Theory Comparison

Related terms:

Body Image Development, Media Influence, Career Success, Self Evaluation, Ado-
lescence, Self Esteem, Research Workers, Internalization, Objectification

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Media Influences on Female Body Im-

age
M.P. Levine, in Encyclopedia of Body Image and Human Appearance, 2012

Social comparison processes

Social comparison theory addresses people’s tendency to compare their own attrib-
utes or behaviors to those of others, especially when the characteristics (e.g., beauty)
are important and when standards for evaluation are ambiguous. In the contrast
effect, social comparison denotes the mediating process in which females compare
themselves with idealized images in the mass media, and, on perceiving that their
own body shape or weight ‘fails’ to meet the thin standard, show increased weight
and body dissatisfaction.

Several lines of evidence support the proposition that social comparison medi-
ates the relationship between media exposure and negative body image. A recent
cross-sectional study found a significant positive correlation between Australian
high school females’ exposure to fashion and beauty magazines (but not television
programs), and to the Internet sites with an appearance focus, and internalization
of the thin ideal, appearance comparison, weight dissatisfaction, and drive for thin-
ness. As predicted by Thompson’s tripartite model of sociocultural influences, the
relationships between extent of exposure to the two forms of media and both drive
for thinness and weight dissatisfaction were mediated independently by thin-ideal
internalization and by the tendency toward greater appearance comparisons.

Two cross-sectional US studies found that young women who self-consciously divide
their attention between the slender models in magazines and themselves are more
likely to demonstrate a contrast effect, whereas those who focus intensely on the
models while defocusing attention on the self are more likely to identify with the
models and to show an assimilation effect. The unhealthy division of attention
probably represents social comparison as a form of self-evaluation. However, the
mechanisms by which social comparison operates are far from clear. On the one
hand, several studies have found that explicit self-evaluative instructions, as com-
pared to instructions emphasizing self-improvement, generate body dissatisfaction.
On the other hand, Stephen Want’s recent meta-analysis of variables that moderate
experimental effects (see Criterion 4) found that explicit comparison instructions
produced significantly smaller effect sizes for body dissatisfaction than distracter
instructions. Want offers the testable hypothesis that distracter instructions facilitate
automatic social comparison processes and also interfere with conscious defensive
or buffering reactions like those induced by laboratory inoculation studies (see
Criterion 5).

There is a complex interplay between the potential standard for comparison (i.e., me-
dia images as social stimuli), the perceiver’s self-concept, the dispositional tendency
toward social comparison as a moderator variable, the mediating process of social
comparison, and media effects. Many adolescent girls and young women are, like
most social scientists, critical of the media’s restrictive and unrealistic thin beauty
ideal. Yet these females remain motivated to seek and use such media for social
comparisons, because they consider professional models to embody (1) social norms
endorsed by female and male peers, and (2) realistic possibilities for a majority of
girls and women. And yet surveys of girls and women ages 8–25 indicate that the
tendency to engage in self-evaluative social comparisons using slender models and
celebrities as a beauty standard is a moderator of media’s negative effects on body
image. Girls and women who compare themselves to models in fashion magazines
and on television report greater body dissatisfaction. Indeed, even though the two
variables potentiate each other, some studies indicate that this social comparison
trait is more determinative of body dissatisfaction than extent of media exposure.

The relationship between preexisting (trait) body dissatisfaction as a moderator of

negative media effects on body image (see above) and social comparison as both
a mediator and a moderator was recently confirmed by researchers in the Nether-
lands. Relative to women expressing body satisfaction, undergraduate women who
were already dissatisfied with their own bodies tended to be negatively affected by
exposure to and comparison with a variety of thin, physically attractive people. They
even showed a contrast effect after seeing a drawing of a thin vase versus a fatter,
rounded vase.

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Pay, Compensation, and Performance,
Psychology of
Joseph J. Martocchio, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sci-
ences (Second Edition), 2015

Social Comparison Theory

According to social comparison theory, individuals need to evaluate their accomplish-
ments, and they do so by comparing themselves to similar individuals (Festinger,
1954). Demographic characteristics (e.g., age or race) and occupation are common
comparative bases. Individuals tend to select social comparisons who are slightly
better than themselves (Festinger, 1954). Researchers have applied social compar-
ison theory to explain the processes for setting executive compensation (O'Reilly
et al., 1988).

As we discussed earlier, compensation committees play an important role in setting

executive compensation, and compensation committees often include CEOs from
other organizations of equal or greater stature. Based on social comparison theory,
compensation committee members probably rely on their own compensation pack-
ages and the compensation packages of CEOs in organizations of equal or greater
stature to determine executive compensation.

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Social Comparison, Psychology of

Ladd Wheeler, Jerry Suls, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Assimilation and Contrast

Until the 1990s, most students of social comparison theory believed that comparison
always led to contrast with the comparison target. That is, an upward comparison
(with someone better) lowered a person's self-evaluation, and a downward compar-
ison (with someone worse) raised the self-evaluation, as shown in the Mr Clean/Mr
Dirty study. There was even a subsidiary theory called ‘Downward comparison
principles in social psychology’ that argued that when people are psychologically
threatened they will deliberately seek out someone worse to compare themselves
to in order to relieve their distress (Wills, 1981). This theory was quite influential
during the 1980s until accumulating evidence caused it to be abandoned. The basic
problem with the theory is that when people are psychologically threatened, they are
more inclined to see others as superior to themselves and would have difficulty
in finding and using downward comparison targets. We discussed previously the
research showing that when people are experiencing negative affect, they are more
likely to make upward comparisons rather than downward comparisons (Wheeler
and Miyake, 1992). Presumably, this happens because negative affect causes people
to perceive themselves negatively and to perceive most other people as superiors to
themselves. In short, although downward comparison does generally make people
feel better, people who are distressed or threatened find it difficult to find and use
downward comparisons.

While believing that comparison usually led to contrast, researchers were aware
that the rank-order studies, among others, had shown that people usually compare
upward. If comparing upward leads to contrasting feelings of inferiority, why would
people do it?

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Dimensional Comparisons and Their

Consequences for Self-Concept, Moti-
vation, and Emotion
Jens Möller, ... Herb W. Marsh, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behav-
ioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Going beyond the I/E model, the dimensional comparison theory (DCT; Möller and
Marsh, 2013) points to the psychological processes behind this so-called contrast
effect. In DCT, dimensional comparisons are defined as taking place when people
compare their ability in one domain (the target domain) with their ability in one or
more, other domains (the standard domain/domains). The purpose of this article is
to present the basic psychological principles of DCT in 10 hypotheses (see Table 1).
Doing this, we follow Festinger's (1954) approach in formulating 10 hypotheses on
social comparison theory (SCT) and Albert's (1977) similar approach in formulating
10 hypotheses on temporal comparison theory (TCT). While Albert derived these 10
hypotheses on TCT by conceptually translating Festinger's 10 hypotheses on SCT
to the context of temporal comparisons, a simple transformation of SCT or TCT
hypotheses to a dimensional comparison context was deemed inadequate: Some
of these hypotheses do not fit DCT, while others have been falsified by subsequent
research. However, the idea of developing hypotheses as a basis for DCT does seem
profitable to us.

Table 1. Ten hypotheses on dimensional comparisons

I People carry out dimensional comparisons that
are intraindividual comparisons of their own abil-
ities in different domains.
II People prefer domains as comparison standards
that share relative attributes with the target do-
main.
III Most dimensional comparisons are upward com-
parisons with a better-off domain.
IV Dimensional comparisons serve motivation-
al needs (for self-differentiation, self-enhance-
ment, self-evaluation, self-improvement, and
self-maintenance).
V Dimensional comparisons are triggered by exter-
nal forces.
VI Dimensional comparisons lead to contrast effects
in self-evaluations (when the respective abilities
are believed to be negatively correlated).
VII Dimensional comparisons lead to assimilation ef-
fects in self-evaluations (when the respective abil-
ities are believed to be positively correlated).
VIII The net effect of dimensional comparisons is pos-
itive.
IX Dimensional comparisons also influence mood
and behavior.
X Dimensional comparisons influence evaluations
of and by other people and groups.

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Social Comparison, Psychology of

L. Wheeler, ... R. Martin, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences, 2001

3.1 Challenges to Downward Comparison Theory

There is substantial controversy about the empirical support for downward com-
parison theory. The theory makes the intuitively appealing prediction that when
people are experiencing distress they will make a downward comparison to reduce
the distress. Others have questioned whether people experiencing distress are psy-
chologically capable of making a downward comparison; their attention may be so
focused on their distress that they are unable to see others as being worse off than
themselves. In research using the Social Comparison Record (see above), Wheeler
and Miyake (1992) found that when participants were experiencing negative affect,
they made upward comparisons rather than the downward comparisons predicted
by downward comparison theory. In contrast, when the same participants were
experiencing positive affect, they made downward comparisons. Such a result is not
consistent with downward comparison theory but is consistent with affect-cognition
priming models in which affect primes (makes ready and available) cognitions about
the self that are congruent with the affect. Experiencing negative affect primes a
person to have negative thoughts about the self and thus to see others as superior
to the self, leading to a contrastive upward comparison and further feelings of
inferiority and negative affect.

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Long-Term Change of Happiness in Na-

tions
Ruut Veenhoven, in Stability of Happiness, 2014

Long-term change
The above-mentioned theories of stable happiness do allow for short-term fluctu-
ations. Comparison theory assumes that meeting aspirations will boost happiness
temporarily until this advancement is neutralized by rising aspirations. Likewise,
trait theories hold that happiness may vary somewhat with ups and downs in life: a
trait happy person will be relatively happy in the year of marriage and unhappy in
the year the couple divorces, but in the long run this person will oscillate around
the same happiness level. Although such individual variations will balance out in
the population of a nation, collective happenings may still affect the average—for
instance, an economic recession or threat of war. For this reason, I consider only
long-term changes in average happiness in nations, that is, for periods of at least 10
years.

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Internal/External Frame of Reference

Model
Herbert W. Marsh, ... Reinhard Pekrun, in International Encyclopedia of the Social
& Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Big-Fish–Little-Pond Effect
Marsh (see review by Marsh et al., 2008) proposed the BFLPE to encapsulate frame
of reference effects that are based on an integration of theoretical models (e.g., rel-
ative deprivation theory, social comparison theory, psychophysical judgment, social
judgment). In the BFLPE model, students are hypothesized to compare their abilities
with the abilities of their classmates and to use this social comparison impression as
one basis for forming their own self-concept (Figure 5); individual ability is positively
related to ASC (the brighter I am the higher my ASC) but school-average ability has a
negative effect on ASC (the brighter my classmates, the lower my ASC). Extensive
support for the BFLPE generalizes across student groups, subject domains, ASC
instruments, and cultures (see review by Marsh, 2007; Marsh et al., 2008). However,
again nearly all of this research is based on a single domain of ASC: typically MSC,
VSC, or global ASC.

Figure 5. Path model predictions based on the big-fish–little-pond effect (BFLPE).

Adapted with permission from Marsh, H.W., 2007. Self-concept Theory, Measure-
ment and Research into Practice: The Role of Self-concept in Educational Psychology.
British Psychological Society, Leicester, UK.

Indeed, integration of these two theoretical models suggests that the negative
BFLPE could be accompanied by a compensatory positive effect (the BFLP-CE)
when both math and verbal domains are considered simultaneously. The I/E model
suggests that processes that change self-concept in one domain have a compen-
satory effect on self-concept in another domain, leading to the predictions that: (1)
school-average ability in math has a negative effect on MSC (the BFLPE) but a posi-
tive effect on VSC (the BFLP-CE); and (2) school-average verbal ability has a negative
effect on VSC (BFLPE) but a positive effect on MSC. Marsh (1990) provided initial
support for this integration of I/E and BFLPE models, showing that school-average
math ability negatively predicted MSC but positively predicted VSC, and vice versa for
English achievement. However, compensatory effects found by Marsh (1990) were
small, and finding appropriate tests of the integrated BFLP-CE model has proved
difficult, because school-average math and verbal achievements typically are so
highly correlated (r’s > 0.95) that school contexts in the two domains cannot be
easily differentiated. The following suggestions by Marsh et al. (2015) capitalized
on an important feature of the German educational system; some academically
selective schools select students on the basis of overall achievement, but others have
a subject-specific theme and select students who excel in a particular area, rather
than overall. Consistent with theoretical predictions, there were BFLPEs for both
types of selective schools, but the BFLP-CE, based on the I/E model, was only evident
for the themed (magnet) schools.

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Social Relationships
Judith Wiener, Victoria Timmermanis, in Learning About Learning Disabilities
(Fourth Edition), 2012

Role of Special Class Placement

To what extent does special class placement affect self-esteem and domain specific
self-concepts of children and youth with LD? Some advocates of inclusion claim
that labeling and segregated special education placement damage self-esteem (e.g.,
Coleman, 1983). Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), however, predicts that
children with LD in more segregated settings might have higher self-esteem and
domain specific self-concepts because they compare their own competencies with
other students with LD.

The evidence does not strongly support either position according to the results
of two meta-analyses (Bear et al., 2002; Elbaum, 2002). For most comparisons,
children’s self-esteem and domain specific self-concepts did not differ by type of
placement. Both meta-analyses, however, showed that children with LD in regular
classrooms who did not receive any special education support had lower academic
self-concept than children receiving support. Whitley (2008), however, provided
evidence that the issue is more complex. Using a longitudinal database that is a
representative sample of Canadian children and youth, she investigated predictors
of self-esteem in a sample of school-identified 10- to 14-year-old children with
LD. The model suggested that the relationship between inclusive special education
placements and self-esteem was indirect; more inclusive placements were associated
with lower social self-concept, the perception that teachers were unfair and that
parents had high expectations. These factors predicted lower self-esteem.

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Quality Adjusted Life Years

J.A. Salomon, in International Encyclopedia of Public Health, 2008

Calculating QALYs
The logic underlying QALY calculations is straightforward. Referring back to Figure
1, the gain in QALYs attributed to some intervention relative to an explicit compara-
tor may be understood as the difference between the areas under the two curves
tracing the health trajectory in each alternative intervention scenario. To calculate
the area under each curve requires knowledge of the sequence of health states that
are experienced; the duration of each health state; and the utility of each health state
measured on a meaningful cardinal scale.

There are a range of conceptual and methodological issues around the calculation
of health state utilities or valuations. Many areas of contention remain. Several
techniques are available for eliciting health state valuations from respondents, in-
cluding the standard gamble, time trade-off, person trade-off, and visual analog
scale, and discussion continues about the advantages and disadvantages of each of
these methods. Empirical studies have found that the different techniques produce
values that differ systematically, and debates about the relative merits of the different
methods refer to economic theory, comparisons of psychometric properties of the
different measurement techniques, and ethical issues. Other persistent controver-
sies relating to measurement of health utilities include the treatment of states
that are regarded as worse than being dead; and appropriate ways to account
for patient adaption in the valuation of health outcomes, in light of observed
differences between predicted and experienced utility. Another area of ongoing
discussion encompasses empirical questions regarding variation in values across
different respondent groups defined by sociodemographic characteristics or by their
relationship to the condition being assessed (e.g., patients, providers, or the lay
public). One general approach that is widely used in deriving utility values for QALYs
combines information elicited from patients and the lay public. In short, patients are
asked to describe their health status using a standardized instrument comprising
ratings along several key dimensions of health (for example, mobility, vision, and
cognition). Utility values are then computed for the resulting multi-dimensional
health states by applying scoring rules that reflect the relative importance of each
dimension, as ascertained from general community surveys. The variety of issues
relating to utility assessment provides fertile ground for researchers and will likely
continue to inspire debate as theoretical and empirical work proceeds.

Regarding the other key inputs to QALYs, while straightforward in concept, all inputs
typically are not fully observed, so models are usually needed in order to assess
the movement of a typical patient through health states over time. Borrowing the
definition suggested by Kuntz and Weinstein (2001: 142), a model in this context
refers to “any mathematical structure that represents the health and economic
outcomes of patients or populations under a variety of scenarios.” Much of the
modeling work for economic evaluations relies on Markov models. A Markov model
comprises a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive health states. Each
person in the model can reside in only one health state at any point in time, and all
persons residing in a particular health state are indistinguishable from one another.
Transitions occur from one state to another at defined recurring intervals (Markov
cycles) of equal length (such as 1 month or 1 year) according to a set of transition
probabilities. These probabilities may depend on population characteristics such as
age, sex, and chronic disease and may vary over time. Values are assigned to each
health state to reflect the cost and utility of spending one Markov cycle in that state.
By synthesizing data on costs, effects, and quality of life, a Markov model enables
comparisons of the outcomes associated with different clinical strategies. Modeling
strategies can accommodate QALY calculations by simulating disease progression
through discrete states; tracking time spent in each state; applying utility weights
to time lived in each state; and cumulating life years, accounting for state-specific
weights, to compute QALYs.

> Read full chapter

Quality Adjusted Life Years

Joshua A. Salomon, in International Encyclopedia of Public Health (Second Edition),
2017

Calculating QALYs
The logic underlying QALY calculations is straightforward. Referring back to Fig-
ure 1, the gain in QALYs attributed to some intervention relative to an explicit
comparator may be understood as the difference between the areas under the two
curves tracing the health trajectory in each alternative intervention scenario. To
calculate the area under each curve requires knowledge of the sequence of health
states that are experienced; the duration of each health state; and the utility of each
health state measured on a meaningful cardinal scale.

There are a range of conceptual and methodological issues around the calculation
of health state utilities or valuations. Many areas of contention remain. Several
techniques are available for eliciting health state valuations from respondents, in-
cluding the standard gamble, time trade-off, person trade-off, and visual analog
scale, and discussion continues about the advantages and disadvantages of each of
these methods. Empirical studies have found that the different techniques produce
values that differ systematically, and debates about the relative merits of the different
methods refer to economic theory, comparisons of psychometric properties of the
different measurement techniques, and ethical issues. Other persistent controver-
sies relating to measurement of health utilities include the treatment of states
that are regarded as worse than being dead; and appropriate ways to account
for patient adaption in the valuation of health outcomes, in light of observed
differences between predicted and experienced utility. Another area of ongoing
discussion encompasses empirical questions regarding variation in values across
different respondent groups defined by sociodemographic characteristics or by their
relationship to the condition being assessed (e.g., patients, providers, or the lay
public). One general approach that is widely used in deriving utility values for QALYs
combines information elicited from patients and the lay public. In short, patients are
asked to describe their health status using a standardized instrument comprising
ratings along several key dimensions of health (for example, mobility, vision, and
cognition). Utility values are then computed for the resulting multi-dimensional
health states by applying scoring rules that reflect the relative importance of each
dimension, as ascertained from general community surveys. The variety of issues
relating to utility assessment provides fertile ground for researchers and will likely
continue to inspire debate as theoretical and empirical work proceeds.

Regarding the other key inputs to QALYs, while straightforward in concept, all inputs
typically are not fully observed, so models are usually needed in order to assess
the movement of a typical patient through health states over time. Borrowing the
definition suggested by Kuntz and Weinstein (2001: p. 142), a model in this context
refers to “any mathematical structure that represents the health and economic
outcomes of patients or populations under a variety of scenarios.” Much of the
modeling work for economic evaluations relies on Markov models. A Markov model
comprises a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive health states. Each
person in the model can reside in only one health state at any point in time, and all
persons residing in a particular health state are indistinguishable from one another.
Transitions occur from one state to another at defined recurring intervals (Markov
cycles) of equal length (such as 1 month or 1 year) according to a set of transition
probabilities. These probabilities may depend on population characteristics such as
age, sex, and chronic disease and may vary over time. Values are assigned to each
health state to reflect the cost and utility of spending one Markov cycle in that state.
By synthesizing data on costs, effects, and quality of life, a Markov model enables
comparisons of the outcomes associated with different clinical strategies. Modeling
strategies can accommodate QALY calculations by simulating disease progression
through discrete states; tracking time spent in each state; applying utility weights
to time lived in each state; and cumulating life years, accounting for state-specific
weights, to compute QALYs.
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