Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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Security, Oil, and Internal Politics: The Causes of

the Russo-Chechen Conflicts

OMAR ASHOUR

To cite this article: OMAR ASHOUR (2004) Security, Oil, and Internal Politics: The Causes
of the Russo-Chechen Conflicts, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27:2, 127-143, DOI:
10.1080/10576100490275102

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100490275102

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27:127–143, 2004
Copyright  Taylor & Francis Inc.
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100490275102

Security, Oil, and Internal Politics:

The Causes of the Russo–Chechen Conflicts

OMAR ASHOUR
Department of Political Science
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

This article aims to answer the following research question: What were the factors
behind the Kremlin’s decision to invade the Chechen Republic in 1994 and 1999?
To answer this question, the author focuses on three independent variables: the
strategic variable related to Russian national security; the economic variable cen-
tered on the Caspian Oil pipeline passing through Chechen territories; and Russian
domestic politics. The author argues that a combination of these three factors, de-
spite their varying importance, led to the outbreak of the Russo–Chechen wars in
the 1990s.

On 1 November 1991, the Chechen President, Dzohar Dudayev, declared the Chechen
Republic independent. The Kremlin responded to the unilateral declaration by sending
the Russian army into the North Caucasian Republic on 11 December 1994. That inva-
sion ignited a full-scale Russo–Chechen war—the first in the 1990s. A peace agreement
was reached on 31 August 1996. Aslan Maskhadov, the then Chechen prime minister,
and Alexander Lebed, the secretary of the Russian National Security Council, signed the
Khsavyurt1 peace agreement, establishing a cease-fire and postponing the negotiations
regarding Russian recognition of Chechnya’s independence to 2001. Another treaty2 was
signed in May 1997 by Maskhadov, who became the president-elect of Chechnya in
1997, and Russian president Boris Yeltsin.3 Both parties agreed to a permanent cessation
of hostilities.
In August 1999, a group of Daghestani Salafi4 Islamists led by Bagautdin Mago-
medov were planning to “liberate” Daghestan by military force. Skirmishes were re-
ported between this group and the Russian MVD5 and OMON6 units. Shamil Basayev,
the ex–Prime Minister of neighboring Chechnya, a well-known warlord and one of the
“independence heroes,” intervened with his private militia on the side of the Daghestanis.
In addition to his declared goal of helping fellow-Caucasians against Russian “imperial-
ism,” Basayev had his own agenda. He was aiming to incite a rebellion in Daghestan,
topple the pro-Russian authorities, and “unite” Daghestan with Chechnya (Politikovskaya,
2001, XIX). Nevertheless, the attempt failed, mainly due to the lack of popular support.
Several thousand Daghestani volunteers joined the Russian forces to repel Basayev and
his “liberating” militia as well as to suppress the local secessionists. Although the elected

Received 5 July 2003; accepted 28 August 2003.

Address correspondence to Omar Ashour, Department of Political Science, McGill University,
855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7, Canada. E-mail: omar.ashour1@mail.mcgill.ca

127
128 O. Ashour

Chechen government headed by Maskhadov condemned Basayev’s incursions and was

willing to cooperate with the Russian government, the Kremlin had other plans. On 29
September 1999, the Russian troops crossed the Chechen–Daghestani borders and an-
other episode of the Russo–Chechen wars began.

Research Question
This article aims to answer the following research question: What were the factors be-
hind the Kremlin’s decision to invade the Chechen Republic in 1994 and 1999? To
answer that question, the author focuses on three independent variables:
1. The strategic variable that is related to Russian national security and geostrategic
concerns.
2. The economic variable centered on the Baku-Novorossiysk oil-pipeline, which
transfers the Caspian oil to the Black Sea through the Chechen territories, and
3. Russian domestic politics and internal power struggles.
Because “it is a rare war that has only one cause” (Taylor, 1995, 7), the author argues that
an amalgam of these three factors (strategic, economic, and internal political), despite their
varying importance, led to the outbreak of the Russo-Chechen wars in the 1990s.

Theoretical Approaches
The Strategic Factor
National security can be defined as “the confidence held by the great majority of the
nation’s people that the nation has the military capability and effective policy to prevent
its adversaries from effectively using force in preventing the nation’s pursuit of its national
interests” (Sarkesian, 1995, 4). The aim of a national security policy is to protect and
preserve the national interests or “the demands that are ascribed to the nation rather than
individuals, sub-national groups, or mankind as a whole” (Wolfers, 1962, 147). This can
be achieved through a national strategy, which “refers to the methods and means used to
achieve these purposes” (Sarkesian, 1995, 28); the main national interest or purpose being
“the survival of homeland and of the political order” of the state (Sarkesian, 1995, 240).
It will be empirically demonstrated in this article that the Kremlin’s point of view in
1994 and 1999 was that Chechen de facto independence destabilized the Russian Fed-
eration and threatened the pro-Russian authorities in the autonomous North Caucasian
republics. This perception was bolstered after the incursions of 1999 in Daghestan. The
Kremlin’s view is supported by geostrategic facts. Located in the center of the North
Caucasus, an independent Chechnya would divide the Russian region and might provide
logistical aid to other secessionist movements, as happened in the Daghestani case. An
independent Chechnya might also become a source of inspiration that contributes to the
moral force of activists and militants seeking “independence.” To sum up, Chechnya’s
secession from the Russian Federation poses a threat to Russian national security. That
potential threat and the geopolitical location of Chechnya constituted the basic strategic
motive for fighting Chechen secessionists in 1994 and 1999.

The Economic Factor

In general, several theories examining the causes of conflict cite economic factors as an
important cause of political instability and war.7 In the Chechen case, that factor is
 Security, Oil, and Internal Politics 129

related to the presence of large reserves of oil and natural gas in and around the Caspian
Sea.8 According to some estimates, the amount of potential oil reserves is up to 200
billion barrels, “or about 10% of the earth’s potential oil reserves”9 (Nelan and Macleod,
1998, 40), ranking “third in the world after the Middle East” and the Russian Federation
(Brownback, 1997, 6). In addition to the oil reserves, gas reserves are estimated to be
7.89 trillion cubic meters—“as much as those of the US and Mexico combined” (Forsythe,
1996, 6). The oil pipeline exporting the Caspian oil to Western markets passes through
Chechnya. Therefore, the Russian government could lose the trafficking and licensing
fees as well as the strategic leverage provided by controlling the route if the Chechens
succeeded in breaking away.

The Domestic Political Factor

Despite the presence of strategic and economic reasons for the Russian military cam-
paign in Chechnya, the author argues that Russian domestic politics played a major role
in shaping the Kremlin’s policy toward Chechnya in the 1990s. Since the collapse of the
U.S.S.R., Russia has been torn apart by internal political disputes involving several ac-
tors. These actors adopted conflicting political programs as well as clashing ideologies.
Seeking political gains, several Russian contenders deliberately involved the Chechen
question in Russia’s internal power struggle.
In general, a leader may “legitimize” his or her regime and its policies through a
mobilization strategy that highlights the threat of local political opponents to both their
rule and their personal survival (Hagan, 1995, 122). Such a strategy can be achieved by
several methods. One of these methods is the appeal to “nationalism and imperial themes.”
Another method involves the manipulation of foreign policy to divert public attention
away from domestic problems (severe economic problems or political corruption for
example) (Hagan, 1995, 129; Huth and Lust-Okar, 1998, 62). The leader can attempt to
influence public opinion through a “foreign policy [that aims] to get [the] people to ‘rally’
round the flag” (Russet and Graham, 1989, 242; Lian and Oneal, 1993, 281). According
to Russet and Graham, presidents are more inclined to launch wars when the state faces
an economic crisis (inflation and unemployment) or on the eve of presidential elections
(Russet and Graham, 1989, 244). In this way, Russia’s domestic dynamics may partially
explain changes in the Kremlin’s policy toward Chechnya. As discussed later, both Yeltsin’s
victory in the 1996 presidential elections against Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov
and Putin’s sudden rise to power in 2000 could not have materialized except through a
“mobilization” strategy based on the Kremlin’s military campaign in Chechnya.
To conclude, a leader of a powerful state might be inclined to launch a “small
victorious war” (Gall and De Waal, 1997, 137) against a weak state if faced with serious
domestic problems whether economic, political, corruption-related, or when he is about
to lose power. The success of the mobilization strategy is easier when the weak state
may cause strategic or economic threats to the powerful state.

A Three-Centuries-Long War: The Historical

Background of the Russo–Chechen Conflict
The following provides a historical background of the Russo–Chechen conflict because
the contemporary situation in the North Caucasus is a by-product of centuries-old inter-
actions between the North Caucasians, in general, the Chechens, in particular, and the
Russians.
130 O. Ashour

The Tsarist Era

The Russian presence in the North Caucasus and particularly in Chechnya can be divided
into three different time sequences: the period of Tsarist expansion, the period of the
Soviets, and the post-Soviet period. During the Tsarist expansion there were three impor-
tant eras in which Chechnya was greatly affected. The first era was that of Ivan the
Terrible (1547–1584), who started the process of Russian territorial expansion in the North
Caucasus. The second era was that of Peter the Great (1696–1725) who was the first to
conquer the Southern Caucasus (Derbent in Daghestan and Baku in Azerbaijan) and the
third era was that of Catherine the Great (Yekaterina II; 1762–1796) who noted the
strategic importance of the region by announcing that the Caucasus is Russia’s gate to the
world (Bino, 2000). The North Caucasians reacted to the Russian advance with a well-
organized armed resistance that fluctuated between success and failure. Beginning in 1783
with Sheikh Mansur’s multi-ethnic Caucasian resistance and continuing until the establish-
ment of the North Caucasian state in 1918, the North Caucasus hardly enjoyed a peaceful
period during the Tsarist era. This era witnessed the 30-year-long Caucasian wars (1829–
1859) involving the legendary Shamil, leader of the North Caucasian resistance in the
nineteenth century. Shamil sought Ottoman and British support but failed to secure it until
his surrender in 1859, when Karl Marx called him a “great democrat” and “exhorted the
oppressed peoples of Europe to emulate his courage” (Gall and De Waal, 1997, 49).

The Soviet Era

Defeating the North Caucasian state by 1921, the Bolsheviks had set up a “Soviet Mountain
Republic embracing the Chechens, Ingush, Ossetes, Karachai and Balkars” (Lieven, 1998,
318). By 1924, when the Bolsheviks militarily controlled the North Caucasus and when
most of the resistance leaders fled to the mountains, the Mountain Republic was divided
into several small republics. In 1936, the Chechen–Ingush region was given the status of
an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, but not a “full union [republic]
. . . like Azerbaijan and Georgia”10 (Lieven, 1998, 319).
After the German withdrawal from the North Caucasus during World War II, the
Politburo (the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.), decided
to liquidate Chechen-Ingushetia.11 On 23 February 1944, the entire Chechen–Ingush population
was deported to North Kazakhstan and other destinations, together with the rest of the
“punished peoples” of the North Caucasus, Middle Volga, and Crimea. The alleged
reason behind the deportations was collaboration with the Germans. Indeed, several hundred
North Caucasians were recruited by the Dagestani, Osman Gube, to fight on the Nazi
side. However, the fact recorded in Soviet military files that “30,000 Chechens and
Ingush served at the front and several were made Heroes of the Soviet Union” (Gall and
De Waal, 1997, 62) did not dissuade Stalin from deporting 425,000 Chechens and 95,000
Ingush. Vindicated in 1957 during Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization” process, the Chechens
revolted and were suppressed. Military trials for political activists were held in “1958,
1963, and 1964 in Makhash Kala [Daghestan], Grozny [Chechnya], and Nazran [Ingushetia]”
(Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1985, 30). Night curfews were often enforced in Chechnya
and Ingushetia during the 1970s and early 1980s (Qamha, 2000, 170).

The Post-Soviet Era

In 1988, the late General Dzohar Dudayev was in charge of the Soviet division of long-
range strategic bombers (equipped to carry nuclear warheads) in Estonia. He was influ-
 Security, Oil, and Internal Politics 131

enced by the Estonian/Baltic model of nationalism and after the Vilnius massacre of
January 1991,12 Dudayev declared that he would not permit Soviet soldiers or planes to
enter Estonia (Gall and De Waal, 1997, 89) and, later, raised the Estonian national flag
over the Soviet military base. By doing that, “he had burnt his boats with the Soviet
military” (Gall and De Waal, 1997, 89). When he returned to Chechnya, Dudayev headed
the Chechen National Congress (CNC), an organization established in 1989 calling for the
independence of the Chechen–Ingush republic. On 6 September, a group of demonstrators
supporting Dudayev’s independence policies stormed the pro-communist Supreme Soviet
and closed it down. One week later, the “Chechen-Ingush parliament held its last session,
and the power was transferred to a provisional council,” which set presidential and par-
liamentary elections for 19 and 27 October, respectively (Panico, 1995, 6). Dudayev “was
able rapidly to mobilize support to his nationalist platform and was elected president” over
several candidates (Ormrod, 1998, 104). Well known for his secessionist policies and
history, the Kremlin issued a warrant for Dudayev’s arrest and sent troops to Chechnya,
which were confronted by the Chechen National Guards (Ormrod, 1998, 104). The Duma
ordered the paratroopers to retreat from Chechnya and considered the action of sending
military troops to a Russian Federal Republic unconstitutional.
From 1991 to 1994, Chechnya was left quasi-independent. A major reason behind this
was that the Russian contenders were occupied with internal power struggles; first be-
tween Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and hard-line communists and then later in 1993 between
Yeltsin and the Russian parliament headed by his former ally and deputy, the Chechen
Ruslan Khasballatov.13 In other words, the struggle for power in Moscow likely postponed
the full-scale Russo–Chechen war for three years. In these three years (1991–1994),
Yeltsin was pursuing an “accommodation” strategy (Hagan, 1995, 128) toward Chechnya.
In 1991, “when Yeltsin still needed to oust Gorbachev, he told the republics of the Russian
federation: ‘Take as much sovereignty as you can handle!’ Then when he came to power
the screws were tightened, and any attempt of independent behavior was met with the
rattle of automatic weapons fire” (Buzglin and Kolganov, 1995). In 1993, “Yeltsin was too
busy . . . with his confrontation with the rebellious parliament to let himself be seduced
into one more adventure” (the invasion of Chechnya; Arutiunov, 1999).
In 1994, Yeltsin described the regime in Chechnya as an “illegitimate dictatorial
rule exercised by Dudayev and his bandit formations.” That was an official declaration
of the Kremlin’s support to those opposing Dudayev (Galaev, 1999). The militant oppo-
sition was defeated by the pro-Dudayev National Guard. The capture of 120 Russian
soldiers among the opposition forces14 confirmed the Kremlin’s involvement in the op-
eration. The “covert attempt failed and was soon made public” and “this humiliating
failure was probably the spark that ignited the large-scale Russian military involvement”
(Finch, 1996, 2; 12). On 11 December 1994, “Russian forces entered Chechnya in a
three-prong attack, from north, west, and south” (Geibel, 1995).

The Strategic Factor in the Russo–Chechen Conflict

The War of 1994–1996
The strategic factor in the 1994 war had two dimensions: national security and geopoli-
tics. The geopolitical position is an independent variable determining whether the inde-
pendence of an autonomous small entity may or may not pose a threat to the national
security of the comprising state. In this case, an independent Chechnya, with such an
important geopolitical location, was considered by the decision makers in Moscow to be
threatening to the Russian territorial integrity and national interests.
132 O. Ashour

The Russian leadership considered the situation in the North Caucasus to be a threat
to Russian national security for several reasons. The first was that it might encourage
ethno-nationalists in other autonomous republics in the Russian Federation to follow the
same path initiated by Chechen secessionists. Tataristan’s escalating demands for inde-
pendence forced the Kremlin to sign a unique bilateral treaty with the autonomous re-
public on 15 February 1994, avoiding a potential Chechen-like war with ethnic Tatars.
The sympathy of the Daghestanis and the Ingush for the Chechens manifested itself in
1994, in the form of repeated attacks on Russian armored vehicles and military caravans
that crossed the two autonomous republics, Daghestan and Ingushetia, on their way
to Chechnya.15 These attacks threatened to exacerbate the situation, causing a broader
Russo-Caucasian war rather than a Russo–Chechen one. In 1994, Dudayev not only
included non-Chechen Caucasian volunteers from Eastern and Western Caucasus into
his “International Brigade” (Abd Al-Rahman, 1999, 144), but he also called for a gen-
eral insurrection against “Russian imperialism” (Dunlop, 1998b, 140). Had his calls been
answered,16 the Russian government could have faced a possibility of losing the oil-rich
and strategically-important south.
The second reason for the Kremlin to consider Chechen independence threatening
to Russian national security was the geopolitical location of the Northern Caucasus in
general and of Chechnya in particular. The Caucasus lies between the Black Sea and the
oil-rich Caspian Sea.17 It is the shortest route that could transfer the Caspian oil to the
Russian Black Sea ports and, later, to Western markets. The Caucasus is also a main
link between Europe and Asia. Historically, Russian military analysts have understood
its strategic importance. General R. Fadeev, a prominent Russian military theorist, stated
that “Russian domination of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, . . . , is a vital issue for
the entire southern half of Russia . . . which can guard its southern basins only from the
Caucasian isthmus” (Belkin, 1998).
As for Chechnya, it lies in the center of the North Caucasus and it borders one
independent state (Georgia) and three North Caucasian autonomous republics (Daghestan,
Ingushetia, and North Ossetia). Chechnya is connected to all these republics through a
network of roads as well as through the Caucasian mountains. These geographical facts
have two implications. The first is that an independent Chechnya, ruled by an anti-
Russian government, could act as a “block” on the strategic Caucasian network of roads.
The second implication is the possibility of the spread of fundamentalist, ethno-national-
ist, and secessionist ideologies, as well as arms and volunteers from Chechnya to the
neighboring autonomous republics or from these republics to Chechnya. It will be logis-
tically difficult or even impossible for the Russian government to prevent that flow.
A third strategic reason for the Kremlin to fight Chechen secessionists in 1994 was
the possibility of undermining the Russian influence in the Transcaucasian republics.18
Present-day Russia had been reduced from a superpower to a regional one. Russian
troops are present in Armenia and Georgia, and enjoy certain facilities in oil-rich Azerbaijan.19
Because Chechnya is located on a strategic crossroad20 leading to the southern Caucasus
(Transcaucasia), Russia could secure a strategic safe-passage to an important, oil-rich
part of its “near abroad” through militarily controlling the breakaway republic. In other
words, “Freedom for Chechnya could break Moscow’s hold on the entire strategic Caucasus
region” (Margolis, 2000).
A fourth strategic concern for the Russians is the potential alliance of an indepen-
dent Chechnya with Turkey, a historical rival of Russia in the Caucasus. Given the
political, cultural, and geostrategic ties, an independent Chechnya would probably prefer
to join the U.S.-backed Turkish-Georgian-Azeri axis rather than the Russian-Iranian-
 Security, Oil, and Internal Politics 133

Armenian 21 one. For this probability, one Russian official stated that “if the Turks could
set up an embassy in Grozny, they would turn Chechnya into a ‘base behind our lines’”
(Lieven, 1998, 85). Similar statements from Russian officials made Pavel Felgenhauer,
the defense and security analyst of the daily Sevodnia newspaper, conclude that “for the
majority of Russia’s ruling elite, an independent Chechnya is absolutely unacceptable
because it contradicts Russia’s long-term military, geopolitical and even economic inter-
ests [and therefore] the Russian government wanted Dudayev and his dream of an inde-
pendent Chechnya dead” (Felgenhauer, 1999).
Finally, the decision to invade Chechnya was taken after the failure of negotiations
between the Kremlin and the Clinton administration during the Conference of the Orga-
nization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1993. The former socialist
states of Eastern Europe were leaning toward the West rather than Moscow (Abd Al-
Rhaman, 1999, 154) and the possibility of NATO’s reaching Russia’s borders was not
acceptable to the Russians in the early 1990s. It was clear that Russia had lost its buffer
zones in Eastern Europe and it was strategically unacceptable for the Kremlin to lose
more zones in the south simultaneously, especially after both “Georgia and Azerbaijan
. . . signed up to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) [slipping] that final tightening
of the Russian noose” (Erickson, 1999, 260).

The War of 1999–Present

The general strategic causes of the 1999 war were similar to the ones that led to the
1994 war. The aims of the Russians in 1999 were:

1. to discourage any other autonomous republic from following the “Chechen path”;
2. to exert full military control on geostrategically important Chechnya;
3. to prevent historical rivals, especially the Turks, from acquiring significant in-
fluence in the North Caucasus through an independent Chechnya; and
4. to stop any potential logistical, political, military, or moral support granted by
Chechen private militias to any secessionist movement within the Russian Fed-
eration.

Some of these reasons were declared officially in 1999. Russian President, Vladimir
V. Putin, declared in an interview that Chechnya would never be granted independence
because that independence would lead to the loss of the Caucasus.22 Putin claimed that
the Chechen intervention in Daghestan was the beginning of a “major plan” to cut off
the North Caucasus from Russia and then to annex Bashkiria and Tataristan.23 State-
ments by unofficial figures in Chechnya strengthened Putin’s claims. For instance, after
Basayev’s militia entered Daghestan, Zelim Khan Yanderbie, the ex-Chechen provisional
president, said in one interview that the days of the Russians in the Caucasus were few
and would come to an end soon (Al-Mashta, 1999d, 1).
General Anatoliy Kulikov, the former Russian Interior Minister who was the com-
mander-in-chief in the war of 1994–1996, asserted in July 199924 that the presence of “a
state [referring to Chechnya] within the Russian Federation’s borders [which] does not
recognize Russian federal laws . . . does threaten the integrity and security of Russia”
(Kulikov, 1999, 43). According to Kulikov, the Kremlin’s aims included “overcoming
separatists’ trends in the region, strengthening the federation and fortifying Russia’s po-
litical and military-strategic positions in the Caucasus as a whole” (Kulikov, 1999, 43).
Because the strategic target of overcoming separatists contradicted Chechnya’s ultimate
134 O. Ashour

aim of independence, the Russians probably would have invaded Chechnya again before
2001,25 whether the bombings in Moscow26 had occurred or not—such was declared by
Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, in one interview (Hoffman, 2000).
Vladimir Rochaylo, the minister of Interior in 1999, said in another interview that it was
the first time in Russian history that a “group of bandits” was able to control a Federal
Republic, and dared to aim for extending their influence over the most geostrategically
important region in the country (the North Caucasus; Qamha, 2000, 171).
In June 1999, Stepashin, Rochaylo, and Anatoliy Kvashnin (the chief-of-staff) met
in Makhach-Kala, the Daghestani capital. The three officials announced that the situa-
tion was very serious and if the Daghestani sociopolitical problems were not resolved,
Moscow might lose the Caucasian republic (Timoviev, 1999, 11–13). Stepashin stated
that even before Basayev’s intervention in Daghestan, the Russian government was planning
“to cordon off the region” by “taking northern Chechnya all the way to the Terek River”27
(Hoffman, 2000). Basayev confirmed the statement to justify his incursions in 1999. He
stated that Russia was going to invade Chechnya again in the period between 1999 and
2000 to prevent the negotiations of 2001 regarding Chechen independence. Both parties
understood the strategic aims of the other and perceived each other as real threats. That
perception, the ambience of fear, and general distrust were among the reasons for the
outbreak of the 1999 war.

The Economic Factor in the Russo–Chechen Conflict

The War of 1994–1996
The economic dimension of the 1994 war can be reduced to two main factors. The first,
as mentioned before, is the presence of oil in Chechnya and the Caucasus in general.28
The second economic factor is related to the geographical location of Chechnya. Grozny
is still an important economic regional center due to its location on a key pipeline junc-
ture. Moreover, it is an important oil refining center that supplies consumers in the
North Caucasus. In 1991 Grozny’s refineries were processing 16–17 million tons a year
and due to its geographical location, “Grozny was at the center of a pipeline network
that branched out to Kazakhstan and Siberia, Baku and the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk”
(Gall and De Waal, 1997, 127). In the early 1990s, oil and gas from the rich fields of
Tengis, Karachaganak (Kazakhestan), and Baku (Azerbaijan) were being exported to
Europe and the United States through the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black
Sea. The oil pipelines had three branches. The first branch was the Tengiz-Novorossiysk
(Russian port on the Black Sea) pipeline, which crosses the heart of the Russian Fed-
eration, exporting only Kazakhstani oil. The second branch runs from Baku to Tikhorestk
then to Novorossiysk, passing through Chechnya and transfers Azeri oil. This pipeline
is connected to the third branch, which runs across the Caspian from the Turkmen
city of Kraznovodsk to Baku. Therefore, two existing branches of the Novorossiysk
pipeline pass through the Chechen territories carrying Azeri oil and Turkmen natural
gas. Using that route to transfer the Caspian oil will significantly reduce the export costs
because the pipeline already exists and works. The short distance and low costs are the
reasons behind making the route through Chechnya attractive to Russian and interna-
tional investors.
In September 1994, “Azerbaijan signed what was then described as ‘the deal of the
century,’ an $8 billion deal with a broad consortium of American-led oil companies”
(Meier, 1995). Russia made sure to obtain a 10% cut of the deal, but it expected addi-
 Security, Oil, and Internal Politics 135

tional revenues through trafficking and licensing fees if and when the Novorossiysk
route was agreed on. In other words, Russia aims “to maximize the economic benefits
from Azerbaijan’s substantial oil and gas deposits” (Thomas, 1999–2000, 83). This aim
can be accomplished by pressuring the Azeri government to choose the Baku-Novorossiysk
route, which passes through Chechnya, for exporting its oil and gas; as well as to avoid
the American/Turkish-backed Ceyhan-Baku route to the Mediterranean, or the Iranian
route to the Persian Gulf.
If the Russians had succeeded in “persuading” the Azeri government, they would
still have had two options regarding Chechnya. The first option was to crush the Chechen
secessionist movement and exert full military control over Chechnya. Failing that, the
Russian government would have had to share the licensing and trafficking fees with the
Chechens. The second option was to build another pipeline branch (200 km long) in
Northern Daghestan (through Kotochobay) and Stavropol region (through Neftikomsk
and Budennovsk), avoiding the Chechen territories29 (Ra’if, 1996, 272). The costs of
building and guarding such a pipeline would be much less than the material and human
costs of the war. For this pipeline, Daghestan is much more important than Chechnya as
the territories of the former cannot be avoided to reach Novorossiysk.

The War of 1999–Present

In 1999, however, the situation was different. If the Russians wanted to exclude Chechnya
through a pipeline in North Daghestan, there were questions about whether or not the
Chechen militias would tolerate such “exclusion.” Shamil Basayev was accused of enter-
ing Daghestan when the Russians were implementing a plan to build an oil pipeline that
bypassed the Chechen territories.30 Trying to justify the incursions and their economic
aims, Emir Khattab, an ethnic Arab and a radical field-commander in Chechnya, issued
a statement accusing the international community of ignoring the Russian blockade im-
posed on Chechnya and its economic consequences, the blockade of Grozny’s airport, and
the breach of the treaty signed in 1997. On the Russian side, the government concluded
that the Chechens were trying to “wrest Daghestan away from Russia by force to gain
access to the Caspian Sea oil resources and establish control over the region’s key trans-
portation nodes and communication lines . . . [as well as to] . . . bring recognition of
Chechnya’s independence by states interested in developing economic relations with the
North Caucasus” (Kulikov, 1999, 46–47). “Even if recognition fails, at the very least
large-scale foreign investments would flow into the region [Daghestan]” (Kulikov, 1999,
47) which is the fourth poorest republic in the Russian Federation (Nicholson, 1999, 26).
Because Daghestan has almost two thirds of Russia’s Caspian Sea shelf, a union or a
confederation with Chechnya “could lead the . . . [two republics] to become a leading
Caspian power” (Rotar, 1998, 2). The potential loser from the Chechen “geo-economic
plans” is Russia, whose role would be reduced from the owner state to a powerful
neighbor.
To conclude, the North Caucasus “has largely lost its prominence as a fuel and
energy base of . . . [Russia], but [not] as a transport corridor for oil that will come out
of the Caspian in the future. This area will grow in importance” (Ruban, 1997, 4).
Because Chechnya could have been by-passed as a route to export the Caspian oil to the
West, it can be concluded that the Russian invasion of 1994 was not primarily aiming
for economic gains. Although the Russo–Chechen war of 1994 had an economic dimen-
sion, that dimension was of a secondary importance. Russian economic interests could
have been attained and secured through methods less costly than war.
136 O. Ashour

The Domestic Political Factor

The Russian domestic political factor was the only variable that changed prior to each of
the changes in Russian policies toward Chechnya, whether in 1991, 1994, 1996, or in
1999. The geostrategic and economic implications of an independent Chechnya remained
unchanged; however, the Kremlin’s policy toward the breakaway republic shifted from
ignoring the republic in 1991 to fighting it in 1994, then to political negotiations in
1996 and later to a support for a peace treaty granting Chechnya de facto independence
in 1997 and finally to fighting again in 1999. Political developments in Russia likely
accounted, in addition to strategic and economic factors, for the variations in the Kremlin’s
policies regarding Chechnya.
In 1994, the Kremlin’s aim was to mobilize the Russian public against a common
historical enemy and to enhance the domestic popularity of the president as well as his
chances for reelection. In December 1993, the outcome of the parliamentary elections
was not in Yeltsin’s favor. Suffering from a severe economic crisis and corrupt political
elite, a significant percentage of Russian voters chose Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his so-
called Liberal Democratic Party of Russia31 as well as voted for the Communist party.
Zhirinovsky’s party “gained almost a quarter of the vote” (Lieven, 1998, 87), and this
seemed to indicate the emergence of a militant nationalism current in Russia. Likewise,
the Communist party led by Gennady Zyuganov attained a relative success in these
elections. Such success annoyed Yeltsin as well as the United States and its allies in
Western Europe.
To get people to “rally round the flag” (Russet and Graham, 1989, 242), Yeltsin
pursued a nationalist policy, similar to the one he pursued in the early 1990s to under-
mine Gorbachev and his set of policies. Chechnya was a suitable field for the imple-
mentation of such a policy, which aimed to increase ethnic Russians’ support for the
president. Since Dudayev had been elected in October 1991, thousands of ethnic Rus-
sians left the Chechen Republic (Ormrod, 1998, 105). Moreover, Dudayev had removed
Russian representatives from key positions in the local military and security agencies
(Finch, 1996, 2). The emigration of Russians provided Yeltsin with a reason to interfere
in Chechnya to ensure their (ethnic Russians’) safety. This action garnered domestic
support because Yeltsin was portrayed as the protector of the Russian people, an image
that he had exploited during the presidential elections of 16 June 1996. In these elec-
tions, Yeltsin faced both Gennady Zyuganov, the popular Communist leader who attrib-
uted the economic and corruption crises to the abandonment of Communism, and “the
neo-fascist demagogue Vladimir Zhirinovsky” (Dunlop, 1998a, 64), whose party had a
relatively strong presence in the parliament.
Within the Kremlin, it was widely believed that the “President needs a small victo-
rious war, like the USA had in Haiti” (Lieven, 1998, 87). That statement was made by
Oleg Lobov, the secretary of the Security Council and a key figure in the “security
clique” around Yeltsin to Sergei Yushenkov, who then headed the Duma Defense
Committee (Lieven, 1998, 87; Tishkov, 1997, 218). Several Russian think tanks “ex-
pected the war to be popular and to stimulate Russian national feelings in support of the
President” (Lieven, 1998, 87). In Yegor Gaider’s32 words: “I have said more than once
that the ‘Zhirinovsky effect’33 played a big part because of his rhetoric, his ‘last march
to the south,’ and so on. It seemed that a victorious war would be very helpful” (Gall
and De Waal, 1997, 165). In early 1994, it seemed that a small war against the Chechens
“would go down well with the electorate . . . and Yeltsin would enter the lists for the
1996 presidential elections as a tough rule” (Gall and De Waal, 1997, 165), a powerful
 Security, Oil, and Internal Politics 137

candidate and, most important, a national hero. When the war against the Chechens
became increasingly unpopular in 1996 primarily due to heavy Russian causalities,
all presidential candidates promised peace during their electoral cam-paigns, including
Boris Yeltsin (Lieven, 1998, 140–141). The latter started negotiations and signed a cease-
fire agreement with the provisional Chechen President Zelim Khan Yanderbei in May
1996, only one-and-a-half months before election day (16 June 1996; Lieven, 1998,
140–141).
On 13 May 1999 (4 months and 17 days before the campaign against Chechnya
began), the Russian Duma decided to discuss five charges against the Russian President
in three parliamentary sessions and then vote for initiating an impeachment process.
These charges were: (1) demolishing the Soviet Union; (2) suspending the constitution
and bombarding the White House (building of the Russian Parliament) in 1993; (3)
violating the constitution by launching a war and sending the army against a Russian
Federal Republic (Chechnya) in 1994; (4) weakening the army and the defensive capa-
bilities of the state; and (5) committing genocide against the Russian people through
pursuing changes that led to the collapse of the economy and to looting the state’s
resources (Al-Mashata, 1999b, 8).
Despite the failure of the attempted impeachment process, several deputies were
prepared to pursue Yeltsin legally when he retired in 2000 (Timoviev, 2000, 34). Yeltsin
needed a successor who could grant him legal immunity. Neither the “fired” Primakov34
nor the “Communist” Zyuganov (both were presidential candidates in 2000 contending
with Putin) would be interested in performing such a task. In an early decree, however,
Vladimir Putin provided the necessary legal protections for Yeltsin, including a lifetime
legal immunity (Timoviev, 2000, 34). That is why Yeltsin’s early resignation and the
appointment of Putin were perceived by analysts as a political deal (Timoviev, 2000,
35). According to the Constitution, if the Russian president resigns and a provisional
president is appointed then the period of electoral campaign must be reduced from six to
three months only, a time which is not enough for a wide-scale electoral mobilization
(Timoviev, 2000, 34). Therefore, Yeltsin’s “early retirement” move was interpreted as a
strike against Primakov, who needed more time to mobilize more supporters and/or
coordinate with the Communists led by Zyuganov.
The most important factor that led Putin to the Kremlin was the war launched against
Chechnya after a series of bombings in Moscow during August and September 1999
(almost 2 months before Yeltsin’s early resignation and 5 months before the presidential
elections) that killed about 300 civilians. The denials of Basayev35 and the accusations
of Alexi Galtin36 were supported by an accident in the city of Rayazan. On 23 Septem-
ber 1999 a bomb was discovered in an apartment block in Rayazan. The FSB37 an-
nounced that it was “undoubtedly connected with the earlier bomb blasts” (Leitzinger,
2000). Later, it was discovered that FSB agents had planted the bomb. The FSB “admit-
ted that it installed the bomb for practice in order to test the alertness of the inhabitants.
The local authority, however, wondered why there was a bomb at all in the sack and
why nobody had been informed of any kind of practice” (Leitzinger, 2000). Lt. Col.
Sergei Kabashov, chief of the local police precinct, asserted that he was never informed
that there was a “test” and that the danger was real. The local branch of the FSB did not
have any information either (Reynolds, 2000, 1). Maura Reynolds, the Los Angeles Times
correspondent, described the feelings of some Russians including the 250 residents of
the building: “at a minimum they believe that the government is covering up something.
At a maximum, they fear that the government might itself have played a role in the
bombing” (Reynolds, 2000, 1). As early as summer 1998, the Muscovite researcher,
138 O. Ashour

Andrie Piontkovsky, predicted that “the next Chechen war would be preceded by explo-
sions in Moscow,” whereas the Moskovskaya Pravda predicted in July 1999 a series of
bombings before the presidential elections (Leitzinger, 2000).
To conclude, the only one benefiting from the bombings and the new invasion of
Chechnya “was the [former] chief of the FSB and the . . . Prime Minster Vladimir Putin,
whose popularity as a successor of Yeltsin was suddenly raised from nothing to top
results” (Leitzinger, 2000). “There is an undeniable fact that the bombings led to the
war and the war fed the rise of Vladimir V. Putin” (Reynolds, 2000, 1); a rise that was
needed to “protect the oligarchs and corrupt officials left behind by Boris Yeltsin” and
to ensure the latter’s immunity against prosecution (Heuvel, 2000, 3).

Conclusion
In both the 1994 and 1999 wars Russian domestic politics was a major, if not the domi-
nant, factor leading to the decision to invade Chechnya. In addition, strategic and eco-
nomic factors had a significant impact and should not be dismissed in any analysis of
the causes of the two Russo–Chechen wars. The domestic political factor manifested
itself as a power struggle in Moscow that was accompanied by military confrontations
in the North Caucasus to divert the public’s attention from the domestic situation and/or
to portray the leader as a national hero, rallying ethnic Russians around him.
In her testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in November
1999, Elena Bonner, the chairman of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation, summarized the
domestic political cause of the war by stating: “the first war was needed in order to
reelect President Yeltsin [and the second war] . . . was needed to raise the standing in
the polls of . . . Vladimir Putin, whom President Yeltsin publicly endorsed as his chosen
successor,” and that “for the presidential administration, for government ministers, and
for Duma politicians, the war [was] needed to resuscitate patriotic slogans and divert the
public’s attention from the corruption38 and financial scandals to the enemy—in this
situation, the Chechens” (Bonner, 1999).
The strategic dimension of the conflict is related to the belief of the Kremlin, under
Yeltsin and Putin, that an independent Chechnya inevitably threatens Russian national
security and may lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation (domino effect). The
potential security threats included the emulation of the Chechen struggle by other ethno-
nationalist activists and the expansion of Turkish influence in the North Caucasus through
an independent Chechnya. Russia lost “its dominating influence in the Caspian Sea region
. . . as new independent governments began to orient themselves not to Russia but to
neighboring states” like Turkey and Iran, in addition to the United States (Ruban, 1997,
3). Therefore, Russia cannot afford to lose more zones of influence, especially in what the
Kremlin considers Russian lands. The military invasion of Chechnya meant, however, that
the gazavat39 will be transformed “from a threat into a reality” (Dunlop, 1998b, 188).
Economically, the geopolitical location of Chechnya and the economic importance
of the Caucasus due to the Caspian oil made both sides, the Chechens and the Russians,
eager to spread their influence in the region. For the Russians, Chechnya could have
been avoided in 1994 as a route for the Caspian oil pipelines. Therefore, the economic
factor cannot have had significantly determined the decision to launch the 1994 war
against Chechnya. However, the economics contributed to the outbreak of the war in
1999 due to the Chechen’s need for an economic partner (other than Russia) to enhance
their independence and sovereignty. Basayev and Khattab wanted that partner to be
“liberated” Daghestan.
 Security, Oil, and Internal Politics 139

In conclusion, strategic, economic, and internal political factors constituted a frame-

work for understanding and explaining the causes of the Russo–Chechen wars of the
1990s. Any attempt at resolving this conflict should take these three factors into consid-
eration. Addressing the root causes of the conflict, rather than issuing ironic claims
about the “normalcy” of the situation in Chechnya, can enhance the slim chances of
peace in the war-torn republic.

Notes
1. Khsavyurt is a city in the Federal Republic of Daghestan near the eastern borders of
Chechnya.
2. “Treaty of Peace and Principles of the Relations between the Russian Federation and the
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.”
3. This was the first Russo–Chechen treaty to be signed by Yeltsin. Before that, treaties
with the Chechens were signed by the Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomirdin, the Secre-
tary of the National Security Council, Alexander Lebed, or his successor Ivan Rebkin.
4. The Salafi Islamist current is characterized by extreme conservatism, adherence to a
Sunni-based puritanical interpretation of Islam and allegiance to the international Salafi move-
ment. Saudi “Wahabism” is considered to be one example of a Salafi interpretation.
5. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del—MVD) that combines
some of the functions of the American FBI, DEA, and Defense Department’s National Guard. “It
is a key actor for the professional implementation of President Yeltsin’s decrees” (Thomas, 1994,
509).
6. Special Forces Police Detachment (Otryad militsii osobogo naznacheniya—OMON) com-
monly known as the Black Berets.
7. See Lionel Robins, Economic Causes of War (New York: Fertig, 1968); Arthur Salter et
al., The Causes of War: Economic, Industrial, Racial, Religious, Scientific, and Political (Lon-
don: Macmillan and Co., 1932); Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller,
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997).
8. Littoral states are the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and
Iran.
9. Other estimates dismiss the figure as speculative. Such estimates give credit only to
proven oil reserves which range from 15 to 30 billion barrels or “less than 3% of the world’s
proven oil reserves” (Jaffe and Manning, 1998–99, 114). However, even with low-end estimates,
“there is no question that the Caspian Basin’s oil reserves are significant” (Jaffe and Manning,
1998–99, 114).
10. A union republic had, theoretically, the legal right to secede from the U.S.S.R., whereas
an autonomous republic did not have that right unless the union republic comprising it seceded
from the Soviet Union.
11. The Soviet Republic comprising the territories of today’s Federal Republic of Ingushetia
and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
12. Soviet troops killed many Lithuanian demonstrators in Vilnius in January 1991.
13. Khasballatov wanted the new Russian Draft Constitution to be ratified by the Congress
of Peoples’ Deputies (De Nevers, 1994, 8; Abd Al-Rahman, 1999, 111). Yeltsin refused and the
dispute intensified when Yeltsin, supported by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, ordered the bom-
bardment of the Russian parliament on 4 October 1993. According to official sources that bom-
bardment caused the death of 49 persons (Abd Al-Rahman, 1999, 110).
14. Identified as soldiers from the Kantemir Division of the Russian army.
15. These attacks forced the Russians to change their military plans in 1994. Rather than
attacking Chechnya from the east (Daghestan), west (Ingushetia), and north (Stavropol region
inhabited by a majority of ethnic Russians and Cossacks), the Russian forces were ordered to
retreat from Daghestan and Ingushetia and to attack only from the north (Stavropol) to avoid any
further clashes that might exacerbate the situation and turn it into a new “Caucasian war.”
140 O. Ashour

16. Dudayev and his nationalist policies were not only popular in the Caucasus in 1994, but
also in other autonomous republics like Tataristan, Bashkeria, and in the Baltic republics. Some
North Caucasian republics resisted the Russian troops (Ingushetia and Daghestan in 1994) and
were subsequently bombed by the Russian air force during the war. Despite that, the situation did
not escalate into a full-scale confrontation between the North Caucasian peoples and the Russian
army.
17. The economic factor of the war shall be discussed in detail later.
18. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
19. A radar station for monitoring the Middle East.
20. Known during the Tsarist era as the “imperial highway.”
21. Especially given the Iranian support to the Russian government in its campaign against
Chechnya (Yanderbie, 2000).
22. “Putin: La Istiqlal Li Al-Shishan Li’anhu Yufqiduna Al-Quqaz (Putin: There Will Be
No Independence for Chechnya Because It Will Make Us Lose the Caucasus),” AlHayat, 15
March 1999, 7.
23. Ibid., 7. Bashkiria and Tataristan are two autonomous Republics in the Volga region.
They are inhabited by an indigenous majority of ethnic Tatars. Ethno-national sentiments are
popular in these two republics.
24. Before the beginning of the 1999 war.
25. The year which, according to the treaty of 1997, Chechens and Russians were going to
negotiate Chechen independence on the basis of international law and the right of self determination.
26. From 14 August to 13 September 1999, the Russian Federation witnessed six terrorist
bombings targeting residential buildings and killing approximately 300 civilians. Three of these
bombings were in Moscow and another three took place in Daghestan. The Kremlin and its
media networks blamed the Chechens for the bombings and related the bombings to Basayev’s
incursions in Daghestan. However, Basayev denied “using such methods” (Al-Taweel, 1999, 8).
His denial was supported by the former Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who declared in an
interview with the German newspaper Der Spiegel that “any clarity of who did the bomb blasts
was never got” (Leitzinger, 2000). In January 2000, The Independent published an “interview”
with Alexei Galtin,, a Russian intelligence officer, in which he accused a faction in the FSB
(formerly KGB) of planning and executing the bombings to provide a pretext for launching
another war against Chechnya (Lanskoy, 2000).
27. The Terek River divides the north of Chechnya (approximately one third of its lands)
and its south (approximately two thirds of Chechnya).
28. In a report issued by the Russian Security Council, it was estimated that by 2005 “Rus-
sian dependence on CIS energy and raw materials resources will increase, making Russian access
to these reserves and markets a ‘vital interest’” (Erickson, 1999, 262) for the economic future of
Russia.
29. In 1997, Russian negotiators threatened to build such a branch to avoid the Chechen
route.
30. Yanderbei, Selim Khan. “An Interview with Selim Khan Yanderbei: The Former Presi-
dent of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” AlSharia’a Wa AlHayat, AlJazeera Satellite Channel,
Al Doha, 5 July 2000.
31. A neo-fascist party.
32. The Russian Prime Minister in 1992 and the head of the “Liberal Democratic Choice of
Russia” Party.
33. Gaider is referring to Zhirinovsky’s rhetoric which reflected extreme nationalism and ignited
a “nationalist race” in which several Russian politicians contended to prove that they are more na-
tionalist and patriotic than others. To prove his nationalism, Zhirinovsky threatened to “finally march
south”(Chechnya) and to exterminate “enemies of Russia” over there once and for all.
34. From March 1998 to August 1999, Yeltsin fired five Prime Ministers and appointed six.
The fired Prime Ministers were: Victor Chernomirdin (fired twice!), Sergei Keryenko, Yevginy
Primakov and Sergei Stepashin.
 Security, Oil, and Internal Politics 141

35. Basayev denied being behind the bombings.

36. See note 23.
37. Formerly the KGB.
38. Before the 1999 invasion of Chechnya and the 2000 presidential elections, Russian do-
mestic political tensions were exacerbated by two interrelated corruption scandals involving Yeltsin,
his daughters, Yelena and Tatiana, and Leonid Dyachechenko, Tatiana’s husband. The first scan-
dal was publicly exposed when the Swiss police stormed the headquarters of the Swiss construc-
tion company “Mabetex” in Lugano. The head of the company, Behgjet Pacolli, was charged
with paying “$10 million in bribes in an exchange for $300 million in contracts to renovate the
Kremlin and other official buildings in Moscow” (Powel et. al, 1999, 50). The Swiss police
found “records documenting credit-cards purchases in the names of Boris Yeltsin, his daughter
and close advisor, Tatiana Dyachenko and her older sister Yelena Okulova” (Powel et. all, 1999,
50). The other corruption scandal involved Yeltsin’s son-in-law again. “Dyachenko’s name sur-
faced twice in a testimony during a House hearing on the Russian money laundering at the Bank
of New York” (Caryl et al., 1999, 48). The U.S. authorities were investigating the transfer of
billions of dollars in suspicious transactions through the Cayman Island branch in which Dyachenko
had two accounts containing $2.7 million (Powel et al., 2000, 43). The two accounts were frozen
and the Russian Federal officers accused a handful of companies, tied to Dyachenko, of “falsify-
ing documents, rerouting shipments of oil products through Ukraine and evading up to $40 mil-
lion in Russian export taxes annually” (Caryl et al., 1999, 48). Later, the investigation was blocked
at the orders of “high-level” Russian officials (Caryl et al., 1999, 48).
39. An Arabic term incorporated into the Chechen culture. The nearest English term to
gazavat is “raid,” mainly against non-Muslims.

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