1
Novel Health Assessment Techniques for a Modern
Power Distribution System
Robert C. Ivans1∗ , Student-Member, IEEE, Pierce L. Russell1 , Tyler B. Phillips1 , Student-Member, IEEE,
2021 IEEE Symposium on Industrial Electronics & Applications (ISIEA) | 978-1-6654-1591-0/21/$31.00 ©2021 IEEE | DOI: 10.1109/ISIEA51897.2021.9509983
Vivek K. Singh1 , Member, IEEE, Timothy R. McJunkin1 , Senior Member, IEEE, and Craig G. Rieger1 , Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—Distribution systems are large and complex systems
that grow over time. When contingencies occur dispatchers, en-
gineers, and executives need to know the answer to the question,
“How bad is it?”, in order to make timely and meaningful
decisions. Therefore, a scalable method to add context to system
conditions is needed. In this paper we present novel deviation-
based techniques which enable scaled bus voltage and line power
measurement deviations to quickly assess local and global health,
and lend context to the severity of contingencies. The proposed
techniques are demonstrated using simulations of line-to-line,
line-to-ground, and three-phases-to-ground fault conditions on
an IEEE 33-bus distribution model.
Index Terms—distribution system, heath metrics, line faults,
voltage stability.
I. I NTRODUCTION
T HE ability to assess the heath of a power system
facilitates an enhanced security focused environment
and promotes a more robust, health-centric system [1], [2].
Complex power distribution systems rely heavily on system
security and the system’s ability to maintain integrity during
contingent events, such contingencies could cause unforeseen
consequences to the economic and safe operation of the power
system [3], [4]. The security of a power system can be defined
as its capability to withstand disturbances in the face of these
events as well as its ability to remain operable to its customers
without interruption [5]–[9]. Due to the complex and expan-
sive nature of distribution systems, scalable system health
assessment becomes a necessary tool to assist dispatchers,
engineers, and executives, in making decisions relative to the
overall health of the system. Consequently, we present our
novel approach to health assessment of a power distribution
system using the IEEE 33-bus distribution model.
Traditional health assessment, which is based on voltage
security and/or frequency stability, provides a deeper insight
into the operational health of a system and provides indications
of anomalous activity [10]. Voltage security is defined as
the system’s capability to maintain system’s voltage within
acceptable limits during system stress, physical disturbances,
and cyber-attacks [11]–[15]. Similarly, frequency stability is
defined as a system’s ability to maintain a stable and syn-
chronous frequency environment between generators amid
environmental and external disturbances [16], [17]. While
1 Idaho National Laboratory: {Robert.Ivans, Tyler.Phillips, VivekKu-
mar.Singh, Timothy.McJunkin, Craig.Rieger}@inl.gov
∗ Corresponding author.
Manuscript received December 28, 2020
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these metrics provide insightful information to system health,
the authors of [18] determined that the system voltage profile,
load, loss, and source power depend heavily on the load
model that is used when considering the distribution system
and consequently, show that the incorporation of a voltage
dependent load model is essential. In addition, the 33-bus
system we will be using for testing features a single generator,
invalidating the use of frequency stability analysis for our
purposes.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to health as-
sessment of the distribution system. Local health assessment
indicates the health of an individual aggregated system re-
source (ASR). In this work we define an ASR as a set of
assets that have common objectives. Note that the ASR can
be used for many scales. For example, the components of
a microgrid, a set of customers in a neighborhood on the
same distribution feeders, the whole distribution system, a
transmission operator area, a balancing authority, etc., could
all be ASRs. Global system health is analyzed over the
collection of ASRs. This approach provides system operators
with an enhanced health analysis awareness to facilitate a
stronger security cognizance. By utilizing line power and bus
voltages as health assessment metrics, we avoid complications
with traditional heath assessment techniques such as voltage
security and frequency stability. Testing of this methodology
was conducted on a model of the IEEE 33-bus distribution
system which provides a robust testing environment for the
proposed health assessment techniques.
In order to provide meaningful local and global health
assessment, system operating points are sampled at set time
intervals to indicate system status. These operating points are
measurements of the bus voltages and line powers of the
system. Operating points are then transformed by assessment
functions into deviations used to calculate local and global
system health. In addition, to assist in the awareness of
critical anomalies, importance factors are utilized to emphasize
significant busses, lines, or ASRs to highlight to a human or
machine, critical faults in the system should they arise.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section II is a literature
review, Section III discusses our implementation of the IEEE
33-bus model, Section IV explains the proposed novel heath
assessment technique, and Section V presents our simulation
results demonstrating the proposed techniques using an IEEE
33-bus distribution model. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.

II. L ITERATURE R EVIEW
Modern life depends on access to dependable and inexpen-
sive power. As such, numerous metrics to describe aspects
of the systems that facilitate power generation, transmission,
and distribution have been devised. The state of electric power
infrastructure in response to abnormal events, such as voltage
and frequency disturbances, have been quantified using metrics
including voltage stability (sometimes referred to as voltage
security), power security, and frequency stability.
Ajjarapu defines voltage stability as, “... the ability of a
power system to maintain steady voltages at all the buses in
the system after being subjected to a disturbance from a given
initial operating condition [19].” This definition implies that
voltage stability is a quantity that is conditioned upon a power
system’s capacity to handle a future transient. Health is distinct
from voltage stability in that it expresses nothing about future
transients.
Morison et al. describes power security as, “... the degree
of risk in a power system’s ability to survive imminent
disturbances (contingencies) without interruption to customer
service [20].” This definition implies that power security is
dependent on statistical analysis or probability calculation to
assess risk. Health is distinct from power security in that risk
is not taken into consideration.
Frequency stability is defined as a system’s ability to main-
tain a stable and synchronous frequency environment between
generators amid environmental and external disturbances [16],
[17]. Health is distinct from frequency stability in that fre-
quency is not used to calculate health.
Health, as used in this work, is a metric that quantifies the
systems deviation from normal or optimal line power flow and
bus voltage values. Health is an intuitive alternative assessment
metric that executives can use to make informed decisions,
which tries to answer the question ”How bad is it?”
In [21] Ioanes, and Tı̂rnovan calculated another metric that
they called health to describe the state of a power grid using
a long short-term-memory (LSTM) learning machine. This
work is different in at least four ways. First, in this work no
training is required because a learning machine is not used.
Second, in this work importance factors, denoted by p, allow
executives to emphasize the effects of deviations on important
buses, lines, and ASRs through scaling. Third, in this work
health is calcualted as floating point number between 0.0
and 1.0, whereas in [21] health is presented as one of three
words–”OK”, ”Vigilance”, or ”Critical”. Fourth, in this work
health is calculated from the difference between normal values
and measured values as opposed to [21] where the difference
between an LSTM’s predicted value and the measured value
is used. The stated differences between this work and [21] are
summarized in Table I.
III. E XPERIMENTAL C ASE S TUDY
Fig. 1 presents the modified IEEE 33-bus distributed system
that is utilized for the experimental case study. This system is
modeled as a radial distribution system that consists of thirty-
three buses and thirty-two connecting lines. All of the buses
have a voltage level of 12.66 kV. The network is fed by a
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2
TABLE I
A C OMPARISON OF T HIS W ORK AND I OANES, & T ÎRNOVAN [21]
This work Ioanes, & Tı̂rnovan
Training required? No Yes
Scaling through p? Yes No
Health expressed as: A floating point ”OK”, ”Vigilance”,
number between or ”Critical”
0.0 and 1.0
Health calculated from: Expected value LSTM prediction
deviation deviation
Distribution line
Tieline (N.O.)
Circuit breaker
Tie-line recloser
Fault indicator
Bus fault
Fig. 1. Modified IEEE 33-bus distributed system separated into six ASRs.
synchronous generator and the total connected active power
load and the reactive power load demands are 3.715 MW
and 2.300 Mvar. The modeled distribution system is divided
into six ASRs. An ASR is a logically grouped set of assets
which have a common goal. In distribution systems this often
results in ASRs, which are grouped based on proximity such
as a microgrid [22]. Further, this system includes 5 tie-lines,
initially open, to support interconnection between multiple
ASRs and it allows system reconfiguration under different
scenarios, such as line faults.
The system is modeled in ARTEMiS/SSN (eMEGASIM)
in the MATLAB-Simulink environment and simulated in the
electromagnetic transient (EMT) domain at a smaller time
step of 50 microseconds. It also includes circuit breakers, tie-
line reclosers, fault indicators, and 400-kW grid-connected PV
array on bus 25. In this work, the PV array is operating as
a constant power factor mode or P-Q control mode where
the power factor is set to unity and it is only supplying the
active power of 400 kW. In this work, we present simulations
of three types of faults, including single-line-to-ground fault
(L-G), line-to-line fault (L-L), and 3-phases-to-ground fault
(LLL-G) in three ASRs, also shown in Fig. 1. All these faults
are simulated at 1 second for 5 cycles and necessary data-
sets are generated for computing health assessment metrics,
as discussed in the next section.
IV. H EALTH A SSESSMENT T ECHNIQUES
The local and global health assessment techniques described
in this section provide a fast indication of where deviations in
the system are located, and thus increase situational awareness,
by taking raw data and converting it into meaningful informa-
tion to be used by a human and/or a machine. To achieve this,
operating points consisting of bus voltages and line powers
are compared with optimum values and then transformed

by assessment functions, α() and β(), into deviations which
are then scaled and summed into local and global health
assessments.
A. System operating points
System operating points are measurements of system pa-
rameters taken at particular moments in time that represent
the status of the system. In this work, the operating points are
measures of the bus voltages and line powers of the system and
are sampled at regular intervals. Each operating point in the
collection is unfiltered data, which when passed through as-
sessment functions, create deviation-based information about
the state of the system. n sequential samples are used to assess
local and global health.
B. The α() function
α() is an assessment function that takes a root-mean-square
(RMS) voltage as an input and returns a unit-less value
between -100 and 100. The input value, ∆V , is the difference
between an actual voltage, from one of the phases of a bus, and
the optimal voltage of that bus. The purpose of the α function
is to quantify the extent of the deviation of a bus voltage. It
produces both negative and positive values so that the output
may be used to distinguish between under- and over-voltage
conditions in other state assessment computations. Each bus in
the IEEE 33-bus model has its own α function characterized by
upper and lower bus voltage limits and slopes. The stereotype
for the α functions implemented in this work is described by
−100 : ∆V ≤ −100

 m1 + θ1
−100


 1
 m (∆V − θ 1 ) : m1 + θ 1 < ∆V ≤ θ1
α(∆V ) = 0 : θ1 < ∆V ≤ θ2
 m2 (∆V − θ2 ) : θ2 < ∆V ≤ 100 m2 + θ2


 PASR1

100 100
: ∆V > m2 + θ2 ,
(1)
where θ1 and θ2 are thresholds relating to the lower and upper
voltage limits, respectively, of the applicable bus, and m1 and
m2 are the lower and upper slopes, respectively, which control
the rate of conversion from deviation to output beyond the
thresholds. Domain values between the thresholds represents
a deadband where normal operation is expected to take place.
Other functions, non-linear functions for example, may be
used depending on the desired performance of the assessment,
provided that they adhere to the requirement of producing
maximum and minimum values of 100 and -100, respectively.
C. The β() function
β() is an assessment function that takes a power as an input
and returns a unit-less value between 0 and 100. The input
value, ∆P , is the difference between an actual line power and
the usual power of that line. The purpose of the β function is
to quantify the extent of the deviation of a line power. Each
phase of each line in the IEEE 33-bus model has its own β
function characterized by an upper power limit. The stereotype
for the β functions implemented in this work is described by

 0 : ∆P ≤ θ
m(∆P − θ) : θ < ∆P ≤ 100
β(∆P ) = m +θ (2)
100 : ∆P > 100
m + θ,

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3
where θ is the threshold for the applicable line power upper
limit, and m is the slope which controls the rate of conversion
from deviation to output beyond the threshold. Domain values
lesser than the threshold represents the region where normal
operation is expected to take place. As the power limits placed
on lines are not directional, meaning one excess watt flowing
out of a line has the same effect on the line as one excess
watt flowing into a line, it is necessary to correct for direction
of power prior to using the β function. Other functions, non-
linear functions for example, may be used depending on the
desired performance of the assessment, provided that they
adhere to the requirement of producing a maximum value of
100.
D. Local health assessment
Local heath assessment provides a quick indication of
voltage or power deviation for a particular ASR. This is
accomplished by scaling and summing the deviations in the
bus voltages and line power flows indicated by the assessment
functions for a given ASR. For example, λ1 , which represents
the local health of ASR1, is given by
Pn PASR1
i=1 j=Bus pαj |αj (∆Vji )|
PASR1 
+ j=Line pβj βj (∆Pji )
λ1 = 1 − P  (3)
ASR1 PASR1
100n j=Bus pαj + j=Line pβj
where n is the number of sampled operating points taken into
consideration, pαj and pβj are importance factors for the jth
bus and line, respectively, in ASR1, ∆Vji is the difference
between the bus voltage and the optimal bus voltage for the
ith sample of the jth bus, and ∆Pji is the difference between
the line power and the optimal line power for the ith sample
of the jth bus. The notation j=Bus means to sum over all
PASR1
of the buses in ASR1; similarly, the notation j=Line means
to sum over all of the lines connected to ASR1. λ can vary
between 0.0 and 1.0, where 1.0 indicates that all voltages and
line power flows are in their deadbands. A λ not equal to
1.0 indicates that a deviation exists in an ASR and should be
investigated. Local health assessments for each of the other
ASRs are conducted a manner similar to (3).
E. Global health assessment
The purpose of the global health assessment is to provide
a single point of reference with which to determine if all bus
voltages and line power flows are in their deadbands. This is
indicated by a global health assessment value (γ) of 1.0. The
global health assessment is given by
Pλ
pλi λi
γ = Pi=1λ
, (4)
i=1 pλi
where pλi is the importance factor for the ith local health
assessmentPλand λi is the ith local health assessment. The
notation i=1 means to sum over all of the local health
assessments. The scaling performed by the importance factors
help to convey the severity or impact of deviations in different
ASRs. A γ not equal to 1.0 indicates that a deviation exists
in one of the ASRs which should be investigated.
 4

1.0
10 1.0
10

Global Health Local Health Bus 33 (kV)

Bus 6 (kV)
0 0
0.8 Phase A
Phase B 0.8 Phase A
Phase B
Phase C Phase C
10 10
1 1
0.6 0.6
Global Health Local Health

ASR1 ASR1
ASR2 ASR2
ASR3 ASR3
ASR4 ASR4
ASR5 ASR5
0.4 ASR6 0.4 ASR6
0 0
1 1
0.2 0.2

Global Global
0.00 0.00
0.00.950 0.975
0.2 1.000 0.41.025 1.050
0.6 1.0750.8 1.100 1.0 0.00.950 0.975
0.2 1.000 0.41.025 1.050
0.6 1.0750.8 1.100 1.0
Time (s) Time (s)

Fig. 2. The voltage of Bus 6, local healths for ASRs 1 through 6, and the Fig. 4. The voltage of Bus 33, local health assessments for ASRs 1 through
global health for a short between phase A and ground in Bus 6. 6, and the global health assessment for a 3-phase short to ground in Bus 33.

1.0
10 TABLE II
Global Health Local Health Bus 18 (kV)

M INIMUM H EALTH A SSESSMENTS FOR T HREE FAULTS

0
0.8 Phase A
Phase B
10 Phase C Fault 11 Fault 22 Fault 33
1 ASR1 0.681 0.775 0.681
0.6 ASR1
ASR2 ASR2 0.786 0.509 0.639
ASR3
ASR4
ASR5 ASR3 0.769 0.311 0.640
0.4 ASR6
0 ASR4 1.00 1.00 0.944
1
ASR5 0.777 0.923 0.923
0.2
ASR6 0.742 0.983 0.059
Global Global 0.794 0.750 0.652
0.00
0.00.950 0.975
0.2 1.000 0.41.025 1.050
0.6 1.0750.8 1.100 1.0 1 Fault 1 is the short between Phase A and ground in Bus 6
Time (s) depicted in Fig. 2.
2 Fault 2 is the short between Phase A and Phase B in Bus 18

Fig. 3. The voltage of Bus 18, local health assessments for ASRs 1 through depicted in Fig. 3.
3 Fault 3 is the three phase short to ground in Bus 33 depicted
6, and the global health assessment for a short between phases A and B in
Bus 18. in Fig. 4.

V. S IMULATION AND R ESULTS These are indications that those ASRs should be investigated
Simulations demonstrating the health assessment techniques first. As scaling is not performed in these simulations (All of
described in Section III were conducted in Python version the importance factors are 1.0.), the impact of the deviations
3.8.2 using fault data from the model described in Section on local and global healths are considered to be uniform. If
II. To achieve this, all local and global importance factors the bus voltage deviations were scaled by importance factors,
were set to 1.0, and then operating points produced by the then the impact of the deviations would also be scaled and
IEEE 33-bus distribution model described in Section II were reflect the relative detriment of each deviation. Next, the
evaluated under various fault conditions including phase-to- global healths lower due to the collective changes in the local
phase, phase-to-ground, and three-phase-to-ground faults. healths. After a short time, the transient effects of the faults
finish propagating through the system, which cause the local
A. Fault condition response and global healths to stabilize at non-optimal values. Finally,
after five cycles automatic corrective action is taken and the
For the simulations in this section, all importance factors
system normalizes, which is reflected in rising local and global
have been set equal to 1.0. Fig. 2, Fig. 3, and Fig. 4 depict
healths. Table II summarizes the minimum values of each of
the local and global health assessments for a L-G, L-L, and
the local healths and the minimum value of the global health
LLL-G faults, respectively. Fig. 2 depicts a phase-A-to-ground
for the faults described in this section.
fault in Bus 6, Fig. 3 depicts a phase-A-to-B short in Bus 18,
and Fig. 4 depicts a 3-phase-short-to-ground in Bus 33. In all
three figures, the fault occurs at 1 s, and causes deviations B. Importance factors
throughout the system which are reflected in the local and Importance factors scale the deviations of the local health
global health assessments. At first, when the fault occurs, the assessments, and the impact of each local health assessment
local healths are reduced due to the induced deviations in on the the global health assessment. The scaling performed
the system. Notice how in each figure the ASR where the by the local health importance factors, pα and pβ , emphasizes
faulty bus is located is affected most severely; In Fig. 2 Bus the deviations that occur in critical busses or lines, while the
6 is is affected most severely, in Fig. 3 Bus 18 is affected scaling performed by the global health importance factors,
most severely, and in Fig. 4 Bus 33 is affected most severely. pλ , emphasizes deviations in more important ASRs over less

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TABLE III
T HE E FFECTS OF I MPORTANCE FACTORS ON λ3 AND γ FOR
A P HASE -A- TO -B S HORT IN B US 18
pα18 1 pβ17−18 2 pλ3 Minimum λ3 Minimum γ
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.311 0.750
2.0 1.0 1.0 0.235 0.738
1.0 2.0 1.0 0.273 0.744
1.0 1.0 2.0 0.311 0.688
1 For each phase of Bus 18.
2 For the line connecting Bus 17 and Bus 18
important ASRs. Thus, the role of importance factors is to add
emphasis to deviations–enabling the local and global health
assessments to be more informative to a human or machine.
Any deviation expressed by the α and β functions will be
reflected in the local and global health assessments, but not
all deviations have an equal effect on the system; the scaling
helps to convey the importance of a fault in one location versus
another.
As the purpose of importance factors are to add emphasis to
changes in bus voltages, line powers, or local health assess-
ments, any logically consistent method for emphasising the
system’s operational priorities can be used to select importance
factors. Some potential selection methods include assigning all
importance factors to 1.0, assigning ranked values based on the
the loads on each line and bus, and performing a contingency
analysis to assign values. For simulations presented in the pre-
ceding section, the busses, lines, and ASRs in the simulation
all have importance factors of 1.0–meaning that they are all
equally important.
To demonstrate the effects of bus, line, and ASR importance
factors on the minimum values of λ3 and γ, four assessments
of the phase-A-to-B short depicted in Fig. 3 were conducted.
Table III summarizes the results of these assessments. The first
row represents the case where all importance factors are equal
to 1.0. This row can be used to compare the results of the
assessments where the importance factors were varied. The
second row represents the case where all importance factors
except for pα18 , the importance factor for Bus 18, are equal
to 1.0. As the fault occurred in Bus 18, the phase A and phase
B voltages experience the largest deviations, and the effects
of these deviations are emphasized by the pα18 of 2.0. This
results in a lower local health assessment for ASR3 and, in
turn, a lower global health than the case where pα18 is 1.0
in the first row. The third row represents the case where all
importance factors except for pβ17−18 , which is the importance
factor for the line connecting Bus 17 to Bus 18, are equal to
1.0. As the fault occurred in Bus 18, the line connecting Bus
17 and Bus 18 experiences a large power flow deviation, and
the effects of this deviation are emphasized by the pβ17−18
of 2.0. This results in a lower local health assessment for
ASR3 and, in turn, a lower global health than the case where
pβ17−18 is 1.0 in the first row. The fourth row represents the
case where all importance factors except for pλ3 are equal to
1.0. As no importance factors for the power flows or voltages
were changed, the local health of ASR3, λ3 , was unchanged.
However, the deviation due to the fault occurring in ASR3, are
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5
emphasized by the pλ3 of 2.0. This results in an unchanged
local health assessment, and a lower global health assessment,
when compared to the case where pβ17−18 is 1.0 in the first
row.
VI. C ONCLUSION
In conclusion, a modified IEEE 33-bus distribution system
model, which was representative of a modern distribution
system, was presented in Section II. This was used to produce
operating points which were evaluated using novel techniques
for assessing local and global health which were presented
in Section III. These techniques, which produced a tiered
indication of local and global health, were then demonstrated
in Section IV. These rapid and centralized health assessments
can be used by humans or machines to quickly ascertain
adverse conditions which require investigation or immediate
action.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This material is based upon work supported by the US
Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Re-
newable Energy (EERE) under the Solar Energy Technology
Office Award Number DE-0008775. Effort performed through
Department of Energy under U.S. DOE Idaho Operations
Office Contract DE-AC07-05ID14517, as part of the Resilient
Control and Instrumentation Systems (ReCIS) program of
Idaho National Laboratory.
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