G.R. No.

159787             May 25, 2007

OGIE DIAZ, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the subject article is libelous. 

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.

This provision should be read in relation with Article 355 of the same Code which states:

ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. – A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.

Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.2 Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper. 

We find the first element present. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them,
unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.3 In the instant case,
the article in question details the sexual activities of a certain "Miss S" and one "Philip Henson" who
had a romantic liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character,
integrity, and reputation of "Miss S." The words convey that "Miss S" is a sexual libertine with
unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such as ours, where modesty is still highly
prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to "Miss S" by the article in question had
besmirched both her character and reputation. 

As to the element of malice, we find that since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a
presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by
personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of
the person who claims to have been defamed.4 We agree with the Court of Appeals that there
was neither good reason nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass "Miss
S" and injure her reputation. 
On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article appeared in the December
28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid. 

The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous
article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not
necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or
if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which
others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by
extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was
the person referred to.5 Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid the rule that this requirement
is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article. 

The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient description or other
indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay
are one and the same person.

Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda Bagay could not have been the person defamed
therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen,7 we held that where the requirement for an identified or
identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203335               February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL
and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, 
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. 40

There is "actual malice" or malice in fact  when the offender makes the defamatory statement
41

with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.  The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of
42

probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused
in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or
even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. 43

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public
figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First
National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime
law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter
standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a
public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion
of public affairs.
44

G.R. No. 184315               November 25, 2009

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, 
vs.
THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, ROBERTO COYIUTO, JR., NOEL
CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO and
THELMA SAN JUAN,Respondents.

Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 353. Definition of Libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.

Based on this definition, this Court has held that four elements constitute the crime of libel,
namely (a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt; (b)
malice, either in law or in fact; (c) publication; and (d) identifiability of the person defamed. 7

Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be instituted, like in the case at bar,
as a purely civil action, the cause of action for which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

The above elements of libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for damages. As held by
this Court in GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos8:

An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to
defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious
imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present the following elements:
(a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication
of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

Of these four elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the publication of the alleged
imputation. Libel is published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or
brought to the attention or notice of another person other than its author and the offended party.9 The
circulation of an allegedly libelous matter in a newspaper is certainly sufficient publication. We are
thus left with the determination of the existence of the three remaining elements of libel, namely: (1)
the defamatory imputation; (2) the identity of the person defamed; and (3) the existence of malice.

Defamatory Imputation

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends
to injure reputation or to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff, or
to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything
that is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into
disrepute.10 In determining whether certain utterances are defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they would
naturally be understood by persons hearing (or reading, as in libel) them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense.11