille-gotten wealth by misappropriating the pork barrel amounting to P172
million of the former, the total amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the
conspirators including the private individuals shall be considered for purpose of
determining if plunder has been committed (Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455,
August 11, 2015).
The damages suffered by the government in diverting the road from the
poblacion to the farm of the accused shall not be considered in determining if
plunder is committed. What is important is the amount of ill-gotten wealth
acquired by the public officer and not the amount of damage suffered by the
government.
In People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12,
2007 -One of the predicate crimes alleged in the information is
misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. However, the following predicate crimes were alleged
and proven by evidence (1) series of acts of receiving collections from "jueteng"
in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00; and (2) series consisting of two
acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle
Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00. This pattern of criminal acts
indicates an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth
in the amount of more than P50 million. Estrada was convicted of plunder.
43 | P a g e
There are two structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle

conspiracy and chain conpiracy. Under the wheel or circle conspiracy, there is
a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the "spokes"). Under the chain conspiracy, usually involving
the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer (Fernan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No.
145927, August 24, 2007, Justice Velasco). An illustration of wheel
conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy
alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada
and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the
spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the
spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (GMA vs. People, G.R. No.
220598, July 19, 2016).
64. Wire-tapping - MMDA officer is extorting money from a driver of a

vehicle, who committed trafficking violation along Edsa. The officer threatened
the driver that he will confiscate her driver’s license unless she will give him
P500.00. However, MMDA officer is not aware that his act of extorting money
is being video-recorder by a passenger. The passenger violated the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law. The recording of private conversations without the consent of the
parties contravenes the provisions of RA No. 4200. The law covers even those
recorded by persons privy to the private communications. The law is applicable
even if the conversation being recorder pertains to criminal extortion (Mamba
vs. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001). Passenger is criminally
liable for violating law. On the other hand, MMDA officer is liable for attempted
robbery. However, in proving attempted robbery, the driver cannot use the
recording since the same is not admissible in evidence.
65. Hazing - The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following
essential elements are established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing
or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or
injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s
admission or entry into an organization (People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222,
February 18, 2015).
Failure to allege that the physical or psychological harm were employed

as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization would prevent the
successful prosecution for the crime of hazing (People vs. Bayabos).
In homicide or murder, what is criminal is the killing of person. Hence,

intent to kill is an indispensable element. Death of the victim consummates the
crime. In hazing, what is prohibited is the infliction of the infliction of physical
or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or
entry into an organization (People vs. Bayabos). Hence, intent to kill is not
material. Death of the neophyte is only important to determine the proper
imposable penalty.
Homicide or murder is malum in se. Consent of the victim to the

infliction of harm may negate dolo or criminal intent, which would make the
killing punishable as reckless imprudence (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No.
151258, February 1, 2012). Hazing is malum prohibitum. Consent of the
neophyte is not a defense (Senate deliberation).
44 | P a g e
In homicide or murder, praeter intentionem is appreciable as a

mitigating circumstance. In hazing, the law expressly disallows the
appreciation of this circumstance. In homicide or murder, the basis of criminal
liability is the actual and conspiratorial participation of the offender in killing
the victim.
In hazing, criminal responsibility is based on (1) actual participation in

inflicting physical harm, (2) presumed participation (of those who are present
during the hazing), (3) the presence of adviser, (4) participation in the planning
(by officers, former officers and alumni of the fraternity); (5) knowledge (of the
parent of frat member in the home of whom hazing occurred, owner of the
place commission, and school authorities).
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no
direct participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices
if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred;
(2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they
consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual
knowledge thereof (People vs. Bayabos).
45 | P a g e

Philippine Law Review on Jurisdiction, Immunity and Retroactivity

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Philippine Law Review on Jurisdiction, Immunity and Retroactivity

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

1. Generality - If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court

Consular officers are immune from criminal prosecution of acts

The presidential immunity is subject the following conditions: (1) the

It is submitted that a Vice-President even during his tenure could not

An incumbent Senator is not immune from suit for being a protector or

2. Territoriality - The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the

Murder or serious physical injuries committed in a foreign vessel

Under the principle of territoriality, the court has jurisdiction over

3. Extraterritoriality – Under the flag state rule, the Philippines has

4. Prospectivity -If the court in trying an accused, who committed a

Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27 of

5. Decriminalization - RA No. 10158 has decriminalized vagrancy by

7. Mistake of fact - Authorities, who manned a checkpoint because of

8. Proximate cause - There had been an interval of 22 days between the

Suicide is not a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC; hence, a

Practicing medicine without license is an offense punishable under special

If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the

If accused employed means to render the victim defenseless, treachery

If a person in committing threat, murder, rape or robbery creates in the

9. Impossible crime - The crime committed is impossible crime if the

Gender is an element of all crimes against chastity except acts of

If the gender element in rape through sexual intercourse is not present,

If the check is unfunded, stealing the checkand presenting it for payment

Kidnapping for ransom consummates at the precise moment when the

Firing a gun at the unoccupied bedroom with intention to kill a victim

the victim is supposed to be sleeping, constitutes arson if the bedroom was

10. Indeterminate offense - Climbing on top of the naked victim,

Inflicting non-mortal woundupon the victim by shooting him constitutes

11. Battered woman syndrome -The essence of this defense of

The elements of Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense are as follows:

12. Imbecility and minority –In exempting circumstance of imbecility,

a. Test of cognition – Under the test of cognition, the mental

b. Test of volition – Under the test of volition, the mental condition

Irresistible homicidal impulse in People vs. Bonoan G.R. No. 45130,

1. If the accused is 15 years of age or below, minority is an exempting

2. Ifthe accused is 15 years of age or below but above 12 years, shallbe

In case of commission of serious crime, a petition for involuntarily

An accused, who is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission

3.If the accused is an adult, application for probation must be filed

Under Section 9 of PD 968, one, who is sentenced to suffer a penalty (or

5.A convict is entitled to a full or 4/5 credit of his preventive

15. Status offense –Status offenses such as curfew violation refers to

16. Exempting circumstance of relationship - The absolutory cause of

17. Voluntary confession - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution

18. Allegation - It is now a requirement that the aggravating or

19. Nighttime - Nighttime is aggravating if the accused took advantage

20. Band - In robbery, band is a special aggravating circumstance under

21. Exploitation of minor –Thespecial aggravating circumstance of

22. Conspiracy - It is immaterial whether appellant acted as a principal

To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have

If there is conspiracy to commit rape, each of conspirators is responsible

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary application

If there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No.

Mayor, treasurer and planning coordinator approved the overpayments

23. Accomplice - Lending weapon such a gun to a killer for purpose of

24. Fencing – In fencing, the property, which the accused possesses

Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is

25. Obstruction of justice – Obstruction of justice can only be

The accused cannot be prosecuted both as an accessory for murder and

After the discoveryof illegal possession of lumber, the accused unlawfully