6.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

6. 1 NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
Perez is the Brgy Captain of Binauaanan, Cam Sur. In a case of murder and kidnapping for
ransom , he was implicated in the extrajudicial confession prepared by the respondent as the
mastermind of the criminal activities, among with other 2 suspects, Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego
Avila. According to Perez, while Ilo and Avila were detained by the police authorities, the
respondent made representation that he could secure their freedom if they will sign the
prepared extrajudicial confessions. Unknown to them, the respondent was also representing the
family of the victim .
During the trial, the respondent denied the accusations against him explaining that it was Ilo and
Avila who sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, that in executing the
extrajudicial confession there was no undue compulsion exerted on the part of the accused.
Complainant Perez then charged respondent with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer for representing conflicting interests before the IBP.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent IS guilty of representing conflicting interests?
RULING:
The court found out that the respondent is GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo.
Perez was able to adduced evidence that respondent was representing the two accused, while
he was also representing the interest of the victim’s family. This was declared by the victim’s
daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before the Regional Trial Court that her family retained
the services of Atty. Danilode la Torre to prosecute the case against her father’s killers.
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.4
Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having
conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof
that he secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict
of interest, Wherefore,
the respondent was SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law,
6.2
4. LETICIA GONZALES vs ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA
Gonzales was the complainant in a civil case where she was represented by the law firm of
Atty. Edmar Cabucana together with the respondent. A decision was rendered by the Court in
favor of Gonzales.Sheriff Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in
connection with the judgment.This prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff
;
In September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales, they harassed
Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint. Gonzales filed a
criminal cases for trespassing, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation
against the Gatchecos;
While the respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, the respondent also represented the
Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales .Respondent alleged that he never appeared and represented of
such case since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented Gonzales in said

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case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but
claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the sps pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing
to take their case.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR ?
HELD:
The court held that the respondent is guilty violating Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
Respondent allegation that it was his brother who represented Gonzales, thus there could be no conflict of
interest is no merit. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil
case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interest applies.
It is well-settled rule that lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on
principles of public policy as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client confidence but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The
proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. The court consider however as
mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the Gatcheco sps pro bono and that it was his
firm and not respondent personally which handled the civil case of Gonzales. And it was observed that
there was no malice and bad faith in respondents acceptance of the Gatchecos cases as shown by the
move of complainant to withdraw the case. Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, of CPR and taking
consideration of mitigating circumstances, Atty. Cabucana is fined the amount of P 2,000 with stern
warning that
6.3
Facts: Felicitas Felicitas Quiambao vs. Atty. Nestor Bamba
Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc (AIB). Quiambao
retained the legal services of Atty. Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB. Respondent was also the legal
counsel of Quiambao in an ejectment case she filed against spouses Santiago and Florito Torroba.
When Quiambao resigned from AIB, respomdent, without withdrawing as counsel from the ejectment
case, represented AIB in a case for replevin and damages filed against her. Quiambao filed charges
against respondent for representing conflicting interests.
For his part, respondent denied that he was a personal lawyer of Quiambao, and he believes that it is part
of his duty to pursue cases in behalf of employees at the time Quiambao was working in AIB. Respondent
also contends that the ejectment case and replevin case are completely unrelated.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: Yes, the respondent is found guilty of representing conflicting interests. Despite respondent
contention that his legal services extend to AIB’s employees, this should not cover the personal cases
filed by its officers.
Even though the replevin and ejectment case are unrelated, representing opposing clients therein gives
rise to suspicions of double-dealing, and would thus result to a conflict of interest.
Furthermore, respondent failed to show that he disclosed or procured the approval of Quiambao before
pursuing the replevin case against her. Thus, the respondent was found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from practicing for one (1) year.
6.4
ATTY CATALAN VS ATTY SILVOSA
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa for direct bribery for bribing his then colleague prose
cutor.

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Attyy  Silvosa claimed that “it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacit
y as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the 
category of crimes against public officers.
Issue: won Atty. Silvosa should be disbarred considering that the crime for which he was convict
ed was in his capacity as public officer.
Ruling:
Yes.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime.
His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacc
eptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a pr
ivilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa was DISBARRED.

6.5
REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent.
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of
computer software development. From February to November 2003, respondent
served as Comtech's retained corporate counsel . In a meeting held on October
2003, respondent suggested to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow the
members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines, to participate
during board meetings, through a teleconference.
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant
became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda
Soledad, a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was
suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus,
Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent effective
November 2003.
In one of stockholders' meeting held on 2004, respondent attended as proxy for
Gary Harrison. Steven and Deanna Palm, members of the Board of Directors, were
present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to order, respondent
objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and
Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting because the corporate by-laws
had not yet been amended to allow teleconferencing.
On 2004, Comtech's new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return the
amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was
the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. Due to Soledad's failure to comply with
Comtech's written demands, a case of Estafa was filed against Soledad.
Respondent appeared as Soledad's counsel.
Complainant then filed a Complaint1 for disbarment against respondent for
revealing information obtained in the course of an attorney-client relationship and
for representing an interest which conflicted with that of his former client ,
(Comtech).
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent violated Canon 15.03 and Canon 21 of the CPR?
RULING:
No. As found by the court, the respondent did not violate Cano Rule 16 and 21 of
the CPR.

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What transpired on January 2004 was not a board meeting but a stockholders'
meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical
presence of a stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders' meeting because a
member may vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation or by-laws.8 Hence, there was no need for Steven and Deanna Palm
to participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent their proxies to
the meeting.
In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate
by-laws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a
confidential information11
12
 Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority
of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with
the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be
confidential. The documents are public records and could not be
considered confidential.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders' meeting could
not be considered a violation of his client's secrets and confidence within the
contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The court finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a
case of EStafa.  records show that respondent did not used against Comtech
any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtech's retained
counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his
retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyer's immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the
client.16 The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
client's interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client
and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.17
νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

6.6
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., represented by GABRIEL H.
ABAD, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK, Respondent.

Don Teodoro V. Santos (Santos) organized Mabalacat Institute in 1950 and Hocorma
Foundation in 1979. Santos hired respondent on 1982 to assist Santos and the organizations he
established, including the Mabalacat Institute, in its legal problems. In 1983 respondent serve
as a director and legal counsel of the Mabalacat Institute .3
From 1983 to 1985, Atty. Funk used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive
officer, and trustee of the HOCORMA foundation.1 He also served as its counsel in several
criminal and civil cases.
On Nov 2006, Atty Funk, filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma
Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc.
Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed against respondent, using information that he
acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) and in breach of attorney-client relationship.2

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Atty. Funk defense was that, that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his
attorney's fees, the lawyer-client relationship between them was terminated.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR when
he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one?
RULING
Evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of the legal services of Atty.
Funk .Indeed, Atty. Funk collected attorney's fees from the foundation for such services. Thus,
he had an obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including
the fact that the property under litigation existed at all, when he sued the foundation.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is
undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after
terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of
another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written consent.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties.1An attorney may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the
erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative.15
Thus, the Court  SUSPENDS Atty. Richard Funk from the practice of law for one year.
6.7
ARTEZULE V ATTY MADERAZO
FACTS:
On 1992, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car, when the car rammed accidentally into a
small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela.3
The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her
small business, resulting to her financial dislocation.
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia,
Villapez and one Bernardo Sia However, the case was dismissed on 1994, allegedly upon the
instance of the complainant and her husband.8 Because of the dismissal of the case,
complainant filed a civil case for damages against the respondent. The case was also dismissed
on, 2001.9
Artezuela filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent due to the alleged gross
negligence of his duties as a lawyer and failure to represent her interests with zeal and
enthusiasm. According to her, during the scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993,
respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding
complainant's persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the
case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant's consent.10
Complainant also claimed that while respondent acted as her counsel, respondent prepared
Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in
respondent's office.She further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the
case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.11
In his defense, the respondent admitted that Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was
printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted as counsel of
Echavia. Respondent intimated that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the
accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount of ₱500,000.00.13
ISSUE:

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W/N the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics?
RULING:

The Investigating Committee found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as
opposed to respondent's bare denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty.
Maderazo, introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's office, asked
him to return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended
Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to
present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. His excuse
was that--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the
counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting
interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof
of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original
client. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, Respondent argued
that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the
complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who
prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.
We cannot find any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once
again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely

6.8 ELESIO1 C. PORMENTO, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ALIAS A.

PONTEVEDRA, Respondent

Elesio C. Pormento, Sr. charged Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and
misconduct for representing conflicting interest praying that on the basis of the
facts alleged therein, respondent be disbarred.

- respondent is his family's legal Respondent denies the allegation that he

counsel and their with respondent
extends beyond mere lawyer-
client relations.3
In Civil case no 1428, which is counterclaim case
for the recovery of his ownership over a
parcel of land, the respondent acted is his
counsel ,wherein respondent failed to inform him
of the dismissal of the case, which deprived of
his right to appeal said to the said order
did not inform complainant of the trial
court's order dismissing the latter's
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648
As to his representation of the persons
against whom complainant filed criminal
cases for theft,9 respondent argues that
he honestly believes that there exists no
conflict between his present and former

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 clients' interests as the cases he handled
In criminal case 3149,in order to protect for these clients are separate and
his rights, Complainant was forced to distinct from each other.
filed a criminal case for qualified theft He further contends that he took up the
against the relatives of the alleged new cause of the accused in the criminal
owner of the disputed land where the cases filed by complainant for
Respondent acted as the counsel of the humanitarian considerations since said
accused in said case of which, accused are poor and needy and
respondent utilized pieces of confidential because there is a dearth of lawyers in
information he obtained from their community.
complainant while the latter is still his
client
Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP Board of Governors set aside and dismissed the Commissioner’s
recommendation for lack of merit,
THE SC do not agree with the dismissal of the complaint by the IBP.
The SC find RULED that there is conflict of interests in respondent's representation
of the complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 and his subsequent employment as
counsel of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
The Court ruled that respondent should have declined employment in Criminal
Case No. 3159 so as to avoid suspicion that he used in the criminal action any
information he may have acquired in Civil Case No. 1649
It cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of complainant in Civil
Case No. 1648, he became privy to the documents and information that
complainant possessed with respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever
may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against complainant any
information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the opposing
side.
Nothing on record would show that respondent fully apprised complainant and his
new clients or at least tried to secure their consent when he took the defense of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
Respondent contends that he handled the defense of the accused in the subject
criminal case for humanitarian reasons and with the honest belief that there exists
no conflict of interests. However, the rule is settled that the prohibition against
representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorney's intentions and
motives were honest and he acted in good faith.37  Respondent also asserts that
when he accepted employment in Criminal Case No. 3159, the attorney-client
relations between him and complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 had already been
terminated. This defense does not hold water because the termination of the
relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.39
Thus, we find respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests
which is paramount importance in the administration of justice.3

6.9 SAMSON VS ATTY.ERA

Ferdinand A. Samson filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Edgardo Era for

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misconduct for representing conflicting interest

Samson and his relatives were victims of pyramiding scam The respondent
perpetrated by (ICS Corporation), whose corporate officers were led alleged that the
by Sison. lawyer-client
Samson engaged the legal services of the respondent to represent relationship between
and assist him and his relatives in a case of estafa they filed against him and Samson and
Sison and her group. his group had been
Respondent suggested to Samson and his relatives about the terminated ; and that
amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts, guaranteeing the he had been appointed
turnover to them of a certain property belonging to ICS Corporation in as counsel de officio
exchange for their desistance. They executed the affidavit of for Sison only for
desistance ,and in turn they received a deed of assignment executed purposes of her
by Sison. Later on, they demanded that they be given instead a deed arraignment.
of absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among
themselves. After sometime, respondent delivered five copies of a
deed of absolute sale involving the property
Upon verification of the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds,
they found out that they could not liquidate the property because it
was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation but was
already under the name of Bank Wise Inc. 5 Upon their urging, Atty.
Era negotiated as their counsel with ICS Corporation. After that, they
failed to hear from the respondent anymore.During the trial, Atty. Era
did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. This forced them
to engage another lawyer. They find out later on, however, that Atty.
Era appears as counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases involving
the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had
perpetrated.7

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP found respondent guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests,
The IBP Board of Governors also adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
The SC likewise affirmed the findings of the IBP.

ISSUE; W/N Atty. Era is guilty of violating Canon 15and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests?
RULING:
Yes the Court finds respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interest by
representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to represent
Samson and his group, knowing that Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his
group had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance.
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group,
the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that
the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences
acquired in the previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he

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 shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself.35 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death
of the client.36
In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them
of the conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either
to outrightly decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice
Sison to engage another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer
the proper sanction.
Hence, the Court ordered the respondent to be SUSPENDed from the practice of law for two
years.

7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF CORPORATE LAWYERS

7.1 HEIM VS SIGNCRAFT SCREENPRINT

Plaintiff, Susan Y. Heim, filed a complaint against defendants, Signcraft Screenprint, Inc. ("Signcraft"),
Dennis J. Harle, and Sandra A. Redington
Some of plaintiff's claims are brought derivatively on behalf of Signcraft and contain allegations of fraud
and self-dealing by Harle and Redington. Plaintiff argues Theodore Forsberg, the corporate counsel of
Signcraft , should be disqualified as counsel for representing the defendants, both of whom are Signcraft
board members

First, plaintiff believes Forsberg likely will be
called to testify as a witness because of his alleged
involvement with the events giving rise to
plaintiff's claims.  However, it is not clear at this
point whether Forsberg will in fact be needed as a
witness as other individuals may be able to supply
the same information
Plaintiff also argues Forsberg, who was (and still
is) corporate counsel for Signcraft, previously
advised her in her capacity as a former director of
Signcraft on matters substantially related to the
matters at issue in this litigation.
The problem with this argument is that a corporate
attorney represents the corporation, not the
individual directors or officers, see LR 83.51.13(a),
so plaintiff was never one of Forsberg's former
clients under LR 83.51.9 to begin with. Once again,
the need to disqualify Forsberg may become more
apparent at a later stage of the litigation, but for
now plaintiff's motion is denied

Under this rule, a lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its officers and directors,
so long as there is no conflict of interest under LR 83.51.7. See LR 83.51.13(e). However, the Committee
Comments to LR 83.51.13 caution that, when shareholders or members bring a derivative action on
behalf of the corporation and the action involves "serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of
the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's

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relationship with the board." As some of plaintiff's claims are brought derivatively on behalf of Signcraft
and contain allegations of fraud and self-dealing by Harle and Redington, Forsberg may be forced to
withdraw his dual representation of Signcraft and the individual defendants, both of whom are Signcraft
board members, and allow Signcraft to retain independent counsel.

7. 2 ROBERT J. KOPKA, v. KAMENSKY AND RUBENSTEIN, MORTON KESSEL,

BARRY ROSENTHAL, and ALTSCHULER,
MELVOIN AND GLASSER,

Landau, Omahana & Kopka (LOK Illinois) was an Illinois law firm and closely
held corporation.. They were also the sole shareholders of a Michigan corporation
(LOK Michigan) and are the general partners of an Indiana partnership (LOK Indiana).
Kopka refers to all three firms jointly as "LOK." Barry Rosenthal and Morton Kessel
are partners at AMG, an Illinois accounting firm. K&R is an Illinois law firm.On 1999,
Kopka resigned from all three LOK firms.
LOK was responsible for repurchasing Kopka's shares, but the corporation failed to
repurchase these shares. When Kopka's resigned, LOK owed a $5.5 million
promissory note to the American National Bank and Trust of Chicago . Kopka, Landau
and Omahana had executed individual personal guarantees for the note.
On 1999, Kopka formed a new law firm named Kopka, Landau & Pinkus. On the same
year, K&R assisted Landau and Omahana to incorporate a new firm in Illinois. Kopka
alleges that Landau and Omahana, with assistance from K&R, converted assets from
LOK for use at their new firm. He also alleges that LOK retained AMG to "provide tax
and accounting services for the LOK entities," but that AMG assisted Landau and
Omahana in securing financing for their new firm. Kopka maintains that AMG
misrepresented LO's financial position to American National, so that this new firm was
treated as a successor to LOK and was therefore allowed to use LOK's assets. Kopka
alleged that LO collected accounts-receivable funds owed to LOK and did not credit
the funds toward LOK's debt.
American National Bank then filed a suit against LOK, Kopka, Landau, Omahana and
others.
On 2002, Kopka filed an amended complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of retainer, and negligence against defendants for depleting the assets of LOK,
depriving him of payment for his shares upon his resignation and causing American
National to file suit to recover on his personal guaranty for LOK's note.
Kopka asserts that K&R and AMG, as attorneys and accountants for LOK, owed him a
duty of care and fiduciary duty because he was a shareholder in two of the LOK
entities and a general partner of the other entity. Kopka maintains that the existence
of privity or status as an intended third-party beneficiary is not necessary to establish
a duty of care in this case.

ISSUE: W/N the Circuit Court Erred in Finding that

K&R and AMG did not Personally Owe KOPKA a Fiduciary Duty?
The circuit court granted defendants' motions and dismissed Kopka's amended complaint.
The court also affirm the dismissal by the circuit court of Cook County of plaintiff's amended
complaint.

Ruling: The Court finds that Kopka failed to establish that K&R and AMG owed a fiduciary duty
to him personally .The general rule in Illinois is that an attorney owes a duty of care only to his

10 | P a g e
 client and not to third parties. An attorney or an accountant owes a duty to a third party
only where hired by the client specifically for the purpose of benefitting that third party.
In order for a nonclient third party to succeed in a negligence action against an attorney, he
must prove that the primary purpose and intent of the attorney-client relationship itself was to
benefit or influence the third party.. In this case, Kopka acknowledges that he did not allege IN
his amended complaint that he was in privity with either K&R or AMG or that he was an
intended third-party beneficiary or that he individually retained the services K&R and AMG
provided for LOK.
The court therefore declined to impose a fiduciary duty upon an attorney to a corporation's
shareholders, in the absence of privity or status as intended third-party beneficiary.
An attorney can be liable for malpractice only to one to whom the attorney owes a duty. A
fiduciary relationship exists between an attorney and client, and the attorney owes the client the
utmost fidelity, honesty, and good faith. On the other hand, an attorney owes a duty to a
nonclient only when the nonclient is an intended beneficiary of an attorney-client relationship.

Charles B. CANNON et al., Plaintiffs,

v.
U. S. ACOUSTICS CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, et al., Defendants.

Charles B. Cannon, Richard L. Davis, John G. Marsh, and Jeffrey Ross brought this
derivative shareholder's action, as well as personal claims, against the defendants,
U.S. Acoustics Corporation for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934
This is a derivative shareholder Defendants' position is that although there is a
action against four officer- theoretical conflict of interest, no real conflict
directors and two corporations. exists. They argue that the corporations are
The complaint alleges that really inactive participants in the lawsuit, [6] and
certain directors misappropriated that should any conflict arise they will withdraw
monies of the corporation and their representation of the individual defendants
violated federal and state and continue their representation of the
securities laws corporations.[7] Defendants further argue that
When the firm of Baker & their present position is that all the transactions
McKenzie filed their complained of are legal and should be upheld.
appearances on behalf of the Nevertheless, defendants' counsel argue there
corporate and individual is no present conflict and should one arise they
defendants, plaintiffs moved to will withdraw their representation of the
disqualify them from individual defendants and represent only the
representing the corporate corporations
defendants and requested that
the court appoint independent
counsel.[2] Plaintiffs base their
motion on the theory that dual
representation in a shareholder
derivative suit creates a conflict
of interest that the court can
order terminated.
For this reason plaintiffs argue
that Mone, Gareis, and the firm

11 | P a g e
of Baker & McKenzie cannot
represent the alleged
wrongdoers and the ultimate
beneficiaries of any judgment
that might be obtained.

Issue: whether the same counsel can represent both the individual and corporate
defendants in a derivative shareholders suit

Ruling:
The CPR unquestionably prohibits one lawyer from representing multiple clients
when their interests are in conflict. The code goes so far as to say that if the clients'
interests are potentially differing, the preferable course is for the lawyer to refuse
the employment initially. In addition, at least one influential bar association has
issued an opinion stating that dual representation is subject to conflicts of interest
even when the corporation takes a passive role in the litigation. The case law on
the question is not consistent; older cases hold dual representation is not improper,
while more recent decisions hold that it is, both in derivative shareholder suits and
in suits under 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
As previously discussed the court is bound to apply the CPR to lawyers practicing
before it. The code is clear that multiple representation is improper when the client's
interests are adverse.. There are a number of problems with this solution. First, the
complaint on its face establishes a conflict that cannot be ignored despite counsel's
good faith representations. Second, counsel overlooks the hardship on the court
and the parties if in the middle of this litigation new counsel must be obtained
because a conflict arises. Under this procedure, once counsel has examined the
evidence, a decision can be made regarding the role the corporation will play in the
litigation. This decision will be made without the possibility of any influence
emanating from the representation of the individual defendants, and will also
eliminate the potential problem of confidences and secrets reposed by the
individual defendants being used adverse to their interests by former counsel
should new counsel have had to have been selected under the approach
suggested by defense counsel. This solution, concededly, is not without its
disabilities. The corporations' rights to counsel of their choice are infringed and in a
closely held corporation, as here, the financial burden is increased. Nevertheless,
on balance, the corporations must obtain independent counsel.

In accord with the foregoing, plaintiffs' motion to strike the appearance of Gareis,
Mone and the firm of Baker & McKenzie as counsel for defendants Acoustics and
Perlite, is granted, and the answer of these defendants is stricken with leave to new
counsel to answer anew within 20 days.
 
Defendants' motion to disqualify Charles B. Cannon in this cause, and to enjoin him
from disclosing any information received from the individual and corporate
defendants during the course of his representation of defendants is granted and
Charles B. Cannon is dismissed as a party plaintiff.
aken together, these two ethical considerations convincingly establish that in a
derivative suit the better course is for the corporation to be represented by
independent counsel from the outset, even though counsel believes in good faith
that no conflict of interest exists.[10]

12 | P a g e
n addition to the conflict of interest problem there is also the proscription of Canon 4
that a "Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." The
question is whether a law firm might jeopardize the confidences or secrets of one
defendant while representing the other. In the case of individuals this is a serious
problem. In a derivative suit, however, the question is likely to be of less moment
since the secrets *217 and confidences of the corporate client are probably
accessible to the director-officer clients. And while this conflict is less troubling than
the conflict of interest difficulties, see Comment, "Independent Representation for
Corporate Defendants in Derivative Suits," 74 Yale L.J. 524, 526-27 (1965); but
see Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 628-30 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 268
F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959), nevertheless, it is one more reason to examine dual
representation with caution

7.1 BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, v. ATTY.

ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent
Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative complaint 1 with the (IBP) against
respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest
They alleged that respondent is a member of the In his Answer,3 respondent stressed that he entered
ASSA Law and Associates, which was the retained his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board
counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and
Association (PPSTA). Respondents brother, Associates. As a partner in the said law firm, he
Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA only filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency in
Board which approved respondents engagement as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.4 On the other hand,
retained counsel of PPSTA. SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin.
filed an intra-corporate case against its members of Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty.
the Board of Directors before the Securities and Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and
Exchange Commission, and a complaint before the indiscriminately filed the said cases against
Office of the Ombudsman, for unlawful spending members of the PPSTA and its Board.
and the undervalued sale of real property of the Respondent pointed out that his relationship to
PPSTA. Respondent appeared as counsel for the Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that when
PPSTA Board members in the said cases. Despite he entered into the retainer contract with the
being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual
of interest, respondent refused to withdraw his capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law
appearance in the said cases. Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the
PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He
merely assured the Board that the truth will come
out and that the case before the Ombudsman will
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering
that respondents therein are not public officials, but
private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent
alleged that the same was being handled by the law
firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA

13 | P a g e
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner
ISSUE:W/N THE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF REPRESNTING CONFLICTING INTEREST?

RULING:
Lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of
directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing
conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility
Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of
PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly,
respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed suit.
In this case, the court ruled on the possibility for conflict of interest. Although early cases found joint
representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual
representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the
defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation from
the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this
restriction on dual representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation
should be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent. In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is
that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably
gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be
influenced by any interest of the individual corporate officials. 14 The rulings in these cases have
persuasive effect upon us.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.

7.2 FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NESTOR A.

BAMBA, Respondent.
complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao charges respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time
representing her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and
double-dealing
the complainant was the president and , the respondent admits that he
managing director of Allied Investigation represented the complainant in the
Bureau, Inc. (AIB), aforementioned ejectment case and later
she procured the legal services of the represented AIB in the replevin case
respondent not only for the corporate against her. He, however, denies that he
affairs of AIB but also for her personal was the "personal lawyer" of the
case. the respondent acted as her complainant, and avers that he was
counsel of record in an ejectment case made to believe that it was part of his
against Spouses Santiago and Florita function as counsel for AIB to handle
Torroba. even the "personal cases" of its officers.
six months after she resigned as AIB Even assuming that the complainant
president, , the respondent filed on confided to him privileged information
behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin about her legal interests, the ejectment

14 | P a g e
and damages against her for the
purpose of recovering from her the car
of AIB assigned to her as a service
vehicle,without withdrawing as counsel
of record in the ejectment case, which
was then still pending
case and the replevin case are unrelated
cases involving different issues and
parties and, therefore, the privileged
information which might have been
gathered from one case would have no
use in the other.

investigating commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing

conflicting interests
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the investigating commissioner's
report and recommendation, but reduced the penalty from one year to a stern
reprimand.7
The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule
1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case
on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending
ejectment case. We do not sustain respondent's theory that since the ejectment
case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues,
parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of
opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of
interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent
may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued
representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully
disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent
of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest
intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition
inoperative.16 Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They have the
right to decline such employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.17 Although there are instances where lawyers cannot
decline representation,18 they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest
between a present client and a prospective one.19
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR

7.3 DIANA D. DE GUZMAN, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, respondent.

Diana De Guzman filed a complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios on the

15 | P a g e
ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03
representing conflicting interests,
Complainant engaged the services of
respondent as counsel in order to form a
corporation, which would engage in hotel and
restaurant business in Olongapo
On 1996, with the assistance of Atty. De Dios,
complainant registered Suzuki Beach Hotel,
Inc. (SBHI) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The corporation required her to
pay her unpaid subscribed shares of stock
amounting to two million two hundred and
thirty five thousand pesos (P2,235,000.00) or
22,350 shares, on or before December 30,
1997.
Complainant received notice of the public
auction sale of her delinquent shares and a
copy of a board resolution dated January 6,
1998 authorizing such sale.4 Complainant
soon learned that her shares had been
acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the
incorporators of SBHI. The sale ousted
complainant from the corporation completely.
While respondent rose to be president of the
corporation, complainant lost all her life's
savings invested therein.
Complainant alleged that she relied on the
advice of Atty. de Dios and believed that as
the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would
help her with the management of the
corporation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
Respondent, however, explained that she only
appeared because the property involved
belonged to SBHI. Respondent alleged that
complainant misunderstood the role of
respondent as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach
Hotel, Inc. Respondent manifested that her
appearance as counsel for complainant Diana
de Guzman was to protect the rights and
interest of SBHI since the latter was the real
owner of the land in controversy.
Respondent claims that there was no attorney-
client relationship between her and
complainant
Respondent further said that the land on which
the resort was established belonged to the
Japanese incorporators, not to complainant.
The relationship of the complainant and the
Japanese investors turned sour because
complainant misappropriated the funds and
property of the corporation. To save the
corporation from bankruptcy, respondent
advised all concerned stockholders that it was
proper to call for the payment of unpaid
subscriptions and subsequent sale of the
delinquent shares. These led to the auction of
the unpaid shares of complainant and hence,
the ouster of complainant from the corporation.

, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution 6 finding that the acts of respondent
were not motivated by ill will as she acted in the best interest of her client, SBHI
ISSUE:
We find merit in the complaint. There are certain facts presented before us that created doubt
on the propriety of the declaration of delinquent shares and subsequent sale of complainant's
entire subscription. Complainant subscribed to 29,800 shares equivalent to two million nine
hundred and eighty thousand pesos (P2,980,000.00). She was the majority stockholder. Out of
the subscribed shares, she paid up seven hundred forty-five thousand pesos (P745,000.00)
during the stage of incorporation.
How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering the amount she had invested in it
is beyond us. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, what happened to her
original shares? This, at least, should have been explained.
Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between her and complainant.
The claim has no merit. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She
appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant.
There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Indeed, the
board of directors now included respondent as the president, Ramon del Rosario as secretary,
Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes Rodriguez as treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director.7 The

16 | P a g e
 present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent.
Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.8
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.10
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission
and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The
lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension,
disbarment,11 or other disciplinary action. 12 The acts of respondent Atty. de Dios are clearly in
violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent. Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios remiss in her sworn duty to
her client, and to the bar. The Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6)
months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will be dealt with more severely.

8. limitation /restrictions of government lawyers in the practice of law

8.1 JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.

Mr. Jovito S. Olazo filed a disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Dante O. Tinga for violating Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

In 1990, complainant OLAZO filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in the
Municipality of Taguig.
The said land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated
and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476 (1986) and Proclamation No. 172
(1987).
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands. The Committee on Awards was headed by
the Director of Lands and the respondent RETIRED JUSTICE TINGA was one of the Committee
members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the
respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02 (Code of

Respondent denied the allegations and asserted
Professional Responsibility) that:
Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the
The complainant OLAZO claimed: that RET. subject land and he later conveyed these rights
JUSTICE TINGA abused his position as to Joseph Rodriguez Such transfer to Joseph
Congressman and as a member of the Committee Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary
on Awards when he unduly interfered with the of the DENR.  In its decision, the DENR found
complainant’s sales application because of his Joseph Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his
personal interest over the subject land. that application over the subject land was given due
respondent Tinga exerted undue pressure and course, and such decision is now final and
influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the

17 | P a g e
Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s President, by the Court of Appeals and by the
sales application and claim the subject land for Supreme Court.
himself.

that respondent Tinga brokered the transfer of

rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew
of the respondent’s deceased wife.  As a result of
respondent Tinga’s abuse of his official functions,
the complainant’s sales application was denied.
The conveyance of rights to Joseph Rodriguez
and his sales application were subsequently
given due course by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03 The

second charge involves another parcel of land
within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant
alleged: that respondent Tinga persuaded Miguel
Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over
the land to Joseph Rodriguez. As a result land were
transferred to Joseph Rodriguez. that respondent
Tinga wanted the rights over the land transferred
to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of
Hagonoy, Taguig. that respondent Tinga in this
regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated
that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph
Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01 The

complainant alleged that: respondent engaged
in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge
that Joseph Rodriguez was not a qualified
beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119, and
that he is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas.
that the respondent Tinga violated Section 7(b)(2)
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act
No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law, within the one-year prohibition period,
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and
Joseph Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Tinga’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct –

18 | P a g e
first, while he was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and
second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client
before the office he was previously connected with.

RULING: Accountability of a government lawyer in public office Since public office is a public trust, the
ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards
for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their
private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the
discharge of their official functions.
A. First charge—Violation of Rule 6.02 It imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a
government lawyer: A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. The above
provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. The
restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private
interests.
The Court ruled that there was no concrete proof that the respondent Tinga abused his position as a
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales
application was ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the
complainant filed a sales application in 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the
complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR
due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Rodriguez. The records
show that it was only on August 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR
rendered its decision, or after the term of respondent Tinga’s elective public office and membership to
the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997. Second, what appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, stating that respondent Tinga had no interest
in the subject land, and neither he was a contracting party in the transaction. Third, the documents
merely showed that respondent Tinga helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots surveyed, and that
respondent Tinga merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay. These acts do not show that
respondent Tinga have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales
application.
B. Second charge—Violation of Rule 6.03 In this case, the Court correlated Rule 6.03 with R.A. 6713.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. –
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: (2) Engage in the private practice of
their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x These prohibitions shall continue to apply
for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in
the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition
shall likewise apply. As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: 1) the private practice is authorized by
the Constitution or by the law; 2) the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official

19 | P a g e
functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service. To fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Tinga must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of
his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that respondent Tinga previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee
on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged
in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited
only in the preparation of a single document.
C. Third charge—Violation of Rule 1.01 Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The matter of Joseph Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the
Secretary of the DENR in the decision, when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the
subject land. As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of
the President, the Court of Appeals and, finally, the Court. Generally, a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar
only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The Court dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainant’s failure to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting
the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power

OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

A petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of
grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

complainant charged respondent with illegal Respondent subsequently questioned said

exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate in favor of respondent’s relatives.3
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in
favor of respondent.
The case was then forwarded to the
administrative order before this Court through
a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also

20 | P a g e
Department of Justice for review and in a
report, then Secretary of Justice Franklin
Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges
of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody
of documents. He, however, found respondent
guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating
the criminal case for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad
Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a
result, Secretary Drilon recommended
respondent's dismissal from service.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in
toto the conclusion reached by Secretary
Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal
from government service.
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied
However in 2002, the daughter of Omar Ali ,
informed CBD on the death of her father ,the
complainant in this case , and that in interest
of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was
requesting the withdrawal of this case
insisted that respondents6 in that petition
violated the laws on security of tenure and that
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach
of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his
authority to resolve the administrative
complaint against him (herein respondent
respondent maintains that there was nothing
irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821
in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to
him, both law10 and jurisprudence support his
stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on
applications for land registration on the basis
only of the documents presented by the
applicants
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to
do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly
committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the
latter's co-defendants.

The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years.

the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.

whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the
employ of the government

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he
has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the
rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is
of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. 31 Although the general rule is that
a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer
if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.32
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President
and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking
advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of
the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain
his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on
this matter. It reads:

21 | P a g e
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this
nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court.

respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys

JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent..

Julieta Borremeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, with grave misconduct for the
allegedly engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as
Branch Clerk of Court

Complainant alleges that she is the authorized
representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de
Leon, the plaintiff, in a case for ejectment,
Decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
who subsequently filed a motion for execution.
Complainant, however, was surprised to
receive a temporary restraining order signed
by Judge Prudencio Castillo, where Atty.
Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk Court,
enjoining the execution of the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges
that the issuance of the temporary restraining
order was hasty and irregular as she was
never notified of the application for preliminary
injunction
The respondent's version of the incident is that
sometime before the hearing of the motion for
the issuance of the temporary restraining
order, complainant Samonte went to court
"very mad" because of the issuance of the
order stopping the execution of the decision in
the ejectment case. Respondent tried to calm
her down, and assured her that the restraining
order was only temporary and that the
application for preliminary injunction would still
be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court
granted the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The complainant went back to court
"fuming mad" because of the alleged
unreasonableness of the court in issuing the
injunction

22 | P a g e
when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter
City, to inquire about the reason for the complainant returned to his office, and
issuance of the temporary restraining order, informed him that she wanted to change
respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her counsel and that a friend of hers
lawyer for writing the wrong address in the recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod,
complaint for ejectment, and told her that if Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at
she wanted the execution to proceed, she the same time showing a calling card, and
should change her lawyer and retain the law asking if he could handle her case.
office of respondent, at the same time giving Respondent refused as he was not connected
his calling card with the name "Baligod, with the law firm, although he was invited to
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with join but he choose to remain in the judiciary.
office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Complainant returned to court a few days later
Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will and told him that if he cannot convince the
not be able to eject the defendant Dave judge to recall the writ of preliminary
Knope. Complainant told respondent that she injunction, she will file an administrative case
could not decide because she was only against respondent and the judge. The threat
representing her sister. To her consternation, was repeated but the respondent refused to be
the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's
the preliminary injunction as threatened by the Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula
Brach 37 had issued an Order directing the claims that the complainant must have filed
execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 37- this administrative charge because of her
14552. frustration in procuring the ejectment of the
defendant lessee from the premises.
Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on
September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her counsel appeared,
despite due notice
While respondent denied having assumed any position in said office, the fact
remains that his name is included therein which may therefore tend to show that
he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be actually and directly
employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as
partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the
impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation
and private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act. No. 6713. It
is to be noted, however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing
evidence that respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office.
Thus, the violation committed by respondent in having his name
included/retained in the calling card may only be considered as a minor infraction
for which he must also be administratively sanctioned.
and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor
infraction he has committed.

the respondent is guilty of an infraction

The complainant by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation
that it was the respondent who gave her calling card "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera Law Offices" and that he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that
while the respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that
his name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the
hands of the complainant.
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name appears
on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal

23 | P a g e
services. 1 Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or
consent, and the calling card 2 carries his name primarily
. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of
solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and
Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:

WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220,
Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning
that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to
cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of
law

8. 2
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
Ramos filed a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant sought the assistance of According to respondent, the complainant
respondent Atty. Imbang in filing civil and knew that he was in the government service
criminal actions against the spouses Roque from the very start as was assigned as
and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave respondent counsel for the complainant's daughter when
₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's
a receipt for ₱5,000 only.3 Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO)
During the hearing of the case, respondent never allowed her to enter the
of Biñan, Laguna
courtroom and always told her to wait outside.
This happened six With regard to the 5000 receipt, requested
times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent to issue an antedated receipt
respondent charged her ₱350. because one of her daughters asked her to
After six consecutive postponements, the account for the ₱5,000 she had previously
complainant became suspicious. She given the respondent for
personally inquired about the status of her safekeeping.  Because the complainant was a12

cases in the trial courts of Laguna,She was friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated
shocked to learn that respondent never filed July 15, 1992.13
any case against the Jovellanoses and that he
was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO).5
The Commision of Bar Discipline(CBD) ruled that that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01
and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD .
The SC adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
RULING:
Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as

24 | P a g e
this was inconsistent with the office's mission. 29 Respondent violated the prohibition against
accepting legal fees other than his salary.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July
15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship.26 Respondent's admission that he accepted money
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the
complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's
fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a
complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the
complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts
constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.31
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only
to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.321avvphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the
complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation
in favor of the client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for
filing fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a
government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-
NOBLE, Petitioner, v. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, Respondents.

Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong")

widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died
sometime in September 1943. Both died
without legitimate children
Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a
petition,5  for the probate of the last will
and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada
allegedly named as his testamentary
heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja
("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio
opposed the petition on the ground that
Abada left no will when he died in 1940.
Caponong further alleged that the will, if
Abada really executed it, should be
disallowed for the following reasons: (1)
it was not executed and attested as
required by law; (2) it was not intended
as the last will of the testator; and (3) it
was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiariesof Eulogio.

25 | P a g e
is the son Alipio is the son of Eulogio. she maintains that the will is not
acknowledged before a notary public She
cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of
the Old Civil Code,.
the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and
allowed probate now RTC-Kabankalan.
the Court of Appeals also affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan. The
appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to probate the
will of Abada.
THE SC affirmed the findings of CA
ISSUE
W/N Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public;13

RULING
No, the will of Abada does requires acknowledgment before a notary public
the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the
execution of any will.23 Therefore, Abada's will does not require acknowledgment
before a notary public.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

HORST FRANZ ELLERT, complainan,

vs.
JUDGE VICTORIO GALAPON JR., Municipal Trial Court, Dulag, Leyte, respondent.

Horst Franz Ellert, filed an affidavit-complaint charging Judge Victorio L. Galapon, Jr. with
grave misconduct, abuse of judicial authority, ignorance of the law, unlawful notarization,
perjury, and false testimony.

This case originated from two (2) cases, namely: DARAB Case and Criminal Case No. 97-07-
CR-161

In DARAB ,Complainant alleged that in the
"Answer"3 filed by Marina Roca and Odeth
Roca with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), the signature of
Judge Galapon, Jr., herein respondent, was
affixed in the jurat.
But, despite the fact that Judge Galapon is not
duly authorized even by the Notarial Law to
sign a document such as the aforementioned
Answer, respondent knowingly, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously subscribed to, and
administered the oaths of Marina Roca and
Odeth Roca by signing the jurat at the bottom
The respondent, in his defense, comments .
that the present complaint is a series of
continuous and relentless harassment cases
filed against him by Horst Franz Ellert
As to the charge he administered the oath in
the Verification portion of the Answer of
respondents Marina Roca and Odeth Roca in
DARAB Case ,respondent judge candidly
admits it. He believes that there was nothing
wrong nor was there any abuse of authority in
administering such oath. There never was any
malice or bad faith attending such act. He
honestly believes that merely administering an

26 | P a g e
of the Verification of the Answer. oath in the jurat is not actionable by any
administrative sanction.

W/N the respondent is guilty of the engaging in unauthorized notarial work?

RULING: The court find respondent guilty of the charge against him, that he engaged in
unauthorized notarial work.
Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may perform their
functions as notaries public ex-officio only in the notarization of documents connected with the
exercise of their official functions. They may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment
of documents which bea the Answer filed with the DARAB that was notarized by respondent
judge is a perfect example of a document which bears no relation to the performance of Judge
Galapon's functions as a judge. Since respondent's actuation of notarizing the aforestated
pleading is not in connection with the exercise of his official duties, consequently, he acted
beyond the scope of his authority as notary public ex-officio.
Circular No. 1-90 clearly provides that it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public in
the municipality or circuit that an MTC and MCTC judge may act as a notary public provided
that, the notarial fees are turned over to the government and a certification is made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or
circuit.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that there was no lawyer or notary public in Dulag,
Leyte.1avvphi1 Therefore, respondent judge's action as a notary public cannot qualify as an
exception to Circular No. 1-90.

WHEREFORE, for unauthorized notarization which constitutes an unlawful practice of law,

respondent Judge Victorio L. Galapon, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court at Dulag, Leyte is hereby
ordered to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

27 | P a g e
MANUEL L. LEE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Respondent.

Complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with

violation of the Notarial Law for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.

complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed
the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of
the witnesses to its execution.

The will was executed and acknowledged

before respondent on June 30, 1965.1  Respondent claimed that the complaint
However, the residence certificate2 of against him contained false allegation,
the testator noted in the He alleged that complainant was "not a
acknowledgment of the will was dated legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and
January 5, 1962.3 Furthermore, the the last will and testament was validly
signature of the testator was not the executed and actually notarized by
same as his signature as donor in a deed respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria
of donation  (containing his purported Nebato, common-law wife of the
4

genuine signature) decedent and corroborated by the joint

Complainant also questioned the affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee,
absence of notation of the residence Sr.9
certificates of the purported witnesses
Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their
signatures had likewise been forged and
merely copied from their respective
voters' affidavits
Additionally, no copy of such purported
will was on file in the archives division of
the Records Management and Archives
Office of the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
The investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent
provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code.
The IBP Board of Governors ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner .The Court also
affirmed the findings of IBP-Governors with modification
ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old
Notarial Law?

RULING:
Yes, the respondent is guilty of violating the laws of Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They
are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him
had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree

28 | P a g e
of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.23 A notary
public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.
By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent
failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the
Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of
the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.17The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay
and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void.18
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy
of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of
the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court
Respondent's failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the
notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
Thus, the photocopy of respondent's notarial register was not admissible as
evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with
the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will
invalid
The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach
of duty.35

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of

professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer's Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old
Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year and his notarial commission REVOKED.Because he has not lived up to the
trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.

29 | P a g e
ATTY. BENIGNO BARTOLOME, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A.
BASILIO, Respondent.

respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of indirect contempt

the Court suspended Basilio from the practice of law for one (1) year, revoked his
incumbent commission as a notary public, and prohibited him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately, after
finding him guilty of violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is further warned that a
repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.5

Basilio, thru his counsel, Atty. Edward L.

Atty. Sotero T. Rambayon (Rambayon)
inquired from the Court about the status
of Basilio's suspension, alleging that the
latter still appeared before Judge
Venancio M. Ovejera of the Municipal
Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac on April 26,
20I6. The letter was subsequently
referred to the OBC for appropriate
action.11
Robea (Robea), claimed to have received
a copy of the Decision on December 2,
20I5,7 hence, his suspension from the
practice of law, as well as the revocation
of his notarial commission and
prohibition from being commissioned as
a notary public should have all
effectively commenced on the same date

the OBC observed that Basilio served his

suspension order from the practice of
law beginning only on July 9, 2016 and Basilio explained that he did not
desisted from his notarial practice on immediately comply with the suspension
December 2, 2015, order because he believed that his
suspension was held in abeyance
pending resolution of his motion for
reconsideration of the Decision

On this score, he maintained that what

was immediately executory was only the
revocation of his notarial commission
and the two (2)-year prohibition of being
commissioned as a notary public.20

(a) whether or not Basilio's suspension should now be lifted, and (b) whether or not
he should be fined for his failure to immediately comply with the order of the Court.

30 | P a g e
The dispositive portion of the Decision explicitly states that the penalties imposed
on Basilio for violation of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility - namely: (a) suspension from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year; (b) revocation of his incumbent
commission as a notary public; and (c) prohibition from being commissioned as a
notary public for two (2) years, were all "effective immediately", viz.:
Basilio's compliance with the order of suspension, as well as all the other penalties,
should have commenced on the day he received the Decision.
Basilio himself admitted that he served his suspension only on July 9, 2016,
proffering that he believed that what was immediately executory was only the
revocation of his notarial commission and the two (2)-year prohibition against being
commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby FINDS respondent Atty. Christopher A.
Basilio GUILTY of indirect contempt

31 | P a g e